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overruled,

.lacks

;

;

8 L.

r. Ilacklcy's Heirs (15 L. P.,
vacated on review. 19 L. P., 18.
Maughan, George W. (1 P. P., 25); over-

et al.

487)

;

ruled, 7 P. P., 94.

4 IS.

I).,

Mather

Jones v. Kennett (G L.
14 L. P., 429.

D.,

088)

;

overruled,

80)

;

overruled,

Met alia r. Acker (29 L. P.. 203)
vacated
on review, 30 L. P.. 277.
McPonogh School Fund (11 P. P., 378)
overruled, 30 L. P.. 010.
;

;

Kackman, Peter

L.

(1

D.,

McFadden

10 L. P., 404.

Kemper

v. St.

Paul and Pacific R. R. Co. (2

overruled, 18 L. D., 101.
King v. Pastern Oregon Land Co. (23 L. D.,
modified, 30 L. I)., 19.
579)
Riser v. Keech (7 L. P., 25)
overruled, 23
L. D., 119.
Knight, Albert B., ct al. (30 L. D., 227)
overruled, 31 L. P., 04.
C. L. L., 805)

;

ct al.

Mountain View Mining

v.

and Milling

vaCo. (26 P. P., 530)
cated on review. 27 L. P.. 358.
McGee. Edward P. (17 P. P., 285)
over;

;

ruled. 29 P. P., 166.

:

McGrann, Owen

P.

(5

P.,

10)

overruled,

;

;

24 P.

P., 502.

McKernan

Bailey (10 L. P., 368)

v.

over-

;

;

Kniskern

Hastings and Pakota Ry. Co.

v.

50)

overruled, 1 P. P., 301'.
Krigbaum, James T. (12 P. P., 017)
overruled, 20 P. P., 448.
(0 C. P.

().,

ruled, 17 P. P., 401.

McNamara

(17
v. State of California
overruled, 22 P. P.. 666.
-'
(0 P. P., 039); modified,

et al.

L. P., 290)

;

;

Meyer, Peter

1

;

Pamb

r.

Ullery (10 P. P., 528)

overruled,

;

32 L. P., 331.
Lasselle v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry.
Co. (3 C. P. O., 10)
overruled, 14 P. P.,
278.
Las Vegas Grant (13 L. P., 040, and 15 P.
P., 58)
revoked on review, 27 P. P.,
GS3.
Laughlin v. Martin (18 P. P., 112)
modified, 21 P. P., 40.
Lemmons, Lawson II. (19 p. P., 37
overruled, 26 P. P., 3S9.
;

;

;

)

P.

(1

P.,

41)

'.

overruled,

;

(3 P. P., 95)

(

4 P. P., 299.
v.

;

modified,

(0,

P.

p.,

689)

;

P..

(0

P.,

Lonergan

l.

lor.)

P..

Francis

modified, 21
v.

Co. (12 P. P., 79)
112.

Miner

Mariott

v.

et

Ry.

overruled. 29 L

;

(2

al.

25 P. P., 195.
Moore, Charles IP (10 L.
ruled, 27 L. P., isu.
Morgan v. Craig LO C. L.

709);

P.,

L.

modified, 28 L. D., 224.
.Monitor Lode (IS L. P.. 358);

P..

overruled.

204); over-

P..

234

<>.,

;

I

over-

ruled, 5 L. P.. 303.

Morrow

et al.

L. P., 54)

;

r.

Stale of Oregon

modified.

<(

al.

(32

L. P., loi.

:;::

L.

I>.,

361);

Nebraska, State of (18 L. 1'..
over
ruled, 28 L, P.. 358.
Nebraska, stale of. v. Dorrington (2 C. L.
17
L..
overruled, 26 L. P.. il-:;.
Neilsen v. Central Pacific K. Et. <'". <t al.
(U0 L. !>.. 2.".::); modified <»n review. 30

L.

!>..

238);

Newbanks

17)

:

overruled,

;

overruled,

26

li':;.

Lockwood,

Pake Shore and Western

Milwaukee,

over-

25 P. P.. 550.
L.

over-

;

ruled, 25 P. P., 550.

1

Pet Pode (4 P.

Pock Lode

over

;

.

Wait

ruled, 13 P. P., 459.
Little

Miller v. Sebastian (19 P. P., 288)
ruled, 26 P. P.. 44s.
Milton et al. v. Pamb (22 L. P., 339)

I

Peonard, Sarah
10 P. P., 404.
Lindberg, Anna

Linderman

;

P. P., 430.

L. P.,

A.

(20
200.

Shockley

(33

i

L.

overruled, B4 L. D., 31 (.
Louisiana. State of (8 L. P.. 126)
fled on review, 9 P. P., 157.

I»..

modi

!..

)

:

216.
/.

Thompson
L'!)

L.

D.,

Newton. Walter (22
25

I

;

overruled.
:

'-'

D.,

L88.

L.

(22

D.,

l..

r.'">

;

L08.
1'..

322

I

\

modified,
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New York Lode and

Millsite (5 L. D., 513)
overruled, 27 L. I>. 373.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (20 L. D., 191)
overruled, 29
modified, 22 L. D., 224
L. D., 550.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Bowman (7
modified, 18 L. D., 224.
L. D., 238)
;

2

;

reversed
Rankin. John M. (20 L. D., 272)
on review, 21 L. D., 404.
* Reed r. Buffington (7 L. D., 154)
over;

;

ruled, 8 L. D., 110.

;

;

Northern

Co. v. Burns
overruled, 20 L. D., 191.
R.

Pacific

L. D., 21)

;

R.

(6

r. Loomis (21
overruled, 27 L. D., 464.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Marshall et ah
overruled, 28 L. D., 174.
(17 L. D., 545)
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Miller (7 L.
overruled, 16 L. D., 229.
D., 100)

Northern Pacific R. R. Co.
L. D., 395)

Rico Townsite (1 L.

Roberts

overruled, 29 L. D., 550.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Symons (22
overruled, 28 L. D., 95.
L. D., 686)
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. r. Urquhart (8
overruled, 28 L. D., 126.
L. D., 365)
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Yantis (8 L.
overruled, 12 L. D., 127.
D., 58)
Nyman v. St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manoverruled,
itoba Ry. Co. (5 L. D., 396)
L. D., 126)

;

;

;

;

;

6 L. D., 750.

Oregon Central Military Road

v.

;

ruled, 13 L. D.,

1.

Horace B.

Rogers,

(10 L.

29)

D.,

over-

;

ruled, 14 L. D., 321.

Atlantic and Pacific R. R. Co. (6
overruled. 8 L. D., 165.
overRogers v. Lukens (6 L. D., Ill)

Rogers

r.

L. D., 565)

;

Sherwood (28

modified, 5

;

;

;

v.

556)

overruled, 31 L. D.,
Co. (19 L. D., 591)
174.
overRobinson, Stella G. (12 L. D., 443)

;

Northern Pacific R. R. Co.

D.,

L. D., 256.

*

:

;

ruled, 8 L. D., 110.

Satisfaction Extension Mill Site (14 L. D.,
see Alaska Copper Co., 32 L. D.,
173)
;

128.

modified, 6
Sayles, Henry P. (2 L. D., 88)
L. D., 797.
Schweitzer r. Hilliard (19 L. D., 294)
overruled, 26 L. D., 639.
Serrano r. Southern Pacific R. R. Co. (6 C.
overruled, 1 L. D., 380.
L. O., 93)
Shanley v. Moran (1 L. D., 162)
overruled, 15 L. D., 424.
overShineberger, Joseph (8 L. D., 231)
;

;

;

Olson r. Traver et ah (26 L. D., 350 and
028) overruled, 29 L. D., 480 30 L. D.,
;

;

;

;

382.

Oregon Central Military Wagon Road Co.
overruled, 18
v. Hart (17 L. D., 480)
;

L. D., 543.

ruled, 9 L. D., 202.

Sipchen

v.

Ross

Smead

v.

Lode (12

L.

D.,

686)

;

over-

ruled, 25 L. D., 518.

634)

modified, 4

;

Southern Pacific R. R. Co. (21
vacated on review, 29 L. D.,

L. D., 432)

Pacific Slope

(1 L. D.,

L. D., 152.

;

135.

Southern Pacific R. R. Co. (15 L. D., 460)
reversed on review, 18 L. D., 275.
Southern Pacific R. R. Co. (28 L. D., 281)
recalled, 32 L. D., 51.
Southern Pacific R. R. Co. (Union Pacific
;

Papina

Alderson (1 B. L.

v.

91)

F.,

;

modi-

256.

fied, 5 L. D.,

;

Patterson, Charles E. (3 L. D., 260)
modified, 6 L. D., 284, 624.
Paul Jones Lode (28 L. D., 120) modified,
31 L. D., 359.
Paul v. Wiseman (21 L. D., 12) overruled,
27 L. D., 522.
Pecos Irrigation and Improvement Co. (15
L. D., 470)
overruled, see 18 L. D., 168
;

;

;

;

and 26S.

R. R. Co.),
L. D., 528.

Spaulding

(33 L. D., 89)

recalled, 33

;

Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (21

v.

overruled, 31 L. D., 151.
Spencer, James (0 L. D., 217)
modified, 6
L. D., 772, and 8 L. D., 467.
"ate of California (14 L. D., 253) vacated on review, 23 L. D., 230.
State of California (15 L. D., 10)
overruled, 23 L. D., 423.
State of California (19 L. D., 585) vacated
on review, 28 L. D., 57.
State of California (22 L. D., 428)
overL. D., 57)

;

;

;

Phelps, W. L. (8 C. L. O., 139)
2 L. D., 854.

;

overruled,

;

Alonzo (2 L.

Phillips,

D.,

321)

;

overruled,

15 L. D., 424.

;

Pike's

Peak Lode (14

20 L.

L. D., 47)

;

overruled,

D., 204.

;

Popple, James (12 L. D., 433)
overruled,
13 L. D., 588.
Powell, D. C. (6 L. I)., 302)
modified, 15
;

;

ruled, 32 L. D., 34.

State of California v. Moccettini
overruled, 31 L. D., 335.
359)
State of California v. Pierce (3
modified, 2 L. D., 854.
118)
State of California v. Smith (5 L.
overruled, 18 L. D., 343.
State of Colorado (7 L. D., 490)
9 L. D., 408.
State of Florida (17 L. D., 355)
vn review, 19 L. D. 76.
State of Louisiana (8 L. I)., 126)
on review, 9 L. D. 157.

(19 L. D.,

;

L. D., 477.
Pringle, Wesley (13 L. D., 519)
29 L. D., 599.

;

overruled,

widow

of Emanuel (6 L. D.,
vacated on review, 33 L. D., 409.

Prue,

436)

;

;

Puyallup

Allotments

modified, 29 L.

L).,

(20

L.

C.

L.

D.,

543)

O.,

;

D.,

157)

;

628.

;

overruled,

;

reversed

;

modified

r

Rancho

Alisal

L. D., 320.

(1 L. D.,

173)

;

overruled, 5

(
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State of Louisiana (24 L. D., 231)
vacated
on review, 26 L. D., 5.
State of Nebraska (18 L. D., 124)
overruled, 28 L. D., 358.
State of Nebraska v. Dorrington (2 C. L. L.,
overruled, 26 L. D., 123.
647)
Stewart et ah v. Rees et ah (21 L. D.,
overruled, 29 L. D., 401.
446)
St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Ry. Co.
modified, 13 L. D., 354;
(8 L. D., 255)
decision, 13 L. D., 354, overruled, and
decision, 8 L. D., 255, reaffirmed, 32 L. I>.,
;

;

;

Union

Pacific R. R. Co.
33 L. D., 528.

21.

Paul,

St.

& M. Ry.

M.

L. D., 249)

Co. r. Ilagen (20
overruled, 25 L. D., 80.
M. Ry. Co. v. Fogelberg (29
vacated on review, 30 L. I).,

;

Paul, M. &
L. D., 291)

St.

;

(33 L.

!>..

89)

re-

:

called,

United

Bush

United States

Dana

States v.
overruled, is L.

L.

L.

I»..

529);

L.

!>.,

161);

(is

45.

I).,

James (14

Vine,

(13

HI.

I>.,

v.

modified, '28 L.

L. D.. 527)

;

;

XXIII

:

modified,

14

622.

1).,

Walker

v. Prosser (17 L. D., 85)
reversed
on review, 18 L. I)., 425.
Walker v. Southern Pacific R. R Co. (24
L. D., 172)
overruled, 28 L. D. 171.
Walters, David
decision
15 L. D., 136)
revoked, 24 L. D., 58.
Wasmund v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. l'.
L. D., 445)
vacated on review. 29 L. D.,
:

;

|

-

;

<

;

191.
Strieker, Lizzie

(15 L. D., 74)

overruled,

;

18 L. D., 283.
Sweeney v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (20
L. D., 394)
overruled, 28 L. D., 174.
Sweeten v. Stevenson (3 L. D., 249)
over-

224.

Waterhouse, William W.
o\( rruled,

;

;

ruled, 3 L. D., 248.

E.

(4 L.

D.,

L. D.,

476)

review, 9 L. D., 150.
v. Schlecbt (20 L.

;

;

;

;

;

3 L. D., 98.

Tripp

v. Stewart (7 C. L. O., 39)
modified,
6 L. D., 795.
Tucker v. Florida Ry. & Nav. Co. (19 L. D.,
414) ; overruled, 25 L. D., 233.
Tupper v. Schwarz (2 L. D., 623) overruled, 6 L. I)., 623.
Turner v. Lang (1 C. L. O., 51)
modified,
5 L. D., 256.
Turner v. Cartwrigbt (17 L. D., 414)
modified, 21 L. D., 40.
;

;

;

;

131)

I).,

;

169)

;

modi-

6 L. D., 71.

fied,

Weber, Peter (7

overruled on

;

D

Werden
overruled,
Taft v. Chapin (14 L. D., 593)
17 L. D., 414.
Talkington's Heirs v. Hempfling (2 L. D.,
overruled, 14 L. D., 200.
46)
Tate, Sarah J. (10 L. D., 469)
overruled,
21 L. D., 211.
Taylor r. Yates ct ah (8 L. D., 279)
reversed on review, 10 L. I)., 242.
Traugh v. Ernst (2 L. D., 212) overruled,

L.

f>

(

18 L. D., 586.

Watson, Thomas

23

I

ruled, 24 L. D., 45.

Wheaton

Wallace (24

v.

34 L.

fied,

D.,

L.

100)

:

modi-

D., 383.

Wickstrom

Calkins (20 L. D.. 459);
v.
modified, 21 L. D., 553
overruled, 22 L.
D., 392.
;

Widow

of

Emanuel Prue

(6

L.

D.,

4:;c>i

;

vacated on review, 33 L. D, 409.
Wilkins, Benjamin (\ (2 L. D., 129)
modified, 6 L. D., 707.
Willamette Valley' and Cascade Mountain
;

Wagon Road

Co. v. Chapman (13 L. D.,
overruled, 20 L. D.. 25'.).
Willamette Valley and Cascade Mountain
Wagon Road Co. v. Brunei- (22 I.. D.
vacated on review, 26 L. D., 357.
654)
Willingbeck, Christian P. (3 L. P.. 383);
modified, 5 L. D., 409.
overruled,
Willis, Eliza (22 L. D., 426)

61)

;

;

;

26 L.

D., 436.
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act
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;

1904
July

1905.— Isolated

3,

1.-.

«.

pubcircular of

tract

;

lic
sale;
notice;
April 11, 1895, amended

Page.

—

July 15, 1905.
Regulations governing opening of Uintab lands.
July 15, 1905.
Pintah lands; persons not qualified to enter
August 1. 1005. -Final proof Oil
claims within forest
serves
August 2. 1905.
Right of way
i

1

<

—

reserves; jurisdiction
2,
1905.
Reclamation
project
Irrigable area
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August 12, 1905. Townsites in
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Au-ust
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.

reserve

July

8,

1905.

15

—Townsites on

withdrawn under act

of

lands

June

65

—
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17,

1902

of

latioiis
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—

July 14, 1905.
Arid land; act of
June 17, 1902 desert land entry
right to use of water
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1.

1904,

amended
August
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;
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July 7, 1905.
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1905.
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for
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August

1905.

21,

Page.

— Homestead

en-

Nebraska under section
act of April 28, 1904
September 1, 1905. Second liomesection 3, act of
stead entries
June 5, 1900, and section 1, act
of April 28, 1904
September 28, 1905. Regulations
relating to rigbts of way for canals, ditcbes, reservoirs, etc
tries in

3,

—

87

October

1905.— Arid

12,

withdrawals
1902
October

of

act

;

land

June
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way
212

disposition

sixty-day

;

applications for isolated tracts
containing less than 40 acres
1905.
November 7,
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entry
1905.
November
Townsite
29,
trustee; expenses; section 11,
act of March 3, 1891
January 0, 1900. Applications for
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rights of way
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—
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1900.
February
14,
agents' reports
February 20, 1900.

residence

1906
February
entry

;
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—Uintah lands
January

of

act

1900.
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583
601

605

1906.— Settlers

22,

Railway lands
1900.

24,

of

Crow
637

1906.— Crow Indian lands

24,

homestead
245

630

— Opening

Indian lands

May

entry

;

qualifica-

;

639

tions

June 4, 190G.— Opening of Shoshone lands
June 4, 1906. Shoshone lands
homestead
entry
qualifica-

—

248

647

—

1906.
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lieu selection
act of
April 21, 1904
June 18, 1906. Right of way for
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paragraph 54 of regulations of
September 28, 1905, revoked___

June
287

8,

;

;

—

358
365

June

1900.— Yellowstone

19,

reserve

est

452
land

certain

;

666

693

for-

lands

opened to homestead settlement

and enti*y
June 25, 1906.

;
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;
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dian lands
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700
In-

even-numbered min050

sections
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465

improvements

;

proof rules__

S

R.

May

27,

— Desert

— Final

on St.
Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba

170

—

1906.

9,

May

pe-

October 20, 1905.— Coal lands;
character of land evidence
November 4, 1905. Suspension of

May
May

;
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after

for railroads, canals, reser-

12, 1906.— Employee of General Land Office
section 452,

;

17,

riod

546

—

April 25, 1906.
Amendments to
regulations concerning rights of
voirs, etc

1905.— Uintah lands;

10,

544

;

1904

;

—

Page.

—
—

April 4, 1906.
Reclamation act
applications for water rights
April 10, 1900.
Homestead; Nebraska lands act of April 28,
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June

1872.

Page.

— Mining

June

regulations; C. M. D., 270, 282, par.
10,

30

;

585

—

March 12, 1877. Desert land act
of March 3, 1877
2 C. L. L.,
;

3,

1880.

— Desert

493
land

;

2 C. L. L., 1382
Mining claim ad9, 1882.
verse proceedings 1 L. D., 685_
December 1, 1883. Fees and com-

—

May

;

missions on canceled entries
L. D.,

660

—

;

—

nity selections

;

4 L. D., 90

317

D.,

123

20 L.
lands

252

D.,

;

494

110

1897.

classification

;

15, 1897.

;

— Mineral

681

;

— Mining

—

3,

;

;

659
14

25 L. D.,

662
regu-

25 L. D., 561, par. 52__
1898.- Mineral application notice; 26 L. D., 145
March 23, 1898.— Mineral land;
classification 26 L. D., 423
lations

February
495

305
30,

446
December

496

601

April 22, 1891.— School indemnity; 12 L. D., 400
April 11, 1895.— Isolated tract;

November

2

February 9, 1885. Desert land
final proof; 3 L. D., 385
July 23, 1885.— Desert land en4 L. D., 51
tries
August 4, 1885. Railroad indem;

493

;

—

;

—

—

;

1375
September

Page.

—

1887.
Desert land entry final proof 5 L. D., 708
January 11, 1889. Application to
amend; 8 L. D., 187
July 17, 1889.
Final proof; 9 L.
27,

286
284

062
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ACTS OF CONGRESS CITED
June

1898.
lands

10,

offered

Page.

— Offered
act

;

of

March

May

witnesses: 32 L. P.. 132
April o, 1903.— Kiowa, etc., lands:
school sections mining laws :;j

18,

—

June

24,

— Mining

tions; 28 L.
and 51

regulapars. 44

594,

I).,

1903.— Attendance

20,

;

—

July
1899.
Application
14,
to
enter; 29 L. D., 29
368,438
December 18, 1899.— Forest reserves lieu selection 29 L. D.,
391
299
January 18, 1900. Use of timber
on public mineral lands 29 L.
D., 571
79
.___
February 10, 1900.— Use of timber
on nonmineral public lands 29
L. D., 572
79
March 6, 1900. Lieu selection
act June 4, 1897 29 L. D., 578578
June 27, 1900. Second homestead
act June 5, 1900; 30 L.
!>.,
374
115
January 22, 1901. Repayment
30 L. P.. 430
329, 618
September 21, 1901.— School indemnity selections
30 L. P.,
;

—

;

August

19< 13.— Soldiers'
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DECISIONS
RELATING TO

THE PUBLIC LANDS,
opening of

utntah indian reservation lands
state of utah.

till:

By the

in

the

President of the United States of America.

A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas,
1,

it

was provided by the

act of Congress,

approved

May

1902 (32 Stat., 263), among other things, that on October
1903, the unallotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, in

27, A.

I).

shall be restored to the public domain Provided,
That persons entering any of said lands under the homestead laws
shall pay therefor at the rate of one dollar and twenty-live cent- per

the State of Utah,

acre;

**

:

"

And. whereas, the time for the opening of said unallotted lands was
extended to October 1, 1904, by the act of Congress, approved March
3, 1903 (32 Stat., 998), and was extended to March 10. L905, by the
act of Congress, approved April 21, 1904 (33 Stat, 207), and was
again extended to not later than September 1. 1905, by the act of Congress, approved March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., loc*!)). which Last named act
provided,

among

other things:

lands, excepting such tracts as may have been sel
aside as national forest reserve, and such mineral lands as were disposed of by

That the said unallotted

the act of Congress of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two, shall be
disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws
Of the United States, and shall he opened to settlement and entry by proclama-

which proclamation shall prescribe the manner in which
he settled upon, occupied, and entered by persons entitled to
entry thereof: and no person shall he permitted to settle upon, occupy, or

tion of the President,

these lands

make

may

enter any of said lands, except as prescribed in said proclamation, until after
the expiration of sixty days from the time when the same are thereh\ opened

settlement and entry: Provided, Thai the rights of honorably discharged
Union soldiers and sailors of the late civil and the Spanish war or Philippine
insurrection, as defined and described in sections twenty-three hundred and four
and twenty-three hundred and live of the Revised Statutes, as amended bj the
act of March first, nineteen hundred and one. shall not be abridged

to

:
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5194
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Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
power in me vested by said acts
of Congress, do hereby declare and make known that all the unallotted lands in said reservation, excepting such as have at that time
been reserved for military, forestry, and other purposes, and such
mineral lands as may have been disposed of under existing laws, will,
on and after the 28th day of August, 1905, in the manner hereinafter
prescribed, and not otherwise, be opened to entry, settlement, and disposition under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite
laws of the United States; and it is further directed and prescribed

Now,

therefore, I,

States of America, by virtue of the

that

Commencing at 9 o'clock a. m., Tuesday, August 1, 1905, and ending at 6 o'clock p. m., Saturday, August 12, 1905, a registration will
be had at Vernal, Price, and Provo, State of Utah, and at Grand
Junction, State of Colorado, for the purpose of ascertaining what
persons desire to enter, settle upon, and acquire title to any of said
lands under the homestead law, and of ascertaining their qualifications so to do. To obtain registration each applicant will be required
to show himself duly qualified, by written application to be made
only on a blank form provided by the Commissioner of the General

Land

Office, to

laws,

and

make homestead

entry of these lands under existing

to give the registering officer such appropriate matters of

description and identity as will protect the applicant and the Government against any attempted impersonation. Registration can not
be effected through the use of the mails or the employment of an
agent, excepting that honorably discharged soldiers and sailors entitled to the benefits of section 2304 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, as amended by the act of Congress, approved March
1,

1901 (31 Stat., 847), may present their applications for registraand due proofs of their qualifications through an agent of their

tion

own

selection, having a duly executed power of attorney on a blank
form provided by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, but
no person will be permitted to act as agent for more than one such
No person will be permitted to register more than
soldier or sailor.
once or in any other than his true name.
Each applicant who shows himself duly qualified will be registered
and given a nontransferable certificate to that effect, which will entitle
him to go upon and examine the lands to be opened hereunder; but
the only purpose for which he can go upon and examine said lands is

that of enabling

him

later on, as herein provided, to understandingly

which he may make entry. No one will be permitted to make settlement upon any of said lands in advance of the
opening herein provided for, and during the first sixty days following said opening no one but registered applicants will be permitted
select the lands for

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

3

make homestead

settlement upon any of said land-, and then only
pursuance of a homestead entry duly allowed by the local land
officers, or of a soldier's declaratory statement duly accepted by such

to

in

officers.

The order

in

which, during the

first

ing, the registered applicants will

sixty days following the open-

be permitted to

make homestead

entry of the lands opened hereunder, will be determined by a drawing
for the district publicly held at Provo, Utah, commencing at 9 o'clock

Thursday, August

and continuing for such period as
The drawing will be had
under the supervision and immediate observance of a committee of
three persons whose integrity is such as to make their control of the
diawing a guaranty of its fairness. The members of this committee
will be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, who will prescribe
suitable compensation for their services. Preparatory to this drawing
a.

m.,

may

17, 1905,

be necessary to complete the same.

the registration officers will, at the time of registering each applicant

who shows himself duly qualified, make out a card, which must be
signed by the applicant, and giving such a description of the applicant
as will enable the local land officers to thereafter identify him. This
card will be subsequently sealed in a separate envelope which will
bear no other distinguishing label or mark than such as may be necessary to show that it is to go into the drawing. These envelopes will

be carefully preserved and remain sealed until opened in the course of
the drawing herein provided. When the registration is completed all
of these sealed envelopes will be brought together at the place of

drawing and turned over to the committee in charge of the drawing,
who, in such manner as in their judgment will be attended with entire
fairness and equality of opportunity, shall proceed to draw out and
open the separate envelopes and to give to each inclosed card a
number in the order in which the envelope containing the same is
drawn. The result of the drawing will be certified by the committee
to the officers of the district and will determine the order in which
the applicants

may make homestead

entry of said lands and

settle-

ment thereon.
Notice of the drawings, stating the name of each applicant and
number assigned to him by the drawing, will be posted each day at
the place of drawing, and each applicant will be notified of his number and of the day upon which he must make his entry by a postal
card mailed to him at the address given by him at the time of registration.

The

result of

each day's drawing will also be given to the

press to be published as a matter of news.

stead entry of said lands during the

first

Application^ for home
sixty days following the

opening can be made only by registered applicant- and
established by the drawing.

in

l

he order
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Commencing on Monday, August

THE PUBLIC LANDS.
28, 1905, at 9 o'clock

a.

m., the

applications of those drawing numbers 1 to 50, inclusive, must be
presented at the land office in the town of Vernal, Utah, in the land

which said lands are situated, and will be considered in
during the first day, and the applications of
those drawing numbers 51 to 100, inclusive, must be presented and
will be considered in their numerical order during the second day.
and so on at that rate until all of said lands subject to entry under
the homestead law, and desired thereunder, have been entered. If
any applicant fails to appear and present his application for entry
when the number assigned to him by the drawing is reached, his
district in

their numerical order

right to entry will be passed until after the other applications as-

signed for that day have been disposed

another opportunity to
to

make

have abandoned his right to
obtain the allowance of a

To

of,

when he

will be given

which he will be deemed
make entry under such drawing.
homestead entry, each applicant must

entry, failing in

personally present the certificate of registration theretofore issued to

him, together with a regular homestead application and the necessary
accompanying proofs, together with the regular land office fees, but
an honorably discharged soldier or sailor may file his declaratory
statement through his agent, who can represent but one soldier or
sailor as in the matter of registration.
Persons who make homestead entry for any of these lands will be
required to pay therefor at the rate of one dollar and twenty-five
cents per acre when they make final proof, but no payment, other
than the usual fees and commissions will be required at the time the
entry is made.
Persons who apply to make entry of these lands prior to October
27, 1905, will not be required to file the usual nonmineral affidavit
with their applications to enter, but such affidavit must be filed before
final proof is accepted under their entries; but all persons who make
entry after that date will be required to file that affidavit with their
applications to enter.

The production of the certificate of registration will be dispensed
with only upon satisfactory proof of its loss or destruction. If at
the time of considering his regular application for entry it appears
that an applicant is disqualified from making homestead entry of
these lands, his application will be rejected, notwithstanding his
prior registration. If any applicant shall register more than once
hereunder, or in any other than his true name, or shall transfer his
registration certificate, he will thereby lose all the benefits of the
registration and drawing herein provided for, and will be precluded
from entering or settling upon any of said lands during the first
sixty days following said opening.
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person or persons desiring to found, or to suggesl establishing,

a town site upon any of the said lands,

before the opening herein provided for,

at

any point, may,

file in

at

any time

the land office a written

application to that effect, describing by legal subdivision- the lands
intended to be affected, and stating fully and under oath the necessil v
or propriety of founding or establishing a

town

at that place.

The

forthwith transmit said petition to the Commissioner of the General Land Office with their recommendation in the
premises.
Such Commissioner, if he believes the public interests will
be subserved thereby, will, if the Secretary of the Interior approve
local

officers

will

withdrawing the lands described in such petiany portion thereof, from homestead entry and settlement and
directing that the same be held for the time being for disposal under
the town site laws of the United States in such manner as the Secretary of the Interior may from time to time direct; and, if at any time
after such withdrawal has been made it is determined that the lands
so withdrawn are not needed for town site purposes they may be
released from such withdrawal and then disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead laws in the manner prescribed herein.
All persons are especially admonished that under the said act of
Congress approved March 3, 1905, it is provided that no person shall
be permitted to settle upon, occupy, or enter any of said lands, except
thereof, issue an order

tion, or

in the

manner prescribed in this proclamation, until after the expirafrom the time when the same are opened to >ett le-

tion of sixty days
nient

and entry.

After the expiration of the said period of sixty

days, but not before, as hereinbefore prescribed, any of said lands

remaining undisposed of may be settled upon, occupied, and entered
under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of
the United States in like manner as if the manner of effecting such
settlement, occupancy,

and entry had not been prescribed herein

in

obedience to law.

The Secretary of

the Interior shall prescribe all needful rules and

regulations necessary to carry into full effect the opening herein pro-

vided for.

In witness whereof,-I have hereunto
United States to be affixed.

set

my hand

and caused the

seal of the

day of duly, in
Done at the city of Washington this 4
the year of our Lord 1905, and of the Independence of the
1

(seal.]

United States the one hundred and

1 1

1

thirtieth.

Theodore Roose^

By

the Presidenl

:

Axvey A. Adee,
Acting Secretary of State.

rlt.
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OPENING OF THE UINTAH INDIAN RESERVATION LANDS IN THE STATE
OE UTAH.

By the

President of the United States of America.

A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, it was declared in my proclamation of July 14, in the
year of our Lord 1905, prescribing the manner in which certain lands
within the Uintah Indian Reservation should be opened to settlement

and entry under the homestead and townsite
States,

among

Liavs of the

United

other things, as follows:

Commencing on Monday, August

28, 1905, at 9 o'clock a. m.,

the applications

must be presented at the land office
in the.town of Vernal, Utah, in the land district in which said lands are situated,
and will be considered in their numerical order during the first day, and the
applications of those drawing numbers 51 to 100, inclusive, must be presented
and will be considered in their numerical order during the second day, and so on
at that rate until all of said lands subject to entry under the homestead law,
and desired thereunder, have been entered. If any applicant fails to appear
and present his application for entry when the number assigned to him by the
drawing is reached, his right to enter will be passed until after the other
applications assigned for that day have been disposed of, when he will be given
tmother opportunity to make entry, failing in which he will be deemed to have
abandoned his right to make entry under such drawing
of those

drawing numbers

1 to 50, inclusive,

And, whereas, there now appear

to

be ample reasons for a modi-

fication of said provision;

Now,

Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
power in me vested by said act of
Congress, and for the purpose of modifying the provision of said
proclamation above quoted, do hereby declare and direct that said
therefore,

I,

States of America, by virtue of the

provision be modified to read as follows:

Commencing oh Monday, August 28, 1905, at 9 o'clock a. m., the applications
numbers 1 to 111, inclusive, must be presented at the land
office in the town of Vernal, Utah, in the land district in which said lands are
situated, and will be considered in their numerical order during the first day,
and the applications of those drawing numbers 112 to 222, inclusive, must be
of those drawing

presented and will be considered in their numerical order during the second day,find so on at that rate until all of said lands subject to entry under the homestead law, and desired thereunder, have been entered. If any applicant fails to

appear and present his application for entry when the number assigned to him
by the drawing is reached, his right to enter will be passed until after the other
applications assigned for that day have been disposed of, when he will be given
another opportunity to make entry, failing in which he will be deemed to have
abandoned his right to make entry under such drawing.
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In witness whereof, I have hereunto
United States to be affixed.

set

my hand

7

and caused the

seal of the

Done
[seal.]

at the city of

Washington

this 2d

day of August,

in

the year of our Lord 1905, and of the Independence of the

United States the one hundred and

thirtieth.

T. Roosevelt.

By

the President

Alvey

A.

A dee,

Acting Secretary of State,

REGULATIONS GOVERNING OPENING
UTAH.

<>I

UINTAH RESERVATION

IX

Circular.

Department oe the

[nterior,

Ge x era l Land Offic
Washington, D. C, July

:

15, 1905.

Register and Receiver,

United States Land Office, Vernal, Utah.
Gentlemen: The following regulations are hereby

prescribed for

the purpose of carrying into effect the opening of the Uintah Indian

Reservation in the State of Utah, provided for in the act of Congress
March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1069), and in the President's proclamation

of

of July 14, 1905, thereunder

:

First. Applications either to file soldiers' declaratory statement or

make homestead entry

of these lands, must, on presentation, in ac-

cordance with proclamation opening said lands to entry and settlement, be accepted or rejected, but local officers may, in their discre
tion, permit amendment of a defective application during the day
only on which same

is

presented.

Second. No appeal to the General Land Office will be allowed or
considered unless taken within one day, Sundays excepted, after the
rejection of the application.

Third. After rejection of an application, whether an appeal

be

taken or not, the land will continue to be subject to entry a- before,

excepting that any subsequent applicant for the same land must be
informed of the prior rejected application and that the subsequent
application,

if

allowed, will be subject to the disposition of the prior

upon the appeal, if any is taken from the
thereof, which fact must be noted upon the receipt or
issued upon the allowance of the subsequent application.

rejection

application

Fourth.

Where an appeal

forwarded to the General
carefully

is

certificate

taken the paper- will he immediately
Office, where they will he at once

Land

examined and forwarded

to the Secretary of the

Interior
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with appropriate recommendation, when the matter will be promptly
decided and closed.
Fifth. Applications to contest entries allowed for these lands filed
during the sixty days from date of opening will also be immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will be at once
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the interior
with proper recommendation, when the matter will be promptly
decided.

Sixth. These regulations Avill supersede, during the sixty days
from the opening of these lands, any rule of practice or other regulation governing the disposition of applications with which they may
conflict, and will apply to all appeals taken from the action of the
local officers

during said period of sixty days.

Seventh. The purpose of these regulations

is to provide an adespeedy
method
of
correcting
any
material
quate and
errors in local
offices, and at the same time to discourage groundless appeals and put
it out of the power of a disappointed applicant to indefinitely tie up
the land or force another to pay him to withdraw his appeal.
Give all possible publicity, through the press and otherwise, to these

regulations.

W. A. Richards,

Commissioner.

Approved
F. L.

Campbell, Acting Secretary.

uintah indian lands-persons not qualified to enter.
Circular.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, July 15, 1905.
The following persons are not qualified to make homestead entry
of the lands of the Uintah Indian Reservation in Utah
1. Any person who has made a prior homestead entry and is not
entitled to make a second homestead entry.
Under the act of June
5, 1900 (31 Stat., 267), any person avIio made a homestead entry and
commuted the same prior to June 5, 1900, is entitled to make a second

May

any
on lands
to be sold for the benefit of Indians, and paid the price provided by
law opening the land to settlement, and who would have been entitled
under the " free homestead " law to have received title without such
payment, had not proof been made prior thereto, is entitled to make a
second homestead entry; under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat.,
527), any person who, prior to April 28, 1904, made homestead entry
homestead entry; under the act of
person

who made

22, 1902 (32 Stat., 203),

final five-year proof, prior to

May

17, 1900,

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
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but was unable to perfect the entry on account of sonic unavoidable
complication of his personal or business affairs, or on account of an
honest mistake as to the character of the land, provided he made a

bona

fide effort to

comply with the homestead law and did

quish his entry for a consideration,

is

not relin-

make a second homeany person who has made a

entitled to

stead entry; under section 2 of said act

homestead entry of a quantity of land containing less than L60 acres,
and is still owning and occupying the same, may enter a sufficient
quantity of lands contiguous to the lands embraced in his original
entry to make up the full amount of 1G0 acres: under section 6 of the
act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), any person who has made a
homestead entry for less than 160 acres, and has received the receiver's
final receipt therefor, is entitled to enter enough additional land, not
necessarily contiguous to the original entry, to

make 160

acres.

A

married woman, unless she has been deserted or abandoned
by her husband.
3. One not a citizen of the United States, and who has not declared
his intention to become such.
4. Anyone under 21 years of age, not the head of a family, unless
he served in the Army or Navy of the United States for not less than
fourteen days during actual war.
5. Anyone who is the proprietor of more than 100 acres of land
in any State or Territory.
6. One who has acquired title to, or is claiming under any of the
public land laws, in pursuance of settlement or entries made since
August 30, 1890, an amount of land, other than mineral land, which,
with the tract now sought to be entered, will exceed in the aggregate
320 acres.
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
2.

Approved
F. L.

Campbell,
Acting Secretary.

mining claim—approximation survey.
Chicago Placer Mining Claim.
The

1

'

rule of approximation permitted in entries under the homestead and other
laws providing for the disposal of uonmineral lands has no

public-land

application to locations and entries under the mining laws.

A

subdivision is not sufficiently identified to
accurately describe the same in a patent by an
attempted description thereol in terms of the public land surveys, and
where patent is soughl to a placer mining claim embracing a portion of an
irregular legal subdivision or lot an official survey of the particular portion

portion

of

an irregular

enable the Department

legal

to

claimed will be required.
"

Not reported

in

volume

31.
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Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land
( G. F. P.
( S. V. P.
Office, September 16, 1902.

May 7, 1901, J. H. Sarsfield made entry for the Chicago placer
mining claim, Leadville, Colorado, for certain lands described in
the certificate of entry as " lots 1 and 2 in Sec. 3, the S. i of lot 3 in
Sec. 3, the N. \ of N. \ of SE. \ of NW. i, Sec. 3, the S. \ of S. \ of
lot 4 in Sec. 3, the N. \ of SE. J of NW. J, Sec. 3, the S. \ of S. \ of
lot 1 in Sec. 4, and the N. \ of SE. \ of NE. \ of Sec. 4, in township
8 south, range 78 west," By the public survey of said sections 3 and
4 ( appro ved March 2, 1883) the quarter sections in which the Chicago claim is situated are represented to be fractional, the lands in the
north half of each quarter section being designated as lots, each lot
containing more than forty acres, while the lands in the south half
of each quarter section are legal subdivisions of forty acres each.
By reason of approved surveys of certain lode and millsite claims,
as shown by a diagram prepared and transmitted to your office by the

United States Surveyor General, the areas of said lots 1 and 2 of
by several acres each. None of the land
embraced in the surveys of the lode and millsite claims is included in

section 3 have been reduced

the entry.

The Chicago claim appears to have been
The location embraces the land described

located February 21, 1901.
in the certificate of entry.

and the aforesaid diagram, the claim
as located and entered contains an area of 165.03 acres. The area
stated in the certificate of entry and paid for by the entry man is 160
According

to the public survey

acres.

April

5,

1902,

your

office,

upon examination of the

record, required

the entryman to eliminate from the Chicago claim the area in excess

of 160 acres, either by relinquishment of one of the tracts embraced

A motion for review, in which
pay for the excess area under the
rule of approximation usually applied to entries under the homestead laws, was dismissed by your office May 20, 1902. The entryman

therein, or

by a survey of the claim.

the entryman asked to be allowed to

has appealed to the Department.
The rule of approximation under which persons seeking title to
non-mineral public lands are permitted to pay for and include in an
entry whatever excess there may be in the claims asserted over and
above the amount limited by the law under which title is sought,
provided such excess is not greater than the deficiency would be
should a legal subdivision be excluded from the entry, is a rule of
administrative expediency relating to entries under the homestead
and other laws which provide for the disposal of lands by legal subdivisions only, and where a literal interpretation of the law would,
by reason of irregular areas of legal subdivisions, resulting from una-

'
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voidable causes in the public surveys, frequently limit the entryman
(o less land than he is entitled to enter under the law.

The laws providing

for the location, entry and patent oi* public
minerals
valuable
for
lands
are materially different from the homestead and other laws which provide for the disposal of non-mineral
lands.

By

Stat., 401),

in

May 14, 1898, 30
be acquired to unsurveyed lands

the latter laws (excepting the act of

under which

title

may

the District of Alaska, through soldiers' additional homestead

149-50)

lands are disposed of after the public
surveys have been extended over them, and only by the legal subdivisions of such surveys.
Under the former, mineral lands may be

rights,

28 L. D.,

and patented either before or after the public surveys have been extended to them, and, excepting as to placer claim-.
which if upon unsurveyed lands may be located and entered by legal
subdivisions, and with respect to which it is provided that in all cases
located, entered

the locations "shall conform as near as practicable with the United

and the rectangular subdiviand that where such claims "cannot be conlegal subdivisions, survey and plat shall be made as on

States system of public land surveys,
sions of such surveys,"

formed

to

unsurveyed lands," it is not required that mineral lands shall be disposed of by legal subdivisions. See Sees. 2320, 2325, 2329, 2330 and
2331 of the Revised Statutes. By section 2330 it is provided that
no location of a placer claim, made after the ninth day of July, eighteen hundred
shall exceed one hundred and sixty acres for any one person or

and seventy,

association of persons.

In the administration of the placer mining law a literal interpremay be given to the provision limiting the number of acres that
may be included in a single location without working injustice to
any claimant thereunder. Location and entry may be made according to legal subdivisions when the lands have been surveyed, or if
the claim can not be conformed to legal subdivisions, survey and plat
tation

are provided for, as in the case of unsurveyed lands.

A

person seek-

ing title under a placer location which embraces more than 160 acres
sutlers no loss of any portion of his entry right because required to
reduce his claim to the number of acres allowed by law. for the reason
that he may have the exact area to which he i> entitled under the law
described by a survey and plat, showing accurately the boundaries
of his claim.
It

follows from what has been said that there

is

no warrant for

the application of the rule of approximation to locations ami entries

under the mining laws.
There is another objection to the entry not noticed in your office
Portions of the lands stated to be embraced in the entry
decision.
such manner as to sufficiently identify them.
These portions are referred to in the entry certificates a- "the S. J
are not

described

in
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of lot 3 in Sec. 3," " the S. | of S. \ of lot 4 in Sec. 3," " the S. \ of S. J
of lot 1 in Sec. 4," and are parts of irregular-shaped tracts designated
as lots by the public survey.
It would be impossible from the description given in the entry certificate to identify the lands claimed under

the location and entry.

This can be done only by a survey of the

portions of said lots intended to be embraced in the entry.

entryman

shall elect to retain the lands claimed in said lots 3

in Sec. 3,

and

If the

and 4
any portion or portions thereof, he
must have a survey of the same made, so that the portion or portions
lot 1 in

Sec. 4, or

may be properly identified.
survey will be required as to ten-acre tracts of regular legal subdivisions or of entire lots, but where it is sought to embrace only a

retained

No

portion of such tracts or lots a survey of the same must be furnished

In no event can the entry be
as in the case of unsurveyed lands.
allowed to stand for more than 160 acres of land.
Your office decision is therefore modified to conform to the views
herein expressed.

PENDING SCHOOL INDEMNITY SELECTION—APPLICATION COVERING
SAME LAND.
Santa Fe Pacific R. R.

Co.

v.

State of California.

Pending the disposition of a school land indemnity selection, even though erroneously received, no other application including any portion of the land
emhraced in such selection should be accepted, nor will any rights be considered as initiated by the tender of any such application.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(

July

F. L. C.

3, 1905.

Land Office,
( F. W. C.

Company has appealed from your
December 10, 1904, rejecting its application, proffered under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36), to select the SW. \
of NE. I and NE. i of SE. J of Sec. 26, T. 28 N., R. 6 E., M. D. M.,
The Santa Fe

Pacific Railroad

Office decision of

Susanville, California, land district, in lieu of an equal quantity of

land relinquished to the United States in the San Francisco

Moun-

tains forest reserve, because of certain prior school indemnity selections

made

of said lands;

also its applications to contest the State's

selections covering these lands;

the latter action being because of

made by one H. D. Burroughs, admittedly
contest in his own name to be prosecuted in his
attorney for and on behalf of the Santa Fe Pacific

the fact that they were

not as initiating a

own interest, but as
Railroad Company.
With regard to the State's selection covering these lands, your
decision states that the selection of the

SW.

J of

NE.

office

J of Sec. 26,

was

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

made on March 12, 11)02, and that
of Sec. 20, was made on February

13

XK. of SE. \
With regard to the Lastthe State's selection was made on

the selection of the

|

16, 11)04.

mentioned selection, the fact is that
October 10, 1903. The list filed on that date, including this tract,
also embraced other selections, and, upon examination thereof, it was
found that certain of the selections were improperly allowed, and the

was canceled, the State subsequently, on Febwhat is termed an amendatory list, embracing
included within the original list, with the exception

selection of those tracts

ruary
all

16, 11)04, filing

the selections

of those canceled, the selection in each instance being on account of
the same basis assigned in the original list.

With regard to the State's selections, that of March 12, 1902, was
on account of a part of section 16 lost to the State because the land in
place was patented under the swamp land grant.
With regard to the
selection of October 10, 1903, the selection was claimed on account of
a portion of a section 16 which had been previously withdrawn for
examination and investigation with a view to its possible inclusion
within a forest reserve.

The

were accepted by the local officers, duly entered of
and were pending undisposed of at the time of the proffer of
the selection by the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, and it was
because of the pendency of such selections, and without regard to their
validity, that your office and the local officers held that the land covered thereby was not subject to selection under the act of June 4,
selections

record,

1897, supra.

This action

is

affirmed.

Good administration

requires that, pend-

ing the disposition of a selection, even though erroneously received.
no other application including any portion of the land embraced
in said selection should be accepted, nor should

any rights be con-

sidered as initiated by the tender of any such application.

With regard

to the affidavits filed as the basis for the contest of the

your office decision rightly held that the applicawere insufficient, and the action rejecting the same is
The proffered selection of the Santa Fe Pacific Rail-

State's selections,

tions presented
also affirmed.

road

Company

will stand rejected.

MOUNT RANTER FOREST RESERVE—YAKIMA INDIAN LANDS— ACT OF
DECEMBER 91, 1904.
I

ffSTRTJCTIONS.

The authority conferred upon the Secretary
ber 21,

l!)ol.

(o sell

of the Interior by the acl of Decern

and dispose of certain lands claimed by the rakiina

Indians and adjoining their then-recognized reservation on the west, held
embrace such of said lands as fall within the limits of the Mount Kanier

to

forest reserve.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

July

(F. L. C.)

Referring to your
state that

mitted,

it

December

3,

office letter "

1905.

R"

Land
(G.

Office,
13.

G.)

of the 28th ultimo, I have to

upon careful examination of the question therein subis clearly the opinion of this Department that the act of
21, 1904 (33 Stat., 595), recognizes the claim of the

Yakima

Nation of Indians to that strip of country adjoining their thenrecognized reservation on the west, " containing approximately two

hundred and ninety-three thousand, eight hundred and thirty-seven
acres according to the findings, after examination, of Mr. E. C.
Barnard, topographer of the Geological Survey, approved by the
Secretary of the Interior, April seventh, nineteen hundred;" that
the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to sell or
dispose of all such lands, except such as may have been allotted or to
which valid rights have not been acquired prior to March 5, 1904,
by bona fide settlers or purchasers under the public land laws; and
that this authority and direction embrace so much of said lands as
falls

within the limits of the Mount Ranier forest reserve, as estabby executive proclamation of February 22, 1897. Your office

lished

will be governed accordingly in the administration of said act.

ISOLATED TRACT-PUBLIC SALE-NOTICE-CIRCULAR OF APRIL
11, 1895,

AMENDED.

Circular.

Registers and Receivers,

Gentlemen

:

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, July 3, 1905.
United States Land Offices.

Referring to the form of notice for publication to be
sales, as prescribed by circular of April 11, 1895

used in public land

(20 L. D., 305), I have to direct that hereafter when instructions are
from this office ordering into market, at public sale, any iso-

received

lated tract or tracts of land,

the day of the

you will not only specify in such notice
for such sale, but also the hour of

month and place

commencement of sale.
Very respectfully,
Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

J. H. Fimple,
Acting Commissioner.
•
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LANDS SEGREGATED FROM YOSEMITE NAT [ONAL PARK ANT) INCLUDED
IN SIERRA FOREST RESERVE—RIGHT <>I WAV V< T OF FJEBRTJ VKY 7
1905.

Circular.

Department oe the
Washington,

This act [February

7.

I).

[nteriqr,

0.,

1905, 33 Stat, 702], so far as

July
it

7,

use of the lands within the addition to the Sierra Forest

made by

it,

for right of

Provided, That

all

way

purposes,

is

1905.

relates to the

Reserve

as follows:

those tracts or parcels of lands described in section one
first, eighteen hundred and ninety, and not included

of the said act of October

within the metes and hounds of the land above described, he. and the same are
made part of the Sierra Forest Reserve: .1//'/ provided
further, That the Secretary of the Interior may require the payment of such
price as he may deem proper for privileges on the land herein segregated from
hereby, included in and

the Yosemite National Park and made a part of the Sierra Forest Reserve
accorded under the act approved February fifteenth, nineteen hundred and one,
relating to rights of way over certain parks, reservations, and other lands, and
other acts concerning rights of way over public lands: and the moneys received
from the privileges accorded on the lands herein segregated and included in the
Sierra Forest Reserve shall he paid into the Treasury of the United States, to
be expended, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, in the management, improvement, and protection of the forest lands herein set aside and
reserved, which shall hereafter be known as the "Yosemite National Park."
Sec. 2. That none of the lands patented and in private ownership in the area
hereby included in the Sierra Forest Reserve shall have the privileges of the
lieu-land scrip provisions of the land laws, hut otherwise to be in all respects
under the laws and regulations affecting the forest reserves, and immediately
upon the passage of this act all laws, rules, and regulations affecting forest
reservations, including the right to change the boundaries thereof by Executive
proclamation, shall take effect and be in force within the limits of the territory
excluded by this act from the Yosemite National Park, except as herein other-

wise provided.

The

several acts of Congress authorizing the use of lands within

forest reserves for right-of-way purposes are applicable to this por-

tion of the Sierra Forest Reserve, with the condition, however, that
the Secretary of the Interior

may

require the beneficiary to pay

a

suitable price for the privileges accorded therein.

The Department
upon

all

of Agriculture

is

vested with jurisdiction to pass

applications under any law of the United States providing

and use lands in a forest
which occupation or use is temporary in character, and which.
if granted, will in no wise affect the fee or cloud the title of the
United States should the reserve be discontinued. The Departmenl
for the granting of a permission to occupy'

reserve,

of the Interior

is

ing lands within

vested with jurisdiction over
a forest

all

applications affect

reserve the granting of which

easement running with the land.

Any

amounts

to

an

permission or license granted
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by the Agricultural Department is subject to any later disposal of
the lands by the Department of the Interior.
All applications for privileges other than of a temporary character
within the said addition to the Sierra Forest Reserve should be in
accordance with the regulations heretofore prescribed in similar cases.
Before final approval is given to any application for a privilege on
or over these lands, the Secretary of the Interior will fix the price
therefor and the

approval

When

is

the

payment thereof

will

be necessary before final

given.

payment

is

made

at the local land office, the receiver will

charge the amount paid on his
the same to his

list

of unearned

moneys and deposit

official credit

until he is advised of the allowance

or rejection of the application.

If the application be allowed, he will

money

into the Treasury to the credit of the special

fund
expended under the direction of the
/Secretary of the Interior in the management, improvement, and prozection of the Yosemite National Park; if rejected, the amount will
be returned to the applicant and a proper receipt taken therefor.
In addition to the foregoing, and before such application will be
approved, the applicant must expressly agree to enter into a contract
whereby he shall bind himself to make further annual payments
for such privilege should the Secretary of the Interior, upon conSuch
sideration of the facts in each particular case, so prescribe.
required,
shall
be
to
the
made
Secretary of the Intepayments when
rior, to be placed to the credit of the special fund provided for in the
act of February 7, 1905, to be expended in the management, improvement, and protection of the Yosemite National Park.
An applicant for the privilege of transporting persons and material
through the reserve to the Yosemite National Park will also be
required, when in the judgment of the Secretary of the Interior the
convenience of the public requires it, to file in the Department a stipulation agreeing to transport the cars of any other person or company
over its road upon the payment of such reasonable charge as may be
determined upon between the parties, or by the Secretary of the
cover the

provided for by

this act, to be

Interior.

E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

land withdrawn under act of june

17, 1902

-townsite.

Instructions.
Directions given relative to the survey, subdivision, appraisal and sale of certain

lands in Idaho within the irrigable area of the Minidoka reclamation project,
entry, except under the homestead law, for disposal in
accordance with the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902, and subsequently

withdrawn from

reserved by the President, under section 2380 of the Revised Statutes, as a

town

site.

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
Acting Secretary Campbell
(S. V. P.)

Your

reports of

May

Commissioner of
July 8, I!)').',.

to the

Office,

23, 1005,

and June

16,

Gi

fh<

1,

certain

ru ral
,

Land

E. V. B.

|

L905, as well as th

reports of the Director of the Geological Survey of

June

17

May

•

L905,

:'..

and June 3, 1905, relative to the survey and sale of
lands in Idaho that have been reserved by the President under
1905,

section 2380, Revised Statutes, as a townsite,

have been considered by

the Department.

The lands
lots 3

and

4,

reserved are

all

of section

15.

except the K.

J

SE.

j-,

and

section 22, T. 10 S., R. 23 E., B. M., Hailey," Idaho, con-

taining in the aggregate 632.70 acres. The order of reservation also
improperly embraced lands in section 16, belonging to the State of
Idaho, but the order was ineffective as to those lands, as the United
States had no jurisdiction and control over them, and they should
not be considered in making the survey of the townsite.
The lands being within the irrigable area and susceptible of reclamation from the irrigation works of the contemplated Minidoka
project, had formerly been withdrawn from entry, except under the
homestead law. for the purpose of being disposed of only in conformity with the provisions of the act of June 17. 1902 32 Stat.. 388)
and were thus placed directly under the control of the Reclamation
Service.
Subsequent!}^ upon the recommendation and advice of th"
Director of the Geological Survey that the lands in question were
suitable for townsite purposes and would become a center of population, they were reserved by the President under the following section
(2380) of the Revised Statutes:
(

The President is authorized to reserve from the public lands, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, town-sites on the shores of harbors, at the junction of
rivers, important portages, or any natural or prospective centers of population.

They were thereupon taken from under the immediate jurisdiction
and control of the Geological Survey and were restored to the control
of the General

Land

Office, as the

bureau provided by law for super

vising the survey and sale of such reservations as public lands of

tli«'

United States under the following provision (2381) of the Revised
Statutes:

When, in the opinion of the President, the public interests require it. ii shall
be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to cause any of such reservations,
or part thereof, to be surveyed into urban or suburban lots of suitable size,
by appraisement of disinterested persons their cash value, and in offer
bidder, and thence afterward
to be held subject to sale at private entry according to sudi regulations as the
Secretary of the Interior may prescribe; but no lot shall be disposed of at public
sale or private entry for less than the appraised value thereof; and all such

and

to tix

the

same

for sale at public outcry to the bighesl

sales shall be conducted by the register
r»is>4

— Vol.

::t

<>r>

m

—2

and receiver of the land

office

in

the
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which the reservation may he situated,

instructions of the Commissioner of the General

Land

in

accordance with the

Office.

It being desirable that the lands reserved should be opened for
occupancy as early as practicable, it becomes the duty of this Department to have them surveyed and subdivided into suitable lots, blocks,
streets, alleys and necessary reservations for public uses and to have

the lots appraised at their cash value and offered for sale at public

outcry to the highest bidder, and to provide by appropriate regulations for the disposal at private entry of the lands

remaining unsold

at the public offering.

You

will

therefore take immediate steps to have the exterior

boundaries of the reservation surveyed without regard to the State
lands adjoining, and to have the lands so segregated subdivided
into streets, alleys, blocks

for public parks as

had

may

and

lots

and

to lay out such reservations

be desirable for public use, due regard being

to the future necessities of the inhabitants of the townsite.

You

have the lots appraised by disinterested persons at their cash
value and have them offered for sale at public outcry to the highest
bidder for cash, the sale to be conducted by the register and receiver
in accordance with such instructions from your office as may be given.
The Director of the Geological Survey submits with one of his
reports a plat of a proposed subdivision of the townsite, which, as to
the streets, alleys, blocks, lots and reservations for parks indicated
thereon, appears to be free from objection, and no reason appears why
the suggestion may not be accepted by your office and the survey be
made accordingly. It is not intended by this suggestion to restrict
your office in the exercise of its judgment, but you are free to make
such recommendation as may seem advisable.
There is no authority under the act to make the other reservation
Avill

The

indicated upon the plat.
tion for public parks

power

may

to lay out streets

dedication of portions of the reserva-

be exercised as

and

a

necessary incident to the

alleys for the public use, but the

law

evidently contemplates that the lots and blocks shall be sold to the

highest bidder unless reserved for government purposes.

The

plat indicates that certain lots are to be used for particular

purposes.

The suggestion merely

indicated the reason for restricting

the area of the lots thus designated, and not that such condition be

imposed at the sale, as there is no authority to prescribe the purpose
for which any lot must be used.
In having the townsite surveyed you may make use of such service
as the Reclamation Service may be able to render, but it must be made
under your direction and subject to your approval. The mere fact
that the land reserved is within the irrigable area of an irrigation
project and susceptible of reclamation, makes no difference in the
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proceedings for the disposal of the lands.
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be disposed of

as all other lands reserved for townsite purposes under section 2380.

After the approval of the survey, the land-

will be offered for sale

bidder for cash after the usual notice, and the land
remaining unsold at the public offering will thereafter be subject to
private cash entry under such regulations as may hereafter be preThere is no authority to sell any such lands except for cash.
scribed.
The law requiring that they shall be appraised at their cash value,
to the highest

necessarily implies that they shall be sold for cash.

Northern Pacific Railway

Co.

Motion for review of departmental decision of June 8. 1905, 33
by Acting Secretary Campbell, July 12, 1905.

L. D., 601, denied

RIGHT OF

W AY— ALASKAN
A. B.

The provisions

LANDS—SEC.

6

ACT

<>I

MAY

14, 1898.

W. Mining Company.
May

18 .)S. conferring upon the Secthe owner or owners of a wagon
road or tramway, not to exceed twenty acres of* public land, for terminal
of section 6 of the act of

retary of the Interior authority to
facilities, at

in the lands,

14,

(

sell to

each end of the road, contemplates the sale of an absolute fee
and where the lands, at the date applied for, are included

within a forest reserve, they are not subject to sale under said section, notwithstanding the wagon road or tramway in connection with which they .ire
desired may have been constructed prior to»the creation of the reserve.
In view of the provisions of the act of February

r.)n.~>,
1.
transferring to the
Secretary of Agriculture the execution of certain laws affecting public
lands within the limits of forest reserves, and the construction placed upon
that act by the Secretary of the Interior and concurred in by the Secretary
of Agriculture, applications for permits for use of rights of way within forof the
est reserves on account of wagon roads or tramways, under section
<*»

act of

May

14, 1898,

come within the

jurisdiction ami control of the Secre-

tary of Agriculture.

Acting Secretary Campbell to fix- Commissiont
(S. V. P.)
Offl'rr. Jul;, 12, 1905.

The A.

/

of the Gt

n< ral
(

F.

L>m<l

W.

( J.

)

W. Mining Company

has appealed from your office (Incision of May 3, L904, refusing to submit, with favorable recommendation, its application for the issue of a permit under section 6 of the
act of May 14, L898 (30 Stat., 409, 411). on account of its constructed
I).

tramway, as shown upon it- map accompanying it- application,
having a length of L.59 milesj and rejecting it> application i<» purchase

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
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two certain

tracts of land, as terminals to said

11.886 acres

and 20

tramway, covering

acres, respectively, for the reason that the lands

by the several applications are within the limits of the withdrawal made by proclamation August 20, 1902, creating the Alexander Archipelago Forest Reserve in the Juneau land district,
Alaska, said reserve having been created under the provisions of secaffected

tion 24 of the act of

March

3,

1891 (26 Stat,, 1095).

appeal the mining company claims to be the owner of certain mining properties on Prince of Wales Island, Alaska, about one
mile from the shore of Hollis Bay and on an arm of Kassan Bay;

In

its

autumn of 1901 the company constructed

that during the

a

tramway

and reduction works to the beach, which was prior to
the creation of the forest reserve, and it is urged that the subsequent

from

its

mill

action creating such reserve should not affect

its

rights previously

acquired under the act of 1898.

By

section 7 of the act of 1898

That

this act shall not apply to

it is

provided

any lands within the

park, Indian, or other reservation unless such right of

limits of

way

any military,

shall be provided for

by act of Congress.

Section 6 of the act of 1898 provides that the Secretary of the Interior

may

issue a permit

use of a right of

way

by instrument

in writing authorizing the

over the public domain in the district of Alaska

By the same
owner or owners
of any such wagon road or tramway not to exceed twenty acres of
for the construction of

section the Secretary

is

wagon roads and tramways.

also authorized to sell to the

public land at each terminal, at the rate of $1.25 per acre, evidently

designed for terminal
use of right of

way

facilities.

The

right given under a permit for

issued under this section for the construction of

wagon road or tranrway, is separate and distinct from the right to
purchase grounds for terminal facilities. The latter contemplates
an absolute fee in the lands, and the fact that such lands are, at the
date applied for, included within a forest reserve is a sufficient bar
a

to the purchase.

Your

decision, in so far as

tions for terminal grounds,

is,

it

rejected the applica-

for that reason, affirmed,

and in

this

noted that the lands applied for seem to be largely
in excess of what would seem to be needed when the actual length of
the road is considered.
With regard to the application for permit for the use of the right
of way .actually occupied by the constructed tramway, in view of the
provisions of the act of February 1, 1905 (33 Stat., 628), transferring
connection

it is

to the Secretary of the

Department of Agriculture the execution of

certain of the laws affecting public lands within the limits of forest
reserves, the departmental letter of

June

8, last,

addressed to the Sec-

retary of Agriculture, defining the jurisdictions of the two depart-

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

21

and privileges within such reserves,
from
the
and of the letter
Secretary of Agriculture, dated June L3,
last, assenting, this Department is of opinion that the question as to
the future occupation of the reserve by the tramway in question ls a
matter for consideration by the Secretary of Agriculture, and. for
this reason, it is directed that the papers relating to the application
in question be forwarded to the Secretary of Agriculture, with a copy
incuts over the granting of rights

of this decision, and that the applicant

company

be fully advised in

the premises.

military bounty land warrant— unoffered land- equitable
adjudication
.

Roy McDonald.
Where the only objection
location, made in good

to confirmation of a military bounty land warrant

faith, is the purely technical one that through inadvertence of the land department the land covered thereby was never for-

mally offered at public sale under the provisions of the act of July t. L876,
it should have been, of which fact the locator was ignorant, the location
may be referred to the Board of Equitable Adjudication for confirmation
under Rule 11.

as

Act 'nig Secretary Campbell
(S. V. P.)

Commissioner of the General Land
July 12, 1905.
J. R. W.

to the

Office,

(

Roy McDonald appealed from your decision of November 25, 190-1,
him to show cause why his location of bounty land warrant

requiring
!

L5,547 should not be canceled as to the

T. 4 S., R. 22 W., La. M.,

April

7,

L903,

115,547, one

SE.

New

Roy McDonald

hundred and sixty

J of the NAY. '.and the X.

The warrant was issued
701 ). to the widow of a
for service in the

SE.

NW,

I of the

i, Sec. 6,

Orleans, Louisiana.
located military bounty land warrant
acres,
|

on the S\V.

of the SE.

tinder the act of

],

Sec.

March

XK.

].

the

S., R.

22

W.

of the

\

6,

T.

1

L855

3,

(

10 Stat..

soldier of the First Mississippi Volunteers,

Mexican war, and was locatable only on lands sub-

minimum

or graduated price.
Stat.. 66),
was by the act of June 21, L866
withdrawn from disposal except under the homestead law. and upon
1!> Stat.. 7:')). it
repeal of that restriction by the act of July 1. ls7C>
was provided

ject to entry at the

All the land located

(

1

1

(

That the repeal of said section shall not have the effect to Impair the right,
complete or inchoate, of any homestead settler, and no land occupied by such
settler at the time that this act shall take effed shall he subject 1" entry, pre
emption, or sale: .\>i<l provided, 'That the public lands affected by this act shall
he offered at public sale as soon as practicable, from time to time ami according to the provisions of existing law. and shall not he subject to private entrj
until they are so offered.
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The subdivision here in question never was offered at public sale
under the act of 1876, supra, and your office held that by express terms
of that act it did not again become subject to entry and was not subject to location under the warrant.
The appeal alleges error in holding that a military bounty land
warrant will not take an unoffered tract of public land which is generally subject to disposal under the general laws.
The restriction of the right of location to land subject to private
entry was, as the law then stood, for protection of the United States
against appropriation of public lands before it had opportunity to
realize a better price by offering its lands at public sale.
What was
intended was to grant as a bounty so much land as was expressed in
the warrant of lands subject to private appropriation generally at the
minimum or lower graduated price. The provisions of the act of
1876, supra, had no other purpose than to protect settlers and to protect the United States in obtaining a higher price, by another offer
The latter object has been abandoned and the land
at public sale.
can not be offered, since the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854),
withdrew all lands from sale except in the State of Missouri. There
is no doubt but that the location was made in good faith, that the case
is meritorious, and that objection to approval of the location is purely
the technical one that the land, through some inadvertence of the land
department, was never formally reoffered under the act of 1876, of
which fact the locator was ignorant.
In view of the Department the case is therefore within the principles announced in the cases of J. M. McDonald (15 L. D., 257), and
Pecard v. Camens et al. (4 L. D., 152), and the case will be referred to
the Board of Equitable Adjudication for confirmation under the 11th
rule, promulgated October 3, 1846.

SWAMP LAND—ADJUSTMENT-CHARACTER OF LAND.
Culligan

v.

State of Minnesota.

In the adjustment of all claims for public lands in the State of Minnesota
initiated in accordance with law prior to survey of the lands, in instances
where selection thereof is made by the State under its swamp land grant,

and the

field notes of survey afford a sufficient basis for such selection, the
land department will, by hearing or otherwise, determine the true character
of the lands, notwithstanding the return of the field notes of survey of the

township.

Acting Secretary Campbell to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S.V.P.)
(G. B. G.)
Office, July 13,1905.

Departmental decision of April 14, 1904 (not reported), affirmed
your office decision of June 17, 1904, which rejected the application

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
of Patrick Culligan to contest the

swamp

23

land selection- of the State

of Minnesota to certain lands in sections 25 and 26, town-hip 57 north.
district. Minnesota, more particularly
your said office decision. A motion for review of Indecision was filed by Culligan and duly entertained, November 29,

range 8 west. Diihith land
described

in

i

1<)04.

The

decision complained of

was ruled under

general regulations given by this Department
65), for the future adjustment of the

T).,

direction \o. 2 of the

March

swamp

L6,

L903 (32 L.

land grant to the

State of Minnesota, which direction was as follows:
(2) All existing contests or controversies in which there is no claim of
actual and bona fide homestead or pre-emption settlement, will he disposed of

under the original plan of following the

tield notes,

there being nothing

in sucl;

contests or controversies which would equitably entitle the claimants adverse

have the contest disposed of under the rule announced
Lachance decision.

to the State to

in the

1 of these same regulations provides that
all exist innand controversies between the State and an actual and bona
fide homestead or pre-emption settler shall be disposed of under the
rule announced in the "Lachance decision" (4 L. I).. 17*.)). which
was, by ordering a hearing, to afford such homestead or pre-emption
claimant an opportunity to prove the character and condition of the

Direction No.

contests

1

land involved at the date of the

Minnesota.
that

all

11)08),

There

is

swamp

land grant to the State of

also a further direction (No. 4)

respecting the

swampy

or

which provides

March 16,
non-swampy character of lands in

contests or controversies thereafter begun

(after

said State, whether theretofore or thereafter surveyed, shall be determined by the field-notes of survey.
The motion for review admits that the decision complained of i< in
strict

accord with these regulations, but asks that the regulation- be

reformed.

After most careful consideration, and upon a more comprehensive
view of the subject, it is believed that the regulations in question
should be amended to afford relief in cases of the character here
presented.

The claim of Culligan arose upon certain forest lieu selections
under the act of June 4, 1<S .)7 (30 Stat., 11, 36), and a selection by
the Northern Pacific Railway Company under the act of March 2,
1S!)
(30 Stat., <)<>:*, 994), and upon the subsequent assignment of the
(

(

.)

claims to him.

The

acts

in

question

authorized

the

selection

of

unsurveyed lands, and the selections in question were in Pact made
prior to the survey of the township in which they arc situated, and
were in fact a mere exchange of lands. At the date of the selections
it

was not known, and

not possible to

know

or surmise, that the field

THE PUBLIC LANDS.
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notes of the survey to be thereafter

The

made would

designate these lands

were without other notice of the
character of this land than such as resulted from an examination
upon the ground. It is sufficiently alleged that such examination
was made and showed the land in controversy to be high and dry, and
not swamp, and movant asks that he be permitted to show this at a
as

swamp.

selectors, therefore,

hearing.
It is

and

thought that in equity and good conscience this should be done,

it is

so ordered.

In the further adjustment of all claims heretofore or hereafter
initiated in accordance with law for public lands in the State of
Minnesota, prior to the survey thereof, in instances where a selection
of such lands is made by the State under its swamp land grant, and
the field-notes of survey afford a sufficient basis for such selection,
your office will, by hearing, or otherwise, determine the true character
of the land, notwithstanding the return in the field-notes of survey of
the township.

townsite entry—trustee— section

2387,

revised statutes.

Bena Tow nsite.
t

The term

"

judge of the county court for the county," employed in section 2387
make townsite entry under said section, as trustee for the several use and benefit of
the occupants of the townsite, embraces any presiding judicial officer of a
court having jurisdiction within the county; and where any one of several
officers coming within the purview of the statute is designated by the State
legislature as the proper officer to assume the trust and make the entry,
such designation is entitled to be recognized by the officers of the land
department.

of the Revised Statutes to designate the officer authorized to

Acting Secretary Campbell to the Commissioner of the General Land
(S. V. P.)
(J. R. W.)
Office, July IS, 1905.

The Bena Townsite

settlers

appealed from your decision of April

14, 1905, rejecting the application

of

W.

S.

McClenahan

as

''

Judge of

the District (County) Court in and for Cass County, Minnesota," to
make entry of the SW. J NW. J, W. ± SW. i, Sec/26, SE. I SE. },
Sec. 27, and NE. J, Sec. 34, T. 145 N., R. 28 W., 5th P. M., Cass Lake,
Minnesota, as the Bena Townsite.
The only matter presented by the appeal is the question whether
under the laws of the United States and of Minnesota the judge of

the district court having jurisdiction within the county wherein

is

an urban settlement upon public lands, or the probate judge of such
county, is the proper officer, as trustee to the several use of the occupants, to

make

the townsite entry.
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was filed in the Local office the declaratory
statement of "W. S. McClenahan, Judge of the District (County)
Court, in and for Cass County." Minnesota, that
October

27, 1903, there

:

about twenty persons have on the 19th day of October, L903, settled upOD and
occupied as a townsite the description .... and I do hereby declare my
intention to claim the said tracts of land as and for a townsite in trust for the
several use

aud

benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective

interests.

November

22, 1904, the local office rejected the application, because

(1) the land

was not

cant as district judge

subject to townsite entry,
is

not authorized to

ber 23, 1904, he appealed to your

June

27, 1904, J.

and

make such

(2) that appli-

entry.

Decem-

office.

G. McGarry, "judge of the probate (county)

court of Cass county, Minnesota,'' filed a like statement, which the

June 29, 1904, because it was instructed, Decemno entries, or other disposition of these lands,
which were temporarily withdrawn and reserved for forestry purposes under the act of June 27, 1902 (32 Stat., 400, 402). McGarry
local office rejected,

ber

2,

1903, to allow

took no appeal.

April

14, 1905,

your

office

affirmed the action of the local

office,

and held that the
judges of the District Courts of Minnesota are not authorized under sections
2387 and 2388, U. S. Rev. Stat., to act as trustees for townsite occupants of the
public land .... but their action in rejecting the declaratory statement filed by

Judge McGarry

is

hereby reversed.

May 15, 1905, Judge McClenahan withdrew his application, and
June 10, 1905, notified the local office that such action was inadvertent and should not be considered as effective. June 13, 1905. lie filed
his appeal and authority to counsel to represent him before the
Department.
Section 2387 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides

:

Whenever any portion of the public lands have been or may lie settled upon
and occupied as a town-site, not subject to entry under the agricultural preemption laws, it is lawful, in case such town be incorporated, for the corporate
authorities thereof, and. if not incorporated, for the judge of the county court
for the county in which such town is situated, to enter at the proper land office,
and at the minimum price, the land so settled and occupied in trust for the
several use and benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective
interests; the execution of which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in such
town, and the proceeds of the sales thereof, to be conducted under such regulations as
in

may

he prescribed by the legislative authority of the State or Territory

which the same may be situated.

The term "county
a

court "

is

clearly not intended to he the

particular court, for the statute

operative in

all

is

general and

i-

name

intended

States where'there are public land-, and

in

<>l

to be

many such
The

States, as Minnesota, there are no courts known by thai name.
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words " judge of the county court for the county " can have no other
meaning than the presiding judicial officer of a court having jurisIn designating the judge of the county

diction within the county.

court Congress sought to assure that the trustee should be a person

of sound discretion and integrity.

The statute does not provide for the administration of the trust,
but merely for protection of the interests of the United States in requiring payment for the lands thus appropriated by urban settlement. It leaves the administration of the trust arising from a community appropriation of public lands to the local authority, by providing that the trustee shall administer his trust " under such regulations as

may

be prescribed by the legislative authority of the State

or Territory in which the same

Under the
court named

may

be situated."

judicial system of the State of Minnesota there

There

the county court.

which are county

courts,

exist

at least three

and have original jurisdiction

is

no

courts

to adjudicate

rights of persons or rights in property arising in the county within

which, and for which they

The

has original jurishundred dollars
than
one
more
and of criminal causes punishable by fine of more than one hundred
dollars, or imprisonment for more than three months; (2) justices
of the peace whose jurisdiction is limited to causes below that of
the district court and not involving title to real estate; (3) the probate court with jurisdiction of estates of decedents and persons under
guardianship. While the legislature is empowered to establish other
courts, and so might have established a county court by name, it has
not done so, and the district court is the only court under the judicial
system of that State having general civil and criminal jurisdiction
throughout the county. It may more appropriately be regarded as
the county court than either of the others, the jurisdiction of which
is inferior and more narrowly limited.
The legislature by an act now codified under chapter 42, Official
Trusts, Statutes of Minnesota 1894, section 4255, has provided
sit.

district court

diction of all civil causes involving

When

the corporate authorities of any town, or the judge of the district court

for any county in

which any town

is

situated, enter, at the proper land-office,

the land or any part of the land settled and occupied as the site of such town,
pursuant to and by virtue of the provisions of the act of congress, entitled "An
act for the relief of the citizens of towns upon the lands of the United States
under certain circumstances," passed May 23d, A. D. 1854, such corporate
authorities, or judge (as the case may be), shall dispose of and convey the
title to such lands, or to the several blocks, lots, parcels or shares thereof, to
the persons hereinafter described, and in the manner hereinafter specified.

This act recognizes the judge of the district court of the county to
officer under the judicial system of that

be the proper person and the
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State intended and designated by the act of Congress as judge of the
"county court." The date of this act is not given, but it is clear
that this legislation was of early date, as it appears in the case of
Village of Mankato v. Meagher 17 Minn.. 26'5, 270), that the townsite of the village of Mankato was entered by the district judge,
L2 Minn.
trustee, March 21, L856,and in Carson v. Smith
Spencer
546, 552), the townsite of Winona was entered by the district judge
It thus appears that the district court
as trustee August L6, L855.
judge was not only recognized by the State legislature to be "the
judge of the county court " within the meaning of the townsite act.
hut that the land department at least fifty years ago also recognized
him as the proper officer in that State to make entry under the statNo reason appears to make a change in the practice that has
ute.
now obtained for more than half a century and under which rights
(

—

(

have grown up.
Nothing in the published departmental decisions is inconsistent
with regarding the judge of the district court, in Minnesota, as the
"judge of the county court" within the meaning of the townsite
legislation of Congress.
The case of Woodruff Townsite (15 L. D.,

was made by the
no court named by
law " the county court/' The legislature of Utah provided that for
the purpose of selections of townsites the probate judge of any county
" shall he deemed and is hereby designated as the judge of the county
court for such county."
There were then in Utah two courts of
jurisdiction throughout the county: (1) the district court of general
jurisdiction, and (2) probate courts with jurisdiction in decedents'
In desigestates, guardianship, "and like matters."' and in divorce.
nating the probate judge as judge of the county court for purposes
of townsite entry, the legislature did no more than to designate which
one of two official incumbents it deemed the proper officer to be
charged with the trust. The land department accepted that designation made by the local legislative authority.
In Cofield v. McClelland (16 Wall.', 331), Congress specially
authorized the probate judge of Arapahoe county to make the entry
As Congress had plenary power, the case is not per13 Stat., 94).
tinent here.
Congress might name any person or officer as such
trustee, and his acceptance of the trust would authorize such entry.
In Montana, there being no "county court " by name established by
law, the local legislature (Laws of Montana. L869, p. s <>) designated
205) arose in Utah Territory, and the townsite entry

probate judge.

There existed

in that Territory

-

(

"

The judge

site entry.

of the probate court " a- the proper officer to
In

ment wherein

Ashby
title

v.

and

make town-

119 U. S., 52(1), in an action of ejectthe validity of the entry were necessarily

Hall

(

involved, the court upheld an entry

made by such

officer.
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In Kansas there was no county court established with such name.

The probate

court was limited to settlement of estates of decedents,

matters of guardianship, indenture of apprentices and habeas corpus

The act of October 31,
p. 325).
made it the duty of the probate judge to make
In McTaggart /'.Harrison (12 Kan., 62, 66) the
a townsite entry made by such officer was lawful

(Compiled Laws, Kansas, 1873,
1868

(ib.,

1873, p. 972),

townsite entries.
court held that

under the laws of the United States, and his duty under the State
law. Sherry v. Sampson (11 Kansas, 611) was an action of ejectment to recover possession of a lot in a town entered by the probate

The

judge.

court held

" in one sense is a " county court."
And it would seem
from the action of the government that the words, " county court," as used in
said act, were intended to mean any county court by whatever name such court
might be known, and whether it was a county court for probate matters only, or
whether it was a county court for general, common-law, chancery, or other juris-

The

"

probate court

diction.

No

known to the Department is inconsistThe purport and intent of the townsite act is that
the several occupants shall be made by the judge

well considered decision

ent with this view.

an entry

in trust to

of a court having jurisdiction over the county where the land

This

fulfils all

lies.

the conditions respecting the qualification of the trus-

If there be several such persons, judges of different courts having jurisdiction over the cQimty, no objection lies in any legislation

tee.

of Congress against designation of the particular officer

b}^

local

and Kansas cases. It is not an
objection that the legislature of Minnesota designated the judge of
the district court, instead of following the legislatures of Utah and
Kansas by designating the probate judge. Had those States designated the presiding officer of some other court of jurisdiction over the
county, such designation would have been equally conclusive.
So that the officer designated by local authority is within the general description of the act of Congress and is the judge of a judicial
tribunal having jurisdiction of the county wherein the townsite is
situated, all requisite conditions imposed by Congress are met, and
such designation is entitled to be recognized by the officers of the
land department. In the particular case here, the judge of the district court, and not the judge of the j^robate court, was charged with
the duty of assuming the trust and making the entry, and his application should be received and that of McGarry rejected.
law, as

Your

was done

in the Colorado

decision

reversed.

is
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17, 1902.

Instructions.
Lands held by virtue of a desert land entry arc held in private ownership within
the meaning of the act of June 17. 1902, and the entryman or his assignee
is entitled to the same rights and privileges and is subject to the same con
ditions and limitations, so far as the right to the use of water is concerned,
as any other owner of lands within the irrigable area of an irrigation
project constructed under the provisions of said act.

Acting Secretary Campbell

to the

The Department has considered
letter of

Director of the Geological Survi >/.
(E. F. B.)

July U, 1905.

(S. V. P.)

June

the suggestions contained in your

1905, relative to the right of a desert land

6,

entryman

water from irrigation works to
be constructed by the government under the act of June 17, 1902 32
to subscribe for a right to the use of

i

Stat., 388).

It is

assumed that the land referred to

is

within the irrigable area

of a contemplated project, but having been entered prior to with-

drawal is not subject to disposal under the provisions of the reclamation act and can only be brought under its provisions by cancellation of the entry, from voluntary relinquishment or otherwise, in
which event it would immediately .become subject to disposal only
under the provisions of that act, according to such units and areas
as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior.
An incipient entry under the desert land act confers more than an

The

payment of the purchase money
which thereby vests in the entryman an
equitable right to the land, subject to be divested by failure to perform conditions subsequent, in which event the act declares "the lands
shall revert to the United States, and the twenty-five cents advanced
payment shall be forfeited to the United States, and the entry -hall
inchoate right.

with the

initial

act requires part

entry,

be cancelled."
Until such forfeiture has been incurred, the entryman has an
equitable right or interest in the land which can be ripened into a
perfect title by fulfilling the conditions required by the act. am! may
transfer and assign such right and interest in the entry to another,

who will by such assignment succeed to all the rights ami interest
and assume all the obligations of the original entryman.
While such entrymen or assignees arc not invested with the legal
title, they have such an equitable right and interest in the land as
to constitute them proprietors within the spirit and purpose o\ the
act of June IT. L902, and the right to the use of water ma\ be granted
to such proprietors if they bring themselves within that provision oi

the act that

"no

right to the use of water for hind in private

own-
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ership shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres

any one landowner, and no such sale shall be made to any landowner unless he be an actual bona fide resident on such land, or occuto

pant thereof residing in the neighborhood of said land."
If the entry is for more than 160 acres of land, the entryman cannot secure the benefit of the act unless he relinquishes the excess, as no
assignment of a portion of the entry will be recognized. (Luther J.
Prior, 32 L. D., 608.)

With regard
desert land act,

same
that

to the limit of time for
it is

difficulty is
is

making

final

proof under the

not advisable to anticipate that question.

presented in entries under the homestead law.

necessary to determine at present

is

The
All

that lands entered under

the desert land law are to be considered as lands in private owner-

ship and the entryman or assignees under such entries are to be
treated in the

manner contemplated by the

act for the

owners of

lands.

residence-abandonment-official employment.

Ray
The

v.

Shirley.

fact that a homestead entryman holds an official position the duties of
which are required to be performed at some place other than on the land
embraced in his entry, constitutes no sufficient excuse for his absence from
the claim, unless it be shown that his absence is actually due to his official
position or employment.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

June

to

IT, 1899,

Edward

Commissioner of the General Land
(E. P.)
July 17, 1905.

the

Office,

E. Shirley

made homestead

entry of the

E. i of the SW. J, the SE. J of the NW. J, and the SW. \ of the
SE. i of Sec. 4, T. 17 N., R. 21 W., Kingfisher land district, OklaS. Ray, on June
charging that the entryman

homa, against which entry Walter
affidavit of contest;

1,

1903, filed an

for on or about two years last past and next prior to this date has not resided
upon said land, but has made his home in the town of Grand, O. T., with his
family that he has abandoned residence on said land for on or about two years
last past, and has offered to sell to divers parties and is now holding it for sale
and offering it on the market that he has not made his home on the land for
about 2 years last past, but lived with his family elsewhere, and that said
alleged absence from the said land was not due to his employment in the Army,
Navy, or Marine Corps of the United States, etc.
;

;

Notice issued June
local officers

1,

September

1903, citing the parties to appear before the
8,

1903,

and submit testimony, which notice

was, on July 12, 1903, duly served upon the defendant at the town of
Grand, Oklahoma. After various proceedings not necessary to be
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here set forth, the testimony on behalf of the plaintiff was submitted
before the local officers November 20, 1903, and that on behalf of the

defendant, December

7,

1903, before the clerk of the District Court of

Day County, Oklahoma,

the respective parties being represented at

both places by attorney.

The

local officers

found that the defendant had fully complied with

the requirements of the homestead law, from the date of his entry
until about the first of October, 1901,
sheriff of

Day County,

when, having been asked by the

the county wherein the land involved

is

situ-

become a deputy or under-sheriff, the defendant removed to
the town of Grand, the county seat of Day County, and was appointed
deputy or under-sheriff, the duties of which office required him to
reside at the county seat; that he continued to hold this office from
the date of his appointment thereto until the filing of the affidavit of
contest, during which time he cultivated the land embraced in his
They held that the defendant's residence in the town of
entry.
Grand, being necessary in order to enable him to perform the duties
ated, to

of the

office

of under-sheriff, should be construed to be constructive

residence on the land, and that, therefore, his absence from the land

was, under the circumstances, excusable, citing the case of A. E. Flint
(G L. D., 668),

When

wherein

it

was held (syllabus)

:

a bona fide settler has established a residence,

away by

official

and is afterwards called
duty which requires his presence at the county scat, such

absence shall not work a forfeiture of his rights.

The

local officers therefore

recommended that the

contest be dis-

missed.

On
your

appeal by the plaintiff, the action of the local
office

decision of

January

24, 1905, affirmed,

officers

was, by

from which decision

now appeals to the Department.
The testimony in this case shows that between June

the plaintiff

date of his entry, and October

1,

17,

189*.).

the

1901, the defendant placed on the

a half dugout, fourteen by sixand about eight feet high, built of boxing lumber, and containing a door, two half windows, and a " gyp " floor; an open >t rawcovered shed, ten by twenty-eight feet, used as a stable; a storm cave
or dugout, ten by ten feet, with one door; a drilled well, something
over 100 feet deep, cased with tubing and supplied with a pump:
another drilled well about 90 feet deep, from which no water was
obtained; a piece enclosed by three-wire fence, and used as corrall;
feed racks for stock: abc .t 100 acres enclosed by two-wire U'Wi-i'i
between fifty and sixty acres of breaking; and an orchard covering
about an acre, planted in the spring of L901, but which was killed by

land the following improvements:

teen feet

dry weather or by stock before the fall of that year. These improvements are variously estimated by the witnesses t<> he worth from
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preponderance of the testimony, however, being
worth between $500 and $600.
In July, 1899, the defendant established his residence on the
land, and thereafter continuously resided there until October 1, 1901,
during which time he appears to have been engaged in cultivating
about fifty acres of the land, caring for his stock, consisting of about
fifty head of cattle and a pair of mules, and conducting a store in a
building on his land, wherein he sold dry goods, groceries and drugs,
and also had a postoffice, of which he w as postmaster.
In the spring of 1901, the defendant, owing to the operation of the
" herd law," was compelled to send what is called his " stock " cattle
away from the vicinity of the land for pasturage. It further appears
that about July, 1901, he resigned the office of postmaster and disposed of his stock of merchandise, and the building in which the
store and postoffice was conducted, to one Bridwell, who thereupon
$300

to $1200, the

to the effect that they are

T

removed the building from the land.
October

1,

1901, the defendant

moved with

his family, consisting

of his wife and two children, to the town of Grand, the county seat

Day County,

the county wherein the land is situated, and opened
About two weeks after removing to Grand, the sheriff
of Day County appointed the defendant under-sheriff, and since
removing to Grand he has continuously resided there with his family,
conducting his drug business and performing such duties as w ere
from time to time assigned to him by the sheriff, in the meantime
making infrequent visits, each of very short duration, to the land.
During this period the land was either rented or a portion thereof
cultivated on shares. No additional improvements were placed on
the land by or for the defendant after he removed therefrom, Octoof

a

drug

store.

T

ber

1,

1901.

D. Howard, testifies that prior to leaving the
land the defendant stated to him that he could not make any money
farming; that after the defendant had removed to Grand the witness
Plaintiff's witness J.

had a conversation with him in his drug-store during the course of
which the defendant asked the witness if he knew of anyone who
would buy his land, stating that if the witness could find, or send
him, such a purchaser, he would pay the witness for so doing.
Plaintiff's witness W. H. Clem, testifies that about a year prior to
moving away from the land the defendant had tried to sell the claim,
that he told witness to sell it for him; that he instructed witness to
sell it

for $1,000, offering witness $50 if he could find a purchaser;

away that on
one occasion, in the spring of 1903, when the witness was in the
defendant's place of business, the defendant told the witness that
" he was deputized deputy sheriff so that he wouldn't have to stay
on his farm."
that the defendant appeared to be very anxious to get

;
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witness J.

Plaintiff's

testifies

that

33

shortly after the

defendant moved to Grand, the defendant told the witness that " he
had been sworn in as deputy to hold his claim down, of to help him
hold his claim down, or something like that."

W.

Plaintiff's witness

him

told

Howard,

defendant said

that the

it;

eel!

L.

testifies that the

defendant has

was for sale, that he wanted to
he was no fanner: that early in the

several times that the land

spring of L903, the witness had

a

his place of business in Grand,

when

conversation with the defendant
the defendant said that "

wasn't for holding his place down, he wouldn't have that

office

at

if it

and a

dollar."

The defendant
ber

he first went to Grand about Septemwas then looking round to see if he could gel
and had previously had some conversation about the
testifies that

L901; that he

1,

something

to do,

business; that on the occasion of this visit to Grand' he partially

dru<>-

engaged the room afterwards occupied by him as a residence and
drug store, and after his return home he notified the owners of the
building that he would take the room: that his commission as underthat during the first year'
sheriff was dated about October 10. 1901
that he was in Grand he does not know whether he spent the greater
pari of his time attending to his drug business or not; that he always
:

first; that he would not swear
months that he conducted the drug business
at Grand, he spent on an average two days a week in the sheriff's
office or in working under the sheriff; that he has never kept account
of the time spent by him in the performance of official duties; that
he was offered the position of under-sheriff about September 1, 1901,
when on his first visit to Grand; that his purpose in holding the
that
office was that he thought he could make some money out of it
he has never told Brown, the plaintiff's witness, that he was holding

attended to the dirties of under-sheriff
that during the

first

ten

:

the office of under-sheriff in order that he might be enabled to remain

the land; that he

off

1903; he was asked
his

mind

was not holding his land

if

is

it

move away from

to

for sale on

not true that about the time he

June

1.

made up

the land, either before or since such

removal, he had not told someone that he wanted to

sell his homestead,
and replied: " 1 might at some time when discouraged made some off
handed remark like that I don't know."
Sheriff Smith testified on behalf of the defendant as follow-:
:

Q.

What are

A.

It

is

can do as

his

the duties of under-sheriff,

duty

to care for the office in

<>r

some

my

of

them?

absence and do any work that

How

long has Mr. Shirley hoen under-sheriff, if you know V
know just the date: it was aboul a week,
know as
weeks, after he moved to Grand that
put him in as under-sheriff.
Q.

\.

I

sheriff.

I

don't

I

I

r>i!)4— Vol.

»4— 05 m

,

:

3

maybe two
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Had Re done any special deputy work for yon prior
He had.
How many deputies have you working under yon

Q.

A.
Q.

to that time?

or have you

had

for

about the last two years and prior to the first of last June?
A. Eight, I think that is, eight all the time.
Q. Do you divide the work equally between these deputies, or have you one
or two that does the most of the work for you?
A. Mr. Shirley does most of the work.
Q. In the last two years ean you state about the amount of fees earned by
Mr. Sbirley as under-sheriff as shown by your books?
A. He is on a salary of twenty dollars per month and he gets his fees when
bis cases is settled, and I have never run them up to see how much it is,
Q. Has he been a good, competent deputy or under-sheriff since holding that
office, under you?
;

A.
Q.

He

*******

Q.

own

called

upon him

to

do any

official

work since he held that

that he has refused to do?

office

A.

has.

Have you ever
I

have

not.

Did Mr. Shirley

solicit the

commission or did you give

it

to

him

of your

selection?

when I first talked to him about
A, I gave it to him of my own selection
taking the commission he said lie didn't know whether he would like the work
or not, and afterwards I got him to take it.
Q. When was this talk with him that you speak of was it before he moved
;

;

to

Grand, or after?

was before he moved.
did you want him to take a commission under you?
A. He was talking of coming to town to go into the drug business and at
that time there was no one in Grand suitable to fill that position outside of men
that was in business and none of them would accept it.
A. It
Q.

Why

CROSS-EXAMINATION.

you if during the first few months, say *or a period of from four
months after Mr. Shirley moved to town, if Virgil Williams wasn't remaining in town and remaining off from his homestead on the strength of the
fact that he held a commission of deputy under you?
A. He was in town, and done some work as deputy sheriff, but wasn't remaining off from his place on account of holding the commission. He was on
his place part of the time and part of the time in town.
Q. I will ask

to six

*******
*******

you if during the first year or more after Mr. Shirley moved to
Grand, if Alex Hutchinson, who remained in Grand all of the time and held a
homestead ten miles or more from Grand, was not a regularly appointed
deputy sheriff under you ?
A. Mr. Hutchinson was at work for part of the time he worked for Bigelow
and Hale and part of the time for Mr. Cupp and was here all of the time and I
gave him a commission as deputy sheriff in case that me and the other deputies
were out of town, there would be an officer left in town.
Q. I will ask

—
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When

did you commence to pay him [Shirley] twenty dollars per month?
Why.
commenced paying him twenty dollars a month as soon as he
commenced handling the books altogether.
Q.

A.

I

Q.

When

did he begin handling the books altogether?

A.

Along

last

January,

believe.

I

REDIRECT EXAMINATION.

you appointed .Mr. Shirley as under-sheriff and since
been necessary for him, or the party holding that office, to
reside at the county seat?
Q. .Mr. Smith, at the time

that time, has
A. It

it

is.

RECROSS-EXAM [NATION.
Q.

came

true, is

It

is

to

town

that

it

lie

vate business of his
A.

not. Mr.

Smith, that during the first year after Mr. Shirley
all of his time to the drug store or to other pri-

gave almost

own?

done considerable work

lie

what portion

for

me

-considerable riding.

work during the ten months
coming to Grand?
couldn't give any estimate of how much, hut he went every time
asked
never paid any attention to the exact
go; he was always ready and

Q. Tell

of his time he spent in your

next after his
A.

him

I

to

amount

I

I

of time he put in

:

I

couldn't

tell

how much time

I

put

in.

you swear positively that during the first six months after Mr. Shirley
moved to Grand, he spent in actual work under you as much as an average <>f
one day each week?
couldn't swear that he did, and
A. No;
wouldn't swear that
worked an
average of a day each week.
Q. Will

I

I

I

It thus appears that at the date of the initiation of this contest the
defendant had been living oil' the land embraced in his entry for a
period of about twenty months.
He seeks to have this absence
excused solely on the ground that during said entire period he held

the office of under-sheriff of the county wherein the land

is

situated,

and that in order to perform the duties of the office it was necessary
for him to reside at Grand, the county seat, a town about twenty-live
miles distant from the land.
The Department has held that absences made necessary by official
duties may be excused, provided such duties devolved upon the entryman subsequently to the making of the entry and the establishment
of residence upon the land, but it i^ not sufficient to show that tin
entryman held an office the duties of which had to be performed at
some place other than the land embraced in his entry. It must
appear that his absence was due to his official position or employment,
and if this is not shown, the fact that he held such official position
It
is
constitutes no sufficient excuse for his absence from his claim.
material, therefore, to a proper disposition of this case i«» determine
whether the defendant's absence from the land has been shown to
have been due to his official position.

4
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The population of Day County
official

report of the census

in

11)00

but 2,173.

office,

was, as shown by the

Considering this fact in

connection with the testimony of the sheriff to the effect that at all
times during the defendant's absence from the land there were eight
deputy sheriffs in the county, tw o of whom, together with the sheriff,
r

were stationed at the county seat all the time and one a part of the
and that he could not swear that the defendant, or even he
himself (the sheriff), was engaged on an average of one day a week in
the performance of official duties, it is clear that the duties incident
time;

and the prospective emoluments of the
were not such as would induce a man of ordinary industry and
prudence to absent himself continuously from his homestead claim
merely for the purpose of holding the office. Moreover, the testimony in the case shows that the office did not, as a matter of fact,
form the real inducement for the defendant's absence from his claim
that his true purpose in removing to Grand was that he might engage
in the drug business at that place, the acceptance and holding of the
office being but a subterfuge employed by him for the purpose of
escaping the consequences that would otherwise inevitably have resulted from proof of his failure to continue to reside on the land.
An entryman's absence from his claim under such circumstances cannot properly be said to have been due to official employment; hence
it must be held, in accordance with the views previously herein
expressed, that the fact that the defendant held the office of undersheriff does not constitute a sufficient excuse for his absence from the
land embraced in his entry.
The defendant's long-continued absence from the land having been
proved, and no sufficient excuse for such absence having been shown,
the entry should be canceled on the ground of abandonment. It is
to the office of under-sheriff
office

accordingly so ordered.

The

decision appealed

from

is

therefore reversed.

Grindberg

v.

Campion.

Motion for review of departmental decision of September
petition for rereview denied
1905,

November

17, 1904,

15, 1904,

and

by Acting Secretary Kyan, July

19,

33 L. D., 248, denied by Secretary Hitchcock,
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BOUNTY LAND WARRANT LOCATION SUBSTITUTION
William
The

\sn.

<

Borders.

\l.

location of a military bounty land warrant issued prior to the death of the
warrantee, by one claiming through an assignment of the wan-ant from
the widow of the warrantee, will not be confirmed in the absence of proof
showing that the widow was the sole heir, or was authorized to assign the
interests of the other heirs,

The

<>l
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if

there were any.

substitution of cash for a military bounty land warrant will not be permitted where the only obstacle to confirmation of the location under the

warrant

the refusal of the locator or transferee to endeavor to procure

is

the necessary proof to establish the validity of the location.

Acting Secretary Ryan

Commissioner of

the

to

Office, -/"I;/ 19,

(F. L. C.)

With your

letter of

June

19,'

1905,

fin

General Land
(E. F. B.

1905.

you transmit the papers

in

the

appeal of William R. Borders from the decision of your office of
June 5, 1905, refusing to accept a substitute in cash for military

name of John AW
was made May 7, 1852, at the KasSec. 13, T. 5 S., E. 5
kaskia land office, Illinois, of the SW. \ SE.
W., 3 P. M., which was afterwards canceled. You however reinbounty land warrant
Brashear, with which

No. 27606, issued in the

a

location

J,'

stated said location for the purpose of allowing Borders to furnish

evidence as to the

validity of the

The papers submitted with your
assigned

May

6,

in

Mary G.
M. Cross, who

1852, by

rantee, to Francis

land

assignment

letter

show

that said warrant

was

Brashear, the widow of the warlocated

it

May

7.

L852,

upon the

question.

September

L6,

of that

year,

reason, chiefly, that no evidence

entry was suspended, for the
had been furnished of the widow's

the

right to assign the warrant, in this, that if the

issuance,

its

it

warrantee died after

belonged to the heirs, and if he died
should have been issued in the name of the

the issuance of the warrant,

before

under which said

was made.

location

it

The warrant and papers were returned to the local office
order that the heir or heirs might be enabled to comply with the

widow.
in

requirements of your

March
fact that

11.

office.

L856, the attention of the local officers

no evidence of the right of the widow

was

called to the

to assign the

warrant

had been furnished, and they were directed to cancel the location
upon the plat, but to withhold the land from entry, for the benefit
of the locator.
In

1862

a

patent was applied

for.

In response thereto the

missioner of the General Land Office, under date of April

2,

ComL862,

the public lands.
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after recounting the fact as to the cancellation of the entry because

of the defect in the assignment, said

:

AS the cancellation in this case was based upon a mere defect in the assignment of the warrant, and as the tract located is now vacant, I have this day
ordered the return of the warrant by the register at Springfield with the view
of reinstating the location, and of issning a patent therefor to the locator, if the
defect in the assignment alluded to is such as to admit of correction within a
reasonable time.
As soon as the warrant
will be further advised.

On

received from the register before mentioned, you

is

same day, the

were instructed to return the
and to " reserve the tract above
described, until otherwise directed, from sale or location."
So far as shown by the record, nothing further appears to have
been done with reference to said entry until December 3, 190-t, when
Messrs. Harvey Spalding & Sons, attorneys for William R. Borders,
the present owner through mesne conveyances of the right, title and
interest of Cross under said location, applied to substitute cash for
said warrant and asked that the entry be reinstated so that the tract
will not appear on the books to be vacant land.
In passing upon this application, your office, by letter of June 5,
1005, held that the warrant can not be accepted in satisfaction of this
location, under the assignment of the widow, unless it be shown that
it was issued after the death of the warrantee or that there Avere no
surviving heirs other than the widow or, if there are any such heirs
surviving, they must join in the assignment before its validity can
the

local officers

warrant to the General Land

Office

;

be recognized.

You

reinstated the entry for the purpose of alloAving Borders to

furnish the testimony indicated.

The warrant appears

have been legally issued and the land Avas
bounty land warrants. It was
issued in the name of the soldier, and the reasonable presumption is
that it was issued during his life time.
The only question is whether
the assignment by the widow of Brashear to Cross, the locator, was
sufficient to authorize the location in his name in the absence of proof
to

subject to location with military

that the

widow was

the sole heir, or was authorized to assign the

interest of other heirs, if there

Such evidence

is

were any.

required by the government, but

it is

for the pur-

should waive the
production of such proof, or should allow a location to be perfected
upon insufficient evidence of the validity of the assignment, no liability

pose of protecting the heirs,

to the heirs

if

there be any.

If

it

would be incurred by the government, but

would be against the land,

their

remedy

as the lawful issuance of a valid warrant,

vesting in the warrantee the right to

make

the claim of the soldier, and the obligation

location thereof, satisfied

would not again be

cast
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Upon the government by allowing a location of the claim to be made
upon a defective or insufficient assignment. The purchaser must
look to every part of the title which is essential to its validity.
(Brush v. Ware, 15 Pet., 93.)
As the government is not free from fault in neglecting to take
proper action upon the location for more than fifty years, and has
silently acquiesced in the occupancy of the premises by the present
owner and his grantors under said entry by withholding it from
entry or other disposition, equity and justice would seem to require
that his title should be quieted and that a patent should issue without
further consideration.

But as he would also, for the same reason, be entitled to have entry
upon which the patent issues free from the claim of any unknown
heirs of Brashear, no valid reason can be perceived why he should
not be allowed to substitute cash for the wan-ant, so that the patent
issued thereon

would

from other claim.

issue solely to his benefit, free

The entryman upon making such substitution would be entitled
whatever interest the widow of Brashear had in the warrant, but

to

as

that interest cannot be ascertained by the Department in the absence
of proof of the same character as that required to establish the validity of the

warrant location, the decision of your

office,

reinstating the

entry and allowing Borders to furnish proof of the validity of the

assignment of the entire interest
condition,

that

endeavored
his inquiry,
stitute to be

the

if

in

the warrant,

applicant will

make

is

affirmed, with this

affidavit

to obtain such proof, stating the extent

and that

made

it

is

not obtainable,

you

that

he

has

and character of

will then allow a sub-

of cash for the warrant, but you will not deliver

the warrant except

upon the application of all parties having any
it, and upon submission of satisfactory proof
or representatives of the heirs, of John \Y. lira-

right, title or interest in

that they are heirs,

shear living

at

the time of Ids death.

The

substitution of cash

the warrant should not be allowed until every effort has been

for

made

procure the necessary proof required to show (he validity of the
assignment and it is evident that it cannot be obtained.
In the case of Robert M. Stitt (33 L. I).. 315), cited by your office,
be permitted to relinquish his
it was said that an entryman will not

to

entry, or allow

it

to be cancelled

and withdraw

his scrip,

where the

entry can be confirmed and where the only obstacle to confirmation
is

the arbitrary refusal of the

Upon

the

same

entryman

to

supply the necessary proof.
a warrant should

principle, a substitution of cash for

where the only obstacle to the confirmation of the loca
the refusal of the locator or transferee to endeavor to procure
the necessary proof to establish the validity of the location with the

not be allowed
tion

is

warrant.

Your

decision, as thus modified,

i>

affirmed.
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mining claim— patent proceedings— equitable action.

Alaska Placer Claim.
Proceedings for patent to a mining claim embracing land lying partly within one
land district and partly within another, conducted wholly within one land
district, and the allowance of entry thereon covering the entire claim, are in
no wise effective as to the lands lying without such land district, and do not
constitute substantial compliance with law as to such lands, within the

meaning of sections 2450 to 2457 of the Revised Statutes, such as would
warrant confirmation of the entry in its entirety under said sections.

Acting Secretary
(S.V. P.)
July

13, 1904,

(

'ampbell to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, July 10,1905.
(G. N. B.)

you submitted, for approval by the Secretary of the

Interior and the Attorney General under section 2451 of the Revised
Statutes, your decision under section 2450 of the Revised Statutes, in

the case of suspended mineral entry No. 1670, Montrose land district,

Colorado,

made October

3,

1001,

by Edward Henry, for the Alaska

placer claim, survey No. 15,416, accompanied by a letter, addressed to
the Secretary of the Interior, explaining certain special features of

the case which in your judgment call for equitable consideration under
sections 2450 to 2457, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes.

The record shows that while a portion of the Alaska claim lies in
Durango land district, Colorado, entry embracing the entire claim
was made in the Montrose district, and no proceedings whatever were
had in the Durango district.
the

In your

letter of

explanation you say:

Notwithstanding the fact that notice of the application for patent in this case
was not posted in the land office at Durango, Colorado, as required by law, I
1

recommend the confirmation of said entry No.

—A

1676, for the following reasons:

examination of the entire record convinces me that the
application for patent, and the entry were allowed in good faith.
Second.- The failure to post copy of the notice of application for patent in
tliis case, in the land office at Durango, Colorado, was not the fault of the
First.

careful

—

claimant.

Third.

—The question
—To cancel

is

one solely between the government and the claimant,

as no adverse claim nor protest has been

And

lastly.

said

filed.

entry and compel

the claimant to

proceedings for patent de novo would be a hardship, which in
should not be imposed upon him.

commence

my judgment

Section 2457 of the Revised Statutes specifies the character of sus-

pended entries which are

to be decided by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office " upon principles of equity and justice, as recognized in courts of equity, and in accordance with regulations to be
settled by the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General, and
the Commissioner, conjointly," under section 2450, and submitted for

approval under section 2451, as those " where the law has been sub-
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stantially complied

with, and the error or informality arose

ignorance, accident, or mistake which

You
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is

state, in substance, that this case

from

satisfactorily explained."

does not come within any of

the regulations adopted under section 2450 .(General Circular. Janu-

ary 25, 1904, pp. 245-250), and for that reason you submit the same
covered by the rules.
(General Circular, p. '2-1-7.)

;i-

a special case, not

Under the
is,

whether

facts disclosed by the record, the question

this

plied with."

tion

under the

An
filed

is a

first

presented

case " where the law has been substantially com-

If not, there

is

nothing to justify equitable considera-

statute.

application for patent under the mining laws

"in the proper land

(Sec.

office."

2325,

is required to be
Revised Statute-.)

This means that the application must be filed in the office of the land
district where the land applied for is situated.
The officers of a land
district have no jurisdiction or control over lands outside the limits
of their district.
They cannot allow entry for land not within the
district for which they are appointed.
In other words, there is no
authority of law for the officers of one land district to dispose of land
lying in another district.
In this case the register and receiver of the Montrose land district
undertook to entertain patent proceedings and to allow entry for a
mining claim embracing land a portion of which is not within their
The
district, but which lies in the adjoining Durango land district.
Department is of opinion that, with respect to the land in the
Durango district, there is no authority of law for the action taken,
and that, therefore, this is not a case "where the law has been sub
No applistantially complied with," as to that portion of the claim.
cation for patent was filed in the Durango office, no notice was posted
in that office or on the claim in that district, and therefore no proof
of notice was, or could have been, filed in thai office.
There was no
lawful notice to adverse claimants, if any there were, as to the land
in the Durango district.
As to that part of the claim there has been
no assumption under the statute "that the applicant is entitled to a
patent/' and "that no adverse claim exists," and there has been no
opportunity for conflicting claimants, if any, to file adverse claims.

In short, not only has there not been substantial compliance with the
law, but there has been no compliance with law

portion of the claim in the

Durango

district

at all. in SO far as

is

concerned.

the

This be

which equitable con
Therefore, your de
cision and recommendation cannot be accepted; and the record ireturned to your office for further consideration, and for such action
in the premises as the facts and the law may justify.
The Department knows of no reason why the entry may not be
allowed to stand as to that portion of the claim which be- in the
ing true,

it

follows that the case

siderations under the statute

is

may

not one as to

be applied.
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Montrose land

should the claimant so

district,

LANB&
elect,

provided the

patent proceedings in that district have been regular, and the law fully

complied with. Or, should the claimant prefer, he may be allowed,
under additional patent proceedings in the Durango district, to be
conducted in all respects in conformity to law, to make supplemental
entry for the portion of the claim in that district, and thus obtain
patent for the entire claim. In that event, the proof of expenditure
in labor and improvements on the claim, which accompanied the proceedings in the Montrose district, if found sufficient and regular,
should be accepted in the proceedings in the Durango district.

mining claim—placer location-conformity to system of pub-

land surveys.

lic

Hogan and Idaho Placer Mining Claims.
The

fact that a placer

mining

location,

if

made

ticable to the system of public-land surveys

conform as nearly as pracand the rectangular subdivi-

to

sions of such surveys, as required by section 2331 of the Revised Statutes,

would embrace

sinall portions of land not valuable for placer mining, conno reason for failure to conform the location to such system and
legal subdivisions, where, if so conformed, the land embraced in the location
would be as a whole more valuable for placer mining than for agricultural

stitutes

purposes.
It is

no objection to the validity of a placer location that

it

embraces veins or

lodes as well as placer deposits.

Acting /Secretary Ryan
(F. l! C.)

to

Commissioner of the General Land
July 19, 1905.
(A. B. P.)

the

Office,

September 11, 1903, the Crooked River Mining and Milling Company made entry for the Hogan and Idaho placer claims and eight
lode claims

known

as the Orion, the Pineapple, the Buffalo

Little Fritz Fraction, the

and the Friday Fraction,

Alaska No.
all

3,

Queen, the

the Alaska No. 4, the Friday,

included in survey No. 1834, Lewiston,

Idaho.

June 7, 1904, your office directed the local officers to notify the
company that it would be allowed sixty days within which to show
cause why the placer claims should not be made to conform to the
United States system of public-land surveys, and stated that on
failure to

make such showing,

the placer claims,

or to appeal, the entry, to the extent of

would be canceled without further

The company has appealed

to the

notice.

Department.

Placer mining claims located after

May

10, 1872, are

as nearly as practicable with the

required by

United States

syslaw to conform
subdivisions
of
such
tem of public-land surveys, and the rectangular
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Surveys; and this

is true whether the claims be located upon surveyed or unsurveyed lands.
(Revised Statutes, sec 2331; Miller
Placer Claim, 30 L. 1)., 225, 227; Wood Placer Mining Company, 32
L. D., 198, 199— on review, Id., 363.)
The Hogan and Idaho claims were located in 1902 upon unsurveyed lands, and were surveyed for patent February 5-11, L903.
They are very irregular in form, vary in width from about 200 feel
to about 1,200 feet, adjoin each other end on end. and are so located
as to embrace within their lines the Crooked River for a distance of
about three and one-half miles. They do not even approximate conformity with the system of the public-land surveys, but are wholly
at variance with such system, which, as was said in the case of Miller
Placer Claim, supra, " affords no warrant for cutting the public lands
into lengthy strips of such narrow width."
In the company's appeal it is stated, in substance and effect, that
the lands adjacent to the placer claims are not valuable for placer
mining, but contain, and in part have been located for, veins or lodes
of gold and silver; and for these reasons it is contended that the
placer locations could not be conformed to the system of public-land
surveys.
There is nothing in the record to show the conditions to be
as thus stated, but even if there were, the company would be in no

better situation,

In the

first

and

place,

its

contention .could not be sustained.

assuming that the land embraced

in the

Hogan

and Idaho locations are of sufficient placer value to be patentable
under the placer law. and that the adjacent lands are non-placer in
character, as stated, a rearrangement of the lines of the locations to
meet the requirements of the law in respect to conformity to the system of public-land surveys, considering that tracts as small as ten
acres in area, in square form, are recognized as legal subdivisions

under the mining laws

(sec. 2330,

Revised Statutes), would not necesnon-placer lands to such an extent

sitate the inclusion of the adjacent

not
It
the validity of the locations on that account.
infrequently occurs that tracts of land small portions of which are

as to affect

not valuable for placer mining are embraced within placer locations
where the lands as a whole are in fact more valuable for placer mining that

for agricultural purposes.

There

is.

therefore, nothing in

phase of the company's contention.
The other phase of the contention is equally untenable. It is a
that i-.
well recognized fact that both classes of mineral deposits
veins or lodes, and placer deposits are frequently found t<> exist in
this

—

—

same land, and it is no objection to the validity of a placer
tion that it embraces veins or lodes as well as placer deposits.
the

loca-

usually a simple matter, in locating placer claim-. even upon
unsurveyed lands, to conform the locations to the system <d publicIt

is

land surveys.

The

law's requirement in this resped a-

t<>

unsurveyed
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lands is met by locating the claims in rectangular form with proper
dimensions and with east and west and north and south lines. (Wood
Placer Mining Company, 32 L. I)., 363, 365.)
It is also asserted in the company's appeal that the Hogan and
Idaho claims are " strictly gnlch placers." This assertion is followed
by the statement, apparently made to support it, that the land rises

from Crooked River
if this

be true,

it

at slopes of

from twenty

to thirty degrees.

Even

needs no argument to show that lands ascending at

slopes of twenty to thirty degrees only, are not thereby rendered

impracticable of location under the placer mining laws. Upon the
company's own showing, therefore, the claims cannot be regarded as
in any sense within the category of
gulch placers."
It follows from what has been said that the entry in question, to
the extent of the placer claims, is unlawful and must be canceled;
and your office decision, in effect holding the entry for cancellation to
such extent, is affirmed. This will leave the lode claims embraced in
the entry in noncontiguous tracts or bodies, a fact necessary to be conwk

sidered in the re-adjudication of the case.

MINING CLAIM— PLACER LOCATION— LEGAL SUBDI VISIONS.
Rialto No. 2 Placer Mining Claim.

A

location under the mining laws does not of itself

amount

to

an appropriation

of land in such a sense as to preclude the inclusion of the same, or parts
thereof, within the limits of a subsequent location, subject to such existing

may

be thereafter maintained under the prior location; and the
made to conform to legal subdivisions of the
public surveys, would embrace all or a portion of the land covered by a
prior location, is not a sufficient reason for failure to conform the placer
location to legal subdivisions, as required by section 2331 of the Revised

rights as

fact that a placer location, if

Statutes.

The

fact that portions of other claims already entered

placer location by conforming the

same

may

be embraced in a

to legal subdivisions, does not

make

such conformity impracticable, within the meaning of section 2331 of the
Revised Statutes, inasmuch as under the law such entered claims may be
excluded from patent proceedings involving the placer.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

July

7,

Commissioner of the General Land
(A. B. P.)
July 19, 1905.

to the
Office,

1902, Julius Nelson

was permitted

to

make entry

for the

Eialto No. 2 Placer Mining Claim, survey No. 15,053, Leadville, Colorado, situated upon surveyed lands, in Sec. 21, T. 9

S., K. 78 W.,
your office directed the local officers
allow the claimant sixty days from notice within which to show

6th P. M.
to

cause

why

September

12, 1903,

his entry should not be canceled for the reason that the
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claim docs not conform to the Legal subdivisions of the public Lands,
as required by sections 2330 and 2331 of the Revised Statutes.

November

L903, the claimant, in response to notice

Prom the local
corroborated affidavit, wherein he states, in substance
that at the time the claim was located it was surrounded
8,

officers, filed liis

and

effect,

" valid lode

and placer claims; " that all the public lands so surrounded were embraced in the location: that " it would have been
impossible to have conformed any more nearly to the Lines of the
by

Legal

subdivisions without embracing non-contiguous tracts: " that,
and entered, the west line of the claim is the section line

as surveyed

between sections 20 and 21, and at other places where possible the
have been followed: and that the irregular lines on the
north, the east, and the southeast were so run "to exclude the valid
existing claims Lying along those sides/' as shown by a diagram
attached to and made a part of the affidavit.
section lines

By

decision of

mineral location

December

28, L903,

your

office

held, in effect, that

a

not, of itself, such an

appropriation of the land
included in it as to prevent the inclusion of the same land in another
location, and. therefore, that the evidence submitted is insufficient to

show

have been located and
accordance with the Legal subdivisions of the public lands;
Nelson's entry was held for cancellation.
He thereupon apthat the claim here in question could not

entered

and

is

in

pealed to the Department.

Upon

the

official

plat of the survey of the claim, approved

April

upon
diagram attached to claimant's affidavit, however, that
the conditions stated and relied on by him are made more fully to
appear. The diagram and official plat agree as far as the latter
5,

L902, several adjoining surveyed claims are protracted.

It

is

the unofficial

goes, except that the claims protracted on the plat are designated on

the

diagram

Under

as entered claims, while not so designated on the plat.

the law (Sec. 2331 of the Revised Statute-)

located after

May

10, L872,

are required to "

conform

placer claims

as near as prac-

ticable with the United States system of public-land surveys, and the
rectangular subdivisions of such surveys; " and it is only when Mich
claims ww cannot be conformed to legal subdivisions " that entry thereof

may

be made' otherwise than in accordance with legal subdivisions.

The claim here in question was located long
Hie appellant raises no question as to the

after L872.

law, but contends that his
one which "cannot be conformed to legal subdivisions,"
because of prior mineral locations surrounding it. as represented in
pari on the official plat, and more fully on the -aid diagram.

claim

is

i^ not
favorably impressed by this content ion.
surrounding prior Locations, in so far a-- unentered, even M their
existence and validity were admitted, as alleged, could not, and del
not, of themselves, amount to appropriations of the land- embraced

The Department

r

Idie
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them

in

such
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preclude the inclusion of such lands, or

a sense as to

parts thereof, within the limits of the Rialto No. 2 location, subject

and were afterwards maintained under
Their existence, therefore, if such were the
fact, would not prove that the Rialto No. 2 claim could not have been
conformed to the legal subdivisions of the public survey. Such
prior locations, of themselves, could not and did not have the effect
to separate the lands into non-contiguous tracts, as contended, within
the meaning of the term non-contiguous as understood and used in
connection with the administration of the public land laws.
If it be true that some of the surrounding claims were entered prior
to the Rialto No. 2 location, as would appear to be the case from the
diagram referred to, that fact could not have made it impracticable,
in locating the Rialto No. 2 placer, to describe it by legal subdivisions.
Under the settled law and practice, such entered claims could and
must have been excluded from patent proceedings involving the
(Mary Darling Placer Claim, 31 L. D., 64.)
placer.
The conclusion reached by your office is accordingly affirmed, but
without prejudice to the right of appellant to. begin patent proceedings anew, provided he shall amend his location to conform to legal
subdivisions as required by law.
to such rights as then existed

such prior locations.

homestead-heirs— cultivation— final proof— alienation.
Prosser

v.

Heirs of Gilley.

homestead entryman may delegate to another the power
perform for their henefit the cultivation on the entry required by law,
and such cultivation, if actually carried on in good faith for the required
period, constitutes compliance with the homestead law the same as though
performed by the heirs themselves.
The right conferred by law upon the heirs of a deceased homestead entryman
to submit final proof on the entry can not be delegated to another.
Where a homestead claimant, by contract to convey the land embraced in his
entry after the submission of final proof, puts it beyond his power to acquire
title under the entry except by perjury, he thereby forfeits his rights, and
upon proof of such fact the entry will be canceled.

The

heirs of a deceased

to

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

The Department has
your

office

decision of

Commissioner of the General Land
July 19, 1905.
(E. O. P.)

to the
Office,

before

it

December

the appeal of C.
4, 1904,

W.

Prosser from

reversing that of the local

officers and dismissing his contest against the homestead entry of
William T. Gilley, deceased, for the S. -J SW. i, Sec. 22, T. 28 N., R.
1 W., Guthrie land district, Oklahoma.
The basis of the contest is the alleged alienation, by the heirs, of
the land covered by the entry, and in support thereof contestant
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powers of attorney executed on behalf of
Peckham. Said powers of attorney are, in
particulars, the same, except as to the amount- named

offered in evidence certain
said heirs, to one Ed. L.
all

essential

therein to be paid to the different parties executing them, in full for
their interest in the land.

As

it

upon the construction of the said

is

instruments that the decision of the Department herein must neces
sarily rest, and as they are similar, only the joint power executed by

Frank Gilley and

Know

men by

J. L.

McLearen,

is set

these presents, Thai

out herein, as follow-:

Frank M. Gilley and J. L. Mclaw of William Gilley, deceased, do hereby make, constitute
and appoint Ed L. Peckham, Attorney al Law. of Blackwell, Oklahoma, our
true, snllirient and lawful attorney, for US and in our name, to make final proof
of the South half of the South-West Quarter (J) in Section Twenty-Two (22),
West of the Indian
in Township Twenty-Eight (28), North of Range one
Meridian, in Kay County. Oklahoma Territory; and for such purpose to take
entire charge of the same and to borrow the funds with which to pay for said
land to the government of the United States and all expenses of making such
And when so proven up. to sell our interests in said land to whatever
proof.
person or persons said Peckham thinks best, and to make and execute a deed
Said Peckham to retain for his services herein all he
of conveyance therefor.
may receive for our interests in said land over the sum of one hundred and
twenty-five dollars ($125.00) and to do and perform all necessary ads in the
all

Learen, heirs

we.

,-it

i

1

»

execution of the aforesaid business in as full and ample a manner as we might
do if we were personally present. Hereby making this power of attorney
irrevocable, and hereby ratifying and confirming all that our said attorney shall

do by virtue hereof.
In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands this 19th day of April,
A.

I)..

ISPS.

Crank
J. L.

M.

Gtt.t.ei

McLeaui

\

The instrument was duly acknowledged.
There is also with the record the joint receipt of said Gilley and
McLearen, bearing the same date as the power of attorney executed
by them, for the amount named therein as due for their interest in
the land.
Similar receipts were executed by each of the other heirs.
bearing the same date as the powers of attorney executed by them,
except in case of James Gilley, whose receipt hears no date.
In the decision appealed from your office denied the validity of
said instruments and held them to he without force and effect for any
purpose
other than perhaps as evidence of the immaterial fact that the heirs did. prior
to proof, have an intent to make the proof for the purpose of selling and dis

posing of the land after the issuance of
for the reason

that

attorney-in-fact to

the

make

final certificate

power attempted to he conferred upon the
While
is not to he
final proof was void.
it

proof cannot be delegated, yet
unless it is clear that such was the plain intent of the instrument, Mich
effect should not he given thereto, as all rules of construction require
denied that the power to submit

final
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language used should be so construed as to give

legal effect to the instrument.

The widow,

heirs or devisees of a deceased

entryman are not

re-

quired to continue the actual residence necessary on the part of the
original entryman, but may either reside upon or cultivate the land
for the required period.

It.

has also been repeatedly held that

culti-

vation of the land by another inures to the benefit of the heirs, and such

performed in person. Following this rule, it is clear
delegate the power to perforin the required services for their benefit, and such cultivation and improvement, if actually carried on in good faith for the required period, constitutes
compliance with the homestead law. The law casting the right
initiated b}^ the original claimant upon his widow, heirs or devisees,
intended to confer upon them all the advantages and benefits which
would have accrued to their deceased ancestor or devisor, and the
Department in construing it has uniformly sought to fully protect
the right in the hands of the beneficiaries without restricting its
enjoyment by imposing conditions not warranted by a liberal conPersonal residence or cultivation by the
struction of the statute.
heirs might greatly limit or entirely defeat the benefit conferred, and
for that reason such requirement has never been enforced as against
them. In the case at bar it was necessary that cultivation be maintained after the death of William T. Gilley, the entryman, and it
appears that the heirs were residents of distant states. Under these
acts need not be

that the heirs

circumstances,

may

it

was not only reasonable, but highly probable, the
upon their attorney-in-fact the power to make

heirs, in conferring
final proof,

power

only attempted to delegate a legal power, namely, the

to perform, or secure

cultivation required of

them

performance

of, the

in lieu of residence.

necessary acts of

The

ministerial act

of submitting final proof could not be delegated, and as the language

conferring the power will admit of two constructions, one legal and
the other void, the former will be adopted as the one intended by the
parties.

This construction of the language conferring the power to make
proof leaves for consideration the effect of the granting of the
power to sell the land after final proof. It is not to be denied that
the heirs might, after acquiring title to the land, deal with it as they
deemed best, but any attempted conveyance or contract to convey,
executed prior thereto, will, when shown, defeat the right to complete
the entry. The beneficiaries named take the right initiated by the
deceased subject to all the conditions imposed by section 2291, Revised
By this section they are required, on making final proof,
Statutes.
to take oath " that no part of such land has been alienated, except as
provided in section twenty-two hundred and eighty-eight." While
actual alienation of the land is impossible prior to submission of
final
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(

.>

Department lias hold that any attempted alienawhich but for the inhibition of the law would have been effectual, is such a violation of the statute as warrants a cancellation of
No other construction can he adopted and give effect to
the entry.
In the case of Anderson
the language used.
Carkins L35 Q. S..
1:83, ls7), the entryman made no attempted actual conveyance of the
His only act of alienation was a contract to convey after the
land.

final proof, yet the

tion,

/•.

submission of

final

The

proof.

(

court held that

such

contract.

a

though incapable of enforcement in a court of equity, would prevent
the homestead right being perfected "without perjury by the homeThe departmental decisions now in force governing such
steader."
cases hold that where a claimant has put it beyond his power to
acquire title except by perjury, he has forfeited his rights. The
power to sell, conferred by this instrument under consideration,
coupled with the agreement therein contained as to the amount to be
paid for the interests of the different

heirs,

acting as principal-,

clearly constitutes a contract to convey the land

and places the present
claimants under the ban of the statute.
Not only was the price to
be paid definitely fixed, but. as appears from the receipts introduced
in evidence, the stipulated amounts were actually paid to the different
heirs at the time said powers of attorney were given.
Though fraud in obtaining the said powers of attorney was alleged
as a defense, no evidence was introduced by the defendants to sustain
the allegation, and while the Tacts set forth in your said decision
might be sufficient to raise a presumption of imposition upon the
heirs or question the honesty of the transaction, yet
rule that

proved.

fraud,

when

upon

relied

as

defense,

a

The Department cannot abrogate

it

is

universal

a

must

be

strictly

the rule and entertain

a

bare presumption or accept an unsupported allegation of fraud, to
controvert the record facts before

it.

For the reasons herein stated your said decision

The entry

in

is

hereby reversed.

question will be canceled.

COAX I.AM) AFFIDAVIT PARAGRAPH

33

OF (OAF LAND REGULA-

TIONS.

W.
The

affidavit prescribed

I).

Keen.

by paragraph :\2 of the coal-land regulations must be
the claimant himself.

made by

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

March

to

Office,
11.

New Mexico,

L902,

W.

I).

Commissioner of
July .!<>. 1905.

the

Keen

filed

in

fl><

the local office

General
(

at

his coal declaratory statement, covering the

Sec. 32, T. II X.. R. 6 K.. N. M. P. M.

5194—Vol. 34—05 m

I

V.

L<ni<I

B.)

11.

Santa Fe,

SW.

1

of
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May 4, 1903, application was made to purchase the tract, and was
accompanied by the necessary proofs, except that in lieu of the affidavit required by paragraph 32 of the coal-land regulations, approved
July 31, 1882, to be made by the claimant (otherwise than so far as
it

was submitted the affidaWillard S. Hopewell, as attorney in fact for Keen. The pur-

refers to the character of the land), there

vit of

chase price was paid, and final certificate of entry issued June 26,
1903.

by decision of September 21, 1903, held
and directed the
local officers to call upon the entryman to submit his personal affidavit
substantially in the form set forth in paragraph 32 of the coal-land
In due course, your

office,

the affidavit of the attorney in fact to be insufficient

;

regulations, except as to the character of the land, unless personally

Motion for review was denied December 2,
and the pending appeal was thereupon taken.
A petition has since been filed here, in which it is prayecj that,
should the Department feel unauthorized to direct that the entry be

acquainted therewith.
1903

;

passed to patent, steps be taken for the submission of the case to the
Board of Equitable Adjudication for consideration and action.

Accompanying the
which

it

is

petition

alleged,

among

is

an

affidavit

by the attorney

in fact, in

other things, in substance, that affiant

made the final affidavit submitted at the time of purchase, believing
himself authorized, as the claimant's attorney in fact, so to do; that
at that

time affiant was informed and believed, and that he

now

understands, that the claimant had not had the benefits of the coallaud laws, or held or purchased, as an individual or as a member of
an association, any coal lands under those laws; that since called upon
by your office decision of September 21, 1903, to furnish the affidavit
of the claimant affiant has made diligent effort so to do, but has been
unable to procure such affidavit, the present whereabouts of the claimant being unknown to affiant; and that affiant believes it will be impossible for him to procure the claimant's affidavit.
It is urged, to
the
petition,
that
entry
is
class
within the
contemplated
support the
by section 2457, Revised Statutes, and entitled to equitable consideration, and may be submitted under the provision of the regulation of
April 25, 1877 (General Circular, issued January 25, 1904, p. 247),
for the submission of special cases not covered by the general rules:
that the local officers permitted the attorney in fact to file the affidavit
to which objection is made, accepted the purchase price, and allowed
entry that the affidavit prescribed by paragraph 32 of the coal-land
regulations does not embody a statutory requirement; that when
claimant filed his declaratory statement he personally made oath substantially to all the essential averments set forth in the affidavit prescribed by the regulations; and that there is no adverse claim to the
land and no right in another to be j^rejudiced.
;
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it
may be said thai the Department has
and
reaffirmed, in the case of Elwood R. Stafexpressly recognized
ford et al. (21 L. I)., 300), which was cited by your office, the requirement, under paragraph 32 of the regulations, that the affidavit
therein* prescribed must be made by the claimant himself, although
the ease went off on another point.
In respect of several of itfeatures the affidavit is one which could not he made by another with

Answering

certainty of

the appeal,

first

Nor

truth.

its

the requirement in this behalf answered

is

by the fact that the claimant

personally

made oath

tory statement, for the Latter does not in fact contain

to his declaraall

the essential

averments of the affidavit prescribed by paragraph 32; and even
were it otherwise, the allegations contained in the declaratory statement could not relate to and cover the ensuing interval to the date
of entry.
The Department would not. therefore, he warranted in
reversing the decision of your office and directing that the entry he
allowed to pass to patent.
i>

It

a sufficient

answer

to the petition to

sought could he secured by the claimant's

say that the

own

relied'

act. viz.,

thereby

by the sub-

mission of his personal affidavit as prescribed by the regulations, if
no other objection were to appear. The fact that the claimant himself can not he found and that the petition is really preferred by the

attorney

in

fact,

recognized only

can not be taken, into account:
in his

the case to entitle

There is nothing in
equitable consideration, and the prayer of

to

it

the latter can he

representative capacity.

the petition must he denied.

The

decision

of your

office

is

affirmed,

and the entry

will

he

canceled.

HOMESTEAD BNTRI ALIEN
Major
A homestead entrynian who
title to

his claim

the time of his death had not acquired the legal

at

the land embraced

II Kins.

Heirs of Hartnett.

v.

in

under the entry,

;i

was not ;it such time, by reason of
person "holding real property," within the

his entry,

of the treaty of March 2, L899, between the United
meaning of article
States and Greal Britain, and his alien heirs, subjects of the latter country,
have therefore no such claim or righl to the lands embraced in the entry ;is
is entitled to protection under the provisions of said treaty.
There is no provision of the homestead law by which any rights or claims to
1

public lands, prior to the issuance of patent, can he devised or succeeded

and perfected

by, or on behalf of, other than citizens of the

Acting Secretary Ryan
(

F. L. C.)

August

Commisisoner of
July .!'h 1905.

the

Office,

28, L894, Patrick Hartnett

for the

SE.

May

L901,

1.

to

|.

Sec.

,
:

»:».

T. 22 X..

Iv.

ih<

made homestead
11

\\\.

I..

United States.

General hand
(

P. E. VV.)

entry, No.

-»

s ^T.

Alva. Oklahoma, and on

he submitted filial proof- therefor, on which final oertifi
on August 22, L901. August 11. L902, John C.

cate No. 2859 issued
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Major filed protest against
ground that said Hartnett
and no heirs, native born
said homestead and that

the issuance of patent for said land on the

died on October 14, 1901, leaving no wife
or naturalized, capable of inheriting the

Hartnett was not himself a naturalized
United States, never having taken out his final papers.
After service by publication had been had in due form, a hearing
was had on July 14, 1903, upon which the local officers found that the
entryman had died and left no heirs, and recommended cancellation
citizen of the

of the entry.

February

12, 1904,

they transmitted the record to your

office

and

your

final,

con-

reported no appeal.

November

23, 1904,

office

held their findings of fact

curred in their conclusions of law and held the entry for cancellation.
In connection with this case, your office in said decision considered
the contest affidavit of Earl R. Stults, filed February 27, 1904, against
the same entry, in which charges similar to the foregoing were

against Hartnett, and

it is

further alleged that Major

is

made

disqualified

as contestant against said entry by the fact that he is, and has since
December 18, 1901, been, the administrator of the estate of said HartThereupon your office held that the right to contest an entry
nett.
does not depend on the right to enter the land, and that in consideration of the circumstances disclosed by the record in the case brought
by Major, he is not disqualified to bring contest. Stults's affidavit
of contest was rejected and he has appealed to the Department, contending that it was error to reject his contest and error not to dismiss

Major's contest.
Prior to your said decision there was also

November

3,

filed in

your

office,

on

1904—

objections to the contest of John C. Major, at the request of

James Hartnett,

one of the brothers and heirs at law of Patrick Hartnett, deceased, and at the
request of His Majesty's Consul, Alexander Finn, under the treaty existing between Great Britain and the United States, proclaimed August Gth, 1900.

Subsequently to your said decision, on January

14,

1905, resident

counsel, as "Attorney for the heirs-at-law of Patrick Hartnett, deceased,

and acting for Hon. Alex. Finn, His Majesty's consul, near

Oklahoma

Territory, representing the

Patrick Hartnett,"

filed his

foreign-born heirs of said

motion that your said

office

decision

be vacated and set aside, and that said entry be submitted to the Board of
Equitable Adjudication, under Rule 31.

In support of this motion

it

is

contended: (1) that at the date of

August 22, 1901, there were no adverse claims of record;
that where certain legal requirements appear not to have been

final entry,

(2)

met because of the neglect or inattention of the local officers the entry
may go to said Board; (3) that claimant and his witnesses swore
that he was a naturalized citizen at that date; (4) that Hartnett may
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have taken out his final papers in Kingfisher County, Oklahoma,
where the records were burned in August L900, or may have taken
out

such papers

in

an adjoining State: (5)

valuable improvements on -aid tract,

more than

made

that

the

Hartnetl

same

his

placed

home

for

and cultivated sixty acres for six seasons i> an
unusually good showing; and 6) that the heirs of the deceased homestead claimant are entitled to consideration and their rights in this
matter should he carefully guarded. This motion and the -aid objections are not supported by any showing of facts.
With the record is a joint affidavit, executed by John Ilartnett.
James Ilartnett and Anne Kiely, all born and >l\\\ residing in Ireland, in which they state, under date of May 6, L903, that they arc
the surviving brothers and sister of the said Patrick Ilartnett, their
two other brothers. Maurice and Thomas, being dead: and that
excepting said Patrick. Maurice and Thomas, no other brother or
sister of affiants ever went to America.
Also a certified copy of
another affidavit by the same parties, dated September 28, L903, and
filed in the office of the probate judge of Woods County, Oklahoma
Territory, in the matter of the estate of said Patrick Ilartnett. statIt is not claimed
ing that the affiants are his sole surviving heirs.
six years

(

or

shown
Article

Where on

that other heirs exist.
1

of said treaty (81 Stat.. 1939) provides

that—

the death of any person holding real property (or property not per-

sonal), within the territories of one of the Contracting Parties, such real prop
erty would, by the laws of the land, pass to a citizen or subject of the other,

were he not disqualified by the laws of the country where such

real property

situated, such citizen or subject shall he allowed a term of three years in
to sell

the same, this term to he reasonably prolonged

if

is

which

circumstances render

withdraw the proceeds thereof, without restraint or interference, and exempt from any succession, probate or administrative duties or
Charges other than those which may he imposed in like cases upon the citizens
or subjects of the country from which such proceeds may be drawn.
it

necessary, and to

Article 3 provides in effect that in case of the death of

a

British

having any known heirs in this
country or testamentary executors by him appointed, the nearest
subject in the United States without

British consular officer shall at once he notified so that the necessary
information may he forwarded to all persons interested; and that
such consular officer shall have the right to appear personally or by
delegate in all proceedings on behalf of the absent heir- or creditors,
until they are otherwise represented.

In

the case of

Department

Patten

v.

Katx. on

review

(26

L.

D.,

317), the

said, with reference to a like provision in a treaty with

another country

:

Prerequisite to an appropriation of the privilege conferred, there must have
died a person "holding real property."
"Holding/' relating to ownership in
property, embraces two ideas: actual possess ion of some subject of property,

and being invested with the

legal title.
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The terms of the said treaty do not apply to the case before us.
Hartnett had not obtained, and was not holding, the legal title to the
Land involved. It is only by and upon the issuance of patent, that the
government parts with the title to the public lands.
There

i>

no provision of the homestead laws by which any rights or

claims to land before patent can be devised or succeeded to and perfected by, or on behalf of, other

than citizens of the United States.

The application on behalf of Hartnett "s

heirs is accordingly dis-

missed.

The contention
is

of appellant Stults

is

without merit and his appeal

dismissed, your said decision being hereby in all respects affirmed.

oklahoma laxds-school sectioxs-mining laws.
Gyfsite Placer Mining Claim.
Sections sixteen, thirty-six, thirteen and thirty-three of the lands ceded by the

Comanche. Kiowa and Apache Indians under agreement ratified by the act
of June 6, 1900, reserved for school and other purposes, are not subject to
the operation of the mining laws.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

October
offered for

to

Office,

24, 1003. L.
filing-

Commissioner of the General Land
July 2-',, 1905.
(A. B. P.)

the

G. Hamilton.

Sam Lazarus and Leo

Jacobs

their application for patent to the Gypsite placer

mining claim, embracing lands in sections 13 and 2-t of T. X., R. 10
W., El Reno, Oklahoma. November 5, 1903, the local officers rejected
the application as to the lands in section 13 on the stated ground that
section 13 is one of the specified sections of each township reserved
to the Territory and future State of Oklahoma, for school and other
purposes, by the act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat.. 672, 676-680), and are
not subject to the United States mining laws as extended by that act.
On appeal by the applicants, your office, by decision of May 9, 1903,
The applicants have further appealed
affirmed the action below.
here.

By the act of June 6, 1900. the agreement whereby the lands of the
Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes of Indians were ceded to the
United State- was ratified and confirmed. Among other things, the
agreement provided that out of the ceded lands allotments should be
to the Indians, and that there should be set aside by the Secre-

made

tary of the Interior, for the use in

common

of the several tribes of

Indians, four hundred and eighty thousand acres of grazing lands.

The

act ratifying the agreement,

That the lands acquired by

among

other things, provides:

agreement shall he opened to settlement by
proclamation of the President within six months after allotments are made and
this
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be disposed of under the general

provisions of the homestead and town-site
laws of the United Stales: ....
That sections sixteen and thirty-six. thirteen and thirty-three, of the lands
hereby acquired in each township shall not be subjeel to entry, but shall be
reserved, sections sixteen and
;iikI

thirty-six, for the use of the common schools,
sections thirteen and thirty three for university, agricultural colleges, uor

mal schools, and public buildings of the Territory and future State of Okla-

homa and in case either of said sections, or parts thereof, is lost to said
Territory by reason of allotments under this act or otherwise, the governor
thereof is hereby authorized to locate other lands not occupied in quantity equal
to the loss.

*******
;

That should any of said lands allotted to said Indians, or opened to settlement
under this act, contain valuable mineral deposits, such mineral deposits shall
be open to location and entry, under the existing mining laws of the United
States, upon the passage of this act, and the mineral laws of the United states
are hereby extended over said lands.

Numerous
to set

errors arc assigned in the appeal but

them out here

in

detail.

They

present,

it

unnecessary

is

though

forms, but one proposition, namely: that the lands

in

various

question are

in

within the category of hinds subject to the operation of the mining
laws, and. consequently, your office decision

is

wrong and should

be

reversed.

This question has been heretofore considered and passed upon by
There
9, L903 (32 L. I).. 95).

the Department, by decision of April

the question involved lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita

and affiliated bands of Indians, under an agreement ratified by act
of Congress of March 2, L895 (28 Stat.. 876, 894 899), as well as
lands ceded by the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribe-, under the
agreement above referred to. The provision of the act ratifying the
Wichita agreement, relative to the extension of the mining laws to
lands vi^U^\ by that agreement, was as follows:
That the laws relating to the mineral lands of the United States are hereby
extended over the lands ceded by the foregoing agreement.
In passing

upon the question, the Department, among other thing-.

said (pp. 96-97)

:

By

the aet ratifying the Wichita agreement the mining laws of the United
There
States were expressly extended over the hinds ceded by that agreement.

would seem
tions It; and

made

to
:;»'>.

lie
1.",

no room for serious question, therefore, that by that ad sec
and '>''>, reserved therein for school and other purposes, wen-

subjeel to the operation of the mining laws in the

like effect

as are sections of land

similarly

same manner and

reserved elsewhere, and no!

witli

yet

granted, as to which the mining laws are applicable.

With respect to the act ratifying the Comanche. Kiowa, and Apache agree
men! the situation is different. By that act only the lands which were to be
nl
\' !!" Ce
allotted to the Indians or to he opened to settlement thereunder
and Plaster Co.,
L. D., 125; Instructions, Id., 154) were made subject to the
mining laws and to mineral exploration and entry. The acl did nol extend the
mining laws generally to the lands i-^Un] by that agreement, as was done bj the
i

.".l
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earlier act with respect to the lands ceded by the Wichita agreement, but only

which were to be
ment under the act. Sections

to the lands

allotted to the Indians or to be
Id

and

.'id,

13 and

:v.\,

opened

to settle-

reserved for school and

other purposes for the benefit of the Territory and future State of Oklahoma,
were not lands to be allotted to Indians or to be opened to settlement any more

than were the four hundred and eighty thousand acres set aside for the common
use of the Indians as grazing lands.
The Department is of the opinion that sections 16 and 36, 13 and 33, of the
lands ceded by the Wichita agreement are. subject to the operation of the min-

*******

ing laws, and that the like numbered sections of the lands ceded by the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache agreement are not subject to the operation of such
laws.

It is

not intended to hold or to intimate that the Territory of Oklahoma

entitled, or that said Territory or the future State of

Oklahoma may

in

is

any

event be entitled, to minerals, if any, now known to exist in sections 16 and 36,
13 and 33, of the lands ceded by the last-mentioned agreement, or which may be
hereafter found to exist in said sections, prior to the time when the same shall
be granted to such Territory or State. It is simply held, as to said sections,
that under existing legislation the lands therein are not subject to the operation
of the mining laws.

The conclusion thus reached was followed in the case of Oklahoma v. L. G. Hamilton (unreported), decided April 6, 1904; and
after carefully considering the various phases of the question as now
again presented, the Department sees no reason to disturb

its

former

ruling.

The

decision appealed

from

is

accordingly affirmed.

mining claim— placer location— conformity- judicial
proceedings.

Laughing Water Plvcer.
The mining laws contemplate

that in

all

cases, except in instances

practicable so to do, placer mining locations

must be made

in

where imconformity

with the system of public-land surveys, that is, rectangular in form and of
dimensions corresponding to appropriate legal subdivisions, and with eastand-west and north-and-south boundary lines.
The only judicial proceedings in which a claim may become involved, resulting
in delay which would otherwise be fatal to entry, and which will protect
the rights of the applicant for patent during their pendency, are those
arising under the mining laws themselves, whereby the applicant is prevented from completing his patent proceedings prior to final determination
of the litigation.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F.

K C.)

March

to the
Office,

Commissioner of the General Land
July 27, 1905.
(G. N. B.)

Harney Peak Tin Mining, Milling and Manumade entry for
the Laughing Water placer mining claim, survey No. 807, Rapid
19, 1902, the

facturing Company, by Albert E. Ledoux, receiver,

City South Dakota, land
?

district.
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claimant that
cause

why
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your office directed the local officers to notify the
would !>c allowed sixty days within which to -how

L903,
it

the entry should

be canceled

not

things not necessary to be here considered.

(

1)

among

because,

there had been

a

other

delay

of over nine years in perfecting entry under the application, tiled

December

and (2) the claim as located does not conform as

30, L892,

near as practicable to the United State- system of public-land surveys and the rectangular subdivisions of such surveys.
that on failure to

make

the required

showing and

It

was stated

in the

absence of

appeal the entry would be canceled without further notice.
.>():
In response to the forego mo-, and on October 25,
a number
were
the
claimant,
filed by
in which, taken together, it
of affidavits
<

l

,

).

among other things, in substance and effect, that the
who
was appointed in L894, was unable to make entry earlier
receiver,
because of inability to procure money to pay for the land; that it
is

alleged,

impracticable to conform the claim to the system of the publicland surveys and the rectangular subdivisions of such surveys beis

valid and subsisting lode and placer mining
where this is not the case only land valuable for its
placer deposits is embraced in the claim; and that the location consists with a general practice in vogue in the mining district in which

cause of adjoining
claims; that

it

is

situated.

December

1903, your office held the showing with respect to the
non-conformity of the claim to be insufficient. The entry was held
for cancellation accordingly, but, with reference to the delay in making entry under the application, it was stated that under all the
circumstances of the case the objection on that score would be
removed.
The applicant has appealed to the Department.
It is shown by the record that the placer claim was located by eight
D,

persons, July

1,

1886, and that,

claimant, as successor in interest,

among other incident-, the present
made an amended location Decem-

ber 31, L891, with which tin pending entry coincides.
4

The township
tober, L898,

in which the claim is situated was surveyed in Ocand the plat of survey was filed in the local office April

K), 11)00.

By
and

the

official

plat the claim

to trend generally north

is

shown

and south,

to
it>

pursue

a

zig-zag course

entire length being

more

from what would
appear to be about 250 to about COO feet, is bounded by twenty-nine
courses, and embrace- 54.11 acre-.
Laughing Water Creek, from
which the claim evidently takes its name, flows almost entirely
No attempt was made even
throughout the claim from end to end.
to approximate the location, or any portion of it. to the system oi
thaw one and one-half mile-.

the public-land surveys,

eit

her

It

in

varies in width

form or position.
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contended by the appellant that the claim was located upon
uniform practice of the land department, prior to departmental decision of August 15, 1900 (Miller Placer Claim, 30
L. D., 225). to pass to patent placer mining claims located on unsurveyed land without regard to their form and position. While the
Department recognizes the fact to be that, in the past, under the
more or less general practice of your office, claims on unsurveyed
lands were permitted to pass to patent without regard to their form,
no case is cited by counsel, and a most diligent search has failed to
discover a decision by the Department, which directly authorizes such
It is

faith of the

indiscriminate locations.

The

decisions cited by counsel to justify

without application, as the locations there under
consideration were of a wholly different class and character. Even
were it not a question of statutory requirement, the frequently fantastic outlines of numbers of placer locations which have of late
years come to the attention of the Department would manifest the
unwisdom of the recognition formerly accorded such non-conforming
claims.
With the gradual diminution of the public domain this
question presents itself as one of increasing importance, and the illegality of locations of such elongated, narrow character as that here
in question, often following the course of and embracing streams of
water which the claimants seek to control, is made the more apparent.
This claim, situate in the Black Hills region, lies along a valley
enclosed by hills of moderate inclination, broken on either side by
frequent draws and flats. The topography of the adjacent ground
is not such as to have made it impracticable to define the location in
conformity with the system of the public land surveys, that is, rectangular in form and of dimensions corresponding to appropriate
legal subdivisions, and with east-and-west and north-and-south
boundary lines. Such conformity the statute contemplates and the
Department must require. (Wood Placer Mining Co., on review,
this location are

32 L. D., 363.)
It is

urged by claimant that

it is

claims.

Assuming the conditions

now to reform the
and subsisting lode and placer

impracticable

location because of surrounding valid

to be as alleged

(for the official

plat does not indicate- the claim to be so surrounded), interference

with unentered claims affords no justification for non-conformity of
This is discussed in the recent case of Rialto No. 2 Placer,
decided July 19, 1905 (34 L. D., 44), dealing with a placer location
upon surveyed land but upon this point controlling here, in which it

location.

is

said

The surrounding

prior locations, in so far as unentered, even if their existence and validity were admitted, as alleged, could not, and did not, of themselves,
amount to appropriations of the lands emhraeed in them in such a sense as to
preclude the inclusion of such lands or parts thereof within the limits of the
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Rialto No. 2 location, subject to such rights ;is then existed and were afterwards
maintained under such prior locations. Their existence, therefore, if such were
claim could not have been
the fact, would not prove that the Rialto No.
conformed to the legal subdivisions of the public survey. Such prior locations,
of themselves, could not and did not have the effect to separate the lands into
non-contiguous tracts, as contended, within the meaning of the term nun-contiguous as understood and used in connection with the administration of the
'_'

public land laws.

It is

contended that the Miller decision, supra^ was,

in effect, a

new

construction of the law, which should not be applied retroactively.

Upon this point it may be said that had the Department previously
construed the law to contemplate such a location as that here in question the contention might be of force.
The Department's apparent
7

have been a more or les- common pracbeen in its results, can not be
given the weight of direct authority, and is to be accounted for by
the prominence of other and decisive questions presented in such cases
It is not clear how an interpretation of a
as have been brought here.
law is to be given except the question is practically presented in a
Whilst fully appreciating the situation, the Department becase.
lieves its construction of the law to be correct and that it must therefore adhere to it.
Finally, counsel for claimant cite two unreported cases (Guyette
Consolidated Placer, decided May 10, 1904, and Kirk Placer, decided
June 30, 1904) in which, in view of the equities there apparent, the
Department specially excepted the non-conforming placer claims of
is
It
those names from the requirement under the later decisions.
contended, in effect, that no difference in principle exists between the
circumstances in those cases and the present, and that like considerIt is, however, plainly disclosed
ation should be accorded the latter.
by the record that such compliance with the requirements of the minacquiescence in

tice,

what seems

however misleading

it

to

may have

ing laws as has been had in this case has been of the most perfunctory
character, and that the only basis for an appeal to special consideration

is

the claimant's reliance upon the former practice observed with

non-conforming

locations.

eration, in the light of this

and other

respect to

presented, the Department

is

Indeed, upon further considwhich have since been

like cases

of opinion that the bounds of strictly

statutory authority were passed

in

the cases cited, and that they can-

No sufficient reason has
therefore be regarded as precedents.
been assigned for the non-con fortuity of this claim, and such rights
not

may seek to acquire in the premises must be ami are
A- the lands
observance of the statutory requirement.
of the vicinity are now surveyed the task is an easy one.
In conclusion, the Department i- con-trained to say thai it is
unable to concur in that portion of your office decision winch holds

as the claimant

subject to

that,

its

under the circumstance- of the

case, the objection to the delay
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under the application for patent would be waived.
which a claim may become involved,
resulting in delay which would otherwise he fatal to entry, under the
doctrine of Cain et al. v. Addenda Mining Co. (29 L. D., 62) and
in perfecting entry

The only

judicial proceedings in

like cases,

and which are held

to protect the rights of the applicant

for patent during their pendency, are those arising under the mining

laws themselves, whereby the applicant is prevented from completing his patent proceedings prior to final determination of the litigation.
(Marburg Lode Mining Claim, 80 L. D., 202.)

The

decision of your

office is affirmed.

HOMESTEAD ENTRY-SECOND-ADDITIONAL-ACT OE APRIL

28, 1904.

David H. Briggs.

A homestead entryman

is

not entitled to

make

a second entry under the provi-

upon a showing that he
relinquished his original entry for the reason that the land embraced therein
sions of the act of April 28, 1004, 33 Stat., 527,

was unsuitable

for farming purposes

and was not of

sufficient

acreage to

enable him to support himself and family by using the land for grazing
purposes.
The right of additional entry provided for by section 2 of the act of April 28,
1004, 33 Stat., 547, is limited to persons who theretofore had entered under
the homestead laws lands within the territory described in the act. and who

own and occupy such

lands,

and can only be exercised upon lands contiguous

to the original entry.

The

right of additional entry accorded by the proviso to section 3 of the act of

April 28, 1004, 33 Stat., 547, extends to

all

persons

who

prior to application

had made homestead entry, and there is no warrant in the act for further limiting the right, as is done in the instructions
of May 31, 1004, issued under said act, to a homesteader who had resided
upon and cultivated the land embraced in his original entry for the period
to exercise said privilege

required by law.
Directions given that the instructions of
to

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

An

May

31, 1004.

32 L. D., 670, be

amended

accord with the views herein expressed.

appeal has been

Commissioner of the General Land
July '28, 1905.
(C. J. G.)

to the
Office,

filed

by David H. Briggs from the decision of

your
of March 23, 1905, rejecting his application to make second
homestead entry under the acts of April 28, 1904 (33* Stat, 527. 547),
for the W. i SE. J, E.
SW. J, Sec. 33, T. 26 N., R. 45 W., NE.J,
E. 1 NW. }, SW. J NW."i, NW. i SW. J, E. J S W. i, NW. J SE. J,
Sec. 4, NE. J- SE. J, Sec. 5, T. 25 N., R. 45 W., containing 640 acres,
office

-}

Alliance, Nebraska.
It

appears that applicant made homestead entry, March 25, 1899,
I SE. J, Sec. 10. and E. J NE. -J, Sec. 15, T. 24 N., R. 44 W.,

for the S.
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which was canceled on relinquishment July
he

is

entitled to

make

the entry

21, L904.

now applied

for
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He claims

under section

that
1

of

the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat.. 527), which provides:

That any person who has heretofore made entry under the homestead laws.
who shall show to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of the General
Laml Office thai lie was unable to perfect the entry on account of some oaavoid

hut

able complication of his personal or business affairs, or on account of as honesl
mistake as to the character of the land
that he math' a bona fide effort to com
:

ply with the homestead law and that

lie

did not relinquish his entry or abandon

his claim for a consideration, shall be entitled to the benefit of the

homestead

laws as though such former entry had not been made.

In support of'his claim applicant alleges that during the month of
1899, he established residence on the land embraced in the

April.

former entry,

built a

comfortable house fenced the entire

tract

and

that he has since maintained residence upon the land.

due- a well:

which not being of acreage sufficient to support himself and family
by means of raising cattle and being unsuited for farming purposes,
he was compelled part of the time to seek employment elsewhere for
earning additional support for himself and family: that since the
enactment of the act of April 28, 1904, he believes that with sufficient
acreage for grazing purposes he will he enabled to establish for himself and family a home upon a ranch and to raise cattle in numbers
sufficient to justify

him

in

making

it

a

home; that there being no

land adjoining his homestead he relinquished the
same, for which he received no consideration.
available vacant

The land applied
L904

28,

for

is

subject to disposal under the act of April

(33 Stat.. :>17). entitled,

-An

act

to

amend

laws as to certain unappropriated and unreserved lands
It

is

provided

in section

1

the homestead
in

Nebraska."

of said act

That from and after sixty days after the approval of this act entries made
under the homestead laws in the State of Nebraska west and north of the fol
lowing line, to wit: .... shall not exceed in area six hundred and fortj
acres, and shall he as nearly in compact form as possible, and in m> event over
two miles in extreme length: Provided, That there shall he excluded from the
provisions of this act such lands within the territory herein described as in the
opinion of the Secretary of the Interior it may he reasonably practicable to irrigate under the national irrigation law. or by private enterprise.

Section

w

_!

reads as follows:

That entrymen under the homestead laws of the United states within the
territory above described who own and occupy the land heretofore entered by
them. may. under the provisions of this act and subject to its conditions, enter
ether lands contiguous to their said homestead entry, which shall not. with the
land so already entered, owned, and occupied, exceed in the aggregate six
hundred and forty acres; and residence upon the original homestead shall be
accepted as equivalent to residence upon the additional land so entered, but
final entry shall not be allowed 'of such additional land until Ave years after
first

entering the same.
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And
That

the

iirst

a former

THE PUBLIC LANDS.

proviso to section 3 of said act
homestead entry

is:

shall not he a bar to the entry

under the provisions of this act of a tract which, together with the former entry, shall not
exceed six hundred and forty acres.

The

May

circular of instructions issued under said act

31,

1904 (32

L. D., (>70), contains this paragraph:

Under said

act no bar

is

interposed to the making of second homesteads for the

area of 640 acres by parties entitled thereto under existing laws, and applications therefor will be considered under the instructions of the respective laws
under which they are made.
full

The Department concurs
cant's

showing

28, 1901

is

your

in the opinion of

not sufficient to bring

him within

(33 Stat,, 527), and therefore he

second entry for 640 acres under section

is

1

that appli-

the act of April

not entitled to

make

of the act of April 28,

He

is

the provisions of section 2 of said act, for

it

1904 (33 Stat., 547), as applied for.

office

clearly not entitled to
contemplates the entry

of additional lands contiguous to lands within the territory described
in the act, entered,

owned and occupied by the

that are absent under the present application.
first

applicant, conditions

With

respect to the

proviso to section 3 of said act, the instructions thereunder,

supra, declare:

By

the

first

proviso of section

3,

any person who made a homsetead entry
and

prior to his application for entry under this act, and has resided upon

cultivated the

same

for the period required by law, will be allowed to

make

additional entry for a quantity of land, which added to the area of the land

embraced

in

the former entry shall not exceed 640 acres, but residence and

made and proved

cultivation of the additional land will be required to be
in

as

ordinary homestead entries.

This paragraph of the instructions, wherein

is

it

declared with

reference to the former homestead entry of an applicant under the
act of April 28, 1904

(33 Stat., 547),

"and has

resided

upon and

same for the period required by law," prescribes a
by the purview of said act. The only prothe first proviso to section 3 of said act, to which said para-

cultivated the

limitation not warranted
vision in

graph

is directed, is that the tract applied for shall not, with the
embraced in the former entry, exceed six hundred and forty
acres.
This being true, the regulation embodied in the foregoing
quotation will no longer be followed, and your office will take the

tract

necessary steps to correct said instructions in the

manner

indicated.

In view of the above, while Briggs can not be permitted to enter
under said act six hundred and forty acres as applied for by him,
he may enter, subject to compliance with the requirements of the

homestead law, four hundred and eighty acres, if he so desires, and
upon showing proper qualification, his former entry being for one
hundred and sixty acres. His application will therefore be approved
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number of

for that

acre-, the decision

of your
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being hereby

office

reversed accordingly.

This decision
case dated

June

substituted

is

L905,

17.

for that

which

is

Department

of the

in

this

hereby recalled and vacated.

final i'hoof on claims within forest reserves,
circular.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, I). C, August /. 1905.
and Receivers,

Registers

United States Land

Gentlemen
cular of April

Attention

:

8,

is

Offices.

called to the following reissue of the cir-

L905, with additions thereto suggested by the Fores-

Department of Agriculture. The original circular is in
and effect, the reissue being deemed necessary to more fully

try Bureau,
full force

emphasize the purpose of the original circular.
(1) Hereafter you will, when issuing notice of intention to make
final proof upon claims, either mineral or non-mineral, within an
established forest reserve, furnish a'copy thereof to the Forest Supervisor in charge of such reserve, in order that he

the taking of final proof to

present at

claimant and his witnesses, or

may

he enabled to

may protest the passage of
may be. In the former

application to entry, as the case

may deem

ever the Supervisor

reduced
final proof
to

writing
in

at

it

that case.

You

will

('2)

You

will

carefully

case,

made

when-

may

he

a part of the

request the Forest Supervisor to

the proof notice, to be

with such notations thereon as he

the mineral

necessary, the examination

the cost of the claimant, and

make proper return of

hi'

examine and cross-examine

may

made

a

part of the case,

consider best.

examine any

proofs

for

claims

within

forest reserves, whether mineral or non-mineral, together with any
evidence furnished by the Forest Supervisor or brought out by his
examination, and either reject, suspend, or approve the same according

to the following directions:

appear upon (he face of the record, you will
reject the
proof, advising claimant of your reasons therefor, with
the right of appeal.
No flirt her act ion thereon will be required from
(3)

If sufficient

facts

final

the Forest Supervisor.
(

I

)

If

you believe the proof

to be

fraudulent, or doubt
rejection, or

do

ful,

but

the

Forest

have sufficient
Supervisor has returned the notice with a definite protest against the
claim, you will suspend the proof and submit a brief statement of the
not

reasons to

justify

it>

if
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which
made, such statement to include the names and addresses
of claimants and witnesses, and your reasons for the suspension of the
You will forward the proof to this office with a copy of your
proof.
facts in the case to the special agent in charge of the district in

said proof

is

The

Letter to the special agent.

make such

investigation as he

report on the approved form.
priate action will be taken

special agent will then proceed to

may deem necessary, and to submit his
Upon the receipt of his report, appro-

upon the

entire record as then

made

made

up.

good faith and
that the law has been in all respects complied with, you will pass
such proof to entry in the regular order, upon compliance by the
claimant with all the requirements therein and on the payment of fees
and commissions, but you will in no case issue final certificate or pass
a mineral application to entry when any definite protest by a forest
(5)

officer

(6)

If you believe the proof to have been

has been

You

made

will

in

against the claim.

promptly notify the Forest Supervisor of whatever

you take in every case.
The names and addresses of Forest Supervisors will be furnished you by this office. Notices of claims in forest reserves in which
there is no forest officer in charge should be forwarded to the Forester,
Agricultural Department, Washington, D. C.
Very respectfully,
J. H. Fimple,
action
(7)

A cting

Commissioner.

Approved
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.

right of way-forest reserves—jurisdiction
Instructions.
Directions given that

all

applications for rights of

way

or other privileges over or

upon public lands in forest reserves, now pending before the General Land
Office and falling wholly within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, as defined in departmental letter of June 8, 1005 (concurred in by
the Secretary of Agriculture in letter of June 13, 1005), he transmitted to
the Department of Agriculture for consideration and disposition.
applications for rights of way or other privileges affect lands lying partly
within and partly without forest reserves, and involve questions within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and also questions within the
jurisdiction of the land department, separate applications will not he required, hut in such cases the application will he examined, and, if found
regular, approved hy the land department in so far as it affects lands without the reserve, and then transmitted to the Department of Agriculture for
consideration and such action as may he proper relative to the lands within
the reserve; hut in the event it appear that the right to use lands without
the reserve is subordinate to permission to use lands within the reserve, the
application should first he passed upon by the Secretary of Agriculture.

Where
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Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L.

(

Commissioner of the General La mi

the

to

Office,

J.

,
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1

ugust

(G. B. G.)

0, 1905.

F" of July 15, 1905, acknowledges the receipt
of departmental letter of June 29, 1905, which defined the divided
Your

office letter

,w

Department of Agriculture and the Department
way and
privileges in forest reserves, and requests that instructions be given
by this Department for the disposition of pending applications the
consideration of which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture as so defined.
It is also suggested that some of these applications may involve
rights and privileges upon public lands partly within and partly
without forest reserves, and requested that your office be instructed

jurisdiction of the

of the Interior in the matter of applications for rights of

in the premises.

Upon

consideration of the matter,

it is

directed that all applica-

pending before your office, in whatever state of preparation, for
permission to occupy and use public lands wholly within forest reserves, and questions relative to their allowance wholly within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, as defined by said
departmental letter of June 29, 1905 [see letter of June 8, 1905, 33
L. D., G09], be transmitted by your office to said Department for consideration and disposition, and that the applicant in each instance
tions

he duly advised of such action.

As
out

to applications affecting lands partly within

forest

and partly with-

reserves, involving questions within the cognizance of the

Department of Agriculture,

it

is

not believed that the public interests

require that the applicant should, as suggested by your

office, be put
and expense of separate applications, but that the applications should be examined and. if found regular, should be approved by this Department as to such part as falls without the foresi
reserves, and then transmitted to the Department of Agriculture for
In
its consideration and approval, in so far as it affects the reserve.
the event it appear that the right to use lands without the reserve is

to the trouble

subordinate to permission to use lands within the reserve, the application should first be passed upon by the Secretary of Agriculture.

ARID LAND-H1K LAM A ION PROJECT—IRRIGABIiE AREA-LEGAL
I

SUBDIVISIONS.
I

NSTKl

<

TIONS.

Public lands lying within the irrigable area of a reclamation projed constructed
under the provisions of the act of June IT. 1002, can be disposed of only
under the homestead law and in conformity with the legal subdivisions,
defined by the public land surveys.
5

104— Vol.

34

05 m

5
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Acting Secretary Ryan

to

the Director of the Geological Survey,

August

(F. L. C.)

0,

(E. F. B.)

1905.

The Department is in receipt of your letter of July 24, 1905,
requesting a reconsideration and modification of the " Instructions
'"

of August 21, 1903 (32 L. D., 237, 239), so far as

it

was therein held

that—
As the Secretary has no authority
there

is

to allow

an entry for

less

than 40 acres,

also no authority to subdivide a 40-acre tract for combination with

other subdivisions.

The

provision that the lands shall be subject to entry only

44

under the provisions of the homestead laws in tracts of not less than forty
nor more than one hundred and sixty acres " does not imply a power to allow an
entry of any amount between said minimum and maximum area, but contemplates that

all

entries

The Secretary may

must be made according

to the ordinary legal subdivisions.

limit the area per entry to the smallest legal subdivision, or

may combine with it one or more legal subdivisions, provided the entry will not
exceed 160 acres; but he has no power to subdivide or change the ordinary
subdivisions fixed by law.

You cite no authority for the modification of this ruling, but base
your request solely upon the ground that your office " has been unable
to find any positive provision prohibiting the disposal of the public
lands in tracts of less than 40-acre subdivisions."
It is a fundamental principle that the public lands can be disposed
of under the general land laws only in conformity with the legal
subdivisions as defined by the public land surveys. It is to be found
throughout the entire public land system from the foundation to the
present time.

Lands lying

in the irrigable area of every project constructed

under

the act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), can be disposed of under the

homestead law only.
the act of

March

located in a

body

Section 2289, Revised Statutes, as

amended by

3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), contains the positive
requirement that land entered under the homestead law shall " be

lands."

in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the public

The same provision was

also contained in the original act of

May

20, 18G2 (12 Stat., 392).
If the conditions referred to in your letter exist to any great extent,

which the Department is not prepared to accept, although
reject your view, the remedy must be provided by the
branch of the government.

it

does not

legislative

Marvin Hughitt.
Motion for review of departmental decision of May 8, 1905, 33
Ryan, August 4, 1905.

L. D., 544, denied by Acting Secretary
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7,

ACT OF

;>.;,

COUTS

V.

StRICKLEK ET

(Rancho Buena

AIj.

Vista.)

Under the provisions of section 7 of the act of July 23, 1866, persons who in
good faith and for a valuable consideration purchased lands from those who
claimed and wore thought to be Mexican grantees or assigns, arc entitled,
provided they fulfil the other conditions of the act, to purchase such of
said lands found not to he included in the grant as finally surveyed, regard-

what other

lands, not within the lines of their original purchase,
found to he the lands granted.
Where the tie line purporting to connect the survey of a private land claim
with the public-land surveys is shown to be erroneous, the actual locus of
the claim as defined and surveyed on the ground must prevail.
less of

were

finally

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

W.

J.

Commissioner of
August 10, 1905.

to the

Office,

the General

Land

(J. R.

W.)

Strickler and others, protestants in Couts v. Strickler et

al.

446), appealed from your decision of April 5, L905,
approving the resurveys in connection with the boundaries of the
(31

L.

I).,

Buena Vista Rancho and plats thereof, executed by Deputy Surveyor
W. A. Sickler under contract No. 226, dated November 21, 1903.
The appeal seeks to open and again agitate the points in controand determined in Couts

versy, heard

reference

is

v.

Strickler, supra, to

here made, without here again discussing

at

which

length the

matters attempted to be raised by the appeal that are there discussed.
is adhered to.
This disposes of all assignments of

That decision

error, except as hereinafter discussed.

The seventh assignment is that the present survey contains 565.45
more than the Hays survey purported to contain, or than the
applicant claimed to purchase. The distances on the right, northerly
acres

and southerly

lines, as run by Sickler, are respectively 134.50 and
and of the westerly and easterly boundaries L65 chain-,
giving a product or contents of 2211) 27/40 acres, which is substantially the area of half of a square league and substantially that
surveyed by Hays (2211). OS). It may, however, have been intended

134.49 chains,

by the assignment to allege as error thai the area of Lands patented
under the grant with those within the I lavs survey not patented.
taken together, exceed the original claim under the grant by the
amount, substantially, stated in the assignment. This occurs from
an error of Hays in his field-notes connecting the westerly line of his
survey of the rancho with the range line between range- lour west
and three west. Instead of with the section line a mile west thereof.

That

this section line

was the one intended bv him

is

shown by the
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other calls of his survey and by the possession and asserted dominion
of Couts and his predecessors in estate prior to any survey of the

lands west of the ranch house to the road from Milpitas to Guajome.
The Treadwell survey adhered to the erroneous connection of the
westerly boundary to the range line and about the area of 565.45
acres of the 1109.67 (one quarter of a square league) patented under

the grant lay outside

and

east of the half of a square league as sur-

veyed by Hays. But this fact does not affect the grant claimant's
right to purchase the land which, at the time of his purchase, was
thought to be within the lines of the grant. In Beley v. Naphtaly
(169 U. S., 353, 362), after giving reasons for the construction
adhered to, the court held that
For the reasons thus given we think that this act includes those persons who
good faith for a valuable consideration have purchased land from those who
claimed and who were thought to be Mexican grantees or assigns, provided
in

they

fulfil

the other conditions

In Watriss

v.

named

in the act.

Keed (99 CaL, 134; 33 Pac,

775, 776), the court held

that

The

was

purchaser from the Mexican grantee
He was assured by the act that if
he made his purchase in good faith, took actual possession, and continued the
same, and paid a valuable consideration, and the land was believed to be within
the grant, he would be treated as a preferred purchaser of the land, and, upon
paying for the same, would be entitled to a patent. If respondent's land was
not within the lines of the grant, it was supposed to be, and the evidence shows
that she honestly believed it to be within such lines, and this entitles her to the
object of the act

to give to the

the right of purchase from the government.

protection of the act.

These principles are as applicable to the present case as to that in
which they were originally applied, as Couts purchased in November,
1866, when the Hays survey had stood for eight years approved by
the surveyor-general, and express reference was made to it in the deed
by the grant claimant to him. The lines so fixed were " the lines of "
bis " original purchase."
So much of those lands as was not included
in the grant as finally surveyed the act permits

regardless of

found

what other lands not within those

him
lines,

to purchase
were finally

to be the lands granted.

The eighth assignment

is,

in substance, that

not in fact retraced Hays's survey, but has

Surveyor Sickler has

made an

original one,

from that of Hays. This, if true, would
be fatal to the present survey, and decisive of the case. This assignment is supported by what purports to be copies of the field-notes
and plat of a survey made February 27, 1904, by S. L. Ward, county
surveyor of San Diego county, California, as " Being a retracing
of the Hays survey of 1858," of the Buena Vista Rancho. The
purported copies are without certification or authentication of any
shifted about a mile west
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kind, and for that reason alone are not evidence or entitled to be
But were these documents unobjectionable in thai respect,

received.

the field-notes bear on their face evidence destructive of their credit.

They show
As there seems to be much uncertainty regarding the starting point,
e., the
W. corner of the Indian (Felipe's) Garden, I went to the range Line,
chains north of the corner to Sees. 30-31-25 & 30, Twps. 11 south. Ranges 3
and 4 west, S. B. M., as referred to in Hays' field notes of his survey and ran
i.

X.

:'.::

thence

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
While very much of the topography as I find it, fails to agree with that given
Hays' field-notes, yet the tract surveyed by his courses and distances includes
the land described in Felipe's original claim and checks all right with the range
in

line.

After spending nearly a week on the ground and carefully studying the situaI am convinced that the Hays survey never was made in the field, but

tion,

simply projected on paper and the topography written up at random.
It thus appears affirmatively that the controlling question was
merely assumed, viz: that Hays was not in error in connecting his
survey to the range line, instead of to the section line, a mile west of
This fatal assumption, or begging of the whole question in conit.
troversy, is adhered to, although on the lines run " very much of the
topography .... fails to agree with that given in Hays' field notes,"
in explanation of which the opinion is advanced " that Hays' survey
was never made in the field, but was simply projected on paper and
written up at random." It is clear that what the county surveyor se<
out to do, and what he in his opinion accomplished, was not to ascertain where Hays's lines and monuments lay and to retrace and relocate them, but, first determining where Felipe's garden was, to lay
on the ground Hays's courses and distances so as to include the land
described in Felipe's original claim and to make an original survey
of that tract, irrespective of where Hays may have laid the lines
including it -to make a survey as Hays ought to have made it regardless of where he did make it.
As the topography of Hays's lines can
not be made to conform, the opinion is advanced that Hays's survey

—

was never made

in the field.

At conclusion of his field-notes Sickler observes:
'he regularity

objects noted
least

in

with which this resurvey checks
the original survey

makes

approximately the same, but there

is

it

a

off the

topography and other

certain that

these lines are

;ii

great discrepancy in connection

with the public land survey.
It will be noticed that Hays makes connection with hut one public land corner,
which he calls the Cor. to Sees. 25, 30, 31, and :;<;. and that ii proves by this
survey to be within a few links of the present location of the
Sec. Cor. bet
Sees. 25 and 2(5.
If the subdivision lines had been established at the time Hays made his survey, the error could easily be accounted for.
However, tin' !or. maj have been
!

<

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

70

some private survey, or the deputy who established the range line may
have erroneously started from a corner on the Tp. line, a mile too far west, in
which case it would be set for the i Sec. Cor. bet. Sees. 25 and 30. At any
rate it seems certain that this Cor. was in existence at the time Hays made his
survey and that when it was pointed out to him he failed to properly identify it.

set in

The survey was
range
I

am

line,

carefully examined, and, as to Hays's tie to the

the examiner says:

firmly of the opinion after careful investigation, that the tie to the range

line should be set aside as erroneous for nearly all the topographical features

point that way, and there seems to be a persistent and lively tradition in this
locality that

Hays's No.

1 Cor.

is

in the vicinity of the

Oak stump

so often

referred to herein.

Again, he says
At the Cor. point for No.

1 Cor. as fixed by the examiner from Hays's tie to
nothing at all in the way of oak trees or shrubbery, the
growth being almost entirely sage and sumach. I was unable also to find any
other oak trees in the vicinity of the alleged Hays bearing tree stump. That
old tree seems to be the only live oak in that locality.

the range

line,

there

is

There are then under these two professed retracings of the Hays
survey two sets of four lines each, aggregating 598.99 chains in each
case, or 7.465 miles.

features

In one, taking as an

initial

point the stump of

Hays as standing in 1858, all the topographical
noted by him in the way of water courses, ravines, valleys,

a live oak,

noted by

and
and

distances, closely agree.

man

subject to liability to mistake.

mountainous country, and their respective courses
That stump is the only live oak discoverable anywhere in the locality. The only real objection to the
survey is that it can not be harmonized to Hays's tie to the range line.
The Ward survey, blindly adhering to Hays's tie to the range line
and ignoring the live oak, starting from a point where nothing but
sage and sumac seem ever to have grown, so disagrees with all topographic features that to sustain it it must be assumed that Hays in
fact never made any survey in the field.
Such contention is not founded in sound reason. A tie to the range
line, while presumed to be carefully made and accurate, is but one
of the calls given by the surveyor to aid in fixing the location of his
work upon the face of the earth and its relation to the surveys of the
public lands. Such call is but human work and like all works of
ridges, in a

No

call of a

survey can be infal-

the calls in about seven and a half miles of lines,
over ridges, valleys, and streams, substantially agree in one set of
lible,

and Avhen

all

lines to show that the survey was in fact made, that it can be laid
again upon the surface of the earth, agreeing in every particular
save that of its tie to the range line, the proof becomes not merely
persuasive, but so clear, cogent, and convincing as irrefutably and
conclusively to establish that the tie to the range line was erroneous
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The

facts show conclusively that Hays in fad
he accurately measured and noted topographical features, but that he erred in connecting his work to the
system of public land surveys, and that his survey has been accu-

made

rejected.

survey,

his

rately retraced

Where

and

that

is

now properly connected

the tie to the surveys of public lands

to the public surveys.

shown

to be erroneous,
the actual locus of the claim as defined and surveyed on the ground
must prevail. Sinnott v. Jewett (33 L. I)., 01).

Your approval of

is

the survey here in question

Snow

v.

is

affirmed.

Dicken.

Motion for review of departmental decision of March
Ryan, August 10,

L. D., 477, denied by Acting Secretary

22, 1905. 33

1905.

TOWNSITES IN ALASKA-PARAGRAPH
1,

1904,

13 OF REGULATIONS OF AUGUST
AMENDED.

Circular.

Section 13 of the
title to

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington^ I). C, August 12, 1905.
regulations concerning the manner of acquiring

townsites on public lands in the District of Alaska (33 L. D.,
is hereby amended by inserting after the first paragraph

163, 170)

therein the following additional paragraph thereto, to-wit:

In addition to the method prescribed by the Rules of Practice for
taking depositions hereinbefore made applicable to town lot contests,
depositions of witnesses to be used in such contests may be taken in
the District of Alaska on notice, within the same time, under like

same manner and form, and before the same officers,
and transmitted to the trustee in like manner and form,

conditions, in the
to be certified
to be

leges

used in such contest cases with like effect, with all the priviall the restrictions, as provided in chapter sixty-

and under

June G, 11)00 (31 U.
hereby clothed with all the
reference to taking such depositions and
in such contest cases, as is conferred by
three of the act of

S. Stat., 321, 436)

trustee

power

is

in

:

and the

issuing orders in

admitting them
said chapter

in

evidence

upon the court

or judge of the district court.
J.

H. Fimple, Acting Commission*

Approved
Tiios.

Ryan, Acting Secretary.

r.
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mining claim-lode within placer—application for patent.

Jaw Bone Lode

v.

Damon

Placer.

Whenever proceedings under an application

for mineral patent have failed, hy
reason of a default incurable as to them, the application stands rejected,
but may, if not in itself or for any extrinsic reason fatally defective, be
made the instrument of renewed proceedings. It is not, however, in the
interval a pending application, and can be considered as renewed, and as
again taking effect, only as of the date proceedings under it are actively

resumed.

An

application for patent embracing a lode within the limits of a placer claim

which patent application is pending can not be permitted to proceed
beyond the point of filing in the absence of a determination by the land
department that the lode was known to exist at the date of the filing of the
placer application
and the law does not contemplate a proceeding to that
end before the land department, or the acceptance by the letter of such
lode application, when an adverse suit against the placer applicant has
been begun by the lode claimant, during the pendency of which all proceedings in that department must be stayed.
for

;

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

May

Commissioner of
August U, 1905.

to the

Office,

23, 1895, the F. F. V. Placer

cation for patent to the

Damon

the General

(F.

and Mining Company

Land
H. B.)

filed appli-

placer mining claim, survey No.

During the period of publicawhich expired August 28, 1895, various adverse
and suits commenced thereunder, which remained

9295, Pueblo, Colorado, land district.
tion of notice thereof,

claims were filed

pending for several years.
February 19, 1896, C. A. Johnson et al., claiming as owners of a
lode mining claim, called Jaw Bone, in conflict with the placer claim,
filed protest against the application, in which it was alleged, in substance and effect, that five hundred dollars, in labor or improvements,
had not been expended on the claim; that not to exceed two and a
half acres of the land embraced in the application is placer in character; that lodes or mineral deposits in place were known by the
placer locators to exist at the time of the location of the placer claim

and that, February 2, 1896, protestants discovered a vein or lode
within the placer limits and made lode location thereon.
A hearing followed, at which the several parties appeared and
submitted testimony. In due course the local officers returned their
joint finding, substantially, (1) that the land

embraced

in the

Damon

placer in character; (2) that it has not been shown that
any lodes were known to exist in the ground at the date of the placer

application

is

patent application; and (3) that it is shown that more than $500, in
labor and improvements, were expended on the claim prior to August
28, 1895

:

wherefore, the protest was dismissed.
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appeal by protestants, your

office, by decision of May L5,
and action of the local officers; and protectants thereupon appealed to the Department.
By decision of January 16, 1004 (unreported), the Department,
affirming your office decision in other respects, found from the evi-

1903, sustained the findings

dence submitted at the hearing that the statutory requirement of an
expenditure of $500, in labor or improvements, prior to the expiration of the period of publication of notice of the placer patent application, had not been satisfied, and reversed the decision of your office
to that extent, " without prejudice to the right of the " placer " claim-

commence
March 7, 1904

ant to

patent proceedings anew, if

it

so desires."

Department denied motion for review of its decision, and declined to pass upon a request
preferred in connection with the motion that, should the latter be denied, the applicant company be permitted to publish and post new
notices of its pending application, without filing new application,
and to submit in that connection further showing of compliance with
(decision unreported), the

the law in the matter of expenditures.

March

15, 1904,

your

office

formally notified the local

officers that,

pursuant to the departmental decisions, the application for placer
patent was " accordingly canceled."
By copies of papers transmitted to the Department December 9,
1901, by resident counsel for protestants,

it

was

disclosed that, fol-

lowing the denial of the motion for review, as above, resident counsel for the placer claimant, under his construction of the expression " pending application," used in that decision with reference to
the request preferred in connection with the motion for review, and
without notice to protestants, filed in your office a " motion to return
office, and for leave to republish notice
as
sanctioned
which
thereof,"
he urged
by the Department's expression.
consideration
of
and
the motion, it also appears,
Upon receipt
your office had, on April 6, 1904, revoked "the cancellation of said
mineral application " and authorized the republication and reposting
of notice thereof, citing the case of Highland Marie and Manilla
Lode Mining (Maims (31 L. D., 37, 39) as authority for Mich new
notice.
Against that action, as in disregard of the judgment rendered by the Department, and as prejudicial "to the rights of the
contestants in and to their known lodes within the limits of the
placer," they protested, and asked "thai instructions be given t<>
Denying, by unreported
prevent any action under said decision/'
decision of December 30, L904, this request, which in effect, equally

application papers to local land

witli
its

of the placer claimant in connection with
raised
the question of the effect to be accorded
for review,

the earlier request

motion

the placer application under which

and regarding

it

as an

proceedings had been renewed.

improper time and occasion

f<»r.

and therefore
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avoiding, any expression of opinion in that behalf, the Department

added
However, the lode claimants are not hereby precluded from pressing their
asserted rights before the land department in an appropriate manner, bringing
forward all the facts and circumstances upon which they rely and thus raising
an issue which may be determined after all those concerned have had full opportunity to be heard.

January
office

7,

1905, counsel for the lode claimants presented to your

a formal request that the order (April

6,

1904) reinstating the

and authorizing republication and reposting of notice thereof be vacated, and urged that the departmental
refusal to instruct to that effect proceeded upon the ground that " the
action to bring about a correction of the erroneous decision of your
office should not have been commenced in the Department."
In opposition, it was stated on behalf of the placer claimant that new notice
of the application in question had already been given, during the
period of publication of which an adverse claim had been filed and
the jurisdiction of the land department in the premises thus temrejected placer application

porarily suspended.

By

decision of

vacation of

its

The records

of this office

as owners of the

by Johnson

January

et al.

31, 1905,

order of April

Jaw Bone

G,

your

office

denied the request for

1904, saying

show that on June

6,

1904,

Thera

II.

Satterlee et

al.,

same Jaw Bone lode claimed
and concerning which testimony was submitted at the original
lode (presumably the

hearing in this case) filed adverse claim No. 2158 against the Damon placer.
It would appear therefrom that the owners of said Jaw Bone lode have asserted
their adverse claim in the manner prescribed by statute and that all proceedings
in the land department concerning said application other than filing proof of
publication, posting, etc., must be stayed to await the termination of said
adverse.

In the names of Johnson

et al., the

former protestants and then

lode owners, in whose names the proceedings on behalf of the lode

claim and above detailed had been conducted, an appeal from that
These parties had, how-

decision has been taken to the Department.

it would appear, a considerable time prior thereto been succeeded in interest by Thera H. Satterlee and two others; but as the
appeal may be effectually disposed of on another ground, the cessa-

ever,

tion of appellants' interest need not be here considered but merely

noted in explanation of the proceedings hereinafter mentioned.
It also appears that in the meantime, during the period of republication of notice of the Damon application for patent, and on June 6,
1904, Satterlee et al., as the then claimants of the Jaw Bone lode
claim, filed in the local office their adverse claim and seasonably

commenced suit thereunder.
December 16, 1904, the adverse claimants also filed in the local office
This applicatheir application for patent to the Jaw Bone claim.
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tion the local officers rejected on the same day. because of its conflict
with the placer application and also because of the pendency of the
adverse suit involving the ground thus in conflict between the two
claims.
From this action the lode claimants appealed to your office,
upon the ground, in substance and effect, that it was error to reject
their application because of conflict with a placer application which

had been "duly canceled on a judgment of the Secretary of the
Interior," and to hold that because an adverse claim had been filed
as against the "erroneously pending application" and suit commenced thereon, all proceedings before the land department must be
stayed.

By

decision of February 23, 1905, your

office

sustained the action

of the local officers, for reasons substantially as follows: Thai by

it

had been reinstated and permission
reposting of notice, and submission of

the placer application in question

given for republication and

proofs thereunder; that an application for lode patent, in conflict
with a pending application for placer patent, can not be allowed to

proceed in the absence of a determination by the land department or

competent jurisdiction that the lode was known to exist at
was filed, and no such determination
had been had in the present case; that it appears from the record that
these lode claimants had seasonably filed their adverse claim as
a court of

the date the placer application

against the placer application

and

instituted suit thereon in a court

of competent jurisdiction; that if claimants of lodes within placer
limits elect to

Statutes,

file

adverse claims, pursuant to section 2326, Revised
to adjudication by the court, the

and submit their claims

law does not contemplate that they

may

at

the

same time

assert

before the land department their claims of rights under the general
exception and reservation created by section 2333, Revised Statutes:

and

that,

haying elected

to institute adverse proceedings,

and

until

the final determination thereof, these lode claimants are precluded

from prosecuting further proceedings before the land department.
From this decision, also, the lode claimants have appealed to the
Department. Their assignments of error are found, upon analysis,
to amount practically to those set out in their appeal to your office.
Although the later of the appeals taken here is broader in its scope,
each

is

closely related to the other in that

it

challenges the action of

your office in reinstating the rejected application for placer patent
and authorizing republication and reposting of notice thereof. The
effect

will

be

found to be

January

L6,

L904, supra,

of that action determined, the situation

relieved of difficulty.
It

is

true that departmental decision of

held the original placer patent proceeding- to have failed, by reason
of a default which could not be cured under those proceedings; and
the expressed recognition of the right of the applicant " to

commence
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patent proceedings anew " implied the course necessary to be pursued
The application for patent being the

to secure the desired patent.

means whereby the orderly course of the patent proceedings proper
is actively entered upon before the local office, the failure of those
proceedings is the failure of the application, which necessarily stands
Therefore, the nature of the default considered, the placer

rejected.

applicant here was obliged to retrace
cation for patent.

To have

its steps,

and renew

its

appli-

required, however, the filing of a

new

formal instrument for that purpose, a duplicate of the original " application " save as to its date, would have been uselessly to encumber
the record. In the case cited by your office (Highland Marie and
Manilla Lode Mining Claims, supra) the Department authorized the
renewal of patent proceedings, following a default like the present,
under a formal application for patent already on file. It was not
there held, however, and it is not to be understood, that in that or
the present, or in any such, case the application took, or could take,
effect as of the date originally filed. Once rejected, it can again take
In the interval, though
effect only as of the date it is renewed.
present in the files, it can not be considered a " pending application,"
despite any inadvertent expression to the contrary, and constitutes no
barrier to an application by another within the

meaning of paragraph

44 of the mining regulations (31 L. D., 474, 482). Stemmons et al.
v. Hess (32 L. D., 220).
It is renewed, and again becomes effective,
only when proceedings under it are actively renewed. As this case
conspicuously illustrates,

not within the contemplation of the law

it is

that an application for placer patent, proceedings under which have
failed

and are subsequently renewed, is to be treated as continuously
it was originally filed, and as having
that as the date relative to which the question of the known

of effect from the date on which
fixed

existence of lodes within the placer limits

is to

be determined.

If

for no other reason, the contrary construction should be rejected as

tending to invite the institution of defective patent proceedings, and
upon their failure the dilatory renewal thereof, the application thus
continuing to stand as a barrier to the acquisition by others of such
rights as they might otherwise enjoy.
An application for mineral patent which has thus been rejected

may, then, unless

any extrinsic reason fatally defectIn
any such case, however, it must be treated as re-filed (and should be
so endorsed by the register), and as again taking effect, as of the
ive,

be

made

in itself or for

the instrument of renewed patent proceedings.

date formal application

is

made

which must in

to that officer for republication of

be promptly had. Where in
any case that date can not afterwards be ascertained the application
must of necessity be held to have taken renewed effect as of the date
notice thereof,

of the

first

publication of the

all cases

new

notice.
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follows that the action of your

office

and authorizing republication
and reposting of notice thereof, was not and could not have been
prejudicial to any rights of the lode claimants in the premises.
By
way of emphasis of this it appears, by a certificate of the clerk of the

in reinstating the placer application

court of Teller county, Colorado, that since these appeals
were taken the jury, sitting in the before-mentioned adverse suit
between the parties here, found the issues joined therein for the lode

district

claimants and that they "are entitled to the possession and occupancy of all the ground in conflict between the Jaw Bone lode

mining claim and the Damon placer mining claim," and that judgment has been entered accordingly. If the facts were presented to
the court as they have been presented here, the court must necessarily
have taken the view hereinabove expressed.
So far as the appeal from your office decision of February
L905, questions the reinstatement of the placer application,

it

is

23,

fully

answered by what has been said above. In addition it may he said
office committed no error in rejecting the application for
lode patent, because of the pendency of the adverse suit between the
Although in such a case as this the remedies open to the
parties.
lode claimant present possibilities of difference in scope, in that under
an adverse suit pursuant to section 2326, Revised Statutes, his claim
that your

may

be sustained in his behalf to its full extent as located, whilst in

proceeding before the land department, and in reliance upon the
reservation under section 2333, there can thereby be awarded to him

a

only his lode and twenty-five feet of territory on each side of
center
latter

its

Daphne Lode Claim, 32 L. D., 513), the essential issue of the
proceeding, the known existence of the lode, is presumed to he
(

raised in the former, as

it

can he fully determined.

embracing

must be
It

is

if

the case

is

truly presented, and

clear that an application

for patent

lode within the limits of a placer claim for which patent

a

application

is

pending can not be permitted

to proceed

beyond

tin-

point of filing in the absence of a determination by the land depart

ment that the lode was known to

exist at the date of the filing of the

was renewed);
and the law does not contemplate a proceeding to that end before the
land department, or the acceptance by the latter of such lode appliplacer application

(in this case, the date the latter

when an adverse suit againsl the placer applicant has been
begun by the lode claimant, pending final determination of which.
under the stay commanded by the statute (Sec. 2326, R. S.). the adverse claimant could not be permitted to prosecute independent
Long John Lode
patent proceedings as to the land in controversy

cation,

(

(Maim, 30 L.

The

I).,

298).

decisions of your office from which the pending appeal- are

taken are affirmed;
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arid land-payment for use of water- act of june

17, 1903.

Instructions.
There

is nothing in the act of June 17, 1902, to prohibit a graduated scale of the
annual payments required of users of water from reclamation projects constructed under said act, and in all cases where it is deemed advisable this
plan of payment may be adopted.

Acting Secretary Ryan

to the Director of the

August

(F. L. C.)

In your

letter of

Water Users
the Malheur

June

1905,

6,

Geological Survey,

16, 1905.

you enclose a

(E. F. B.)
letter

from the Malheur

Association, stating that if the users of water within
project are required to

pay the contemplated

cost of

construction, forty dollars per acre, in ten equal annual payments,

the cost of the project will be prohibitive.

ated

payment of one

They ask

dollar for the first year,

that a gradu-

two dollars for the

second year, three dollars for the third year, four dollars for the
fourth year, and five dollars per
be permitted.

annum

for the remaining six years,

You state that the Board of Engineers recommend that the first
annual payment be small and that successive payments increase gradwhich you concur, for the reason that the conditions for
developing the project would be best subserved by such an arrangement.
There is nothing in the act to prohibit a graduated scale of payments, and in all such cases where it is advisable to do so, it will be
ually, in

adopted.

TIMBER CUTTING-SMELTING PURPOSES-SECTION

8,

ACT OF MARCH

3,

1891.

Bert D. White.
The

provisions of section 8 of the act of March 3, 1891, as amended by act of
the same date, conferring upon the residents of certain States and Territories authority to cut timber on the public lands for agricultural, mining,

manufacturing or domestic purposes, contemplate the cutting and use of
timber for smelting purposes.

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
(E.F.B.)
August 18, 1905.

A letter from the

Commissioner of the General Land Office of July
27, 1905, resubmitting an application by Bert D. White for permit to
cut lumber on the public lands under authority of section 8 of the
act of

March

3,

1891 (26 Stat., 1095), has been referred to

me

for

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
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opinion as to whether or not the application can be granted as to
that portion of the timber desired for smelting purposes.

Said section as amended (26 Stat., L093) provides
and other States and Territories named therein—

that in

Montana

in any criminal prosecution or civil action by the United States for a trespass
upon such public timber lands or to recover timber or lumber cul thereon, it
shall be a defense if the defendant shall show that the said timber was so cut
or removed from the timber lands for use in such State or Territory by a resident thereof, for agricultural, mining, manufacturing or domestic purposes
under rules and regulations made and prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and has not been transported out of the same; hut nothing herein contained shall operate to enlarge the rights of any railway company to cut timber
on the public domain: Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior may make
suitable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this act. ami lie
may designate the sections or tracts of land where timber may be cut, and it
shall not be lawful to cut or remove any timber except as may be prescribed by
such rules and regulations; but this act shall not operate to repeal the act of
June third, eighteen hundred and seventy eight, providing for cutting of timber
on mineral lands.

The

regulations prescribed by the Secretary for carrying into effect

the provisions of the act declare that

its

operation shall he confined

non-mineral lands, as the act specifically provides that it shall not
operate as a repeal of the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat.. 88), " which
to

makes provision

in said States

and Territories for the

timber on the public lands that are known to be of
character for the uses named in said act."

free cutting of

a strictly

mineral

In the instructions governing the granting of permits for the cut-

ting of timber from the mineral lands under the act of June
(29 L.

I).,

571), "

no timber

poses, smelting being a

3,

1878

permitted to be used for smelting purseparate and distinct industry from that of
is

mining."
In the instructions for carrying into effect the provisions of the act

March 3, 1891 (29 L. D., 572), the uses for which timber may be
taken by settlers and other residents of the State or Territory ate
of

defined in section 3 to be "strictly for their

own

use for firewood,

fencing, building; or other agricultural, mining, manufacturing or

domestic purposes," and in section 5
fied

in section 3

....

it

is

stated that " the u>es speci-

constitute the only purposes for which

may be taken from the public lands in said States and Territounder this act."
While there is no specific prohibition against the use of timber for
smelting purposes in the instructions last referred to, the two acts
have been administered by the land department as conferring the
same benefits and privileges and containing the same Limitations and
timber
ries,

restrictions as to use, differing only in this, that

one

is

confined to

mineral, and the other to non-mineral, lands, hence by necessary im-

DECISIONS RELATING TO

80

plication the regulations of the

THE PUBLIC LANDS.

Department forbid the taking of tim-

ber from non-mineral lands for smelting purposes.

The

question as to whether a permit can be given for the taking and

use of timber

from non-mineral lands under authority of the

act

March 3, 1891, is submitted for opinion in view of the decision of
the Supreme Court in United States v. United Verde Copper Co.
of

(196 U. S., 207), which holds that smelting is a domestic industry
contemplated by the terms of the act of June 3, 1878, and that the
Secretary of the Interior cannot, by regulation, abridge the permission given by Congress so as to deprive a domestic industry from
the use of timber as authorized by said act.
The decision involved a construction of the act of June 3, 1878,
authorizing the free use of timber from mineral lands, and as the
Department has construed and administered the acts as having
practically the same scope and purpose, and containing the same
limitations and restrictions, that decision would seem to control as to
this application, unless there is a material distinction in the two acts.
In the act of June 3, 1878, the language is " for building, agricultural,

mining, or other domestic purposes," whereas the language in
March 3, 1891, is for agricultural, mining, manufacturing,

the act of

or domestic purposes,'* the

word

" other "

being omitted in the later

act.

This omission would seem to be of minor importance, especially in
view of the fact that the two acts have been construed as having the
same purpose, differing only as to the character of the lands from
which the timber may be taken, were it not for the fact that the court
gave to the word " other " material weight as an important factor
in the interpretation of the statute.

After observing that the permission given by the statute

is

not

confined to the special enumeration of industries, but extends to
" other domestic purposes," the court says
Counsel for the Government recognizes this, and substitutes for " domestic "
the word " household," and contends that the word " other " should be treated
as an intruder and eliminated from the statute, and making the latter read that
timber may be felled for " building, agricultural, mining or domestic purposes."

But we are not permitted to take such liberty with the statute, if " domestic "
has a meaning consistent with the intentional use of the word " other." It has
such meaning. It may relate, it is true, to the household. But, keeping its idea
of locality, it may relate to a broader entity than the household. We may
properly and accurately speak of domestic manufactures, meaning not those of
the house but those of a county, state or nation, according to the object in contemplation.
So in the state the word " domestic " applies to the locality to
which the statute is directed, and gives permission to the industries there practiced to use the public timber.
This definition of " domestic " gives the word an
apt and sensible meaning, and we must regard the association of the word
" other " with it as designed, not as accidental,
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So that although smelting may
it is

be a separate industry
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from mining,

not deprived of the license given by the statute, as the general

clause

,w

other domestic purposes

the industries designated by

it

much a grant of permission to
timber as though they had been

" is as

to use

and their rights are as inviolable as the rights

especially enumerated,

of the industries which are enumerated."

The im poll ant
word

significance given by the majority of the court to

••other." as used in the statute,

is further illustrated by the
views expressed in the dissenting opinion that the word "other" can
not be used as an enlargement of the word ••domestic," "and thai it

the

should be confined, as are the preceding words, to timber used for
ether analogous structural purposes and for household consumption
other purposes domestic in their character."
Construing the two acts in the light of that decision alone, the
omission of the word "other" from the act of March 3, 1891, must
be regarded "as designed, not as accidental," and that it was the
intention of the legislature to limit the free use of timber taken from
non-mineral public lands, to the industries specifically enumerated
and for household consumption, or uses strictly domestic in their
character, as the absence of the enlarging word "other" associated
with the word " domestic " limits the operation of the general clause.
Bui the several acts authorizing the free use of timber from the
public lands, having application respectively to particular localities or
the character of the lands, have the same general scope, purpose and
limitation and must be construed in pari materia.
Substantially the same right that is given by the act of March 3,
1891, to the free use of timber from the unreserved public lands for
domestic purposes, is by the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 11,36),
extended to forest reservations. That act provides
in short, to

The Secretary of the Interior may permit, under regulations to be prescribed
by him, the use of timber and stone round upon such reservations, free of charge,
by bona fide settlers* minors, residents and prospectors for minerals, for fire
wood, fencing, buildings, mining, prospecting, and other domestic purposes, as
may be needed by such persons for such purposes; such timber to be used in
the State or Territory, respectively, Where such reservation may he located.

The

act of

July

1.

L898 (30 Stat.. 597,618), authorizes the Secre-

tary of the Interior
permits under the provisions of the 8th section of the act March
1891,
Idaho and Wyoming to cut timber in the State of Wyoming wesl
of the Continental Divide on the Snake River and its tributaries to the boundary
line of Idaho, for agricultural, mining, or other domestic purpose-, and i"
to granl

."..

to citizens of

remove the timber so cut

The question

to the State of Idaho.

as to

whether

removal of timber from

5194—Vol. 34—05 m

foresl
(>

this act

authorized the cutting and

reservations within the locality

nieii-
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tioned by the act, was considered by the Department in

its letter

of

1902 (31 L. D., 412-415), and it was held that " these
several acts must be construed in pari materia and such effect must
be given to the act of June 4, 1897, as if the act of July 1, 1898, was

September

19,

in terms incorporated therein."

which merely extended the provisions of
3, 1891, to certain reservations and
enlarged the territory from which certain citizens could procure timber for the uses and purposes contemplated by said act, the word
" other " occurs, which the court, in the case cited, construed as enlarging the operation of the term " domestic " as associated in the
In both of these

acts,

the section of the act of

March

general clause.
to the words " or other domestic purposes," as they occur in
the one case, " and other domestic purposes," as they occur in the

Giving

same significance and operation that was given to those
words by the court in the interpretation of the act of June 3, 1878,
it is manifest that the omission of the word " other " from the act
of March 3, 1891, was not intended to make any distinction in the
different acts as to the purposes for which the free use of timber
upon the public lands may be permitted.
Considering that it was not intended by the act of June 4, 1897,
and July 1, 1898, to extend the uses for which timber may be taken
beyond that contemplated by the act of March 3, 1891, and that any
domestic industry having relation to the industries specifically enumerated, may come within the meaning of the general clause " other
domestic purposes," as held by the court in the case cited in construing the act of June 3, 1878, I am of the opinion that the permit in
other, the

may be granted as to that portion of the timber desired for
smelting purposes.
this case

Approved

:

Thos. Ryan,
Acting Secretary.

practice— reopening oe closed case— supervisory power.

Doll

v.

Jones.

After a case involving conflicting claims to a tract of public land has been
closed in the land department, the Secretary of the Interior, in the exercise
of his supervisory power, will, upon reopening the case for further consideration, be governed by the same rule, in determining the rights of the
is observed by the courts in a proceeding to charge the holder
of a patent from the United States as trustee that is, it must not only be
shown that the party to whom the land has been awarded is not entitled

parties, as

;

to

it,

but that the party attacking his claim has the better right thereto,

and that if the law had been properly administered, the land would have
been awarded to him.
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Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)
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Commissioner of
August 19, 1905.

to the

Office,

This petition

Till.
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Land

the General
<

K. V. B.)

by Osceola Jones praying for the exercise of

is filed

the supervisory authority of the Secretary of the Interior in the
matter of his homes! end entry, made October 8, L901, for the X\Y. \.
X.. R. 15 W., Elreno, Oklahoma, which was held for canSec. 3, T.
('»

your office of August 25, 1904, for conflict
with the application of John Doll to make homestead entry of said
tract, and was finally canceled November 26, L904.
The petition has
cellation by decision of

been served upon John Doll,

who

has

filed his

answer thereto, and

it

considered upon the facts alleged, which are either
not denied or are admitted in the answer.
will therefore be

John Doll

declaratory statement for

filed a sailor's

a

trad of land

opened to settlement and entry by the proclamation
of the President of July 4. 1901, and on September 4. L901, tendered
a relinquishment of his filing for said land, and applied to make
another declaratory statement to embrace the land in controversy
which is also within the same territory.
lis application was transmitted to the Department, and by decision of September 30, 1001
(not reported), it was held that Doll was not entitled to file a sailin the territory

I

or's

declaratory statement, as his naval service covered only

period

a

of six weeks, hut in view of the erroneous action of the local officers
in

allowing him to

file

such statement, and of the peculiar circumit
was held that his right to make

stances disclosed by the record,

homestead entry under his drawing should

he

not

lost.

was

It

ordered that his relinquishment of the then existing filing be accepted
and that upon presenting formal application to enter the land applied
for and
to

showing

his qualification, his application he accepted subject

any prior adverse claim.
October

8,

make

a second S.

Subsequent

in
I).

S."

local

office

application to

with instructions to allow

make homestead entry

your

office

cause

why

Doll

to

because of the entry of Jones and was transmitted

December

II.

Jones was

L901.

his entry should

file

of the tract, which he

His application was rejected by the

did within the time required.
local officers

was

Department

to Jones's entry, the letter of the

received at the

formal

Jones was allowed to make homestead
question "subject to John Doll's application to

L901, Osceola

entry of the tract

not

then

he cancelled

required

for

conflict

t<>

-how

to

with the

application of Doll, to which he responded by alleging that Doll was
not qualified to

file a

sailor's declaratory statement

:

that

lie

\\

a

-

spec

it
for sale; and thai re
Inning mad'' valuable improvements

ulating on his second filing, Inning listed

spondent was the prior settler.
on the land in which he was living with his family.
a

hearing.

He asked

for
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The matter was

referred to a special agent of your

ine the land originally applied for

He

by Doll and

office to

exam-

also the land in

first selected by Doll was
had offered to sell the land embraced in
his second application and had not acted in good faith that Jones
had resided on the land with his wife and children and in law and

controversy.

a valuable claim

reported that the tract
that Doll

;

;

After the report of the

equity has the better right to the claim.

was received you ordered

special agent

September

8,

hearing, which was had

a

1903.

The land having been entered by Jones, the burden of proof was
upon Doll, who offered testimony to the effect that the land he first
applied for was worthless; that he never offered to sell his relinquishment of the second tract; and stated that he listed the land for sale
"

under pretensions and with reason
It

was

in

my mind

that after

I

"

which he explained

as follows

learned that Jones's filing was on record as a

for the sole purpose of trying to defraud me
out of my homestead right wherein I tried to learn or discover the true facts
Finally I dropped it altogether and paid no
of the case some way or other.

subject for

filing,

more attention

that

to

it

was put on

it.

Jones demurred to the evidence and moved to dismiss the contest,
upon the following grounds: (1) That the evidence does
not show that Doll was entitled to make a second filing; (2) because
the evidence does not warrant the cancellation of Jones's entry, but
on the contrary shows that it should remain intact; and (3) that Doll
substantially

was not
officers

entitled to

file

a sailor's declaratory statement.

The

local

sustained the motion and dismissed the contest.

When

the case

came before your

office

on the appeal of Doll you

held that the question as to the right of Doll to

make

a sailor's declar-

atory statement was determined by the decision of the Department
of September 30, 1901, which allowed

him

to

make homestead entry

of the land applied for, subject to any prior adverse right; that

was no adverse claim

there

until October

8,

1901,

when Jones made

entry of the tract subject to the prior application of Doll to
sailor's declaratory statement.

You found

that Doll

had not

the tract for sale and that as he had not been allowed to

file

his

offered

make entry

he was not bound to improve the land. You reversed the local officers, but instead of remanding the case to allow Jones to submit his
testimony, his entry was held for cancellation, subject to the right
of appeal, which he failed to file in time, and the entry was cancelled

November

26, 1904.

filed his appeal, which you refused to transand the Department, by decision of January 19, 1905 (not

Subsequently, Jones
mit,

reported), denied his petition for certiorari because of his failure to

copy of the decision of your office with his petition and because
did not present such a case as to invoke the supervisory power of

file a

it
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office

February

2, 1905.

The

principal around upon which the claim of Jones rests

the entire record upon

its

face

ing as a valid adverse claim

at

shows that Jones's entry was

when

the date

make homestead entry

application to

made

Doll

is

that

subsist-

his formal

of the tract and that said right

has not by any act of Jones been forfeited or subjected to the right
or claim of Doll.

A

determination of that question involves

decision of the
tion

of

Department of September

Doll to

embrace the land
to

file a

make

a

second

in controversy.

sailor's

a

construction of the

30, 1901,

upon the applica-

declaratory

It held that Doll

sailor's declaratory statement, but in

action of the local officers in allowing

him

to

statement

was

to

not entitled

view of the erroneous

make such

filing,

and of

the circumstances disclosed

by the record, referring evidently to
Doll's allegation as to the character of the land first filed upon, it
was determined that he should not be held to have lost his right to
make homestead entry under his drawing, and the local officers were
thereupon directed to accept his relinquishment of his then existing
filing and to allow him to make homestead entry of the tract embraced in his second application upon presenting a formal application therefor, subject to any prior valid adverse claim.
When Doll presented his formal application to make homestead
entry of the land November 15, 1901. it was rejected by the local
officers because it conflicted with Jones's entry, which had been
allowed October 8, 1001, " subject to John Doll's application to make
a second S. I). S."
Your office in reversing their action construed the decision of the
Department to mean that the application of Doll to make homestead
entry related back to the filing of the second sailor's declaratory statement and defeated the intervening claim of Jones.
In view of the fact that Doll had no right to file a sailor's declaratory statement, which was directly decided by the Department, and
initiated

no right whatever by such filing, it
the Department intended

tion to hold that

is

an erroneous construc-

to recognize such filing

which the formal appliand cut
<>ll
all intervening claims, unless such intention were clearly or necessarily implied.
When the Department said that "he should not be
held to have lost his right to make homestead entry under the draw
as conferring an incipient or initial right to

cation to

ing."

it

make homestead entry would

meant that

his right

to

relate as of that date,

make entry within

the

preferred

period of sixty days allowed to regular applicants under their drawings before the lands were opened to entry by the public generally

should not be

lost

by reason of his

(hat he did not possess.

As

obtain lands under a right
might expire before he could

effort to

that period
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be served with notice of the decision, he was allowed additional time
(thirty days after notice) in which to make formal homestead appliHis
cation for the land, " subject to any prior valid adverse claim/
1

application was not presented until after the sixty days' period had

when presented the land had been entered by Jones, subwhatever right Doll had under his second sailor's declaratory statement. As he acquired no right under that declaratory statement, Jones's entry constituted a " prior valid adverse claim," which
was subsisting when Doll's relinquishment of his former filing was
accepted and his formal application to make entry of the tract was
tendered, so that the only benefit conferred by the decision of the
Department was the restoration of his homestead privilege. It was
not intended that such privilege when formally exercised should
relate back to the filing of the declaratory statement so as to validate
If such had been
that filing as the initial claim of Doll to the tract.
the purpose of the Department, or if it had intended to recognize any
right in Doll under such filing, it would have allowed him to make
entry of the tract applied for subject only to " any prior valid adverse
claim " existing at the date of such filing. The fact that it did not
so protect his " formal application " to make entry thereof is evidence
that it did not intend to recognize any right in Doll under such filing.
In your decision of August 5, 1904, you stated that the point raised
by Jones, " that Doll had no right to make a soldier's or sailor's
declaratory statement, was fully passed upon by the Department
September 30, 1901, and is res adjudicata" That is true, but the
expired, and

ject only to

decision

was not favorable to Doll. On the contrary, it was directly
him upon that contention and was in favor of the conten-

adverse to

tion of Jones before the local officers.

Jones failed to appeal from the decision of
within the time allowed by the rules, and his petition for
certiorari was dismissed because of a technical non-compliance with
For that reason the Department has not consida rule of practice.
ered any of the charges as to the failure of Doll to comply with the
It is true in this case

your

office

law,

and the alleged errors and

failing to

remand the

irregularities in the proceedings in

case to the local officers to allow Jones to sub-

mit his testimony, and in deciding the issue alone upon the testimony
submitted by Doll.
If the only question presented by this petition were the failure of
Doll to comply with the law, it would not be entertained. Jones's
claim rests not upon the default of Doll, but upon a superior, prior
which has been denied him by an erroneous inter-

right to the land

pretation of the decision of the Department, and the mere failure to

observe and comply with rules of procedure should not bar his right
to relief.

Where

a party seeks to charge the holder of a patent

from the
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United States as

trustee, he must not only show thai the patentee is
not entitled to the land, but that the claimant has the better right to
the land, and that if the law had been properly administered, the
title

17);

would have been awarded to him. Bohall
Sparks v. Pierce (115 U. S., 408); Lee

Dilla

v.
v.

\\ S.,

(111

Johnson (116 U.

S.,48).

The same

rule will ordinarily control the decision of the Secretary

of the Interior

of public land

in
at

determining as to the rights of parties to a tract
any time before the issuance of the patent, where

the case has been closed.
In such cases he will exercise the supervisory power conferred by law to see that justice i> done to all parties,
and that the public land is disposed of only to the party entitled to
it.

Knight v. Land Association (142 U.
Your decision, so far as it disregarded

S., 161).

the prior right of done- by

reason of his existing entry, which constituted a valid adverse claim

make homestead entry
was error, and upon that ground it is reversed.
Inasmuch as Jones's entry has been canceled and Doll has been
allowed to make entry of the tract, you will require him to show
cause why his entry should not be canceled and the entry of Jones
reinstated, and if he fail to show cause, upon sufficient ground other

to the land at the date of Doll's application to

thereof,

than that herein decided adversely to him, within a time to be fixed
by your office, his entry will be canceled and the entry of Jones will
be reinstated.

HOMESTEAD ENTRIES

IN

NEBRASKA UNDER SECTION

3,

ACT OF APRIL

28, 1904.

Circular.

Department of tin: Enterior,
General Land Office,
Washington,
Registers

<in<l

I>.

('..

August

J I.

1905.

Receivers,

United states Land

Gentlemen: The

Offices,

Nebraska.

circular of instructions, dated

May

31, L904

(32

670), under the act of April 28, L904 (33 Stat.. 547), known
as the Kinkaid Act. which permits entries of certain lands in
Nebraska to embrace 640 acres, provides as follows with regard to
additional entries under the first proviso to section 3 of the act
homestead
By the first proviso of section 3, any person who has made
I,.

I).,

:

;i

entry prior to his application tor entry under this not. and has resided
and cultivated the same for the period required by law. will he allowed to

upon

make

an additional entry for a quantity of land, which added to the area of the land
in the former entry shall not exceed 640 acres, bu1 residence and cultivation of the additional hind will he required to he made and proved as iii ordinary homestead entries.

embraced
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On

July 28, 1905, in the David H. Briggs case (34 L. D., 60), the
Acting Secretary of the Interior held that said paragraph
wherein it is declared with reference to the former homestead entry of an applicant under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547), "and has resided upon and
cultivated the same for the period required by law," prescribes a limitation not

warranted by the purview of said act. The only provision in the first proviso
which said paragraph is directed, is that the tract
applied for shall not, with the tract embraced in the former entry, exceed six
hundred and forty acres. This being true, the regulation embodied in the foregoing quotation will no longer be followed.
to section 3 of said act, to

In view thereof, said paragraph of the instructions
read as follows:

By

the

first

proviso of section

amended

is

any person who made

3,

a

to

home-

stead entry prior to his application for entry under this act, will be

allowed to make an additional entry for a quantity of land which,
to the area of the land embraced in the former entry, shall not
exceed 640 acres, but residence and cultivation of the additional land

added

made and proved

will be required to be

as in ordinary homestead

entries.

Very

J. H. Fimple,
Acting Commissioner.

respectfully,

Approved
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.

FOREST RESERVE-SEJLECTION UNDER ACT OF MARCH

JUNE
Comstock
The

6,

Northern Pacific Ry.

v.

2,

1899-ACT OF

1900.

Co.

provision of the act of June 6, 1900, which declares that subsequently to
October 1, 1900, " all selections of land made in lieu of a tract covered by
an unperfected bona fide claim, or by a patent, included within a public
forest reservation,
shall be confined to vacant surveyed non-mineral
public lands which are subject to homestead entry." applies only to selections made under the provisions of the act of June 4, 1897, and has no
application to selections made by the Northern Pacific Railway Company
under the provisions of the act of March 2, 1899.
:

.

.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

.

to

The above

entitled case

is

Commissioner of
August M, 1905.

the

Office,

the General

before the Department upon the appeal

of Charles L. Comstock from your

office

decision of February 11,

1905, sustaining the action of the local officers in rejecting his

stead application, tendered February 24, 1904, for the

NW.

i

SW.

SW.

home\ of

of Sec. 29, and the SE. J of N.E. j
\ of SE. J of Sec. 30, T. 39 N., R. 5 E., Lewiston, Idaho,

and

and NE.

NW.

Land

(E. J. II.)

J

of

J
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district,

Northern

for conflict

within the Limits of the

March

with the prior selection thereof by the

Railway Company,

Pacific

89

in

Pacific Forest

lieu

of land relinquished

Reserve, under the act of

L899 (30 Stat., 993).

2,

appears that the relinquishment by the railway company of its
lands within the limits of said forest reserve, was accepted by
departmental letter. of July 26, 1S .), in which it was said that the
It

(

(

.)

railway company was authorized to select other lands in lien thereof
and that acting thereon the company, on April 24, 1901, prior to
survey, made selection of the above described tracts, with others, per
No. 30.

list

24, U>04. the township plat of survey was hied in the
and on the same day Comstock tendered the homestead
application in question, alleging settlement on the land April 19,
application was rejected for conflict with the railway
I lis
L902.
selection, and he appealed.

February

local

office

March

21, 1904, the

embracing the tracts

railway company filed a new list of selections,
question, describing the same according to

in

the plat of survey, as required

The questions

by said act of 1899.
were mainly considered

issue in this case

at

in the

Northern Pacific -Railway Company (33 L. D.,
Ferguson
wherein
departmental
decision was rendered in favor of the
634),
railway company. The further claim is, however, made in this case
that under the act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat., 014), selections of land

case of

/'.

relinquished within the limits of a forest reserve
October
could, after
1, 1900. only be made from surveyed land, and
in support thereof paragraph 4 of Circular of Instructions of July
in

7.

lieu

of land

L902 (31 L.

The

act of

I)..

June

372).
6,

is

cited.

1900, supra, declares

all selections of land made in lieu of a tract covered by an unperfected
bona fide claim, or by a patent, included within a public forest reservation, as
shall be confined to vacant surprovided in the ad of June 4, 1807
veyed non-mineral public lands which are subject to homestead entry, not ex-

that

in area the tract covered by such claim or patent: Provided, That
ootbing herein contained shall be construed to affect the rights of those who.
previous to October 1. 1900, shall have delivered to the United States deeds for
lands within foresl reservations and make application for specific tracts of

ceeding

lands
It

in lieu thereof.

will

selections
Stat.. 3C>),

question.

l)e

noted that by the terms of said act.

made under

it

applies only to

June I. L897 (30
and not to those made under the act of March 2. 1899, in
The latter is a special act which dedicated and set apart a
the provisions of the act of

portion of the lands in the Pacific Forest Reserve, in the State of

Washington, as

a

public park, to he

National Park, and

made

known

as the

Mount Ranier

provision for the relinquishment

by the
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Northern Pacific Railway Company of

its lands therein, and for the
Said railway company, therefore, was not confined in making selections after October 1, 1900,
under the act of March 2, 1899, to surveyed lands.
It is not claimed that Comstock made settlement on the land in
controversy until a year after the railway company's original selection thereof.
Such settlement was, therefore, subject to the company's right to perfect its selection after survey, which it did by
filing a new list of selections, embracing said tracts, within the pre-

selection of other lands in lien thereof.

scribed period.

Your

office

decision

is

affirmed.

settlement— notice-timber land application.
Deuel

v.

Borseth.

Notice of a settlement claim, posted conspicuously on the land, is sufficient to
protect the claim against one who subsequently makes application for a
portion thereof under the timber and stone act, whether the timber-land
applicant has actual notice of the settlement claim or not, provided the

posted notice was of such character that it might have been seen by a
reasonable exercise of diligence.
Notice of a settlement claim, posted on a subdivision thereof outside of the
technical quarter-section on which the improvements are located, will protect the settler's claim to such subdivision as against the claim of one who

subsequently makes application therefor under the timber and stone

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L.

C)

Commissioner of
August 23, 1905.

to the

'

Office,

the General
(J. L.

act.

Land
McC.)

Henry Borseth, on September 19, 1902, filed timber-land applicaNE. i of the SW.-J of Sec. 3, T. 30 N., K. 15 W., Seattle

tion for the

Washington, and published notice of his intention to
said entry on March 16, 1903.
December
On
2, 1902, John N. Deuel filed protest against the allowance of proof by Borseth, alleging that he had settled upon said land,
together with other land, described as the NW. J of the SE. ^, the
NW. \ of the SW. I and the SW. J of the NW. J of the same section,
on August 3, 1901, and that he was so residing at the time Borseth
land

district,

make proof upon

made

his filing.

Borseth offered proof as advertised, showing clearly that the land
was of the character that could properly be entered as timber-land.
A hearing on Deuel's protest was set for January 7, 1904. On
January 2, 1904, Borseth wrote to the local officers " I will not be
at the land office, to the hearing on the protest against my timber:
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leave the matter for the land

office to docido.*'
In fact he
Deuel did; and his attorney moved that default be
entered against Borseth, which was done. Testimony was submitted
by Deuel and several witnesses in his behalf.

claim:

I

did not appear.

As

the result of said hearing, the local officers found that

the

had shown his superior right, by virtue of improvement,
cultivation, and residence, and recommended that Borseth's timbercontestant

land application and the proof submitted thereunder be rejected.

Your office, on February 24. L905, rendered a
judgment of the local officers, and finding and
holding that the plaintiff had not made such a showing as to residence, improvements, and cultivation as would defeat the Borseth
Borseth appealed.

decision reversing the

claim under the timber-land law.

From

this action counsel for the contestant has filed an appeal.
Before dealing with the questions raised by the appeal, it is indispensable to a correct understanding of the case to set forth the stain-

of the several forty-acre tracts embraced in Deuel's homestead claim.

The

controversy

tract in

— the XF.

j

of the

SW.

j

of said Sec.

li

no way encumbered prior to Borseth's application to enter
the same under the timber-land act.
The remaining tracts were covered by- the Olympia Forest Keservation, State of Washington, by proclamation of February 22. L897,
act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 34, 36).
These three " forties," however, were eliminated from said reservation April 7, 1900; but. Inning been sold and patented, were reconveyed to the government.
of the SF.
The XW.
was reconveyed by Charles Wright, on
November 22, 1899, and lieu land selected, which selection was approved by your office April 20, 1904. On this date it became subject

was

in

1

J

to entry.

and the SW. i of the NW.
were reconHayes, on January 22, 1900, and lieu landselected, which selections were approved May 23, 1903.
On this date

The

NW.

|

of the

SW.

|

|

veyed by Jennie Y.

they became subjed to entry.

Deuel alleges that he was residing upon and cultivating "said
lands" since August 3, 1901, with the intention of entering the same;
that he might at any time have made entry of the
forty" here in
controversy, but by so doing would have exhausted his homestead
right
and he points out that in case he is debarred from entering
said land in controversy the remainder of his claim will be left noncontiguous, >o that the most he can enter would be eighty acre-.
The appeal alleges that it was error on the pari of your office, " not
to find that said Deuel was a homestead claimant to the land herein,
"'

;

together with other land-, and

at

the time of the timber-land applica-

was occupying, cultivating, and improving the same."
Here we strike an ambiguity: doe- "the same" refer to the fortj

tion of Borseth

THE PUBLIC LANDS.
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A

acres in controversy, or to that, "'together with other lands?"

similar ambiguity appears in the finding of the local officers:

A

careful consideration of the testimony herein submitted

shows

that, long

prior to the filing of the timber-land application of said Borseth, the homestead

claimant herein established an actual, bona fide residence on the land claimed
by him under the homestead laws to wit, the NW. i of the SE. i, the N. \ of
the SW. h and the SW. i of the NW. i, of above said section.

—

abundant evidence to prove that there are improvements,
etc., to the value of at- least a thousand dollars,
" on the land."
But the evidence does not show on which of the
" forties " the house and other improvements are.
It is certainly
not shown that any of them are upon the " forty " here in controBorseth's timber-land proof says there are no improvements
versy.
There

is

consisting of a house,

thereon.

The appeal

alleges that notice of Deuel's claim

had been given by

notices posted on the tract in controversy; and that his claim to the
land involved " was open and notorious, and known to said Borseth
at the time he

made

his timber-land application."

abundant evidence that notice of Deuel's claim was posted
conspicuously on the land in controversy. Witness Wischmeyer
There

is

testifies

There was a notice on the northwest corner of this disputed forty, on a hemthe hemlock tree was cut out, may be
"I
five feet or more from the ground, and there was a paper notice on it
hereby claim as a soldier's homestead." It was signed by Mr. Deuel, and by
Krull and Smith. It was written on the tree also. I have seen it a hundred
times, I guess
Yes, you couldn't help seeing the notice, unless you would
You have got to make a turn right there, at the creek,
look the other way.
and have got to cross the creek, and you can't help seeing it.
lock tree, right close to the road or trail

;

:

E.

W.

Shattuck's testimony- concludes as follows:

Shattuck, that any one making a careful
it a matter of fact, Mr.
examination of this especial forty must have seen Mr. Deuel's notice? A.
Q. Isn't

Couldn't help

F.

—

it.

%

H. Krull's testimony runs thus

As to the forty in dispute, on what part of it did Mr. Deuel post notice?
The northeast part, right in plain view of the county road; right oh the road.

Q.

A.

Q.

Did you witness that notice also?

Q.

What kind

of a tree

hewed

was that

— A.

Yes,

sir.

notice put on?

— A.

It

was about

ten inches

smooth on one side, and a notice tacked up there and
also written on the wood itself with an indelible pencil.
Q. State whether or not that notice was in plain view of any one passing on
in diameter,

this

off

county road or trail?

Other witnesses

The testimony

:

— A.

Yes,

sir, it

testify to the

was.

same

effect.

show on which parand improvements were. If they had
be upon the NW. \ of the NW. \ in the same quarter(as hereinbefore stated) fails to

ticular forty Deuel's house

been shown to

—
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—

with the forty in controversy the question here in issue
might easily have been settled, inasmuch a> notice given by residence
and improvements upon one portion of a quarter-section extends to
Bui in
the entire quarter-section as defined by the public survey.
section

view of the uncertainty upon this point,

becomes necessary

it

to

inquire further.

no positive testimony bringing home to Borseth
individually
knowledge that Deuel was claiming the forty acres in
is a
vwy strong probability that such was the
there
controversy,
Witness
testifies:
Byron
fact.

While there

is

a

(l

A.

I

Did you ever have a talk with Mr. Borseth about
had a talk with Mr. Burton, who located trim.

Was

(j.

—

reference to this particular

A. In reference to this
forty?
he was going to get Borseth to Lake that
he could: he didn't want the old man in there next to him.
in

it

forty: ho told
forty,

his claim to this forty?

if

me — Burton

did

— that

—

Who

did he mean by the old man? A. Mr. Deuel.
Byron, is it not the fact that Mr. Deuel's homestead claim to this
forty .... has been open, notorious, and well recognized by settlers in that
county since 1901? A. It was, certainly; I think it is considered the best
Q.

Q. Mr.

—

residence in there.

This testimony does not prove conclusively that Borseth knew of
Doners claim, though it indicates that such was very probably the
fact.
It
will not be necessary, however, to bring such knowledge
home to Borseth with absolute certainty, in order to arrive at a conclusion.

In the case of

Smith

Johnson

/'.

of a certain section

7,

et al. (17 L. D., 454).

Smith made

NE. j
S. i of the MY.
\
Wisconsin. His
Ashland
district.
in the
land
and the

of the

application to enter the S.

1

application was denied because of Johnson's prior homestead entry

NW.

Smith proved prior settlement on the
lie had made no settlement on the S. \ of the NW.
j.
J
He proved, however, that he had placed written notices conspicuj.
ously on said S. \ of the NW.
Thereupon the Department held

of the entire
of the

S.

\

of Sec.

7.

XE.

.[.

(see

syllabus)

:

Notices defining the extent of a sett lenient claim, posted

in

conspicuous places

thereon, are sufficient to protect such claim as against subsequent settlers; and

immaterial

in

such case whether the later

has actual notice or not.

it

is

If

the posted notices are of such character that they might have been seen by a

sett

lei-

reasonable exercise of diligence.

The Department again
in

the case of Driscoll ei

held, in very clear

al. v.

Doherty

and emphatic language,

et al. (25 L. D., 420, syllabus)

:

Notices defining the extent of a settlement claim, posted on subdivisions
thereof outside of the technical quarter section on which the improvements are
placed, will protect SUCh claim as against subsequent settlers.

The

cases above quoted

Driscoll

t

t

nl. r.

Doherty

from

et a I.)

(i.

e.,

Smith

/•.

Johnson

are cited with approval

in

et

<>'..

and

the depart-
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mental decision in the case of Warren v. Gibson (29 L. I)., 197). In
each of the cases named the opposing parties were claimants under
the homestead law but the ruling enunciated is equally applicable in
the case here under consideration, where one of the parties is a claimant under the timber-land law. The case must be decided in accord;

ance with the principles hereinbefore set forth.

The action of your office in awarding to Borseth the right to make
timber-land entry of the tract in controversy is reversed and Deuel
will be allowed to make homestead entry of the entire one hundred
;

and sixty acre tract described

in his application, unless

some other

reason to the contrary shall appear.

INDIAN LANDS-SELECTION-TOWNSITE.

Turnbull
No

v.

Roosevelt Townsite.

upon lands within the ceded limits of
making homestead entry
thereof, prior to the opening of said lands to settlement and entry.
In view of the provisions of the act of February i), 11)03, which extended the
townsite laws to the lands within the ceded limits of the Red Lake Indian
reservation and authorized their occupation for townsite purposes prior to
formal opening thereof to disposition under the homestead laws, the occupation of a portion of said lands as a townsite prior to and on the date they
were opened to settlement and entry, prevented the attachment of any rights
on that date under a settlement with a view to acquiring title under the
homestead laws, covering the same land, initiated prior to occupation of
rights could be acquired by settlement

the

Red Lake Indian

reservation, with a view to

the land for townsite purposes.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

The land involved

Commissioner of
August 28, 1905.

to the
Office,

herein",

the General

namely, the SE. i of the SE.

Land

(E. P.)
J of Sec. 36.

K,

R. 35 W., Crookston land district, Minnesota, is within the
ceded limits of the Red Lake Indian Reservation, and, together with
T. 162

was opened to settlement? and entry November 10, 1903,
under the provisions of the act of January 14, 1889 (25 Stat., 642),
and pursuant to the notice issued by the Department September 22,
other tracts,

1903.

November

9,

1903, there

was

filed in the local office a

paper in the

nature of a townsite declaratory statement, signed by A. J. Hamilton.

Elof Swanson, John Butterfield, John Carlson, G. Myers and T.
Knutson, and verified under oath by all of the persons named except
Carlson. Said informal townsite declaratory statement reads as follows
:

NOTICE.

To the Register and Receiver of the U. S. Office. Crookston. Minn.
The undersigned represent that they are now occupying tor business and

resi-

dence purposes certain tracts of land within the SE. i, SE. } of Section 36,
Township 162 N., Range 35 W., as shown by a plat of the same hereto attached.
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That on or about October, 1900, the .Minnesota and Manitoba Railway Com
pany located a station, named Roosevelt, on said land: tbat a commodious sta
tion building, side track, post office, hotel, store buildings, warehouses and resi
deuces have been erected on said land and it is a prospective centre of population.

The undersigned give notice of their intention to gain title under the CJ. s.
townsite laws to the several tracts of land shown on said plat, as provided in
sections 2382, 2383, 2384 and 2385 of the Revised Statutes of the 1'. S.. and request that the said SE.
SB. 1. Section
T. 102, R. 35, a government sub
.">»'>.

|

division of forty acres, be reserved for townsite purposes,

and that homestead

entries on said land be rejected.

Attached to said paper was an informal plat showing the approximate location of a railroad station, a post office building and six other
buildings used for townsite purposes.

Said townsite declaratory statement was in due time transmitted
by the local officers to your office for consideration, and. by letter of
January 14. 11)04. your office advised the local officers that the paper
filed by the townsite claimants was not in the required form for the
entry of land for townsite purposes under sections 2382 to 2386, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes, and the regulations issued thereunder, and directed them to notify the applicants that they must
proceed in accordance with the laws and regulations set forth in the
departmental townsite circular. Although duly served with notice
of your said office decision, nothing further appears to have been
done by the townsite claimants towards acquiring title to said land
tinder the townsite laws, other than to file in your office. March 15,
11)05, a petition, praying that the tract he platted and disposed of
under the provisions of sections 2382 and 2384 of the Revised
Statutes.

November

10. L903,

Peter Turnbull presented at the local

office

an

application to

make homestead entry of

toe-ether with

other land, upon which application action was sus-

pending disposition of the townsite appliand petiexecuted by himself, which reads as follows:

pended by the local

June

cation.
tion,

That he

is

1.

officers

1D04. he filed in the local office an affidavit

the identical person who. on

November

Register and Receiver of the Crookston land
to
V.

the land above described,

make homestead entry for the
M.
that he was informed at
;

E.

J

SE.

|.

office,

10. 1903, presented to the
Minnesota, his application

See. 36, T.

162 X.. R. 35

\V..

5th

that time by the Register of said land office

petition of townsite entry

for a pari of said tract, viz
SE.
SE. |.
on the day before, but tbat said petition was in some resped
defective and bad been or would be forwarded to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office for bis consideration: tbat bis (affiant's) entry applicathat

a

bad been

:

I

filed

tion would be received, held and suspended at said Crookston land office,
without detriment to bis interests or prejudice to bis rights, pending the consideration of said townsite petition; tbat he is informed, though be has not
been formally or officially notified of the fact, thai by letter of January 13,
10(t4.

the Commissioner of the General

Land

Office notified

the said Crookston
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land
legal

office

that said townsite petition

was not

in

such form as to constitute a

application for townsite filing or entry, but would be treated as notice

was claimed

that the land embraced or described therein

for townsite purposes

and, as such, reserved from homestead entry, reasonable time being allowed

although more than four
Office letter, no
Affiant
legal or formal townsite filing or entry application has been presented.
asks, therefore, that there shall be no further delay in the matter of his homestead entry application, and that said application may be immediately allowed,
and he hereby asserts a right to said land superior to any that might or could
be lawfully claimed under the townsite or other laws, which right he acquired
by actual settlement upon and improvement of the tract prior to the coming
thereon of any other person or persons, especially those in whose behalf the
He alleges, in support of his claim
said townsite petition has been presented.
to priority and superiority of right, that said land is a part of the former Red
Lake Indian Reservation the title to which became fully vested in the United
States by virtue of treaty made pursuant to the act of Congress approved
that, inasmuch as it is
January 14, 1889 (commonly called the Nelson Act)
agricultural land within the meaning of said act, it has been lawfully subject
that because of the
to settlement ever since the consummation of said treaty
claim of the State of Minnesota, under its school grant, which has been declared invalid by the United States Supreme Court, said tract was not proclaimed as open to actual entry and so opened until November 10, 1903, but
there was not, at the date of affiant's settlement thereon, and never has
been any lawful inhibition against settlement upon and acquirement of right
thereto under the settlement laws of the United States; that he made actual
bona fide settlement upon the said tract in May, 1901, and established residence
thereon with his family, in good faith, with the intention of making his permanent future home thereon, and that, there was at that time no other person
or persons residing upon said land, or any part thereof, claiming a right
thereto under the settlement laws or otherwise; that he has continuously
resided upon and improved said land ever since the date of his original settlement and made it his home to the exclusion of a home elsewhere, and has
always intended to enter it as a homestead whenever he might be lawfully
permitted so to do; that he presented his entry application as soon as it was
possible to do so after the land was officially declared to be subject to disposal;
that he acquired' a lawful right to and interest in said land, by virtue of the
settlement laws, iminediately upon making settlement thereon, which right
is superior to any that might or could be asserted under any law by any one
who may have subsequently gone upon said tract. Affiant further states
that when said land was declared to be subject to entry and disposal there
were residing upon the same, temporarily and otherwise, seventeen persons
exclusive of himself and family, viz:
Elof Swanson and family, 3 persons;
John Carlson and wife, 2 persons; A. J. Hamilton and son, 2 persons, John
for the perfectment of townsite application

;

that,

months have passed since the date of the said General Land

;

;

—

Butterfield

and family,

10 persons, all of

whom came

to

reside there subse-

quent to the settlement upon the land by this affiant; that affiant, although
then claiming the land, having no actual entry of record, was powerless to
prevent the intrusion of others upon the premises, and, as a right of way under
special act of Congress had been granted across said land to the Minnesota
and Manitoba (now Canadian Northern) Railway, be deemed it useless to
make effort to do so. Affiant believed himself to be lawfully entitled to said
described land under the provisions of the homestead laws, and, therefore, he
presents his petition praying for the protection of his rights and property, and
the immediate allowance of his pending homestead entry application.
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L5, 11)01.

Turnbull

the local

filed in

office a

petition pray-

make application

ing thai the notice of intention to
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entry be rejected and that the petitioner's application to

for townsite

make home-

stead entry be allowed, for the following reasons:

They have

filed, nor caused to be filed with the register of deeds
county within which the land is situated any plat, map or
diagram of the alleged townsite with statement of facts, as required by Section
2382 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.
2. They have not tiled in the General Land Office a verified transcript of any
such plat, map or diagram and statement, with testimony of witnesses relative
to the establishment of the alleged town in good faith, as the law requires; nor
have they tiled such plat, map or diagram, statement and testimony in the district land office having jurisdiction over the land applied for.
::.
Within less than three months from the date of the filing of the so-called
declaration, that is to say. on January 13, 11)04, the Commissioner of the General
Land Office decided that the papers then presented were not such as the law
requires in townsite applications and that they were insufficient for the purposes
intended and required the parties to comply with legal requirements within a
reasonable time. The parties were duly notified January 20, 11)04, of the said
decision and requirement made by the Commissioner, hut they have never made
any attempt to comply with the requirement or to cure the defects in said
papers.
On November 7, 1904, one A. J. Harwood, a United States Commissioner for the District of .Minnesota, through whom all the correspondence
relating to the alleged townsite claim has been conducted, forwarded a letter
to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, calling attention to the fact
that more than a year had elapsed since the alleged founding of the town and
thai the law had not been complied with by the parties in respect to the filing
of map, statement, testimony, etc.. and requesting, in view of such failure, that
the Secretary of the Interior shall proceed with respect to said town as provided
by Section 2384 of the United States Revised Statutes, thus waiving, in hehalf
of said parties to said so-called declaration any right which might have been
acquired thereunder, and any and all claim to intention to make townsite entry
1.

l

recorder

i

not

for the

as alleged therein.

To

refuse to grant the request and prayer of this petitioner will unnecesimpose upon the petitioner the hardship and burden of expense and
trouble of a contest, and longer deprive him of the rights and privileges to
which he is entitled under his settlement made in May. 1901, and his homestead
entry application presented November 1<>. 1903, the day the lands were opened
to disposal under the act of January, 1889 (the Nelson law) and acts amenda4.

sarily

tory thereto.

The
l'.'Oo,

for

was denied by your

petition
it

being held

(

1

)

that

office

decision of

public hind that

is

January

11.

used and occupied

purposes of trade and business, whether application to make

townsite entry of the same he
stead entry;

(

'2

)

made

or not.

is

not subject to

informal, was nevertheless sufficient
gate the land until canceled upon

a

in

form and substance

t<>

5194

Vol.

to
::i

2386,
or.

m

inclusive,
7

-core

contest or other proper proceed-

ing; (3) that the failure of the townsite claimants to proceed
sections 2382

home-

that the said townsite declaratory statement, while

of the

under

Revised Statute-, did

not
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amount to a waiver or relinquishment by them of any rights they
might have acquired, and that while the said claimants had been
notified that they must proceed in accordance with the laws and regulations, no penalty, other than that prescribed by section 2384,
could properly be imposed as a consequence of their failure to so
proceed within a given time; and (4) that the question as to whether
Turnbull acquired any rights superior to those of the townsite claimants by virtue of his alleged prior settlement was one that could be
determined after a hearing.
March 21, 1905, Turnbull filed in your office a petition, based on
the allegations contained in the affidavit filed by him in the local
office June 1, 1904, and the petition filed by him in your office December 15, 1904, both hereinabove set forth, it being contended by him
that he is entitled to make homestead entry of the land because of
his alleged prior homestead settlement, notwithstanding the alleged
occupancy thereof for townsite purposes at the time his application
to enter

was presented.

In passing upon said petition for a hearing your office, by decision
of April 13, 1905, held (1) that, in view of the departmental order
of August 1, 1899, prohibiting all persons from going upon any of
the ceded Chippewa lands, except those within the Red Lake reservation that had been theretofore opened to settlement or offered for
sale, Turnbull acquired no rights whatever by virtue of his alleged
settlement made upon the land in question prior to November 10,
1903; (2) that under the provisions of the act of February 9, 1903
(32 Stat., 820), said land became subject to townsite settlement and
entry from and after the date of the approval of said act; (3) that
in view of the fact that Turnbull fails to allege in his affidavit that
on November 10, 1903, the land was unoccupied by anyone save himself, but, on the contrary, admits that it was in fact at that time occupied by seventeen persons, exclusive of himself and family, and
does not attempt to dispute the sworn statement of the townsite
claimants to the effect that on November 10, 1903, the land was occupied for townsite purposes, his affidavit fails to state a cause of
action; and (4) that inasmuch as said land was segregated by the
townsite declaratory statement or notice filed in the local office November 9, 1903, the local officers should have rejected Turnbull's
application at the time it was presented, so far as it embraced the
land in question, instead of suspending it. The petition for a hearing
was therefore denied, and Turnbull's application to make homestead
entry of the tract in controversy was rejected.

From
The

this decision

Turnbull has appealed to the Department.

January 14, 1889 (25 Stat,, 642), after providing for the
cession, survey and classification of lands within the Red Lake and
other Chippewa Indian reservations in the State of Minnesota, and
act of
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the allotment of certain lands in said reservations to Indians, read- as

follows

That when any of the agricultural lands on said reservation not
under this act nor reserved for the future use of said Indians have been
surveyed, the Secretary of the Interior shall give thirty days' notice through at
least one newspaper published at St. Paul and Crookston, in the State of Minnesota, and at the expiration of thirty days the said agricultural lands so
surveyed shall be disposed of by the United States to actual settlers only under
the provisions of the homestead law.
Sec.

G.

.

allotted

Under

the provisions of said act certain tracts within the ceded

portion of the Red Lake reservation; the same having been previously

surveyed, examined and ascertained to be agricultural lands, were on

by departmental notice of August 1*2. 1808, opened
and entry under the homestead laws. Included in the
list of lands so opened was all of township 162 north, range 35 west,
with the exception of sections 16 and 36 thereof, the tract herein
involved being within the section last named. These sections, although they appear to have been at that time surveyed and examined,
October

5,

1898,

to settlement

were not included in said list, for the reason that the State of
Minnesota was then claiming them under the school land grant, which
claim was not finally disposed of until the Supreme Court rendered
its decision of May '2. 1902, in the case of State of Minnesota v. Hitchcock (185 U. S., 173), declaring that no land in the Red Lake reservation passed to the State under the school land grant.

August

1,

1899, the

Department issued a circular or order which

reads in part as follows

The

said act of January 14, 1880, provides for the disposal, after notice by

advertisement for thirty days
only,

as to

manner indicated

the

in the

manner indicated

therein, to actual settlers

under the provisions of the homestead laws at the price and on the terms
payment provided in the act of such lands as may have been determined in
in the act to

be agricultural.

No lands

in

the

.... Red

Lake .... Reservation have ever been or will be open to sale or settlement
by the United States under the homestead law or any other laws of the United
States, until advertisement to that effect, as required by said act

Excepting the lands heretofore offered for sale or open to sett lenient upon the
Lake Reservation and excepting those in said section 15 so as aforesaid
ordered to be sold, there has been no appraisal or order for sale or for the opening to settlement, or for the advertisement of any lands whatever within any of
\U'(\

said reservations.
All persons are, therefore, hereby warned not to go upon any of the lands
within the limits of said reservations, except upon the lands within the Red Lake
Reservation heretofore opened to settlement or offered for sale, for any purpose

any intent whatsoever. No settlement or other rights can be secured
upon said lands and all persons found unlawfully thereon will be dealt with as
trespassers and intruders.

Or with

A copy
office to

to post the

2, L899, forwarded by your
Crookston, Minnesota, with Instructions

of this order was, on August

the local officers

same

in a

at

conspicuous place in their

office.
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This order was, in

effect,

an executive order of withdrawal, and,

if

authorized, operated to prevent any person from acquiring any rights

whatever, by virtue of attempted homestead settlement, in or to any
of the lands covered by the order, that is to say, such of said ceded
lands as had not been theretofore declared to be open to settlement

and entry, until they should, by duly advertised notice, be opened to
homestead settlement and entry. Said order was, however, in the
opinion of the Department, modified by the act of February 9, 1903
(32 Stat., 820), which extended the townsite laws to the ceded Indian
lands in Minnesota, the said act, by the express terms thereof, becoming effective from and after its passage.
Turnbull admits that the alleged acts of settlement relied upon by
him were performed in direct violation and disregard of said order
of August 1, 1899, but contends in his appeal that the land in question having then been surveyed, examined, and found to be agricultural land, the Department was without authority, under the act of
January 14, 1889, supra, or any other law, to reserve it from settlement; he therefore insists that by his alleged settlement, although
the same was made at a time when the land was not subject to entry,
he acquired rights that were good as against all the world save the
government, the State of Minnesota's claim to the land having been
eliminated by the said decision of the Supreme Court, citing the
case of

Kinman

v.

Appleby (32 L.

D., 526),

and the

cases therein

cited.

In the case of Wolsey
Supreme Court, referring

v.

Chapman

(101 U.

to a withdrawal,

S.,

755, 768), the

by order of the Depart-

ment, of certain lands in the State of Iowa, said

The proper executive department of the government had determined that,
because of doubts about the extent and operation of that act [of August 8,
1846], nothing should be done to impair the rights of the State above the
Raccoon Fork until the differences were settled, either by Congress or judicial
decision.
For that purpose an authoritative order was issued, directing the
local land officers to withhold all the disputed lands from sale.
This withdrew
the lands from private entry, and, as

we

held in the case of Riley

v.

Wells,

was

purpose of pre-emption while the order
was in force, notwithstanding it was afterwards found that the law, by reason
of which this action was taken, did not contemplate such a withdrawal.
sufficient to defeat a settlement for the

In the case of Riley v. Welles (154 U. S., 578), the Supreme Court
held that a certain settlement upon and possession of a tract within
the limits of the executive withdrawal referred to in the case of

Wolsey

v.

Chapman, supra, were

sequent recognition by the land

" without right,"
officers

and that the sub-

of such settlement and pos-

session and the permission accorded the settler to make proof and
entry under the pre-emption law " were acts in violation of law and

void, as

was

also the issuing of the patent."
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In view of the rulings of the Supreme Court in the two cases last
above cited, the Department is of opinion that the order of Angus!
1, 1899, was, as to the tract involved herein, an authoritative order
of withdrawal, and that Turnbull acquired no rights whatever under
the homestead law by virtue of

any

act of settlement that

may have

been performed by him prior to the time the said order was revoked

by the advertisement of the notice of September 22, 1903, opening
said tract to settlement and entry under the homestead laws.
The
Department has, it is true, held that although as against the government no rights can be acquired by virtue of a settlement made upon
land while it is in a state of withdrawal or reservation, yet, where
such tract subsequently becomes subject to entry and is claimed by
two or more persons, each relying upon a settlement made during
the period covered by the withdrawal or reservation, the question as
to priority of

settlement

may

be properly considered in determining

No orders, howhad ever been issued forbidding such settlement on the lands
involved in those cases, whereas such settlement was specifically proHence said cases have no
hibited on the land here in question.
the respective rights of the conflicting claimants.

ever,

application to a case like the one at bar.

Turnbull's right to make homestead entry of the land in question
must therefore depend upon some act of settlement performed after
9 o'clock, a. m., of November 10, 1903, the hour that the same first
became subject to homestead settlement and entry, or upon his application to enter, presented on that date.
At that time, however, the
land appears to have been occupied for townsite purposes, and a
declaratory statement or notice showing such occupancy and evidencing an intent on the part of the occupants to claim the same under
the townsite laws was then on file.
This tract was, as hereinbefore
settlement
subject
townsite
and entry from and after the
stated,
to
of
February 9, 1903, and said informal townsite
passage of the act
declaratory statement or notice, while insufficient as an application
to enter the land under the townsite laws, was, in the opinion of the
Department, j>r'nn<i facie evidence that the land was appropriated.
The Department therefore holds that the same was not subject to
homestead entry at the time Turnbull applied to enter it. and that
his application was properly rejected by your office.
Turnbull, therefore, having acquired no right to the land either
l>\

virtue of his alleged settlement or his application to enter,

entitled to a

hearing for any purpose, except upon

initiated.

The

action appealed from

is

affirmed.

is

not

a contest regularly
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TOWNSITE ENTRY—MINERAL LAND—SECTION
3,

16,

ACT OF MARCH

1891.

Nome and Sinook Company

et al.

v.

Townsite of Nome.

of section 16 of the act of March 3, 1891, townsite entries
be made by incorporated towns and cities on the mineral lands of the
United States, subject to existing rights under any valid mining claim or
possession, lode or placer, held under existing law.

Under the provisions

may

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

August
Alaska,
451,

Office,
5,

Commissioner of the General Land
August 29, 1905.
(G. N. B.)

to the

Nome,
Nome, amended survey No.

1904, Porter J. Coston, trustee for the townsite of

made entry

for the townsite of

embracing 452.83

acres,

Juneau, Alaska, land

provisions of the act approved

The record show s
T

that July

2,

district,

under the

March

3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095, 1099).
the
day set therefor in the pub1904,

and posted notice, townsite final proof was submitted. On
that day the Nome and Sinook Company and K. T. Lyng filed separate and substantially similar protests, in which irregularities in
the proceedings leading up to the entry are alleged, together with
allegations to the effect that the land embraced in the townsite is
mineral in character, and that the protestants are the owners of
certain valid placer mining claims situated within the townsite.
lished

Counsel for the protestants cross-examined the final-proof witnesses
but did not introduce evidence. On the day the entry was allowed,
and without notice to^the protestants, it appears, the protests w ere
dismissed. The papers were forwarded by the local officers and considered by your office September 17, 1904. In your office decision
T

it is

stated that

Inasmuch as

this office cannot determine from the record whether notices of
the dismissal of the original protests were regularly served upon the parties
filing them, and whether they have acquiesced in that action, the allegations

of all the papers will be here considered

and disposition be made

thereof.

Five protests were disposed of by your office decision, but only tw o
are here on appeal. The allegations of the protests under consideration are fully stated in your office decision and need not be restated
T

in detail.

Your

office

held the protests for dismissal.

Nome and Sinook Company and R. T. Lyng,
have appealed to the Department.
A careful examination of the record shows that the proceedings
prior to entry were in substantial compliance with law, and in no
w ay prejudicial to whatever rights the protestants may have in and
to the land in controversy.
The technical objections to the proceedings raised by the protests present no sufficient ground for
rejecting the entry. It is further contended that the allegations that
The

T

protestants, the
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in the townsite is

mineral

protestants are the owners of valid placer
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in character,

and that

mining claims

therein,

located and held prior to the proceedings for townsite patent, are
sufficient to

warrant the Department

in directing a

hearing now to

determine the facts. The action of the local officers in dismissing
the protests without notice to protestants was irregular, hut the allegations of the protest were considered by your office and have been
again considered here.

The record and

the records of your

office

show that October

3,

1900,

townsite committee filed with the surveyor-general of Alaska an

a

application for the survey of the out-boundaries of the town of Nome,

formerly called Anvil City. The application was dated June *28, 1899.
At that time a population of 1,500 was claimed and improvements

worth $100,000 alleged.
Beyond riling in the Surveyor-General's
blue-print copy of a survey of the townsite, showing streets
and alleys, blocks and lots, nothing was done toward securing a townsite patent at that time.
The town was incorporated April 9, 1901.
The town now has a population of about 5,000 during the open season,
and about 3,000 throughout the year. The value of the improvements
is now about $800,000.
The streets are graded, the business streets
being planked; there are sidewalks and graded alleys; there is a Hue
office a

water system, an electric light plant, a telephone system, and a fullyequipped fire department. The mining claims, for the most part,
were located in January, 1899, and have not been systematically
worked since that time.
Section 16 of the act of

March

3,

1891, supra, provides:

That town-site entries may be made by incorporated towns and cities on the
mineral lands of the United States, hut no title shall he acquired by such towns
or cities to any vein of gold, silver, cinnabar, copper, or lead, or to any valid
mining claim or possession held under existing law. When mineral veins are
possessed within the limits of an incorporated town or city, and such possession
is recognized by local authority or by the laws of the United States, the title
to town lots shall be subject to such recognized possession and the necessary use
thereof and when entry has been made or patent issued for such town sites to
such incorporated town or city, the possessor of such mineral vein may enter
and receive patent for such mineral vein, and the surface ground appertaining
thereto: Provided, That no entry shall be made by such mineral-vein claimant
for surface ground where the owner or occupier of the surface ground shall
have had possession of the same before the inception of the title of the mineralvein applicant.

In the case of Hillings
!

y.

Ward Townsite

(29 L.

I).,

21, 23), the

)epartment said

The townsite patent when

issued will not. therefore, deprive the protectant

any other person, of any rights existing at the date of the townsite entry
under any valid mining claim, or possession so recognized as aforesaid, within
Nor
the patented area.
All such rights are protected hy the statute in terms.

oi
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Department of jurisdiction to issue patent
any such mining claim upon application therefor supported by proper proofs,

will the townsite patent deprive the

for

for the reason that the statute also provides that patent

may

he issued to the

possessor of any such mining claim after the townsite patent has been issued.
All rights of mineral claimants existing at the date of the townsite entry being
thus reserved and fully protected by the statute, there would seem to be no
necessity for the segregation, prior to the issuance of the townsite patent, for
the purpose of excluding the same from the patent, of any mining claims, surveyed or unsurveyed, for which applications had not been filed at the date of
the townsite entry. All such claims, if subsisting and valid at the date aforesaid, may be carried to entry and patent, upon proper proofs showing that the
mining laws have been complied with and that the claims are within the protection of the statute, notwithstanding the townsite entry and patent, provided
only that such mineral entry and patent shall not embrace surface ground
**
where the owner or occupier of the surface ground shall have had possession
of the same before the inception of title of the mineral-vein claimant."

See also Lalande

et al. v.

The law provides

Townsite of Saltese (32 L. D., 211).

that under a townsite entry no

title

shall be

acquired by the town or city to any valid mining claim- or possession
held under existing law, and is applicable to placer as well as to lode
mining claims.
(Telluride Additional Townsite, 33 L. D., 542.)
There is no right that the protestants have in the land embraced in
the townsite entry that can be affected by the issuance of townsite
patent.
A patent may be obtained by them for lands claimed, upon
proper proceedings, and a showing that at the date of the townsite
entry the lands were known to be valuable for minerals, and that
such lands were possessed by them by virtue of a compliance Avith
law, notwithstanding The issuance of townsite patent. The protestants, although they have seen the town grow upon lands claimed b/^
them, have taken no steps to secure the paramount title. Until this
is done, the Department does not feel justified in directing that a

hearing now be had to determine questions that may in such event
arise, especially as the law preserves to the protestants all rights
they may have acquired under the mining laws prior to the townsite
entry.

decision protests have been filed by
in each of which the known
Watts,
J.
mineral character of the land at the date of the townsite entry is

Since the date of your

M. Bartholomew and

alleged,

and

in

which

it is

office

J. S.

alleged the protestants are in possession of

valid placer mining claims located within the out-boundaries of the

These protests should be dismissed. Whatever rights the
protestants have in and to the land in controversy are fully protected
by law, and may be asserted and secured by proper proceedings.
The decision of your office is affirmed.

townsite.
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railroad grant—indemnity—adjustment—act of july
Jones
The Northern

Pacific

v.

Northern Pacific Ry.

Railway Company

is

Pacific

Railway Company

is

1898.

Co.

the lawful successor in interest to

the land-grant rights of the Northern Pacific Railroad

The Northern

1,

Company.

entitled to indemnity for lands lost

grant made by the act of July 2. 1NC>4. to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, on account of the prior grant of May 5, 1864, to the Lake
Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, between Thomson's Junction
and Dnluth.
railroad indemnity selection, valid when made, under departmental order
relieving the Northern Pacific Railroad Company from the designation of a
particular loss as a basis for the selection, will not be avoided upon an
allegation that a loss subsequently designated, in obedience to departmental
order of Augusl 1. 1885, was not the nearest available loss.
Any requirement for the specification of a loss as a basis for an indemnity selection is
only for departmental information and as an aid in the adjustment of the
to the

A

grant.

An

application to purchase under the provisions of the act of June

sented prior

January

after,

but upon which proof and

to,
1,

ISPS, does not present a claim for

provisions of the net of .Inly

Where an

1.

3,

1878, pre-

payment were not made

until

adjustment under the

1898.

applicant to purchase under the provisions of the act of June

.">,

1878,

allowed to make proof and payment in violation of an order withdrawing
the land from entry, no claim is thereby initiated falling within the remedial provisions of the act of July 1, 1898.
is

Act
(

n g Secretary R>/<ih to the Commissioner of the
F. L. C. )
Office, August 30, 1905.
i

This

is

December

the appeal of Richard B. Jones
2,

T.

:>l

1.

office

(G. B.

(J.)

decision of

L901, holding for cancellation his cash entry allowed

under the act of June

August

from your

General Land

3,

1878 (20 Stat., 89), as amended by the act of
SW. J of the SE. \ of Sec. 7.

L892 (27 Stat, 348), for the

X.. R. L4

W., Duluth land

The land in controversy
the grant made in aid of

lies

district,

Minnesota.

within the second indemnity limits of

the construction of the Northern

Pacific

which is found in
the joint resolution of May 31, L870 (10 Stat., 378), and was selected
by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company October 17, L883.
This
-election remained of record until March
2, 1S .>7. when it was canceled, pursuant to departmental decision in the case of Northern
Pacific Railroad Company (23 L. D.. 204), holding Duluth to be the
eastern terminus of the company's grant, but was reinstated by your
office letter of May 26, L900, under the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Doherty
Northern Pacific Railrailroad east of the city of Duluth. provision for

'2 %

(

/'.

way Company (177 U.

S.,

121), holding the eastern terminus of the

grant to be at Ashland. Wisconsin.

Between the date of cancellation
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it had been reinstated, to wit, on December
Richard B. Jones applied to purchase the tract
under the timber and stone acts, supra, and after due publication and

of the selection and before
17,

1897, the said

made entry

proof

thereof,

December

10, 1898.

At the date of the

purchase, but not at the date of the application, the tract in contro-

was withdrawn from entry by virtue of departmental order of February 28, 1898 (26 L. D., 265), but there was a
provision in the order permitting the completion of all entries thereversy, with others,

tofore allowed.

contended upon the appeal, in substance:
That the Northern Pacific Railway Company has no legal or
equitable claim upon the United States to be considered the successor
It

is

1.

in interest to the land-grant rights of the

Company, and

that, there

is

Northern Pacific Railroad

therefore no authority of law for the

patenting of lands to the first-named company.
2.

basis
3.

That the company's
is

selection

was and

is

void, because no valid

assigned.

That the

selection

is

irregular and void, because the selected

land was not at date of selection the nearest available public land to
the section alleged to have been lost in place.

That the timber and stone application of Jones having been prewhen the tract in controversy was unappropriated
public domain, his application was the equivalent of an entry, and
4.

sented at a time

that he thereafter, in accordance with the terms of the order of sus-

pension of February 28, 1898, supra, had the right to complete the
same by making proof and payment thereon.
5. That such application having been presented, and such proof and
payment having been made, he had prior to January 1, 1898, in contemplation of law and within the meaning of the act of July 1, 1898
(30 Stat,, 597, 620), purchased the land directly from the United
States, that he had an entry prior to January 1, 1898, within the
meaning of departmental instructions of February 14, 1899 (28 L. D.,
103), and that therefore he is entitled to an adjustment of his claim
under said act.
The question of the successorship of the Northern Pacific Railway

Company to the land-grant rights of the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company was considered by Attorney-General Harmon, February 6,
1897 (21 Opinions, 486), and, referring to certain mortgage forecloswas then advised that it should

ure proceedings, this Department

act upon applications for patents by the railway company upon the
same considerations which should govern it in case there had been no
foreclosure and the applications had been made by the old company.
It was but recently urged before this Department that said opinion
was ill-advised and unsound, both in law and fact. The matter was
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again submitted to the Attorney-General, and April L2, L905, Attorney-General Moody considered the question, concluding as follow-:
It

seems

to

me

that the decision of

my

predecessor was correct, and accord-

ingly have to advise you [the Secretary of the Interior

|

that, in

my

opinion, you

should continue to be governed by the rule there laid down.

This question is not therefore open for further consideration by
Department. Hugh R. Ferguson /\ Northern Pacific Railway

this

Company

(33 L. D., 634).
Appellant's second contention, that the company's selection herein

Is

void because of invalid basis, rests

assigned

lies

upon the allegation that the

basis

within the overlapping limits of the grant to the State

of Minnesota to aid in the construction of a railroad

Lake Superior, made by the

acts of

May

from

St.

Paul

L864 (13 Stat.. 64),
and July 13, 1866 (14 Stat, 93), afterwards conferred by the State
upon the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, and the
to

5,

grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, made by the act of
July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365), that Congress did not make a double
grant within these overlapping limits, and that the date of the grant

Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company being prior
grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company's road opposite the tract, and the tract having been approved to the former company prior to the definite location of the last-named company's road,
it was not granted to it, and therefore not lost to that company's
to the

to the

grant.

This contention

is

unsound.

May

of the withdrawal of

This base land

is

not within the limits

made on account

of the grant of
and the case does not therefore fall within the ruling of
this Department in the case of Northern Pacific Railroad Company v.
Rooney (30 L. I)., 403). It is true the base land was certified under
the grant of May 5, 18(>4, but it was because of the fact that it fell
within the indemnity limits of that grant as adjusted to the line of
definite location, and was selected after the date of the Northern

May

5,

L864,

Pacific land grant, but

road.

26, 1864,

Xo

prior to the definite location of that line of

question arises therefore

in

this case of the right

of the

Northern Pacific company to satisfy its loss from its second indemnity-belt where the base land was in law and fact lost prior to its
grant of July 2. 1864.
In the case of Northern Pacific Railroad

Company

(23 L.

act of July

•_!.

I)..

204)

it

was held

L864, supra, said

that because of a proviso in the

company would

not

be entitled to

any of the losses sustained on account of the
grant to the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company,
made by the act of May 5, 1864, between Thomson's Junction and
It
held that,
Duluth. This decision was fundamentally wrong.
because of an agreement, amounting to a consolidation between the
receive indemnity for
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two companies, whereby the Northern Pacific Company was authorized to use the other company's tracks between Thomson's Junction
and Duluth, it thereby adopted this as its line of road between these
points, that Duluth being on Lake Superior, the eastern point named
in the company's charter, that point was therefore the eastern terminus of its grant, and that it therefore, between these points, being
" upon the line of another railroad route to aid in the construction of
which lands " had been theretofore granted by the United States, was,
because of the proviso above referred to, not entitled to indemnity
for lands lost because of the prior grant. This view was declared
erroneous by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Doherty
case, supra, which recognized the extension of the road eastward from
Thomson's Junction to Ashland, Wisconsin, as part of the land-grant
load, and it follows that, as the route of the Northern Pacific railroad
is in no sense upon the same general line as that of the Lake Superior
and Mississippi railroad, the proviso in question is without application, and the contention that the Northern Pacific company is not
entitled to indemnity for this tract must fail.
With regard to the regularity of the indemnity selection of this
land there can be no question but that, as originally presented, it
was a proper selection under existing departmental regulations, the
company at that time being relieved from the specification of a basis
for its selections. It is claimed, however, that this selection should
not receive departmental approval because there are, or were, at the
time said selection was perfected by the assigning of a basis in 1893,
available lands nearer to the. loss then specified
and the question is
therefore presented, whether, admitting the same to be true, the
selection is a proper one under the terms of the granting act.
;

The

third, or granting, section of the act of

grants to the Northern Pacific Railroad

July

2,

18G4, supra,

Company

every alternate section of public land, not mineral, designated by odd numbers,
to the amount of twenty alternate sections per mile, on each side of said railroad line, as said company may adopt, through the Territories of the United

and ten alternate sections of land per mile on each side of said railroad
whenever it passes through any State, and whenever on the line thereof the
United States have full title, not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appro
priated, and free from pre-emption or other claims or rights at the time the
line of said road is definitely fixed, and a plat thereof filed in the office of the
Commissioner of the General Land Office; and whenever, prior to said time,
any of said sections or parts of sections shall have been granted, sold, reserved,
occupied by homestead settlers, or pre-empted or otherwise disposed of, other
lands shall be selected by said company in lieu thereof, under the direction of
the Secretary of the Interior, in alternate sections, and designated by odd
numbers, not more than ten miles beyond the limits of said alternate sections.
States,

December

made within

7,

1887, the question as to whether selections could be

the

first

indemnity belt of the Northern Pacific land-
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grant for losses outside the particular State or Territory in which
the same occurred, was submitted to the Attorney-General for opin-

and

ion,

his

in

consideration thereof Mr. Attorney-General Garland, in

opinion dated January

IT.

to the clause of the section

L888 (8 L.

1).,

14. 17). after

referring

above ({noted providing for indemnity,

says

The conditions

of this indemnity, set

forth in detail, under which the right

or privileges of selection rests in the company, are. lands shall have been lost
out of the amount granted; selections must be made by the company of other

lands

lieu of

in

them;

those selections must he

made under

the direction of

selections shall only he of alternate

odd-numbered
and they must not he more than ten miles beyond the limits of the
granted sections. These are all the limitations or conditions provided for by
Interpretation
the act of 1864, subject to which the right to select is granted.
will not warrant the adding of another limitation that the lieu lands must be
To annex
selected in the sumo State or Territory in which the lands were lost.
such an additional limitation to the words of the grant would he legislation
and not construction.
the Secretary of the Interior

;

sections,

It

is

That

further provided by said section 3 of the act of L864
all

mineral lands

tions of this act.

and

be.

in lieu

and the same are hereby, excluded from the operathereof a like quantity of unoccupied and unappro-

priated agricultural lands, in odd

road
It

may

:

numbered

sections, nearest to the line of said

he selected as above provided.

will be noted that this provision limits the selection of

nity for losses to the grant

indem-

on account of mineral lands, to

"odd

numbered sections, nearest to the line of said road," etc.
There could he no good reason for attaching an additional condition
upon selections made in lieu of lands lost to the grant because mineral
in character, and it might therefore be urged that it was intended to
enlarge the limits within which such selections could bo made.
Thus, for general indemnity, selections were to be made from " alternate sections, and designated by odd numbers, not more than ten miles
beyond the limits of said alternate sections." being the granted sections, and for losses on account of mineral lands, to " odd numbered
sections, nearest to the Line of said road."

Be this as

it

may. the lands made the basis for the

question were not

lost

to the grant because

mineral

in

selection

in

character, and

the limitation " nearest to the line of said road." differs widely from
a

requirement that the selection must be nearest the tract

made

losl

and

the basis for the selection.

Colton Marble and Lime Coin
was said by the court

In the case of the United States

pany (146 U.

S., 615,

618)

it

/'.

it mighl well he assumed ihat
very likely the Atlantic and Pacific Company
portion sufficient t"
would he called upon to select from the indemnity lands
make good the deficiency, in the granted limits. That rigm" of selection was a
;i
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prospective right, and if it was to be fully exercised, no adverse title could be
created to any lands within the indemnity Hunts. Suppose, for instance, it
should turn out that only half of the indemnity lands were necessary to make
good the deficiency, and that one-half of such lands were well watered and
valuable, while the remainder were arid and comparatively valueless, obviously
the right of selection would be seriously impaired if it were limited to only the

arid

and valueless

Iii

tracts.

that case the court had under consideration the prospective

right of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad

Company

sections within the indemnity limits of its grant,

July

27, 1806

to

odd numbered

made by

act of

(14 Stat,, 292), which grant has the same indemnity

provisions as the Northern Pacific act of 1864, with the exception that

indemnity for
ited to "

grant on account of mineral lands

is

lim-

sections nearest to the line of said road

and

losses to the

odd numbered

within twenty miles thereof."

With regard

to this latter provision

is limited to odd numbered secprimary limits of the grant, as those limits are
twenty miles on each side of the road in States and forty miles on
it

will be noticed that the selection

tions within the

each side of the road in Territories, thus, in
provision, because the sections

from which

effect,

nullifying the

selections are to be

made

were specifically granted in place.

The resolution of May 31, 1870, supra, providing for a second
indemnity belt to the Northern Pacific grant, before quoted from,
merely limits the place of selection to a belt " ten miles on each side
of said road, beyond the limits prescribed in said charter," etc.
The act of 1864 and the resolution of 1870 each therefore established a limit beyond which* the company can not go in making its
general indemnity selections, but in neither is there any requirement
limiting such selections to the lands nearest the sections in which
the losses to the grant occur, and to so limit such selections would
attach a condition or limitation upon the right of selection not found
in the granting acts.
That the right of selection conferred by these acts can not be
restricted by the Secretary of the Interior seems clear. His duty in
the premises is to supervise the administration of the grant, but this
authority does not permit him to abridge or enlarge the laws of
Congress. He should see that the selections made in satisfaction of
the grant are confined to the lands described in the granting act, but
as between different sections, equally within the descriptions contained
therein, he can not say which may or which may not be selected, for
in so doing he would be denying the railroad company the right to
make the selection. See Willamette Valley and Cascade Mountain
AVagon Road Co.

v.

Bruner (26 L. D., 357).

Attention has been called to the circular of August
90), relaxing to railroad indemnity selections

4,

1885 (4 L. D.,

and requiring

a designa-
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tion of a loss as a basis for all
it is

indemnity

select ions, in

Ill

which circular

said that

Where

deficiencies exist, for which indemnity is allowed by law, the lieu selecmust he made from vacant unappropriated land within proper sections and
limits nearest the granted section in which the loss occurred.

tions

This circular was issued before the opinion of the Attorney-General
Its main purpose was to
to.
require the specification of a loss as a basis for the selection, thereby
aiding the adjustment of the grant, for it required the designation
of a loss as a basis for all selections previously approved and certified
as well as for those then pending or thereafter to be made.
In respect to the portion of said circular above quoted, in the matter
of proximity between loss and selected tract, in view of what has
been said, it can not be considered as a limitation upon the right of
selection, but rather as suggesting a manner of designating the losses
so as to aid in adjusting the grant.
It might also be stated that it is
learned upon inquiry at your office that, at least as to lands within
the second indemnity belt, a strict adherence thereto has not been
or the decision of the court referred

enforced.
In the case of William Ilickey (26 L.
labus)

I).,

621)

it

was held

(syl-

:

Indemnity selections are made under the direction of the Secretary <>!' the
and the enforcement of any requirement in the matter of a specification of a loss is only for his information, and as a liar to the enlargement of
the grant, and may he waived whenever he deems such course advisable.
Interior,

The conclusions hereinbefore reached answer appellant's fourth
The railway company's selection was improperly can-

contention.

the application of Jones initiated no right as against the
company, and his purchase no claim which can be recognized by the
celed:

land department, unless

July

1,

181)8.

it

is

protected by the provisions of the act of

supra, and this question involves consideration of the

and last specification of error on appeal.
Jones had purchased this land from the United State- prior
to January 1, L898, or if he had prior to that time made an entry
(hereof within the meaning of the act of July 1. L898, he is entitled
to an adjustment thereunder.
It is believed that he had done neither
of these things.
While the application to purchase was presented
prior to the date named, proof and payment were not made until after
that date.
There was no purchase until the money was paid. There
was therefore no purchase prior to January 1. L898. Bui it i> contended that the application of Jones was the equivalent of an entry.
No vested righl is acquired by a timber and stone application. While
such an application, if presented in accordance with law and for land
fifth

If

subject thereto, reserves the land

from other disposition by the land
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department, no right is initiated as against the government, and prior
to the submission and acceptance of final proof and the payment of
the purchase price, the Secretary of the Interior may suspend the
same from disposition and sale under the public land laws. Board
of Control, Canal No.

3,

State of Colorado,

v.

Torrence (32 L. D.,

The tract was
withdrawn from entry by the order of February 28, 1898, and the
purchase by Jones, allowed in violation of that order, initiated no

472).

This

is

precisely

what was done

in this case.

right falling within the remedial provisions of the act of July

W. Eaton and A. F. Huntoon
way Company (33 L. D., 426).
1898.

The

F.

decision appealed

from

is

v.

1,

Northern Pacific Kail-

affirmed.

TIMBER CUTTING— RESIDENTS-DOMESTIC PURPOSES— SECTION
OF MARCH 3, 1891.

8,

ACT

City and County or Beaver.
and counties are " residents " of the State in which they are located,
within the meaning of that term as used in section 8 of the act of March
1891, as amended, conferring upon the residents of certain States and Territories authority to cut timber on the public lands for agricultural, mining,
manufacturing, or domestic purposes.
Timber used by cities tfor constructing electric-light plants and building hridges,
and by counties for building bridges and constructing flumes across the
county roads, is used for " domestic purposes " within the meaning of secCities

.">,

tion 8 of the act of

March

3,

1891, as

amended.

Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
(E. F. B.)
August 31, 1905.

A letter from the Commissioner of the General Land Office recommending that an application filed by Beaver City, the County of
Beaver, and others residing in the State of Utah, for permit to cut
and remove timber from the public lands under the 8th section of the
act of March 3, 1891, as amended (26 Stat., 1093), has been referred
to

me

for opinion " as to whether or not the within application can

be granted as to the thirty thousand feet and four thousand feet of

timber desired by the City and County of Beaver, Utah, respectively."
Said section, as amended, permits the cutting of timber from the
non-mineral public lands in the States of Utah and other States and
Territories

named

therein, "

by

a

resident thereof for agricultural,

mining, manufacturing, or domestic purposes, under rules and regulations made and prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior," for use
in such State.
The only question involved in this reference is whether the City of
Beaver and the County of Beaver are residents of said State within
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the moaning of the act and whether the timber is to be used for the
purposes contemplated by the act.
The City of Beaver and the County of Beaver are aggregations of
residents of said State and a permit for the taking of timber from
the public lands to be used by such residents collectively for their

common

benefit

comes as well within the purview of the

permit to such residents as individuals.

The applicants

act

as a

are there-

fore within the meaning of the act " residents" of said State and as
such are entitled to the benefits of the act.

The

uses for

which the timber

is

to be applied

by the City of Bea-

and for bridges. The timber
applied for by the County of Beaver is to be used for building
bridges, and constructing flumes across the county road-.
In an opinion submitted August L8, L905 (34 L. IX, 78), as to
whether a permit can be granted under the act of March 3, 1891, for
smelting purposes, it was said that this act must be construed in pari
materia with the act of June 3. L878 (20 Stat., 88), and the acts of
June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 11, 36), and July 1, 1898 (30 Stat., 597, 618).
authorizing the free use of timber on public lands, Avhich have the
same general scope, purpose and limitation, differing only as to the
character and locality of the land from which the timber is taken.
The specific uses enumerated in the several acts may be considered
as a whole to aid in interpreting the full scope and meaning of the
words "or domestic purposes " as they occur in one. and "other
domestic purposes" as they occur in the other acts. Besides, the act
of June 3, L8T8, has received an interpretation by the Supreme Court
in the case of United States v. United Verde Copper Co.
190 U. S.,
'201). as to the uses for which timber may be taken, giving to the general clause "other domestic purposes" such operation as to include
uses relating to those specifically designated.
Speaking of the operation of the word " domestic " in its association with the word " other"
ver are

for

an electric-light

plant

(

the court says:

may relate,
may relate to

is true, to the household.
But, keeping its idea of locality,
broader entity than the household. We may properly and
accurately speak of domestic manufactures, meaning no1 those of the household,
hut those of a county, state or nation, according to the object in contemplation.
So in the statute the word ••domestic" applies to the locality in which the st.it
It

it

ute

is

directed,

it

a

and gives permission

to the industries there practiced to use the

public timber.

The regulation governing the granting of permits under the ad
March 3, L891, specify the purpose- for which the timber may be
used.
They are, " firewood, fencing, building, or other agricultural,

of

mining, manufacturing or dome-tic purposes."
The use of timber for the building of an electric power plant
expressly authorized by the regulations and
5194.

vol.

34—05 m

8

i-

such

a

is

use a- conies
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purview of the statute. The building of bridges
and the construction of flumes across the public roads is a use equally
contemplated under the general clause " other domestic purposes."
I have therefore to advise you that the permit may be granted to
clearly within the

these applicants for the uses specified in their applications.

Approved
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.

second homestead entries— section 3, act of june
section 1, act op april 28, 1904.

5,

1900,

and

Circular.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, September 7, 1905.
Registers

and Receivers,

United States Land

Gentlemen: Section

Offices.

3 of the act of

June

5,

1900 (31 Stat., 267),

provides, in part

That any person who prior to the passage of this act has made entry under
the homestead laws, but from any cause has lost or forfeited the same, shall be
entitled to the benefits of the homestead laws, as though such former entry had
not been made.

Section

1

of the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 527), provides as

follows
That any person whov has heretofore made entry under the homestead laws,
but who shall show to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of the General Land
Office that he was unable to perfect the entry on account of some unavoidable
complication of his personal or business affairs, or on account of an honest
mistake as to the character of the land that he made a bona fide effort to comply with the homestead law and that he did not relinquish his entry or abandon
his claim for a consideration, shall be entitled to the benefit of the homestead
law as though such former entry had not been made.
;

On June

26, 1905, in the case of Peter

G. Cox

v.

Levi F. Wells (33

L. D., 657), the Secretary of the Interior held as follows:

That portion of the act of April 28, 1904, above set forth, like the third section
June 5, 1900, relates to persons who had, prior to its passage, lost
or forfeited their homestead entries, and were for either of said reasons unable
to perfect the same.
The act of 1904, however, imposes conditions or restrictions that were not imposed by the act of 1900. the earlier act providing merely
that any person who bad from any cause theretofore lost or forfeited his homestead entry, should be entitled to the benefits of the homestead law, as though
such former entry had not been made, while the latter act requires such a
person, in order to entitle himself to the benefit of the homestead law, regardless, of his former entry, to show to the satisfaction of your office that he was
unable to perfect such former entry on account of some unavoidable complicaof the act of
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tion of his personal or business affairs or a mistake as to the character of the

land; that ho made a bona fide effort to comply with the homestead law. and
that he did not relinquish such entry or abandon the claim for a consideration.
The Department is of the opinion that the effect of the act of April 28, 1904,
is

to

modify the act of June

5,

1900, or place a limitation

thereof: and that all applications to

upon the operation

make second homestead

entry, filed sub-

sequently to approval of the act of April 28, l'.NM. should be disposed of thereunder so far as the provisions of the same are applicable.

In view thereof, you will no longer allow entries to go of record

made under

as

transmit

the third section of said act of

June

5,

applications for second entries to this

1900, but will

together
with the affidavit of the party, duly corroborated, showing his qualifications to make entry under the first section of the act of April 28,
1904, above cited.

The

all

instructions issued under date of

June

27,

office,

1900 (30 L. D.,

371), are modified accordingly.

Very

respectfully,
J.

H. Fimple, Acting Commissioner.

Approved
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.

contest-charge—timber and stone act-mineral land-seeection under act of june 4, 1897.
Jones
The

fact that land

is

v.

Aztec Land and Cattle Company.

more valuable

and stone thereon than for
from appropriation under the

for the timber

agricultural purposes does not exclude

it

homestead laws, if not mineral in character, nor bar selection thereof
under the provisions of the act of June 4, 1897.
The allegation in an affidavit of contest that land " is more valuable for the
timber and stone." does not by necessary implication charge that the land
is mineral in character and does not constitute a sufficient basis for a
contest.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(

S.

V. P.)

Commissioner of the General La nil
September 6, 1905.
(J. R. \Y.

to the

Office,

|

Harry T. Jones appealed from your decision of March 11. L905,
denying a hearing and dismissing his affidavit to contest the -election under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat, 36), of the Aztec Land
and Cattle Company. Limited (hereinafter termed the company).
for

the

XW.

J,

Sec.

34,

T.

3

X.,

R.

83

W., Glenwood

Springs,

Colorado.

The company having theretofore filed
18i)T, supra, at a time not shown

act of

under the

its

application

in

the record. October

7.
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1904,

Harry T. Jones

filed in the local office his

duly corroborated

affidavit for contest of the selection, alleging:

That the NW. i of section 34 in township 3 N., R. 83 W. of the Oth P. M. v is
more valuable for the timber or stone contained thereon or therein than for
agricultural purposes, and that such was the fact at the time that the contestee above named filed its lieu selection No. 9043 thereon, and that such was
the fact at all times prior and subsequent hereto, and that the fact of said land
being more valuable for the timber contained thereon or the stone contained
therein than for agricultural purposes, was a thing notorious and patent and
well known at the time of the filing of said lieu selection thereon and at all
other times herein mentioned or referred to
and all of which this contestant
now and here offers to prove at his own expense if he be accorded a hearing
for that purpose, which he now prays.
;

This was transmitted by the local
office,

which March

1-1,

office,

without action, to your

1905, held that:

When the selection was filed there was no law or regulation which prohibited
the selection of timber or stone land under the aforesaid act, and your action in
allowing the lieu selection of the Aztec Land and Cattle Company, Limited, to
be placed of record was proper and is affirmed. Jones's application for a hearing
is

denied and his affidavit of contest

is

dismissed, subject to his right of appeal.

The appeal alleges error in holding that land more valuable for its
timber and stone than for agricultural purposes is not excluded from
selection under the acts of June 4, 1897, supra, and June 6, 1900 (31
Stat., 614), and from settlement, entry, and patent under the homestead laws.

The record does not show when
reference to the act of
after that date.

By

Avere limited, or, in

June

6,

the selection was made, but by the

1900,

it is

implied that

it

was made

that act selections under the act of 1897, supra,

words of the

statute, " confined to vacant, sur-

veyed, non-mineral public lands which are subject to homestead
entry."

No

question

is

made

in the brief

and argument but that the

lands in question were vacant, were surveyed, and were non-mineral,
so that the only questions presented are, whether they were " public
lands which are subject to homestead entry," and whether the act of
June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89), excludes land of the character therein
described from settlement or homestead entry, and

made them

sub-

appropriation only under the act of 1878.
Prior to the act of 1878 any public lands not excepted by law
because of their valuable mineral deposits, salt, etc., in general were
not subject to disposal otherwise than under the pre-emption and
ject to private

homestead (or settlement) laAvs until after a public cash offering.
The settlement laws imposed conditions of residence, improvement,
and cultivation, compliance with which involved considerable expense
and lapse of time before a title could be obtained. There were also
many tracts that because of their rocky or heavily forested condition
were left unentered under the settlement laws because unsuitable for
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the

law of 1878 (20

facts, the
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In view of such
only to certain moun-

resident population.

Stat,, 89), applicable

August 4. 1892 (27 Stat., 348),
the public land States, provided that lands

tain State-, afterward.

cable to

all

117

made

appli-

valuable chiefly for timber, but unfit for cultivation, and which have not been
public sale, according to law, may be sold .... at the minimum

offered at

two dollars and fifty cents per
be sold on the same terms.

price of

stone

acre,

and lands chiefly valuable

for

may

act

merely opened unoffered lands of this general description

to private

cash purchase in limited quantity, at an enhanced price.

This
prior to

its

public ottering.

It

was not the making of a new classifiand only at the

cation of lands that could be sold only under the act

Such lands,

price fixed.

if

not

purchased under this act

in

advance

of their public offering, upon being offered were subject to private

entry or warrant

cash

location

reserved from sale or entry.

like

any other public lands, not

They became

subject to settlement entry

under the homestead law. the timbered or stony character and unfitness for cultivation being regarded merely as a circumstance to be
considered in passing on the good faith of the settlement entryman.

John A. McKay (8 L. IX. 526); Porter v. Throop (6 L. D.. 691);
Wright v. Larson (7 L. I).. 555); Keller v. Bullington (11 L. D.,
140)
Harper v. Eiene (26 L. I)., 151).
It is thus clear that the mere fact that the land is more valuable
for the timber or the stone therein does not exclude it from appropriation under lieu selection or homestead entry, if not of mineral
:

1

character.

The

affidavit does not directly

that the land
thai

it

"

is

is

mineral

in

nor by necessary implication charge

character, but alleges in the alternative

more valuable for the lumber or stone" than for agriculIt is entirely component with the truth of this aver-

tural purposes.

ment that the stone adds nothing to its value and that it is desirable
for its timber alone.
A great variety of substances, valuable clay-.

gypsum,

lime, stone, phosphate, guano,

-tone, petroleum, etc..

quality and

may

marble and

slate,

building

render land of mineral character

if

the

market conditions make the land chiefly valuable

for

working such deposits with profit. Dobbs Placer.
L. D., 565, 567;
Phifer v. Heaton, 27 L. I).. 57: Morrill v. Northern Pacific R. K. Co.,
1

30 P.

I)..

175; Florida Central etc.. R. R. Co., 26 L. D., 600; Richter

Utah, 27 L.

Schrimpf

et al v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co.,
Northern Pacific R. R. Co.. 29 L. I).. 248;
Tulare Oil & Refining Co. v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co.,
L. D., 269.
But to a mineral character the deposits must be workable at a profil
above that for other purposes.' South Dakota Mining Co. v. McDon
aid, 30 P. I)., :>57.
It is " valuable" mineral deposits thai give the
v.

29 L.

I)..

I)..

95;

327; Beaudette

v.

(

-J .»

DECISIONS RELATING TO

118

THE PUBLIC LANDS.

mineral character excepting land from homestead entry. Land not
valuable for its mineral deposit is not excepted from homestead
entry.

The

selection

affidavit therefore

was

insufficient for the basis of a con-

and it was subject to
under the exchange provisions of the acts of 1897 and 1900,

test, as to

the mineral character of the land,

supra.

Your

decision

is

affirmed.

FINAL PROOF-RESIDENCE— SECTION 2307 OF THE REVISED STATUTES.

Mary

E.

Hahn.

the final proof submitted on an entry made under section 2307 of the
Revised Statutes shows that the en try woman never established actual residence upon the land, although notified in accordance with the directions
contained in departmental decision in the Anna Bowes case that if she
desired to retain her entry she would be required to begin actual residence
upon the land within six months from notice, such proof is insufficient and
will be rejected
but where it appears that the proof was offered prior to
the expiration of six months from the date of such notice, the entry should
not be canceled unless it be first ascertained that she did not begin actual
residence upon the land within the prescribed period.

Where

;

Acting Secretary Ryan
(S. V. P.)

Mary

E.

.

Hahn

to

Office,

Commissioner of the General Land
September 7, 1905.
(F. W. C.)

the

has appealed from your

office

decision of

August

5th, last, sustaining the action of the local officers in rejecting her

proof proffered under her homestead entry made September 19, 1902,
covering the S. ± of SW. J of Sec. 22, NE. i NW. \ and NW. \ NE. J,
Sec. 27, T. 25 N~, R. 42 W., Alliance land district, Nebraska.
The decision of your office, as well as the action of the local officers,
was based upon the fact that claimant had never established an
actual residence upon the land included in her homestead entr}7
In the case of Anna Bowes (32 L. D., 331) it was held that the widow
or minor orphan children of a deceased soldier or sailor making
homestead entry under section 2307 of the Revised Statutes must
comply with the provisions of the homestead law as to residence and
.

7

cultivation to the same extent as a soldier or sailor making entry
under section 2301 of the Revised Statutes. The entry in question
was made under the provisions of section 2307 of the Revised Statutes, claimant showing that she is the widow of Joseph Hahn,
deceased, who w as on the 20th of April, 1861, enlisted as a private in
Company H, Sixth Regiment of Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and was
mustered into the United States service as such for the period of
three months on the 10th of May, 1861
that he Avas appointed a
sergeant on the last named date and mustered out June 16, 1861, to
7

;

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
reenlist for a period of three years;

of

Company

H

that he

was
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enlisted as a private

of the Sixth Regiment of Ohio Volunteer Infantry

on the 18th day of June, 1861, for a period of three years; and that
lie was transferred to the Veteran Reserve Corps November 15, 1861,
by order of the War Department. In her proof claimant admits
that she never established actual residence on the land covered by
her entry and never built a habitable house thereon, that the only
improvements made thereon consisted of about three-quarters of a
mile of fencing, valued at $75, and that she did no cultivation on
the land, but gave parties the right to use it for grazing cattle, which
seems to have been the only use made of the land since her entry.
Departmental decision in the Bowes case, supra, directed that persons having uncompleted entries made under section 2307 be notified
that if they desired to retain such entries they would be required to
begin actual residence upon the land within six months from the
issuance of such notice, or, if they so elected, they would be permitted
to relinquish their entries without prejudice to their homestead rights,
by giving notice of such election within the same time. From the
report of the local officers, dated April 5, 1905, it appears that on
November 30, 1901, claimant was advised that actual residence on her
homestead entry was required, and also of her option to relinquish
her land without prejudice to her homestead right, if she desired, and
that registry return receipt, signed by her December 5, 1901, of such
She does not appear to have elected to
notice, is among the papers.
relinquish her entry without prejudice to her homestead right, and
does not appear to have begun actual residence upon the land, as
Her proof was offered, however, March 11, 1905. before

required.

months from the date of the notice given her
in the Bowes case.
For the reason^
given in the decision in the Bowes case, your office decision, rejecting
the proof proffered by Mrs. Hahn, is affirmed.
You will advise her
hereof and institute inquiry to learn whether she has begun actual
residence upon the land within the period prescribed in the departmental regulation heretofore referred to. and in event she has not.
the expiration of six
as

required

by the decision

her entry will be cancelled.

LIEl

SELECTION INDKK

A(

I

OF .JINK

1,

1897

M IIOOL

I'KNDIN*.

indkmmtv selection.

Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company.
Pending disposition of

;i

school-land

neonsly received, selection of the
reserve relinquished under
1897,

Should not ho allowed.

fehe

indemnity selection,

same land

even

though erro

lion

of

a

exchange provisions

<>r

the act

in

tract

in

"f

a

forest

June

l.
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Acting Secretary Ryan

Commissioner of the General Land
(F. W. C.)
September 8, 1905.

to the

'

(S. V. P.)

Office,

'

Company has appealed from your
December 13, 1904, rejecting its application, proffered under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36), to select lots 1 and
2 and the S. \ of NE. J, Sec. 3, T. 28 N., R. 6 E., M. D. M., SusanThe Santa Fe

office

Pacific Railroad

decision of

an equal quantity of land
San Francisco Mountains
forest reserve, because of certain prior school indemnity selections
ville

land

district, California, in lieu of

relinquished to the United States in the

made

of said lands; also,

its

application to contest the State's selec-

tion.

The

was presented and rejected February IT,
In the report of the local officers, dated June 8, 1904, it is
stated that on March 16, 1904, H. D. Burroughs, as attorney in fact,
filed a motion asking that the application be placed on file and held
subject to any rights the State of California might have under its
school land indemnity selection, and that on the same da}^ the local
selection in question

1904.

was " suspended and revoked pending consideration of the motion," and that
on March 23, 1904, the local officers denied the motion and held " said
application as rejected," from which action an appeal was taken upon
officers notified

him that the

rejection of his application

the grounds: (1*) in holding that the lands applied for were segregated by the State indemnity selection, and (2) that said indemnity
selection was invalid and void for the reason that the lands used as
a basis therefor " are not within a forest reserve, but are within
temporary withdrawals and therefore do not constitute a lawful
basis for State and indemnity selections."
At the time of the filing of this appeal there was also filed an affidavit, made by H. D. Burroughs, to contest the State's selection,
alleging that the lands made the basis therefor " are not within a
forest reserve, and are not such lands as entitle the said State to
selection of other lands in lieu thereof, and do not constitute a lawful basis for the selection of public lands for said school lands."
Long prior to the filing of the application in question, to wit, on
August 20, 1903, an application to select the lands here applied for,
as school indemnity, had been filed in the local land office and accepted
by the local officers on a base of the W. ^ of NW. \ of Sec. 36, T. 23
N., R, 16 E., and lot 4 and part of lot 3, Sec. 36, T. 22 N., R. 17 E.,
M. D. M., alleged to have been lost to the school grant by reason of
inclusion in a forest reserve.

With regard to said base lands, the facts appear to-be as
They were placed within a temporary withdrawal December

follows:
24, 1902,

for examination and investigation with a view to their inclusion
within a forest reserve, but on January 20, 1904, Sec. 36, T. 23 N., R.
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L6 E., was released from reservation and Sec. 36, T. 22 N., R. IT E.,
was also released September 20, 1904.
By departmenta] decision of December 10, 1903, ex parti Stat< n\'
California (32 L. I).. 346), it was held that the mere inclusion of
sections 1<> and 36, granted for school purposes, within a withdrawal
made for the purpose of permitting investigation and examination
of the Lands with a view to their possible inclusion within a forest
reservation does not place them within a "reservation" within the
meaning of that term as employed in the act of February 28, 1891
(26 Stat.. 796), and therefore does not afford a base for selection of
indemnity lands. Thereafter the State filed a motion for review.
asking that, should the motion he denied, the selections theretofore
made on account of such bases might he permitted to stand until the
question as to whether reserves should be created of the land- theretofore withdrawn, and. if so. to what extent, i- determined, and
February 13, 1904, the Department, in denying the motion for review,
granted the State's request. This action was just four days prior to
the presentation of the application here in question \)\ the Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad Company, and although, as before stated, it had
been determined as early as January 20, 1904. that section 36, township 23 north, range L6 east, would not he included within a foresl
.X)4. that the remaining tract made
reserve, and on September 20.
the basis of the selection in question would not be included within a
(

1

forest

reserve, final order

selection until

March

is.

In the case of Santa
fornia, decided

July

application to select,
it

was

not

made

for the cancellation of the

L905.

Fe

Pacific Railroad

Company

v.

State of Cali-

1005 (84 L. D., 1^). considering
filed Uy the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad
3,

a

similar

Company,

was held that

Good administration requires that pending the disposition of n selection, even
though erroneously received, no other application including any portion of the
land embraced in said selection should be accepted nor should any rights be
considered ;is initiated by Hie tender Of any such application.

This rule of administration has been followed for many years and
was undoubtedly fully apprised thereof when tendering
the application here in question.
His motion, following the first
rejection of his application, asking for suspension of action upon his
application, or that the same he permitted to remain subject to rights
under the State's selection, tends to establish such a knowledge on his
the applicant

part,

and while

State's selection

it

is

would not he needed,
rejected

true that your office should have canceled the

as soon
yet

the application

it
was determined that the base landmust he held that the local officers correctly

as
it

here under consideration, when

because of the pending indemnity -election by the State.

presented,

The appeal
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by the applicant from such rejection entitled
as to the correctness of the action

With regard

when

it

onty to a judgment

taken.

nothing was alleged
by the records of your office and
which had been fully considered and passed upon in the decisions
hereinbefore referred to. There was no necessity for a hearing to develop these facts nor could any rights be considered as initiated by
therein but

to the application to contest,

what was

fully disclosed

the filing of such application.

The

action of your

office

in rejecting this application to contest,

as well as that affirming the local officers in rejecting the application
to select, is affirmed.

lieu selection under act of june 4, 1897— conflict with prior
application.

Aztec Land and Cattle Company.
Where

a selection tendered under the exchange provisions of the act of

June

4,

pending application, the selector should be
and given opportunity to protect his rights by

1897, is in conflict with a prior

apprised of the conflict
proper proceedings.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(

S.

V. P.

Office,

The Aztec Land and

Commissioner of the General Land
September 11, 1905.
(J. R. W.

to the

Company, Limited (hereinafter styled
the company), appealed from your decision of March 9, 1905, rejecting its selection under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36), for
Cattle

1,201.77 acres of land, including the

SE.

\ of the

SW.

\,

Sec. 5, the

E. i of the NW. I, and the NE. J of the SW. J, Sec. 8, T. 17 N., R. 4
E., B. M., Boise, Idaho, in lieu of 1,200 acres of land relinquished to
the United States in the San Francisco Mountains forest reserve,
Arizona.

March 10, 1904, at 9 A. M., William G. Cadby presented his timber
and stone application to purchase the tracts above described under
On the same day, at 3:15 P.
the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89).
M., the company presented its application, not knowing, as it is
The company's applicasaid, anything of Cadby's application.
tion was apparently in all respects regular, except that the affidavit
that the base assigned had not been used for any prior selection bore
date some months prior thereto. The local office rejected the company's application for that sole reason, not for conflict with Cadby's
application.

The company promptly, but

after

March

10, 1904, ob-

tained and filed other affidavits to the fact required to be shown.

Your

office

held that these proofs were not of the substance of the

application and might be furnished later, but rejected the company's
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with Cadby's application as to one
therein. This ruling
It is claimed that the. applicant should have
is assigned for error.
been informed of the conflict and have been given opportunity to
eliminate such land and to substitute other, so as to fill its selection
and exhaust the base assigned.
The papers on their face show that no conflict of claims was
intended by either of the parties, as Cadby's declaratory papers were
dated at Meadows, Idaho, March 7, 190-L, and were transmitted by
mail. The company's selection was made and dated by its attorney
selection because of the conflict

hundred and sixty acres of the land embraced

March

in fact,

1904,

9,

and the accompanying

affidavits as to the

character and condition of the land selected are dated at Boise, Idaho,

March

)*,

1904.

presenting the

Each party was proceeding independently, Cadby
application. The selection, without fault or intent
was practically a partial one. The proper course in

first

of the selector,

such case, in the interest of economical administration and just regard
good faith of the second applicant, was that he should
be informed of the conflict as to part of the land he selected and be
given opportunity to eliminate such tracts. The local office erred in
not so doing. Upon being advised of it, he was entitled to an election
to the evident

of three courses for protection of his rights: (1) He might abide his
application and contest the right of the prior applicant.
(2) He

might ask

to

amend by eliminating

excess of base,

and

so save the

the land in conflict, waiving the

remainder of his

selection, if

he deemed

that to his advantage; (3) or eliminate the excess and so exhaust the
base by selecting other land subject to such appropriation. William

A. Orser, 33 L.
the selection.
tion,

I)..

Your

and the case

is

352.

Your

decision

is

remanded

office

erred in peremptorily rejecting

vacated, so far as
to

your

office

it

rejects the selec-

for further proceedings

appropriate thereto.

timbek am) stone act— "lands chiefly valuable for stone."
Xakvek
"Lands

v.

Eastman.

stone" are subject to entry under the net of June
lsis. regardless of whether or not the stone can, under existing conditions,
considering the cost of quarrying and transportation, be marketed at a
chiefly valuable for

:'».

profit.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(S. V. P.)

to

Office,

the Commissioner of the General Land
(D. C. EL)
September //. 1906.

The record shows that on May 25, L903, George Eastman made his
sworn statement under the aet of dune 3, L878 (20 Stat, s '.n. for the
purchase of the E. \ of tlie NE. \ of Sec. It, T. L9 N.. K. -".7 E.,
Spokane Falls, Washington, land district, alleging the land to be
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unfit for cultivation and chiefly valuable for its stone, and that on the
same day notice of intention to submit proof in support of his said
statement and application was issued and duly published. On June
2, 1903, Andrew F. Narver filed protest against the allowance of

Eastman's said application setting forth " that at least one half of
said tract is good agricultural land and good for grazing purposes
and not such land as would be considered stone land," and on June
16, 1903, said Narver, as assignee of Harriet Jefferson, widow of
Thomas Jefferson, filed soldiers' additional homestead application
for the above described land, which said application was suspended
and held to await action on the final proof of said Eastman, to be
submitted in support of his aforesaid application for said land.
On the day fixed for the making of final proof, August 15, 1903.
Eastman appeared and submitted proof. Narver also appeared and
cross-examined Eastman and his witnesses and further testimony as
to the character of the land was introduced by both parties.
The local officers found that the land is chiefly valuable for the
stone therein contained and recommended that Narver 's protest be
dismissed and his application to make soldiers' additional homestead
entry be rejected and that Eastman's final proof upon his timber and
stone application be approved and cash certificate issued to him for
said land.

Narver appealed to your office, where, on October 8, 1904, a dewas rendered reversing the action of the local officers and
rejecting Eastman's application and final proof.
The case is before
the Department on the appeal of Eastman from your said decision.
The concurrent findings of the local office and of your office, to the
effect that the land is unfit for agricultural or grazing purposes and
cision

that

it

contains large quantities of stone suitable for building culverts

and for the foundations of houses, appear

to be sustained by a preponderance of the evidence in the case.
The testimony shows that there are three large ledges of rock running through the land and a great deal of loose rock scattered over the
tract, that the quantity of stone in the land is estimated at over two
hundred and thirty four thousand perches, which in its present state
is valued by a stone mason (the only witness who attempts to fix its
value) at fifteen cents per perch, and that if the stone is taken from
the land and sold in the nearest market, about 12 miles distant, it will
bring from seventy five cents to one dollar per perch, and that the
cost of transporting the stone to market will be $4.00 or $5.00 per
perch. And it further appears from the testimony of one witness
(the only one who fixes the price) that the cost of quarrying the stone
will be about fifteen cents per perch.
The local officers and your office, while concurring in opinions as to

the material facts in the case, differ in the conclusions arrived

at,

said
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holding that the land is chiefly valuable for its stone and your
holding that, although the land contains large quantities of
stone which may be utilized for building culverts and for the foundations of houses, yet the cost of quarrying the stone and putting it in
market would so far exceed the price for which it could be sold as to
leave the stone without any commercial value whatever.
In other
officers
office

words, your decision seems to be based upon the theory that the commercial value of an article is the net profit it will yield over and above
all costs of production and transportation to market.

The Department does not concur

in this view.
It does not follow
is
no
clear
because
there
profit
from
the
sale of an article
arising
that
that has been manufactured or produced that it therefore has no

commercial value. Take for example the farmer. In the course of
husbandry, it frequently happens that different crops raised by the
farmer when put in market do not sell for enough to pay the costs of
their production and transportation, but can it be truly said that said
crops have no commercial value simply because after the same have
been sold and all expenses incident to their production and shipment
deducted, there is no clear gain to the farmer, and therefore, as a
corollary, that the lands are not valuable for agricultural purposes?
And the same may be said as to the entry under this act of land valuable " chiefly for stone." Could not the land be valuable chiefly for
stone even though, because of its remoteness from market of other
causes, the stone could not then be sold for a remunerative price?
The statute does not say that the stone must be of a commercial
value, or, as you construe that term, can be sold at a profit.
The
statute says. " lands chiefly valuable for stone."
To adopt the construction you place upon the act requires the interpolation therein of
a word so as to make it read as though Congress had said, "lands
commercially valuable chiefly for stone," a thing not justified in view
of the plain language used.
In the case of
effect

Smith

v.

Buckley

(IT)

L.

I)..

held that, in determining whether land

821), the Department in
is

subject to entry under

the coal land law. the costs of transportation can not be taken into

shown to exist in the
same principle should not hold

consideration as affecting the value of the coal

land; and no reason

good and be applied

The

is

seen

the

in this case.

real question to be

land involved herein

why

is

determined

in the case at

of such character that

it

bar

is,

whether the

can be entered under

June 3, 1878, known as the timber and stone act.
Evidently the statute has reference to the intrinsic value of the land
because of its stone, and if the land be found to be thus valuable and
the applicant be willing to invest his money therein, he should !>«'
allowed to make entry thereof, regardless of the question a- to whether
the act of

the investment will prove to be profitable

<>r n<>t.
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In the case of the United States

was held that the said

statute' of

v.

Budd

June

3,

(144 U.

S., 154,

167),

it

1878, does not refer to the

probabilities of the future, but deals with the facts as they exist at

the time the application to purchase the land

is

made and

See also Gilmore

in support thereof is submitted.

v.

the proof

Simpson (16

L. D., 546).

In the case at bar, under the statute and Eastman's application, the
chief value of the land must be the stone contained therein, and if the

stone has a distinct value and

is

the land and

it

is

scattered over

found in large ledges running through
in such quantities and in such manner

as to render the tract in its present state unfit for cultivation, the land

belongs to the class contemplated by the statute and should be entered thereunder.

The evidence in this case showing by a clear preponderance that the
land in question is unfit for cultivation, and that the stone in its present state has a specific value, the said land is of the character contemplated by the act of June
scope and meaning.
The decision appealed from

3,

is

1878, supra,

and comes within

its

accordingly reversed, Narver's pro-

be dimissed and Eastman's application and final proof approved. Since the case has been pending here on appeal, Narver has
filed a virtual withdrawal of his protest against the application of
test will

Eastman

to purchase the land in question

peal to your

office

from the action of the

and has asked that his ap-

local office rejecting his said

protest be dismissed, but, as the appeal has already been considered

and passed upon by your office, the said request can have no effect or
bearing upon the case. Narver has also, since the case has been here
on appeal, requested that he be allowed to withdraw his soldiers' additional homestead application for the said land and also the soldiers' additional homestead scrip filed therewith, which said application is returned to your office for appropriate action.
v

FOREST RESERVE— SELECTION UNDER EXCHANGE PROVISIONS OF ACT
OF JUNE 4, 1897.

Frank
Two

F.

McCain.

distinct classes of exchanges are authorized by the act of
first,

perfected

titles,

where

title is

given and

June 4, 1897
which case

title is received, in

nothing is required to be done by the selector but to vest the United States
with good title to the land relinquished in a forest reserve and to select the
land taken in lieu thereof in accordance with the law and regulations governing such exchanges and second, unperfected claims, wherein the lands
taken in exchange are taken by the selector with credit for his previous
partial compliance with the law governing his entry, settlement, or claim
upon the relinquished land, but with obligation under such law to do such
acts as he had, prior to his relinquishment, not yet performed.
;
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in the act of July 4, 1884, that the lands in the former Columbia
Indian reservation by said act restored to the public domain should he disposed el' "to actual settlers under the homestead laws only," is no bar to
the selection of portions of said lands in lieu of. an unperfected claim to
lands in a forest reserve, based upon homestead settlement, and relinquished
under the exchange provisions of the act of June 4, 1897.

The provision

Acting Secretary Ryan
(

S. V. P.)

to

Office,

the Commissioner of the General Lund
September 12, 1905.
(J. E. W.)

Frank F. McCain appealed from your decision of
denying their homestead entry for the XE. ] NE. j.
and SE. \ XE. J, Sec. 3, T. 36 X., R. 21 E., W. M.,
Sec. 10, E. J SE.
Waterville, Washington, selected under the act of June 4. 1897 (30

The
March

heirs of
9,

1905,

1

unperfected claim of their father, Frank F.

Stat., 36), in lieu of the

McCain, as a settler upon the unsurveyed W. ^ NW. ^, Sec. 31, T. 36
X.. R. 20 W., and E. ± NE. J, Sec. 36, T. 36 N., R. 19 E., in the
Washington forest reserve, established by executive proclamation of
February 22, 1897 (29 Stat, 904).
The land selected and that relinquished is within the former Columbia Indian reservation and was restored to the public domain by
Executive order of May 1, 1886, under the act of July 4, 1S84 (23
Stat, 76, 79), which provided that after allotments to Indians
the remainder of said reservation to be thereupon restored to the public domain

and shall be disposed of

to

actual settlers under the homestead

laws only,

may

be subject to sale under the laws relating
to the entry of timber lands and of mineral lands, the entry of which shall
be governed by the laws now in force concerning the entry of such lands.
except such portion thereof as

June

18, 1904,

Florence M. Green, describing herself as " one of the

heirs [and] for all of the heirs of

Frank F. McCain,

deceased,'' filed

an application to make homestead entry for the lands selected herein
above first described. Therewith she hied an affidavit that she is
the daughter of Frank F. McCain, who died March 21, 1902, then

unmarried. Leaving the affiant, another daughter and a son ol' full
age, and four other children now minors; that May 10, 1895, McCain
made homestead settlement on lands above last described, which are
non-mineral, agricultural and unsurveyed, and resided thereon and
cultivated the

same

until his death,

having made certain described

buildings and other improvements of the value
land

was after

his

settlement

and

improvement

$800; that the
included in the

ol'

reserve; and that the heirs desire to change their settlement
to land outside the reserve and to -elect in lien thereof the land
forest

herein

first

described.

their personal

by two witnesses of
no entry, -he tenmade
having
McCain

This

knowledge.

is

corroborated

dered the \'w> therefor.

The

upon authority of William
and upon her appeal to your office that

local office rejected the application

C. Quinlan, 30

I,.

D.. 268,
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was affirmed upon authority of departmental decision of Au1902 (unreported), in the case of Jesse H. Sherman.
The act of June 4, 1807 (30 Stat., 36), provides—

action

gust

8,

that in cases in which a tract covered by an unperfected bona fide claim
is included within the limits of a forest reserve, the settler .... may,
desires to do so, relinquish the tract to the government

and may

....
if

he

select

in

vacant land open to settlement
Provided further.
That in cases of unperfected claims the requirements of the laws respecting
settlement, residence, improvement, and so forth, are complied with on the
new claims, credit being allowed for the time spent on the relinquished claims.
lieu thereof a tract of

An

.

.

.

.

:

is of the same character
and the law governing the original claim
applies thereto. The entry applied for in the present instance was
a homestead and permissible under the act of 1884, supra, governing

entry in lieu of an unperfected claim

as the claim relinquished

disposal of the lands here involved.
cited

by the

local office,

In the cases of Quinlan, supra,
cited by your office, the land

and Sherman,

relinquished and assigned as base for the selection
ple title

by patent from the United

States.

The

was held in fee simhad nothing

selector

do in the way of compliance with the homestead law or of proof of
such compliance. Those decisions are not applicable to the case

to

was not an exchange of
given for 'title relinquished, but is for a " transfer of settlement," as stated in the application.
There are two distinct "classes of exchanges authorized by the act
here, wherein the application in its terms
title

of June 4, 1897.

First, perfected titles,

They partake of

received.

where

title is

given for

title

the nature of private entries, warrant

and scrip locations. Nothing is required to be done by the selector
but to vest the United States with good title to the land relinquished
in a forest reserve and to select the land taken in Heu of it in accordance with the law and regulations for making of such exchanges.

Second, unperfected claims, wherein the lands taken in exchange
are taken by the selector with credit for his previous partial com-

pliance with the law governing his entry, settlement or claim upon
the relinquished land, but with obligation under such law to do

such acts as he had, prior to his relinquishment, not yet performed.

To such

cases the decisions in

applicable.

make
make

Quinlan and Sherman, supra, are not
of this class and was to

The present application was
'

a homestead entry of land subject thereto in lieu of a right to
a homestead entry

made

of the relinquished land for which no

upon
and improved had not been surveyed.
Technically speaking, the entry was properly denied for insufficiency of the relinquishment.
Upon McCain's death the homestead
settlement right under the law, there being no widow (Revised
entry had been

Statutes,

Sec.

for the sole reason that the land settled

2291), descended to his children in equal shares.
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and four

to be minors.
Florence M.
Green, only one of those of full age, has relinquished. Though she
professes to relinquish on behalf of all she does not show a power to

are alleged to be of full age

act

on behalf of the other two of full age or as guardian for the
The relinquishment should be executed by all the children

minors.

and by

of full age

a guardian for the minors duly appointed and

authorized by the court so to do for the purpose of effecting a transfer of the settlement to the land selected.

The

action of the local

and of your

office

office

application was therefore the necessary result

in rejecting the

of the insufficiency

of the relinquishment, but of this defect the applicant was not advised

and had no opportunity

vacated and the heirs will

to

remove

be given

The

it.

decision

is

therefore

reasonable time to cure the

application made for all the heirs by filing a full and complete
relinquishment of and on behalf of all of them.

TIMJtEU

AND STONE ACT—PURCHASE BY MARRIED WOMAN—PROOF.
Minnie

J.

McAtee.

woman to purchase under the timber and
immaterial whether the proof that she proposes to make the
purchase with her separate money and for her own use and benefit be shown
by the particular specified affidavits in the regulations, or in some other
manner, so long as the facts required to he shown are proved by competent
evidence in some portion of the record.

In case of nn application by a married

stone act,

is

it

Acting Secretary Ryan
(S. V. P.)

Minnie

Commissioner of the General Land
September 13, 1905.
(J. R. W.

to the

Office,

McAtee appealed from your decision of January 13,
made October 6, L903, upon an application

J.

L905, rejecting her proof

under the
of the

X

act of

\Y.

|.

dune

the X\V.

L878 (20 Stat., 89), to purchase the SAY.

3,
{

of the

14. T. 3 X.. R. 5 E., II. M.,

May

6,

L903,

form 4-001

:

'.

Sec. L3,

and

lots

1

and

8,

j

Sec.

Eureka. California.

Mrs. McAtee

her affidavit,

SW.

in

filed at

the local

duplicate, on

office

form

her application, on
her affidavit

4r-537

;

having previously exhausted her rights, on form 4-102 I>: and
her non-mineral affidavit, on form 4-062.
The register thereupon
issued notice for publication for proof to be made October 6, L903,
and notice was duly given and proof thereof filed. On the day fixed
Mrs. McAtee appeared at the local office and submitted proof.
The
government was represented by a special agent of your office, who
cross-examined the applicant and her witnesses at considerable length.

of not

5194 -Vol. 34
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m
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In her direct testimony, on the regular blanks, to questions 11 to

15,

inclusive, reduced to narrative, she testified

am

I expect to keep this land and lumber on it
not a practical lumberman
I do not know of any capitalist or company which is
get title to it
no person has
offering to purchase timber land in the vicinity of this entry
I

when

;

I

;

;

offered to purchase this land after

best

I

acquire

there

title to it;

is

no nearest or

for the timber on this land at the present time.

market

two hours May 4, with Mr. Garrett,
information as to corners. &c, was from
Mr. Garrett neither he nor any other person has any interest in my claim, nor
has offered to purchase or to find a purchaser for it or the timber thereon when I
I do not know and have not heard that my locator is
shall have acquired title
working for or in the interest of or has any connection with any person or firm
my locator is a
operating, investing, or speculating in timber or timber lands
proof witness
he has just proved up on his claim and his wife is to today Dr.
I had no conversation with
Perott and Mrs. Garrett also located adjoining me
them as to what they intended to do with their claims I know of no person,
firm, or corporation, or agent of such, operating in or purchasing timber or
I have had no communication, verbal or written,
timber lands in that vicinity
with any such relative to purchase or sale of my claim or the timber thereon or
its value
and do not know and have not heard of any person securing or
procuring timber or timber lands by inducing people to make timber land
I have not solicited any person to make such entries in order to enable
entries
I know of no persons or firms
other persons to procure the timber from me
who have recently! purchased timber lands or timber in the locality; I expect to
keep the land and timber when I have acquired title I do not know how long I
I
will keep it
I don't expect to sell it, have not made any plans to sell it
purchase this tract for my own use, for my own benefit I have no personal use
I expect to keep it until I get old and educate my children and
for the timber
derive the benefit from purchase of this land. At the time I made application
for this claim I intended to make money from it and derive a benefit or I would
the land is so situated that considering my occupation,
not have taken it
circumstances, and condition in life I can use the money I get for the timber for
my own exclusive use and benefit; I own no real estate in the vicinity or in the
my intent as to cutting the timber myself, have some one cut it, or to
State
I expect to keep the land
sell it, is that I will without doubt have to sell it
after I have acquired title; I think I can use the money for the lumber or
timber on this claim for my own exclusive use, but I can't use the timber when
I made the application it was my intent to sell the timber and use the proceeds.
Cross-examination.

I

visited the land for

Dr. Perott, and Mrs. Garrett

;

all

my

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

1

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

The

local office,

not regarding

making

its entirety,

reference to but part of this testimony, and

found and held

:

That .... as she has no personal use for the timber only that she may sell it
second, that the land is inside of the reservation made by order of

at a profit

;

the General

Land

Office

on October

1,

1903—

Your office, reviewing the case upon her appeal,
requirements of sections 2 and 3 of the act of June 3, 1878,
supra, and making special reference to form 4—537, page 292, general
circular of January 25, 1904, held that
rejected the proof.

set out the

None of the requirements of law prescribed by sections 2 and 3 of said act
have been complied with, either in form or substance. In this connection atten-
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Department in 33 L. D., •_!<;:> M. Edith Curtis],
view of which the action of your [the local] office is

called to the ruling of the

is

and eases therein

cited, in
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I

affirmed.

Your

office in

examination of the record evidently overlooked the

made before the register of
The papers transmitted to the Department -how

duplicate affidavit on form 4r-537,
local

office.

the
full

compliance with all the requirements of the law in due and regular
form, and with all requirements of the regulations in such case provided, save the provision (General Circular of January 25, 11)04, page
40) respecting entries of this kind by married women, that
in addition to the proofs already provided for she shall make affidavit at the
time of the entry that she proposes to purchase said land with her separate
money, in which her husband has no interest or claim: that said entry is made

for her sole and separate use and benefit; that she has made no contract or
agreement whereby any interest whatever therein will inure to the benefit of her
husband or any other person; and that she has never made an entry under said
act or derived or had any interest whatever, directly or indirectly, in or from a
former entry made by any person or association of persons.

No

separate affidavit under this requirement

found among the

is

papers, but all the matters therein required to be

shown by separate

married woman, save the provision of the first clause,
by the affidavit on form 4-537, and also by her
testimony, especially that upon her extended cross-examination,
above set out. In addition thereto, on cross-examination, she testified, reduced to narrative, that
affidavit of a

are fully covered

have heen employed by A. Brizard and I work in the post office, and my commonth about $25 or $30 and my living expenses.
have a husband and two children;
ordinarily save out of my earnings about
Sir. a month; I have kept the money which I have saved at home and then I
have cattle which I buy and sell; I got this money for paying for the land and
all expenses connected with the filing, out of my earnings; I am not borrowing
any, it is my own money.
I

pensatiOD averages during the
I

I

All the elements of proof of facts required by the law or the regulations thus fully
tive

proceedings

appeared
it

in the record.

In judicial or administra-

generally immaterial

is

how

a

fact appears, so

proved by competent evidence in any part of the record. In
the Lake Superior Ship Canal. Railway and Iron Company /'. Patterson (30 L. I).. L60, ITS), speaking of notice of final proof, the
Department held that

only

it

is

:

The accomplishment of
accomplished,

is

than the manner in which it is
he considered, and where it appears that

this purpose, rather

the matter most

to

this purpose has been fully accomplished, the particular manner
done becomes immaterial, its efficiency is demonstrated.

power

to

make

it. is

which

it

was

I).. 611, 614) it was held that " a quesand appropriation of public lands, there being
one of tact rather than of mere form." Where it

In J. M. Longnecker (30 L.
tion of reservation

in
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is

essential to allege facts taking a contract out of the bar of the

statute of limitations, the courts generally hold that the defect of alle-

gation

cured by an answer showing the

is

must show

the parties,

it

is

sufficient if it

though not in the complaint,

the record

appear in any part of the record,
where it should be

petition, or bill,

It is also generally recognized that evidence given before

alleged.

the tribunal where the witness
pecially

Where

fact.

jurisdictional facts, as, for instance, diverse citizenship of

where the witness

is

is

subject to cross-examination, es-

in fact cross-examined, is of greater

evidential value than the witness's ex parte affidavit.

Applying

these principles, the

Department

regulation as to proof by married
stantially

and

women

is

of opinion that the

in such cases

was sub-

satisfactorily complied with in the present case.

Her

ex parte affidavit as to her acquisition and ownership of the money

with which she was making the purchase could add nothing toward
establishing the fact that it was her own separate property beyond
her testimony to such fact given orally before the local office, corroborated, as it was, by the other witnesses also orally examined,
that her financial standing is good.
The land was withdrawn October 1, 1903, for the proposed
Klamath Kiveif forest reserve, by an order which provided that:
Neither this temporary withdrawal, nor the .permanent reservation of the
may follow will affect any bona fide settlement or claim properly
initiated prior to the date hereof, provided that the settlers or claimants continue to comply with the law under which their settlements or claims are
lands which

initiated.

The date

of October 6th for taking of the proofs was fixed by the
presumably because of pressure of business pending before
the office, but the proceeding Avas initiated May 6th and was unafThe applicant prosefected by the express terms of the withdrawal.
complied
with
diligence
and
the
law
on the day fixed.
with
cuted
Edith
D.,
in
M.
Curtis
L.
The decision
(33
265), cited by your
holds
that
pending
timber
merely
a
and
stone application
decision,
order
reserves
land
from
other
disposal
by
withdrawal
a
to purchase
applicant
time
allowed
for
or
proof.
As
the
offer
no longer than the
herein offered her proofs on the day set by the register, the decision
cited is wholly irrelevant to the case.
The local office erred in holding the application to be speculative,
or for speculation, within the meaning of that term as used in the
In that respect the case is controlled by the decision in Annie M.
act.
register,

Donahue et al., 32 L. D., 349.
The decisions of your office and of
if

the local

office

are reversed, and,

no other objection appear, the proof will be approved.
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WOMAN—PURCHASE

Nellie E. Garrett.

woman making

application to purchase under the timber
pay from her separate money only the lees and
expenses of making the entry, and to borrow upon her own credit, to be
secured by mortgage on the land, the sum necessary to pay therefor, does not
of itself impugn the good faith of the applicant, in the absence of anything
tending to show that the person from whom she proposes to borrow the
purchase money is a lumberman or engaged in acquiring timbered lands, or
that under pretense of a mortgage security the entry is made or intended to
be for his benefit or that of any person other than the applicant herself.
An applicant to purchase under the timber and stone act is entitled to a copy
of the final proof submitted on his application.
Where in final proof proceedings a witness is asked to give a categorical answer
to an interrogatory, he should be permitted, in connection therewith, to
state such facts and circumstances in explanation thereof as in his opinion
make the categorical answer the correct one to the question he is required
to answer in such form.

The

married

fact that a

and stone

net proposes to

Act tag Secretary Ryan

Commissioner of the General Land
September 13, 1905.
(J. R. W.)

to the

*

(S. V. P.)

Office,

from your decision of February 3, 1905,
June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89),
to purchase the NW. i of the XW. J, Sec. 12, the X. ^ of the XK. |.
and the SW. I of the NE. J, Sec. 11, T. 3 N., R. 5 E.. H. M., Eureka.
Nellie E. Garrett appealed

rejecting her application under the act of

California.

The

facts in this case are in every respect but one substantially

same as in that of Minnie J. McAtee, from the same local office,
this day decided by the Department, and reference thereto is hereby
the

made without repetition.
The record herein discloses that the applicant was able to pay of her
separate money only the fees and expenses of her entry, and had
prepared to borrow upon her own credit, to be secured by mortgage
of the land, the sum to be paid for its purchase.
This fact does not
of itself impugn the good faith of the applicant.
It is not shown
that the lender, whom she named, is a lumberman or engaged in
a mortgage secuwas made or intended to be for his beneiit or that of any
one but the applicant herself.
Annie M. Donahue (32 L. I).. 349,

acquiring timbered lands, or that under pretense of
rity the entry

353.

There

is

further

filed

in

this case the allidavit

verified before tin' register of the local office,
states,

among

other things, that

At the time of the taking

make

;it

her

own expense

;i

—

of the applicant,

March

25,

L905,

which

<>t* said proof she asked
for and offered i<« pay for or
copy of said proof, but thai she was refused the righl
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and privilege of having or making a copy of the same; that affiant's appeal in
this case is thereby hampered and rendered more difficult, and she is obliged
to rely upon her memory of the contents of the same
And affiant further deposes and says that her cross-examination taken and
written by and before W. S. Wade, Esq., the Special Agent of the U. S. General
Land Office, was not in all respects in form and substance as she wished it to
be with respect to her " intent " in seeking to purchase the said land
that the
said Special Agent would not permit her answers to certain of his questions to
be written as she gave them
that he asked questions in which he set forth
matters in a different light than she desired them to be and required her to
answer them by saying simply " yes " or " no." and refused to write down any
:

;

qualifying statements or explanations

make her

;

that she believes the purpose of the

show " speculation " and an
government and do something she did not wish and had
no purpose of doing, and that her said answers to said questions do not truly
show her actual " intent." and were forced out of her in the manner above set
that her " intent " in seeking to purchase the said land was to hold it as
forth
an investment, just as she would do if she purchased property of that kind from
said questions

was

to

said testimony

intent to defraud the

;

a private individual.

In respect to these allegations it should be said that the applicant
was entitled as a matter of right to have a copy of her final proof,
to be made by her or by the local office, as might be deemed best in
the discretion of said office if made by the local office, the applicant
in such case to pay the ordinary fees for the transcription of the
:

testimony.

Referring to the statement made in the second paragraph of this
T
it is only necessary to sa} that a witness may be asked to
give a categorical answer, but in connection therewith he should be
permitted to state the facts and circumstances explanatory of it.
which, in his view, make the categorical answer the correct one to
the question he is required to answer in such form.
affidavit,

The

decision herein

is

reversed, and, if no other objection appear,

the proof will be approved.

Snow

v.

Dickex.

Motion for re-review of departmental decision of March 22. 1905,
-177, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, September 23, 1905.

33 L. D..

additional homestead extry-sectiox

2,

act of april

28, 1904.

Robert Kxoetzl.
The

right to

make

additional homestead entry accorded by section 2 of the

act of April 28. 1904. generally

sons

who made

known

as the Kinkaid Act,

is

limited to per-

their original entries prior to the date of said act.

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

Ryan

Acting Secretary
(

F. L. C.

An
your

of

May

1.

Commissioner of the General Land
September 25, 1905.
(C. J. G.)

to the

Office,

appeal has been
office
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filed

by Robert Knoetzl from the decision of

1905, sustaining the action of the local officers

under the act of April 28, 1904
SE. J, and S. J SW. J, Sec. 14, SE. J
and E. \ SE. J, Sec. 15, T. 25 N., R. 19 W., Val-

in rejecting his application to enter

(33 Stat., 547), the S. \

NW.

NE. ].
i SE. i
entine, Nebraska.

The land covered by

NE.

{.

the foregoing description

additional to homestead entry of record
1904, for the S. \

NW.

\

and N.

\

SW.

J,

is

applied for as

made by Knoetzl April
Sec.

14,"

30,

T. 26 X., R. 19 W.,

and the ground for the rejection of the application to make additional
entry is that the original entry was not made until after the act of
April 28, 1904.
In a corroborated affidavit accompanying his application for additional entry Knoetzl stated ** that he would not have entered the land
described above had he not supposed that he would be permitted
to amend his entry and include other lands under what is known as
the Kinkaid law " while in an affidavit filed in support of his appeal
to your office, and reiterated here, he states that at the time he made
his original entry he was not aware of the provisions of the act of
April 28, 1904, and had no means of knowing what such provisions
But whether he has acted in good faith or not in the matter
were.
is not of controlling moment under the circumstances, for it is clear
that his application is not within the provisions of said act.
Knoetzl's original entry being still of record, his application for additional entry is governed by section 2 of said act, which provides:
;

The entrymen under the homestead laws .... who own and occupy the
lands heretofore entered by them,
said

may

enter other lands contiguous to their

homestead entry.

The

which confers the additional entry privilege, in
who made homestead entry prior to said act.
The language employed can not be so construed as to include entrymen who own and occupy lands entered after said act. The applicaact in question

terms refers to persons

Knoetzl being based on an entry not in existence at the date of
made subsequently thereto, said application was
properly rejected. This has been the uniform riding in numerous

tion of

the act, but on one

like

but unreported departmental decisions.

The

decision of your

office

herein

is

affirmed.
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private land claim— survey— section

10,

act oe march

3, 1891.

Arroyo Hondo Grant.
The

" necessary expenses " of making survey and plat of private land grants
under the provisions of section 10 of the act of March 3, 1891, one half
of which are to be paid by the grant-claimant, embrace all the expenses
necessary to the completion of such a survey as will be entitled to approval
by the Court of Private Land Claims, including the cost of publication of
notice of the survey required by the statute and the cost of additional surveys, where necessary and ordered by the court, but not including the cost
of examinations in the field made by special agents of the land department.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

With your

to

Office,

letter of

Commissioner of the General Land
(E. F. B.)
September 25, 1905.
the

September

the claimants of the Arroyo
office

of June

8,

1,

1905,

you transmit the appeal of
the decision of your

Hondo Grant from

1905, rejecting their application to retax the cost of

survey of said grant and to eliminate therefrom the charge for publication of notices and for examination of survey in the field.

This claim has been confirmed by the Court of Private Land Claims
and has been surveyed under authority of the tenth section of the act
of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 854, 858), which provides that where
any decision becomes final the Commissioner of the General Land
Office shall cause the tract to be surveyed at the cost of the United
States, and that notices by publication of the completion of the survey shall be given in tire- English and Spanish languages preliminary
to its approval by the court.

When any survey is finally approved by the court, it shall be returned to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, who shall as soon as may be cause a
patent to be issued thereon to the confirmee. One half of the necessary expenses
of making the survey and plat provided for in this section, and in respect to
which a patent shall be Ordered to be issued, shall be paid by the claimant or
patentee.

The cost of the survey of this claim as taxed by the SurveyorGeneral amounts to $1,247.58, made up of the following items:
Cost
Cost
Cost
Cost
Cost
Cost

of survey

*

of platting and other

work

in Surveyor-General's office

of first examination in the field of the survey

62.

Fe New Mexican

58.

of second examination in the field of survey

Total

$1, 247.

that they are not chargeable with

of said expense, except the cost of

making

00

80
80

135. 74

„__

The claimants contend

75.

334. 80

of publication of notice in El Boletin Popular
of publication in the Santa

$580. 44

58

any part

the actual survey in the
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field

and the

appeal

is.
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plat thereof.
The question therefore presented by their
are " the necessary expenses of making the survey and

What

provided for in this section? "
The logical and most reasonable interpretation of the section is thai
they are the expenses necessary to the completion of such a survey as
will be entitled to approval by the court.
The "survey and plat
provided for in this section " is a survey of which notice by publicaplat

tion in the

manner provided by

must be given as
court.

a

the statute has been given, and which

necessary step to authorize

its

approval by the

and necessary expense to the makone-half of which must be paid by the

It is therefore a legitimate

ing of the survey

and

plat,

grant-claimant or patentee.
Objection is also made to what appellant
charge of the cost of survey in the field, in
appeal that the cost of the survey as first
surveyor was $261.80. Objection was filed
that

survey and

it

contends
this: It

is
is

an excessive
stated in the

returned by the deputy
by the United States to

was returned by the court for

correction.

It

involved an additional cost of $318.64, making the sum total for cost
of survey in the field $580.44, which was paid to the deputy-surveyor.

Appellants insist that as the objection was filed by the United
and no objection was made by claimant,
any error occurred in the first survey it was due to the fault of the

States to the first survey
if

officials

of the United States and claimants should not be charged for

such errors.

A

deputy surveyor

sense only.

He

is

is

an

officer

of the United States in a limited

required to take the

official

oath and to perform his

duties under the direction of the Surveyor-General, but his

by contract and when the contract

is

work

is

executed his relations with the

government terminate.
Furthermore, the 10th section of the act, under authority of which
this survey was made, provides that upon the return of the survey to
the Surveyor-General, it shall remain in his office open to objections
for ninety days.
If no objections are filed the Surveyor-General
shall approve the same and forward it to the Commissioner.
If
objections are filed, they shall be forwarded with the survey and the
Commissioner of the General Land Office shall transmit them to the
court with the survey, and
if found to be incorrect, the court shall
return the same for correction in such particulars as it shall direct."
It is presumed from the statement in the appellant's brief that the
additional cost of $318.64 was made pursuant to the direction of the
court given under authority of the provision above referred to
and not by any direction of the United States officials, who had no
authority to determine whether the survey was made m conformity
w

'
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So that, if the deputy surveyor was entitled to any
pay for the extra work performed under the direction of the court
it was a legitimate charge and the United States is only liable for

with the decree.

one-half of the expense.

The

cost of examination in the field

by a special agent of your
not a necessary expense for obtaining such a survey and plat
as will be entitled to approval by the court and hence no part of such

office is

cost is chargeable against the grant-claimant.

Those examinations

are provided for by special appropriations and are

made

for the

purpose of ascertaining whether the survey complies technically
with the manual and regulations of your office. The determination
of whether the survey returned by the deputy is in accordance with
the decree rests solely within the jurisdiction of the court.
The act of July 31, 1876 (19 Stat., 121), relative to the survey of
private land claims, which was in force prior to the act of March 3,
1891, as to all claims provided for by the latter act, contained a provision " that a patent shall not issue, nor shall any copy of such survey be furnished, for any such private claim until the cost of survey
and platting shall have been paid into the Treasury of the United
States by the party or parties in interest or any other party." In
construing this act it was held that the only costs chargeable to claimants are for the actual survey in the field and for making the plat
thereof and that other expenses incurred by the government in
investigating the claim preliminary to the survey are not chargeable
against the claimant/ (Rancho Santiago de Santa Ana, 2 L. D.,
To the same effect is the decision in Pueblo of Monterey (13
371.)
L. D., 291).

These decisions

rest

upon the same

principle, that there are

many

expenses necessarily attendant upon the survey of such claims that
the government properly incurs in making investigations for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of claims and the correctness of the

work of its officials which are for its own protection and interests
and are merely incidental to and not a necessary expense of the survey.
That principle applies with equal force as to the survey provided for by the tenth section of the act of March 3, 1891, and in
determining what are the necessary expenses of making such survey
and plats.
You will therefore eliminate from such cost the charge for making
examinations in the field.
Your decision is modified accordingly.
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AM)

ls<>:},

18, 18!>1

State of Montana.

v.

Failure on the part of a State to publish notice of an application for the survey
of lands within thirty days from the date of such application, as provided l>y
the act of August 18, 1894, does nol affect its preference right to select such
lands, for the period of sixty days

The

survey, conferred by the ;i<-t of
provision in the act of .March

from the

March

''>.

township

filing of the

plal

of

L893.

1893, according to certain states a preference right, over all persons or corporations, except prior settlers, for a
period of sixty days from the filing of the township plat of survey, within
which to select lands under grants made by the act of February 22, 1889,
was not repealed by the provisions of the act of August 18, 1894, according
.">.

extend from the date of applicaby the State for the survey of the lands until the expiration of sixty
days from the date of the filing of the township plat, provided notice of the
application for survey he published within thirty days from the date of the
a similar right of selection for a period to
tion

filing of

such application.

A<tht(i Secretary

Ryan

{

Office,

The above
of Albert
14. L905,

H.

entitled case

(

is

Kay from your

before the Department upon the appeal
office

decisions of

January 28 and March

rejecting his application to purchase the

29 X.. R. 27

and stone

Commissioner of the General Land
September 27, 1005.
E. J. H.

to the

'

F. L. C.)

W., Kalispell,

act of

On March

June

Montana, land

NW.

district,

\ of Sec. 2, T.

under the timber

1878 (20 Stat., 89).
the governor of the State of Montana

3,

14, 1899,

filed

an

application for the survey of the described township, and the lands

withdrawn from settlement and entry or other disposition adverse to the State, under the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat..
Such withdrawal was to become effective on March 18, 1899,
394).
date
the
of receipt of said application in your office, and publication
of notice of the application for survey and of the State's preference
right of selection was made, commencing April 27, 1899.
It appears that on October 17. 1904, the township plat of survey
was filed in the local office and on the same day Kay Hied his applitherein were

cation to purchase the tract in controversy under the timber and stone
act. and November 21, 1904. within sixty days from the filing of the
township plat of survey, the State of Montana presented its application to select said tract with others, under the grant of lands for
public buildings made by the act of February 22. L889 (25 Stat..

681

).

The

admitting said State into the (Jnion.
State's application

was

rejected

for conflict

with the prior

application of Kay. from which the State appealed, alleging error
in

rejecting

its

in allowing adverse filings during
preference right under the act of L894.

application and

the time the State

had

a
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January

28. 1905,

your

office

of notice by the State was not
the filing of

its

decision held, that as the publication

commenced within

thirty days after

application for survey, the reservation, being con-

ditioned thereon, expired upon the lapse of time, the conditions
it could be prolonged in force not having been complied
but it was held that the State had a general
with (32 L. D.. 240)
preference right of selection for sixty days after the tiling of the
township plat, as against all persons not claiming settlement on the
date of such filing, under the act of March 3. 1893 (27 Stat.. 593),
and that under said act no publication was required. McFarland

whereby

:

'•.

State of Idaho (32 L. D.. 107).

The action of the local officers in accepting applications not based
upon settlement, adverse to the rights of the State, was held to be
erroneous, and all such applications, including that of Kay under
the timber and stone act. were rejected, and the local officer- were
instructed not to allow any of said applicants to complete entry.
It appears that subsequently to the transmission to your office by
the local officers of the foregoing appeal by the State, said officer-.
filed by Kay to dismiss
same not having been filed with the record.
In
it was not considered in your office decision of January 2s. 1905.
this motion to dismiss it was alleged that no notice of said appeal
was served by the State upon Kay.
It also appears that on February 11. 1005. the local officers transmitted to your office the record on appeal in the matter of the proof
submitted by Kay on January 13. 1905. in support of his application
under the timber and stone act. which proof was rejected by the local
officers for the reason that the State had a preference right of selection for sixty days after the filing of the township plat as against
all who were not settlers.
March 14. 1904. in considering said matters, which had been received from the local office and filed with the papers in the case since
the original record was acted upon by your office, it Avas held that
while there was no evidence that the State had served notice of its
appeal upon Kay. inasmuch as the motion to dismiss went into the
merits of the case, it must be denied.
In regard to the rejection by the local officers of Kay's proof, it
appears that in his appeal therefrom he alleged that the State had
made selections in excess of its grant for public buildings, and that
its application to select was not accompanied by the required certificate that said selections, together with those approved and pending,
did not exceed the grant. With reference thereto your office decision
found from the records of your office that such selections do not exceed
the grant, and held that the absence of a certificate to that effect did

on January

17. 1905.

transmitted a motion

said appeal, but that the
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it
might be supplied on motion: that
only required for the guidance of the local officers,
was shown that the State had not in fact exceeded it- granl

not invalidate the selection, as

such certificate

is

and a> it
no further consideration need be given thereto'. The action of the
local officers in said matter- was affirmed.
It is strongly urged in the appeal that as the acts of March
L893,
and August 18, 1894, are both enactments upon the same subject, and
as the later act. with its enlarged scope, provides a more effective
method for securing to the State a preference right to select lands
under its grants, it was intended that such later act should supersede
and abrogate the provisions of the earlier act that inasmuch as the
:'..

:

State failed to

make

the publication of notice required by the act of

concluded from asserting any right to the land in controKay, who tendered his timber and stone application
therefor on the day of the filing of the township plat of survey long3

81)4

it

is

versy as against

prior to the proffer of the State's
In the case of
said,

The

McFarland

v.

list

of selections.

State of Idaho (32 L. D., 107),

was

it

on page 109. that

and 1894 is. that under the
reserved for the benefit of the State for a period of sixty
days from the filing of the township plat of survey, whereas, under the act of
1894, they are reserved from the date of the filing of the application for survey.
principal difference between the acts of 1893

acl of 1893 lands are

if

the publication required by that act

reason

why

the State

of 1894, and waive

its

may

is

There would seem

made.

to be

no good

not apply for a survey of these lands under the act

right to have

them withdrawn from the date

cation by failing to publish the necessary notice, inasmuch as

of the appli-

had a right
and did rely, upon the terms of the act of 1893, for a preference righl
is
not
for sixty days from the filing of the township plat of survey.
It
believed that the State lost any right which it otherwise bad under the ad of
L893, by failing to comply with some of the requirements of the act of 1894.
it

to rely,

There is no material ditl'erence in the situation in the above cited
from that in the case under consideration, the only difference
being that in the former it does not appear that the required notice
was ever published, while in this case the notice was published hut not
within the time required in said act of 189-1, so that the withdrawal
did not become effective.
A careful examination of the cases of Thomas R. Jrindley t al. L6
11 Wall.. 88), cited in supL. I).. 167) and United States v. Tynen
port of the contention of Kay that the act of 1893 was repealed by
case

(

<

(

(

the act

of 1894, discloses that

authority for such claim.

-aid cases can

not

he considered

In each of those cases, wherein

was

ain-

volved this question of the repeal of a statute l>y the enactment of a
subsequent one upon the same subject, with no expressed provision
therein Tor such repeal, there are provisions in the later acts that arc

repugnant to provisions
under consideration.

case

in

the earlier one-.

That

is

not true in the
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Under

the act of 1893 the State

clays after the filing of the

make

its selections

is

given a preference right for sixty

township plat of survey within which

as against all except settlers.

The

and pending
upon and

ations under that act undoubtedly disclosed that prior to

the survey in the

were

so

field,

many

lost to the State,

and

to

practical oper-

of the best tracts were settled
it

was obliged

to take the inferior lands,

hence the act of 1894 was passed, to enable the State to ask for the
survey and have the lands reserved from settlement from the date of
such application, thus giving the State an enlarged opportunity to
secure the selection of lands under its grants, and that was the undoubted purpose Congress had in view in passing it. If it be held
that said act abrogated and repealed the act of 1893, then the State
has no preference right of sixty days after the filing of the plat of
survey within which to make its selections, in any township wherein
it has not applied for the survey, published timely notice thereof and
secured the withdrawal of the lands from settlement or other adverse
appropriation.

In the case of the United States

Kay,

it is

said that "

when

v.

Tynen, supra, cited on behalf of

there are two acts on the same subject the

There appears to be no
giving effect to both of the foregoing acts. Then the
State can apply for the survey, publish the required notice and have
the lands withdrawn with the preference right of sixty days after
survey for making selections. But if the State for any reason fails to
apply for the survey and withdrawal or to cause notice thereof to be
published, it can await the survey by the Government in the ordinary
rule

is

to give effect to both if possible."

difficulty in

course,

and have

its

preference right of sixty days for

making

tions after the filing of the plat against all but prior settlers.

selec-

Xo

un-

would accrue from such a
situation, as after applying for survey and withdrawal, if no timely
notice thereof was published, there would be no effective reservation,
and settlements made at any time prior to the filing of the plat would
fairness to settlers or the general public

be good.

Regarding the refusal of your

office to

dismiss the appeal of the

State from the action of the local officers in rejecting
list,

because no service of said appeal was made;

failure to hold that the omission of the State to

its

and

selection

also

the

with its selection list a certificate that the selections therein, together with those
approved and pending, did not exceed the grant, the department is
of opinion that under the circumstances your office rulings were
file

correct.

Your
by

Kay

office

to

decisions are accordingly affirmed

make purchase

will stand rejected.

and the application
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31, 1898.

Mexico.

"permits for right of pasturage" issued by the board of public
New Mexico under the provisions of acts of the
legislative assembly of that Territory. ;111< 1 covering any of the lands granted
to the Territory by the act of June 21, 1898, should be limited, in accordance
with the provisions of section 10 of thai act, to ao1 exceeding one section or
r»40 acres of land to any person, corporation, or association of persons.
and all such leases or permits must be submitted to the Secretary of the

All leases or

lands of the Territory of

Interior for his approval.

Assistant Attorney General Cain />l><n to the Secretary of the Interior,
September 28, 1905.
(G. B. G.

By

reference of the Acting Secretary,

August

24, 1905.

I

am

asked

whether " Permits for Right of Pasturage." issued by the
Board of Public Lands of the Territory of New Mexico under the
provisions of an act of the legislative assembly of said Territory,
approved March 20, 1901, should be submitted for the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior under the provisions of the act of dune
21, 1898 (30 Stat., -tS-t), and whether under the terms of said act
these permits should be limited in area to six hundred and forty
for opinion

acres of land.

The lands in question were granted to said Territory by the -aid
June 21. 1898, and section 10 thereof authorizes the legislative
assembly to make provision for " leasing all or any pari of the lands
act of

in this act," not to exceed one section to any one person,
corporation, or association of person-. " but all leases made under the

granted

provisions of this act shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary
of the

Interior,

all investments made or securities purchased
leases of lands provided for by this act
...
approval by the Secretary of the Interior."
...

and

with the proceeds of
shall be subject to

.

.

It appears from certain correspondence, relative to this matter,
between the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Commissioner of Public Lands for the Territory, and from copies of some

of these permits submitted therewith, that grazing lands granted

t<>

the Territory, as aforesaid, are being occupied in large bodies

under
authority of these permits, none of which, it seems, were submitted to
the Secretary of the Interior for his approval; and it is further suggested that the proceeds arising from these permits are not being
invested

in

securities

with

the

approval of the Secretary of the
for the support of the Public

Interior, or at all. but are being used

Land Board.
I

am

of opinion that these permits arc Leases

in

form and substance,
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and it seems clear that they are called permits for the purpose of
avoiding the provisions with reference to leasing these lands found in
This is substantially admitted, it being
the granting act, supra.
urged that the necessities and best interests of the Territory demand
that these grazing lands be leased in large bodies. In so far as these
leases undertake to authorize the occupation and use of more than one
section, or six

hundred and forty acres of land, by any one person,

corporation, or association of persons, they are in violation of both

the letter and spirit of the granting act, supra, and therefore null and
It is also clear that if otherwise valid they are

void.

and

effect,

unless they have been submitted to

Secretary of the Interior.

I advise

without force

and approved by the

you that these permits, or

leases,

should be submitted to the Secretary of the Interior for his approval,
and that such approval should be withheld if they embrace more than

one section of land.

Approved
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.

power of secretaky to withdraw public lands for municipal
purposes.
Opinion.
The Secretary

of the Interior has no

power

to

withdraw from disposal under the

general land laws public lands occupied and improved by a town for the pur-

'

pose of storing and conducting a water supply to the town, pending Congressional action authorizing the town authorities to make entry of the same
but action upon any application to enter such lands may be suspended by the
land department until the town authorities have been afforded opportunity
to secure the contemplated legislation.

Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
September 30, 1905.
(E. F. B.)

am

from the Commissioner of the General
upon the request of Hon. H. M. Hogg that certain public lands in Colorado be withdrawn from entry pending contemplated
legislation by Congress granting the same to the town of Mancos,
I

Land

in receipt of a report

Office

Colorado.

copy of a resolution passed by the board
is desired for the purpose of
storing and conducting water to supply the town; that the municipal
authorities have expended $25,000 in constructing upon the lands
described a system of water works for said town, and the Senators
and Representatives of said State are requested to procure the enactIt is stated in a certified

of trustees of said town that the tract
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town author-

The Commissioner report- that the
unappropriated and recommends that the withdrawal be

make entry of

is

the same.

made.

The matter

is

referred to

me

for opinion as to whether the action

requested can be Lawfully taken.

The Secretary of the Interior has no authority to withdraw lands
from the operation of the general land laws except as the means to
accomplish some end in the performance of the duties enjoined upon
him

in the disposal of the public lands, or to reserve

uses as the exigencies of the public service

The power

may

them

for public

require.

temporarily withhold lands from the operation of the
a view to submitting to Congress any question
as to their disposal is inherent under the general authority to supervise and regulate the manner of acquiring public lands so that all
persons may have equal opportunities and advantages in acquiring
such Lands under the general land laws, but that powder must be exercised in the interest of the public and cannot in my opinion be
extended to authorize a withdrawal or reservation of land for the
to

genera] land laws with

benefit of an individual or a corporation although the corporation

may

be

a

municipality.

But while the land may
as to take

it

nically applied,

temporarily

not be

withdrawn from entry or

out of the category of public lands as that term

all

it

would

not

filing so
is

tech-

be an abuse of authority to suspend

action looking to the final disposal of the land until

such time as the executive authority

may

consider the equities of the

case.

So far

as appears

from anything contained

in

the record, the land

may be appropriated for the purposes contemplated under the right
has already been improved by the construction
of way acts, and as
it

of a reservoir and pipe lines to the extent of $25,000 and the

town

contemplate securing Congressional action authorizing
the acquisition of the land. I can see no reason why the Commissioner
should not be instructed to suspend action upon any application to
enter such land until the town authorities have been a Horded the
opportunity of securing the contemplated Legislation.

authorities

Approved:
E. A.
5194

HitchcocKj Secretary,
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railroad grant—adjustment—act of july
Northern Pacific Ry.

1,

1898.

Co.

Where

a tract of land was inadvertently patented to the Northern Pacific
Railway Company, either prior or subsequently to the act of July 1, 1898,
during the pendency of an application to make homestead entry thereof
based upon settlement made in good faith prior to January 1, 1898, the
conflicting claims of the company and the settler are subject to adjustment
under the provisions of said act notwithstanding the issuance of such
patent.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(F. L. C.)
October 4, 1905.
(F. W. C.)

Your

office letter

of July 29,

forwards a request, made by

last,

Railway Company, that
known as Vancouver
list No. 71, of lands subject to relinquishment under the act of July
1, 1898 (30 Stat., 597, 620), by the Northern Pacific Railway Company, as successor to the Northern Pacific Railroad Cornpan}^, be
revoked as to the tract embraced in the individual claim of Fredresident counsel for the Northern Pacific

the approval of a certain

May

list,

erick Girard, namely, the S. ± of

SW.

8,

1905,

J, Sec. 19,

the reason that in the opinion of the railway

T. 3 N., R. 2 E. for
?

company

the conflict-

ing claims are not subject to adjustment under the act of 1898, the
having been patented to the railway company prior to the pas-

tract

sage of said act, to wit,

So much of the
consideration

is

May

27, 1895.

act in question as is material to the question

under

as follows:

That where, prior to January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the
whole or any part of an odd-numbered section, in either the granted or the
indemnity limits of the land grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, to
which the right of the grantee or its lawful successor is claimed to have
attached by definite location or selection, has been purchased directly from the
United States or settled upon or claimed in good faith by any qualified settler
under color of title or claim of right under any law of the United States or
any ruling of the Interior Department

The company's contention

is

prior to the passage of the act

had been patented
can not be said that the claim of

that where land
it

company rests upon a mere definite location
other w ords, that it is not land " to which the right
the

7

or selection;

in

of the grantee or

claimed to have attached by definite location
or selection," the effect of the patent being to fix and determine the
right of the company thereto, and in this connection it is argued
that should it be held otherwise the necessary result would be to open
anew many controversies settled and disposed of prior to the passage
of said act, which is clearly contrary to the spirit of the act, it being

its

lawful successor

one of repose.

is
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The tract here in question is within the overlap of the two grants
made to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company by the act of July 2,
18G4 (18 Stat.. 365), and the resolution of May 31, 18T0 (16 Stat.,
378), where the same meet in the neighborhood of Portland. Oregon.
The line to the east of Portland down the Valley of the Columbia

was never

river

nor constructed; the line to the
Within this overlap the Depart1895 (Spaulding v. Northern Pacific Railroad

definitely located

north of Portland was constructed.

ment held, July

Company, 21 L.

18,

D., 57), that (syllabus

)

:

Portland, Oregon, the Northern Pacific

lias two grants, the first for the
eastward, under the act of L864, and the second northward, under the joint
resolution of 1870. and. so far as the limits of the granl cast of said city over-

At

line

laps the subsequent grant, the latter must fail; and. as the road at such point

unconstructed, and the grant therefor forfeited by the act of Sepfrom said grant, do not inure to the later
grant, hut are subject to disposal under the provisions of said forfeiture act

eastward
teinher

is

1890, the lands so released

I'll.

The application of Spaulding

in this case

had been

filed a

of years prior to the departmental decision; in fact, your
sion

upon

his application

was made

May

21, 1892.

number

office deci-

It will thus be

seen that the question as to the rights of the Northern Pacific com-

pany

in

number

the overlap referred to

of years.

It

had been an agitated question for

might be here

a

stated, although not material to

brought to have judicially determined the rights of the Northern Pacific Railway Company within
the conflict referred to, the Supreme Court sustained the claim of the
railroad company.
From the proof filed by (Jirard in support of his election to retain
the tract in question as against the railway company, under the
provisions of the act of July 1, 1898, it appears that lie made
settlement upon this land as early as May. L887; that he continued
residing thereon until May, L894, making valuable improvements;
that on July L3, 1891, he tendered a homestead application for this
land, which, although rejected at the time, was decided in his favor
upon appeal. It will thus be seen that the patenting of the tract to
the railway company in L895 was a clear inadvertence, as Girard's
homestead application was at that time pending undisposed of.
What good reason can therefore be advanced for denying Girard
lie had settled upon the
the benefits of the act of July 1. L898?
land believing it to be excepted from the railroad grant and resided
thereon, with his family, for more than seven years; formally tendered his homestead application, and his right of claim thereto was
sustained by a decision of this Department and the i-<ue of the patent
to the railway company in the meantime was an inadvertence.
It does not appear that the railway company made any disposition
of this land prior to the passage of the act of July 1, 1898, and whatthis case, that in a suit subsequently
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ever might be said in a case where the land had been in accordance
with an adjudication patented to the company prior to the passage
of said act, the Department is clearly of opinion that the conflicting
claims to the tract in question are subject to adjustment under the

provisions of said act, and the request for revocation of the depart-

mental approval of the list including this tract is denied, and you
will again invite the company to make relinquishment of the tract,
advising them of the conclusions herein reached.
It

would seem that the better course

to pursue,

where the land has

been patented to the company, whether before or after the passage
1, 1898, would be to request of the company a
formal reconveyance of the land preliminary to its inclusion in a list
for relinquishment under said act.

of the act of July

forest reserve—railroad grant—act of march

Northern Pacific Ry.

Co.

v.

Mann (On

2,

1899.

Review).

Even

if it be admitted, as contended by the Nortbern Pacific Railway Company, that the Nortbern Pacific land grant can never be fully satisfied

from selections made within the limits provided for in the act of July
1804, and the joint resolution of May 31, 1870, such fact furnishes no

2,

authority for permitting the company to relinquish the lands within the
Mount Ranier National Park and the Pacific forest reserve falling within

indemnity limits of its grant, and to select other lands
under the provisions of the act of March 2, 1899.
Departmental decision in this case of June 19, 1905, 33 L. D., 021, adhered to.
the secondary

or'

in lieu thereof,

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F: L. C.)
October 5, 1005.

Land Office,
(F. W. C.)

With your office letter of July 20, last, was forwarded a motion
by the Northern Pacific Railway Company for review of departmental decision of June 19, last (33 L. D., 021), in the case of the
Northern Pacific Railway Company v. William J. Mann, involvingcertain described lands in T. 42 N., R. 2 E., Coeur d'Alene land district, Idaho, wherein it was held that section 3 of the act of March 2,
1899 (30 Stat,, 993), authorizing the Northern Pacific Railway Company, upon relinquishment of lands in the Mount Ranier National
Park and the Pacific forest reserve theretofore granted to said company, to select, in lieu thereof, an equal quantity of non-mineral
public lands, does not contemplate the relinquishment by the railway
company of

the lands within the reservations falling within the sec-

ondary or indemnity limits of the grant, the same not having been
selected and not being subject to selection at the date of the passage of
said act, with the consequent right of selection of other lands in lieu
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primary or place
attached
had
at that date
limits to which the rights under the granl
under
in
arriving
review,
at the conclusion above
In the decision
announced, it was said:
thereof, but applies only to the lands within the

In the firsl place, these indemnity or base lands were all unsurveyed and
had been by proclamation dated February 20, 1893 (No. 44. i>7 Stat.. 1063),
reserved from all settlement, entry or other disposition en account of the
No selection was possible on account of
Pacific forest reserve thereby created.
the granl while the lands were niisiirveyed. and. as a consequence, all right of
further selection was terminated by the proclamation referred to so long as
the lands remained reserved for forestry purposes.
No good purpose was therefore apparent for providing for a release of these indemnity lands, and while
it might be admitted that a right of selection would still exist should the reservation terminate, yet this furnishes no reason for securing the company's release,
as the necessity therefor would surely cease upon the termination of the
reservation.

A more

controlling reason for denying the

indemnity lands

lieu of these

amount

to

an increase

in

company

a

rignt

of selection in

that to recognize such a right

is.

the grant

this: that

in

would

it

would clearly

result in extending

No such purthe granted limits to the outer indemnity limits in this locality.
is indicated, and under well-known rules of construction the claim which

pose

amounts

to

an addition or increase

the grant

in

must be and

accordingly

is

denied.

The motion

alleges that

:

while the case was pending on appeal the railway company filed with the Commissioner of the General Land <>lii<-o a description of all lands selected by it in
lieu of tracts

in

its

indemnity limits within the Pacific forest reserve, aggre-

gating 26,280 acres, and also a tract for tract designation of losses to the
company's grant in place by reason of mineral classifications. These losses

aggregating 26,280 acres. sb<>\\ that a quantity of land exactly equal to that
within the indemnity limits in the Pacific forest reserve has been elsewhere
lost to the grant in place.
There .\v<- no other available lands from which
these losses can be s;itislicd. and

the company's right to select
there would

merely

it

is

manifest, therefore, that

lieu of Pacific

lands in

in

recognizing

reserve indemnity lands,

the total acreage of the company's grant, but

be no increase in

The company by

its

acreage lost to it by reason of mineral
relinquishment of right to select indemnity

then embraced

the area

in

the

the position of renouncing the righl

place limits, from these lands,
nity selection.
tion

forest

a satisfaction of a portion of the

classifications.

in

in

It

was possible

is

satisfy

forest
its

reserve,

placed

itself

large losses within

whenever they should become subject

true, as stated in

until

Pacific

to

the

indemthe departmental decision, that no selecto

survey of lands, and that the lands being withdrawn

by executive proclamation, no indemnity selection thereof has yet at any time
been possible.
Nevertheless, there existed ;ii the time of the company's relin

March

1899, and still exists, a possibility
domain, and thus rendered subject
to selection.
This possibility of future selection was a valuable righl and one
which the company lost by its relinquishment. As shown in our former brief

quishment pursuant

to

the act of

2,

that the lands will be restored to the public

at the time was that the company should, in lieu of its
This does not
relinquishment, secure an increase of indemnity area elsewhere.

the clear understanding
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mean

the addition of a single acre to the grant, hut simply the opportunity of
some degree of approximation.

satisfying losses in full or with

We
sides,

respect fully submit that the obvious intent of the transaction, on both

was that

this additional field of

indemnity selections should be given, in

return for the railway company's forever extinguishing

Any

of these lands.

and

its

other construction of the agreement

is

right to avail itself
at once inequitable

unilateral.

The mere

fact that the lands in the Pacific forest reserve

prior to the passage of the act of 1899, does not affect the case.

were withdrawn
The lands were

unsurveyed and under departmental decisions, the company could not select
them on that account. It was and still is true, however, that the company has
lost more lands than it can ever secure indemnity for within existing limits
and to now take away its opportunity to indemnify its losses up to 26,280 acres
all

means

a diminution of the grant to that extent.
As indicated in the brief filed
on appeal, the right of indemnity is a valuable right, capable of assignment, and
there is a plainly expressed transfer of this indemnity in the company's release
filed in tins case and duly accepted by the Department.
Having filed a list of
lands lost to the grant within its place limits, the increase suggested is impossible.
On the contrary, to adhere to the former decision will mean a reduction
in the grant of 20,280 acres.

The matters

motion and not considered in the prean allegation that the Northern Pacific landgrant can never be fully satisfied from selections made within limits
provided for in the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365), and the resolution of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat,, 378), a claim this Department can
not accede to but if it be as alleged, such allegation furnishes no sufficient reason for disturbing the decision heretofore rendered in this case.
That decision was made under a construction of the act of 1899 in the
light of the known conditions at the time of its passage, without consideration of the question as to whether the Northern Pacific landgrant, as a whole, could be satisfied, and from the nature of the legislation it can not be seriously contended that that question could or
should control its construction. If the act of 1899 authorized the
selection of other lands in lieu of those odd-numbered sections within
the indemnity limits not previously selected, then that right exists
without regard to the question as to whether the land-grant, as a
whole, might be satisfied elsewhere within the limits prescribed by law.
With regard to the possible right or necessity to resort to these
indemnity lands in the future in partial or full satisfaction of the
grant, it may be that the release of the lands in place carried with it
the right to an indemnity limit bordering on and adjoining the lands
released; but waiving this question, it seems to the Department at
this time that in the event these indemnity lands are opened to general
disposition in the future, the relinquishment heretofore executed by
the railway company under the act of 1899 should not be construed
as preventing the company from asserting claim thereto at that time.
vious decision,

;

set forth in this

amount

to
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As

under review:

said in the decision

With regard
rights etc.,

claim that

to the

and

in

to

all
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relinquishing under the act of 1899

in

all

its

ad of July 2, 1864, and acts
"by way of indemnity or other-

lands granted by the

amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto,
wise.'* the railway company intended and did waive

indemnity privileges, it
was no cause for
rejecting the relinquishment and thai as the acceptance thereof was in the
terms of the act of L899 it can not be construed as enlarging its provisions.
is

sutlieient

After

to

say that such fact,

if

understood

at

its

the time,

most careful consideration of the entire matter, as pre-

a

sented on review, the Department adheres to

and the motion

its

previous decision,

accordingly denied.

is

SWAMP LAND—AD.ru ST .\1K VI '-< HAKACTER OF LAND.
CULL1GAN

V.

STx\TE OF

MINNESOTA (On IvK-KEVIEW)

.

of all claims resting on a selection or exchange of lands,
accordance with law for public lands in the state of Minnesota,
prior to survey thereof, the land department will, by hearing or otherwise,
determine the true character of the lands selected, if claim is presented
theret
behalf <>f the State under its swamp land grant, based upon the
field notes of survey, notwithstanding the return of the held notes of sur-

the adjustment

In

presented

in

i

vey of the township may afford a sutlieient base for the State's claim.
L905, 34 L. D., 22, modified.
Departmental decision in this case of .Inly
1."..

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

October

(F. L. C.)

5,

1905.

Land Office,
(F. W. C.)

On the 22nd instant there was tiled in this Department, on behalf
of the State of Minnesota, a motion for review in the case of Patrick
Culligan
the

/*.

swamp

lands

in

State of Minnesota, involving an application to contest
land

selection

and

sections 25

for the

State of Minnesota for certain

26, T. 57 X., R. 8

W., Duluth land

district.

Minnesota.

This case was
April

11,

f i

ist

L904, not

considered by the Department in
reported, which affirmed your

its

office

decision of
decision of

A motion
which was entertained November 2D, IDOL and in the order of entertainment, of which a copy was
required to he served on the State, it was said:

.June 17. L903, rejecting Culligan's application to contest.

was

filed

for a review of said decision,

The case involves the question
claimant

for lands

in

of an alleged right,

legal

or equitable,

«»f

a

the state of Minnesota

under the acts of June 1. L897
L899 (30 Stat, 993), and upon selections there-

(30 Stat, .".i>. and March
under made prior t<» survey, to dispute the claim of tin- State t<> such lands
under its swamp land grant and inquire into the real character of such lands
•_'.
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at a hearing before the local office, notwithstanding they may, subsequent to

such selections and prior to the final approval thereof by the Secretary of the
Interior, have been returned by the surveyor-general as swamp and overflowed
lands, and notwithstanding the regulations of March 16, 1903 (32 L. D., 05),
which seem to preclude such inquiry.

The record made on review shows that service of the motion and
order were duly made upon the State and that an argument was filed
on behalf of the State in opposition to the granting of the motion.
The motion was considered
(34 L. D., 22)

,

and granted.

in departmental decision of July 13, 1905

In said decision

it

was

said

The claim

of Culligan arose upon certain forest lieu selections under the
June 4, 1897 (30 Stat, 11, 30), and a selection by the Northern Pacific
Railway Company under the act of March 2, 1899 (30 Stat, 993, 994), and upon
the subsequent assignment of the claims to him. The acts in question authorized the selection of unsurveyed lands, and the selections in question were in
fact made prior to the survey of the township in which they are situated, and
were in fact a mere exchange of lands. At the date of the selections it was
not known, and not possible to know or surmise, that the field-notes of the survey to be thereafter made would designate these lands as swamp. The selectors, therefore, were without other notice of the character of this land than such
as resulted from an examination upon the ground. It is sufficiently alleged
that such examination was made and showed the land in controversy be high
and dry, and not swamp, and movant asks that he be permitted to show this

act of

at a hearing.
It is

thought that in equity and good conscience this should be done, and

it is

so ordered.

In the further adjustment of all claims heretofore or hereafter initiated in
accordance with law for public lands in the State of Minnesota, prior to the
survey thereof, in instances where a selection of such lands is made by the
State under its swamp land grant, and the field-notes of survey afford a sufficient basis for such selection, your office will, by hearing, or otherwise, determine the true character of the land, notwithstanding the return in the fieldnotes of survey of the township.

In the motion for re-review

it is

urged that the change should not

March 1G, 1903 (32 L. D., 65),
providing for the adjustment of the swamp land grant in the State
of Minnesota, without giving the State an opportunity to be heard

be

made

in the existing regulations of

in opposition to the change.

Culligan's motion admits that the decision of April
against

him was

1904,

14,

in accordance with these regulations but

it

was

sought by his motion to have the regulations modified and the order
entertaining said motion was drawn with a view of bringing to the
From a review of
attention of the State particularly this feature.
the matter it can not be said that the change was made without due
opportunity of the State to be heard in the premises. It is noted,
however, that in the final paragraph of the departmental decision
of July 13, last, on the motion for review, containing an order for the
modification of existing regulations, the language used is capable
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It is broad enough to include
setof a construction not intended.
tlement claim and this would amount to a return to the departmental
;>

La Chance

case (4 L. D., 479), a purpose not intended.
shows that its scope was intended to be limited
to protect only those eases where a selection of exchange of lands
is permitted by law to attach prior to the survey of the lands, the
claim being, when filed, a complete one. it but remaining to adjust
the boundaries thereof to the lines of the public survey when extended

decision in the

The

entire decision

To this extent the decision on review is
modified and the final paragraph in the decision on the motion for
over the lands selected.

review

is

amended

In the further

so as to read:

adjustment of

all

claims resting on a selection of exchange of

lands heretofore or hereafter presented in accordance with law for public lands
in the State of Minnesota, prior to the survey thereof, you will, by hearing or

otherwise, determine the true character of the lands selected,

if claim is preland grant, based upon
the tield notes of survey, notwithstanding the return of the field notes in the
survey of the township may afford a sufficient base for the State's claim.

sented thereto on behalf of the State under

its

swamp

California and Oregon Land Co. et

L.

at,.

Motion for review of departmental decision of June 5, 1905 (33
1)., 5 .)5), denied by Secretary Hitchcock, October 6, 1905.
(

RAILROAD GR ANT-ADJTJSTMENT-ACT OF JULY

1,

1898.

Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
Under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1898, the Northern Pacific Railway
Company is bound to accept the list of lands subject to relinquishment
under said act prepared and submitted to it by the Secretary of the interior, and can not. as a matter of fight, require of the individual claimant the establishment of his claim at a hearing; but where a settlement
claim has. upon an ex parte showing by the settler, been included in snch
a list, the Department, notwithstanding the approval of the list, has the
right to inquire, by hearing or otherwise, whether the showing on which
the tract was listed represented the true condition or status of the tract
involved on January 1. 1898.
Set retary Hif<-h<<></,'

(F. L. C.)

Your

office

consideration
a

f<>

the

Commissioner of the General I. "nil Offia
October 6, 1905.
(F. W. C.)

letter of the 28th

ultimo presented for departmental
question as,to the proper action to be taken upon
attacking the good faith of a settlement claim which

(lie

showing filed
upon an ex parte showing, been included

has,

.

in a

list

of Lands sub-
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relinquishment by the Northern Pacific Railway Company
under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat., 597, 620),
which list has received departmental approval.
The inquiry is made in connection with the individual claim of
James Dalglish to the SW. ± of Sec. 23, T. 11 N., R. 19 W., Missoula
land district, Montana. It seems that the tract in question was included in what is known as Montana List No. 28, of lands subject to
relinquishment under the act of July 1, 1898, a copy of which was
furnished the railway company with request for relinquishment
under said act, and in response thereto there was filed what is known
as relinquishment No. 28, State of Montana, the tract in question
ject to

being omitted because of the reported contract for the sale thereof to
9, 1899, subsequently to the passage of said

Marcus Daly, February
act.

Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Humal. v. Avery et al. (195 U. S., 480), the company was again
invited to relinquish the tract in question, and in response thereto
affidavits by three persons, are filed to the effect that they are
acquainted with the land; that careful examination was made
thereof on May 27, 1899, and again January 24, 1902, and no improvements were found thereon or indications that the land had been
occupied and cultivated by James Dalglish or any other person or
persons; and that the land is mountainous in character, heavily timbered, and is wholly unfit for cultivation.
The tract was listed for relinquishment by the railway company
upon the ex parte showing filed by Dalglish, which is to the effect
that he settled upon this land in December, 1899, and continually
bird et

resided thereon to the time of filing his election in April, 1903 that
he built a house thereon in December, 1897 that a portion of the land
was cleared, plowed and fenced and crops raised thereon; and that
he " improved it each year since 1897, to present time."
;

;

Under the regulations of February 14, 1899 (28 L. D., 103), issued
under the act of 1898, it was proper to list the tract in question upon
the ex parte showing of the individual claimant. The list so prepared received departmental approval before the railway company
was advised of the

The

filing of the claimant's election to retain the land.

act of 1898 provides

That the railroad grantee or

its successor in interest shall accept the said
the Secretary of the Interior as conclusive with
respect to the particular lands to be relinquished by it, but it shall not be
bound to relinquish lands sold or contracted by it or lands which it uses or
list

or

lists

so to be

made by

needs for railroad purposes, or lands valuable for stone, iron or coal.

under the act of 1898 the railway company
prepared and submitted to it by this
It can not therefore, as a matter of right, require of the

It seems, therefore, that
is

bound

to accept the list as

Department.
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speedy adjustment of conflicts between individuals and the railway company and to put an
end (o the expense and delay incident to the ordinary contests. The
purpose of the

company can
the.

act

not therefore

appear as

a

a

On

contestant in this matter.

other hand, the Department should not knowingly permit itself

imposed upon nor should it require of the company a relinquishment of land to which there was in fact no real claim on January 1,
Notwithstanding the approval of the list the Department has
L898.
the right to inquire whether the showing on which the trad was Listed
to he

represented the true condition or status of the tract involved.

The

by the railway company in the case under consideration
tends to discredit the showing filed by Dalglish and upon which this
tract was listed for relinquishment, and in the opinion of this Department the railway company should he advised that if it will serve th.e

showing

filed

same upon Dalglish the matter

will be taken

up by your

office

for

consideration, after the usual length of time to he allowed Dalglish
to

make response thereto, when, if upon the entire record as made in
way your office believes the showing filed in opposition sufficient

this

to discredit

the

showing

filed

by Dalglish. you

by hearing or

will,

otherwise, investigate the matter in order to arrive at the true condition of the land

on January

asserted to the land

1,

1898, the nature of the claim then being

by Dalglish, and whether his subsequent actions

with relation thereto tend to show that he has since maintained the
claim or abandoned the same.

arid

land-withdrawal settlers—act of jine

17, 11)02.

Opinion.
The power conferred upon the Secretary of the [nterior by the act of June 17,
L902, to make the necessary withdrawals to carry into effecl the provisions of the act, and to acquire rights and property for the purpose contemplated, implies the right to appropriate for irrigation purposes public
lands to which the United States has the full legal and equitable title, but
the inchoate rights acquired by a bona fide settlement made in pursuance
of and in strict compliance with the public land laws should not be arbitraIn determining the compensation it
rily
taken without compensation.
should be considered with reference to the loss sustained by the settler in
depriving him of his inchoate right by the arbitrary taking of lands which

had cultivated, improved and resided upon under authority of law with
view to he acquisiti
the title.

lie

t

a

i'

The Secretary of the [nterior has no authority under the provisions of the
seventh section of the ad of .lime 17. 1902, to compensate settlers upon lands
within the limits of a withdrawal made in connection with an irrigation
project unless they have in good faith acquired an inchoate righl to the
land by complying with the requirements of law up to the date of the withdrawal and have such a claim as oughl to he respected by he United States.
I
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Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
(E.F.B.)
October 12, 1905.
I

am

in receipt

by reference of a

letter

from the Director of the

Geological Survey requesting to be advised whether persons occu-

pying and improving public lands but who have not taken any steps
same under the public land laws have claims of
such character as are properly subject to acquisition by purchase or
condemnation under the terms of the Reclamation Act (32 Stat.,

to acquire title to the

388).

The

letter

has been referred to

me

for opinion

upon the ques-

tion submitted.

Reference

is

made

in the letter to

claim of one Pemberton,

who has

two particular claims

:

First, the

occupied and cultivated a tract of

proposed reservoir line for fifteen years, having
who has taken no steps
to acquire title to the same under any of the general land laws.
The
other claim is that of Sulton Bros, who purchased through ar. intermediate grantor the improvements of Yancy Moffatt, a settler, who
improved a tract of land within the proposed area of the reservoir,
and filed a preemption declaratory statement for the tract July 11,
1885, but who has taken no further steps to complete his filing, as
required by the provisions of the preemption act.
land within

the

placed thereon substantial improvements, but

It is

presumed that the inquiry of the Director was prompted by

the following expression in the letter of the Department of January
2Q, 1905, relative to lands in the

As the

Truckee-Carson project:

and equitable title is in the United States to all public lands
mere inchoate right has attached, there is no outstanding legal or
equitable title in such lands to purchase, but, the improvements of the settlers
made upon such lands under authority of the public land laws is a property
light that can not be taken without compensation, which probably may include
the enhanced value of the land by reason of the settler's cultivation and
to

which

legal

a

improvement.

That expression was made with reference to the authority conJune IT, 1902, upon the
Secretary of the Interior to acquire rights or property by purchase
or by condemnation under judicial process and to pay for the same
from the Reclamation Fund.
A mere entry of public lands by a qualified settler with a view to
ferred by the 7th section of the act of

acquiring

title

under the general land laws confers only an inchoate

right which, although

it

may

be asserted against every one

who has

not a prior right, is no bar to the appropriation of such land by the
United States. Ordinarily such appropriation can only be exer-

by Congress acting directly, but the power conferred upon the
Secretary of the Interior by the act of June IT, 1902, to make the
necessary withdrawals to carry into effect the provisions of the act

cised
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and to acquire rights and property for the purpose contemplated,
necessarily implies the right to appropriate for irrigation purposes
public lands to which the United States has the full legal and
equitable

title.

It follows

from this that

the construction and

a

mere withdrawal of lands, for use

in

operation of an irrigation project, under the

is of itself an appropriation of all lands within
withdrawal except lands to which a vested right
or interest had attached at the date of the withdrawal so as to deprive Congress of the power of disposition and control over the same.

provisions of that act,

the liniit> of Mich

I)., 387.
Board of Control v. Torrence, II). 472.)
So that the United States may exercise ownership and control over
all lands covered by such withdrawal, irrespective of the occupancy
and improvement of such lands by settlers who have not acquired a
vested right thereto, although they may have made filings and
entries and may have complied in all respects with the laws under
which their settlements were made. In such cases there would be no
property or right necessary to be acquired by the United States, as a

(Instructions, 32 L.

right to appropriate the land, but

it does not follow
complied with the law up to the
date of the withdrawal should be arbitrarily deprived of the fruits
of his labor without just compensation.
It is more than probable that the United States may not have any
use for the improvements of the settler in the construction and operation of any project, and would therefore have no object in acquiring
them.
Hence the compensation to the settler should not be measured by that alone but should he considered with reference to the loss
sustained by the settler in depriving him of his inchoate right by the
arbitrary taking of lands which he had cultivated, improved and
resided upon under authority of law with a view to the acquisition of

condition to

that a settler

the

its

who had

in all respects

title.

The power conferred upon
section of the act to acquire

the Secretary of the Interior

"rights" or property, and

to

by the 7th
pay from

the reclamation fund the sum that may be required for that purpose
evidently contemplated that the inchoate right acquired by a bona -fide

upon' public lands made in pursuance of and maintained in
compliance with the law should not be destroyed and arbitrarily taken without compensation.
It is not a purchase of the land
that is required, because the settler has no title to sell, nor of his improvements, because the United States may have no object in acquiring them, but it is the acquisition of the right that a hon<t pic settler
had earned by complying with the law.

settler
strict

In the cases referred to the parties will he deprived of no valid
rights under the general

land laws.
In Pemberton's case, he is a
mere squatter who had forfeited whatever right he acquired and had
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home.

He had

a purpose to acquire title to the land for a
not in any respect complied with the law and the

taking of the land by the United States would deprive him of no
right either legal or equitable acquired under the general land laws.

Whatever improvements he has may be removed if it can be done
without impairing the right of the United States.
In the case of Sulton Bros., the sale of the improvements by the
an abandonment of the filing independently of
same within the period prescribed by the
The statutory life of his filing had long since expired and
statute.
whatever rights he acquired thereunder were by the express terms
of the statute forfeited. While a settler may be permitted to complete his filing and acquire title to the land after the time for submitting proof and making payments fixed by statute, it is merely by
grace of the government and not from any right that can be asserted
by the settler in virtue of the inchoate right conferred by the statute.
My opinion is that the Secretary of the Interior has no authority
under the 7th section of the act of June 17, 1902, to compensate
settlers upon lands within the limits of the withdrawal except such
settlers who have in good faith acquired an inchoate right by complying with the law up to the date of the withdrawal and have such
It is the right
a claim as ought to be respected by the United States.
deprived
of
the
by
government that is to be
that the settler has been
compensated for and not merely the intrinsic value of his improvements. A settler who has not complied with the law has no such
right, and as to such settlers the improvements may be removed if in
doing so it will not impair the property of the United States.
settler

was of

itself

his failure to perfect the

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock. Secretary.

arid land-withdrawals-act of june

17, 1902.

Instructions.
Withdrawals under the provisions of the act of June

17,

1902, in connection

with irrigation projects, will he made as follows
1. When a site has heen selected with a view to making an examination and survey for the purpose of determining whether the construction
of an irrigation project upon such site is practicable and advisable, a withdrawal will immediately be made of all lands believed to be susceptible
of irrigation from such contemplated works, in accordance with the second
:

form of withdrawal provided for by the third section of the act of June
17, 1902, and at the same time a preliminary withdrawal will be made of
lands that may be needed for use in the construction and operation of
the works, which will reserve such lands from entry of every character
but will not affect entries previously made.
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determined that the project is practicable and
of the same is approved and authorized
by the Secretary of the Interior, a withdrawal will be made of all public
lands shown by the examination and survey to bo required for use in
the construction and operation of the works, and all persons who may
have made entry of such lands within such withdrawal prior to the pre
liminary withdrawal and who have not acquired a vested righl thereto,
2.

advisable and

it

shall be

the construction

will be notified of the appropriation of their lands for irrigation purposes
and that their entries will be canceled and their improvements paid for
by the governmenl .-is provided for by the eighth and ninth sections of the
circular of June 6, 1905, unless sufficient cause be shown within sixty days
from the date of such notice.

Hitchcock

Secretary

to

;

(

F. L.

(

the

Director

of

the

Geological

October 12, 1905.

.

Survey,

(E. F. B.)

Referring to your letter of August 29, 1905, to the Commissioner
the General Laud Office, requesting that the local officers be
directed not to allow final proof to be made by Ed. Sayles upon his
and XE. \ S\V. j. Sec
homestead entry for lots 1 and 2, SE. J NW.
of

|

18, T. 35 X.. R.

25 E., Waterville, Washington, Lying within the limits

withdrawal made for tin contemplated Okanogan irrigation
Department approves of the views of the Commissioner
expressed in his reply thereto of September 8, L905, thai no suffi-

of a

1

project, the
a-

cient reason

has been shown

from submitting

why

said

entryman should be restrained

proof upon his entry as authorized by law, it
the practicability of the project has not yet been
final

appearing that
determined by the Secretary of the Interior so as to authorize the
appropriation of any lands Tor such purpose.
view of the suggestions of the Commissioner of the General

In

Land

and of the recommendations contained in your reply
September L6, L905, it is deemed advisable to make a deciruling as to the effect upon existing entries of a preliminary withOffice

thereto of
sive

drawal made by the Secretary of the Interior for the purpose of
ascertaining whether a contemplated irrigation project is practicable

where the lands entered may be needed for use in the construction
operation of the project.
The authority of the Secretary to make withdrawals under the act

mikI

of

June

IT.

L902 (32 Stat., 388), and the effect of such withdrawals,

was considered
(32 L.

I)..

in

6), in

the letter of the Department of February 11. L903
which, referring to the two classes <d' withdrawals

authorized by the act,

it

was said:

The firsl withdrawal provided for by Hie third section
made by the Secretary of the Interior before giving notice

of the

ad nm-a

be

to the public of the

him to be pracand advisable, bul nothing, in the law prohibits a withdrawal prior to
such determination, with a view to an examination of any particular locality,
to obtain information to enable the Secretary to determine whether a contem
lands irrigable under any project that has been determined by
ticable
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is advisable or practicable.
That both withdrawals provided for
by said section may be made preliminary to the examination and survey is
shown by the provisions for the restoration to public entry of any lands not
required for the purposes of the act, and for the restoration of the lands supposed to be susceptible of irrigation from the contemplated project, if it be
determined that such project is impracticable or inadvisable.

plated project

obvious that the expression as to the authority of the Secretary
make both withdrawals preliminary to the examination and survey was not sufficiently guarded as to the effect of such
preliminary withdrawal upon lands needed for use in the construcIt is

of the Interior to

and operation of the works.
to withdraw lands for that purpose is given by the
third section of the act which fixes the time when such withdrawals
The language is
shall be made.
tion

The authority

That the Secretary of the Interior shall, before giving the public notice provided for in section four of this act, withdraw from public entry the lands
required for any irrigation works contemplated under the provisions of this
act, and shall restore to public entry any of the lands so withdrawn when, in
his judgment, such lands are not required for the purposes of this act.

To

ascertain

when

this

withdrawal shall be made we must look to

the fourth section of the act, which provides that after the determination

be

by the Secretary that the project is practicable he may cause to
contracts for its construction and shall thereafter give public

let

notice of the lands irrigable under such project, the limit of area per

entry and the charges to be

made per

ferred to in the third section and

it is

acre.

This

is

the notice re-

evident that the purpose of the

statute was not to authorize such withdrawal until after the determination of the practicability of the project and to require it to be

made

before the notice

is

given.

Such withdrawals made under express authority of the statute
" have the force of legislative withdrawals and are therefore effective
to withdraw from other disposition all lands within the designated
limits to which a right has not vested " (Instructions, 32 L. D., 387,
388), but they must be made strictly in accordance with the legislative will and the Secretary cannot enlarge the power or infringe
any provision of the act (Instructions, 33 L. D., 104). The practical effect

of such withdrawals

is to

appropriate for use in the con-

and operation of the works all public lands within the
limits of the withdrawal to which the United States has the legal and
equitable title. The right is also conferred upon the Secretary by
the seventh section of the act to acquire for the United States by
purchase or condemnation private rights or property that may be
needed for the same purpose. The power and authority to appropriate public lands is coincident and coextensive with the power to
acquire private property. Both are to be exercised after the Secrestruction

tary has determined that a project

is

practicable.
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The other provision

1()1

of the statute authorizing the Secretary to

withdraw lands "believed to be susceptible of' irrigation from said
works " also fixes the time for such withdrawal. lie is authorized
at or immediately prior to the time of beginning the surveys for
any contemplated irrigation works" to make a withdrawal of such
lauds from entry except under the homestead law. So that, before or
at the time the survey and examination is made with a view to determining whether the project is practicable, the Secretary withdraws
from entry under authority of the statute all lands (except under
the homestead law) "believed to be susceptible of irrigation from
such works." Land required for use in the construction and operation
of the works, and not susceptible of irrigation therefrom, cannot be
withdrawn under this provision of the statute, which also requires
that the "surveys shall be prosecuted diligently to completion, and
upon the completion thereof, and of the necessary maps, plans, and
'*

the Secretary of the Interior shall determine
whether or not said project is practicable and advisable, and if determined to be impracticable or unadvisable he shall thereupon restore
said lands to entry." The lands in one class are appropriated for use.

estimates of cost,

In the other class they are withdrawn from entry under the general
land laws to be disposed of under the homestead law only, subject

and limitations prescribed by Congress.
power to withdraw lands is specially conferred by a
particular act it must be exercised in strict conformity thereto.
(Instructions, 33 L. D., 104.)
The Secretary can make no withdrawals that would affect or impair entries made in pursuance of the
general land laws except by special authority of Congress, which
alone has the power to take away inchoate rights acquired by entries
under the general land laws unless such power is specially conferred
upon the executive branch of the government as in the act of June 17,

to the conditions

Where

L902.

(

the

Instructions, 32 L.

I).,

387.)

Withdrawals of lands made prior

to the

determination by the Secre-

tary as to the practicability of an irrigation project must be exercised

under

a

ditl'erent

power.

If

it

is

made under

his supervisory

means to accomplish some end in the performance of
a duty enjoined upon him, it would have the effect to withhold such
lauds from entry, but could not take away inchoate rights acquired
authority as

a

under entries made prior to the withdrawal.
In the instruction- of
February 11, L903, supra, the power to make such withdrawals was
sustained upon the ground that there is nothing in the act prohibiting it, and as the act authorizes the Secretary to make examinations
and surveys with a view to determine whether any contemplated
project is practicable and advisable, a withdrawal of Lands from all

5194— Vol. 34—05 m
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entries

pending such examination was

justified as a legitimate aid

in the performance of that duty.

This view was also presented in the instructions of July 12, 1904
it was said that "such a withdrawal is
evidently contemplated by the act, and in order to make it effect ive
it must be an absolute withdrawal from entry of every character of
all lands, whether they may be needed for construction or may be
susceptible of irrigation from the works."
The instructions of June 6, 1905 (33 L. D., 607), to which you refer
have reference only to the withdrawals specially provided for by the
act, which have the force of legislative withdrawals, and not to preliminary withdrawals of lands that may be needed for use in the con(33 L. D., 104), in which

struction

and operation of the works.

The Commissioner recommends

that no lands embraced in a bona

fide entry existing at date of withdrawal of lands needed for construction purposes should be appropriated for such purpose without

the entryman's consent, until he has had an opportunity to have the
action of the reclamation officers approved

suggests that as soon as

it is

by the Department.

He

determined that entered lands are needed

for use in the construction and operation of the works the entryman
should be notified and advised that he will be allowed sixty days from
notice in which to show cause why his land should not be appropriated for such purpose.

There

is

much force in this suggestion. While the only showing
made would be that the land w as not needed for the

that could be

7

purposes contemplated, and while the recommendation of the Reclamation Service should have such weight as to be practically conclusive
of that question, the rights of a bona fide entryman are certainly
entitled to consideration and he should be given the privilege to show
that his lands should not be appropriated for such use.

The

special

authority conferred by the act, and the general power of the Secretary to employ all the necessary
act in full force

and

effect,

means

to carry the provisions of the

are ample to insure the fulfillment of the

purpose of the act without infringing upon the rights of entrymen,
as possible, and no withdrawal or
use of public lands should be made without due consideration of such

which should be protected as far
rights.

.

Hereafter withdrawals will be made as follows
1. When a site has been selected with a view to making an examination and survey for the purpose of determining whether the construction of an irrigation project upon such site is practicable and
advisable, a withdrawal will immediately be made of all lands believed to be susceptible of irrigation from such contemplated works,
in accordance with the second

form of withdrawal provided for by
At the same time a

the third section of the act of June 17, 1902.
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made

preliminary withdrawal will be
for use in

ivmtvc

-iidi

As

may

be needed

the construction and operation of the works, which will

lands from entry of every character but will not affeel

entries previously
2.

of lands thai
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soon as

it

made.
shall he

determined that the project

and advisable and the construction of the same

practicable

is

approved and authorized by the Secretary of the Interior, a withdrawal will be made
of all public lands shown by the examination and survey to be required for use in the construction and operation of the works, and
all persons who may have made entry of such lands within such with
drawal prior to the preliminary withdrawal and who have not acquired

a

is

vested right thereto, will be notified of the appropriation

and that their entries will be
and their improvements paid for by the government as
provided for by the 8th and 9th sections of the circular of June 6,

of their lands for irrigation purposes

cancelled

(33 L.

L905

I).,

607), unless sufficient cause be

shown within

sixty

days from the date of such notice.
Care must be taken to confine such withdrawals strictly to lands of
the character and class authorized to be withdrawn and not to embrace land- of one class in the withdrawal of lands of the other class,
nor to

make any unnecessary withdrawal of

land, as far as

can be

it

prevented.

OKLAHOMA LANDS-SCHOOL GItANT-ACT OF .TUNE

6, 1900.

Territory or Oklahoma.
moo, relating to the opening to settleUnder the provision of the ad of June
nient and entry of the ceded Kiowa. Comanche and Apache lands, authorizing qualified entrymen having hinds adjoining the lands ceded, whose
entries embrace less than L60 acres, to enter so much of the ceded lands
*',,

lying contiguous as shall, with the lands already entered, make in 11k
aggregate L60 acres, such entrymen may make extension of their existing
entries so as to include portions of sections thirteen and thirty-three within
the ceded country, notwithstanding the provision of said acl reserving said
1

sections

for

university,

agricultural

colleges,

normal

schools

and

buildings of the Territory and future State of Oklahoma, and for
so lost the Territory

-

must look

tary Hitchcock to the

to the

Commissioner

October

JF.L.C.)

indemnity provisions of

/.-',

<>f

its

nil

public

hinds

-rant.

the General L<nt<l Offta

1905.

.

(F.W.C.)

November 6, L903, the attorney genera] for the Territory of Oklahoma called attention of this Department to the fact (hat under the
provisions of the act of June 6, L900 (3] Stat., 679), which act provided

for the

opening

to settlement

Comanche and Apache Lands
larly that

in

and entry of the

provision authorizing qualified

ceiled

Kiowa.

Oklahoma, particuentrymen having lands ad-

the Territory of
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joining the lands ceded, whose entries embrace less than 100 acres, to
much of the ceded lands lying contiguous as shall, with that

enter so

make in the aggregate 100 acres, persons have been
make extension of existing entries so as to include por-

already entered,

permitted to

tions of sections 13 and 33 within the ceded country, which claims
were allowed in plain violation of the further provision of the act of
June 6, 1900, supra, specifically reserving sections 13 and 33 for university, agricultural colleges, normal schools and public buildings of

the Territory

and future State of Oklahoma,

instance of S. G.

Eskew

citing particularly the

for a portion of section 33, T. 8 N., E. 17

Wj

and upon consideration of the matter this Department on December.
5, 1903, directed your office to issue a notice in each instance where an
existing entry has been permitted to be extended so as to include a
portion of a section 13 or 33 within the ceded country, citing the

cntryman

to

show cause within sixty days why his entry should not
him that any showing filed thereunder must be

be canceled, advising

served upon the proper territorial authorities.

Acting thereunder notices were issued and with your office letters
March 24, and April 12, 1905, there were forwarded showings
filed by Samuel G. Eskew and Max Hill, respectively, the latter having been permitted to make an additional entry so as to extend his
former entry to include lot 4 of section 33, township 8 north, range 16
These showings appear to have been
west, within the ceded country.
served upon the territorial authorities but no response thereto seems
to have been filed.
of

In the act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat,, 876, 894), ratifying the
agreement with the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians in Indian
Territory, and providing for a cession of certain of their lands, it was
provided by article 8 of said agreement
that whenever any of the lands acquired by this agreement shall, by operation
of law or proclamation of the President of the United States, be open to settle-

ment, they shall be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead
and townsite laws of the United Slates
And provided further. That
any qualified entryman having lands adjoining the lands herein ceded, whose
original entry embraced less than one hundred and sixty acres, may take suffi:

cient land from said reservation to make his homestead entry not to exceed
one hundred and sixty acres in all, said land to be taken upon the same conditions as are required of other entrymen.

By

the act of June

1900 (31 Stat., 672, GTG), ratifying the

0,

agreement made with the Comanche, Kiowa and Apache tribes of
Indians in Indian Territory, it was provided by article 11
That the lands acquired by this agreement shall be opened to
proclamation of the President within six months after allotments
be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead
laws of the United States.
And provided further, That
.

.

.

:

settlement by

are

made and

and town-site
any qualified
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1

(if)

ontryman having lands herein coded, whose original entry embraced less than
one hundred and sixty acres in all, shall have the righl to enter so much of
the lands by this agreement ceded lying contiguous to his said entry as shall,
with the land already entered, make in tlie aggregate one hundred and sixty
acres, said land to he taken upon the same conditions as are required of other
entrymen.

March 3, 1901 (31
lands coded by the agreements before referred

In accordance with the provisions of the act of

.

Stat.. L093, L094), the

to

were opened to entry by proclamation of the President dated
Said proclamation provided:
4, L901.

July

that all of the lands so as aforesaid ceded by the

Indians, and the

of

Wichita and

Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache

affiliated

tribes of Indians,

hands
respec-

saving and excepting sections sixteen, thirty-six, thirteen, and thirtyand all lands located r selected by the Territory of
Oklahoma as indemnity school or educational lands, and saving and excepting
tively,

three in each township,

all

all

<

lands allotted in severalty to individual Indians, and saving and excepting
lands allotted and confirmed to religious societies and other organizations,

and saving and excepting the lands selected and set aside as grazing lands for
the use in

common

Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes of Indians,
set aside and reserved at each of said county
disposition as town sites, and saving and excepting the lands now
for said

and saving and excepting the lands
seats for

used, occupied, or set apart

for military, agency, school, school

Indian cemetery, wood reserve, forest
the 6th day of August, 1901, at

and not otherwise, he opened
the general provisions of the

It

'.)

to

farm, religious,

reserve, or other public uses, will, on

o'clock, a. m., in the manner herein prescribed
entry and settlement and to disposition under

homestead and town-site laws of the United States.

was further provided:

The intended

beneficiaries of the provision

approved, respectively,

March

2,

1895,

and June6,

in

the said acts of Congress,
which authorizes a quali-

1900,

fied entryman having lands adjoining the ceded lands, whose original entry
embraced less than 160 acres, to enter so much of the ceded lands as will make
his homestead entry contain in the aggregate not exceeding ICO acres, may
obtain such an extension of his existing entry, without previous registration and
without regard to the drawing herein provided for, only by making appropriate
application, accompanied by the necessary proof, at the proper new land office
at some time prior to the opening herein provided for.

seems that immediately following the issue of this proclamation,
your office prepared from the records, for the information of the
It

list of the several entries adjoining the ceded lands
than L60 acres where the persons were entitled to the
benefit of the special provision for extension of existing entries to
include lands within the ceded country, and in this list is found the
names of Eskew and Hill. In accordance with notices issued to them

local officers, a

covering

they

less

made extension

entries, prior to the

of their existing entries through

date

additional

opening of the general body of
the r^{\v(\ lands.
The question arises now whether such entries covering portions of a section 33 within the ceded country were properly
set

for the
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view of that provision of the act of June

6,

1900,

which

provides:

That sections sixteen and
hereby acquired

in

thirty-six, thirteen

and

'

thirty-three, of the lands

each township shall not be subject to entry, but shall be
and thirty-six for the use of the common schools, and

reserved, sections sixteen

and thirty-three for university, agricultural colleges, normal
and public buildings of the Territory and future State of Oklahoma

sections thirteen
schools,

and

in

;

case either of said sections, or parts thereof,

is lost

by
hereby

to said Territory

reason of allotments under this act or otherwise, the governor thereof is
authorized to locate other lands not occupied in quantity equal to the loss.

A reading of the statutes above quoted
qualified

shows that Congress granted
entrymen having lands adjoining the lands ceded covering

than 160 acres, the right to extend their existing entries to include
much of the lands by this agreement ceded lying contiguous to
his said entr}^ as shall, with the land already entered, make in the
aggregate 160 acres," and without condition otherwise than that
" said land to be taken upon the same conditions as arc required of
other entrymen." This clearly does not limit the right to any particular sections of land; that is, it did not exclude from the right any
less

" so

particular sections of land.

It is true that the act of

June

6,

1900,

after providing for this special privilege reserved generally sections

and 33 of the lands acquired under the agreement made
with the Indians, in each township, and provides that such lands
shall not be subject to entry.
This, however, under well-known rules
16, 36, 13

of construction, should not interfere with the special right previously

provided for. The reservation from entry should more properly be
construed as a reservation from the general right of entry given in

and

to the reserved lands.

The proclamation

reserves and excepts from the lands to be opened
and settlement and disposition under the general provisions
of the homestead and town-site laws, sections 16, 36, 13 and 33 in each
to entry

township, but, as before stated, the proclamation provides for the

entrymen on adjointhan 160 acres, to extend the
same so as to include parts of the ceded lands " without previous
registration and without regard to the drawing herein provided for
only by making appropriate applications accompanied by the necessary proofs, at the proper new land office at some time prior to the
opening herein provided for," thus clearly recognizing the privilege
as a special one and not affected by the provisions relating to the

exercise of the special privilege granted existing

ing lands having entries covering

less

general right of homestead entry granted within the ceded country.

The entire matter considered, it is the opinion of this Department
that the extensions of existing entries so as to include a portion of
the ceded lands were properly allowed notwithstanding the fact that
they include portions of a section 33 within the ceded country.

>
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There is nothing in the decision of the Department in the ease of
John W. Spain (31 L. D., 362), that makes againsi this conclusion.
The land there sought to be entered was a pail of a tract thai had
been selected by the Territory under the Indemnity provisions of
it- grant, and the right asserted thereto was the general right of
homestead entry and not the special privilege under consideration
The provision reserving sections L6, 36, 13 and 33
in this case.
within the cviU'd country, provides
in case either of said sections, or parts thereof, is lost to said Territory by
reason of allotment under this net or otherwise the governor thereof is hereby
authorized to locate other lands n<.t occupied in quantity equal to the loss.
;iik1

This provision

is

broad enough to include any

tiguous lands so a- to include

The

a

portion of

a

State

may

made upon

con-

loss the

sustain by reason of the extension of existing entries

section 33.

com-

entries in question will he permitted to stand subject to

pliance with law and the parties will he advised accordingly.

homestead—insane entryman-citizenship-act of june

8,

1880.

Eggert Martens.
It

invoking the confirmatory provisions of the act of June
where a homesteader has become insane, to show that
such homesteader is a citizen of the United States, it being only accessary
to show that he had complied with the provisions of the homestead law
not

is

necessary

in

1880, in instances

8,

up

to

The case

the time of becoming insane.
of I-Ytte

r.

Christiansen,

L".i

L.

I>.,

710, overruled.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)

October

Land

office,

(G. B. G.)

12, 1905.

This is the appeal of Eggeri Martens, by his guardian, John
Gaedke, from your office decision of November 11, L904, denying the
right to complete Martens's homestead entry for the SE.
of the
\'K.
the E. I of the SE: [, and the SW. \ of the SE.
Sec 23,
T. K) X., R. :;i \\\. North Platte land district, Nebraska.
This entry was allowed April 22, L886, and the final proof offered
j

',.

',.

by the said guardian therein show- thai Martens fully complied with

homestead law in the matter of residence and
and that he has valuable improvements upon the claim.
!t
appears upon the oath of Gaedke that Martens is. and has been
lor some years past, an insane person, incompetent to understand or

the provisions of the

cultivation,

attend

i

to business affairs of any kind, and
(Gaedke) was duly appointed the guardian of
ft y dune 17. L903.

it

i-

shown

his person

that

he

and prop-
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for reasons which

who has

more
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not been admitted to

fully appear

full- citizenship,

from an order entered upon

the records of the district court of Lincoln County, Nebraska.

order

is

This

in part as follows:

Eggert Martens, a native of Germany, and at present residing within said
appeared in open court, by and through his legal guardian, John Gaedke,
and made application to be admitted to become a citizen of the United States.
And it appearing to the satisfaction of the court, that said Martens had declared on oath before the District Court of Lincoln County, Nebraska, a court
of record having common law jurisdiction and using a seal, on April 7th, 188G,
that it was bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the United States and
to renounce forever all allegiance to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty whatsoever, and particularly to the Emperor of Germany, of whom
he was heretofore a subject. The Court being satisfied from the certificates of
Dr. G. A. Runstrom that the said Eggert Martens is paralyzed in both lower
limbs, and by reason of which paralysis the said Martens is unable to appear in
open court, and take the oath of citizenship required by law. The Court is
further satisfied from the affidavits of William McMichael and John Gaedke,
his witnesses, on file, and which are hereby ordered to be entered of record,
and from careful inquiry of said witnesses in open court that said Eggert
Martens has resided within Lincoln County, State of Nebraska, in the United
States of America for the term of more than sixteen years, preceding this application, without being at any time during said sixteen years out of the territory of the United States, and that he has been within this State for sixteen
years last past and it further appearing to the satisfaction of this court, by
the affidavit of said witnesses and by inquiries of said witnesses made in
open court that during the said sixteen years residence, of said Eggert Martens,
in this State, he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached
to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to
the good order and happiness of the same, and that he does not disbelieve in
and is not opposed to all organized government, and is not a member of or
affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in
or in opposition to all organized government, and does not advocate or teach
the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any
State,

;

officer or officers, either of specific individuals or officers

generally of the gov-

ernment of the United States or of any other organized government because of
his or their official character, and has not violated any of the provisions of the
act of Congress approved March 3, 1903, entitled "An act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States." The Court is further satisfied from the
affidavit of the witnesses on trial and inquiry made in open court that during
the residence of said Eggert Martens in this County and State since the year
1886 said Martens has always been a very good man, peaceable, industrious, and
law-abiding, and by his daily walk during a residence of sixteen years he has
practically illustrated and emphasized his attachment to the principles of the
Constitution. The Court is further satisfied that for five years- or more the
said Martens has been afflicted with some character of a deranged mind, in
that he believes that it is unnecessary for him to appear in open court and take
final oath to become a full naturalized citizen of the United States.
The
Court further finds as a matter of fact from inquiry of witnesses and by the
records of the county court of this, Lincoln County, that by reason of the physical and mental defects of the said Eggert Martens, John Gaedke was duly
appointed on June 17th, 1003, by the County Court of Lincoln County, Ne-
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1

<> ,>

braska, guardian of the properly and person of tin said Eggerl Martens, and
that by reason of the mental and physical condition of said Martens saidGaedke
The Court is further satisfied
still holds and lills said office as such guardian.
1

life for ten years or more after becoming a
County and State showed by his daily life that he was attached
to the principles of the governmenl of the United States and the state of Nebraska, and that in equity and good conscience he has earned all rights that full

that said Martens by his daily
resident of this

citizen

entitled

is

Whereupon

it

to.

is

ordered by the court that the foregoing findings he made of

record.

While the order in terms declares that Martens has in equity and
good conscience earned all the rights of a citizen, yet he is not legally
a citizen, and the question presented by this record is. whether a person occupying this status may acquire title to public lands under the
homestead law.
Section 2291 of the Revised Statutes, governing generally the <piostion

No

issuance of

of

entries,

is

final

certificates

and patents upon homestead

as follows:

certificate,

however, shall he given, or patent issued therefor, until the

expiration of live years from the date of such entry; and
of such time, or at

such entry; or

if

if

at

the expiration

any time within two years thereafter, the person making

he he dead, his widow; or

or devisee; or in ease of a

in

widow making such

case of her death, his heirs

entry, her heirs or devisee, in

case of her death, proves hy two credible witnesses that he, she, or they have
resided upon or cultivated the same for the term of live years immediately
succeeding the time of filing the affidavit, and makes affidavit that no part of
such land has been alienated, except as provided in section twenty-two hundred
and eighty-eight, and thai he. she. or they will hear true allegiance to the gov-

ernment of the United States; then, in such case. he. she. or they, if at that
time citizens of the United States, shall he entitled to a patent, as in other
cases provided hy law.

In the administration of the homestead laws the land department
title under this
has been removed; also that an
insane person, although a citizen, can not complete title thereunder,
because he is not capable of taking the oath of allegiance therein
required of all homesteaders citizens, as well as aliens. It necessarily
results that an insane alien can not complete title thereunder because

has uniformly held that an alien can not complete
section until the disability of alienage

a citizen nor take this special oath of allegiance.
These conditions called for remedial legislation, and to that end
Congress passed the act of June 8, L880 (21 Stat., L66), which i- as

he can neither become

follows

:

enacted by the Senate <m<i House of Representatives <>f tin United States
in Congress assembled, Thai
in all enscs in which parties who
regularly initiated claims to public lands as settlers thereon according t<> the
provisions of the preemption or homestead laws, have become insane or shall
hereafter become insane before the expiration of the time during which their

Be

<>l

it

Aiiirricu

residence, cultivation, or

Improvement of the land claimed by them

is

required
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by law to be continued in order to entitle them to make the proper proof and
shall be lawful for the required proof and payment to
il

perfect their claims,

made

be
for

for their benefil by any person

them during

who may

be legally authorized to act

and thereupon their claims shall be confirmed
be shown by proof satisfactory to the Commis-

their disability,

and patented, provided
sioner of the General

it

shall

Land

Office that the parties

complied

good faith with

in

the legal requirements up to the time of their becoming insane, and the require-

ment

in

homestead entries of an

affidavit of allegiance

by the applicant

in

certain cases as a prerequisite to the issuing of the patents shall be dispensed

with so far as regards such insane parties.

That

this act

was intended

to provide a

means whereby

homesteaders, whether citizens or aliens, might acquire

insane

all

title to their

claims is shown by its title, The remedy according to the title
be applied to " cases where the settlers have become insane."

is

to

An

is as much within the title as a citizen, because an alien
has declared his intention to become a citizen may have the same

insane alien

who

settlement rights upon public lands as a citizen.
act the benefits conferred are conditioned only

In the body of the
upon a showing " by

proof satisfactory to the Commissioner of the General

Land

Office

that the parties complied in good faith with the legal requirements
to the time of their

becoming insane," and

this includes

up

an insane alien

as surely as an insane citizen, because in the one case as well as in the

other proof

may

be

made

that up to the time of becoming insane

the alien had complied with

all legal

requirements.

But

it is

mooted

that because the last clause in the act specifically relieves insane persons from " the requirements in homestead entries of an affidavit of
allegiance,"

and

fails to in

terms relieve such persons from proof of

citizenship, therefore an insane alien is not within the remedial pro-

visions of the act.

This reasoning

is

contrary to

applied in the construction of remedial statutes.

all

The

known

rules

clause in ques-

what had preceded it, but out of
abundance of caution it would seem Congress endeavored to make
plain that the insane homesteader being entitled to a patent by reason
of the fact that he had up to the time of becoming insane " complied in good faith with the legal requirements," should not be
required to do after that time what he manifestly on account of his
mental condition could not do. The affidavit of allegiance and proof
of citizenship required by section 2291 of the Revised Statutes are no
part of the " legal requirements " which must have been complied
with to entitle an insane person to the benefits of the act. The words
" affidavit of allegiance " were intended to include proof of citizention in nowise limits or restricts

ship, as well as the special

homesteaders

—citizens and

affidavit of allegiance required of all

An

aliens alike.

alien

upon making the

proofs required by the naturalization laws takes an oath of allegiance*
He does not become a citizen until he takes such oath. If therefore

he be relieved from taking the oath, he

is

thereby relieved of

a

con-
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intended to relieve him of

and

is

it

inconceivable thai Congress

part only of the essentia] conditions.

a

ordinarily proof of citizenship

It is true that

171

required of

is

all

where the party making entry had nut become a
citizen at that time, he was required, when submitting final proof of
compliance with law as to residence, cultivation, or improvement, and
not before, to show that he was then a citizen, and also to make a
homesteaders,

l>ut

The

further affidavit of allegiance.

act of 1880 only affects cases

where the homesteader became insane before making final proof, and.
as he was not required, under the homestead laws, to become a citizen
until he was ready to submit final proof, he mighl have complied in
good faith with the Legal requirements up to the time of becoming
insane without taking out his final naturalization papers, and thus
becoming a citizen of the United States. This ad provides for the
confirming and patenting of these claims " provided it shall be shown
by proof satisfactory to the Commissioner of the General Land Office
that

the parties complied in good faith with the legal requirements

up to the time of their becoming insane." This clearly establishes a
new rule governing the patenting of entries made by those becoming
insane after the

making of

the original entry, and relieves the insane
in

further com-

insane.

That former

party from the performance of any necessary acts
pliance with the homestead laws after

provision of the act which

makes

becoming

lawful for the guardian to make

it

"the required proof" is necessarily controlled by the provision just
above quoted, and its effeel is merely to authorize the guardian to act
for the entryman in making "the required proof" which is clearly

from the act of 1880 and first above
otherwise, and to include within the " required

defined in the provision taken

quoted.

To

hold

proof" to be made by the guardian, acts, the performance of which
ordinary cases would ocean- after the entryman became insane,
would nullify that provision of the act of 1880 which clearly limits

in

a showing of compliance with the legal requirements
upon the pail of the entryman up to the time of his becoming insane.
These views of the act in question are in harmony with a circular

the proof to

issued by the

paragraph

.">

Commissioner of the
of which

is

(

reneral

Land

)ffice,

(

July

17, 1880,

as follows:

Tlif final proof must be made by
person whose authority to :i«'l tor tli«Insane person during such disability shall he duly certified under seal of the
proper probate court, <ni<l no proof of citizenship, except of declaration of
:i

intention to

become

This was
to greal

a

;i

citizen, will he required.

(7

(".

L.

<>..

contemporaneous construction of the

weight, not only because of

struction, but because

made by

administration of the

act.

a

89.)

act.

and

is

entitled

general rule of statutory con-

the officer specially charged with the

Moreover, the debate-

upon the

lull.
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which became the law

The

in question, tend to support this construction.

introduced provided that the requirement in homestead
entries of "citizenship" should be dispensed with as to insane perbill as

sons.

The committee on public lands

in the Senate reported

an

amendment, striking out the word citizenship and inserting in lieu
thereof the words " an affidavit of allegiance." The amendment
was adopted without discussion. Now, if, as hereinbefore shown,
it was the intention of Congress to relieve the insane homesteader
from those things which he could not do, the amendment was made
upon the theory that the word citizenship as used in section 2291
of the Revised Statutes did not include the affidavit of allegiance

required by the same section, but inasmuch as an oath of allegiance
is

the final act in becoming citizens,

it

was evidently believed that

to

homesteader from taking an oath of allegiance was also
to relieve him from all proof of citizenship.
The case of Fette v. Christiansen (29 L. D., 710), being not in
harmony with the conclusion herein reached, and being at variance
with the said circular of July 17, 1880, which has otherwise been
unquestioned for twenty-five years, said case will not be hereafter
relieve the

followed.

The

decision appealed

from

reversed, your office is directed to
and inasmuch as more than seven
the entry was made the same will be
is

reinstate the entry in question,

years have expired since
referred to the

Board of Equitable Adjudication for

CONFIRMATION—PROTEST—PROVISO TO SECTION
3,

7,

final action.

ACT OF MARCH

1891.

Clara Eckstein.
to section 7 of the act of March 3, 1891, the filing of a probringing to the notice of the government the invalidity or illegality of
an entry, within two years from the date of the issuance of the receiver's
final receipt, operates to suspend the running of the statute and will defeat
confirmation of the entry under said provision whether the land department

Under the proviso
test,

actually orders an investigation of the matters charged in the protest
within the two-year period or not.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)
October 16, 1905.

Land

Office,

(D. C. H.)

This case involves the homestead entry of Clara Cleghorn, now
Clara Eckstein, for the SE. J of Sec. 25, T. 8 S., R. 6 E., Rapid City,
South Dakota, land district, and is before the Department on the
appeal of said Eckstein from your office decision of February 3, 1905,
denying her motion for confirmation of said entry under the proviso
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March
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1891 (26 Stat., L095), which reads

us follows

That after the lapse of two years from the date <>i' fssuance of the receiver's
upon the final entry upon any tract of land under the homestead, timber
culture, desert-land or pre-emption laws, or under this act, and where there shall
be no pending contest or protest against the validity of such entry, the entrymaB
shall be entitled to a patent conveying the land by him entered, and the same
receipt

shall be issued to him.
It

appears from the record that

in this case

was made

issued thereon

May

'2 1.),

May

'27.

proof in support of the entry

final

1902,

and that

final certificate

1902; that one Charles Graves,

December 11. L902, addressed
Land Office, called attention to

by

was

letter of

Commissioner of the General
and asked that it be investigated, stating that claimant had never resided on the land, and that,
on the day she made final proof, and several times after that date, he
called the special agent's attention to the matter and that no action
had been taken by him, which said letter bears evidence of having
been received at your office on December 20, 1902; and it further appears that on January 20, L903, said Graves, by letter, called the said
Commissioner's attention to the fact that his first letter had not been
answered, and again insisted that an investigation should be had to
the end that the entry might be canceled for failure of claimant to
reside upon the land, which said letter appears to have been received
at your office on January -J4. 1903.

No

to the

said entry

consideration seems to have been given to the subject-matter of

said letters by

your

office until

submitted to Special Agent
ber 29, L904, Special Agent

August

Wadsworth

8,

L904,

when

the matter was

for investigation.

Darby submitted

On

Octo-

charging that
claimant had not complied with the law in the matter of residence
and recommending that the entry be canceled, whereupon your office,
by letter "P" of November 11. J.904, suspended the entry, and
directed the local officers to allow the usual time within which to
apply for a hearing. Claimant, on January L6, 1905, filed a motion
for confirmation of the entry, alleging as grounds therefor that more
than two years from the date of the final receipt having elapsed
before the proceedings now pending against the entry were commenced, the entry was confirmed and that patent therefor should
issue under the proviso to section 7 of the act of March o. L891, supra.
Claimant at the same time filed an application for a hearing and
asked that same be considered without prejudice to her said motion
his report

lor confirmation of her entry.

Your office, by decision of February 3, L905, aforesaid, denied
claimant's motion for confirmation of the entry, but granted the application for hearing.
While' no reason is given in said decision for
denying the said motion, it appears by reference t<> Letter U
<»f

P"
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December 10, 1904, that your office considered the action taken by
Graves in the nature of a pending protest against the entry, and held
that, as such, it

was

sufficient to defeat

confirmation of the entry

under (he aforesaid proviso. Claimant has appealed from your decision of February 3, 1905, in so far as it denies her motion for confirmation of the entry, and in said appeal alleges practically the same
grounds as are set forth in her said motion.
It is clear from the record that at the time your office ordered the
investigation of the entry in question to be made (August 8, 1904)
more than two years from the date of the final certificate (May 29,
190*2) had elapsed, and the question for determination is, whether or
not the action taken by Graves in the matter, and the mere filing of
his said letters in your office, can be considered as a pending protest
against the entry in question, or is such a proceeding as will except
the entry from the confirmatory operation of the proviso to section 7
of the act of March 3, 1891. In the instructions of July 9, 1902
(31 L. D., 368),

it is

said

that—

to protect the entry against any adverse proceeding after the lapse of two years from the date of the receiver's receipt
upon final entry, whether such proceeding was instituted through individual
efforts, or by the government through its appointed agents.

the purpose of this statute

And
the

is

further on in said instructions

word contest

is

it is

held that

technically applied to proceedings against entries instituted

by persons seeking to acquire a preference right of entry under the act of

May

14,

1880—

and that
the word protest has a broader signification and is applied indiscriminately to
every proceeding against an entry, whether initiated by an individual in defense
of his own right or as a friend of the government, or whether it is initiated by

the government through

its

trusted agent.

These instructions clearly recognize the right of an individual
proceedings against an entry at any time within two years
from the date of the final certificate issued thereon, and the proceedings can be initiated either by regular contest, or by way of protest,
which latter mode is simply the calling of the attention of the government to the invalidity of the entry and asking that the matter
be investigated, with a view to the cancellation of the entry.
In the case at bar, it appears from the record that the protestant,
Graves, on the day the claimant made her final proof, and several
to initiate

times thereafter, called the attention of the special agent to the entry

and that the said agent took no action in the matter,
letter of December 11, 1902, Graves brought the matter
to the notice of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, stating that claimant had never resided on the land covered by her entry
in question

and

that-

by
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and asking that an investigation he had, and that the entry be canceled, and that on January 20. L903, he again by Letter called the -aid
Commissioner's attention to the entry, repeating the charges made
in Ins first letter and insisting that an investigation he had and offering to furnish the necessary testimony to secure the cancellation of
the entry, and that said letters were received and filed in your office,
marked, "for investigation," within eight months from the date
The protestant having within the
of claimant's final certificate.
prescribed time, done all that was in his power to do. can it he said
that he did not initiate a proceeding against the entry in question
and that there was no pending protest against its validity at the
lime the final certificate was issued, simply because your office did
not act promptly in the matter, and order the investigation of the
entry before the lapse of two years from the date of the issuance of

The

said certificate?

act clearly gives to the individual the right

to

proceedings againsl an entry by way of protest, and .after the
individual has done all he possibly can to make his protest effective,

initiate

hold that it avails nothing because the officials of the government,
through inadvertence, or otherwise, fail to take immediate action
thereon, would rob the statute of its spirit and substance, and rento

der

it.

The
to

to a certain extent, ineffectual.

instructions of July

warrant the holding that

the act in question,

it

is

i>.

in

L902, hereinbefore referred to.

appear

eases of protests against entries under

your

not absolutely essentia] that

office shall

within two years from the date of the final certificate actually order

an investigation of the matters charged
the
(•".1

to

running of the statute

may

order that

in the protest, in

be arrested, for

in said

instructions

protestant may, by bringing
government the invalidity or illegality of an
suspend the running of the statute and defeat the confirmation

L. D.,

371)

it

is

in effect said, that a

the notice of the

entry,

of the entry.

From
sented

a

careful examination of the record and the matters pre-

for consideration

by the appeal, the Department

opinion that the action taken by Graves constituted

a

is

of the

protest against

in your office
was a pending
protest against the validity of said entry within the meaning of the
statute and when acted upon as hereinbefore stated, operated to defeat
the confirmation of the entry under the proviso to section 7 of the act
of March
L891, notwithstanding the fact that no action Looking to
the suspension or cancellation of the entry was taken by your office
until after the lapse of two years from the issuance of the final reThe judgment of your office i> accordingly hereby affirmed.
ceipt.

claimant's entry and

said, protest

having been

filed

within two years from the date of the final receipt

:'>.

it
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uintah ceded lands— disposition after expiration of "sixty-

day period."
Instruction s.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, October 16, 1905.
and Receiver, Vernal, Utah.
It was provided by act of Congress, approved May

^Register

Gentlemen

:

among other things, that on October 1, 11)03,
the unallotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, " shall be

27, 11)02 (32 Stat., 263),

restored to the public domain: Provided,

That persons entering any

of said lands under the homestead laws shall pay therefor at the rate
of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre."

By

various acts of Congress the time for the opening of said unal-

was extended from time to time, and by act of Congress
approved March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1069), said time was again extended to not later than September 1, 1905, which last named act,
among other things, provided

lotted lands

That the said unallotted

lands, excepting such tracts as

may have

heen set

aside as national forest reserve, and such mineral lands as were disposed of hy

the act of Congress of May 27, 1902, shall be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States, and shall he
opened to settlement and entry hy proclamation of the President, which proclamation shall prescribe the manner in which these lands may be settled upon,
occupied,

and entered by persons

entitled to

make

entry thereof; and no person

any of said lands, except as
prescribed in said proclamation, until after the expiration of sixty days from the

shall be permitted to settle upon, occupy, or enter

time when the same are thereby opened

to settlement

and entry

and by proclamation of the President, dated July 14, 1905, after providing for the manner in which these lands might be settled upon,
occupied, or entered during the sixty-day period, it was further
provided

:

After the expiration of the said period of sixty days, but not before, as hereinbefore prescribed, any of said lands remaining undisposed of may be settled
upon, occupied, and entered under the general provisions of the homestead and

townsite laws of the United States in like manner as if the manner of effecting
such settlement, occupancy and entry had not been prescribed herein in obedience to law.

According to said proclamation, this period of sixty days began on
August 28, 1905, and, as a consequence, will expire at midnight of
October 26, 1905. Thereafter all unreserved non-mineral lands which
have not been entered on the plan provided for in said proclamation
may be settled upon, occupied and entered under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States.
While these lands will become subject to settlement immediately
after midnight of the 26th of the month, it will not be possible to
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on the morning of

the 27th of this October.
It may, and possibly will occur, thai on the opening of your

on October

'27.

next,

a

number

office

of persons will have assembled at the

seeking to make entry for the Lands remaining undisposed of,
and the duty will devolve upon you to make and enforce such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to secure a fair and orderly
office

course of proceedings on the part of
of applications by mail

is

all

concerned.

The transmission

permissible, but such applicants should not

be given superior rights thereby.

upon opening your office on October 27, L905,
in line, and act upon their applications
After acting upon all applications of those
in order of presentation.
who were in line at the opening of your office, you will act upon all
applications received by you by mail on that morning in the order in
which you may happen to open them, and then proceed with the
applications of those who have formed in line after the opening of
your office. Any applications received in subsequent mails should

You

will, therefore,

number of persons

note the

be considered in the actual order of arrival, after all applications of

those

who

are in line at date of their receipt have been acted upon.

(See 27 L.

and 33 L.

L13,

I)..

I)..

Such of the persons present

582.)

who may

be acting as agents of ex-

under section 2309, Revised Statutes, will be allowed to make
one entry in his individual character, and to Hie one declaratory statement as agent, if properly authorized, and if desiring to make other
filings you will require him to take his place at the end of the line
and await his proper turn before doing so, and he will be allowed to
file but one declaratory statement at a time.

soldiers

After the disposition of applications presented by persons present
at

'•>

o'clock

m.,

a.

which should be proceeded with

at

once,

all

other

applications presented will be disposed of in the usual way. the time
of actual presentation being duly noted on the application.

Yon

are expected to act

promptly under the lawful instructions

before you as occasions arise, allowing any parties feeling aggrieved

by your action the right of appeal, under the Rules of Practice, without

seeking special

instructions

from

this office

in

the particular

cases before acting thereon.

After said sixty-day period you will continue to number the entries
consecutively

the " Qintah Indian series."

in

Your attention is also
of June L3, L905 (33 L.
the act

of

called to the instructions of the

May

entering said lands of $1.25 per acre,
r.i'.M

-Vol.

.:

Department

610), to the effect that the provisions of
21. L902, supra, requiring the payment by persons
I)..

I

05 m

-12

is

not repealed by the provisions
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in the act of

March

3,

1905, aforesaid, " that the said unallotted lands

with certain stated exceptions] shall be disposed of under the general
"
provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States
but that payment should not be exacted until the offer of proof in
You will be governed accordingly.
final consummation of the entry.
|

;

Very

respectfully,

W.

A. Richards,
Commissioner.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

Hogan and Idaho Placer Mining Claims.
Motion for review of departmental decision of July

19, 1905,

34

L. D., 42, denied by Secretary Hitchcock, October 17, 1905.

COAL LAND— SECTIONS

3347

TO 2352 OF THE REVISED STATUTES.

McKibben
A

"

v.

Gable.

preference right of entry " under section 2348 of the Revised Statutes
where any person or persons, severally qualified to enter, have
opened and improved any coal mine or mines upon the public lands, and are
arises

.

in actual possession of the

or persons

A

who have

same

;

so opened

have the possession thereof.
" preference right of entry "

and such right accrues only to the person
and improved such mine or mines, and

under section 284X of the Revised Statutes

is

not created, or initiated, by the filing of a declaratory statement under section 2340.

The

no

It

office of

the declaratory statement

is

to preserve the right,

statement has
without force or effect for any purpose.
is not in all cases essential to the validity of an application to purchase coal
lands, or to the completion of proceedings thereunder, that the applicant
show that he had actually opened and improved a mine of coal on the lands
applied for. This is necessary only where the applicant asserts a preference right of entry under the statute and must maintain his assertion or
suffer defeat in favor of another applicant or claimant.
not to create
office to

it.

If the right does not exist, the declaratory

perform and

is

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)
October 18, 1905.

This

is

a controversy between S. S.

Land

Office,

(A. B. P.)

McKibben and Thomas

P.

Gable, each asserting claim to the SE. J of the SE. J, the W. J of
the'SE. i, and lots 3 and 4, Sec. 28, T. 13 N., R. 6 E., Santa Fe, New

Mexico, as coal lands.

The laws providing

for the disposal of the coal lands of the

United
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States are contained in sections 2347 to 2352, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes.

July 26, 1902, Gable filed, under section 2349, a declaratory statement for the lands, accompanied by certain affidavits, all of which
were in regular form except that the receiver before whom the affidavits were verified, had failed to enter his ollicial certificate or jurat
thereon.
May 11. L903, McKibben tiled, under the same section, a
declaratory statement for the lands, also in regular form, and sworn
August 5, L902, two other persons filed a joint deto by himself.
claratory statement for the

May

ir>,

same

lands.

1905, Gable filed with the register his application, under

May 11, 1903, to purchase the lands as coal lands, and
accompanied the same by the affidavits of two other persons, sworn
to May 12, L903, wherein it is set forth, amongst other things, in
substance and effect, that the lands are chiefly valuable for coal and
At the same
otherwise subject to disposal under the coal land laws.
time he made tender of the purchase money at the price of twenty
dollars per acre, the lands being within fifteen miles of a completed
railroad.
The local officers suspended action upon his application,
and the conflicting claimants of record were cited to appear, July
13, 1003, and show cause, if any they could, why the application
oath, dated

should not be allowed.

On

the day named McKibben appeared, by his attorneys, and
what he terms a protest against Gable's application to purchase, sworn to by himself and corroborated by two witnesses.
The
It
protest is chiefly an attack upon Gable's declaratory statement.
filed

in McKibben himself other than as
under his declaratory statement. It is charged, in substance, that the application to purchase should be rejected for the
reason that prior to its filing no coal mine, or coal of merchantable
value, or of any value, had been opened, exposed, or developed on
the lands, and no improvements had been made thereon, by Gable or
in his behalf.
Gable appeared in person and by attorney. The
other claimants did not appear, and are out of the case.
Both the
contending parties submitted evidence.
Presumably upon the theory'that McKibbenV protest and declara-

contains no assertion of right

claimant

tory statement, taken together, were sufficient to raise the issue of the

character of the lands, evidence

was introduced by both

parties

relating to that quest ion. as well as to the matters specifically charged.

September 30, L903, the local officers found for Gable and recommended that his application to purchase be allowed and that McKibbenV protest be dismissed.
Upon appeal by McKibben, your office, by decision of April 19,
1904, affirmed the action below, and gave direct ion to the local officers,
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amongst other things, that before finally accepting Gable's applicaand proofs, evidence of the authority of the agent who filed the
same should be furnished as required by rule 34, Rules of Practice.
McKibben filed a motion for review, which was denied May 31,
His counsel
1901. and he thereupon appealed to the Department.
have filed elaborate briefs in his behalf, and, in addition, have
referred to the briefs hied when the record was before your office,
all of which have been carefully considered.
The provisions of the coal land laws that need be specially referred
tion

to are as follows:
j

Every person above the age of twenty-one years, who is a citizen
of the United States, or who has declared his intention to become such, or any
association of persons severally qualified as above, shall, upon application to the
register of the proper land-office, have the right to enter, by legal subdivisions,
any quantity of vacant coal-lands of the United States not otherwise appropriated or reserved by competent authority, not exceeding one hundred and sixty
acres to such individual person; or three hundred and twenty acres to snch association, upon payment to the receiver of not less than ten dollars per acre for
such lands, where the same shall be situated more than fifteen miles from any
completed railroad, and not less than twenty dollars per acre for such lands as
Sec. 2347.

shall be within fifteen miles of such road.

Any person or association of persons severally qualified,
who have opened and improved, or shall hereafter open and

Sec. 2348. [In part]

as above provided,

improve, any coal mine or mines upon the public lands, and shall be in actual
possession of the same, shall be entitled to a preference-right of entry, under
the preceding section, of the mines so opened and improved.
Sec 2349. [In part.] All claims under the preceding section must be presented to the register of the proper land-district within sixty days after the date
of actual possession and the commencement of improvements on the land, by
the filing of a declaratory statement therefor.
I

i

It is further provided, by section 2350, that all persons claiming
under section 2348 shall prove their respective rights and pay for the
lands filed upon within one year from the time prescribed for filing
their claims, and that failure to do so shall render the lands subject
to entry by any other qualified applicant also, by section 2352, that
nothing in the preceding sections shall authorize the sale of lands
valuable for mines of gold, silver or copper.
By section 2348 " a preference-ri^ht of entry " is provided for.
This right arises where any person or persons, severally qualified to
enter, have opened and improved any coal mine or mines upon the
public lands, and are in actual possession of the same. The right
accrues only to the person or persons who have opened and improved
the mine or mines, and have the possession thereof.
Once acquired,
the right may be preserved and continued, by filing a declaratory
statement under section 2349, until the expiration of the time within
which proof and payment must be made under section 2350. The
right is not created, or initiated, by the filing of a declaratory state;
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acquired only by opening, improving, and having pos-

is

mine or mines of

a

on the public lands.

coal

In

the

absence of either of the required conditions, there is no preferenceThe office of the declaratory stateright of entry under the statute.

ment

is

to preserve the right, not to create

declaratory statement has no

exist, the

McKibben made oath
and opened

If the right does not

perform, and

is

with-

any purpose.

out force or effect for
" located

it.

office to

in

declaratory statement

his

that

he had

valuable mine of coal on the lands." but in

a

and it is admitted in the
was not the fact. Through his counsel
he asserts that neither he nor Gable ever opened a mine of coal on
the lands, or discovered any coat of value thereon; and he contends
that not having himself applied to purchase, he was not required to
show at the hearing that he had opened a coal mine or discovered
this he

not sustained by the evidence,

i>

briefs of his counsel that such

valuable coal on the lands.

shown by the evideclaratory
was filed
statement
McKibben's
dence,
without authority of law. Inning no basis to rest upon, and can avail
him nothing in this case. He obtained no preference right of entry
and therefore his declaratory statement had no office to perform, and

Under

it

the conditions thus admitted, as well as
is

clear that

was, so far as this record shows, without legal force or effect.
follows that

By

McKibben has no

section 2347

it

is

It

valid claim to the lands in controversy.

provided that any person possessing the neces-

sary qualifications may. upon application to the register of the proper
land-office,

purchase and enter not to exceed one hundred and sixty

acres of vacant coal lands of the United States.

of an applicant to purchase

that

is

All that

is

required

he shall show himself qualified

show that the lands applied for are of the character
and shall pay the government price therefor.
Are the lands in controversy of the character subject to sale under
the coal land laws?
If they are, McKibben's declaratory statement
being out of the way. there would appear to be no obstacle to the comto enter, shall

subject to sale,

pletion of Gable's purchase.

It

is

not in

all

cases essential to the

validity of an application to purchase coal lands, or to the completion

of proceedings thereunder, as contended by counsel for

McKibben.

must show that he had actually opened and improved a mine of coal on the lands applied for. This is necessary
only where the applicant asserts a preference right of entry under the
statute and must maintain his assertion or sutler defeat in favor of
that the applicant

another applicant or claimant.
In such a case, to establish his
claimed preference right of entry, the applicant would have to show
that he had opened and improved a mine of coal on the lands, and was
in

actual possession of the same.

This

is

not

a

case of that

kind.

To

sustain his application to
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purchase, in the absence of any lawful claim by McKibben, Gable
not

is

hound

to rely

upon

his declaratory statement,

and

is

therefore

not required to show the existence of a preference-right of entry
under it. He may rest his claim upon his application to purchase
irrespective of

and

it

any question of right under

his declaratory statement,

therefore unnecessary here to consider whether his declara-

is

tory statement was a valid one or not.
are on their face regular, and,

His application and proofs
amongst other essential matters, show
7

The evidence taken at the
the lands to be chiefly valuable for coal.
hearing not only fails to overcome the showing thus made, but
tends strongly to sustain it. Upon the entire record the Department
is clearly of the opinion that the lands are shown to be of the character subject to sale under the coal land laws.
office

McKibbems

dismissing

statement for cancellation

is

protest

The

and holding

accordingly affirmed.

decision of your

declaratory

his

Gable will be

allowed a reasonable time within which to complete his purchase in
accordance with the directions given in your said decision.

mining claim— statute of limitations— section

The

3.133,

tj.

s.

Little Emily Mining and Milling Co.

The main purpose

of section 2332 of the Revised Statutes is to declare that evidence of the holding and working of a mining claim for a period equal to
the time prescribed by the local statute of limitations for mining claims

,

shall ho considered as sufficiently estahlishing the location of the claim

and

the applicant's right thereunder " in the absence of any adverse claim," and

no authority for restricting the application of the provisions of
is unable
by reason of the lapse of time or the loss of mining records by fire or otherwise to furnish the proof of possessory title required by the mining laws.

there

is

said section to such cases only in which the applicant for patent

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)
October 18, 1905.

Land

Office,

(G. J. H.)

Little Emily Mining and Milling Company
company) made mineral entry No. 311 for the
Laura and Eureka lode mining claims, Independence land district,

August

9,

1904,

The

(hereinafter called the

California.
It appears from the record that on May 13, 1904, application for
patent for the above-mentioned lode claims was filed on behalf of the

company, in support of which evidence was furnished showing that
on January 28, 1884, it acquired, through mesne conveyances, the title
of some of the original locators and had been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of said claims and worked the same
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to the date of the filing of the application, with

period

the exception of a short

in

L893,

when

certain persons

(not

claiming under any of the original locators) entered upon and took
possession of a portion of the claims here in question, whereupon the

an action in ejectment against said persons, in
Court of the United States. Ninth Circuit, Northern District of California, and that court, on January 23, 1896, rendered
judgment in said action awarding the exclusive right of possession
and enjoyment of the land embraced in the claims here in question to
Since the termination of said suit and until the riling
the company.

company

instituted

the Circuit

of the application for patent, a period of about eight years, and

more

than equal to the time prescribed by the statute of Limitations for

mining claims

(real property or possession thereof)

of the State of

California (five years- sees. 318 and 319, Civil ('ode of Procedure),

company

the

is

shown

to

have held and worked the claims and

appeal's to have in all respects complied with the requirements of the

mining laws.

Upon

consideration of the application and the showing

made

to

support the same, entry was allowed by the local officers.
When the
matter came in due course before your office, it was found and held,
in decision of March 2, L905, among other things, as follows:
would appear thai the applicant desires to base its possessory title to said
under the provisions of section '2:\:V2 of the United States Revised

It

claims

Statutes

The statute

of limitation provides for eases in which applicants are unable
by reason of the lapse of time or the loss of mining records by fire
or otherwise, the proof required to support their possessory title to mining
claims under section 1
of the Revised Statutes, and can not he invoked to
cure the defects in title as in this case.
Applicant will therefore he allowed
to furnish,

>

,

:

»L'."»

sixty days from receipt of notice in which to show cause why said entry
should not he canceled by reason of failure to show complete title in applicant
at date of application for patent.
See decision of the Department of December
30,

1904,

Barklage

Hubbard
et al.

v.

It.

Sherer

v.

C.

Russell. 29 L. D.,

C.

Koenneker

et

<//..

unreported.

See also

101.

From the decision of your office the company lias appealed.
From an examination of the record the applicant appears to have
furnished

all

the proof required by section 2325 of the Revised Stat-

showing compliance with the mining laws, notice of the application was posted and published, and no adverse claim or protest has
ever been filed.
The only question presented by the appeal is whether
the facts shown by the record present such a case as conies within the
utes,

remedial provisions of section 2332 of the Revised Statutes.
Said section reads as follows:

Where such person or association, they and their grantors, have held and
worked their claims for
period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of
limitations for mining claims of the state or Territory where the same may he
;i
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situated, evidence of such possession
shall he sufficient to establish a
in the absence of

and working of the claims for such period

right to a patent thereto under this chapter,

any adverse claim

;

but nothing in this chapter shall be

deemed to impair any lien which may have attached in any way whatever to
any mining claim or property thereto attached prior to the issuance of a patent.

The

existing

official

regulations under said section (31 L. D., 487)

are as follows
74.

The provisions

of section 2332, Revised Statutes, will greatly lessen the

burden of proof, more especially
since, the records of which, in

in the case of old

many

claims located

many

years

have been destroyed by fire, or lost in
other ways during the lapse of time, but concerning the possessory right to
which all controversy or litigation has long been settled.
75. When an applicant desires to make his proof of possessory right in accordance with this provision of law, he will not be required to produce evidence
of location, copies of conveyances, or abstracts of title, as in other cases, but
will be required to furnish a duly certified copy of the statute of limitation of
mining claims for the State or Territory, together with his sworn statement
cases,

giving a clear and succinct narration of the facts as to the origin of his title,
and likewise as to the continuation of his possession of the mining ground

covered by his application the area thereof the nature and extent of the
mining that has been done thereon whether there has been any opposition to
his possession, or litigation with regard to his claim, and, if so, when the same
ceased whether such cessation was caused by compromise or by judicial decree, and any additional facts within the claimant's knowledge having a direct
bearing upon his possession and bona fides which he may desire to submit in
;

;

;

;

support of his claim.
7G. There should likewise be filed a certificate, under seal of the court having
jurisdiction of mining cases within the judicial district embracing the claim,
that no suit or action of any character whatever involving the right of possession
to any portion of the claim applied for is pending, and that there has been no
litigation before said court affecting the title to said claim or any part thereof
for a period equal to the time fixed by the statute of limitations for mining
claims in the State or Territory as aforesaid, other than that which has been
finally decided in favor of the claimant.

The claimant should support his narrative of facts relative to his possesoccupancy, and improvements by corroborative testimony of any disinterested person or persons of credibility who may be cognizant of the facts in the
case and are capable of testifying understanding^ in the premises.
77.

sion,

All the evidence required under these regulations has been fur-

nished by the applicant.

There

is

nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that Con-

gress intended to restrict the application of

its

provisions to cases

where the applicant for patent is unable by reason of the lapse of time
or the loss of mining records by fire or otherwise to furnish the required proof of possessory title, nor do the regulations above quoted

They state merely that the provisions of
that section " will greatly lessen the burden of proof, more espeso construe said section.

cially in the case of old claims located

In the case of Barklage

et al

v.

many

years since,"

etc.

Russell (29 L. IX, 401), cited to
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reference to said section

(pp.

405-406)
One purpose of section 2332, as indicated in paragraph 7b [now 74] of the
foregoing regulations, and clearly shown in the history of the proceedings in
Congress attending its consideration and passage there, was to lessen the burden
and transfers of old claims concerning which the poscontroverted but the record title to which had in many
instances been destroyed by fire or otherwise lost because of the insecurity and
difficulty necessarily attending its preservation during the early days of mining
operations upon the Pacific Coast and vicinity. As originally enacted, the secof proving the location

sessory right

was

not

was intended, primarily, if not solely to apply to placer claims, for the
patenting of which there had previously been no provision, and to which class
all, or nearly all. of the earlier claims belonged, the establishment of record title
tion

which under the original locations and through successive transfers was esp>>and oftentimes impossible for the reasons jnst stilted.
The section was not intended as enacted, nor as now found in the Revised
Statutes, to be a wholly separate and independent provision for the patenting
As carried forward into the Revised Statutes it relates
ef a mining claim.
to both lode and placer claims, and being in pari materia with the other sections of the revision concerning such claims is to be construed together with
them, and so as, it' possible, that they may all stand together, forming a
Properly construed with section
harmonious body of mining law
and other sections of the Revised Statutes upon the same subject, it is believed
thai the main purpose of section 2332 was to declare that evidence of the
bolding and working of a mining claim for a period equal to the time prescribed by the local statute of limitations for mining claims shall be considered
as sufficiently establishing the location of the claim and the applicant's right
thereunder " in the absence of any adverse claim?"
to

«

ially difficult

l'.".!*.")

Iii

the present case the applicant, as before stated, appears to have

complied

in

every particular with the requirements of the mining

laws and the regulations issued thereunder, and has held and worked

and exceeding the time prescribed by
mining claims. The decision in
case furnishes no authority for the conclusion reached by your

the claims for a period equal to

the local statute of limitations for
that

office in

the decision appealed from.

The judgment

of the court in the ejectment proceeding hereinmentioned awards "the exclusive right of possession and
enjoyment of all the land and surface included within the exterior
lines of said locations " to the company, and further holds that
before

mi the 8th day of February, 1893, and ever since said date, said plaintiff was
the owner of and entitled to the possession of and is now the owner of and
entitled to the possession of said above-described lands, mining claims and
locations
to

and premises and of each and every portion thereof and

is

entitled

recover possession thereof from said defendants.

Since the judgment

of the court

awarding

to

the

company

the

exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of each and every por-

mining claims in question, it has held and worked said
accordance with the mining laws: no one else appear- to

tion of the

claims

in
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have asserted any right or attempted to exercise any claim whatever
thereto; no adverse claim was filed during the period of publication
of notice of the application for patent; and no objection, by protest
or otherwise, is being made before the land department to the issuance of patent to the company as applied for.
After careful consideration of the matter, the Department is of
opinion that the company is entitled to invoke the remedial provisions of section 2332 of the Revised Statutes, and, unless other
objection appear, the entry will be carried to patent.

Your

office

decision

is

reversed.

Ray

v.

Shirley.

Motion for review of departmental decision of July 17, 1905, 34
L. D., 30, denied by Secretary Hitchcock, October 17, 1905.

arid land-imperfect titles—act of june

17, 1902.

Opinion.
The

act of June 17, 1902, contemplates that the United States shall he the full
owner of irrigation works constructed thereunder, and clearly inhibits the

acquisition of property, for use in connection with an irrigation project,

subject to servitudes or perpetual obligation to pay rents to a landlord

holding the legal

title thereto.

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
October 19, 1 906.
(J. R. W.)

There are informally referred to

me

of the Geological Survey of September
sition

the two letters of the Director
8,

1905, concerning the acqui-

of leasehold or possessory rights of George E.

Shute,

in

i of the NW. J, and the W. J of the SW. J of Sec. 36, T. 1
N., R. 13 E., G. & S. R. M., Arizona, proposed to be acquired under

the

SW.

the act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), in connection with the Salt
River project; also of the rights of Henry E. Kester and Lawrence E.

Karr and wife
east, S.

in connection

The

to lands in section 36,

township 16 south, range 21

B. M., Arizona, proposed to be acquired under the same act
title

with the

and

Yuma

project.

rights of George E. Shute were subject of depart-

mental instructions of May 10, 1901 (32 L. D., 601). The land is
reserved by section 2 of the act of February 24, 1863 (12 Stat., 664,
665), to be granted for school purposes to the future State to be
All power of
erected, including such land within its boundaries.
the Territory over it is restricted by the act of April 7, 1896 (29
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temporary leasing for terms not longer than five years,
any event upon the admission of the future State

hut (o terminate in

which

to

shall

title

Under

be granted.

this condition of title the

Director of the Geological Survey was Instructed (32 L.

I)..

604)

:

therefore confer with the present holder of the leasehold and
with the proper local authorities, in the event that acquisition of the possessory
right and improvements is accessary to prosecution of the irrigation project,

Your

office will

report

will

.-Hid

what price they can be obtained. In such ease, however,
Department for approval, it will be neces-

.-it

prior to reporting the matter to the

sary that the Board of Supervisors, or other proper territorial authorities, consent to the purchase, waiving further payment of rent and agreeing not in
lease of the same land during the period of territorial existmatter is presented in such form the Department will consider
the advisability of such purchase iii each particular case.

future to

make

a

W'lion the

ence.

The Director
A copy <>f your

now

reports that:

May 10, 11)04, was sent to the Supervising Engineer
River project for his guidance, and he has reported that he has
l.ecn unable to carry out your instructions as the Board of Supervisors deny
that they have the power to consent to the purchase of the lease and to waive
further payment of rent and to agree not in future to make a lease of the
letter of

of tin- Salt

same land dufing the period of territorial existence.
In the meantime Mr. Shute has sold his leasehold and some personal property
to J. E. Sturgeon for $4,000.
The lease will expire next year and will probahly
he renewed from time to time, hut sooner or later this property will have to
he acquired for the Salt River project.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

thought that possibly the requirement that the Hoard of Supervisors
should waive further payment of rent could he met by adding to the purchase
price of the leasehold the estimated rental which would have accrued to the
It

is

not. purchased the rights of the lessee
it is
however. 'that the county supervisors have power to agree not
make a lease of the same land during the period of Territorial

Territory had the United States
not

believed,

future to

in

;

existence
I
may he advised as to what action should be taken
Information is also
secure the land for the project.
anything, should he done relative to the two sections

respectfully request that

I

by this

office

in

order

desired as to what,

if

to

which are unimproved and unleased and in respect to which no negotiations
have been begun, and also in regard to the two tracts adjoining the leasehold
of George E. Shute. leases on both of which expired on April 4, 1004, and possession being in the United States, as stated above.

The

territorial authority

has control of the land until the coming
which Congress has declared its

into existence of the future Slate to
intent to grant the title

Whether

or not

local authorities to

make further

leases,

torial authority.

ing
if

it

its

and

for benefit of

the law of Arizona

It

which the land

now authorizes

is

reserved.

the State and

waive payment of rents and to undertake not
such Legislation
is

also within

is

to

within the power of the terri-

power of Congress, uotwithstand-

reservation of these lands, to authorize other disposal of them,

shall see

lit

so to do.

It

is

not the intent of the irrigation act to
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titles and to subject the public
and unascertainable burdens for
rents in perpetuity, liable every five years to be increased by reapThe law contemplates that the United States
praisals of the land.
shall be full owner of the works when completed, and that the entire
cost of the work shall be imposed on the land benefited, and shall be
reimbursed to the Treasury by the future owners of the land reclaimed, ratably to the whole area reclaimed.

authorize the acquisition of imperfect

works

to be constructed to uncertain

am

I

of opinion that

expressed purposes clearly

these plainly

inhibit the acquisition of property subject to servitudes or perpetual

obligation to pay rents to a landlord holding legal title thereto. No
power has been delegated to the Secretary of the Interior to impose
such obligations upon the United States, or subject the United States
or an irrigation project to such liabilities.
I therefore

recommend that the matter be submitted

to Congress,

which has plenary power in the premises to authorize appropriation
of such lands to the purposes of an irrigation project.

The Director

states that:

In the construction of the Yuma dike, contract for which has. recently heen
awarded, it will be necessary to cross section 36, T. 16 S., R. 21 E., S. B. M.,
Arizona, the same also being school land, lease for which is held by Henry E.
Kester, and

Lawrence

Karr and

E.

wife.

Whether work

shall be begun or prosecuted upon any project which
completion land to which title can not be obtained
under existing law is a question which should receive consideration.
While the conditions might in some instances justify preliminary
work, yet a general disregard of such obstacles might involve great
embarrassment and possibly subject the government to large pecun-

requires for

iary

its

loss.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

PRIVATE CLAIM-SURVEY.
Couts

Strickler et

v.

al.

(Rancho Buena

(On Review).
Vista.)

power of the land department at any time to re-trace any surveys
has made whenever it becomes necessary to the determination of a question pending before it for its decision involving rights in public lands.

It is within the
it

Secretary HitchSock

to the

J.

W.

Strickler

Commissioner of the General Land

October 25, 1905.

(F. L. C.)

and

others, protestants, in Couts

(J.
v.

Office,

R. W.)

Strickler et

al.

(31 L. D., 44G), filed a motion for review of departmental decision of
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August 10. 100.") (34 L. I).. 67), approving the resurveys in connection
with the boundaries of Buena Vista Ranchoand plats thereof executed
by Deputy Surveyor W. A. Sickler under contract No. 226, of November 21, 1903.
It

is

asserted that the lands claimed by protestants were not in-

This question of fact was fully considupon consideration of the evidence
is that the lands involved were included within the lines of the Hays
survey upon the ground, referred to in the deed by which ('out- purThe evidence of agreement of the topographical features of
chased.
the ground, as given in the field-notes of I lays and of Sickler. shows
that each traversed the same lines. It is in the highest degree improblays could have fabricated field-notes which would agree
able that
with notes of the actual survey of a piece of land about a half century
afterward, hounded by lines of seven and a half miles. This agreement of topographical features proves that Hays and Sickler actually
surveyed the same piece of land, or that Sickler merely copied Hays's
notes.
But the inspection of Sickler's survey shows that he made his
notes from the face of the land, and necessarily proves that Hays did
cluded

in the

I

lavs survey.

ered and the precise point decided

I

also.

contended that " there never was at any time any question
its boundaries."
The grant and the
to the extent of one half of a
decree of the court confirming it were
square league of land, a little more or less." followed by an act of
It is also

about the size of the grant or

w

*

and monuments, describThe words of the grant in themquestion whether the grant was intended to he for
one-quarter of a square league. One can not intelli-

juridical possession giving courses, distances

ing one quarter of
selves raised

a

pne-half or for

a

square League,

gently read the statements of facts

in

the

many

reported decisions

(cited in 31 L. D., 447) or consider intelligently the fact that the final

delimitation of the grant

surveys were
Bize of the

made

grant and

was not

effected

until after six different

for that purpose, without perceiving that "the
its

boundaries " were always

a

question until the

survey was finally approved.
Protestants present two contentions of law

:

That the re-tracing of the Hays survey by Sickler was without
authority of law and illegal, because not made by request of the grant
claimant as required by section 6 of the act of July 1. 1864
13 Stat.,
B32, 334), and that it was approved contrary to the provisions of sec(

1

)

(

because it does not follow the decree of confirmation
which "designates the specific boundaries of the claim."
Stat.. 218,
(2) That under section 8 of the act of July 23, L866
220), if a Mexican grant claimant fails within ten months from the

tion 7 of that act

(

1

I

decree of confirmation to request the surveyor-general to survey the
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grant, he waives right to purchase land subsequently excluded from
it,

and

all

land not included in such grant

when surveyed becomes

" subject to the general land laws of the United States," open to entry

by bona fide settlers like other public lands.
It would be a novelty to hold that the land department is deprived
of authority to survey a Mexican grant claim by the act of 1804,
supra, until requested by the grant claimant.

The survey

of such

claims was necessary for their segregation from the body of the public
lands in order to ascertain and survey the public lands, and the power
to survey private land claims mingled and lying undefined among
public lands
lands.

The

is

incident to the general

work of surveying the public

act of 1864 is to be construed in connection

with other

prior legislation for surveys of public lands in California.

Section

one of the act of 1864 makes reference to section 13 of the act of
March 3, 1851 (9 Stat., 631, 633), which evidently contemplates a
survey of such grants as of course, in the progress of the public surveys.
No request of the claimant was necessary. The survey of the
public lands was directed by Congress, and the survey of the private
lands mingled among them was necessary to that end. The act of
1864, as to survey of lands granted by the former sovereign, was
merely supplementary to the act of 1851, and section 6 of the act of
1864 merely provided how a Mexican grant claimant might obtain a
survey of lands confirmed to him in advance of the survey of the
surrounding public lands, and it was by section 6 of the act of 1864
made the duty of the surveyor-general to survey a confirmed grant,
Whether the surveys had reached the surrounding public land or not,
whenever the claimant made a request therefor and deposited the cost
of a special survey.

The point made

is,

in question Avas not a

however, immaterial, as Sickler's survey here
survey of the grant. A survey of the grant

had been made by Rice, and was
ler was to do was to ascertain and

approved. The work Sickupon the ground, and to re-trace
an erroneous survey made in 1858 by Hays, before the act of 1864
was passed, referred to in the deed under which Couts purchased
in 1866, and at that time standing in credit approved by the surveyor-general, though not yet finally accepted and approved by the
land department. It is within the power of the land department
at any time to re-trace any surveys it has made whenever that becomes
necessary to determination of a question pending before it for its
finally

fix

decision involving rights in public lands.

This also practically disposes of the second contention. The conmade until April 14, 1879. At that
time Hays's survey was still in full credit and remained so uniil
May 27,1884 (31 L. D., 447-448). In L8T9 Couts had no occasion
firmation of this grant was not
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survey of this claim, for one had been made twenty-one
in
His failure to request a survey
credit.

to request a

years before and was yet

within ten months after the decree of confirmation could have no
further effect than to waive right to purchase any land not

within

Hays survey. But he had nothing to waive as to such
dvcd made reference to that survey and his claim was

the lines of the
land, for his

When that
by that reference confined to lands within those line-.
rejected
one
was
and
another
made and finally apfinally
survey
proved against his contention, he seasonably applied to purchase
under the act of L866 the land included in the lines of his original
purchase and excluded from the survey of the grant as finally apThe adverse claimants assert no right of earlier origin than
proved.
July 23, 1866, nor any prior to Couts's purchase, November 28, L866.
The settlers entered upon the land June 21, 188C, with prior notice

warned by him of

of Couts's claim, and were

They obtained no

any improvements.
purchase under the
345)

Watriss

:

The

v.

act of 1866, supra.

Reed (99

it

before they

made

right adverse to his right to

Jacks

v.

Belard (30 L.

1).,

Cal., 134).

and law therefore present no reawhich is adhered to,

several contentions of fact

son to recall, vacate, or modify said decision,

and the motion

is

denied.

TIMBER AM) STONE ACT—APPLICATION TO PURCHASE—EFFECT OF
E X ECTTTrV E

Hattie
Where an applicant

thereafter where prevented by

E.

Bradley.

in

act

of .tunc

."..

accident

becomes effective as
within

the

such

to

ten-day

fails to

submit

land,

period

from sub-

or unavoidable delay

on the day set therefor, a withdrawal
purposes, embracing the land, thereupon

applicant,

1878,

the published notice, or within fen days

it

forestry

and

I >

purchase under the

to

proof on the day fixed therefor
mitting

WITH UAAVAL.

immediately

regardless of

after

the date

made

theretofore
the

fixed

fact
in

for

attaches
tint

the

the

notice.

may have filed application to readvertise notice of intention to submit proof.
An executive order reserving lands for a specific public purpose has the same
effect, as againsl an application to purchase under the act of June
::,

IMS, ns an adverse claim of

&

cretary Hitchcock

t<>

flic

On
E.

\

K. II

private individual.

Commissioner of

Octobers,

(V. L. C.)

office

a

tfu

1905.

Gt neral

Land

Offld
(E. P.)

.

or about November 1. L902, Hattie E. Bradley filed in the local
an application to purchase under the timber and stone act the

SW.
E.,

WW

SE.
Lakeview land
i,

the

1

and the SW.
NE. 1. Sec. 7. T. 21 S..
district, Oregon, her sworn statement being
J

\
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executed before A. C. Palmer, formerly a United States CommisBecoming aware that
sioner, but whose term had then expired.

Palmer was not

qualified to act in such matters. Mrs. Bradley, on

or about February 14. 1903, filed a second application to purchase
the same land, which application was executed before A. A. Bell,
United States Commissioner, whose office, it appears, was located at
Prineville, Oregon, a town outside the limits of the land district
wherein the land applied for is situated. Thereafter notice for
jniblication

was

December 11, 1903. as the date for the
M. Lawrence. United State- Commissioner

issued, fixing

submission of proof.

J.

at Bend, Oregon, being the officer designated before
should be submitted. The town of Bend, it appears,
Lakeview land district.

Before the time

set for

whom
is

proof

outside the

the submission of proof, to wit, July 31,

1903. the land applied for, together with other tracts,

was withdrawn

for forestry purposes, said withdrawal being, by the terms thereof,
subject to claims theretofore properly initiated, provided the settlers

or claimants should continue to

comply with the law under which

their settlements or claims were initiated.

Mrs. Bradley failed to appear December 14, 1903. at the place designated in the notice, and submit proof, but on December 30, 1903. filed
1903,
an affidavit, executed by herself. December
Spokane, Washington, in which said affidavit it was alleged that
owing to personal illness, she was unable to submit proof at the date
set, wherefore she asked that she be allowed to readvertise and that
her final proof be ordered to be taken before the United States Commissioner at Prineville, Oregon.
The application to readvertise was transmitted to your office, and
upon consideration thereof your office, by decision of August :24. 1901.
directed that in the absence of any adverse claim to the land, the
applicant be allowed to complete her purchase. Xew notice accordingly issued October 5, 1901, setting December 31, 1901. as the date
for the submission of proof, and naming Prineville, Oregon, as the
place where, and the county clerk of Crook county, Oregon, as the
officer before whom, the proof should be submitted.
The proof was taken January -J. 1905. by the officer designated and
at the place named, your office having, however, in the meantime, to
wit. on November 9, 1901, instructed the local officers to " take no further action in timber and stone cases where this office has allowed
re-advertisement on application after date of withdrawal of land
in the local office

'_!'_?.

at

involved for forestry purposes."

By

decision of

March

17. 1905.

your

office

directed the local officers

to reject Mrs. Bradley's proof, citing in support of its action the

cases of

M. Edith Curtis (33

(Id.. 1285).

L. D., 265)

and Joseph W. White
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On appeal by Mrs. Bradley the action of your office was affirmed
by unreported departmental decision of July 25, L905.'
The case is again before the Department on motion for review
filed

by the applicant.

It is

asserted in the motion that Mrs. Bradley's application to re-

advertise was filed on

December

days from the
is contended
thai this served to keep her claim alive and to prevent the attachment
lo the land of the order of withdrawal of July 31, 1903.
As to this
contention it may he said (1) that the file mark on the back of the
application to readvertise shows that the same was filed in the local
date originally

office

December

originally

set

22,

L903, within ten

and

for the submission of proof,

set

it

days after the date
and (-2) that as to lands
embraced within the order of

30, 1903, or sixteen, instead of ten

for the submission of proof:

covered by timber and stone filings

withdrawal of July 31, 1903, and other orders similarly worded, it
wholly immaterial whether the application to readvertise is filed
before or after the expiration of the final proof period, for in neither
event could proof be lawfully submitted under readvertised notice.
for the reason that immediately after the expiration of the final
proof period, the applicant being then in default in the matter of
proof, the order of withdrawal attaches, and the land thereupon
becomes no longer subject to purchase tinder the timber and stone
See case of M. Edith Curtis, supra.
act.
Furthermore, the local officers were instructed by your office, in
its decision of August 'id, 1904, to permit Mrs. Bradley to complete
the purchase of the land only in the event of there being no adverse
claim to the land.
In the case of Joshua L. Smith (81 L. I)., 57) it is
held that an executive- order reserving lands for a specific public purpose has the same effect that an adverse claim of a private individual
woidd have.
In view of this ruling it is held that the withdrawal
of duly 31, L903, was an adverse claim, and that, therefore the local
i-

officers

acted

authority when they issued the notice upon

without

which the proof was submitted.

As

to the assertion

made

in

the motion to the effect that

of the submission of proof the

at

the date

withdrawal had been revoked,

only necessary to say that the only basis therefor

is

it

is

the fact that a

withdrawn by said order has been restored to
upon informal inquiry at your office, it is learned that no

portion of the land
entry, but.

portion of the land herein involved has been so restored.

The motion under consideration presents no
disturbing the decision complained
wise, the said decision

is

adhered

hereby denied.

51W

Vol.

•".

I

<»:»

m

13

to,

sufficient

reason

for

and none appearing otherand the motion for review is

of.
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coal lands-character of land—evidence.
Instructions.
determining whether a tract of public land contains coal deposits the
well known rules of evidence are as applicable as in any other case, and
whatever is relevant to and bears in any degree upon the question is ad-

In

missible in evidence.
In such cases the characteristics peculiar to coal deposits are to be kept in
view, and the presence of such deposits may be determined upon authenticated evidence of conditions which constitute the sufficient guide of the
geologist or coal expert.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F.L. C.)
October 26, 1905.

Land

Office,

(F.H. B.)

Under date of September 5, 1905, the Director of the Geological
Survey transmitted to the Department, for its consideration, copy of
a letter addressed to him from Salt Lake City by Mr. Joseph A.
Taff, a geologist of that bureau, which is as follows
I have been in Utah now three weeks, engaged in the investigation of coal
lands in cooperation with Mr. G. E. Hair, Special Agent of the General Land
Office, and I find the following conditions, which, without reasonable question,

are subject to and
Interior

The

demand

investigation and action by the

have applied

Department of the

purchase the lands subject to investigation,
and the sales are withheld until it is determined whether or not they contain commercially valuable coal. If these
lands do not contain coal, they are the property of the State of Utah, and are
subject to sale at not exceeding $2J50 per acre.
If they contain coal, they belong
to the United States, and are valued at $15 or $2() per acre, depending upon
whether they are more or less than fifteen miles from operated railroads.
With these preliminary statements in regard to relations of State and
Government lands, I beg to inform you that there is a ruling in force in the
State, promulgated by a Commissioner of the General Land Office, that lands
cannot be classed as coal lands unless commercially valuable coal is exposed
in each legal subdivision of forty acres proposed for sale.
To this ruling the
local United States Land Office and State Land Board have been and are now
citizens

to

either as grazing or coal lands,

subject.

Under the existing conditions

of the coal deposits as

I

find them, such a rul-

ing prevents the proper classification of coal lands, prevents the sale of such

lands desired by honest would-be purchasers in tracts of sufficient size to warrant profitable exploitation, has caused large areas of very valuable coal lands

and sold at $1.50 per acre, and will cause the conremains in force.
may lie in any attitude with respect to a continuous
coal outcrop, a forty-acre tract or a section of land may be within a few hundred
feet of exposed coal and so situated that coal could be mined from the entire
tract, and yet it would be impossible to find coal in the area before purchase.

to be classed as grazing land

tinued sale of such lands if
Since a land sub-division

I

it

respectfully suggest that the attention of the Secretary of the Interior be

brought to this matter, and most earnestly request that he cause a ruling to be
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issued permitting the classification of lands as coal lands in legal subdivisions as
established by the United States surveys to distances of one mile beneath the

surface from the

known outcrops

of commercially valuable beds of coal.

This correspondence was, upon receipt, referred to your office " for
early report in duplicate, and return of papers, with recommendation," all of which are now before the Department.
In the report thus submitted your office discusses at some length
decisions of the United States Supreme Courl and of the
Department as supporting a rule of classification which rejects evidence of extrinsic conditions, standing alone, and concludes that no
certain

such showing

is

made by Mr. Taff

would warrant the Department in modifying the practice to the extent of
holding, as he appears to desire, thai lands may be adjudicated to be mineral
lands solely upon the geological formation thereof and of the geological formation and of the discoveries and development of mineral on adjoining lands.
as

In entering upon consideration here of the report and request of
it may be remarked that the question raised has of late

the geologist

been suggested to the Department under circumstances which emphasize

its

importance.

It

is

however, that

believed,

the

obstacles

government and
others, are more apparent than real, and are for the most part the
unsubstantial result of confusion of the admissibility and the weight
opposed

to its satisfactory solution, in justice to the

of evidence.

make

it

It Avill be profitable at this point to

examine, in order

to

clear that they do not warrant the construction that evidence

exclusively of the mineral character of land- surrounding or adjoin-

ing

particular tract

a

in

controversy

incom />< tent

is

to establish the

character of the latter, the following decisions of the
Court, two of which are cited by your office and given that
like

which the question of the character of certain

known

tain

lodes

or

coal

deposits,

Supreme
effect, in

tracts, alleged to con-

respectively,

was determined

adversely to the alleged mineral character.
In the case of Colorado Coal
307, 327 s

and Iron Co.

v.

United States (123

the court, after referring to certain earlier cases

l'.

S..

in

which the mineral character of the lands therein involved had

<

)

been established by direct and positive evidence, said:
thus be seen that, so far as the decisions of this courl have herehave been held to be "known mines" unless at the time
the rights of the purchaser accrued, there was upon the ground an actual
will

II

tofore gone, no lands

and opened mine which

The circumstance

had.

that

been worked or was capable of being worked.

there

are

surface

reins of coal docs not constitute a none,
will

it

indications of the existence of
does not even prove that the land

ever be under any conditions sufficients
worked as a mine.

valuable on account of

its

coal

deposits to be

In

683)

United States v. [ron 'Silver Mining Co. (128 U. S., 673,
the evidence as to the existence of Lodes or veins in territory
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for

was alleged, placer patent had been fraudulently
it
was held to be insufficient, the court saying:

which,

obtained,

It appears very clearly from the evidence that no lodes or veins were discovered hy the excavations of Sawyer in his prospecting work, and that his
lode locations were made upon an erroneous opinion, and not upon knowledge,
It is not enough that there
that lodes hearing metal were disclosed hy them.
may have been some indications hy ontcroppings on the surface, of the existence of lodes or veins of rock in place hearing gold or silver or other metal,
To meet that desigto justify their designation as " known " veins or lodes.
nation the lodes or veins must be clearly ascertained, and he of such extent
as to render the land more valuable on that account, and justify their

exploitation.

Sullivan

Iron Silver Mining Co. (143 U. S., 431) presented
known lode, within the meaning of section 2333,

v.

the question of a

Revised Statutes, within patented placer limits, and concerning the
evidence submitted to establish the existence of such a lode, the court
said (p. 435)

:

purport was that it was commonly believed that underlying all the
country in that vicinity was a nearly horizontal vein or deposit, frequently
called a blanket vein
and that the parties who were instrumental in securing
this placer patent shared in that belief, and obtained the patent with a view
But whatever beliefs may
to thereafter developing such underlying vein.
have been entertained generally, or by the placer patentees alone, there was up
to the time the patent was obtained, no knowledge in respect thereto.
It
was, so far as disclosd by this testimony, on the part of everybody, patentees
included, merely a matter of speculation and belief, based not on any discoveries in the placer tract, or any tracings of a vein or lode adjacent thereto,
but on the fact that quite a number of shafts sunk elsewhere in the district
had disclosed horizontal deposits of a particular kind of ore, which it was
argued might be merely parts of a single vein of continuous extension through
Such a belief is not the knowledge required by the section.
all that territory.
Its

;

Dower

v.

Richards (151

II.

S.,

658)

involved the question of a

and profitable mining operations had
for many years been conducted, but which had thereafter been
abandoned and yet subsequently made the subject of a lode location,
alleged to have been such a known lode as to except it from a townsite patent earned and issued during the period of abandonment.
vein or lode

upon which

active

Affirming the decision below, to the

effect that

worked out and therefore abandoned was not
court added (p. 663)

a

a "

lode regarded as

known

lode," the

It is established by former decisions of this court, that, under the acts of
Congress which govern this case, in order to except mines or mineral lands
from the operation of a townsite patent, it is not sufficient that the lands do in
fact contain minerals, or even valuable minerals, when the town-site patent
takes effect; but they must at that time be known to contain minerals of such
extent and value as to justify expenditures for the purpose of extracting them;
and if the lands are not known at that time to be so valuable for mining purposes, the fact that they have once been valuable, or are afterwards discovered
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to be still valuable, for such purposes, does nol defeal or impair the title of perDeffeback v. Harvvke, 115 U. S. 392;
sons claiming under the town-site patent.

Davis

r.

The

Weibbold, 139 U.

of these

iirst

507.

S.

was

a suit in

sixty-one patents issued for as

equity by the United States to vacate

many

distinct

under

tracts of land,

the pre-emption act of 1841, and alleged to have been fraudulently

One ground relied upon to maintain the suit was that, as
by evidence in the record, the patented lands embraced
" known mines." of coal and were therefore excepted from disposition
under the pre-emption law. As appears from the above-quoted portion of the opinion, the specific objection of the court went to the
obtained.
disclosed

weight of the evidence found in the record, which apparently established

" surface indications of the existence of veins of coal "

mere

In the first paragraph of the quotation the court
merely stated the situation in prior decided cases, and made no
attempt to outline a rule of determination.

at the time of sale.

The second

was

case cited

also a

suit

in equity,

begun by the

United States to vacate two placer patents. It was alleged, and attempted to be proved, that the patented land was not placer in character but contained sundry veins or lodes, within the knowledge of
the patentee at the time of his application for the patent.
Appar-

was attempted to be drawn principally from
by the evidence adduced, that the patentee had
lode locations upon the ground, which he afterwards
substituted with placer locations.
The court found
lode discoveries of any character, but remarked
'•some indications by outcroppings " are not enough

ently, this inference

the fact, established

originally

made

abandoned and
no evidence of
abstractly

that

to establish the "

The

known

case of Sullivan

" existence of lodes.

v.

Iron Silver Mining

Company was an

action

of ejectment brought by a placer patentee to recover possession of a

embraced within the patented placer
upon which the defendants had entered after the issuance

certain portion of the premises
limits,

The defendants set up. in defense to the action,
them of the around in controversy, and alleged
valuable lode therein and its known existence at the

of the placer patent.
a

lode location by

discovery of

a

date of the

placer

effort

failed

thus

made

for

want of

Upon

location.

and known existence of

a

to establish
sufficient

the question

lode as alleged

issue

of the discovery

was

joined.

The

an exception out of the placer patent

evidence to sustain the defendants'

alle-

by them being discussed in the portion of the opinion above quoted and the showing
condemned as "merely a matter. of speculation and belied'."
The last case cited was also an action of ejectment, broughl by

gations, the nature of the evidence submitted

j'

claimant

under

a

townsite patent

to

recover

possession

of

two
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lots

city

within

the

patented

townsite

limits.

The defendants,

ground by virtue of a mining
location upon a lode alleged to have been known to exist and to have
been worked long prior and subsequent to the patent and therefore
The facts established were that
to have been excepted therefrom.
their answer, asserted title to the

in

for
in

many

years prior to the issuance of the townsite patent the lode

question had been profitably worked, and

many

tons of gold

from it, but that some months prior to patent work
en the ledge was abandoned and nothing further attempted until
many years thereafter, when the defendants' location was made, the
ledge having in the interval been regarded as worked out and as
of no further value for mining purposes. Under these facts it was

ore extracted

held that "

known

" existence of the alleged lode, so as to except it

from conveyance by the townsite patent, was not established.
In none of these cases, therefore, nor in any decision of the court of
which the Department has knowledge, is it held that evidence of
exploitation and development of the particular tract in controversy
must always be adduced to establish its mineral character. In but
one of the cited eases, the third, was anything like evidence of conditions outside or surrounding the tract in controversy submitted, and
that was considered and found to fall short of establishing its mineral
In the last two cases the evidence touching the character
character.
of the lands in question amounted to expressions of opinion and
belief, in the one, and to an unwarrantable inference in the other.
In
the first two cases thus considered, upon evidence, though meagre, of
conditions upon the tracts themselves, patents of the government
were directly assailed, against which a mere preponderance of evidence, sufficient to turn the scale in ordinary actions, would in no
event have been allowed to prevail. As said by the Court in Maxwell Land-Grant Case (121 U. S., 325, 381)
:

We

take the general doctrine to be, that when in a court of equity it is proposed to set aside, to annul or to correct a written instrument for fraud or mistake in the execution of the instrument itself, the testimony on which this is

done must he clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and that it cannot he done upon
a bare preponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt. If the proposition, as thus laid down in the cases cited, is sound in regard to the ordinary
contracts of private individuals, how much more should it be observed where
the attempt is to annul the grants, the patents and other solemn evidences of
title emanating from the government of the United States under its official seal.
In this class of cases, the respect due to a patent, the presumptions that all the
preceding steps required by the law bad been observed before its issue, the
immense importance and necessity of the stability of titles dependent upon these
official instruments, demand that the effort to set them aside, to annul them, or
to correct mistakes in them should only be successful when the allegations on
which this is attempted are clearly stated and fully sustained by proof.

Indeed, that from extrinsic conditions the existence of
within the boundaries of

a

given tract might be ascertained

a

vein

is

con-
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v.

Reynolds (124

IT.

199

8., 374,

384)

thus:
There may be

in determining whether such knowledge in a given
between mere belief .-Hid knowledge there is a wide difference.
The court could not make them synonymous by its charge and thus in effect
incorporate new terms into the statute
Knowledge of the existence of a lode or vein within the boundaries of a
placer claim may be obtained from its outcrop within such boundaries; or from
the developments of the placer claim previous to the application for a patent;
or by the tracing of the claim from another lode, or perhaps from the general
It
condition and developments of mining ground adjoining the placer claim.
may also be obtained from the information of others who have made the necesWe do not
sary explorations to ascertain the fact, and perhaps in other ways.
speak of the sufficiency of any of these modes, but mention them merely to show
that such knowledge may be had without making hopes and beliefs on the
As well observed by the court, when the case was here
subject its equivalent.
before, it is better that all questions as to what kind of evidence is necessary,
and we may add sufficient, to prove the knowledge required by the statute,

case

was had,

difficulty

inn

Should be settled as they arise.

decisions of the Department,

The

it

is

true, with

respect to the

establishment of the coal or other mineral character of lands, have in
a number of instances tended to support the conclusion that actual

developments upon

a tract

in

controversy are indispensable.

One

of

was Dughi v. Harkins (2 L. 1)., 7*21), in
homestead entry was assailed by the mineral claimants of
involved, the Department saying on that occasion:

the early cases considered

which

a

the tract

This land was returned by the surveyor-general as agricultural in character,
and hence was subject to a homestead entry. In such case the agricultural
character of the land continues until its mineral character is satisfactorily
shown; and. upon a hearing ordered to establish its true character, the homestead entryman may rest upon the surveyor-general's return, and is required
The burden of proof is therefore
only to rebut proof of its mineral character.
on the mineral claimant and he must show, not that neighboring or adjoining
lands are mineral in character, or that that in dispute may hereafter by possibility develop minerals in such quantity as will establish its mineral rather
than its agricultural character, but that, as a present fact, it is mineral in character; and this must appear from actual production of mineral, and not from
any theory that it may produce it: in other words, it is fact and not theory
which must control your office in deciding niton the character of this class of
lands.

In

tin'

et al.

(5 L.

entries,

it

Commissioner- of King's County
Alexander
arose upon protests against certain coal
which
L26),

later case of
I)..

was

said

>•.

:

Aside from the testimony offered by the protestants. the evidence submitted
by the counsel for the entrynieii shows thai their opinion is based upon a mere
theory thai coal will lie found, if be shaft is sunk deep enough.
Bu1 il bas
been repeatedly held by this Department thai the proof of the mineral character
t

of land
il

is

not

must be specific and based upon the actual production of mineral: tint
enough to show thai the neighboring or adjoining lands are mineral in
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may hereafter develop minerals to
mineral character, but it must be shown as a
present fact that the lands are mineral, and this must appear from actual production of mineral and not from a theory that the lands may hereafter produce it. Hooper v. Ferguson (2 L. I)., 712); Dughi v. Ilarkins (Ibid., 721);
Roberts v. Jepson (-LI, D.. GO) Cleghorn v. Bird (Ibid., 47S) Lientz et al v.
Victor et al. (17 Cal., 272) Alford v. Barnum et al. (45 Cal., 482).
character, and that tho lands in controversy

such an extent as to show

its

;

;

;

The use in those decisions, and others in which it is repeated, of the
expression " actual production," doubtless, has given rise to a rigid
rule in the determination of the character of lands not contemplated

by the Department. Taken literally, a requirement of an " actual
production " from a tract in controversy as a condition to the establishment of its mineral character would exclude from consideration
mere exposures of mineral deposits; and this certainly was not
intended. Indeed, whilst the decisions have evidently thus far been
adverse where evidence of surrounding conditions has not had the
support of discoveries or disclosures on the tracts directly involved,
it is

nevertheless true that such evidence has been given consideration

and has never been held inadmissible.

Thus, in Savage

ton (12 L. D., 012, 614), whilst citing Dughi
sioners v. Alexander, supra, it was said

r.

et al. v. BoynHarkins and Commis-

In the case at bar coal has been discovered in the vicinity of the land, and at
one place about twenty-five or thirty tons have been taken out from time to time
by the people living near by for their own use, but there is no evidence showing
that coal is being or has been mined anywhere in that immediate section for merchantable purposes. Furthermore the contestants seek to establish that by
reason of the coal measures found on adjacent tracts and by the dip and angle
of inclination of said measures, that coal exists on the land in question at the
depth of from seven hundred to eight hundred feet, but I do not think a preponderance of the testimony sustains this claim.

In Scott
were made
There

is

v.

Sheldon (15 L. D., 361, 362) the following comments

not even expert evidence offered to show that

it

is

probable that the

veins of coal in that vicinity extend into or underlie the land sought to be

entered as a homestead. But one witness for the defense testifies to this probability, but his testimony is not sufficient to convince me, especially in the face
of the fact that no attempt seems ever to have been made to demonstrate the
truth of this theory.

The coal-land laws, embodied in sections 2347 to 2352, inclusive, of
the Revised Statutes, do not prescribe " discovery " upon the land
sought as a condition precedent to the acquisition of title, excepting only as they confine the " preference right of entry." to one who
has " opened and improved
differ

a mine on the tract.
In this they
from the lode and placer mining law s, whereunder " discovery "

within

"'

T

its

limits

is

specifically

an indispensable pre-requisite to the

validity of a location, together constituting the initiation of rights

under those laws.

Whilst this technical "discovery" does not of

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
the patentably mineral character of the Land,

itself establish

may
in

be determined in the absence of

a

location,

the chain of evidence; and analogy

same elements

ciation of the

in respect

is

it

may have

naturally

well

known

is

particular subject of the present consideration

presence

their

is

is

in

of the data which

any

case.

The

may

be relied

is

imperfect.

relevant to and hears in any degree

the question of the character of a given trad of land
evidence to the end of its ascertainment.

The

link

But there

to coal lands.

rules of evidence are as applicable here as in

other case, and whatever

and the concern

which
a

suggested the asso-

no location under the coahland laws, and the analogy

The
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any
upon

is

admissible

is

coal deposits,

upon

in

to determine

characteristics peculiar to them,

therefore, must be taken into account and kept steadily in view.
These bedded deposits, generally of wide extent and of regular formation, the result of slow accumulation at the earth's surface, following laws of occurrence common to stratified formations and conse-

quently conforming to the lay of adjacent strata, differ radically

from most other useful mineral deposits, particularly the metalliferin sedimentary beds, but generally in
veins and pockets, and replacement, impregnation, and contact deposits, and which, from the nature of their origin, present such
abrupt variations in form and character as to preclude safe prediction of their underground extension or calculation of their quantity
Even where the coal beds
or quality in advance of exploitation.
were deposited upon an uneven floor, and vary rapidly from place to
place, the geologist can easily ascertain the extent of variability and
from the conditions of deposit the degree of persistency of the coal
beds; and, readily determining in most fields the geologic structure,
can further determine the area of workable coal and closely approximate the depth at which an outcropping coal bed will be found in
any part of the held.
It is well recognized that constancy or variability at the outcrops or other exposures are evidences of the same
conditions underground.
In this connection the following extracts
from what is endorsed as a standard work, by J. P. Lesley, entitled
Manual of Coal and its Topography," are of interest
ous ores, which rarely occur

w

*

:

never round Issuing in veins from the interior of the planet, like sold
and silver; nor filling irregular cross crevices in limestone, like lead: nor
spread abroad in lakes of hardened lava, like basalt and greenstone; nor emCoal

is

upward from the walls and bottoms of deep wide
bunches of grapes, or in bundles of pipes, like the hematite ores nor
lying exposed upon the surface in blocks, like native copper, or meteoric iron:
bid always as a thin sheet or stratum, extending through the hills as far as the
hills extend, and inclosed between similar sheets of other kinds of rock.

bedded

in

clay, crystallizing

fissures, as

*

*

•

*

*

*

*

*

more surprising than the vast expanse of even the thinnesl
sheets of coal.
The original deposit of carbonaceoun matter seems

Nothing
these

;

is

of
to
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*******

have been in every instance almost co-extensive with the lake or sea
laid down.

was

in

which

it

and by itself as far as the mountain
never branching nor forking nor rolled together, but passing through the mountain from side to side, from end to end, or cleaving down
through it from summit to base, from end to end, and commonly in this latter
case passing under an adjoining valley and reascending through the length and
breadth of a mountain on the other side

Each sheet
does in which

of coal extends for itself
it lies,

*******

The

practical character of a coal bed

ings upon

its

is

soon determined by a few good open-

outcrop.

Under ordinary circumstances and for all practical purposes the quality, size,
and mining condition of a coal bed can be explored as well in two or three days
by a gangway ten or fifteen feet long, as by workings through it for a month or
a year.

The only proper method

to

is

open the same bed at numerous places along

its

outcrop, and from a comparison of these crop openings the actual average character of the bed within can be confidently predicted,
*

A

*

and

*

*

*

its

contents calculated.
*

*

may

indeed belie itself at one point or at two where openings are
made, but not at a dozen. Veins of lead, of copper, of iron alternately increase
and diminish in size, rapidly and unexpectedly. The miner never knows until
he strikes the vein what it will be worth, nor how soon the pocket which he has
entered may close up between bare walls. Not so with coal. It varies little
and seldom disappoints. What it is at one point it is likely to be much the same
coal bed

at another.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Even intervals of hundreds of miles in which it has undergone an infinite
number of slight and perhaps some striking variations, will sometimes present

how

it

at the most distant places with strangely identical features, showing

vast and regular has been the law of
*

*

The great Pittsburg bed

*

*

its

deposit.
*

*

*

remarkable instance of this law, covering as it
does tens of thousands of square miles, and scarcely varying from a thickness
of eight feet, showing itself always a double bed, and yielding everywhere
both a superior quality and quantity of coal.
is

a

Upon faith of such investigations prudent men often expend large
sums of money in the purchase of lands and development of the propOften the depth or thickness of the overlying strata is such
erty.
as to prohibit economical exploration from above, and the distance
of many tracts from outcrops, or openings made at convenient and
accessible points, is too great to justify penetration by drifts or
slopes for purposes of preliminary investigation and ascertainment
In the nature of things, therefore, reliance must frequently
;done.
be had upon such evidences as may become the guide of the geologist or coal expert.

Mere outcrops, disintegrated by

action of the elements

and broken

#
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and mixed with debris as they often arc seldom bear witness in themselves of the quality and quantity of the coal beds behind them.
[Jnless in such eases, therefore, they are sufficiently exploited no
determination of the coal character of the overlying lands can be
Nor can opinions, unexplained or
reached by the land department.

expressed by unqualified witnesses, suffice upon any point.
acter of the outcrops, or the extent
or the nature, extent,

and

result of

and

The

char-

result of their exploitation,

exposures of the coal bed other-

wise made, the positions of the outcrop- or openings with relation

each other and to the tract

in controversy, the thickness, merchantand identifying characteristics of the coal bed. the
geological formation and other data whereby the position and areal
extent of the coal bed with respect to the tract in controversy are

to

quality,

able

determined, should be fully

out in the evidence, the qualifications

set

of the witnesses shown, and the situation illustrated, as far as possiand other exhibits, properly
ble, by plats, charts, photographs,
authenticated and introduced in evidence, for the guidance of the
Each such case must then be adjudicated upon
land department.
it ^
individual merits, the question of depth of each ascertained
deposit, as affecting its commercial value, to be considered in that

connection,

if

important.

contest—motion to dismiss—rehearing.
Neilson
Where

contestant

;i

fails at

v.

Blum.

the hearing to sustain the allegations in the

the

affi-

homestead
entryman charged with abandonment, and the defendant thereupon moves
that the contest he for that reason dismissed, a new trial should not he
davit

of

contest

to

relative

oonmilitary

service

of

the

granted for the purpose of permitting the contestant to supply the proof
he neglected to produce a1 the hearing, hut the contest should he dismissed.

Secretary Hitchcock to

flic

(V. L. C.)

May
Sec.

T.

r

of

tli<>

General Land

October 27, 1905.

21, L900,

i).

Commission,

L55

Algol
X..

K.

Blum made homestead
85

\Y.,

Minol land

Office,

(E. P.)

entry of the N"W.

district.

North

|

of

Dakota,

which entry William J. Neilson, on November L8, L901,
an affidavit of contest, charging abandonment and failure on

against
filed

entryman to establish a residence on the land, which
was alleged, was not due to service in the army or navy.
Notice issued citing the parties to appear before the local officers
February 15. L902, and submit testimony. On the day appointed
both parties appeared, and after certain motions made on behalf of
the defendant had been overruled by the local officers, the plaintiff

the part of the

default,

it
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submitted his testimony, which, while showing that the defendant
had never established a residence on the land, failed to show that
When
his absence from the land was not due to military service.
the plaintiff had rested his case the defendant moved that the contest

be dismissed because of the failure of the plaintiff to sustain his
This motion was promptly

allegations as to non-military service.

overruled by the local officers, to which ruling the defendant noted
an exception. From the testimony submitted the local officers found
(hat the defendant had never established a residence on the land and

recommended that the entry be

canceled.

From

the action of the

local officers the defendant appealed.

In passing upon the defendant's appeal your office, in its decision
11)04, after finding that the defendant had never established a residence on the land, and that the plaintiff had failed to
prove that the defendant's absence from the land was not due to milof January 28,

itary service, said

The defendant's motion to dismiss the contest for the reason that the contestant had not shown that the defendant's absence from the land was not due to
his employment in the army or navy should have been dismissed conditionally;
that is, the contestant should have been given the opportunity to have produced testimony on this point, and in case of failure to make the proof required by the statute, his contest should have been dismissed.
The government is a party in interest in all contests, and in view of the unsatisfactory condition of the record and the facts disclosed, I do not think this
case should be dismissed, but that it should be remanded for further hearing,
.and the contestant afforded an opportunity to submit testimony touching the
matter indicated and the defendant an opportunity to put in his defense on the
merits.

Upon motion

of the plaintiff, filed in the local

parties to

office

March 29, 1904, issued neAv
appear before them May 20, 1904, and

the local officers, on

March

2G, 1904,

notice, citing (he
* w

furnish evidence

touching the allegations of the contest affidavit filed in this case."
On the date set for the hearing last ordered both parties appeared,
by their respective attorneys, before the local officers. The defendant
formally objected to the jurisdiction of the local officers to take any
further testimony with reference to said charges except in a new proceeding regularly initiated, the basis of said objection being that
your office had no authority to remand the case for further hearing
for the purpose of affording the plaintiff another opportunity to
sustain his allegations, in the face of the defendant's motion to dismiss the contest because of the insufficiency of the showing made by
the plaintiff at the former hearing.
No oral testimony was submitted at this hearing. It appears, however, that there was then on file in the local office two depositions,
taken May 16, 1904, under the authority of a commission issued by
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upon the application of the plaintiff. These depomade to certain written interrogations,
prepared by the plaintiff's attorney, tend to show that during the
years 11)00, 1901, 1902 and 1903, the defendant was residing with his
family at Arvilla. North Dakota (a place shown by the map to be
about two hundred miles from the land), and that his absence from
It does not appear from the
the land was not due to military service.
the local officers

sitions, consisting of responses

record, however, that these depositions were offered in evidence, that

they were with the record in the case at the time the second hearing

was had, or

that either the defendant or his attorney

edge that they were then on

file in

the local

had any knowl-

office.

Testimony was submitted at this hearing on behalf of the defendwhich tends to show that in the summer of 1902, the defendant
built upon the land a one-story frame house, fourteen by sixteen feet,
and remained on the land at the time the house was built about a
week: that in February, 11)04, he, with his family, removed to the
land and thereafter continuously resided there until the date of the
hearing; and that the improvements on the land, consisting of the
house and from ten to fifteen acres of breaking, were worth from a
hundred and fifty to two hundred dollars.
Upon the conclusion of the testimony the defendant moved that the
contest be dismissed upon the grounds (1) that it was not proved
that his absence from the land was not due to military service, and
(2) that the undisputed testimony showed that prior to issuance of
the notice of the last hearing he had cured any laches that might have
ant

theretofore existed.

August

1.

L904, the local officers held as follows:

That the defendant, Algol
residence whatever

<>n

the

Blum, had never established or maintained any

land

in

question prior to the service of the

first

notice of contest on him, or prior to the time that this office acquired jurisdiction in

this case.

the conclusion of the taking of testimony the defendant moved that this
contest he dismissed for the reason that the defendant had cured any ladies
At

might have existed prior to the service of notice of the hearing of tins conWe do not think that the above motion is well taken, tor the reason that
this contest was remanded to the Commissioner for the purpose of enabling the
plaintiff to introduce testimony as to whether the defendant was employed in

th;it

test.

the service of the
in his

l'.

S.

Army

defense on the merits.

or Navy, and the defendant an opportunity to put
Said motion is hereby denied.

They therefore recommended

On

that the entry he canceled.

appeal by the defendant, your

office,

by decision of March

3,

1905, held as follows:

The evidence in the ease shows that at the time the coldest was tiled the
defendant had never established his residence on the land, hnt it appears that
in January,
1904, and before this contest was remanded, the defendant had
moved his family on the land and had broken eight or ten acres.
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It is contended by the defendant that contestant's failure to prove non-military
service at tbe first hearing in the presence of defendant's objection and his
motion to dismiss on the ground of such failure entitled him to a dismissal of

the contest; that when the contest was remanded on January 28, 1904, by this
office on the status then existing as shown by the record, the defendant was
entitled to a dismissal of the contest: and. further, it appearing that the defendant had cured his laches in January, 1904, before the case was remanded and
was taken towards supplying the defect in the contestant's
proof as to non-military service, this contest should be dismissed that remanding the case on January 28, 1904, was in substance equivalent to dismissing the
contest and giving the contestant a preference right to proceed de novo with his
before any step

;

contest.

This contention of the defendant is not supported by the practice of the
Department.
It appearing that the defendant had not established his residence on the land
at the time the contest was filed, and it further appearing from said depositions
referred to that the default of the entryman was not due to military service,
the said entry

is

held for cancellation.

From said last-mentioned decision of your office the defendant has
appealed to the Department, alleging error as follows:
1. The Hon. Commissioner erred in failing to pass upon the questions raised
by the motion to dismiss for the reason that there was no proof of the nonmilitary service of the defendant as alleged in the contest affidavit and notice.
2. The Hon. Commissioner erred in considering the depositions filed in said
cause as alleged in the opinion, said depositions having never been offered in
evidence and not being in evidence in said cause.
3. The Hon. Commissioner erred in holding said entry for cancellation.
4. The Hon. Commissioner erred in overruling the motion to dismiss made at
the close of testimony in said cause.
5. The Hon. Commissioner erred in holding that there was no curing of the
laches of the defendant prior to the service of contest notice.

At the first hearing had in this case the plaintiff wholly failed to
comply with what the Department has repeatedly held to be an
absolute requirement imposed by the act of June 16, 1898 (30 Stat.,
473), namely, that in all contests thereafter initiated against a homestead entry on the ground of abandonment the contestant must prove
at the hearing that the settler's alleged absence from the land was
not due to military service. On the ground of such failure on the
part of the plaintiff, the defendant, at the earliest possible moment,
moved that the contest be dismissed, which motion was overruled by
the local office, and this action of the local officers was made one of
the grounds of the defendant's appeal. Your office, however, while
finding the ground upon which this motion was based was clearly
sufficient, held, in effect, ihat the plaintiff was entitled to another
Opportunity to sustain his allegations, and for this purpose directed
that a rehearing be ordered. The Department believes that this was
error.

The

fact that a party neglects to so present his case as to

meet the requirements of the law

is

not a sufficient reason for the
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Every person is presumed to know the law,
granting of a new trial.
and where, as in a ease like the one at bar. ample opportunity has
once been afforded a contestant to properly present his case, and he
fails to do so, he should abide by the consequences of his neglect.

To hold otherwise would

be to encourage a laxity in the presentation

of cases that would have a tendency to lead to never-ending con-

and create doubt and uncertainty as to the effect of proThe Department is of opinion
that upon the defendant's motion made at the first hearing, he was
troversies

ceedings before the land department.
clearly entitled to a

Under

judgment of

dismissal.

motion for the issuance of new
no better light than that of the initiation
and as it appears from the undisputed testimony

this view, the contestant's

notice can be considered in

of

a

new

contest,

submitted on behalf of the defendant at the second hearing that at
the date of the initiation of the second contest, if it can be called

was with

such, the defendant

must

be

his family

residing on the land,

held that he had, so far at least

it

was

the contestant

as

concerned, cured any laches that might theretofore have existed.

For the reasons above stated the contest

The action of your

office is

is

dismissed.

accordingly hereby reversed.

RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTION-ACT OF JULY
Casey et

al.

v:

1,

1898.

(Jrignon et al.

All action looking to the disposition of lands involved in

second indemnity

selec-

the Northern Pacific Railway Company in lienor lands alleged
to have been lost to its grant within the limits of the withdrawal on general
route of the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, has been

tions

made

suspended
question

l>y

by the land department to await final determination of the
(now pending before the Supreme Court of the United States)

whether lauds so situated furnish a sufficient basis for second indemnity
where it appears that any such lands are embraced in entries
allowed prior to selection by the company, the suspension as to such lauds
will no longer continue.
Action on such entries will proceed in due course
and the selection to that extent will be canceled. In case of a decision
favorable to the company on the question pending before the court, it may
then relinquish whatever claim it may have to the lands under its selection,
with a new to selection of other lands in lieu thereof under the provisions

selection; but

of the act of July

1,

ISPS.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General L<in<l Office^
(F. L. C.)
October ..V. 1905.
(F. W. C>

The Department has considered
from your

office

decision of

May

the appeal
L3,

(

\

M):>,

by Sarah L. Casey

rejecting Iter homestead

application, proffered July L6, 1896, as to the

NE.

1

of the X\V.

\

of
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W., Duluth land district, Minnesota, for conwith the allotment of Oscar F. Waggoner, and suspending action
upon her application as to the NE. J of the SW. | of said section 11.
As originally presented her application covered the E. J of the

Sec. 11, T. 54 N., R. 11
flict

NW.

and NE.

J

as to the

SE.|

the allotment of

your

office

Your

\

of the

of the

Henry

decision "

office

SW.

J of said section 11.

The application

NW.

J of Sec. 11 was rejected for conflict with
Grignon and said rejection was sustained by

G"

of

November 3, 1897, and the case closed.
from disposed of other applications

decision appealed

for lands in said section 11, but Case}7 seems to be the only one

who

appealed.

The
list

entire tract covered

by Casey's application was included

in a

of indemnity selections filed by the Northern Pacific Railroad

(now Railway)

known

Company, October

as second indemnity

list

No.

IT,
15,

1883,

the selection being

re-arranged

list

No. 15 B.

Grignon and Waggoner are Winnebago Indian allottees, their allotments having been made July 8, 1873, under the ninth and tenth
sections of the act of July 15, 1870 (16 Stat., 361), and the act of
May 29, 1872 (17. Stat., 185). Said allotments were approved by
the Department Jul} 23, 1873, and Grignon having subsequently
become a citizen of the United States, the Department, September 23,
1896, upon the recommendation of the Commisisoner of Indian
Affairs, directed that a patent in fee be issued to Grignon for the
land covered by his allotment. No further action, appears to have
.been taken upon these allotments because of undisposed of railroad
indemnity selection filed October 17, 1883, more than ten years after
the allotments to Grignon and Waggoner.
The railroad indemnity selection in question is based upon a loss
within the limits of the withdrawal on general route of the Lake
Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, which the Department
7

has held not to furnish a sufficient base for a second indemnity selecThe question involved is pending in a case recently decided
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, from which
an appeal has been taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.
tion.

The Department has

for several years suspended action upon lands

involved in selections of the character here in question, pending the
final determination of the case brought by the railway company, in
order to have the question involved judicially determined, and it is
all to continue such suspension

believed to be in the best interests of

by the Supreme Court of the United
In cases, however, where, like the allotments here in question, the entries were allowed prior to the railroad indemnity selection, there would seem to be no good reason for continuing the suspension as to such lands, for no matter what the decision may be it
until the case is determined

States.

would not

affect the interests of these claimants,

and

it

would

not,
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the opinion of this Department, be to the best

Indians to permit
to others
,V.>7.

As

under

assert

It

1898 (30 Stat.,

Supreme Court, would be

in the

to afford the rail-

the privilege of relinquishing whatever claim

way company

its

selection of these lands, to the

others under the act of July

select

1,

a consequence, the only result of a decision favorable

company,

to the

interests of the

transfer of their claims to these allotted lands

a

under the provisions of the act of July

620).
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1,

end that

it

it

might
might

1898, supra.

therefore directed that the suspension no longer continue but

is

that these allotments be

proceeded with in due course, and for that

purpose the selection as to the lands involved will be finally canceled.

Your

office

rightly held the claims of these Indian allottees to be

superior to the right of Casey under a homestead application prof-

This reduces her application
is in conflict with
{
the railroad indemnity selection of October 17. 1883, and the suspension will continue as to said tract until the question of the company's
rights under its selection is finally determined by the decision of the

July

fered, as before stated,

XE.

to the

of the

SAW

16, 1896.

of said section 11, which

j

Supreme Court.
The decision appealed from

is

accordingly affirmed.

railroad <;hant— adjustment— purchaser—act of july
Neil
Where

al

v.

Northern Pacific Ry.

the time of the passage of the act of July

1,

1,

1898.

Co.

1898, the conflicting claims

homestead settler and tin- Northern Pacific Railway Company to a
tract of land wore of a character subject to adjustment under that act, the
fad thai the settler subsequently purchased the land from the company in
order to proteci Ins improvements will not prevent him from transferring
his claim to other lands in accordance with the provisions of said act.
of a

Secretary Hitchcock
(

t<>

the

The W.

Commissioner of the General Lund

I

of

SW.

1

of Sec.

1.

ton, land district, is situated

made

to the

T. 3 X.. R.

1

Office,

(E. J. H.)

October 28, 1905.

V. L. C.)

K..

Vancouver. Washing-

within the primary limits of the grant

Northern Pacific Railroad (now Railway) Company, by
May 31, L870 16 Stat., 378), and was patented

the joint resolution of

company May
May 2, L896, James

to said

(

(

21, l^ .»r>.

tendered his homestead application for
which was rejected by the local officers
because the land had been patented to the company, and he appealed.
April 7. L905, Neil filed his election to relinquish said land and
transfer his claim to other land in lien thereof, under the provisions
the above described

S. Neil

land,

5104—Vol. 34r-05 M
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of the act of July

ment of

election

1,

it

1898 (30 Stat, 597, 620). In Neil's sworn stateshown that in 1889 he purchased the improve-

is

ments then on the land of a prior settler and established residence
thereon; that in 1890 and 1891 he made further improvements and
with his family resided on the land until September, 1898, at which
time he had a house fifteen by twenty feet, a barn eighteen by twentyfour feet, a wood-shed, two acres cleared, thirty acres slashed, one-half
mile of fencing and an orchard, and had raised crops every year, the
value of his improvements being $(>00; and that in September, 1898,
he purchased said land from the Northern Pacific Railway Company
and had since sold the same.
May 10, 1905, your office decision held that in September, 1898, Neil,
instead of seeking relief under the act of July 1, 1898, abandoned his
homestead claim and purchased the land from the company and subsequently sold the same, " thus divesting himself of

and

interest in

and

to

it,

all right, title

and that he has now no homestead claim

thereto for adjudication under the said act of 1898.

?1

of the local officers rejecting his homestead application

and

The decision
was affirmed,
was held for

under said act
from which action Neil has appealed to the Department.
In the case of Newkirk v. Northern Pacific Railway Company (32
L. D., 309), it was held that—
his election to relinquish the land

rejection,

The
and

if

act of July

1,

1898, refers to conditions existing at the time of its passage,

the conditions were such at that time as to permit the adjustment of

Company and an indiby the company within the indemnity
limits of its grant, the fact that the land department failed to proceed under
the act until after the individual claimant had relinquished his claim in order
that his son might make entry thereof, will not prevent such adjustment heing
made, and the action of the individual whose claim was pending at the date
of the passage of the act, in so relinquishing his entry, will he considered as
equivalent to an election on his part to retain the land for the purpose of
adjustment.
the conflicting claims of the Northern Pacific Railway

vidual

At

claimant,

to

;i

tract

selected

the time of the passage of the act of 1898, Neil's homestead

application for the land in controversy between

him and

the rail-

road company was pending in your office on appeal from its rejection by the local officers, and the conditions were such that said
conflicting claims were then adjustable under said act.
Humbird
et al.

v.

Avery

et al. (195

U.

S., 480,

500).

It

appears that Newkirk,

in the case above cited, subsequently to the passage of the act of 1898,

relinquished his claim to the land in order that his son might make
entry thereof, while in this case Neil, in order to save his valuable

improvements, purchased the land of the company. This purchase
not be considered as an abandonment of his claim but
rather that it supports his election to transfer his settlement claim

should
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company having eviimprovements until an advantageous

other land, the purchase from the railroad

dently been

made

to protect his

sale thereof could be

Four

office

made.

decision

rejecting

Neil's

election

claim to the land under the act of 1898,

is

to

relinquish

reversed,

remanded for your further consideration and action
made.

his

and the case

in the light of

the ruling herein

mineral lands-classification—act of august
St.

The

5,

1892.

Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Ry. Co.

fact that a tract of land was, prior to survey, classified as mineral

under

the act of February 26, 1895, can not be considered as a classification of

"at the time of actual government survey," within
meaning of the act of August 5, 1892.

the land as mineral

the

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General L<m<I Office,
(F. W. C)
October 31, 1905.
(S. V. P.)

The Department has considered the appeal of the St. Paul, Minneand Manitoba Railway Company from your office decision
of May 19, 1004. holding for cancellation the selection made August
25, 1893, by said company for lots 2 and 4, S. \ of NE. J, SE. J
of SW.*
and X. J of SE. i, Sec. 3, T. 25 X., R.
of X W. J. NE.
apolis

.{

J

Montana.
was made under the act of August 5,
L892 (27 Stat.. 390), by which act the said company, in lieu of its
relinquishment of certain lands to which it was entitled and which
had been disposed of by the United States without regard to the
claim of said company, was granted the right to select—

22 W., Kalispell land district,

The

mii

selection in question

equal quantity of nonmineral public lands, so classified as nonmineral at

the time of actual

The land

in

government survey, which has been or

question was returned in the report

shall he

made ....

made by

the min-

land commissioners appointed under the act of February 26,
L895 (28 Stat.. 683), for the month of June, 1896, as mineral land, it

eral

being

portion of a body of land returned by said commissioners as

a

mineral land

in

their report for said

month, and the classification as

made was approved by the Secretary of the

Interior on

December

14,

L896.

The

act of

February

26, 1895,

under which

this classification

was

made, was designed to separate the mineral lands from the nonmineral lands for the purpose of aiding a speedy adjustment of the
Northern Pacific land : grant. While it is true that the classification

made by

when approved was final as to the NorthCompany, it did not prevent such disposal of

said commissioners

ern Pacific Railroad
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the lands as

may

be proper on a subsequent showing as to their

character, the effect of the return by the mineral land commissioners

being likened to the return of mineral lands made by the government surveyor (25 L. D., 446). A return of the lands as mineral
prior to the public survey can not, however, be considered as a classification of the lands as mineral at the time of the actual government
survey, within the meaning of the act of. August 5, 1892.
The lands here in question Avere surveyed in 1897, subsequently to
the approval of the mineral classification before referred to, and the
survey as made was approved by the surveyor general June 23, 1898.
An examination of the field notes and plat of the government survey
discloses no indication as to the presence of mineral upon any portion of the section in question, it being returned generally as fourth
The return made
class soil, stony, mountainous, and well timbered.
at the time of the government survey is essentially a nonmineral
classification, and, in the opinion of this Department, the previous
classification by the mineral land commissioners under the act of
February 26, 1895, can not defeat the selection in question.

Your

office

decision

is

therefore reversed, and, if the selection

otherwise regular and proper,
a

it

is

should be listed for approval with

view to the issue of patent.

rights of wax for canals, ditches, reservoirs, telegraph and
telephone lines, electrical plants, tramroads, etc.
Regulations.
right of

way

for canals, ditches, and reservoirs.

Sections 18, 19, 20, and 21 of the act of Congress approved

March

3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), entitled "An act to repeal timber-culture
laws, and for other purposes," grant the right of way through the

public lands and reservations of the United States for the use of
canals,

ditches,

reservoirs heretofore

by
upon the

or hereafter constructed

corporations, individuals, or associations of individuals

and approval of the papers and maps therein provided for.
When the right of way is upon a reservation not within the jurisdiction of the Interior Department, the application must be filed in
accordance with these regulations, and will be submitted to the
Department having jurisdiction. But where the right of way is
filing

wholly within a military reservation, the application should be filed
with the War Department, direct. A map and field notes of the
portion within any reservation must be submitted, in addition to
the duplicates required herein, except in the case of a forest or timber
land reserve. This map and field notes must conform to all the
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provisions of this circular, and the local officers will- forward them
to this office.

The word adjacent,
with the right

as used in section 18 of the act, in connection

to take

material for construction

from the public

lands, must be construed according to the conditions of each separate

The right extends only to construction, and
(28 L. I)., 439).
no public timber or material may be taken or used for repair or

case

improvements (14

L.

I)..

566).

the railroad right-of-way act.

are the

The

same

These decisions were rendered under
and are applied to this, as the words

in both.

sections above noted read as follows:

That the right of way through the public lands and reservations of
is hereby granted to any canal or ditch company formed for
the purpose of irrigation, and duly organized under the laws of any State or
Territory, which shall have tiled, or may hereafter tile, with the Secretary of
the Interior a copy of its articles of incorporation, and due proofs of its organization under the same, to the extent of the ground occupied by the water of
the reservoir and of the canal and its laterals, and fifty feet on each side of
the marginal limits thereof; also the right to take from the public lands
adjacent to the line of the canal or ditch, material, earth, and stone necessary
for the construction of such canal or ditch: Provided, That no such right of
way shall be so located as to interfere with the proper occupation by the Gov
ernmenl of any such reservation, and all mans of location shall be subject to
the approval of the Department of the Government having jurisdiction of such
reservation, and the privilege herein granted shall not be construed tojnterfere with the control of water for irrigation and other purposes under authority
Sec.

is.

the United States

of the respective States or Territories.

That any canal or ditch company desiring to secure the benefits of
within twelve months after the location of ten miles of this canal,
if the same be upon surveyed lands, and if upon unsurveyed lands within twelve
months after the survey thereof by the United Sates, file with the register of
the land office for the district where such land, is located a map of its canal
or ditch and reservoir: and upon the approval thereof by the Secretary of the
Interior the same shall be noted upon the plats in said office, and thereafter all
such lands over which such rights of way shall pass shall be disposed of subjc.i
to such right of way.
Whenever any person or corporation, in the construction
of any canal, ditch, or reservoir, injures or damages the possession of any
settler on the public domain, the party committing such injury or damage shall
be liable to the party injured for such injury or damage.
SEC 20. That the provisions of this act shall apply to all canals, ditches, or
reservoirs heretofore or hereafter constructed, whether constructed by corporaSec.

lb.

this act shall,

individuals, or association of individuals, on the tiling of the certificates
and maps herein provided for. If such ditch, canal, or reservoir has been
or shall l»e constructed by an individual or association of individuals, it shall
be sullieient for such individual or association of individuals to tile with the
Secretary of the Interior and with the register of the land office where said
land is located a map of the line of such canal, ditch, or reservoir, as in a case
Of a corporation, with the name of the individual owner or owners thereof,
together with the articles of association, if any there be.
Plats heretofore tiled
shall have the benefits of this act from the date of their tiling, as though tiled
under it
Provided, That if any section of said canal, or ditch shall not be comtions,

:
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pleted within five years after the location of said section, the rights herein
granted shall be forfeited as to any uncompleted section of said canal, ditch,
or reservoir, to the extent that the same is not completed at the date of the
forfeiture.

Sec. 21. That nothing in this act shall authorize such canal or ditch company to occupy such right of way except for the purpose of said canal or ditch,
and then only so far as may be necessary for the construction, maintenance,
and care of said canal or ditch.

The act approved May 11, 1898 (30 Stat., 401), entitled "An act to
amend an act to permit the use of the right of way through public
lands for tramroads, canals, and reservoirs, and for other purposes,"
makes an important declaration in section 2 as to the purposes for

which the rights of way under the act of 1891 may be used, but does
not authorize the approval of any application for right of way for
purposes other than irrigation.
(28 L. D., 474; 32 L. D., 452 and
of
act
1898 is as follows:
language
of
the
The
461.)
enacted by the Senate and House of Representative* of the United States
in Congress assembled. That the act entitled "An act to permit the
use of the right of way through the public lands for tramroads, canals, and
reservoirs, and for other purposes," approved January twenty-first, eighteen
hundred and ninety-five, be, and the same is hereby, amended by adding thereto
the following
" That the Secretary of the Interior be, and hereby is, authorized and empowered, under general regulations to be fixed by him, to permit the use of right
of way upon the public lands of the United States, not within limits of any
park, forest, military, or Indian reservations, for tramways, canals, or reservoirs, to the extent of the ground occupied by the water of the canals and
reservoirs, and fifty feet on each side of the marginal limits thereof, or fifty
feet on each side of the center line of the tramroad, by any citizen or association of citizens of the United States, for the purposes of furnishing water for
domestic, public, and other beneficial uses.
" Sec 2. That rights of way for ditches, canals, or reservoirs heretofore or
hereafter approved under the provisions of sections eighteen, nineteen, twenty,
and twenty -one of the act entitled 'An act to repeal timber-culture laws, and for
other purposes,' approved March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, may
and said rights of way may be used for
be used for purposes of a public nature
purposes of water transportation, for domestic purposes or for the development
of power, as subsidiary to the main purpose of irrigation."

Be

of

it

America

;

These acts are evidently designed to encourage the much-needed
ditches, canals, and reservoirs in the arid porof
the
country
tion
by granting right of way over the public lands
necessary to the nlaintenance and use of the same. The eighteenth
1.

work of constructing

section of the act of 1891 provides that

The

privilege herein granted shall not be construed to interfere with the con-

trol of

water for irrigation and other purposes under authority of the respective

States or Territories.

The

control of the flow

and use of the water

is

therefore, so far

concerned, a matter exclusively under State or Territorial control the matter of administration within the jurisdiction of
as this act

is
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this

the right

of

way oxer

approval under this

act,

to

the approval
In

public lands.

the
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however, which

in

natural sources of water supply, such as the

of rtiaps carrying
submitting maps for
any wise appropriate

damming

maps should

of rivers or

accompanied by
proof that the plans and purposes of the projectors have been regularly submitted and approved in accordance with the local laws or
customs governing the use of writer in the State or Territory in
which the same is located. No general rule can he adopted in regard
Each case must resl upon the showing filed in
to this matter.
the appropriation

of lakes, such

l>e

support thereof.

The

'2.

act

is

not in the nature of a grant of lands; hut

or qualified fee, giving the possession

it

is

a

base

and right of use of the land for

the purposes contemplated by the law. a reversionary interest remain-

ing in the United States, to he conveyed by
the land

may

it

to the person to

whom

be patented, whose rights will be subject to those of the

grantee of the right of way.

All persons settling on a tract of pub-

which right of way has attached for a canal,
ditch, or reservoir, take the same subject to such right of way. and
at the full area of the subdivision entered, there being no authority to
make deduction in such cases. If a settler has a valid claim to land
lic

land, to part of

existing at the date of the filing of the

map

of definite location, his

measure of
damages for right of way as may be determined upon by agreement
right

superior, and he

is

is

entitled to such reasonable

or in the courts, the question being one that does not fall within the

jurisdiction

By

of this Department.

section 21

of the act above

approval of a map of a canal, ditch,
or reservoir does not necessarily carry with it a right to the use of
land 50 feet on each side, the approval of the Department granting
only such right of way as the law provides. The width necessary

quoted

it

will be seen that the

lor construction,

voir
3.

is

maintenance, and care of a canal, ditch, or reser-

not determined.

Whenever

a

right of

way

land reserve, the applicant must

is

located

file

upon

a

forest or timber-

a stipulation under

seal, incor-

porating the following:
(1)
fere

Thai the proposed right of way

with the proper occupation of

tin

4

is

not so located as to inter-

reservation by the

(

government.

(2) Thai the applicant will cut no timber from the reserve outside
the fight of way.
(3) Thai the applicant will remove no timber within the right of
way except only such as is rendered necessary by the proper use and
enjoyment of the privilege for which application is made, and that he
will also remove from the reservation, or destroy, under proper >aleguards as determined by this Office, all standing, fallen, and dead
timber, as well as all tops, lops, brush, and refuse cuttings on the right
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of way, for such distance on each side of the central line as may be
determined by the General Land Office to be essential to protect the

from fire to the fullest extent possible.
That the applicant will furnish free of charge such assistance
men and material for fighting fires as may be spared without

forest
(4)
in

serious injury to the applicant's business.

The applicant

will also be required to give

bond

to the

Government

of the United States, to be approved by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, such bond stipulating that the makers thereof will

pay

to the

United States

" for

any and

all

damage

to the public lands,

timber, natural curiosities, or other public property on such reserva-

upon the lands of the United States, by reason of such use
and occupation of the reserve, regardless of the cause or circumstances
under which such damage may occur." A bond furnished by any surety
company that has complied with the provisions of the act of August
13, 1894 (28 Stat., 279), will be accepted, and must run in the terms
of the stipulation above quoted. The amount of the bond can not be
tion, or

fixed until the application has been submitted to the General
Office,

when

a

form of bond

will be furnished

Land

and the amount thereof

fixed.

No

construction can be allowed on a reservation until an applica-

way has
laws of the United States
or has been considered by
sion for such construction
tion for right of

4.

been regularly

filed in

accordance with the

and has been approved by the Department,
this Office or the Department, and permishas been specifically given.

Canals, ditches, or reservoirs lying partly upon unsurveyed land

can be approved if the application and accompanying maps and
papers conform to these regulations, but the approval will only relate
to that portion traversing the surveyed lands.
(For right of way
wholly on unsurveyed land, see paragraphs 16 and 17.)
5. Any incorporated company desiring to obtain the benefits of
the law is required to file the following papers and maps with the
register of the land district in which the canal, ditch, or reservoir is
to be located, who will forward them to the General Land Office,
where, after examination, they will be submitted to the Secretary
of the Interior with recommendation as to their approval
First. A copy of its articles of incorporation, duly certified to by
the proper officers of the company under its corporate seal, or by the
secretary of the State or Territory where organized.
Second. A copy of the State or Territorial law under which the
company was organized (when organized under State or Territorial
law), with certificate of the governor or secretary of the State or
Territory, under seal, that the same is the existing law.
(See eleventh subdivision of this paragraph.)
.
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When

said law directs that the articles of- association or
connected
with the organization be filed with any State
other papers
certificate of such officer that the same have
the
Territorial
officer,
or

Third.

according to law, with the date of the filing thereof.
When a company is operating in a State or Territory
other than that in which it is incorporated, the certificate of the
proper officer of the State or Territory is required that it has complied with the laws of thai State or Territory governing foreign corbeen

filed

Fourth.

porations to the extent required to entitle the
in

company

to operate

such State or Territory.

No forms

are prescribed for the above portion of the " due proofs "

required, as each case must be governed to

some extent by the laws of

the State or Territory.

Fifth.

The

official

statement, under the seal of the company, of

the proper officer that the organization has been completed, that the

company

is

fully authorized to proceed with construction according

to the existing

law of the State or Territory, and that the copy of
and correct. (See Form 1, p. 236.)

the articles filed in true

Sixth. A true list, signed by the president, under the seal of the
company, showing the names and designations of its officers at the
date of the filing of the proofs.

Seventh.

A copy

water needed for

(See

Form

2, p. 2oT.)

of the company's title or right to appropriate the
its

canals, ditches,

and

quired by the State or Territorial laws.

reservoirs, certified as reIf the miner's inch

is

the

must
be stated.
In cases where the right to appropriate the water has not
been adjudicated under the local laws, a certified copy of the notice
In cases where the notice of
of appropriation will be sufficient.
appropriation is accompanied by a map of the canal or reservoir it
will not be necessary to furnish a copy of it if the notice describes
the location sufficiently to identify it with the canal or reservoir for
which the right-of-way application is made. In cases where the
unit used in such title, its equivalent in cubic feet per second

water-right claim has been transferred a number of times it is not
necessary to furnish a copy of each instrument of transfer: an abstract of title will be accepted.

A copy of the State or Territorial laws governing water
and irrigation, with the certificate of the governor or secretary
(See
that the same is the existing law.
of the State or Territer
eleventh subdivision of this paragraph.)
Ninth. A statement of the amount of water flowing in the stream
Eighth.

rights

supplying the canal, ditch, or reservoir, at the point of diversion
damming, during the preceding year or years. For this purpose
it
will be necessary to give* the maximum, minimum, and average
monthly (low in cubic feet per second, and the average annual flow.

or
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is required.
The method of measurement or estimate by which these results have been obtained must
In case there is no well-defined flow which can be
be fully stated.
measured, the area of the watershed, average annual rainfall, and

All available data as to the flow

estimated run-off at the point of diversion or

damming

should be

given.

Tenth. Maps, field notes, and other papers, as hereinafter required.
Eleventh. If certified copies of the existing laws regarding corporations and irrigation, and of new laws as passed from time to
time, be forwarded to this office

by the governor or secretary of the

State or Territory, the applicant

may

file,

in lieu of the requirements

of the second and eighth subdivisions of this paragraph, a certificate

of the governor or secretary of state, under seal, that no change

has been

made

since a given date, not later than that of the laws last

forwarded.
6. Individuals or associations of individuals making applications
for right of way are required to file the information called for in
the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth subdivisions of the preceding
paragraph. Associations .and individuals must, in addition, file
their articles of association if there be none, the fact must be stated
over the signature of each member of the association.
7. The maps filed must be drawn on tracing linen in duplicate, and
;

must be

strictly

conformable to the

field notes

of the survey thereof.

They must be filed in the land office for the district in which the right
of way is located but if located in more than one district, duplicate
maps and field notes need be filed in but one district, and single sets
in the others.
The maps should show other canals, ditches, laterals,
;

or reservoirs with which connections are made, but they must be dis-

tinguished from those for which right of

way

is

desired by ink of a

different color.
8. Field notes of the surveys must be filed in duplicate, separate
from the map, and in such form that they may be folded for filing.
Complete field notes should not be placed on the map, but only the
station numbers where deflections or changes of numbering occur,
station numbers with distances to corners where the lines of the pub
lie surveys are crossed, and the lines of reference of initial and terminal points, with their courses and distances. Typewritten field notes

with clear carbon copies are preferred, as they expedite the examination of applications.
The field notes should contain, in addition to
the ordinary records of surveys, the data called for in this and in the
following paragraphs. They should state which line of the canal
was run whether middle or a specified side line. The stations or
courses should be numbered in the field notes and on the map. The
record should be so complete that from it the surveys could be accurately retraced by a competent surveyor with proper instruments.

—
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notes should
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show whether the lines were run on the true
and in the Latter ease the declination of the

or the magnetic bearings,

needle and date of determination must be stated.
of the instrument used in

running the

lines

and

its

The kind and

size

minimum reading

The line of survey should
proposed ditch and, as exactly as
The method of
possible, the water line of the proposed reservoir.
running the grade lines of canals and the water lines of reservoirs
must be described.
9. The scale of the map should be 2,000 feet to an inch in the case
of canals or ditches and 1,000 feel to an inch in the case of reservoirs.
The maps may, however, be drawn to a larger scale of 1,000
feet to an inch in the case of canals or ditches and 500 feet to an inch
in the case of reservoirs when absolutely necessary to properly show
the proposed works.
10. All subdivisions of the public surveys represented on the map
should have their entire boundaries drawn, and on all lands affected
on the horizontal circle should be noted.
be that of the actual location of the

by the righl of way the smallest legal subdivisions (40-acre tracts
and lots) must be shown, and the section, township, and range must
be clearly marked on the map.
11.

The termini

of a canal, ditch, or lateral should be fixed by

reference of course and distance to the nearest existing corner of the

The

public survey.

initial point of the

survey of

a reservoir

should

he fixed by reference of course and distance to the nearest existing

corner outside the reservoir by a line which does not cross an area
will

lliat

map.
(

be covered with water

field

Forms

3

notes,

engineer's

when

affidavit,

the reservoir

and

is

in use.

applicant's

The

certificate

and 4) should each show these connections.

is upon unmust be connected by traverse with an established
corner of the public survey, if not more than six miles distant from
it. and
the single bearing and distance from the terminal point to
the corner computed and noted on the map. in the engineer's affidavit,
and in the applicant's certificate (Forms
and 4). The notes and

L2.

A\ 'hen

either terminal of a canal, ditch, or lateral

surveyed land,

it

l\

all

data

for the

computation of the traverse must be given

in the

Held notes.

When the distance to an established corner of the public survey
more than 6 miles, this connection will be made with a natural
object or a permanent monument which can be readily found and
recognized and which will \\\ and perpetuate the position of the terminal point.
The map must show the position of such mark and course
and distance to the terminus. The field notes must give an accurate
L3.

is

description of the
above.

The

mark and'

full

data of the traverse as required

engineer's affidavit and applicant's certificate

(Forms

'*>
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and 4) must

THE PUBLIC LANDS.
These monuments are of great

state the connections.

importance.
14. When a canal, ditch, or lateral lies partly on nnsnrveyed land,
each portion lying within surveyed and nnsnrveyed land will be
separately stated in the field notes and in Forms 3 and 4 by connections of termini, length, and width, as though each portion were inde-

(See paragraphs 11, 12, and 13.)
a reservoir lies partly on nnsnrveyed land

pendent.

When

15.

initial

its

point must be noted, as required for the termini of ditches in para-

graph

and

11,

so that the reference line will not cross

will be covered with water

when

the reservoir

is

an area that

The

in use.

areas

of the several parts lying on surveyed and unsurveyed land must be

separately noted on the map, in the field notes, and in

Forms

3

and

4.

Maps showing canals, ditches, or reservoirs wholly upon nnsnrveyed lands may be received and placed on file in the General Land
1C).

Office

and the

local land office of the district in

and the date of

located, for general information,

which the same
filing will be

is

noted

but the same will not be submitted to nor approved by the
Secretary of the Interior, as the act makes no provision for the
approval of any but maps showing the location in connection with
the public surveys. The filing of such maps will not dispense with
thereon

;

the filing of

maps

after the survey of the lands

and within the time

limited in the act granting the right of way, which map, if in all
respects regular
IT.

when

In filing such

fixed as indicated in
18.

Whenever

filed, will

maps

receive the Secretary's approval.

the initial and terminal points will be

paragraphs 12 and

13.

the line of survey crosses a toAvnship or section line

of the public survey, the distance to the nearest existing corner should

be ascertained and noted.

In the case of a reservoir the distance
will be covered with

must not be measured across an area which
water when the reservoir
reservoir

points

the

is

must show these
of

intersection

The map

in use.

of the canal, ditch, or

distances,

and the

and the

distances.

field

notes must give

When

corners

are

destroyed by the canal or reservoir, proceed as directed in paragraphs
21

and
19.

22.

The map must bear

a statement of the

ditch, or lateral at high-water line.

limits of the variations

The

from

it

width of each canal,

If not of uniform width, th^

must be

clearly defined on the

map.

should record the changes in such a manner as to admit
of exact location on the ground. In the case of a pipe line, the diameter of the pipe should be stated.
The map must show the source of
field notes

water supply.
20. In applications for right of
the reservoir must bo stated on the
of acres that will be covered

1

way

for a reservoir, the capacity of

map

in acre-feet

foot in depth

(i. e.,

by the water

the

it

number

will hold;
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acre-foot is t3,560 cubic feet).
The map must show the source of
water supply for the reservoir and the location and height of the
1

dam.
21.

Whenever

a

corner of the public survey will be covered

earth or water, or otherwise

rendered

useless,

In-

marked monuments

(one on each side of destroyed corner) must be set on each township
or section line passing through, or one

on each line terminating at.
These monuments must comply with the requirements
for witness corners of the Manual of Surveying Instructions issued
by this office, and must be at such distance from the work- a- to be
safe from interference during the construction and operation of same.
In case two or more consecutive corners on the same line are desaid corner.

stroyed, the

monument

shall be set as required in the

Manual

for the

nearest corner on that line to be covered.

The

on which such monument

is set will be determined by
the
corner
to be destroyed to the first
from
running
existing corner on the line to be marked by the monument, setting on
the random line a temporary mark at the distance of the proposed
monument. If the random line strikes the corner run to. the monument will be established at the place marked; if the random line
passes to one side of the corner, the north and south or east and west
distance to it will be measured and the true course calculated.
The
proper correction of the temporary mark will then be computed and
The field notes for
a permanent monument set in the proper place.
the surveys establishing the monuments must be in duplicate and
separate from those of the canal or reservoir, being certified by the
surveyor under oath. They must comply with the form of field notes
prescribed in the Manual of Surveying Instructions issued by this
office.
When application is made for a canal or reservoir which is
constructed and in operation, the method to be adopted in setting the
monuments, being governed b}^ the special features of each case, must
No Held notes will be
be left to the judgment of the surveyor.
monuments
are set conform
accepted unless the lines on which the
to the lines shown by the field notes of the survey as made originally
under the direction of this office, and unless the notes are in such
form that the computation can be verified and the lines retraced on
%

2'2.

a

line

random

line

the ground.
*2o.

The

engineer's affidavit and applicant's certificate must

designate by

termini

(as

in

paragraphs

11

to

17.

length each canal, ditch, or lateral, and by initial

each reservoir

shown on

This

and

affidavit

a

map,

this certificate

both

and
area
and
point
inclusive)

which right of way i- asked.
(changed where accessary when

for

is made by an individual or association of individApplicant- under
must be written on the ma)) in duplicate.
the act of March 3, L891, must include in the certificate (Form h

an application
uals)
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the statement: "And I further certify that the right of way herein
(See
described is desired for the main purpose of irrigation."

Forms

and

3

No changes

page 237.)

4,

or additions are allowable

when

in the substance of these forms, except

the facts differ from

those assumed therein.
24.

When maps

of the land

are

filed,

the register will note on each the

name

and the date of filing, ovei' his written signature.
also be made on the records of the local land office,

office

Notations will

as to each unpatented tract affected, that application for right of

way for
name of

a canal (or reservoir)

applicant.

The

is

pending, giving date of filing and
map, over his

register will certify on each

by the proposed
and any other
connection with the application, will then be promptly

written signature, that unpatented land
right of way.

The maps and

is

affected

field notes in duplicate,

papers filed in
transmitted to the General Land Office with report that the required
notations have been made on the records of the local land office.

Any

valid right existing at the date of the filing of the right of

way

application will not be affected by the filing or approval thereof.

(See paragraph

2.)

If no unpatented land

cation, the local officers will reject

it,

is involved in the appliallowing the usual right of

appeal.
25.

Upon

the approval of a

map

of location by the Secretary of

the Interior, the duplicate copy will be sent to the local

who

mark upon

will

officers,

the township plats the lines of the canals,

ditches, or reservoirs, as laid

down on

the map.

They

will also

note the approval in ink, on the tract books, opposite each tract

marked
26.

as required

When

by paragraph

24.

the canal, ditch, or reservoir

is

constructed, an

davit of the engineer and certificate of the applicant

and

6)

must be

filed in the local office, in duplicate, for

affi-

(Forms

5

transmission

office.
No new map will be required, except in case of deviafrom the right of way previously approved, whether before
or after construction, when there must be filed new maps and field
notes in full, as herein provided, bearing proper forms, changed to
agree with the facts in the case. The ma}) must show clearly the
portions amended or bear a statement describing them, and the location must be described in the forms as the amended survey and the
amended definite location. In such cases the applicant must file a

to this

tions

relinquishment, under seal, of

all rights under the former approval
amended, said relinquishment to take effect when
of amended definite location is approved by the honorable

as to the portions

the

map

Secretary.

If the canal or reservoir has been constructed on the

and

is

to be used until the canal or

location

is

ready for

location originally approved,

reservoir on the

amended

use, the relinquish-
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ment may be made to take effect upon the completion of the canal or
reservoir on the amended location.
27. The act approved February 2G, 1897 (29 Stat., 599), entitled
"An act to provide for the use and occupation of reservoir sites
reserved," permits the approval of applications under the above act
of 1891 for right of way upon reservoir sites reserved under authority
of the acts of October 2, 1888 (25 Stat., 505, 520), and August 30,

The

1890 (26 Stat., 371, 391).

text of the act

is

as follows:

House of Representatives of the United States
in Congress assembled, That all reservoir sites reserved or to be
reserved shall he open to use and occupation under the right-of-way act of March
And any State is hereby authorized to
third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one.
improve and occupy such reservoir sites to the same extent as an individual or
private corporation, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the
[nterior may prescribe: Provided, That the charges for water coming in whole
Be it
of America

enacted by the Senate and

or part from reservoir sites used or occupied under the provisions of this act
shall

always be subject to the control and regulation of the respective States and
which such reservoirs are in whole or part situate.

Territories in

When

an application is made under this act a reference to it should
added to Forms 4 and 6. In other respects the application should
he prepared according to the preceding regulations.
he

OIL PIPE LINES.
28.
act

The

act

approved

grant right of

to

May

the States of Colorado

and Wyoming,"

right-of-way act of

to the

21, 1896 (29 Stat., 127), entitled "An
over the public domain for pipe lines in

way

March

8,

tions furnish full information as to

papers.

is

similar in

its

requirements

and the preceding regulathe preparation of the maps and
1891,

Applicants will he governed thereby so far as they are

applicable.
29.

The

text of the act

is

as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United states
of America in Congress assembled. That the right of way through the public
lands of the United States situate in the State of Colorado and in the State of
Wyoming outside of the boundary lines of the Yellowstone National Park is
hereby granted to any pipe-line company or corporation formed for the purpose
of transporting oils, crude or refined, which shall have filed or may hereafter
file with the Secretary of the Interior a copy of its articles of incorporation, and
flue proofs of its organization under the same, to the extent of the ground occupied by said pipe line and twenty-five feet on each side of the center line of the
siime: also the right to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said
pipe line material, earth, and stone necessary for the construction of said pipe
line.

Sec

'2.

line

if

lands,

That any company or corporation desiring

to

secure the benefits of

months after the location of ten miles of the pipe
the same be upon surveyed lands; and if the same be upon nnsurveyc.l
within twelve months after' the survey thereof by the United States, file

this act

shall within twelve
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office for the district where such land is located a
and upon the approval thereof hy the Secretary of the Interior
the same shall be noted upon the plats in said office, and thereafter all such
lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to

with the register of the land

map

of

its line,

way.

;such right of

if any section of said pipe line shall not be completed within live
years after the location of said section the right herein granted shall be forfeited.
as to any incomplete section of said pipe line, to the extent that the same is not
completed at the date of the forfeiture.
Sec. 4. That nothing in this act shall authorize the use of such right of way
except for the pipe line, and then only so far as may be necessary for its construction, maintenance, and care.

Sec.

3.

That

RESERVOIRS FOR WATERING STOCK.

The

30.

"An

act

approved January

act providing for the location

reservoir sites,"

is

13,

1897 (29 Stat., T84), entitled

and purchase of public lands

for

as follows

enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the tinted states
in Congress assembled. That any person, live-stock company, or
transportation corporation engaged in breeding, grazing, driving, or transporting
live stock may construct reservoirs upon unoccupied public lands of the United
States, not mineral or otherwise reserved, for the purpose of furnishing water
to such live stock, and shall have control of such reservoir, under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and the lands upon which the same is
constructed, not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, so long as such reservoir
Provided, That such
is maintained and water kept therein for such purposes

Be

it

America

of

:

reservoir shall not be fenced and shall be open to the free use of any person

desiring to water animals of any kind.

Sec 2. That any person, live-stock company, or corporation desiring to avail
themselves of the provisions of this act shall file a declaratory statement in the
United States land office in the district where the land is situated, which
statement shall describe the land where such reservoir is to be or has been
constructed; shall state what business such corporation is engaged in; specify
the capacity of the reservoir in gallons, and whether such company, person, or
corporation has filed upon other reservoir sites within the same county ;. and if
so,

how many.

3. That at any time after the completion of such reservoir or reservoirs
which, if not completed at the date of the passage of this act, shall be constructed and completed within two years after filing such declaratory statement, such person, company, or corporation shall have the same accurately
surveyed, as hereinafter provided, and shall file in the United States land
office in the district in which such reservoir is located a map or plat showing
the location of such reservoir, which map or plat shall be transmitted by the
register and receiver of said United States land office to the Secretary of the
Interior and approved by him, and thereafter such land shall be reserved from
sale by the Secretary of the Interior so long as such reservoir is kept in repair
and water kept therein.
Sec 4. That Congress may at any time amend, alter, or repeal this act.

Sec.

31.

voir

Although the
sites,

title

indicates that lands are to be sold for reser-

the act does not provide for the sale of any lands, and

therefore no lands can be sold under

its

provisions.

The

act,

ever, directs the Secretary of the Interior to reserve the lands

howfrom
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approval of the
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the location of the

res-

ervoir.

Any

company, or transportation corporation
breeding, grazing, driving, or transporting live stock, in
order to obtain the benefits of the act must file a declaratory statement in the United States land office in the district where the land is
32.

engaged

person, live-stock

in

located.

When

33.

of

the applicant

articles, of

its

required in paragraph

5,

these papers are Hied with

thereto by

number

its

is a

corporation

subdivisions
its first

1.

drawn

will be sufficient in

accordance with

in

should

-2.

3,

4,

file

Form

i)

also a

copy

organization, as

its

5,

6,

declaratory statement,

by the company.
34. The declaratory statement must be
be

it

incorporation and proofs of

and
a

11.

IT

reference

any subsequent application

made under oath and should

(page 240), and must contain

the following statements:

The

county in which
has been constructed; the description by the
smallest Legal subdivisions (40-aere tracts or lots) of the land sought
to be reserved, under no circumstances exceeding 160 acres; that the
land is not occupied or otherwise claimed; that to the best of the applicant's knowledge and belief the land is not mineral or otherwise
reserved; the business of the applicant, including a full and minute
statement of the extent to which he is engaged in breeding, grazing.
driving, or transporting live stock, giving the number and kinds of
such stock, the place where they are being bred or grazed, and
whether within an enclosure or upon unenclosed lands, and also from
where and to where they are being driven or transported; the amount
and description of the land owned or claimed by the applicant in the
vicinity of the proposed reservoir; that no pail of the land sought to
First.

the reservoir

post-office address of the applicant; the
is

to be or

or will be fenced, but the same will be kept open to the
any person desiring to water animals of any kind; and
that the lands so sought to be reserved are not. by reason of their
proximity to other lands reserved for reservoirs, excluded from
reservation by the regulations and rulings of the Land Department.
Second. The location of the reservoir described by the smallest

be reserved

is

five use of

legal

subdivisions

(

tO-acre tracts or lots),

its

area in acres,

its

capac-

from which water is to be obtained for such
miles
reservoir, whether there air any streams or springs within
of the land sought to be reserved; and if so, where.
Third. The number, location, and area of all other reservoir sites
filed upon by the applicant, especially designating those located in
the same county.
gallons, the source

ity in

'2

35.

Upon

the filing of such declaratory statements there will be

5194—Vol. 34—05
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noted thereon the date of filing over the signature of the officer receiving it, and they will be numbered in regular order, beginning
with No. 1. The register will make the usual notations on the
records, in pencil, under the designation of " Reservoir declaratory

—

adding the date of the act. For the filing of
such reservoir declaratory statement the local officers will be authorized to charge the usual fees.
(Sec. 2238, U. S. Rev. Stat.)
The
declaratory statement will be forwarded with the regular monthly
returns, with abstracts, in the usual manner.
In acting upon these
statements the following general rules will be applied
statement, No.

,"

First. No reservation will be made for a reservior containing less
than 250,000 gallons, and for a reservior of less than 500,000 gallons
capacity not more than 40 acres can be reserved. For a reservoir
of 500,000 gallons and less than 1,000,000 gallons capacity not more
than 80 acres can be reserved. For a reservoir of 1,000,000 gallons
and less than 1,500,000 gallons capacity not more than 120 acres can

be reserved.

160 acres

may

For a reservoir of 1,500,000 gallons capacity or more
be reserved.

Second. Not more than 160 acres shall be reserved for this purpose
in

any

section.

'

Third. Not more than 160 acres shall be reserved for this purpose
group of tracts adjoining or cornering upon each other.

in one

Fourth. A distance of one-half mile must be left between any two
groups of tracts which aggregate more than 160 acres.
Fifth. The local officers will reject any reservoir declaratory statement not in conformity with these rules.
Sixth. Lands so reserved shall not be fenced, but shall be kept
open to the free use of any person desiring to water animals of any
kind.
If lands so reserved are at any time fenced or otherwise
inclosed, or if they are not kept open to the free use of any person
as aforesaid desiring to water animals of any kind, or if the reservoir
applicant attempts to use them for any other purpose, or if the reservation is not obtained for the bona fide and exclusive purpose of constructing and maintaining a reservoir thereon according to law, the
declaratory statement, upon any such matter being made to duly
appear, will be canceled and all rights thereunder be declared at aa
end.

Seventh. Notwithstanding the action of the local

officers in

accept

ing any such declaratory statement, the Commissioner of the General
Land Office will reject the same if upon considering the matters set
forth therein it does not appear that the declaratory statement is filed
in

good faith for the

sole

purpose of accomplishing what the law

authorizes to be done.
36. The reservoir, if not completed at the date of the act, shall be
completed and constructed within two years after the filing of the
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declaratory statement; otherwise the declaratory statement will be
subject to cancellation.
37. After the construction and completion of the reservoir the
applicant shall have the same accurately surveyed and mapped, in

accordance with the instructions of paragraphs 7 to 24, inclusive, so
The map and Held notes, which are not
far as they are applicable.
to be

prepared

field

38.

must be

in duplicate,

The map must hear Forms

10

and

11

filed

in the

(pages 2

11

proper local

office.

and 242), and the

notes must be sworn to

When

the local

by the surveyor.
and other papers have been filed in
the date of filing will he noted thereon and the proper

the

office,

notations will he

map.

field notes,

made on the local office records, as in the case of the
The maps and papers will then be promptly

declaratory statement.

forwarded to this office.
39. The map and papers will be examined by this office as to
their compliance with the law and the regulations, and to determine
whether the amount of land desired is warranted by the showing
made in the application. If found satisfactory they will be submitted to the honorable Secretary, and upon approval the lands
shown to be, necessary for the proper use and enjoyment of the
reservoir will be reserved from other disposition so long as the reservoir is maintained and water kept therein for the purposes named
the act.

in

40.

Upon

the receipt of notice of such reservation

the local officers will

report the
41.

make

from

this office

the proper notations on their records

making thereof promptly

to this

and

office.

In order that this reservation shall be continued

it

is

necessary

that the reservoir "shall be kept in repair and water kept therein."

For this reason the owner of the reservoir will be required during the
month of January of each year to file in the local office an affidavit
to the effect that the reservoir has been kept in repair and water kept
therein during the preceding year, and that all the provisions of the
act

have been complied with.

Form

12 (page 242) will be used for

file such affidavit steps will be taken
Upon
looking to the revocation of the reservation of the lands.

failure to

this affidavit.

!•_'.

If the reservoir

statement

may

be

is

filed,

located on unsurveyed land, the declarator)

the

lands

being described as closely

as

practicable.

examining the maps and papers of
whether the provisions of the
acts of Congress are properly complied with; whether the proposed
works are described in such a manner that the benefits to be granted
h>.

all

The duty of

this office in

these applications

is

to ascertain

under the various acts are defined so as to' avoid future uncertainty:
and whether the rights of other grantees of the Government are
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properly protected from interference.

made
4:4:.

The above

regulations are

for these purposes.

The widely

tions proposed

different conditions to be considered in the opera-

by the applicants make

regulations that will furnish this
all cases.

This

office

office

will therefore call

it impossible to formulate
with the data necessary in
for additional information

Avhenever necessary for the proper consideration of any particular
case.

PERMISSION TO USE RIGHT OF WAT FOR TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
LINES, ELECTRICAL PLANTS, CANALS, AND RESERVOIRS.
45.

The

act of

February

relating to rights of

other public lands,"

Be

is

1901 (31 Stat., 790), entitled "An act
certain parks, reservations, and
as follows
15,

way through

enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled. That the Secretary of the Interior
be, and hereby is, authorized and empowered, under general regulations to be
fixed by him, to permit the use of rights of way through the public lands, forest
and other reservations of the United States, and the Yosemite, Sequoia, and
General Grant national parks. California, for electrical plants, poles, and lines
for the generation and distribution of electrical power, and for telephone and
telegraph purposes, and for canals, ditches, pipes and pipe lines, flumes, tunnels,
or other water conduits, and for water plants, dams, and reservoirs used to
promote irrigation or mining or quarrying, or the manufacturing or cutting of
timber or lumber, or the supplying of water for domestic, public, or any other
beneficial uses to the extent of the ground occupied by such canals, ditches,
flumes, tunnels, reservoirs, or other water conduits or water plants, or electrical
or other works permitted hereunder, and not to exceed fifty feet on each side
of the marginal limits thereof, or not to exceed fifty feet on each side of the
center line of such pipes and pipe lines, electrical, telegraph, and telephone lines
and poles, by any citizen, association, or corporation of the United States, where
it is intended by such to exercise the use permitted hereunder or any one or
more of the purposes herein named: Provided, That such permits shall be
allowed within or through any of said parks or any forest, military. Indian, or
other reservation only upon the approval of the chief officer of the Department
under whose supervision such park or reservation falls and upon a finding by
him that the same is not incompatible with the public interest: Provided further. That all permits given hereunder for telegraph and telephone purposes
shall be subject to the provision of title sixty-five of the Revised Statutes of
the U"nited States, and amendments thereto, regulating rights of way for telegraph companies over the public domain: And provided further. That any perit

mission given by the Secretary of the Interior under the provisions of this act
may be revoked by him or his successor in his discretion, and shall not be held
to confer any right, or easement, or interest in, to, or over any public land,
reservation, or park.

This act, in general terms, authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior, under regulations to be fixed by him, to grant permission
to use rights of way through the public lands, forest and other
reservations of the United States, and the Yosemite, Sequoia, and
General Grant national parks in California, for every purpose con46.
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templated by acts of January 21, 1895 (28 Stat.. 63£), May 14, 1896
(29 Stat., 120), and section 1 of the act of May 11. L898 (30 Stat.,
KM ). and for other purposes additional thereto, except for tramroads,
the provisions relating to tramroads, contained in the act of 1895

section 1 of the act of 1898, aforesaid, remaining unmodified
not being in any manner extended.
in

Although

this act does not expressly repeal

and
and

any provision of law

relating to the granting of permission to use rights of way. contained
to, yet considering the general scope and purand Congress having, with the exception above
noted, embodied therein the main features of the former acts relative
to the granting of a mere permission or license for such use, it is
evident that, for purposes of administration, the later act should
control in so far as the same pertains to the granting of permission
Accordingly
to use rights of way for purposes therein specified.
all applications for permission to use rights of way for the purposes
specified in this act must be submitted thereunder. Where, however,
it is sought to acquire a right of way for the main purpose of irrigation, as contemplated by sections 18 to 21 of the act of March 3,
L891 (26 Stat.. 109:)). and section 2 of the act of May 11, 1898, supra,
the application must be submitted in accordance with the regulations
issued under said acts.
(See pages 215 to 223, inclusive.)
47. It is to be specially noted that this act does not make a grant
in the nature of an easement, but authorizes a mere permission in the
nature of a license, revocable at any time, and it gives no right what-

referred

in the acts

pose of the act,

ever to take from the public lands, reservations, or parks, adjacent

way, any material, earth, or stone for construction

to the right of

or other purpose.
48.
is

By

section 1 of the act of

February

1,

1905 (33 Stat., 028).

it

provided:
That the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture

shall,

from and after

this act, execute or cause to he executed all

laws affecting public
lands heretofore or hereafter reserved under the provisions of section twentyfour of the act entitled "An act to repeal the tinihor-culture laws, and for other
purposes," approved March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, and acts
Supplemental to and amendatory thereof, after such lands have heen so reserved, excepting such laws as affect the surveying, prospecting, locating, appro
the passage

priating,

of"

relinquishing, reconveying, certifying, or patenting of any

entering,

such lands.

Under

this provision

of Agriculture
tions

is

it

has been determined that the Department

invested with jurisdiction to pass upon

all

applica-

under any law of the United States providing for the granting

of a permission to occupy and use lands in a forest reserve, which

CUpation or use
will in

no wise

is

temporary

a fleet

in

character, and which,

the fee or cloud the

should the reserve be discontinued.

title

if

<><•

granted,

of the United States
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.Therefore, when it is desired to obtain permission to. use a right of
way over public lands wholly within a forest reserve, an application

should be prepared in accordance with the instructions issued by the
Department of Agriculture, and the same filed with the officer in

charge of such reserve.
Where, however, permission to use a right of way over lands
wholly outside of forest reserves is desired, the application must be
prepared and filed in accordance with the regulations contained in
paragraphs 5 to 24, inclusive, appropriate changes being made in the
prescribed forms so as to specify and relate to the act under which
is made.
In case the application involves rights and privileges upon public
lands partly within and partly without a forest reserve, separate apapplications must be prepared and the one affecting lands within the
forest reserve filed with the forest officer and the other filed in the
local land office.
Application for permission to use the desired right of way through
the public lands and parks designated in the act must be filed and
permission granted, as herein provided, before any rights can be
claimed thereunder. Permission may be given under this act (February 15, 1901) for rights of way upon unsurveyed lands, maps to be
prepared in accordance with the requirements of this circular.
49. An affidavit that the applicant is a citizen of the United States
must accompany the application, and if the applicant is an association of citizens, each must make affidavit of citizenship, and a complete list of the members thereof must be given in an affidavit by one
of them if not a native-born citizen, the applicant will be required to
The applicant must also set
file the usual proofs of naturalization.
forth in the affidavit the purposes for which the right of way is to be
used, and must show that he in good faith intends to utilize the same
for such purposes in the event his application therefor is granted.

the application

;

50.

When

application

is

made

for right of

way

for electrical or

water plants, the location and extent of ground proposed to be occupied by buildings or other structures necessary to be used in connection therewith must be clearly designated on the map and described

and forms by reference to course and distance from
In addition to being shown in connection with the main drawing, the buildings or other structures must
be platted on the map in a separate drawing on a scale sufficiently large
to show clearly their dimensions and relative positions.
When two
or more of such proposed structures are to be located near each other,
in the field notes
a

corner of the public survey.

it will be sufficient to give the reference to a corner of the public
survey for one of them provided all the others are connected therewith by course and distance shown on the map. The applicant must
also file an affidavit setting forth the dimensions and proposed use
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and must show definitely thai each one is
proper use of the right of way for the purposes con-

of each of the structures

necessary for

templated

in

a

the act.

Whenever

51.

parks designated

right of

a

in

way

is

located

the act, the applicant

upon any of the national
must show to the satis-

Department that the location and use of the right of
way for the purposes contemplated will not interfere with the uses
and purposes for which the park was originally dedicated and will
faction of the

not result in
Hi'

damage

or injury to the natural conditions of property

scenery existing therein.

When

the right of

way

of the designated national parks, the applicant must
tions

and bond required by paragraph

phone

3,

is

located in any

file

the stipula-

and, in the case of a

tele-

an additional stipulation incorporating the following:
"
completion of telephone lines they shall be subject
upon
That
(5)
to the free use of the park officers for all purposes incident to the
administration of the park."
line,

right of way within a park is desired for operations
with mining, quarrying, cutting timber, or manufacturing lumber, a satisfactory showing must be made of the applicant's
right to engage in such operations within the park.
53. Applications for right of way, under this act, all or any part
of which crosses or is located upon anj Indian reservation, before
being transmitted to the Department will be submitted by the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the Office of Indian Affairs
for such action and recommendation thereon as that office may deem
proper in so far as the same pertains to such Indian reservation.
Applicants will be required to furnish, in triplicate, so much of the
map and field notes as relate to that portion of the right of way
applied for, if any, within an Indian reservation; and in event the
application is subsequently granted, one copy of such portion of the
map and field notes as pertains to such reservation will be placed on
file in the Indian Office.
In this connection, attention is directed to
52.

Whenever

in connection

T

the provisions of section 3 of the act of

March

:',.

L901 (31 Stat.. 1083),

which authorizes the granting of permanent rights of way. in the
nature of easements, for telegraph and telephone purposes only,
through Indian reservations and other Indian lands upon payment of
proper compensation for the benefit of the Indians interested therein.
The provisions of the latter act and the nature and character of the
lights authorized to be secured thereunder differ materially from the
provisions contained in this act and the rights authorized to be conferred

thereunder.

Applicants, therefore, desiring to secure

per-

manent rights of way through Indian reservations or other Indian
lands for telegraph and telephone purposes will be required to submit
their applications therefor under the acl of March 3, L901, supra, in
For
accordance with the then current regulations issued thereunder.
(
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existing regulations under said act, see regulations approved

March

26, 1901.)
54. All applications for the use of a right of way under this act,
through any lands designated therein, for telegraph and telephone
purposes, must be accompanied by an official statement from the PostOffice Department showing that the applicant has complied with its
regulations under title sixty-five of the Revised Statutes of the
United States and amendments thereto.
55. Upon the filing of an application under this act, the register
will note the same in pencil on the tract books, opposite the tracts
traversed, giving date of filing and name of applicant, and also indorse on each map the date of filing over his written signature. If
it does not appear that some portion of the public lands or parks designated in the act would.be affected by the approval of such maps,
they will be returned to the applicant with notice of that fact. If
vacant public land or lands in any park so designated are affected by
the proposed right of way, the register will so certify on the map and
duplicate over his signature, and will promptly transmit the same to
the General Land Office with report that the required notations have
been made.
56. Upon receipt of applications for right of way by the General
Land Office, the same will be examined and then submitted to the
Secretary of the Interior with recommendation as to their approval.
Permission to use rights of way through any park designated in the
•act will only be granted upon approval of the chief officer of the Department under whose supervision such park falls and upon a finding
by him that the same is not incompatible with the public interest.
If the application, and the showing made in support thereof, is satis-

factory, the Secretary of the Interior will give the required permission in such

form

as

may

and

be deemed proper, according to the fea-

to be expressly understood, in accordance
with the final proviso of the act, that any permission given thereunder may be modified or revoked by the Secretary or his successor,

tures of each case;

it is

any time, and

any
any public land or park.
The final disposal by the United States of any tract traversed by the
permitted right of way is of itself, without further act on the part of
the Department, a revocation of the permission so far as it affects
that tract, and any permission granted hereunder is also subject to
such further and future regulations as may be adopted by the Dein his discretion, at

shall not be held to confer

right, easement, or interest in, to, or over

partment.
57.

When

permission to use the right of

way

applied for

is

given

copy of the original map will be
sent to the local officers, who will mark upon the township plats the
line of the right of way and will note in pencil, opposite each tract

by the Secretary of the

Interior, a
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of public land affected, that such permission has been given, the date
thereof, and a reference to the act.

TRAMROADS.
58.

The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to permit the use of
way for tramroads through the public lands of the United

rights of

States, not within the limits of

any park,

forest, military, or

reservation under the provisions of the act of Congress of

Indian

January

amended by section of the act of May 11,
The act of January 21, 1895, supra, entitled
permit the use of the right of way through the public

21, L895 (28 Stat..

635), a-

1

(30 Stat.. 404).

L898

"An

act

to

lands lor tramroads, canals, and reservoirs, and for other purposes,"
is

as follows:

Be it enacted by the senate ami House of Representatives of the United states
of America in Congress assembled, Thai the Secretary of the Interior be. and
hereby is. authorized and empowered, under general regulations to be fixed by
him, to permit the use of the right of way through the public lands of the United
States, not within the limits of any park, forest, military, or Indian reservation,
for tramroads, canals, or reservoirs to the extent of the ground occupied by the
water of the canals and reservoirs and t\Uy feet on each side of the marginal
limits thereof; or fifty feet on each side of the center line of the tramroad, by
any citizen or any association of citizens of the United States engaged in the
business of mining or quarrying or of cutting timber and manufacturing
lumber.

This act was amended by section

1

of the act of

May

11, 1898,

supra, as follows:

Be it (united by the senate and House of Representatives of the United states
America in Congress assembled, That the act entitled "An act to permit the
esc of the right of way through the public lands for tramroads. canals, and
reservoirs, and for other purposes." approved January twenty-first, eighteen
hundred and ninety-five. be. and the same is hereby, amended by adding thereto

of

the following

"Thai the Secretary of the Interior be. and hereby is. authorized and
empowered, under general regulations to be fixed by him, to permit the use of
right of way upon the public lands of the United States, not within limits of
any park, forest, military, or Indian reservations, for tramways, canals, or
reservoirs, to the extent of the ground occupied by the water of the canals and
reservoirs, and fifty feet on each side of the marginal limit thereof, or fifty feet
on each side of the center line of the tramroad, by any citizen or association of
citizens of the United suites. Cor the purposes of furnishing water for domestic,
public, and other beneficial uses."
59.

Applications for permission to use rights of way for tramroads

should be prepared and filed in accordance with the regulations hereinbefore prescribed relative to presentation of applications for rights of
way under the act of February IT), 11)01, and the then current regulations issued
l

s 7o

the

under the general railroad right-of-way

act of

March

(for existing regulations under the lattei act see 32 L. D.,

prescribed

forms

in

such

I

3,

s
1

).

regulations being so modified as to
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specify and relate to the acts under which the application is made.
It is to be specially noted that the acts relating to traniroads do not

authorize the granting of permission to use rights of way for such
purpose within the limits of any park, forest, military, or Indian
reservation, and it is to be further noted that permission to use rights
of way for tramroads over public lands, when granted, only confers
a right in the nature of a license and is subject to all the conditions
and limitations hereinbefore stated in paragraph 56 of these regulations.

RIGHT OF WAY OVER FOREST RESERVES FOR DAMS, RESERVOIRS, WATER
PLANTS, DITCHES, FLUMES, PIPES, TUNNELS, AND CANALS FOR MUNICIPAL OR MINING PURPOSES.
60.

Section 4 of the act of Congress approved February

1,

1905

(33 Stat,, 628), reads as follows:
Sec.

4.

That rights of way for the construction and maintenance of dams,
water plants, ditches, flumes, pipes, tunnels, and canals, within and

reservoirs,

across the forest reserves of the United States, are hereby granted to citizens

and corporations of the United States for municipal or mining purposes, and
for the purposes of the milling and reduction of ores, during the period of their
beneficial use, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Interior, and subject to the laws of the State or Territory in
which said reserves are respectively situated.
61. This act grants rights of way through forest reserves to citizens and corporations of the United States for the objects therein

specified,

during the period of their beneficial

use,

under rules and

regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and
subject to the laws of the State or Territory in

which said reserves

are respectively situated.

All applications for the right of
in said act,
62.
is

The

way

must be submitted thereunder

right granted

is

for the purposes set forth
in accordance herewith.

not in the nature of a grant of lands, but

and right of use of
act, during the period
the right terminates and

a base or qualified fee, giving the possession

the land for the purposes contemplated by the
of the beneficial use.

When

the use ceases,

thereupon proper steps will be taken to revoke the grant.
No right, whatever, is given to take from any part of the reserva-

any material, earth, or stone for construction or other purposes,
it give any right to use any land outside of what is actually
necessary for the construction and maintenance of the works.
63. Applications for right of way under this act should be made
in the form ol a map and field notes, in duplicate, and must be filed
in the local land office for the district in which the land traversed by
the right of way is situate; if in more than one district, duplicate
maps and field notes need be filed in only one district and single sets
in the others.
The maps, field notes, evidence of water rights, etc.,

tion

nor does
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corporation, the articles. of incorpora-

a

and proofs of organization must be prepared and filed in accordto 23, inclusive, appropriate changes being
ance with paragraphs
made in the prescribed forms so as to specify and relate to the act
under which the application is made.
(54. An affidavit that the applicant is a citizen of the United States
must accompany the application, and if the applicant is an association of citizens, each must make affidavit of citizenship, and a complete list of the members thereof must be given in an affidavit of one
A copy of their articles of association must also he furof them.
nished, or if there he none, the fact must he stated over the signature
tion

1

of each
If the

member

of the association.

applicant

is

not a native-born citizen,

lie

must

file

the usual

The applicant must set forth in the affithe purposes for which the right of way is desired.
When application is made for right of way for water plant-,

proof of naturalization.
davit
65.

the location
ings, or

and extent of ground proposed

to he

occupied by build-

other structures necessary to he used in connection therewith,

must he clearly designated on the map and described in the held notes
and forms by reference to course and distance from a corner of the
In addition to being shown in connection with the
public survey.

main drawing, the buildings or other structures must he platted on
the map in a separate drawing on a scale sufficiently large to show
clearly their dimensions and relative positions.
When two or more
of such structures are to he located near each other,
cient to give the reference to a

them, provided

shown on

all

it

will he suffi-

corner of the public survey for one of

others air connected therewith by course and dis-

map.
The applicant must also

tance

the

file an affidavit setting forth the dimenand proposed use of each of the structures and must show definitely that each is necessary to a proper enjoyment of the right of
way granted by the act.
66. The applicant must file with each application under this act
a stipulation, under seal, incorporating the conditions set forth in
subdivisions 1. -2. :\. and t of paragraph 3.
The applicant will also he required to give bond to the Government of the United States, to he approved by the Commissioner of
the Genera] Land Office, such bond stipulating that the makers
thereof will pay to the United States " for any and all damage to

sions

the public lands, timber, natural curiosities, or other public property
on such reservation, or upon the Lands of the United States. by reason
ol

Mich use and occupation of the reserve, regardless of the cause or

Dished by any surety
of the act of

August

company
13, 18!)

1

damage may

occur."
A bond furcomplied with the provisions
(28 Stat.. 279), will he accepted, and

circumstances under which such

that has
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must run in the terms of the stipulation above quoted. The amount
of the bond can not be fixed until the application has been submitted
to the General Land Office, when a form of the bond will be furnished and the amount fixed.
No construction can be allowed on the reservation until an applica-

way has been regularly filed in accordance herewith and has been approved by the Department, or has been considered and permission specifically given by the Secretary of the
tion for right of

Interior.
07.

Upon

the filing of an application, under this act, the register

will note the

same

in pencil

on the tract books, opposite the tracts

traversed, giving date of filing

map

indorse on each
filing

If

the

name

and name of applicant, and also
office and the date of the

of the land

over his written signature.
it

reserve

does not appear that some portion of the public lands in

would be

affected by the approval of such maps, they will

be returned to the applicant with notice of that fact.

If unpatented

lands are affected by the proposed right of way, the register will

on the map and duplicate, over his signature, and will
promptly transmit the same to the General Land Office, with report
that the required notations have been made.
68. Upon the approval of a map of location by the Secretary of
the Interior, the duplicate copy will be sent to the local officers,
who will mark upon the township plats the lines of the right of way
as laid down on the map.
They will also note the approval in ink
on the tract books, opposite each legal subdivision affected, with a
reference to the act mentioned on the map.
W. A. Richards,
Commissioner.
Approved September 28, 1905.
Thos. Ryan,
so certify

:

A cting

Secretary.

FORMS FOR "DUE PROOFS" AND VERIFICATION OF MAPS OF RIGHT
OF WAY FOR CANALS, DITCHES, AND RESERVOIRS.
Form
I,

-

—

.

1.

Company, do

secretary (or president) of the

hereby certify that the organization of said company has been completed; that
the company is fully authorized to proceed with construction according to the
existing laws of the State (or Territory) of
and that the copy of the
articles of association (or incorporation) of the company tiled in the Depart,

ment of the Interior is a true and correct copy of the same.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my name and the corporate
the company this
day of
in the year ID
,

[Seal of company.]

seal of

—

—

.

of the

Company.
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I,

do certify that

,

pany, and that the following

a

is

am

I

true
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2.

Com-

the president of the

of the officers of the said company,

list

name and

official designation of each, to wit: (Here insert the full
designation of each officer.)
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my name and the corporate seal of
in the year 190
day of
the company this

With the

full

name and

official

—

,

[Seal of company.]

,

Company.

President of the

Form
State ok
Count y of

3.

,

,

ss:

being duly sworn, says he is the chief engineer of (or the per- Company; that the
son employed to make the survey by) the
survey of said company's (canals, ditches, and reservoirs), described as follows:
(Here describe each canal, ditch, lateral, and reservoir for which right of way
,

is asked, as required by paragraph 23, being a total length of canals, ditches.
- acres),
miles, and a total area of reservoirs of
and laterals of
was made by him (or under his direction) as chief engineer of the company
(or as surveyor employed by the company) and under its authority, commenced
19
19
on the
day of
and ending on the
day of
"land that the survey of the said (canal, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs)
accurately represents (a proper grade line for the flow of water, and accurately
represents a level line, which is the proposed water line of the said reservoir) ],
and that such survey is accurately represented upon this map and by the accompanying field notes, a [And no lake or lake bed, stream or stream bed. is
used for the said (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs) except as shown on
,

this

,

,

—

map.]

Sworn and subscribed
|

—

SEAL.

to before

me

day of -

this

—

,

19-

|

Notary Public.

Form
I.

,

Company; that

—

4.

I
am president of the
subscribed the accompanying affidavit,

do hereby certify that

the chief engineer of

(or

,

who

was employed

to

make

the survey by)

is

the said com-

pany; thai the survey of the said (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs), as
map and by the accompanying field notes, was

accurately represented on this

made under authority of the company;
by

its

that

articles of incorporation to construct

the

company

the said

is

duly authorized

(canals, ditches. laterals,

and reservoirs) upon the location shown upon this map; that the said (canals.
and reservoirs), as represented on this map and by said field

ditches, laterals,

"This clause to be omitted

in

applications for telephone and telegraph

lines.
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notes,

the

was adopted by the company, by resolution of its board
19
as the definite location of the said
day of -

— —

— —

,

,

of directors, on
(canals, ditches,

—

— (describe as

in Form 3)
« [and
used for the said (canals,
ditches, laterals, and reservoirs) except as shown on this map]
and that the
map has been prepared to be filed for the approval of the Secretary of the Inte-

and reservoirs) described as follows

laterals,

that no lake or lake bed, stream or stream bed

is

;

order that the company

rior, in

may

obtain the benefits of

Congress approved March

(sections 18 to 21,

&

"An act to
repeal timber-culture laws, and for otlier purposes," and section 2 of the act
inclusive, of the act of

approved

May

described

is

1898)

11,

;

desired for the

3,

1891, entitled

and I further certify that the right of way herein
main purpose of irrigation/'
President of the

—

Company,

Attest
[Seal of company.]

,

Secretary.

Form
State of
County of

5.

,

s.s:

,

being duly sworn, says that he is the chief engineer of (or was
employed to construct) the (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs) of the
Company; that said (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs) have been
constructed under his supervision, as follows: (Describe as required in paragraph 23) a total length of constructed (canals, ditches, and laterals) of miles, and a total area of constructed reservoirs of
acres that construc19
tion was commenced on the — — day of and completed on the —
19
clay of
that the constructed (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs), as aforesaid, conform to the map and field notes which received the
19
day of
approval of the Secretary of the Interior on the
,

;

— —
,

—

,

—

,

;

—

,

Sworn and subscribed

to before

me

this

day of

,

19-

[SEAL.]

Notary Public.

Form
I.

,

do certify that

I

am

the president of the

Company:

that the (canals, ditches, laterals, and reservoirs) described as follows (describe

Form

accompanying afficompany
in the premises), and on the exact location represented on the map and by the
day of
field notes approved by the Secretary of the Interior, on the
19
and that the company has in all things complied with the requirements

as in

davit of

5)

were actually constructed as
,

set forth in the

chief engineer (or the person employed by the

,

—

;

This clause to be omitted in applications for telephone and telegraph lines.
Here insert the description of the act of Congress under which the application is made when filed under some other act than that of 1801 and 1898.
cOr, where filed under other acts than that of 1891 and 1898, state the purposes for which right of way is applied for.
a

i>
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of Congress**

of the acl

:*>.

L891,

granting right of way
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canals,

for

and reservoirs through the public lands of the United States).

ditches,

Company.

President of the
Attest

—

:

[Seal of company.

|

Secretary.

FOBM

7.

Under ad February

|

l.~>.

L901.]

State of
County of

—

being duly sworn, says he

.

person employed by)

the—

is

the chief engineer of

(or the

company, under whose supervision the survey

was made <>f the grounds selected by the company for structures for electrical
purposes under the act of Congress approved February 15, 1901, said grounds
township
being situated in the — - quarter of the — — quarter of section
- principal meridian; that the accompanying drawing
range
correctly represents the locations of the said structures; and that in his belief
the structures represented are actually and to their entire extent required for
the necessary uses contemplated by the said act of February 15, 1901 (HI
.

—

,

,

Stat, 790).

Subscribed and sworn to before

me

day of

this

Chief Engineer.
19

—— —
,

[seal.]

,

Notary Public.

Form

I,

,

pany

8.

nder act of February

|I

do hereby certify that

I

15,

am

1901.]

the president of the

—

—

com-

the survey of the structures represented on the

accompanying drawing was made under authority and by direction of the company, and under the
its chief engineer (or the person employed in the premsupervision of
ises), whose affidavit precedes this certificate; that the survey as represented on
the accompanying drawing actually represents the structures required in the
of range
quarter of the
of township
quarter of section
- principal meridian, for electrical purposes, under the act of Congress.
approved February 15, 1901 and that the company, by resolution of its board
of directors, passed on the
19
day of
directed the proper officers
to present the said drawing for the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in
Order that the company may obtain the use of the grounds required for said
structures, under the provisions of said act approved February 15, 1901 (31
:

tli.u

—

,

—

,

,

,

;

,

Stat..

—

,

790).

Company.

President of the
I

Seal of the

Attest

company.

I

:

Secretary.

"Here
cation

is

insert

the description of the

made, when

tiled

;ict

under some other

of Congress under
act

which the appli

than that of 1891,
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Form

9.

Reservoir declaratory statement.

[Under act of Jan.
Res. D.
No.

13,

1897 (29

Stat.. 481).]

Land Office at

S.
i

.

,

.

J"

—

-

of

do hereby certify that

,

19—.

am

president of the
- com pany, and on behalf of said company, and under its authority, do
hereby apply for the reservation of land in
County, State of
for
the construction and use of a reservoir for furnishing water for live stock under
the provisions of the act of January 13, 1897 (29 Stat., 484). The location of
I,

,

,

I

,

and of the land necessary for its use, is as follows:
of
township
of range —
M., containing
acres
I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the said land is
not occupied or otherwise claimed, is not mineral or otherwise reserved, and
said reservoir

section

in

—

,

that the said reservoir
cant of

is

used in connection with the business of the appli-

to be

The land owned or claimed by the applicant within the
reservoir (within three miles)

is

as follows:

vicinity of the said

.

further certify that no part of the land to be reserved under this application
same shall be kept open to the free use of any
person desiring to water animals of any kind that the land will not be used
I

is

or will be fenced; that the

;

any purpose except the watering of stock and that the land

is not, by reason
proximity to other lands reserved for reservoirs, excluded from reservation by the regulations and rulings of the land department.
of
acres, in
The water of said reservoir will cover an area of
section
in township
of range
of said lands; the capacity of the
The source
— gallons, and the dam will be
feet high.
reservoir will be —
of the water for said reservoir is

for

of

its

,

,

—

and there are no streams or springs within two miles of the land to be reserved
except as follows
The applicant has hied no other declaratory statements under this act except
as follows
.

:

No.

,

No.

,

No.

,

No.
No.
No.
No.

,

,

——

No.
No.

,

,

No.

—
—

Total,

—

And

,

I

,

,

-

—
—
-

- land

office,

land

office,

land
land
land
land
land
- land
- land
- land

office,

-

-

acres, of

office,
office,
office,
office,

office,
office,
office,

area
area
area
area
area
area
area
area
area
area

which Nos.

further certify that

it

is

to be reserved

acres.

— be reserved - -

to be reserved

acres.

to

acres.

to be reserved
to be reserved
to be reserved
to be reserved

to be reserved
to be reserved
to

acres.

—
—
—
—

-

acres.

acres.
acres.

acres.
acres.

be reserved — - acres.
are located in said county.

the bona fide purpose and intention of tbis

applicant to construct and complete said reservoir ami maintain the same

in
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ad

accordance with the provisions of said
pre or may be prescribed thereunder.
Seal of company.

of Congress

_?

4

1

and such regulations us
•

I

I

Attest

:

Secretary.

State oi
Co n ill of
ii

being duly sworn, deposes and says thai the statements herein
true to the besl of his knowledge and belief.

made are
Sworn

me

to iiiul subscribed before

day of

this

.

the year

in

—

[SEAL.]

1!)

—

A otary Public.

When the applicant is a corporation the form should be executed by its presi
Note.
When the applicant is oot a cor
dent, under its sent, and attested by its secretary.
als, strike out the words in italics.
f individ
poration or an association
<

Land

(

>i

i

u

i;

at

.

19—.

,

I.

register of the laud office, do hereby certify

.

going application
right to the

for the reservation of lands subject

is

visions of the acl

January

of

same; and

thai

1897;

13,

the land

thai

is

the fore-

thereto under the pre
no prior valid adverse

by reason of

oot,

is

there

thai

its

proximity

to

other

lands reserved for reservoirs, excluded from reservation by the regulations and
rulings of

t

lie

Fees. S

land department.

—

paid.

Register.

The description

should include "a full and
engaged in breeding, grazing,
driving, or transporting live stock, giving the number and kinds of such stock.
the place where they are being bred or grazed, and whether within an inclosure
or upon nninclosed lands, and also from where and to where they are being
of the business of the .applicant

minute statement of the extent

which he

to

Circular Juno 23, L899

driven or transported."

Form
STATE

OB

is

LO.

,

County of

,

ss.

being duly sworn, says that he is the person who was employed
lo make the survey of a reservoir covering an area of
acres, the initial
there describe as required by paragraph 23
point of the survey being
Baid reservoir liaving been constructed upon the
quarter of the
quarter
<>f section
township
range
principal meridian, as pro
.

>

—

.

posed

;

,

reservoir declaratory statement, No.

which was filed in the local
under the provisions of the act of January 13, 1897 (29
stat.. 184); thai the said survey was made on the
day
19
thai the dam and all necessary works have been constructed in a substantial
manner; thai the reservoir lias a capacity of
gallons, and
the time of
i>y

land office at

.

.

>i

,

.-it

said survey contained

gallons

Sworn and subscribed

to

before

me
'

<

f

water.

this

(

|.-iy

f

|«

(

(

[SEAL.]

Votary Public.
oP.»l

vol.

".

I

05

m

Hi

;
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Form

11.

—

- company
do certify that I am the president of the
I am the person who filed) reservoir declaratory statement,
— that the reservoir proposed has heen
in the local land office at No.
township
quarter of the — — quarter of section
constructed upon the
- acres,
principal meridian, covering an area of
range
- (describe as in Form 10)
that the
the initial point of the survey heing —
dam and all necessary works have been constructed in a substantial manner in
good faith in order that the reservoir may be used and maintained for the purposes, and in the manner prescribed by the said act of January 13, 1897 (20
Stat, 484), the provisions of which have been and will be complied with in all
I,

,

which

filed

(or that

,

;

,

—

,

.

;

respects.

[Seal of company.]

,

President of the Company.
Attest
Secretary.

Form
State of
Co

12.

,

it

nt a of

,

ss:

being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the president or
company which filed (or that he is the person who filed) reservoir
the
in the local land office at
declaratory statement. No.
that the reservoir constructed in pursuance thereof, as heretofore certified, has been kept
in repair that water has been kept therein to the extent of not less than
that neither the reservoir
gallons during the entire calendar year of 19
nor any part of the land reserved for use in connection therewith is or has
been fenced during said years, and that the said company has in all things complied with the provisions of the act of January 13, 1897 (29 Stat 484).
,

—

,

;

;

—

;

.

Com pa n y.

Pes id cut of

Sworn and subscribed

to before

me

day of

this

,

19

—

[seal.]

,

Notary Public,

PRIVATE ENTRY—ACT OF AUGUST

30, 1890.

Lester B. El wood.
The provision

August 30, 1890, limiting the amount of land to
be acquired by any one person, under the public land laws,
to 320 acres, has no application to private cash entries made under the pro-

which

title

in the act of

may

visions of section 2354 of the Revised Statutes.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

November

(F. L. C.)

With your

letter of

August

10,

1905,

Land

Office,

(E. F. B.)

2, 1905.

you transmit the appeal of

Lester B. Elwoocl from the decision of your

office

of

May

15, 1905,
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holding for cancellation private cash entries of lands in the State of
Missouri made by sundry purchasers, whose names with a description
of the lands respectively entered arc fully described in your said

May

decision of

L5, L905.

These entries were made at the instance of A. R. Jackson, as agenl
for C. A. Brickman, who transmitted t<> the local officers at Booneville,
Missouri, the applications of the several entrymen in one envelope,
There was no conwith one draft covering the various purchases.
cealment of the fad that Jackson was securing the title to these lands
at private cash entry a- agent for C. A. Brickman and had the cash
certificates issued to the persons

respectively

the tracts

chased by appellant,

named

applied

who now hold-

in

the several applications for

They were subsequently

for.

pur-

the title to them.

You directed an investigation for the purpose of determining
whether the entrymen were seeking the land- for their own benefil
or were acting for others, either directly or indirectly.
Upon being
advised of the fact- above stated, yon held the entries for cancellation, for the reason that the law limits the area to 320 acres in the
aggregate which any one person may acquire of the non-mineral
public lands.

The lands
and

question were public lands

in

in

the State of Missouri

the time of the issuance of the final certificate were subject to

at

sale at private cash entry

under section 2354, Revised Statutes, which

provides that
All

when

the public lands,

offered

private sale,

.-it

may

he purchased, at the

option of the purchaser, in entire sections, half-sections, quarter-sections, half
quarter-sections, or quarter quarter-sections.

The

of

act

cash entry

all

March

2,

L889 (25 Stat.. 854), withdrew from private
in the State of Missouri, and !<>

public land- except

further provide for the disposal of public lands in said State
vate cash entry the

ad

of

May

distinction between offered
section of said act

it

is.

L898 (30 Stat.,

LI 8),

at

pri-

abolished the

and unoffered lands, and by the second

provides

That
to

all public lands within the State of .Missouri shall hereafter he subjeel
dispn sal at private sale in the manner now provided by law for the sale of

lands which have horn publicly offered for sale, whether such lands have ever
been offered at public sale or not
Provided, That the actual settlers shall have
preference right, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the
:

;'

Interior

By

may

prescribe.

that provision all public land- in the State of Missouri,

offered or unoffered,

were subjeel

when

as

state>. tin

1

that

section

only restriction

whether

private cash entry under

in the same nianner and to the same
was applicable in all the public land
upon the righl being that actual settlers

the provisions of section 235^

extent

to sale at
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have

shall

preference right under such rules and regulations as the

a

Secretary of the Interior

The

may

prescribe.

instructions issued under that act are contained in the circular

of June

1898 (27 L. D., 68), which provides that—

10,

made after the passage of"
duly corroborated affidavit showing that
there is no one other than himself claiming said land as an actual settler.
In
other respects you will take action under existing regulations, treating all public
lands as unoffered.
In

applications to purchase land at private sale

all

this act, the applicant

There

is

must furnish

a

nothing in the circular requiring the purchaser to show-

that he desires the lands for himself or that prevents the purchase

being

made through an

there

is

agent.
All that he is required to show is that
no other than himself claiming the land as an actual settler.
If there is no settler claiming a preference right the applicant may
purchase whether lie is a settler or not.
In this case the land was not entered with a view to occupation,
entry or settlement under any of the land laws that limit the quantity
that any one person may acquire under such laws, but to purchase it
at private cash sale, and there is nothing in the act or law under which
the purchase was made that limits or restricts the purchaser to

quantity.

You

held that the right of purchase at private cash entry was

restricted

by the act of August

30,

1890 (26 Stat., 391), providing

that—
*

No person who

shall after the passage of this act, enter

upon any of the

public lands with a view to occupation, entry or settlement under any of the

land laws, shall he permitted to acquire title to 'more than three hundred and
in the aggregate, under all of said laws; hut this limitation shall
not operate to curtail the right of any person who has heretofore made entry
or settlement on the public lands, or whose occupation, entry or settlement is

twenty acres

validated by this act.

That

March

act has been

construed by the 17th section of the act of

1891 (26 Stat., 1095), to refer to agricultural lands and not
lands entered under the mineral law, but it is evident that the act of

August

3,

30.

1890,

and the explanatory

act of

March

3,

1891,

had

reference to lands under the general land laws that limit the quantity
that

may

be taken under one entry and not to purchasers at private

under laws that contain no restriction whatever as to
That
question is settled by the principle that controlled
quantity.
decision
of
the Department in the case of John W. Clarkson
in the
D.,
and
Instructions (33 L. D., 606).
L.
399)
(31
As it appears from the statement in your letter that the affidavit
required by tin' circular appears with each of the entries, your decision holding them for cancellation is reversed.
cash entries

the public lands.

decisions relating to

isolated tracts containing less tiiw fort's
sion of applications.
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lcres— suspen-

Circular.

Department of the

Interior,

General Land )ffice,
Washington, D. ('., Novi mber
1905.
Registers and Receivers, United States Land Offices.
Sirs: Ln departmental order of September 26, L905 not reported],
suspending certain islands from disposal, it was said:
(

(

.'/,

|

This suspension

made with

submitting to Congress the question
for the disposal of small and
isolated tracts other than is provided for by the general land laws now in force
where it is evident that such tracts are not adapted for the use and purposes
contemplated by such laws.
is

whether some provision should

view

a

not

to

made

be

In compliance with this order, yon are directed to receive and suspend, without

further action,

all

applications to enter, select, pur-

and disconnected tracts, presented after
November L5, L905, which embrace Less than forty acres, until yon
receive further instructions from this office.
This order is not intended to affect entries made under the act of

June

locate,

or

chase,

17.

L902,

isolated

commonly known

Very respect

J.

Approved
K.

as the reclamation act.

fully,

H. Fimple, Acting Commissioner.

:

A Hitchcock,

St 'cretary.

SCHOOL LAND—INDEMNITY SELECTION.
State or California.
.»n."».
in rule 2 of the instructions of March
that with each
indemnity school selections " a certificate of the proper authorities
thai the base lands have net been sold, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of.'*
shall be furnished by the State, adhered to.

The requirement
list

»'».

(

l

of

Secretary Hitchcock

to the

Commissioner of

November h
'

(F. L. (\)

General Land

tht

1905.

'

Office,

(G. B. G.)

your office decicompliance with departmental
instructions of February 21, L901 (30 L. I)..
). and March 6, L903
(32 L. I).. 39), the State must file with each list of indemnity school
-elections a certificate from the county recorder a- to the status of the
This

is

the appeal of the State of California from

sion of April 17. L905,

holding that,

in

I

«

>

1

base lands offered in support of the -election.

Section 2 of the instructions of February 21, L901, supra, which
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relate to selections on account of losses or waivers of base lands in

forest reservations, provides:

The

State will be required to

tile

with each

list

of selections a certificate by

or officers, charged with the care and disposal of such school lands,
that the State has not encumbered, sold or disposed of, nor agreed to encumber, sell or dispose of, any of the said lands, used as bases, and that no part of

the

officer,

said lands

the State.

is

in the

possession of any third party, under any law of permission of

There must also be

filed

with

all lists a certificate

from the recorder

of deeds, or official custodian of the records of transfers of real estate in the

proper county, that no instrument purporting to convey or in any
the title to any of said lands, is on file or of record in his office.

Kule

2 of the instructions of

on

March

6,

1903. supra,

way encumber

which

relate

mineral character
of the base lands, provides that the State shall furnish " a certificate
of the proper authorities that the base lands have not been sold, encumbered or otherwise disposed of."
It is submitted on behalf of the State that these conditions are
to selections based

losses because of the alleged

unreasonably burdensome and in some instances prohibitory, and requested that they be modified.
The regulations in question received most careful consideration.

was thought then, and upon further consideration is still believed,
would adequately safeguard
the interests of the United States in the matter of these indemnity
selections.
If, as suggested on behalf of the State of California,
It

that nothing less than therein required

may

charge unreasonable fees for
is unfortunate, but no
satisfactory relief suggests itself to this Department.
Other States
are complying with these regulations, and from informal inquiry in
your office it satisfactorily appears that from the standpoint of the
interests of the United States the rule should not be relaxed in the
interests of the State of California.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.

county recorders

in

that

State

these certificates, the situation for that State

swamp (.hant-character of land-effect of patent.
State of Louisiana.
The issuance

of patent upon entries embracing lands alleged by the State to
have passed to it under its swamp land grant terminates the jurisdiction of
the land department thereover: and any question as to the character of the
lands and whether the issuance of patent therefor was inadvertent will he
inquired into only for the purpose of determining whether recommendations

should he made for the institution of suit to set aside the patent. The
question as to whether the issuance of patent amounted to an adjudication
that said lands were not swamp, and therefore did not pass to the State
under its grant, is one for determination by the courts, and not by the land
department.
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Commissiom r of
November h 1905.

Secretary Hitchcock to the
(

This

is

it-

1

1.

Offici

,

(G. B. G.)

the appeal of the Stale of Louisiana

January

swamp

Gem ml La ml

'

V. L. (V)

sion of

the
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from your

office deci-

under
Orleans

L905, holding for rejection the State's claim

New

land grant to numerous tracts of land in the

land district, specifically described in said decision.
appeal-- from the papers

It

accompanying the appeal, or from the

have been entered.
under the public land laws, and that patents have
issued therefor to the claimants under those law-, the Latest of which
It further appears that the claim of
issued more than ten years ago.
the State under its swamp grants was made in apparent compliance
files

of your

that all of the tracts involved

office,

located, or -old

with regulations then in force, after the dates of said entries, locations,

and

sales, hut

before the issuance of patent.

is put upon the ground that the issuance
under this state of facts was in law an adjudication
that said land was not swamp, and therefore did not pass under the
It is urged upon the appeal that
grants of swamp land- to the State.
that the State's claim
there was in law and fact no such adjudication

The

decision of your office

of these patents

;

to these

lands has never been considered,

land department

:

that the records

and

much

files

less

adjudicated, by the

of your

office

contain con-

documentary evidence that said lands are, and were, swamp
and overflowed lands within the meaning of said grants: and it is
asked that your office be directed to certify to the Department the
necessary data to establish these facts, and that the Secretary of the
clusive

Interior render

a

decision

upon the swampy or non-swampy character

of -aid land-.
It

i-

land department or the Secretary of the
head thereof, has jurisdiction over the land in-

not believed that the

Interior, as the official

volved for any purpose.

The

issuance of the patents aforesaid trans-

ferred that jurisdiction to the courts.

The question

as to the char-

—

and the inadvertent issue of patent therefor if,
indeed, such action was inadvertent
would only be cognizable here
for the purpose of ascertaining whether recommendation should be
made to the Department of Justice for the institution of suits to set

acter of these land-

—

ThiS question has been settled by lapse of time.
have elapsed since the last of these patents issued,
and under the limitation placed on actions of the sort suggested, by

aside the patents.

More than

six years

section 8 of the act of

March 3, L891 (26 Stat., L093,
The question whether the

could not be maintained.
patents

amounted

L095), the action

issuance of these

upon the character of the lands is
one for the courts, if it be made the subject of further inquiry, and
BUch inquiry can only be had upon an action or actions by the State
itself, or persons claiming through (he State.
Whatever may be the
to adjudications
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purpose of the State in asking this Department to make a specific
finding as to the character of these lands, it will be enough to say that,
if

such finding in law has not already been made, the courts offer a

forum for the adjudication of that question.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.

lands in round valley indian reservation opened to settle-

ment and entry.
Instructions.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, November 7,

1905.

Registers and Receivers,

San Francisco, and Eureka, California.
Gentlemen: The act of February 8, 1905
vides for the survey and reappraisement of

all

(33 Stat., TOG), prothe lands, relinquished

from the Round Valley Indian Reservation in the State of California
under the act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat,, 058), which had not been
theretofore disposed of; and that the said lands, when surveyed and
appraised, shall be subject to settlement and entry under the provisions of the homestead laws of the United States.
Said lands having been surveyed and reappraised in accordance
with the provisions of said act and said reappraisement having been
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the hour of 9 o'clock a. m.,
January 15, 1906, has been fixed as the time on and after which the
lands described in the schedule hereto attached will be opened to
settlement and entry.
The lands will be subject to settlement and entry under the homestead laws and the right of commutation under section 2301, Revised
Statutes, is expressly, conferred by the act; they will be subject to
entry under section 2300, R, S., by those entitled to make entry thereunder, as the law does not limit entries to actual settlers, but in ease
entry is allowed under said section 2306, the entryman will be required
to make payment of the appraised price for the lands embraced
therein; and declaratory statements under section 2309 may also be
filed by those entitled under section 2304, Revised Statutes, to make
the same.

Applicants for these lands must possess the qualifications required
homestead entries, and all applications to
enter presented prior to April 16, 1906, must, in addition to the usual
affidavits required therein, be accompanied by an affidavit alleging
that there is no person having a superior right to the land desired, as
a settler thereon and an occupant thereof on January 1, 190-1.
in the case of ordinary
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(

.>

Persons claiming a preference right of entry by reason of settleand occupation of said lands on January 1. L904, must exercise
thai righl by making application to enter before April 16, L906, as the
ii

km

1

1

land- to occupied will, after that dale become subject to entry by any

You will require of all persons claiming a
other qualified person.
entry,
by reason of such settlement and occupation,
right
of
preference
a

special affidavit, duly corroborated, setting forth all the fact- a- to

such settlement and occupation of the land- claimed by them, and

showing that their settlement and occupation has continued

until the

date of their applications to enter.

Each entryman is required to pay the appraised price for the
lands entered by him, such payment to he made in live equal annual
payments, one-fifth at the time of entry and one-fifth in one. two.
three, and four years, respectively, from the date of entry, with
per cent per
interest on the deferred payments at the rate of
.">

annum.

commutation of an entry, the appraised price must he
of proof, the entryman receiving
credit for any payment- previously made, and, if the entryman he
an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen, such
proof will not he accepted unless accompanied by proof of full
When parlies, who are entitled, under the pronaturalization.
visions of section 2305, Revised Statutes, to credit upon the period
In case of

paid

the time of submission

at

for military service, submit proof before the end of
year from date of entry, they will he required to make

of residence
the

fifth

like manner of the full amount of purchase money
in
Remaining unpaid for the lands embraced in their entries.
The usual fee and commissions now provided by Law where the
price of the land is Kl.-_?r> per acre must he paid at the time of original entry and when the commutation or final proof is made, but
you will not collect any payment for lands in excess of 1(J0 acres
embraced in an allowed original entry, as the payment of such
excess will he included in the whole amount required to he paid by

payment

installments.

Cash receipts (Form

\\()</)

1

installments of (he purchase

and payment are made,
receipt

(Form

1

L40«)

duplicate, will he issued for the

final certificate

a

homestead receipt (Form

in

money when

I

189)

and

a

cash

f

L96)

proof

final

and

a

final

110) will he issued in addition to a cash

for the final

(Form 4-131)

receipt

When commutation

payment.

proof and payment are made, yon will issue
I

When

paid.

(Form

a

cash receipt

for the

(Form

payment of the

purchase price, noting thereon the receipt of final commissions.
All homestead entries for these lands will he indorsed " Round
Valley Reservation lands," and yon will open a new series therefor,

commencing with Number

1,

and the same

will he reported

on sepa-
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The cash certificates and receipts ^v
be indorsed
manner and numbered in their proper order in the Round
Von will report and account for
Valley Reservation cash series.
the money received on account thereof in separate monthly and

rate abstracts.

i

1 1

in like

quarterly returns.

A

separate account should also be rendered for homestead fees and

commissions as received on

"

Round Valley Reservation

lands."

moneys received from the sale of said
lands in the Treasury of the United States as receipts from sales of
u
Round Valley Reservation lands," act of February 8, 1905; he
will also deposit all homestead fees and commissions so received as
from Round Valley Reservation lands." but to the credit of the
United States the same as fees and commissions received on account

The

receiver will deposit all

' w

of public lands of the United States.

The lands of said reservation now to be opened are not affected
by the provisions of the act of May 17. 1900 (31 Stat.. 179), for the
reason that they were not " opened to settlement " prior to the passage of said act.
All persons who have since attempted, or
attempt, to make settlement on any of said

who may

hereafter
lands prior to the

hour the lands are formally opened to settlement and entry, as
above set forth, will be considered and dealt with as trespassers,
and preference will be given the prior legal applicant, notwithstanding such unlawful settlement.
It may be, and possibly will occur, that at the time of opening
a number of persons will be assembled at your office seeking to
make entry of these lands, and the duty will devolve upon you to
make and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to secure a fair and orderly course of proceedings on the part of
all

concerned.

The transmission of applications by mail is permissible, but it
was not intended to confer upon such applicants a superior right.
You will, therefore, upon opening your office, note the number
of persons in line, and act upon their applications in the order of
After acting upon all applications of those who
presentation.
were in line at the opening of your office, you will act upon all
applications received by you by mail on that morning in the order
in which you may happen to open them and then proceed with
the applications of those

opening of your

office.

who may have formed in
Any applications received

line after the

in

subsequent

mails should be considered in the actual order in which the letters

containing them are opened, after

all

applications of those

are in line at time of their receipt have been* acted upon.

who

(See 27

L. D., 113, and 33 L. D., 582.)

Such of the persons who may be acting

as agents for ex-soldiers
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under section 2309, Revised Statute-, will be allowed- to make one
in his individual character and to lilt- one declaratory statement as agent, if properly authorized, and if desiring to make

entry

will require him to take \\\> place at the end of
and await his proper time before doing so, and he will be
allowed to file but one declaratory statement at a time.
After the disposition of applications presented by persons pres-

other filings, you

the line

ent

at

posed

9 o'clock

of

in

the

a.

in.,

other applications presented will be dis-

all

usual

way. the time of actual presentation being

noted on the application.

You are expected

promptly under the lawful instructions
any parties feeling aggrieved
by your action the right of appeal, under the rules of practice,
without seeking special instructions from this office in the particular
to act

before you as occasions arise, allowing

cases before acting thereon.
for publication have been forwarded to the newspapers
which they are to be published.
You will at once make requisition for such blank forms as you
Printed
will need in connection with the entry of these lands.

Notice-

in

copies of these

instructions

for

distribution will

be

forwarded

to

you a- soon a- practicable.
J. II. Fimple,
Acting Co m n iss io ner.

Very respectfully,

i

Approved, November 7, 1905.
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
I

Schedule omitted.

I'.NTIiV

FEES AM) COMMISSIONS.

Walter

C. Frazer.

HOMESTEAD

An applicanl

to make homestead entry is not entitled to have the fees and
commissions paid by him upon a prior homestead entry, canceled for conflict, applied in payment of the fees and commissions required in connection
with his second application; but, uj
proper application therefor, the fees
:iik1 commissions paid
the canceled entry will he repaid under the
ii]

provisions of section 2 of the

ad

of .(tine

1U.

1880.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(V. L.

;

(

November

.)

Walter C. Frazer has
(unreported) of

decision

dated December

6, l'.MU.

/.

1905.

Land

Office^

(J. L.

M'C.)

motion for review of departmental
of your office,

filed

a

May

24, L905, affirming that

which sustained the action of the

local officers
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make homestead entry for the W.
XK. j. ami the XE. \ of the NW.
Woodward land district, Oklahoma.

in rejecting his application to

the

XK. h the XK.

Sec. lo. T.

t

|

of the

X.. R. 23 E.,

I

of

j

of

The ground

of rejection was that Frazer failed, and still refuses,
pay the fees and commissions (fourteen dollar-) due on -aid entry.
He had previously made entry for the W. J of the XE. j and the X.
of the NW. ] of See. 10. same township and range; hut upon discovery that such entry had been erroneously allowed, because of being
to

1

.',

with the prior entry of another person, Frazer relinquished
and applied to make entry of the tract in question and he contends
that the fees and commissions paid on the first entry should apply
on hi- second entry not being satisfied with paying the fee- and
commissions on the second entry and being repaid those erroneously
paid on the first entry. The movant says:

in conflict
it

:

—

Not having been advised of tbe reasons of tbe recent action on tbe part of the
Honorable Secretary, or informed of tbe grounds on which the General band
Office sustained the action of the local land office, tbe appellant labors under the
disadvantage of not knowing how the Honorable Secretary can possibly reach
the conclusion he does in the premises.

Probably the several tribunals referred

to considered the reasons

for the action taken to be so palpable that there

explaining them

exU nso.
of the local officers was in
instructions of

The

in

December

1.

It

1

was no occasion

for

will be sufficient to say that the action

strict

accordance with the departmental

1883 (2 L.

making

I)..

660)

:

homestead or timber-culture entry
credit for the fee and commissions paid by them on a canceled prior entry is
discontinued. The fees and commissions paid on entries of the above mentioned character canceled for conflict, or because they have been erroneonsly
allowed and can not be confirmed, will be repaid to tbe proper parties upon their
practice of allowing parties

making application

a

therefor, as provided in the second section of tbe act of

Congress, approved June

Id. 1880.

The preceding- instruction has been strictly followed ever since
promulgation, and good practice requires that it should continue

its

to

be followed.

The motion

for review

is

overruled.

IXDIAX LAXDS-ALLOTArEXT-^rARRlEI) WOMAN.

Thompson

v.

Frazier.

Where an Indian woman, a member of one tribe, marries an Indian man. a
member of another tribe, but is never enrolled as a member of her husband's tribe, she is entitled to an allotment in her own tribe, as the head of
a family, notwithstanding her husband; prior to Ins marriage, received an

allotment in bis tribe as a single person.
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Offta

.

(C. J. G.)

(

Miner Thompson has appealed from the decision of your office of
December 1. L904, involving charges preferred by him against Ponca
Indian allotment No. 37,
Sec.

made

T. 32 N.. R. 7 W.,

I.

1

Section

I-",

among other

of the act of

(

to

Hannah

II.

Frazier, for the X.

\

of

Weill, Nebraska.

March

things, an follows

L889 (25 Stat.. 888, 892), provides,

2,

:

Each member of the Ponca tribe of Indians now occupying

part of the old

a

Ponca reservation, within the limits of the said Greal Sioux reservation, shall
he entitled to allotments upon said old Ponca reservation as follows: To each
head of

family, three hundred and twenty acres.

;i

In an affidavit filed in the local land office

Hannah

that

alleged

married

II.

Santee Sioux Indian

to a

and was therefore not entitled

to

Commissioner of Indian

the

The

I.

1

at

f'.inhh

Instructions
;i

same

as the head of a family,
was referred by your office
who returned the same under

Affairs,

1902, with this statement

:

this allottee was the wife of a Santee Sioux Indian at the time
was made is not denied by this office.
The only question a!
case is. was this woman the wife of
Santee Sioux Indian, the head
within the meaning of said section 13. This office has held in its
to allotting agents that where the husband was a white man. or not

member

.

of the tribe to

allotments to the Ponca

woman,

this

to

.

.

;i

which

and allotted as the head of

As

Ponca Indian

fact thai

issue in this
,i

Thompson

L902,
a

affidavit

the allotment

*i\'

1.

the date her allotment was made,

to the

This

under the foregoing' section.
date of July

April

Frazier, the allottee, was

addressed to this

office

1

n

his wife belonged, the wife should be regarded

family, and this ruling

however,

December

the

Departinenl

is'.>7.

1.

;iini

in

making

the

steps should he taken

held

in

communication

;i

as follows:

"These Indian women have been, through
net entitled to.

was followed

ndians.

t<>

which they are
if not gone

error, allotted lands

eaueel their allotments,

or to obtain their relinquishment, or to set aside the patent by action

h> patent,

Of the courts."
In

view of this proceeding, it
in the proper local land

he had

governing proceedings of such

March
a

result

2,

L903,

your

is

presumed thai you should order a hearing to
accordance with the rules of practice

office in

offices.

office

a hearing, which was had. and as
recommended dismissal of Thomp-

ordered

thereof the local officers

son's

charges and that the allotment he held intact.

your

office

found,

in

hient to

owing

Upon appeal

rendered the decision here complained of. in which, it was
\iew of the departmental ruling referred to. that the allot

Hannah

II.

Frazier was illegal, but held said allotment intact
•*

to the

,

,

.:

>

provisions of the act of April 23, 1904
which inhibits the cancellation of allotments upon which
(

Stat., 297),
first

patents have issued, except in certain specified instances, of
Case

is

held

1)\'

VOUr

office not to

he one.

or trust

which

this
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The Commissioner
•24.

of Indian Allans in a letter of date February

1890, addressed to the agent of Santee

Agency. Nebraska, with

respect to this allottee, instructed said agent as followHarriet
Indian,

[Hannah]

had one

Frazier

H.

who has had 160
child. Harriet.

married Charles

Frazier,

Santee

a

Sioux

him at Santee Agency. They
Would she (Harriet [Hannah] H. Frazier) be entitled
acres of land patented to

320 acres?
Harriet [Hannah] H. Frazier should be regarded as the head of a family and
allowed 320 acres. He husband being an Indian of another tribe has no land
rights on the old Ponca Indian reservation.
Had she married a white man she
would have been regarded as the head of a family (the white father having no
rights
and the same rule should govern in view of the fact that her Indian
husband is not of her tribe and has no land rights on the old Ponca reservato 160 or

i

She should not be deprived of her just rights because her Indian husband
happens to own property elsewhere.

tion.

Like instructions were given in the same letter as to other Indians.
As to one. Alice Howe, who had recently married a Flandreau Sioux,
it was said that she should be regarded as the head of a family and
given 320 acre-.

In

a

communication

November

4,

to the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs of date

1897, the agent of the Santee

Agency

stated,

as

set

forth in a letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of date

November

that-

29. 1897.

certain Santee Indians married women belonging to the Ponca tribe before
allotments were made to the Santees in 1885: that land was allotted to these

men

as heads of families, their wives being enrolled with them
that the men
have received their full share of the benefits provided by section 17 of the
Sioux Act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 888). and that in 1800 the wives of these
men were allotted 320 acres each, as members of the Ponca tribe and heads of
:

families.

The agent asked
said section 17,

if these

and

women were

entitled to the benefits under

also stated that

Charles Frazier married

Hannah Howe, a Ponca. about 2 years after he was
and when land was allotted at Ponca in 1890

allotted land at Santee in 1885.

she was allotted 320 acres and her child an allotment of about 63 acres; that
Hannah Frazier has never been on the Santee rolls with her husband, but is
enumerated on the Ponca census roll, it being the intention of Frazier and his
wife to move on the Ponca allotment in the spring and make a home thereon.

he would be justified in paying Hannah Frazier
under said section 17, and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in
transmitting the agent's communication to the Department, said:

The agent asked

if

So far as the first mimed cases are concerned. I have to state that where a
his wife are members of different tribes it has been the practice of
this office to allow each an allotment as a single person with the tribe to which
they respectively belong or to allow either of them to take an allotment as the
head of a family on the reservation to which said allottee belonged, the other
not being entitled to an allotment. Under this practice it would seem that these

man and
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women were

no1 entitled to

Sioux
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women

married
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allotments witb the Ponca tribe, as under the
If this be true
am

are ao1 entitled to allotments.

I

of the opinion thai they would not be entitled t,» the benefits of section IT.
From the schedule of Santee allotments approved hy the Departmenl May

1.

appears that Charles Frazier was assigned L60 acres of land under the
It
is therefore doubtful
i;th article of the Sioux treaty of L868 (15 Stats.. 637).
whether his wife. Hannah Howe, was entitled to an allotment as a member of
As the decision of the Departmenl of July 21, 1896, places an
the Ponca tribe.
interpretation upon section 17 of the Sioux Ac1 somewhal different from that
deem it proper to suhmit these i|uesii(»ns for your
entertained hy this office,
consideration and decision before instructing A.geu1 Clements in the premises.
1885,

it

I

was

in reply to this letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Department, after quoting rrom section 17 of the Sioux act,
used the language quoted by the Commissioner in his letter to your
office of date July Ik L902, hereinbefore referred to. and which led
your office to hold that the allotment in question was illegal. It will
he observed, however, that the finding of the Department that the
allotments to these Ponca women were erroneous, was made to cover
without distinction both cases mentioned by the Indian agent. The
one case included Ponca women who had married members of the
Santee tribe and had been enrolled with them, prior to the allotments
to their husbands as heads of families: and these women were afterwards allotted as members of the Ponca tribe and also as heads of
families.
As to the correctness of the departmental ruling with respect to this class it is unnecessary to say anything here, except to
-tale that it differs materially from the other case named by the agent,
which is that of the Ponca woman. Hannah II. Frazier. who married
a Santee Indian about two years after he had received an allotment as
a member of the Santee tribe and as a single person, and who was
never on the Santee rolls with her husband but continued to be
home on the Ponca roll, she being finally allotted hind as a member
of the Ponca tribe and as (he head of a family.
The appeal of this case here is directed solely to the holding of
your office that under the act of April 23, L904, there is no authority
It

that the

4

Hannah II. Frazier. But the contenmade, as otherwise appears from the record, that if it
be found the allottee and her husband were both citizens of the
United State- at the time the allotment was made, then she was not
the head of a family and so not entitled to an allotment. This might
be trite had the allottee married an Indian homesteader, a citizen of
the I'n it ed Slate-, and soughl an allotment out of the public domain
but the lands involved here are tribal properties and are not governed

to cancel

tion

is

the patent issued to

also

:

with respect to

by the provisions of the general allotment act
zenship.

Besides, in section

1

1

of the Sioux act

it

is

provided

citi-

:

An. each and every allottee under this act shall he entitled to all the rights
and privileges and he subjed to all the provisions of section six of the acl ap
proved February eighth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven.
I
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Said section 6 (24 Stat., 388, 390), declares, among other things,
the citizenship of allottees, " without in any manner impairing or
otherwise affecting the right of any such Indian to tribal or other
property." By analogy, in the case of Frank Bergeron (80 L. I).,

was held that an Indian who has received an allotment of
common by his tribe, is
not thereby disqualified from taking land for a homestead as a citizen
In the decision of your office here comof the United States.
375),

it

his proportionate share of the land held in

plained of

it

is

said

:

dated November 26, 1902, addressed to this office by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in regard to the allotment of Julia A. (Hick, referred to
above, it was staled that Julia A. Glick, who married a white man. was. under
In

;i

letter

March 2. 1889, entitled to an allotment, she being
Ponca tribe, and the Department having uniformly held Hint
a woman whose husband is a white man. or otherwise not entitled to an Indian
allotment, is to be regarded as the head of an Indian family.
It |s further
section thirteen of the act of

a

member

of the

stated that the land allotted to Mrs. (Hick

was not

the property of the United
rights to tribal prop-

States but of the tribe to which she belongs, and that her
erty are not impaired by her marriage to a white man.
If a

Ponca Indian who has married

a

white

man

is

entitled to an allotment

of 320 acres on the Ponca reservation as the head of a family,

it is

not seen wh\

Hannah

Frazier should not occupy the same position, she having married a
Santee Sioux Indian who was not allotted as the head of a family, but who
citizen of the United States.
became prior to her marriage
:\

The Department is of opinion that the riding relied upon by
your office is not conclusive of nor properly applicable to the case now
under consideration, but that the former practice in regard to such
cases was the proper one and should be followed; and that on the
merits of this case alone the charges preferred against the allotment
of Hannah H. Frazier should be dismissed.

There are other reasons, however, sufficient to justify the dismissal
charges.
In the first place no matters were alleged against
the allotment that were not already within the knowledge of the
Indian Office; hence no information was given that was not already
well known.
In the second place, persons making charges against an
Indian allotment do not acquire a preference right of entry in the

of these

event of the cancellation of the allotment.

And

in the third place,

since the passage of the act of April 23, L904, there

is

no authority

to

cancel a patent issued to an Indian allottee, except in specified instances, without the approval of Congress.

As

this case does not

deemed

come

proper case
to submit to Congress under said act, the decision of your office
herein is modified accordingly, the charges in question will be dismissed and the allotment held intact.
within the provisions of the

act.

and as

it is

not

a
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SETTLEMENT LANDLORD AND TENANT.

McNamara
The

nil*- th.it

v.

Morgan.

settleinenl rights can not be acquired by the tenant or

employe of

intervening rights, is not applicable in
is established, and
all cases where the relation of landlord and tenant
should never be extended to eases where the relation of tenant was assumed merely for the purpose of protecting settlement rights and in fur-

another which can be

therance of
the

at

first

;i

bona

up

set

to defeat

fide intention

on the part of

n settler to assert

his rights

opportunity.

No rights can he acquired by acts of settlement as against an entryman claiming
under a prior record entry, hut .-is between subsequent claimants the prior
actual settler is entitled to precedence upon the cancellation of the entry or
extinguishment of the record idle.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of

November

(V. L. C.)

flic

General L<m<l

Office,

(E. O. P.)

11, 19Q5.

Counsel for Leui Morgan

lias tiled, and the Department has conof
it> unreported decision of July 29, L905,
motion
for
review
sidered,
and
SW.
holding the homestead entry of Morgan for the XK.
j

SE. 1. See.
Oklahoma, subject
\\V.

t

35, T. 11

X.. R. 2 K..

to the rights of

J

Oklahoma City land

McNamara by

district.

virtue of his prior

settlement on the land.

The

<iuest ion

of law presented and relied upon as

pending motion,

is

a

hasis for the

forth in the fourth specification of error, as

set

follows:

The Hon. Secretary erred in virtually finding that the only question at issue
whether McNamara was Hie prior settler on said land, the real question at
issue being whether McNamara's tenancy did not. under all the decisions, provent him from setting up
settlement right upon the cancellation of said entry.
and the Hon. Secretary erred in refusing and failing to p;'^s on said question in
.•my of his decisions, and contestee asks here specifically for findings of fact as
\v;is

;i

the tenancy of

to

McNamara in
may have

review contestee

for

sustained by the record, to a

order that

if the Secretary denies this motion
chance to present proper findings of fact, as
court of competent jurisdiction, in an action for
;i

resulting trust.

The

facts

necessary

to

a

decision

herein

are,

briefly

as

stated,

follows:

The land involved was formerly embraced in an Indian allotment.
prior to the filing of Morgan's application was occupied by

and

McNamara under an alleged lease from the Indian
whom he had purchased and owned the improvements
time of the cancellation of the said allotment, on

Morgan's application was
(

»"

the land the

question was
5194

filed

day previous.

made

with

Vol. :'.t— or,

s,

a

—

January
'Jd'e

allottee,

thereon

January

8,

from
at

the

L903.

21. L903, alleging settlemenl

testimony ^hows thai the lease

in

knowledge of the illegality of the allotment
it
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and defective

McNamara 's

title of the lessor, and for the sole purpose of protecting
claim until opportunity was afforded him to exercise

his settlement rights.

Counsel for Morgan asserts that the question now presented has
never been directly passed upon in any of the prior decisions of the
Department, yet the following language is found in the Department's
decision now sought to be reviewed

|!

:

The question whether McNamara's right by virtue of being upon the land,
with the intention of entering the same under the homestead law, attached
eo instanti upon the cancellation of the Indian allottee's claim, was before the
Department at the time its former decision was rendered, and was taken into
careful consideration in arriving at the conclusion therein announced.

Decision

now

is

resulting trust
is

specially asked

may

upon

this point in order that a

be established in the courts in the event the same

adverse to the claim of Morgan.

The

contention of counsel for

McNamara

Morgan can only

rest

upon the theory

under his lease prevented
the assertion of any settlement rights by him during the continuance
of the lease and that the estoppel arising by virtue of this rethat the relation of

lation existed in so far as

it

as tenant

effectually controlled the real intention of

with his alleged acts of settlement until
McNamara
actual knowledge of the termination of the lease had been brought
home to him.
The Department has frequently held that settlement rights cannot
be acquired by a tenant or an employe of another which can be set up
in connection

to defeat the intervening rights of another.

But

the application of

not general and cannot, nor has

it been, adhered to in every
where the relation of landlord and tenant has been established.
It is applied in those cases where the facts show that the tenant,
agent, or employe, had never, at any time prior to the intervention of
an adverse claim, manifested an intention to assert a settlement right

this rule

is

case

The

principle thus applied

is correct but it should never
wherein
be extended to cases
there was in fact a bona fide intention
on the part of such settler to assert his rights at the first opportunity
and he had assumed the relation of tenant simply to protect those
rights and in furtherance of his honest purpose to assert them.,
(Clark u. Martin, 11 L. D., 72; Hall v. Levy, ib., 284.)
In the case of Withers v. Page (28 L. D., 547, 549), the reason of

in himself.

the rule requiring some overt acts of settlement
tinction

is

\

is

stated

and

a dis-

noticed between the cases where the principle heretofore

referred to will govern and where

The purpose

it

will not be applied.

of the rule requiring some overt act of settlement in addition

to

the purchase of improvements of a prior settler upon the tract of land is to give
notice to the world of the settlement right and claim of the person so purehasing.
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in the case of a lessee where
and tenant has terminated.
While no rights can be acquired by acts of settlement as against an
entryman claiming under a prior record entry, yet as between subse-

The same reason

is

equally controlling

the relation of landlord

quent claimants the prior actual settler

is

entitled to precedence

upon

extinguishment of the record title.
Counsel for Morgan vigorously contends that because McNamara
had no actual knowledge of the cancellation of the record title of his
lessor, the Indian allottee, until after the entry of Morgan, his acts of
settlement and his intent were not contemporaneous and cannot be
This proposilinked or connected to defeat such intervening entry.
tion is asserted in the face of knowledge on the part of Morgan that
McNamara was Living on the land at the time he performed his
alleged acts of settlement, and the Department is of the opinion the
testimony supports the claim of McNamara that Morgan at that time
had full knowledge of the circumstances under which he took the
lease and of his lixed intention to make homestead entry of the land
upon the extinguishment of the outstanding Indian title. The claim
of Morgan is unsound in theory and unjust in principle and cannot
he sustained.
McNamara's intent had long been formed and his acts
of settlement performed in accordance therewith and both were in
existence and awaiting attachment as a settlement right eo instanti
the right of the record claimant was destroyed.
At that instant the
relation of landlord and tenant ceased and the operation of the estoppel fell with it. and has no -application either in controlling the rights
the cancellation of the entry or

or defeating the intention of

McNamara.

The familiar doctrine of estoppel

is

an instrument for the preven-

and will never be applied to protect or promote it. As
between landlord and tenant it arises from the obligation of the
tenant to return the possession and it exists wherever this duty exists.
The occupant in such cases is considered to have pledged his faith to
tion of fraud,

return the possession of the land at the expiration of his term and
during his tenancy the law will not permit him to deny or disparage
his landlord's title.
But when the obligation to return the possession
is for any cause satisfied or becomes impossible by reason of the absolute
falls

failure of title of the Lessor, the estoppel

with the extinguishment of the obligation.

Real Property, 5th ed., vol.

ruder

McNamara was

acquired prior to

3, p. 98.)

Department is
up settlement rights
the cancellation of the Indian allotment and the

the circumstances

of opinion

no Longer exists. It
(See Washburn on

surrounding this
not estopped to

case, the

set

termination of the lease, as against third parties.
With exceptions or limitations of this character it will he found on examination
the authorities, particularly those of modern date, that the doctrine
<>f estoppel
in pais, however it may have been applied formerly, cannot now
<>t'
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be asserted to preclude the grantee from denying bis grantor's title and acquiring a superior one. unless there exists such a relation of the parties to each
other as would render the proceeding a breach of good faith and common

[Robertson

honest)/.

et al

v.

Pickrell

el al.,

109 U.

S.,

608, 016.]

Clearly the rights of McNamara under his settlement on the land
were superior to those of Morgan, and he having asserted them

within the required period they will he sustained, over the technical
claim of settlement asserted by Morgan.

For the reasons herein

stated the motion for review

is

denied.

mining claim-placer-legal subdivisions.

Roman Placer Mining

Claim.

Lands not embraced in the application for patent for a mining claim, and in
the published and posted notice and other proceedings, can not be embraced
in the entry.

The smallest

legal subdivision of the public surveys provided for by the mining
and such laws do not
laws is a subdivision of ten acres, in square form
contemplate that in the location and entry of placer mining claims rectangular tracts of five acres may be recognized and treated as legal subdivisions.
;

Secretary Hitchcock

to the

February
for the

Commissioner of the General Land

No rem her

(F. L/C.)
3,

Roman

1901, the

Office,

(A. B. P.)

16, 1905.

Diamond Fire Brick Company made

entry

placer mining claim, survey No. 14,524, Pueblo, Col-

The claim, though located upon surveyed lands, does not
conform to the United States public-land surveys, or to the system
and rectangular subdivisions of such surveys. For this reason your
office, by decision of July 8, 1903, directed that the company be
required to conform the entry to the public surveys, on pain of the

orado.

cancellation thereof in the event of default.

it

The company was notified accordingly, and, in response,
terms an "amended application to purchase," wherein

is

attempted to be described in tracts which, with two

filed

exceptions,;,

contain only five acres each, though in rectangular form,
instance, the " S. i of the
and so on.

By

NW.

J of the

decision of February 15, 1904, your

so-called

amended application

NE.

office

what

the claim

J of the

as,

for

NE.

J,"

refused to accept the

to purchase for the stated reasons, (1)1

that the lands are described in five-acre tracts, and not according to
and (2) that, as so described, portions of the lands

legal subdivisions,
lie

outside of the boundaries of the claims as located and entered.

The company has appealed to the Department.
The claim as entered is without pretense to conformity with
1

the
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Its shape is such as finds no warrant whatever in
mining laws: and the refusal of your office to permit the entry
The chief contention of the
to pass to patent was manifestly right.
company, in its endeavor to sustain the entry as it now stands, is th tl
to have conformed the claim to the public surveys would have necessiThere is nothing
tated the inclusion of lands not placer in character.
the adjacent lands are not
It' it be assumed that
in this contention.
placer, as alleged, the laying of the lines of the location in conformity
with the public surveys, which may he done to embrace tracts as small
as ten acre- in area, in square form, would not require the inclusion

public surveys.

the

of adjacent

non-placer lands to such extent as to

of the location

reason.

for that

affect

the validity

(Hogan and Idaho Placer Mining

Claims 34 L. I). 4i>.)
Your office was also right
by the company
surveys.

in

its

in refusing to accept the showing made
attempt to conform the claim to the public

Lands not included

in the

application for patent, the pub-

and posted notice and other proceedings, cannot he embraced
This is plain, and in view thereof, and of the fact as
in the entry.
appears from the record that the claim cannot otherwise he conformed
lished

to the

public surveys,

is

it

clear that the defects therein are. for this

reason, incurable.

Nor

is

there any authority

under the mining laws for making

entry and obtaining patent for a placer claim
small as five acres in area, t'hough
(.11

this subject

i^

found

in

in

composed of

rectangular form.

tracts as

The law

section- 2329 to 2331, inclusive, of the

Revised Statutes, which sections are as follows:
Sec.

232i>.

Claims usually called "placers," including

excepting veins of quartz, or other rock

in

nil

forms of deposit,

and

place, shall be subject to entry

under like circumstances and conditions, and upon similar proceedings,
as .-ire provided for vein or lode claims; but where the lands have been previously surveyed by the United States, the entry in its exterior limits shall conpatent,

form to the legal subdivisions of the public lands.

may be subdivided into ten-acre
and two or more persons, or associations of persons, having contiguous
claims of any size, although such claims may be less than ten acres each, may
2330. Legal subdivisions of forty acres

tracts;

make

joint

entry thereof:

ninth day of July, eighteen

luit

no location of

a

hundred and seventy,

placer claim,

made

after the

one hundred and
sixty acres for any one person or association of persons, which location shall
conform to the United States surveys; and nothing in this section contained
shall defeat or impair any bona fide preemption or homestead claim upon agricultural lands, or authorize the sale of the improvements of any bona fide
settler to any purchaser.
Sec. 2331. Where placer-claims are upon surveyed lands, and conform to legal
subdivisions, no further survey or plat shall be required, and all placer mining
claims incited after the tenth day of May. eighteen hundred and seventy-two,
shall conform as near as practicable ,with the United States system of publicland surveys, and the rectangular subdivisions of such surveys, and no such
location shall include more than twenty acres for each individual claimant
but
shall exceed

:
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where placer-claims can not l>e eon formed to legal subdivisions, survey and plat
made as on unsurveyed lands; and where by the segregation of mineral
land in any legal subdivision a quantity of agricultural hind less than forty

shall he

acres remains, such fractional portion of agricultural land may be entered by
any party qualified by law, for homestead or pre-emption purposes.

That under these sections placer claims located since May 10, 1872,
whether upon surveyed or unsurveyed lands, are required to conform
as nearly as practicable to the United States system of public-land
surveys, is settled by numerous decisions of this Department. (Miller
Placer Claim, 30 L. IX, 225; Wood Placer Mining Company, 32 L. D.,
198 on review, 77/., 368; Hogan and Idaho Placer Mining- Claims,
34 L. D., 42; Rialto No. 2 Placer Mining Claim. 34 L. 1)., 44; Laughing Water Placer, 34 L. I)., 56.)
There is no difficulty in applying the principle to a claim upon unsurveyed lands. It is done by locating the claim in rectangular form,
of lawful dimensions, and with east-and-west and north-and-south
boundary lines. (Rialto Xo. 2 Placer Mining Claim, 34 L. D., 44;

—

Laughing Water Placer, 34 L.

D., 56;

Wood

Placer Mining Company,

32 L. IX. 303. 3H4-305.)
If the claim be

upon surveyed

lands, as

is

the case here, the matter

of conforming the same to the public surveys, where not for some sufficient

physical or other reason impracticable to do

simply by locating the claim according
such surveys.

The

so, is

accomplished

to the legal subdivisions of

smallest legal subdivision recognized by the public land laws,

other than the placer mining laws,

is a

tract of forty acres

—that

is,

a

form constituting one fourth of a quarter section, or
one sixteenth of a section, of land except where by reason of a sectract in square

—

tion being fractional its subdivision into smaller tracts

may

result in

the formation of lots of irregular shape and dimensions, in which

known and
with
relation
to
the
section
by
the
numbers
respectively
described
they

event such lots are considered legal subdivisions and are
bear.

By the placer mining laws (Sec. 2330, supra) it is provided that
" legal subdivisions of forty acres may be subdivided into ten-acre
tracts; "

and further, that "two or more persons, having contiguous

claims of any
each,

size,

may make

although such claims may be less than ten acres
These provisions are intended

joint entry thereof."

meet conditions, which not infrequently arise, peculiar to the asserwhere the claimed placer deposits are limited in
extent to tracts of much smaller area than forty acres. In such cases,
to

tion of placer claims,

it

is

provided:

(1) that a regular subdivision of forty acres

may

be

subdivided, that is, reduced by subdivision, according to the system of
public land surveys, to four tracts of ten acres each in square form,
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and (2) that in the evenl of contiguous claims of any size, though
less than ten acres cadi, the persons, or associations of persons,
asserting the same may make joint entry thereof.
Whether under the latter provision entry and patent may be obtained for a placer claim or claims aggregating less than ten acres is
a

question

not

now

before the Department, and no opinion

is

ex-

Tt is sufficient for the decision of this
pressed with respeel thereto.
docs
statute
not contemplate that in the location
the
that
to
say
case

and entry of placer mining claims rectangular tracts of live acres may
he recognized and treated as Legal subdivisions of the public surveys.

The smallest

legal subdivision provided for

division of ten acres;
be

not

a

subdivision

and that must be

by the statute

in square form, else

is

a sub-

it

would

according to the system of the public-land

surveys.

The decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
As paragraphs 22, 23 and 2-1 of the mining regulations (31 L. D.,
477—f~N) are not in entire accord with the views herein expressed,
said paragraphs are hereby severally revoked and the following substituted in lieu thereof:
22.

By

section 2330 authority

is

given for subdividing forty-acre legal sub-

These ten-acre tracts should be considered and
dealt with as legal subdivisions, and an applicant having a placer claim which
conforms to one or more of such ten-acre tracts, contiguous in case of two or
more tracts, may make entry thereof, after the usual proceedings, without

divisions into ten-acre tracts.

further survey or plat.
In subdividing forty-acre legal subdivisions, the ten-acre tracts must be
square form, with lines at right angles with the lines of the public surveys;
and the notice given of the application must be specific and accurate in
_!.">.

in

description.
24.

A ten-acre subdivision may be described,

for instance,

if

situated in the

of the NE.
of the NE. J" of
extreme northeast of the section, as the " NE.
the section, or. in like manner, by appropriate terms, wherever situated: but
in addition to this description, the notice must give all the other data required
in a mineral application, by which parties may be put on inquiry as to the
land sought to be patented.
The proofs submitted with applications must
show clearly the character and extent of the improvements upon the premises.
!

!

REPAYMENT—TIMBER AM) STONE ENTRY—CHARACTEB OF LAND.
Harrison
Where entry under the

\Y.

(

>rmandy.

act of June
1878, was erroneously allowed for land
valuable for its mineral deposits and upon which mining claims
had been located and improvements made prior to the timber land entry,
hut <»!' which the entrynian had no knowledge, and it appears that he
."».

chiefly

acted
tion,

in good faith and did not procure the entry through misrepresentarepayment of the purchase money paid by him may be allowed.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(

No vernier

F. L. C.

An

appeal has been

filed

16, 1905.

Land
(

C.

Office,

G.

J.'

by Harrison W. Ormandy from the

deci-

sion of your office of July 11, 1905, denying his application for repay-

ment of the purchase money paid on timber and stone entry for the
S. J NE. J and 8. \ NW. J, Sec. 24, T. 7 S., R. 13 E., La Grande.
Oregon. Said denial was for the reason that Ormandy filed with his
timber land declaration a nonmineral affidavit, when in fact the land
contained valuable mineral deposits, and thus procured his entry
through misrepresentation.

Ormandy filed the usual sworn statement for the purchase of said
land June 25, 1902, and after due notice was allowed to make entry
therefor September 18, 1902, cash certificate being issued to him
accordingly. Both his application to purchase and the non-mineral
affidavit filed at the time of submitting proof contained the statement.
in substance, that he

same

had personally examined the land and found

to be chiefly valuable for its timber

;

the

that there were not within

knowledge any minerals of value nor any mining or
The entry was contested by H. C. Thomas et al.\
who alleged that the land embraced therein was mineral in character
and that they were joint owners of mining claims located thereon
prior to the date of said entry that they were before and had been
since said entry was made, in actual and continuous possession of said
'claims; that the testimony on which Ormandy was allowed to make
entry, to the effect that the land was uninhabited, unappropriated and
unimproved, was false and fraudulent; and that the possession, occupancy and improvements of H. C. Thomas et al. were at the time of
Ormandy's application open and visible, and must have been well
known to him and his witnesses if they ever inspected the premises.
A hearing was prayed for and granted, but on the date named thereits

limits to his

other improvements.

;

for

Ormandy made

hearing.

The

default; he also

made

default at a postponed

contestants submitted testimony in support of their

and as to their
from Ormandy 's attorneys,

allegations as to the mineral character of the land
'locations

and improvements;

also a letter

addressed to contestants' attorneys, as follows

We note that yon will withdraw the allegations of fraud. This letter may
stand as a stipulation by us on behalf of Mr. Ormandy that the protest represented by you may be sustained and his own timber^ entry canceled
the
basis of the cancellation being prior mineral rights held by your clients, it
being stipulated and understood that the entry by Mr. Ormandy was made by
him in good faith and without any knowledge that the land contained any
mineral deposits.
;
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formal stipulation signed by the respective attorneys

the record and

is

also in

is

as follows:

That the protestants withdraw their allegations of fraud from their pro2. That
the allegations of the protest are true except as to
herein.
That the protestee, Harri
the matter of fraud on the part of the protestee.
son W. Ormandy, made the entry of the land covered by cash certificate No.
7522 in good faith and without any knowledge thai the said land contained
4. Thai
any mineral deposits or thai the protestants had prior mineral rights,
5. That
the protest herein may ho sustained and the timber entry canceled.
\ Thomas. II. \Y. Poster, and
this stipulation shall apply to the protests of II.
George E. Robinson vs. Harrison YV. Ormandy. and II. C. Thomas and II. W.
Foster rs. Harrison \V. Ormandy; and the facts herein itipulated may be taken
1.

tests

•"..

(

;is

true therein.

The local officers rendered decision finding that the statements
made in the stipulation were corroborated by the testimony submitted
at the hearing, and recommended cancellation of the timber land
Your office canceled said entry as follows:
entry.
On

consideration of the evidence submitted

testants to

have been

in

I

find that the

same shows

pro-

possession of valid lode mining claims embracing por-

of the forty-acre suh-di visions covered by cash entry No. 7522
date of said entry, and accept the withdrawal by the timber claimant of
Contest No. 1856 is accordingly closed and timber cash entry
his said entry.
tions of each

at

7522 canceled.

In an affidavit

filed

with his application for repayment.

Ormandy

says:

my original entry, and as I remember in June, 1002. I perwent over each forty acre tract
upon the land entered by me.
also went over the land itself in different
thereof and followed.out the lines.
localities thereof.
The land was mountainous and not agricultural;
saw no
evidence of mineral thereon and saw no mining tunnels or anything to indicate
mineral locations thereon; the land as it appeared to me was valuable only for
made entry thereof under the timber and stone act in
timber and stone and
perfect good faith and believing at the time that there was no mineral thereon.
Under date of August l">. 1904, I received Information from the Honorable
Register and Receiver of the United States Land Office at La Grande that a
contest affidavit by II. C. Thomas d ah, against my entry had been made upon
the ground that pre\ ions to the time of my entry such protestants had gone upon
a portion of said land and had made mineral locations thereon.
No entries had
been made by said protestants in the United States Land Office and when
made
my entry
had no knowledge of any such locations; and although
had hen
over the land as above stated and had complied with the requirements of the
law and regulations regarding entries under the timber and stone act.
had
never seen any evidence of any appropriation of any portion thereof for mining
After such contest had been instituted evidence was submitted to my
purposes.
attorney showing that upon a portion of the land the protestants had recorded
notices of mineral locations in the office of the Recorder of Conveyances of the
Comity in Oregon in which the land in question was situated.
Being advised
by my attorney that if such were the fads my entry would be probably SUbjecl
I" cancellation, although it had been made by me in good faith.
executed a
stipulation relinquishing my claim and consenting that the entry be canceled.
Before making

sonally went

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I
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from La Grande and am an employee of the Boston Rubber Shoe
Portland, Oregon, and I had neither time nor money to make any
desire to claim the property if any one before me had in good
eontest, nor did
faith expended any money in making any mineral locations upon the property in
I moreover consented to the cancellation of my entry upon the underquestion.
standing that, my entry having been made in good faith, the government would
repay me back the money which I paid it for the land in question.
I

live far

Company

at

I

One
a

of the witnesses on behalf of

Ormandy under

his proof says in

sworn statement

I myself knew the land before I testified as a witness, having been over the
same, and I testified that in my belief said land was valuable chiefly for timber
and stone and subject to entry under the provisions of the timber and stone act
such was my belief from observation thereof and the testimony was given in
good faith and without any knowledge of any mineral locations having been

made

thereon.

by your office, that repayment will
one who procures an entry of public land through

It is well established, as stated

not be allowed to
misrepresentation.

It is equally well settled that

land chiefly valu-

able for its mineral deposits can not be taken under other than the

The testimony on behalf

of contestants at the hearing
were on the land at the time of Ormandy 's
timber land entry a cabin, sheds, tunnel house, blacksmith shop,
open cuts and tunnels, the combined value of which was several
thousands of dollars. If this testimony be true it seems somewhat
Howincredible that Ormandy failed to see these improvements.
ever, it was not impossible, the land being apparently inspected
merely with reference to its timber value, for him to pass over each
The
legal subdivision thereof without seeing said improvements.
charge of bad faith was withdrawn, and neither the local officers
nor your office, in passing upon the contest allegations, found that he
had acted in bad faith, only deciding that the land was in fact
mineral in character. In view of the testimony to this effect, as well
as the stipulation to the effect that Ormandy made his entry in good
faith, and also in face of the positive denial of Ormandy that he had
any knowledge of the fact that the land contained mineral deposits,
and a like denial by one of his proof witnesses, it may very properly
be held that bad faith on his part has not been proven. This is the
sole point upon which the case turns, for, as was said in the case of
Hayden v. Jamison (on review 26 L. D., 373), reference being made
to the rule announced in the case of Pacific Coast Marble Co. v.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. et al. (25 L. D., 233)
It having been found, and not being now questioned, that the land in con-

mineral laws.

is

to the effect that there

7

,

—

more valuable on account of its said stone deposit than for agricomes squarely within the rule above set out, and it results
that the homestead entry of Jamison as to the land in conflict was and is unauthorized and can not be upheld.
troversy

is

culture, this case
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be concluded that

the

bad faith,

Ormandy's entry was canceled
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may

it

properly

for conflict within

meaning of the repayment statute, after a hearing had and finding
was and is chiefly valuable for its mineral deposits.

that the land

Sec

in this

connection cases of Joseph Ilobart (12 L.

X. Vdsti (27 L. D., 616)

The

;

decision of your office

I).,

431)

:

Nils

Cloninger (28 L. D„ 21).
herein is reversed, and repayment will

George

1).

be allowed as applied for, in the absence of other objection.

coal land-application to imim hask.

Lehmer
It

v.

Carroll et

al.

not essential to the validity of an application by an association of four
persons to purchase six hundred (or six hundred and forty) acres of coal
lands that the applicants shall have opened and improved a mine or mines

is

of coal on each of the tracts

embraced

in

the application.

It is sufficient in

such case, where there are no conflicting claimants, that the applicants show
that they are severally qualified to purchase, that the lands applied for are

and that as an
have expended not less than five
working and improving a mine or mines of coal on the

of the character subject to sale under the coal land laws,

association

of

persons the applicants

thousand dollars

in

lands.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

November

(F. L. C.)

16, 1905.

Land

Office,

(A. B. P.)

October 10, 1903, Mary H. Carroll, Mariam Killom, Joseph Beadle
and James Brady filed application to purchase, under the coal land
laws (sees. 2347 to 2352, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes), the SE.
and the SW. of Sec. 19, T. 5 S., R. 23 E., and the E. \
of the NW.
|

1

\

and the SW. J of the SE.
Bozeman, Montana, and made tender of
payment at twenty dollars per acre. The application, itself under
oath, was accompanied by the separate individual affidavits of the
In these papers it is set forth, in
applicants and two other persons.
substance, that the lands applied for are of the class and character

of Sec. 24,

and the SE.

\ of the

SW.

]

1

of Sec. 13, T. 5 S., R. 22 E.,

under the coal land laws, that the applicants are severpurchase, and apply to purchase, as an association
under section 2348, and that they have expended the sum of $8,000 in
developing and improving mines of coal on the lands.
With the application to purchase were presented what purport to
he deeds of release and quitclaim to the associated applicants, embracing, severally, portions of the lands applied for, and for which the

subject to sale
ally qualified

persons

to

who executed

the deeds had, respectively, previously

filed

declaratory statements,' under section 2349.
From the official
records it appeared thai other declaratory statements had been filed

coal

covering portions of the lands.

The

local officers

thereupon notified
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whom

deeds of release and

who did

not appear to have

the coal declarants, as well as those from

quitclaim had been obtained as those

until December 28,
any they could, why the associated applicants
should not be permitted to purchase and enter the lauds applied for,
None of the parties so notified ever appeared in (he proceedings.
December 26, L903, one Frank W. Lehmer, a stranger to the record,
filed his sworn protest, corroborated by the affidavit of one II. II.

released their claims, that they
1903, to

show

would be allowed

cause, if

Griffith, against the application to purchase.

ing was had.
witness.

at

The applicants introduced no

upon the proofs

On

this protest a hear-

which the protestant submitted the testimony of one
evidence, but rested their case

support of their application to purchase and
the cross-examination of the witness introduced by the protestant.

The

filed in

local officers

recommended

that the protest be dismissed and

that the application to purchase be allowed.
testant,

your

office

On

appeal by the pro-

affirmed the action below with the modification

that the applicants be required to furnish certain additional proofs

The protestant thereupon appealed to the Department.
In his protest Lehmer asserts no right, or claim of right, in himself
to any of the lands embraced in the application to purchase. He does
not deny that the lands are chiefly valuable for coal and in other
respects subject to sale under the coal land laws. His charges are, in
substance and effect, (1) that no preference right of entry was
acquired by any of the parties from whom the applicants obtained
deeds of release and quitclaim to, themselves of the lands covered by
the declaratory statements filed by said parties, respectively, because
none of them ever opened and improved any coal mine or mines on the
lands, wherefore the declaratory statements were illegal and of no
effect, and consequently no rights were conveyed by such deeds, (2)
that the applicants to purchase had not themselves, either collectively
or individually, prior to the time of filing their application, or at any
time, opened and improved any coal mine upon any of the lands
applied for other than the SE. J of the SW. J and the SE. i of the
NE. J of Sec. 1-9, T. 5 S., K. 23 E., and (3) that the applicants to purchase had not, either as an association or as individuals, expended
the sum of $5,000 in working and improving any mine or mines of
coal on any of the lands applied for.
before entry.

Under the facts disclosed by the record it is obvious that the first
and second charges of the protest relate to immaterial matters, and
raise no question for departmental inquiryIn the first place, upon
failure of the coal declarants to appear and show cause against the
application to purchase, after being notified to do so, they ceased to be
parties to the record and were thereafter out of the case. This left
the record clear of any claim to the lands other than that asserted by
the associated applicants to purchase, and it could make no difference
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them, or to the government, whether the coal declarafory statements
were valid when filed or not. In the second place, it Ls n<>i essential
to the validity of the application to purchase that the associated
applicants should have opened and improved a mine or mine? of coal
to

on the several tract- of land applied

for.

In this particular, aside

Prom the requirement involved in the third charge of the protest, it i'•nflieient that the proof- -how the lands to be of the class and character subject

Gable, 34 L.

The

to
I)..

disposal

under the coal land law-.

(McKibben

r.

178.)

third charge of the protest doe- present

a

matter material for

government to inquire into. The statute (sec. 2348) provides
that when an association of not less than four qualified persons shall
have expended not less than five thousand dollars in working and
improving any mine or mines of coal on the public lands, such association may enter not exceeding six hundred and forty acre- of such
As touching the quanland-, including the mining improvements.
tity of lands applied for. the present application is based upon this
the

provision of the statute.

The

protest

charges that the expenditure

mining work and improvements required to authorize such a purchase had not been made.
On this question, material only to the
government, inasmuch as in his protest Lehmer asserts no claim to
the lands or any part thereof, the testimony of the one witness introduced at the hearing not only does not overcome the showing made
by the application and proofs but tends to sustain such showing.
There is therefore nothing in this charge.
It
is unnecessary to consider the many other matters discussed by
counsel, and in the decision appealed from, for the reason that they
in

have no material bearing on the case. The application to purchase
and the proofs submitted therewith show substantially all that the
law requires, and the Department sees no necessity for the additional
proofs called for by your

office.

Upon

claimants, after notice, to appear and

failure of the prior record

show cause against the appli-

cation to purchase, there remained nothing in the

way of

the allow-

ance of the application except the one and only material charge

in

-ehmerV protest. That charge being now disposed of the application should be allowed to pass to entry upon payment of the purchase
price for the lands, unless other material objection shall -appear
and
the decision of vour office is modified according! v.
I

:

Auirust
tion to

l'.>.

L904, one B.

purchase

a

W. Metheny

portion of the lands

offered for filing his applicain

question, as coal land-, and

submitted therewith his affidavit, corroborated by two witnesses,
wherein the matters set forth in Lehmer 's aforesaid protest are in sub
stance repeated, with the further averment that the application by
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Carroll and others was not

made

for their

indirectly, if not directly," for the use

thy.

The

and

own

use and benefit, "but

benefit of one J. C.

McCar-

local officers rejected the application because of the pend-

ing controversy upon the protest by Lehmer.

Your

office

affirmed the

rejection of the application, but, treating' Metheny's affidavit as a

new

protest or contest against the application by Carroll and others,
held that the same should be suspended to await the result of the
Both parties have appealed
controversy upon Lehmer's protest.
here.

September

27, 1904,

Lehmer

offered for filing his

own

application

to purchase a portion of the lands in question, as coal lands.

the application he submitted his affidavit, corroborated by
nesses,

wherein are

set

wit-

forth substantially the same matters contained

in his protest aforesaid,

mation and

With

two

with the additional averment, upon " inforand others did not apply to purchase

belief," that Carroll

own use and benefit, but for the use and benefit
The local officers rejected the application, and
was affirmed by your office. Lehmer has appealed here.

the lands for their

of J. C. McCarthy.
their action

The

action by the local officers

the decisions of your
erally affirmed.

To

office

was right

in each case.

In so far

as

sustain their rulings, they are hereby sev-

the extent of the holding, however, that Meth-

eny's affidavit of protest should await the result of Lehmer's protest,

with the view to a further hearing upon substantially the same
grounds, your decision in that case is reversed, and said affidavit is
rejected.
The charge in each of the affidavits, intended to raise the
question of the good faith of the associated applicants, Carroll et air,
is not sufficiently clear and explicit to justify a further hearing,
under the circumstances of this case.

school grant—adjustment— indemnity selection.
State of California.
In the adjustment of school land grants, it is within the power, and is the duty,
of the land department to see that sufficient losses, or quantities of land to

which the State might have been entitled under its grant had they been in
place and not otherwise disposed of, equal in amount to previous certifications on account of the grant, approximately, are furnished as a base for

such previous approvals or certifications, before other approvals and certifications are made on account of the grant.
There is nothing in the act of March 1, 1877, relating to indemnity school land
selections in the State of California, in conflict with this requirement.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
November 17, 1905.
(F. L. C.)

Your
ditions

office letter

Land
(F.

Office,

W.

C.)

of the 31st ultimo calls attention to certain con-

made apparent

after an examination of the grant to the State
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schools, presenting a -seeming excess

of 50,176.76 acres in approvals or certifications heretofore

made on

account of said grant.

Following the disclosure of an excess, after examination of the
grant at the instance of this Department, your office laid certain rules
upon the State requiring that other and sufficient bases be supplied
After a conference beto meet the apparent excess in approvals.

tween your

and the State surveyor-general, that officer, under
addressed a communication to you. being in the
nature of a motion for review, in which is set up certain reasons why
the State should not comply with the demands of your office in the
This communication accompanies your letter
particulars referred to.
In your said letter you discuss at length the difof the 31st ultimo.
ferent questions sought to he raised by the surveyor-general of the
office

date of July

6, last,

State.
It

is

purpose of the Department at this time to assume direcmatter further than to provide a fitting rule governing

not the

tion of this

cases of this sort, disclosed

upon partial or

final

adjustment of the
and to consider

State's grant in the State of California or elsewhere,

the effect of the act of

may

affect the

March

1,

1877 (19 Stat., 267), in so far as

it

matters presented.

support of common
township and it is the
number of townships or fractional townships within the boundaries
of the State that determines the extent or measure of the grant hence,
in adjusting the grant, the main object is to determine whether the
State has received for each township the designated sections, an equal

The grant of lands

schools

is

to the several States for the

generally based upon the unit of

a

;

quantity of lands in lieu thereof, or for the fractional quantity due
where such sections are wanting or the township is fractional in
quantity.

When

end

this

is

reached the grant

is

fully satisfied

and

the State fully indemnified.
In

Knight

v.

Land

Association (142 U.

S., 161,

181),

it

was

said

:

The Secretary is the guardian of the people of the United States over the
public lands.
The obligations of his oath oblige him to see that the law is
carried out. and that none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of to a
party not cut led to it.
He represents the government, which is a party in
it

interest

In

is

every case involving the surveying and disposal of the public lands.

the orderly

quired to

s(><

process of adjustment

forth

in

their indemnity

account of which the indemnity

is

States are re-

the several
lists

the specified

claimed, and

regulations issued governing such selections to

it

is

make

losses

on

the object of
the losses and

lands equal, as nearly as practicable, in area.
Such designation of losses i> for the information of this Department, t<> the end

selected

that

what

the grant

be not exceeded.

Without determining at this time
anv given case that i-. low

will he considered as an excess iu
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much

of a variance between the selected and the lost lands will be

considered sufficient to form the basis for a

designation of losses

—

it

demand

sufficient to say that

is

for further

where

it

is

made

apparent from an examination that a real excess in approvals exists,
is not only within the power of this Department, but becomes its
it
necessary duty, to see that sufficient losses or quantities to which
the grant might have been entitled,

had they been

in place

and not

otherwise disposed of, equal in amount to previous certifications on
account of this grant, approximately, are furnished as a base for

such previous approvals or certifications, before other approvals and
made on account of the grant.

certifications are

A

demand by your

will stand

office

in keeping with this rule of adjustment

and be respected

until complied with on the part of the

State, or until, in a proper proceeding before this

Department,

it

is

set aside.

From your office letter it appears that the greater part of the
apparent excess arises on account of approvals or certifications made
to the State prior to March 1, 1877, and on behalf of the State it is
claimed, without questioning the excess, that if it existed it was
fully settled and satisfied by the confirmatory provisions of the act
of March 1, 1877, supra, and can not, for that reason, be made the
basis for a

demand

for further specifications of losses in satisfaction

of such previous approvals.
,

this act were fully discussed in Durand v. Martin
and while there is much said to support a claim

The provisions of
(120 U.

S., 366),.

that all previous certifications on account of the school grant to the

State of California were confirmed by

its

provisions,

it

is

made

clear

was not intended thereby to enlarge or make any new grant
to the State, which would be the effect of a concurrence by this
Department in the State's contention.
that

it

In said case the court said (pages 374-5)
The

:

statute relates only to such selections as had been certified to the state,

meets the requirements of all the cases of defective
certified.
These are: I. Cases where the state wns
entitled to indemnity, but the selection was defective in form
2. Cases where
the original school sections were actually in place, and the state was not entitled
to indemnity on their account: and 3. Cases where the state was not entitled to
indemnity, because there never had been such a section sixteen or section thirtyand, taken as a whole,

selection

it

which could be so

;

was represented when the
As to the first of these
because the state was entitled to

was made and the official certificate
was simply confirmed
indemnity, and nothing was needed to per-

six as

selection

given.

classes,

fect

its

the certificate

the title but a waiver by the United States of

all

irregularities in the time

and manner of the selections. As to the second, the selection was confirmed,
and the United States took in lieu of the selected land that which the state
would have been entitled to but for the indemnity it had claimed and got. In
its effect this was an exchange of lands between the United States and the
state.

And

the state

as to the third, in lieu of confirmation, bona fide purchasers from
titles by paying the United

were given the privilege of perfecting their
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Under these circumstances, it was a
States for the land at a specified price.
matter of no moment to the United States whether the original selection was
invalid for one cause or another.

If the state

was actually

entitled to indem-

and the Tinted States only gave what it had agreed to give. If
the state claimed and got indemnity when it ought to have taken the original
school sections, the United States took the school sections and relinquished
And if the state had
their rights to the lands which had heen selected in lieu.
claimed and sold land to which it had no right, and for which it could not give
school land in return, and equitable provision was made for the protection of
the purchaser by which he could keep the land, and the United States would
In this way all defective titles, under the government
get its value in money
pertificates, would he made good without loss to the United States.

was

nity, it

got.

i

may

It

he. as

was claimed

in

argument, that when the

hill

was

originally pre-

pared the framer had it in mind only to provide for selections made in lieu of
school sections within Mexican grants before the final survey of the grants, and
for selections made in lieu of sections not finally included within the survey of

hut to our minds it is clear that before the bill finally became a law.
a grant
Congress saw that, as ample provision had heen made for the protection of the
United States in all cases, it was best to include all certificates which were
defective, no matter for what cause, and so the words "or are otherwise defect:

invalid" were added in what seemed to be the most appropriate place

ive or
to

carry that purpose into effect.

No

selection

was made good unless

it

had

heen certified, and not then unless the United States got an equivalent either in
land or in money, or in carrying out their original school-land grant.

In this
purchasers from the state were or could be perfected without loss to the United States, and that, we have no doubt, was the
intention of Congress when the statute was enacted.

way

the titles of

It

is

many

bona

all

fide

not proposed to question approvals or certifications

made

years ago on account of school grants whether before or after

March

18TT.

1,

Tt

tion of its school

is

well understood that the State only

makes

selec-

lands after having found a purchaser for the same.

As before stated, the losses set forth in these lists as a base for the
indemnity selections, are required primarily for the information of

Department as a check against exceeding the grant, and to rethrough mistake, the
-elections were permitted to exceed the losses, does not affect such
previous approved selections, and to exact that losses be supplied

this

quire that further losses be supplied where,

to

meet such excess before further approvals or certifications are

made on account of the grant is the only reasonable course open
this Department in protecting the interests of the United States

to

in

the matter.

The matter of the further adjustment of
school grants to the several
is

therefore

You

will

remanded

advise^ the

to the

States

in

this grant,

support of

and other

common

schools,

primary consideration of your

office.

State of California of the conclusions herein

icached, and while the State should he afforded an opportunity to
bring any matters arising in the adjustment to the attention of this

Department, by petition or appeal,

may

it

is

hoped

he speedily and satisfactorily adjusted.
op.»

t— Vol.

34

—05

m

18

that the

whole matter
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HOMESTEAD ENTRY— ADDITIONAL—ACT OF APRIL

28, 1904.

Charles E. Myers.
application -to make homestead entry was pending at the date of the
act of April 28, 1904, and prior to allowance of entry thereon the applicant
presented a supplemental application to enter additional lands under the

Where an

provisions of said act, requesting that the two applications be considered
together, the fact that entry on the original application was inadvertently

allowed without considering the supplemental application, does not warrant rejection of the application for additional entry on the ground that the
original entry was allowed subsequently to the passage of the act.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

November

(F. L. C.)

18, 1905.

Land

Office,

(C. J. G.)

A motion has been filed by Charles E. Myers for review of departmental decision of June 23, 1905 (not reported), sustaining the action
of your office in rejecting his application to make homestead entry
under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547) for the E. i SE. i, Sec.
,

NE.

NE.

SAY. \ NE.
W., Valentine, Nebraska.
23,

i

i,

J,

and W. \ SE.

J,

Sec. 26, T. 35 N., R. 25

The records of your office show that on December 21, 1903, Myers
made homestead entry for the S. \ NE. \ and E. \ SE. i, Sec. 35, T. 35
N., R. 25 W., which he relinquished April 27, 1904, and on the same
day applied to make second homestead entry for the E. \ SE. J, SE. \
NE. i, Sec. 26, and NE. J NE. J, Sec. 35, T. 35 N., R." 25 W. The
application was forwarded to your office May 13, 1904.
On July 18, 1904, while his application of April 27, 1904, was pending in your office, Myers applied for the land first described herein,
asking that he " be granted a homestead entry upon said land in connection with the land I have applied for on April 27, 1904, which
application is now on file, and I ask that the same be made and considered herewith." The following indorsement, under date of August 9, 1904, was made on the back of said application by the local
officers

Charles E. Myers
his affidavit

made

application for a second homestead entry as stated in
filed the within as amendment to said homestead

and on July 18

application, the land applied for

now

his application for a second entry on

being vacant, and having recommended
which the applicant is now residing we

would recommend that his application be allowed for the land applied for originally and for the land applied for herein and all be treated as one application
under the act of April 28, 1904.

This paper was received in your office August 15, 1904, and October
25, 1904, your office, after stating the reasons given by Myers for relinquishing his entry of December 21, 1903, allowed his application
of April 27, 1904, and gave him sixty days from notice in which to
make second entry for the land embraced in said application, no reference being made to his application of July 18, 1904, nor the recom-

'
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mendation of the local officers. In accordance with these directions
Myers, on November 29, 1904, completed his application of April 27,
1904, and made entry for the E. J SE. J, SE. J XE. J, Sec. 26, and
NE. J XE. J, Sec. 35, T. 35 X.. R. 25 W., accompanying the papers
with the following sworn statement dated November 29, 1904:
|

Comes now the said Charles E. Myers, and. completing his entry said depayment fees and commissions therefor, on oath states that he
is now and has been residing with his family on said land since about May 5,
and commenced making improvements preparatory to establishment of such resithat he does not elect to exhaust his homestead right
dence on April 28, 1904
by entry thereof but asks to be allowed to amend same so as to include the E. h
NE. 1, and W. \ SE. h Sec. 20, said Tp. 35 N., in accordSec. 23, NE.
SE.
mice with an application heretofore filed by him, and the additional land applied
for being the only land contiguous to his homestead as allowed which is subject
to homestead entry and not embraced in application of any other person.
Bcribed land by

;

]

!.

April

July

1,

1905.

IS, 1904.

your

office

passed upon Myers's application of

referring to the recommendation of the local officers

and treating said application as one for additional entry
under the act of April 28, 1904. supra, and concluded as follows:

thereon,

The former application having been already considered by

this office

and the

entry allowed of record, as above stated, the application does not come within
the provisions of section 2 of the act of April 28, 1904, supra, for the reason
that the original entry
cation

is,

Upon
which

was made subsequent

to the date of said act.

The

appli-

therefore, hereby rejected, subject to the right of appeal.

appeal, departmental decision of June 23. 1905. a review of

is

now

asked,

was rendered, which followed and affirmed the

foregoing action of your

office

without discussing or referring to

Myers's application of July 18, 1904, or to his sworn statement of

November 29, 1904.
Under the provisions of section 2 of the act of April 28, 1904. supra.
known as the Kinkaid Act, and subject to its conditions, " entrymen
under the homestead laws .... who own and occupy the lands
heretofore entered by them, mav .... enter other lands contigumi-."
This, however, is not the provision of the act which Myers in
While, prior to said act he had applied to enter 160
effect invoked.
acre-, which was all that was allowable at the time, yet his application had not been acted upon at the passage of the act nor prior to the
time

lie applied for the benefits of said act in connection with his
former application.
It was manifest error to thus ignore his appli-

which he asked to be conwere both pending at the date your office acted upon
his lirst application, and he was clearly entitled to the provisions of
the act of April 28, 1904, which in the meantime had been passed, as
the circular instructions issued under said act May 31, 1904 (32 L. 1).,
670), contains this paragraph:
cation of

July

18, 1904, a- the applications

sidered together

,

Under said act no bar

making

of second homesteads for

the full area of (340 acres by parties entitled thereto

under existing laws, and

is

interposed to the
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\x\\\ be considered under the instructions of the respective
laws under which they are made.

applications therefor

If, therefore,

Myers was

qualified to

make entry

of 1G0 acres under

was likewise entitled
1904, said act having been passed

his application of April 27, 1904, as found, he
to the benefits of the act of

April 28,

before final action upon said application.

It follows, too, that his

rights in this respect are not prejudiced by the error in failing to

consider and pass upon said rights, which were timely asserted by
the filing of his second application of July 18, 1904.

The motion

is therefore granted, departmental decision
hereby vacated, the decision of your office of
April 1, 1905, is reversed, and your office will allow Myers to amend
his entry of November 29, 1904, in accordance with his application
of July 18, 1904, so as to include in addition to the land embraced in
said entry the land described in said application.

for review

of June 23, 1905,

is

TOWNSITE ENTRY—MINERAL LAND-SECTION

16,

ACT OE MARCH

3, 1891.

Nome and

Si nook

Company

et al.

v.

Townsite of Nome (On

Review).
The owners

of unpatented mining claims located upon the mineral lands of the
United States are entitled to the exclusive and peaceable possession of
their claims so long as they continue to comply with the requirements of the
law respecting possessory rights, and are not required to apply for patent
at any time, or ever, in order to preserve such possessory rights.
Locations upon the mineral lands of the United States, lawfully possessed and
held under the mining laws at the date of a townsite entry embracing such
locations, are within the meaning of the language of section 16 of the act of
March 3, 1891, " any valid mining claim or possession held under existing
law," and can not be injuriously affected by the allowance of such entry;
and the mineral claimant may, upon proper proceedings and proofs as In
other cases, obtain patent for his claim notwithstanding the townsite entry

or the issuance of patent thereon.

In the administration of the public land laws the land department has no
authority to determine on their behalf alleged rights of claimants there-

under except where such claimants seek to obtain the legal or paramount
the lands claimed; and where a claimant seeks to obtain the legal
title to a tract of public land the inquiry by the land department is directed
to questions affecting his right to have such legal title conveyed to him and
not to questions relating to possessory or other rights unrelated to and disconnected with his application for the legal title.
title to

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(

No vernier U,

F. L. C.

This

is

a

motion by the

(

Nome and Sinook Company and

for review of departmental decision of
7

Land

1905.

August

Office,

V. P.

S.

R. T.

Lyng

25, 1905, in the case of

.
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et cd. r. Townsite of Nome (34 L. D.,
upon certain protests by said company. Lyng,

Nome and Sinook Company
The

102).

case arose

and others,

filed

July

2,

11)04,

against the application of Porter J.

Coston, trustee, to make townsite entry to embrace the incorporated
town of Nome, Alaska. Entry was allowed upon the application

August 5, 1904,
tests by the local

at

Juneau, Alaska, after the dismissal of the pro-

officers.

amongst other things, the mineral character of
and that protestants
arc the owners and in possession of valid placer mining claims
embracing certain of such mineral lands.
In the decision complained of the Department held, in substance

The

protests allege,

the lands involved in the townsite application,

and

effect,

Stat..

(1) that section sixteen of the act of

March

3,

1891 (26

1101), applies to placer mining claims, as well as to

1095,

vein or lode claims as previously held

(Hidings

v.

Ward

Townsite,

2D L. D. 21), (2) that under the provisions of said section the pro-

whatever rights they have acquired
under the mining laws, as against claimants under the townsite
entry, or patent when issued, and (3) that in the absence of applications for patent by the protestants the Department is without autectants are fully protected in

thority to determine

any question relating

to their rights as against

the townsite claimants.

The contentions urged

in the motion for review relate chiefly to
two points of the Department's decision. They are in sul>stance set forth in the following extracts from the motion for review

the last

Theoretically the issuance of the townsite patent would not affect the rights
in fact, as the Department well knows, such
proceeding would he very disastrous to the mineral claimant in ninety-nine
out of every hundred cases.
The Department's proposition that it is under no

of these mineral claimants, hut
;i

obligation to order a
is

bearing until these mineral claimants apply for patent,

not tenable, because, under the law, mineral claimants are not compelled

t<»

apply for a patent at any time, or ever.
So long as the mineral claimant
complies with the law annually he is entitled to the undisturbed and peaeeahle
possession of and the right to work his property.
This right, which is statu-

and cannot he altered or amended or revoked by executive action, will
negatived if departmental decision of AugUSl 29, 1!M>:>. is per-

tory

he completely

mitted to stand

These mineral claimants have, under the statute, the right to the undisturbed,
peaceable possession of the claims they have located and worked, so lonj: ;is they
continue annually to comply with the requirements of the law: and for the

Department

assume an attitude that

to

will force

them

to

apply for mineral

patents, or else lose possession of at least a material part of their property,
to

deny them

a

statutory right.

Having complied with the provisions

of

is

the

which there has been no denial by the townsite trustee in his appliand having made their locations upon mineral land, of which there lias

statute, of

cation,

been no denial

by the townsite trustee, these protestants are at liberty to
whenever they please, or never to make
and, in the event they choose never to make application for patent, stili

make
it:

their application for mineral patent
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they have just as much right to the full and undisturbed enjoyment of their
claims as though they were patented. Any decision to the contrary is in the face
of the statute and we respectfully suhinit that the decision complained of is of
such character.
;

undoubtedly true that owners of unpatented mining claims
upon the mineral lands of the United States are entitled to
the exclusive and peaceable possession of their claims so long as they
continue to comply w ith the requirements of the law respecting possessory rights, and are not required to apply for patent at any time,
or ever, in order to preserve such possessory rights. These propositions are clearly embodied in the mining laws and are w ell established
by judicial authority. Whenever occasion has arisen, they have been
recognized by the Department.
It does not follow, however, that the possessory rights of these
protestants, if any they have acquired under their mining locations,
have been or will be defeated or in anywise interfered with by anything contained in the decision complained of. On the contrary,
it is expressly held in that decision that under the provisions of
section sixteen of the act of 1891 no title can or will pass by the townsite entry or patent to "any valid mining claim or possession held
under existing law/' If, therefore, the claims of these protestants
are upon mineral lands, and were lawfully possessed and held under
the mining laws at the date of the townsite entry, they are clearly
within the meaning of the language " any valid mining claim or
possession held under existing law," and cannot be injuriously affected
by the application of the principles enunciated in the Department's
It is

located

T

T

decision.

And

it

was because of these principles that

it

was further

held in that decision that patents might be obtained by the protestants for their claims, should they at any time in the future so desire,

upon proper proceedings and proofs

as in other cases, notwithstanding the townsite entry, or the issuance of patent thereon.
The further contention that in refusing to order a hearing on be-

half of these protestants the Department has assumed an " attitude
that will force them to apply for mineral patents, or else lose possession of at least a material part of their property," is equally unten-

In the administration of the public land laws the land departto determine on their behalf alleged rights of
claimants thereunder except where such claimants seek to obtain the
legal or paramount title to the lands claimed. And where a claimant
seeks to obtain the legal title to a tract of public land the inquiry by
the land department is directed to questions affecting his right to
have such legal title conveyed to him and not to questions rebating to
possessory or other rights unrelated to and disconnected with his
able.

ment has no authority

application for the legal

title.

When

the protestants here shall

apply for patents for their mining claims, should they ever do

so, it
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duty of the land department to inquire into and determine
questions which may arise under the mining laws generally, or under section sixteen of the act of 1891, touching their
rights to patents from the government for the legal title to the lands
will bo the

any and

all

embraced in their claims. In the absence of patent applications the
land department has no jurisdiction or authority to make such
inquiry and determination. This is in substance the holding of the
decision complained of, and the holding is clearly right.
The protestants may, if they choose, apply for patent and have all
questions touching their right to the legal title to the lands claimed
by them inquired into and determined in the manner stated, or they
may continue to rest upon their claimed possessory rights under their
locations, in which latter event, should their rights be invaded, their
remedy will be in the courts where such matters are clearly cognizable.
It is objected in the motion for review that certain statements of
fact contained in the Department's decision, assuming that they were
considered material, are unjust to the protestants.

The statements

are as follows:

The town now has a population of about 5,000 during the open season, and
about 3,000 throughout the year. The value of the improvements is now about
The streets are graded, the business streets being planked; there are
$800,000.
sidewalks and graded alleys: there is a tine water system, an electric-light
The mining
plant, a telephone system, and a fully equipped tire department.
claims, for the

most

part,

were located

in

January,

IS!)!),

and have not been

systematically worked since that time.

This recital of the conditions as they appeared from the record was
wholly unnecessary to the conclusion reached in the decision, and was
not intended to,

and cannot in any manner, affect the rights of the
any other mineral claimants, in the assertion of

protestants, or of

their claims, either in the courts or before the land
recital is

department.

The

not to be considered as a finding of facts, and the decision

will be treated as

had not been made. Aside from
is no error in the
and the motion for review is accordingly

though such

this inadvertence,

recital

now rendered

Department's decision,

harmless, there

denied.

DESERT-LA N

I >

E NTRY-ANXUAL E X PEXDITURE-PERM ANENT

IMPROVEMENT.
RlGDON

r.

Adams.

The mere purchase by

a desert-land entryman of well casing alleged to he with
constructing an artesian well on the land embraced in his entry,
hut which was never used for such purpose, nor even removed to the land.
but was paid for by note and left in the warehouse of the merchant from
a

view

whom

to

it was purchased, does, not constitute a ••permanent
Improvement"
Within the meaning of the desert land act. and the value thereof cau not he
applied toward meeting the requirements of the law relating to annual
expenditure.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

November

(F. L. C.)

John

L.

Adams, on October

28, 1905.

30, 1902,

the N. i of the NW. i of Sec. 7,
T. 18 S., R. 26 E., Roswell land district,

(J. L.

made

desert-land entry for

and the S. J of the

He made

his first yearly proof

had expended the sum of $173.60

New

Office,

McC.)

SW.

J of Sec. 6,

Mexico.

November
in the "

2, 1903, stating that he
purchase of casing for an

artesian well."

On

April

5,

1904,

James

C.

alleging that the entryman

Rigdon filed contest against said entry,
had " never placed the improvements

required by law on the said desert-land entry," nor " expended the

required amount of one dollar per acre in irrigating, reclaiming,
cultivating and improving the same."

A hearing was had, as the result of which the local officers found
and held that the charge had not been proved. The contestant appealed.

Your

office,

on April

25, 1905, reversed the action of the

cancellation.
The entryman has
appealed to
The defendant testifies that he, on October 26, 1903 (within one
year after date of his entry), purchased " casing," such as is used in
connection with artesian wells, from a firm in Roswell, New Mexico,

local officers,

and held the entry for
the Department.

but that, up to the date of initiation of contest (seventeen months

had not used it, nor even brought it to the land, but
was still in the care of the firm from which he had purchased
and that, aside from the purchase of said casing, he had done

after entry) he

that
it

;

it

nothing in the

way

of irrigating, reclaiming, or cultivating said

land.

The appeal contends that your

office

erred " in not giving

Adams

more than $160, same
having been performed on grubbing, clearing, making two miles of
ditches, one mile of wire fence, and plowing nineteen acres."
According to the defendant's testimony at the hearing, nothing of
all this had been done at the date of the initiation of the contest,
hence it can not be considered as having cured his laches.
The appeal contends that there was " error in ruling that the only
annual expenditure contemplated by the desert-land laws are in the
construction of canals and ditches, and in permanent improvements
upon the land." The argument in support of the appeal insists that
said ruling " is the very acme of technicality, and does not agree with
credit for the second year's expenditure of

the Department's long line of

decisions

adjudicating

....

cases

upon equitable principles, and mainly upon the question whether or
not the entryman was proceeding in good faith."
Section 5 of the desert-land act, as amended by the act of March 3,
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what means such land

shall be

reclaimed, to wit

By means

of

main canals and branch

npon the land, and

in

ditches,

and

in

permanent improvements

the purchase of water-rights for the irrigation of the same.

further provides that, within oik year after entry:
1

It

The party

so entering shall

expend net

less

than one dollar per acre for the

purposes aforesaid.

The annual proof should show an expenditure whereby the land
is
"permanently improved." It is exceedingly doubtful

it-elf

whether

in

any case an iron or

steel (or

other kind of) casing, mere

portable property, unattached to any particular tract of land, dis-

connected therewith except by having been unloaded thereon, and as

away

was brought, could be considered as a permanent improvement." In the case here under consideration, said
casing was not even taken to the land, but remained in the warehouse
where it was purchased payment therefor having been made by
easily carried

as

'*

it

—

defendant's note.

Not infrequently

it

requires well-casing to the value of a thousand

dollars to encase an artesian well.
the

demands of

If the defendant could satisfy

the desert-land law as to improvement, irrigation,

and reclamation, during the first year, b\ purchasing, or giving his
note for. a few lengths of w ell-casing, why might he not as properly
T

make

his second

and third years* annual proof

same manner

in the

leaving the casing in the care of the merchant from

chased

to be delivered at

it,

some time

in the future,

whom

he pur-

when demanded

At the end of four years he could relinquish his claim
what it cost him
or omit paying the notes he had given therefor
and thus defeat the
very purpose of the desert-land act. which contemplates that at the
end of four years the land shall be reclaimed and in a state of cultivation.
The Department can not convince itself that it would be
proper for it to open so inviting a door to speculation and fraud.
The action of your office in rejecting said annual proof and canceling the entry was correct, and is herebv affirmed.
(if

ever)

(

for a valuable consideration, sell the casing for

—

mining claim—application fob patent-publication of notic ienewspaper published nearest claim.
Pike's

Peak and Other

Looks.

By the newspaper published nearest a mining claim, within the contemplation
of section 2325, Revised Statutes, is meant the newspaper of established
character and general circulation in the vicinity of the claim which is
nearest

tance

in

point of practicable accessibility:

from the claim

that

is.

Involved over the most nearly

nearest
direct

by the

dis-

traversable
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route, and over which the editions of the paper are or may be transported
by the usual and available means of conveyance. The distance in contemplation is that which must actually be traveled to bring the paper into
the neighborhood of the claim, in order that the intended office of the notice
may in that vicinity be performed.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

November

(F. L. C.)

Land
(F.

28, 7 905.

Office,

H. B.)

January 25, 1904, The Pike's Peak Gold and Copper Mining Company filed application (No. G53) for patent to the Pike's Peak and
certain other lode mining claims, Prescott, Arizona, land district; and
Phoenix Republican," published at Phoenix, Arizona, was desthe
ignated by the register as the newspaper in which notice of the appli**

cation should be published.

February

8,

1904, Eli S. Perkins filed protest, alleging the current

publication of the notice in the designated newspaper at Phoenix,

from the claims
by the usually traveled route

distant, as further alleged, at least forty miles

air line

and probably

fifty miles

in an
;

that

long time prior to the date of the patent application protestant
has published the " News-Herald," a newspaper of established character and general circulation in the vicinity of the claims and elsewhere, at Martinez, about twenty-eight miles in a direct line and by
the usually traveled route from the claims in question; and that the
News-Herald is nearest the claims and is the newspaper in which the
notice should have been published.
Wherefore, protestant prayed
that a hearing be ordered, to the end that he might furnish evidence
for

a'

to sustain the allegations of his protest.

Hearing Avas accordingly ordered and had, at which appearance
was made and testimony submitted by and on behalf of both parties.
March 29, 1904, the local officers, finding from the evidence little difference as to distance of the two papers from the claims, the Phoenix
Republican to be a bona fide newspaper of established character and
general and the greater circulation, held that greater publicity had
been given the notice by its publication in the latter paper and that
the register had not abused his discretion in the premises. Protestant thereupon appealed to your

office.

In the course of its decision of September 19, 1904, your office, having examined the evidence, found therefrom, in substance and effect,
that, geographically measured, Martinez is the nearer of the two
towns to the claims in question, by from three to six miles, depending
upon the particular points of each from which measurements are
taken that there are no direct routes of travel between Martinez and
;

the claims, to reach either of which from the other a circuitous route

must be followed
is

;

that

from Phoenix

to the claims the route of travel

comparatively direct, and, as far as accessibility

is

concerned, the
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is nearer than Martinez: that practically all business
on behalf of these and other claims in the vicinity are with
Phoenix, the place of the Pike's Peak company's offices and the postoffice address of most residents of the mining district in which the
claims in question are situate; that it does not appear that either
newspaper has any considerable circulation in the immediate vicinity
r)f the claims involved, few persons probably being resident there;
that both may be called newspapers of general circulation, having
subscribers in most of the towns in that section; that both appear to
be established newspapers, and there is little choice between them in
this respect; and that, whilst it would appear that a notice published
in the Phoenix Republican would be most likely to attract the attention of persons having interests in the region of the claims involved,

latter

town

relations

it

is

also true that the

Xews-Herald

is

such a newspaper as is conis published

templated by the statute and mining regulations and
actually

nearer the land embraced in the application for patent.

Wherefore, citing the cases of
L. I)..

Tough Nut and Other Lode Claims

359) and Northern Pacific Railway

Company

(32

(Ibid., 611), it

was errone-

tt-as

held that the designation of the Phoenix Republican

ous,

the conclusion in that behalf reached b}r the local officers in the

present controversy

was reversed, and

it

was directed that the

register

designate another newspaper, for republication of the notice, falling

intendment of the statute and the official regulations.
The applicant company has appealed to the Department. Several
iissignments of error are set out, those of which it is essential to consider being, in substance, that your office erred in observing geographprithin the

or direct-line measurements, instead of
governing in the selection of a newspaper;
that in designating the Phoenix Republican
abused his discretion; and erred in deciding
of the two cases cited, supra.
ical

us

First considering the evidence
that the findings
It also

it.

usually traveled routes,
that

it

erred in holding

in this case the register

the case

submitted in the case

of the local officers and your

office

upon authority
it

may

be said

are sustained by

appears, by undisputed testimony, that by the available

mining claims and the respective towns
Phoenix is actually less. The general circulation of
Phoenix Republican is shown to be considerably greater than
of the News-Herald, of Martinez, and it was expressly admitted
the former is and was a newspaper "of established character

routes of travel between the
the distance to
(he
that
that

and general circulation in the vicinity of the claims
Xavapai and Maricopa counties."

Upon

in

question in

Department is unable to agree with the concluby your office, and is constrained to hold that the appellant company's assignments of error, as above, are well founded.
the whole the

sion reached
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facts here disclosed are not parallel to those of either case cited

by your

office,

and

this case is not controlled

readily appear.

by either of them, as

—

will

—

In the first case so cited Tough Nut and Other Lode Claims it
was held that the register of the Prescott, Arizona, land office had
abused his judicial discretion in the designation of the newspaper in
which the publication in that case occurred, for the reason, as the
facts were found, that two other bona fide newspapers of established
character and general circulation in the vicinity of the claims involved were published at a point " at least six miles nearer " the
claims, "either by an air line or by the usually traveled route.*'
There appeared in that case to be no justification for the designation
and the
of the more remote paper in which the notice was published
record strongly suggested that the register's judgment in that behalf
had been influenced by the receiver's ownership of that paper.
In the case of Northern Pacific Railway Company, the second case
cited by your office, notice (pursuant to section 2335, Revised Stat;

utes)

of a hearing ordered to determine the character of certain

by the commissioners appointed
under the act of February 20, 1895 (28 Stat., 683), was published in
a newspaper many miles more remote from the lands than certain
other existing and bona fide papers, in which, too, notices of the prior
The latter papers were respectively
classification had appeared.
about twelve and eighteen miles nearer than the paper in which publication occurred, and the requirement of the statute had plainly not
there been met.
Notice of each application for patent to a mining claim is required
by the statute (Sec. 2325, R. S.) to be published, at the instance
of the register, " in a newspaper to be by him designated as published
As has frequently been said, that officer is
nearest to such claim/
thus invested with discretion in the matter, but a judicial discretion
which may be revieAved and controlled by your office and the Department to prevent its abuse. That discretion, within prescribed limits,
is thus given him with the manifest object of carrying into effect the
purpose of the statute itself. As said in departmental instructions
of February 3, 1898 (20 L. D., 145, U0-7)
lands, theretofore classified as mineral

'

:

The

is given some discrehappen, as in the case
of Bretell v. Swift, that the newspaper nearest the land, geographically measured, is not the paper nearest to the land by the usually traveled route, and is
not the paper best calculated to secure publicity of the notice in the neighborhood of the claim. The statute is not simply that the publication shall be in a
newspaper *' published nearest to such claim," but is that the publication shall be
" in a newspaper to be by him [the register] designated as published nearest to
such claim." There are three elements in this requirement
First, the publication shall be in a newspaper
second, that newspaper shall be the one " pub-

statute clearly seems to indicate that the register

tion in the selection of the newspaper.

It

may sometimes

:

;
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" and third, the register shall designate and deterlished nearest to such claim;
mine what newspaper is "published nearest to such claim." As applied to
newspapers, printing is not the sole act of publication. To he published within
the meaning of this statute, a newspaper must he circulated, that is, it must be
The performance of the regisdistributed as a means of disseminating news.
ter's duty, under the statute, requires the exercise by him of reasonable judgment and discretion, both in determining what is a newspaper and in determinlie
ing which of several papers is the one published nearest to the claim.
should not act arbitrarily or indifferently in the matter, but should be guided by
the purpose of the statute in requiring publication, which is the diffusion of

information and notice respecting the application for patent in the vicinity of
and among those whose residence or presence in that locality hespeak

the claim

their interest in the claim or their
Ill

knowledge thereof.

the course of those instructions the

views expressed in the case of
(on review. 15 L.

I).,

Condon

Department reaffirmed the
Mammoth Mining Co.

et al. v.

330, 334), in which, discussing the provision of

the statute in question,

it

was held

means that the register shall publish the notice of such application in
by him designated as being the newspaper published nearest to
such claim, not by actual measurement in a direct line between newspaper
offices in the same town or city, hut in the nearest town or city in which a
paper or papers of established character and general circulation is published.
Unquestionably, under this statute, when several newspapers are published in the
same town or city, the register may designate whichever in his judgment will
hest subserve the public interests and which will give the widest notice to the
From these views it folpublic that the entrymen are seeking title to a mine.
lows, that in this matter the register has some discretion in the designation of
the newspaper, as to its established character as a newspaper, its stability and
general circulation and the like. But it is a legal discretion and in its exercise
his act is certainly subject to review and control by your office and the Departnient. and where it is shown that he has abused such discretion, your office, as
well as the Department, has the power to set aside his action in order to avoid

that this

a paper to he

I

injustice or unfair discrimination, or an ignoring of the provisions of the law
and the rules and regulations of the Department.

The Department does not entertain the view that geographical or
airline measurements should he applied in determining, for the pur-

which of two or more newspapers pubnearest the mining claim concerned.
Under such an inflexible rule the register would have little room for
the exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of that
question to the end that the statutory purpose might be best subaerved. The circular of April 21, 1885, it is true, established a hard
and fast rule in that respect, afterward incorporated into paragraph
37 of the mining regulations approved December 10, 1891, whereby it
was declared that the register had " no discretion under the law to
designate any other than the newspaper .... of general circulation
pose of the statutory notice,
lished

that

is

at

different

points

is

published nearest the land, geographically measured."

this construction

was discarded

in the

lint

ensuing revision of the regula-
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tions, December 15, 1897, and supplanted by the provisions of paragraph 52 thereof (25 L. D., 561, 578), retained in the like-numbered
paragraph of the regulations of June 24, 1899 (28 L. D., 594, 603),
and in paragraph 17 of the present regulations (31 L. D., 474, 482),

as follows

The

register shall publish the notice of application for patent in a paper of

established character and general circulation, to be by

him designated as being

the newspaper published nearest the land.

The omission, from the revision following the regulations of 1891,
of the words " geographically measured," and the judgment and discretion to be

employed by the

register in determining in each case

the proper newspaper, within the intent and meaning of the statute,
for publication of notice, are subjects of

the departmental instructions of February

remark and discussion
3,

in

1898, supra.

By the newspaper published nearest a mining claim, within the
contemplation of the statute, is meant, as the Department regards
it, the nearest in point of practicable accessibility; that is, nearest
by the distance from the claim involved over the most nearly direct
traversable route, and over which the editions of the paper are or
may be transported by the usual and available means of conveyance.
An objective, distant five miles in a straight line but distant ten
miles by the only available route, is for practical purposes the
greater distance removed. The purpose of the statute demands its
and the distance in contemplation is that which
must actually be traveled to bring the paper into the neighborhood

practical application,

of the claim, in order that the intended office of the notice may in
The use of the expression " usually

that vicinity be performed.

traveled route," in this connection, however,

may

be misleading,

inasmuch as the route " usually " traveled in a particular locality
might not be the shortest of the available and traversable routes,
within the intendment of the statute.
The register, in the exercise of the judgment and discretion lodged
in him, must determine in every instance what is a newspaper, that
is, whether of established character and general circulation, where
it is actually published, its circulation in the vicinity of the mining
claim involved and as compared with the like circulation of other
papers of equal standing in other respects, and which among all of
them is published nearest the claim according to the distance necessary to be covered by each to reach the neighborhood of the latter
all within the intent and meaning of the statute and to promote to
the utmost its object, " which is the diffusion of information and
notice respecting the application for patent in the vicinity of the

claim and

among

those whose residence or presence in that locality

bespeak their interest in the claim or their knowledge thereof."
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found to be that the Phoenix Republican,

designated for publication of notice of the Pike's Peak patent application, is a newspaper of established character, of equal circulation
in the vicinity

of the claims with the News-Herald of Martinez and

of greater general circulation,

the former

is

and that the place of publication of

really nearer those claims than

is

that of the latter

paper by the respective available routes of travel, it can not be held
that the register abused his discretion in the premises or that the
requirements of the statute have not been satisfied.

For these reasons the decision of your

office

must

be,

and

it

is,

reversed.

townsite trustee-expenses -section

11,

act of march

.1.

1891.

Instructions.
3, 1891, attorney's fees may be properly
included in the account of a townsite trustee, as legitimate expenses inci-

Under section 11 of the act of March

dent to the execution of his trust, and allowed by the land department,
where necessary and not in excess of a just and reasonable amount.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(

F. L. C.

No vember 29, 1905.

)

The Department

is

in receipt of

your

Land
(

office letter

of

Office,

C. J. G.

November

17,

1005, submitting- the correspondence of Porter J. Coston, trustee of

the townsite of

Nome, Alaska, and

in that connection

asking for

instructions relative to the question of including certain attorney's
lees in his

account as such trustee.

The appointment of

said townsite trustee

March

was made under

section

1891 (26 Stat., 1095, 1099). which also
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to "provide by regulation
11 of the act of

3,

for the proper execution of the trust."

The fund from which

are

derived the expenses incident to the execution of his trust by the
trustee, is created by Levying assessments upon the townsite property.
The regulations of August 1, 1904 (33 L. D., 103), under said act,
after specifically naming certain purposes for which assessments may
!>e made by the trustee, further prescribes:
:ind

nil

other legitimate expenses incident to the expeditious execution of his

trust.

Thus expenditures

in

connection with the legitimate work of the
upon prior legislative authority,

townsite trustee are not dependent

no appropriation is made by Congress for the purpose, and the
money does not come out of the United States treasury. Hence the
assessment fund is wholly under the control of the land departmenl
and it is purely discretionary with said department as to how and for
as
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what purposes in connection with townsite work said fund shall be
expended. It is believed that attorney's fees constitute a proper
charge in certain cases upon said fund, and the circumstances set
forth in the correspondence submitted seem to be sufficiently exceptional to warrant the inclusion of said fees in the " legitimate
expenses " incident to the work of the trustee. It is not intended,
however, by this paper to approve the fees in question, whatever they
may be, the account for which has not vet been presented, but only
to express the opinion that they may properly be allowed in the event
they are found to be necessary and not in excess of a just and reasonIn this connection it may be said that the trustee should
able sum.
exercise special care and judgment in the premises and be reasonably
convinced of their necessity before incurring expenses of this character, as the levying of assessments in the first instance is and should
be limited to matters necessarily attendant upon the proper execution of his trust.

RIGHT OF WAY-TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH LINES— SECTION
OF MARCH 3, 1901.

3,

ACT

Opinion.
The annual tax upon telephone and telegraph lines referred to in section 3 of the
act of March 3, 1901, is conditioned upon two things: (1) The line upon
which the tax

sought to he imposed must he upon lands such as the Secis authorized to subject to the terms of the act, and
Where
(2) the line must not be subject to State or Territorial taxation.
the line upon which the tax is sought to be imposed runs through any of
the lands which the Secretary is authorized to subject to the terms of the
act, and is not subject to State or Territorial taxation, such line is under
the act subject to an annual tax not exceeding five dollars for each ten
miles thereof constructed and maintained, regardless of any tax which may
be levied and collected by a municipality through which the line runs.
Rights of way under the provisions of section 3 of the act of March 3, 1901, are
" in the nature of an easement," and are property rights subject to sale or
transfer without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior.
is

retary of the Interior

The term

" line,"

the right of

as employed in section 3 of the act of

way

means

3,

1901,

is

held to con-

an independent line, upon which the grantee may place as many
wires as he chooses, the tax to be assessed against the property only at the
In towns, where no wellrate of five dollars for each ten miles of line.
defined system of parallel wires is maintained, each wire will be regarded
as covering a separate right of way, and, if otherwise within the terms of the
act, is subject to taxation as such.
act of March 3, 1901, specifically provides that telephone and telegraph
lines constructed under its provisions shall be operated and maintained
under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Interior, which carries with it the power to require sworn statements from
the person, company, or corporation operating the lines, to the end that
the annual tax be properly assessed and collected but in the event of nonstitute

The

March

granted, and each separate line of poles

;
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compliance with such requirement, it is not within the power 'of the Secretary, under executive authority, to close the places of business of the offending parties, any question as to the forfeiture of the right of way being
a matter for determination by the courts.

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
October 27, 1905.
(G. B. Gkj

By

reference of the Acting Secretary

my

opinion

is

asked as to cer-

tain legal questions arising in course of administration of the act of

March
act,

>
:

li>01

>.

which

is

(31 Stat., 1058, 1083).

and especially

section 3 of that

in full as follows:

That the Secretary of the Interior

is

hereby authorized and empowered

to

grant a right of way. in the nature of an easement, for the construction, operation, and maintenance of telephone and telegraph lines and offices for general

telephone and telegraph business through any Indian reservation, through
any lands held by an Indian tribe or nation in the Indian Territory, through any
lands reserved for an Indian agency or Indian school, or for other purpose in
connection with the Indian service, or through any lands which have been
allotted in severalty to any individual Indian under any law or treaty, but which
have not been conveyed to the allottee with full power of alienation, upon the
terms and conditions herein expressed. No such lines shall be constructed
across Indian lands, as above mentioned, until authority therefor has first been
Obtained from the Secretary of the Interior, and the maps of definite location of
The compensation to be paid the
the lines shall be subject to his approval.
tribes in their tribal capacity and the individual allottees for such right of way
through their lands shall be determined in such manner as the Secretary of the
Interior may direct, and shall be subject to his final approval; and where such
lines are not subject to State or Territorial taxation the company or owner of
the line shall pay to the Secretary of the Interior, for the use and benefit of the
Indians, such annual tax as he may designate, not exceeding five dollars for each
ten miles of line so constructed and maintained; and all such lines shall be constructed and maintained under such rules and regulations as said Secretary may
prescribe.
But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to exempt the
owners <»f such lines from the payment of any tax that may be lawfully assessed
nuMinst them by either State, Territorial, or municipal authority; and Congress
hereby expressly reserves the right to regulate the tolls or charges for the
transmission of messages over any lines constructed under the provisions of this
a<t
Provided, That incorporated cities and towns into or through which such
telephone or telegraphic lines may be constructed shall have the power to regulate the manner of construction therein, and nothing herein contained shall be
so construed as to deny the right of municipal taxation in such towns and cities.
That lands allotted in severalty to Indians may be condemned for any public
purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where located in the same
manner as land owned in fee may be condemned, and the money awarded as
:

damages

shall be paid to the allottee.

my opinion is desired upon the following questions:
Does the "annual tax" referred to in the statute apply to
exchanges within towns, or is it confined to long distance and

Specifically,
First.
local

toll lines

(

5194— Vol. .4— or> m
,

:

10
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Second. Does the law contemplate and require that transfers and

approved by the Department

sales of telephone lines shall be

Third. Does the term " line," where

it

?

occurs in the statute provid-

ing for an annual tax " not exceeding five dollars for each ten miles
of line," refer collectively to all the wires which the company may
establish upon its right of way, or does it refer to each individual
wire, particularly in towns where no well-defined system of parallel wires is maintained?
Fourth. Does this act authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
prescribe regulations requiring owners of lines to furnish affidavit
disclosing such information as

the assessment of

may

be necessary in order to facilitate

damages and the levy of

taxes,

and may the Secre-

tary of the Interior, in the event of non-compliance with such regulations or with the law, close the places of business of offending parties?

Fifth. Will the

making of

a false affidavit in such cases be subject

to prosecution in the Indian Territory

Responding

?

to this reference categorically, I

am

of opinion

The annual tax referred to in the statute is conditioned upon
two things ( 1 ) The line upon which the tax is sought to be imposed
must be upon lands such as the Secretary of the Interior is authorized
First.

:

to subject to the terms of the act,
to State or Territorial taxation.

and

(2) the line

must not be subject
upon which

If, therefore, the line

is sought to be imposed runs " through any Indian reservation,
through any lands held by an Indian tribe or nation in the Indian
Territory, through any lands reserved for an Indian agency or Indian
school, or for other purpose in connection with the Indian service, or
through any lands which have been allotted in severalty to any individual Indian under any law or treaty, but which have not been conveyed to the allottee with full poAver of alienation," and is not subject
to State or Territorial taxation, such line is subject to an annual tax
not exceeding five dollars for each ten miles thereof, constructed and

the tax

maintained.
in
is

It is not material to this question that the municipality

which such

line is

found may levy and

collect a tax thereon;

it

nevertheless subject to the special tax imposed by the act, unless

subject to Territorial taxation.

way granted by the Secretary
"in the nature of an easement,"

Second. Inasmuch as the right of
the Interior under said act

is

of
it

seems clear that the right granted is higher than a personal privilege, and it being -a property right is subject to sale or transfer without the consent of this Department.
Third. I am of opinion that the term " line," as employed in said
act, means the right of way granted; that the grantee may place as
many wires on this line as may seem desirable, and that a tax may be
assessed against the property only at the rate of five dollars for each
ten miles of line. In towns where no well-defined system of parallel
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maintained, it would seem that each wire covers an independand separate right of way, and if otherwise within the terms of
Each independent line
the act would be subject to taxation as such.
independent
line.
is
manifestly
an
of poles
Fourth. The act specifically provides that these lines shall be
operated and maintained under rules and regulations to be prescribed
by the Secretary of the Interior, and I think you may, and that it is
your duty to, prescribe such regulations as will secure an orderly
administration of the act. This would carry with it the power to
require sworn statements from the person, company, or corporation
operating these lines, to the end that the annual tax might be propI do not think, however, that in the
erly assessed and collected.
event of non-compliance with these regulations it would be within
lines is

ent

power of the Secretary of the Interior to close places of business
under executive authority. Whatever might be said of the power of
Congress to confer upon an executive officer such judicial functions as
would be necessary to terminate the right granted, no attempt is here
made to confer such jDOwer on the Secretary of the Interior, and it
i- clear that any question as to the forfeiture of such right of way
would only be cognizable in the courts. I am of the opinion, how-

the

ever, that

it

would be the duty of the Secretary of

the. Interior in a

proper case to refer the matter to the Department of Justice for such
proceedings as seemed proper and necessary in the discharge of the
duties

imposed upon him by the act.
The question as to whether a prosecution for making a false

Fifth.

oath in these matters
tory has not arisen,

would be cognizable in the courts of the Terriand may never arise. I therefore beg to be

excused from answering that question at this time.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretai'ij.

SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL IIOMESTEAD-SERVICE-SECTION 2304, R.

Herbert
In

C.

S.

Johnson.

computing the period of service of a soldier "who lias served in the army of
the United States." within the meaning of that phrase as used in section
_.".oi of the Revised Statutes, the entrance of the soldier into the army will
he considered as dating from his muster into the service, and not from his
enrollment.

&

i

retary Hitchcock to the

(F. L. C.)

Commissioner of the General Lund Offic<
ml,, r 6 1905.
(E. O. P.)

.

Dea

:

Herbert C. Johnson, assignee of Philander L. Compton, has filed,
and the Department has considered, motion for review of its unreported

decision of

December

11.

L903,

denying his application

to
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under the provisions of section 2306 of the Revised Statutes,
and 3, Sec. 1, T. 34 N., R. 110 W., Evanston land district,
Wyoming, said application being based upon Compton's service in
the army of the United States during the war of the rebellion, and
his prior homestead entry made October 1, 1872, for the S. ^ NE. J,
Sec. 34, T. 21 N., R. 10 W., Traverse City land district, Michigan.
But two questions are presented by the pending motion. It is contended by counsel that the Department erred in computing the time
of service in the army of the United States from the date of muster-in
rather than from the date of enrollment of the soldier and that even
if such interpretation of the language of section 2304 be adopted at
enter,

lots 2

;

this time, it should not

decisions of the

be allowed to overturn the prior settled
to the prejudice of those rights which

Department

have been acquired thereto in reliance upon the previous construction,
by which the Department had long been governed and under which
the right now claimed was always recognized.
The questions thus raised were before the Department in the appeal
of Julian D. Whitehurst (32 L. D., 356), and at that time fully considered and determined. That no person can serve another in any
capacity and thereby create a legal obligation until the tendered
service for the particular duty is accepted, either actually or constructively, is self-evident.

immaterial.
party.

No

The

fact that such service

when
army of

different rule applies

In the organization of the

is

solicited

the United States

is

is a

the United States the

individual presents himself in pursuance to the call for troops for

This is the tender for acceptance or reUnited States. This tender must be presumed to have been made with full knowledge of the applicant that
he must possess certain qualifications and submit to certain conditions,
entry into such service.

jection on the part of the

his tender will be rejected. Among
proof that the applicant is physically
able to perform the duties of a soldier.
He must also submit to the
rules and regulations of war and change his status from civilian to
soldier.
It is contended that the evidence of acceptance on the part
of the United States is the enrollment of the applicant, notwithstanding this may have taken place prior to a physical examination or an

and unless these are fully met,
other of those qualifications

is

inspection by the duly authorized officer of the United States.

War Department was

To

unwilling to accede. While enrollment
is evidence of the then-existing intention of the applicant to take the
necessary steps to complete his entry into the army, yet no duty is imposed, other than that arising from patriotic impulse, to continue the
tender, submit to medical examination and inspection and complete
the contract whereby his status is irrevocably changed, so far as any

this the

act of his is concerned.
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But intention will not make a man a soldier, unless accompanied
by the acts necessary to constitute a change of his state from civil
The question before us is not what he intended to do, or how much
had done, how far his intention had been carried out, when the

or followed
to military.

he actually
defendants
assumed to exercise military authority over him. If he was not then a soldier,
his previous expressions of intention to become one, or even his supposition that
he was, would not make him one.
Tyler

v.

Pomeroy

(8 Allen, 480, 504).

Therefore, enrollment alone cannot be accepted as conclusive evidence that the United States has accepted the proffered services.

Muster into the service

is

the regular formal

and giving

method of completing

proceeding on the
Surely no duty rests upon the United
States to accept the tendered service, regardless of failure on the part of
the applicant to meet the specified requirements. The United States
the conditional contract

finality to the

part of both parties thereto.

has in such cases always reserved the right of individual selection and
the general practice

is

to exercise

it.

Until this right

is

exercised or

waived, the proposal of the applicant can only be considered as a
continuing one, and. until acceptance, no duty is imposed upon either

While

party.

it

is

true that in

many

instances during the civil war,

the exigencies of the service occasioned

many

irregularities in the

procedure, and the acceptance of the proffered services of the volunteer was not always evidenced by a formal muster in, yet it is not believed that in any instance was it evidenced by enrollment alone.
When there was no formal muster in, the evidence was supplied by
such acts on the part of the government, acquiesced in by the soldier,
as compelling submission to the rules of war and military discipline,
giving and accepting pay, subsistence, etc., and such acts as clearly
evidenced a change of status from civilian to soldier. And it is not
believed that constructive muster-in is ever to be resorted to where enrollment was in due course followed by actual formal muster-in. To
extend it farther would be in effect to include all those who enrolled
for service whether accepted or not.
The volunteer who enrolled
and was rejected occupied up to that time exactly the same position
as the ones who enrolled at the same time and were afterwards accepted, yet no one would seek to maintain that he was in the army of
It is urged that because the accepted volunteer
was paid from date of enrollment, that his position was thereby
changed; that the effect of acceptance as evidenced by a formal
muster-in, was retroactive, and that he was paid from that date by

the United States.

virtue of his status as a soldier in the

The Department, however,
ment

is

is

army

of the United States.

of opinion a better reason for such pay-

presented, not inconsistent with the view that until acceptance

was not in the army of the United States, namely, that
by reason of the completion of the contract on the part of the volunteer, a just and equitable claim was established as against the United

the volunteer
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States to remunerate him for the time taken from his ordinary employment and which would otherwise, so far as material gain is conBut the recognition of this equitable
cerned, be entirely lost to him.
claim by the United States could not operate to charge him with any
dereliction of duty prior to the actual change of his status from
civilian to soldier.
And there appears to be ample justification for
the payment of such equitable claims in the language of the various
statutes, though the time for the commencement thereof is not
specifically fixed at date of enrollment.
(See act of July 24, 1861,
12 Stat,, 274; act of August G, 1861, 12 Stat, 326.)
Had the person for whose benefit these acts were passed been in the army of the
United States, such additional legislation would have been unnecessary, and it would seem, therefore, to be a legislative recognition
of the ruling of the War Department that prior to muster-in such
persons were not in the army of the United States.
After a careful consideration of all the matters presented in support
of this contention, the Department is of opinion the same was correctly decided in the case of Julian D. Whitehurst, supra, and the rule
then announced will not now be disturbed.
The plea that the right claimed is a vested one acquired under prior
rulings of the Department, and therefore cannot now be disturbed, is
not supported by the citation of authority, other than departmental
decision in the case of Elijah C.

Putman

(23 L. D., 152).

The

facts

presented and the question decided in said decision were entirely dif-

from the one now involved. The language used therein in refPutman was unnecessary to a determination of
the issue and was mere dictum. An erroneous practice of the land
department would not be binding upon the Department, however
long continued, and however loath the Department may be to disturb
a settled practice, its plain duty forbids its recognition thereof, when
ferent

erence to the service of

contrary to the language of the statute.
For the reasons herein stated, and those set forth in the carefully
considered case of Julian D. Whitehurst, supra, the motion for review
is

denied.

homestead entry—additional-section

6,

act of march

3,

1889.

August Meisner.
By

the exercise of the right to make additional homestead entry conferred hy
section 6 of the act of March 2, 1889, even though for a less amount of land

than might have been taken thereunder, the entryruan thereby exhausts the
privilege granted by said section.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
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December

F. L. C.

An
your

appeal has been
office

of

June

6,

filed

6, 190-5.
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Land
(

Office,

C. J. G.

by August Meisner from the decision of

1905, holding for cancellation his cash entry for

NW. h Sec. 8, T. 43 X., R. 24 W., Marquette, Michigan.
appears that on December 24, 1898, Meisner made homestead
entry No. 9087 for the XE. J SE. J, Sec. 22, T. 42 X., R. 25 W., which
he commuted July 18, 1900, under section 2301 of the Revised StatHe made additional homestead entry No. 10359 on October 16,
utes.
1901, under section 6 of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat, 854), for
the

SW.

|

It

W., which he commuted March
additional homestead entry
L903, under said section 6, for the land first
X<>. 11167 on September
described herein, which he commuted to cash entry Xo. 20534 December 27, 1904. The latter entry is the one now in question.
The several entries of Meisner were for non-contiguous tracts of
Your office correctly held that his additional entry of October
laud.
16, 1901, under section 6 of the act of March 2, 1889, exhausted his
homestead right, notwithstanding he did not secure by such entn
By
sufficient land to complete the maximum quantity of 160 acres.
the terms <>f that section, even though standing alone, it is clearly
But the act of 1889 as
susceptible of such construction and no other.
relates
common
to the one and
subject of the acquisition of
a whole
homestead.- on the public lands, and therefore it is to be construed in
Only one entry is
pari materia with the original homestead law.
allowed under said law and if the applicant thereunder elects to enter
less than 160 acres he exhausts his homestead right, unless it is otherThere are numerous such special
wise specifically provided by law.
laws and the act of 1889 is one of them. It provides in section 6
thereof, under which Meisner made his additional entries:
the X.

I

11, 1903.

XE.

i,

Sec. 12, T. 42 X.. R. 25

He was

also allowed to

make

'•>.

r

That every person entitled, under the provisions of the homestead laws, to
who has heretofore complied with or who shall hereafter
comply with the conditions of said laws, and who shall have made his final
proof thereunder for a quantity of land less than one hundred and sixty acres
and received the receiver's final receipt therefor, shall he entitled under said
laws to enter as a personal right, and not assignable, by legal subdivisions of
the public lands of the United States subject to homestead entry, so much
additional land as added to the quantity previously so entered by him shall not
exceed one hundred and sixty acres: Provided, That in no case shall patent
issue for the land covered by such additional entry until the person making such
additional entry shall have actually and in conformity with the homestead laws
resided upon and cultivated the lands so additionally entered and otherwise
fully complied with such laws.

enter a homestead,

Following the construction placed upon the original homestead
law and the practice thereunder, when Meisner made his additional
entry of October 16, 1901, and elected to enter Less than enough to
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make np 160

acres,

he exhausted his right, as he was only entitled to

the exercise of one privilege of additional entry under said section.
Nor is there any other known act allowing additional entries in
certain instances, under

remain

The

which the entry

in question can be allowed to

intact.

decision of your

office

herein

is

affirmed.

fort assinniboine military reservation-forest reserve lieu
selection—act of june 4, 1897.
Charles Ziegler.
Lands formerly embraced within the Fort Assinniboine military reservation, and
opened to entry by the act of April 18, 1896, are subject to selection in lieu
of lands within a forest reserve relinquished to the United States under the
exchange provisions of the act of June 4, 1897.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L.

C)

December

7,

1905.

Land

Office,

(J. R.

W.)

Charles Ziegler, by Walter B. Sands, attorney in fact, appealed
from your decision of March 31, 1905, rejecting his selection, No.
10917, your office series, under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36),
for lot 9, Sec. 7, T. 32 N., R. 16 E., and lot 2, Sec. 10, T. 32 N., R. 15 E.,
M. M., Greatfalls, Montana (46.06 acres), in lieu of lot 1, Sec. 16, T. 1
S.,

R, 7 E., S. L. M., in the Uinta forest reserve, Utah (40 acres).
selected lies in the abandoned Fort Assinniboine military

The land

reservation.

Your

decision rejected the selection because

the act of April 18, 189G (29 Stat, 95), and instructions thereunder of May, 1896
(unreported), provide "that all lands which have been or may hereafter be

excluded from the limits of the Fort Assinniboine military reservation in the
State of Montana shall be open to the operation of the laws regulating homestead entry except section twenty-three hundred and one, Revised Statutes, and
to entry under the townsite laws and the laws governing the disposal of coal
lands, desert lands and mineral lands, and shall not be subject to sale under the
provisions of any act relating to sale of abandoned military reservations."

the disposal of said lands

is

As

restricted to the various forms of entry specially

designated in the act, they are not subject to disposal under any other law regulating the disposal of public land and hence are not subject to selection under
the act of June 4, 1897.

This

is

claimed to be erroneous, and

it is

argued that

probably true that the land in this abandoned military reservation
would not be open to entry under any existing land laws except those mentioned but it did not exclude by implication later enacted laws that clearly
authorized the entry of lands that were then open to settlement and were of a
character contemplated by the later act.
It

is

The

July 5, 1884 (23 Stat., 103), and act of August 23, 1894
(28 Stat., 491), provided generally for disposal of abandoned military reservation lands in a specific manner, after appraisal, and with
act of
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view to obtaining for the government the enhanced value to which
such lands had appreciated during their state of reservation. The
act of April 18, 1896, as to this particular reservation provided that
the lands therein, except one mile square

embracing the government

buildings
open to the operation of the laws regulating homestead entry, except
twenty-three hundred and one of the Revised Statutes, and to entry
under the townsite laws and the laws governing the disposal of coal lands,
desert lands, and mineral lands, and shall not he subject to sale under the proshall be

section

visions of

any act relating to the sale of abandoned military reservations.

'2
all entries theretofore made under " the homestead,
desert
land, or mineral land laws " were validated and, if
townsite,

By

section

canceled, were directed to be reinstated.

Section 2301, Revised StatApril 18, 1896, was that permitting
homestead entry by payment of the minimum price

utes, referred to in the act of

commutation of a
after fourteen months from date of the entry on proof of settlement
and cultivation for that period required by the section as amended
by section 6 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat, 1095, 1098). The
policy of securing to the government an enhanced value for the lands
in this military reservation was thus abandoned and the restriction
of the classes of entries permitted was with view to securing development of their resources by improvement, cultivation, residence, reclamation from desert character, or mineral exploration, such as was
required by the several laws under which entries of them were
permitted.

By

the act of June

4,

1897, the United States, in furtherance of a

public policy, sought to acquire complete
private right in the forest reserves.
to the

owner of lands

to select " a tract of

To

title to all

lands held in

secure that object

it

proposed

in a forest reserve in lieu of such lands the right

vacant land open to settlement," and by the act of
1900(31 Stat., 588, (>14), "vacant, surveyed non-mineral
public lands which are subject to homestead entry." The lands in
this abandoned military reservation are of the class thus specified.
It was within the power of Congress to offer any unappropriated
lands in such exchange, and a proper construction of the acts of June
1.
L897, and June 6, 1900. later in date than the act of April is. L896,
is to extend the modes by which such lands may be appropriated, nor
does this construction interfere with any declared policy of the former act, which did not confine the modes of appropriation to those
requiring settlement, residence and cultivation, nor did it enact in
terms that such lands should be appropriated in those modes only.
That act in form and terms merely excepted them from operation of
the acts of 1884 and 1894. supra, providing generally for disposal of
abandoned military reservation lands, and provided that they should
be disposed of in other modes specified.
It is not inconsistent with

June

6,
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the act of 1896, nor violative of any express or implied policy of Congress, to make them subject to yet other modes of appropriation, and

any " vacant land open to settlement," or " vacant, surpublic lands which are subject to homestead
non-mineral
veyed,
owner of lands in a forest reserve any such
to
the
offered
it
entry,"
described lands not in terms reserved for disposal in a specially restricted manner, or for attainment of some declared public purpose.
The cases of William C, Quinlan (30 L. D., 268) Joseph S. White
in offering

;

536); State of Utah (ib., 301); Webb McCaslin (31 L. D.,
W. D. Harrigan (29 L. D., 153) Hiram M. Hamilton (32
243)
James Page (32 L. D., 536), are not inconsistent
L. D., 119)
(ib.,

;

;

;

herewith.

Examination of these

cases will

show that they

fall into

one or more of three general classes ( 1 ) Where by act of Congress
lands are directed to be disposed of under some specific laws only, or
:

(2) for discharge of specific trusts

manner

charged thereon, or (3) in a

specific

in furtherance of an indicated policy, as to secure agricul-

by resident owners.
In the act here considered no such intent, object, or policy appears.
The act of April 18, 1896, supra, merely excepted the land from operation of the acts of July 5, 1884, and August 23, 1894, and provided
for their disposal under other acts, among which were the homestead
laws without the commutation privilege. The acts to govern their
disposal were of various character, excluding the purpose of assuring
a resident agricultural holding. There was no trust requiring their
sale for raising of a fund for a particular object; there were no words
of exception or limitation to disposal under the acts named to the
exclusion of any other law. When Congress by the acts of June 4,
1897, and June 6, 1900, offered " vacant land open to settlement," and
" vacant, surveyed non-mineral public lands which are subject to
homestead entry," these lands being of such class, became subject

tural development

thereto.

Your
your

hereby reversed and the papers are remanded to
for adjudication upon the merits.

decision

office

SUIT

is

FOR CANCELLATION OF PATENT—PRACTICE—HEARING.

Mary
As between

rival applicants for the

his prior right

E. Coffin.
same

land, the prior settler

by continued compliance

must maintain

wi'th the law.

Suit for the cancellation of a patent will not be advised by the land department

merely because such patent was inadvertently issued; but it must appear
that some interest of the government, or of some party to whom it is under
obligation, has suffered by such inadvertent action.
Where patent has inadvertently issued for a tract of land, the land department,
notwithstanding the title has passed out of the government, has authority
to order a hearing between claimants under the patent and persons asserting
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adverse rights to the land, with a view to determining the advisability or
necessity for bringing suit for cancellation of the patent.

Secretary Hitchcock

t<>

the

Commissioner of the General Land

December

(F. L. C.)

The Department

is

8,

Office,

(J. R.

1905.

W.

in receipt of your letter of September 14, 1905,

transmitting exemplified records in

Mary

E. Coffin's selection, num-

under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat.,
36), and John Glode's homestead application, conflicting as to lots
i and 0, Sec. 13, T. 65 X., R. 18 \\\, 1th P. M., Duluth, Minnesota.
The record shows that Mrs. Coffin made application, in due form
and compliance with existing regulations, October 7, 1899, for these
tracts, then unsurveyed, which was found regular and approved for
patent April 20, 1902, and May 25, 1902, in inadvertent violation of
ber 1182,

your

office series,

then existing regulations of

December

18,

1899 (29 L. D., 391, 393),
and the regu-

patent issued therefor, the lands being then unsurveyed.
lations

providing that patent should not issue upon selection of unsur-

veved lands until four months after receipt at the local

office

of the

approved township plat of survey.
February 8, 1905, the approved township plat of survey was filed
in the local office, and on that day John Glocle filed his homestead
application for these and other tracts, alleging settlement thereon
June 13, 1898. He further filed affidavit, corroborated by two witnesses, that

continued to reside on, improve and cultivate said land with the intention
same as a homestead until November 15, 1899
raised two
crops on sai<l land and made Improvements thereon of the value of from $100
lie

<>!'

to

entering the

$150,

at all

....

viz: a house about 12 x 14 feet in size, comfortable to live in

seasons, about

[

an acre cleared, about two rods square in cultivation.

was one of
on or about the 1st day of
November, 1899, affiant learned that said land had been scripped, and was
advised that said scrip filing on said land would bar his settlement; but
affianl says that at the time said scrip application for said land was made he
and about

'i

of a mile of trail cut; as a settler on the land affiant

the petitioners for survey of said township, but

prayed a healing and cancellation of the selection.
June 3, 1905, your office ruled Mrs. Coffin to surrender her patent,
demanded reconveyance of the land within sixty days and an abstract
of title, showing revestiture of the United States with good title.
August 31, 1905, the local office returned proof of service, and reported no action had been taken.
Upon these facts your office
recommended that suit be brought to annul the patent.
September L6, 1905. counsel for Mrs. Coffin filed in the Department
Tie

a

request that

the matter of establishing the right to the land patented be first considered and
the rights of the respective applicants considered before further action is taken

:

:is

the selector

ent with

what

....
is

is

lawful

willing to
in

make any reconveyance

the matter.

possible

and

consist-
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This communication was referred to your office for recommendation
and report, and November 4, 1905, your office reported that
all the facts and circumstances in connection with this case, this
would not recommend that a hearing he ordered, in the ahsence of a
written pledge from the patentee, Coffin, that she will faithfully abide by the
final judgment of the Department in the premises, and deed the land to the
Government, freed from incumbrances in case it is finally held that the rights
of the homestead claimant are paramount.

Considering

office

Glode

fails to set out

Coffin's patent.

and

cultivation,

While he

facts entitling

him

to

annulment of Mrs.
improvement

alleges settlement, residence,

he fails to allege that the prior right thereby

acquired has been prosecuted and maintained.

It is well settled that

between rival applicants for the same land, the prior settler must
maintain his prior right by continued compliance with the law.
Northern Pacific R, R. Company v. McCabe (29 L. D., 30) Mclnnes
Meyer v. Northern Pacific Railway
v. Cotter (21 L. D., 97, 98)
Company (31 L. D., 196). This the affidavit does not assert. Its
implication is that on being advised of the selection he no longer
prosecuted and maintained his settlement. This is amendable, and
though the affidavit is clearly defective, it is assumed for purposes
of this decision that such amendment is made.
While the land department by issue of patent loses jurisdiction
to adjudicate the rights of the parties to the land, yet there remains
a duty to be performed by the Department when its aid is sought
by a request to bring suit for cancellation of a patent. It does not
follow as a matter of course that such suit should be brought merely
because patent issued inadvertently. It would be mere formalism
to obtain cancellation of the patent if the Department must on the
existing facts at once again issue patent to the same party.
(See
O'Shee v. Coach, 33 L. D., 295.) It is the duty of this Department,
before asking aid of the Department of Justice for correction of its
errors, to ascertain whether the interests of the United States, or of
some party to whom it is under obligation, have suffered by its own
misprision.
It is clear that no interest of the United States has
suffered because no question is raised but that the United States got
good title to the tract relinquished in the exchange, nor yet that the
land selected and patented w as not of the kind and character offered
by the United States. The principles applicable are the same as
apply in controversies between private parties for cancellation of
conveyances, and if there be no substantial equity in the government
East Omaha Land
to demand relief, it must be defeated in such suit.
;

;

T

Company

(21 L. D., 179).

moreover, one of the established powers of the land department to order hearings in such cases for obtaining information necessary for its action, as well after patent has gone out to determine the
It

is,
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advisability or necessity of bringing suit for cancellation^ a> to de-

termining questions arising as to rights
;

If

Glode be willing to

and

assert

will

lands not patented.
Central Pacific Kail-

in public

Thomas J. Laney (9 L. D., 83, 85) Bullock
road Company (11 L. D., 590, 592).

v.

undertake to prove the main-

tenance of his residence and due compliance with the law up to issue
of the patent, a hearing will be granted, on notice to the selector, and

upon a contest against an existing
Such finding will be examined by your office as upon an appeal
by the party whose right may be found, prior to issue of the patent,
the inferior one, and the proceeding will be transmitted to the Departthe local office will find the facts as

entry.

information in determining the advisability of instituting suit for cancellation of patent. Should Glode not allege residence
in compliance with law to the time that patent issued, and renew his
request for a hearing within sixty days from service hereof, the patent, though inadvertently issued, will be allowed to stand.

ment for

its

STATE SELECTION-PREFERENCE RIGHT-FOREST RESERVE LIEU
SELECTION-ACT OF JUNE 4, 1897.

Cronan
The preference
pi.it

to

r.

West

right, for a period of sixty

et al.

days from the

of survey, accorded the State by the act of

make

filing of

March

3,

the township

1893. within

which

selection of lands under giants to the State, does not segregate the

lands against other applications, hut they should he received, subject to the
that be not exercised, take effect,

if otherwise entitled
date of their presentation.
Where a selection tendered under the exchange provisions of the act of June 4,
1897, is in conflict, in part, with prior pending applications, it should not.
for that reason, be rejected in its entirety, but the selector should be afforded
opportunity to protect his rights by proper proceedings.

State's right, and,

if

to approval, as of the

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
F. L. C.
December 9, 1905.
(

Land

Office,

(J. R.

W.)

John Cronan appealed from your decision of February 8, 1905,
under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36),
to select lands in lieu of land relinquished to the United States in a

rejecting his application

forest reserve, as to certain lands therein included described as the
SE.
SW. h Sec. 3, and W. \ NE. ], Sec. 4, T. 43 N., R. 2 E., B. M..
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.
August 21, 1903, the township plat of survey was tiled in the local
office.
On that day Samuel J Gilbert presented his application for
homestead entry for the SE. \ SE. j, Sec. 5, with other land, which
was suspended pending the State's sixty days preference right under
1

.

the act of

March

3,

1893 (27 Stat., 572, 592).
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October
filed his

19, 1903,

John Cronan, by

J. J. Skuse, attorney in fact,

application (as stated in his brief) to select the

W.

J, Sec. 3,

J and NE. J, Sec. 4, and SE. J, Sec. 5, in lieu of lands relinquished
In fact no such application
the United States in a forest reserve.
found in the papers transmitted by your office, and the only paper

W.
to
is

is one dated October 19, 1903, marked " Copy,"
and includes only the SE. \ SW. J, Sec. 3, W. J NE. J, Sec. 4, and
SE. J SE. J, Sec. 5, which is referred to in letter of counsel addressed
to you of date April 19, 1904, wherein he describes the same lands
and says

of similar character

I herewith file a duplicate deed of relinquishment hy John Cronan to the
United States, a duplicate of abstract of title and a duplicate affidavit of non
use of said base land, also a duplicate non-mineral and non-occupancy affidavit
as the records of your office show that the original papers connected with this
application were lost in the local land office after the same had been filed therein
October 19, 1903, by the said Cronan.

Referring to Cronan's application, the local

among

report,

cept
all

February

8, 1904,

John Cronan made lieu selection application for the SE. \
the plat ....
W. I NE. \, Sec. 4, and SE. \ SE. J, Sec. 5
filed .... August 21, 1903, and no applications were received therein exthose of settlers who made affidavits as to settlement, residence, etc.

October

SW.
was

office,

other things, that

I,

19, 1903,

Sec. 3,

.

.

.

including these being suspended until the expiration of sixty days allowed

|

the State of Idaho for preference right of selection. The said application of
Cronan having been made two days prior to expiration of this time, on October

On October 21, 1903, Frei
19, it was considered premature and of no effect.
made timber and stone sworn statement for the W. \ NE. \,
Sec. 4
November 28, 1903, notice was served upon John Cronan of the rejection of his
selection for the land .... October 21, 1903, Theodore C. West applied to make
second sworn statement for the S. \ SW. \ and SW. \ SE. \ of 3, having previously made sworn statement for land in the Lewiston land district ....
Cronan's application as to SE. \ SW. \ was rejected because of said application
.

.

.

of West.

Your

Cronan for the land
was received by the local office
October 19, 1903, and suspended until November 28, 1903, and then
rejected; that by letter of February 16, 1904, B. C. Tiffany, attorney
for Cronan, transmitted to your office affidavits of Cronan and J. J.
Skuse that applications by Cronan had been filed at the local office
October 19, 1903, " to select under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat.,

first

decision states that the application of

herein described and in conflict

36), certain described lands,'' "all being for the land here in question, " and that attached to Cronan's affidavit a certificate by the
register of the local office states

John Cronan presented lieu selections for lands in
which w ere considered by the register and receiver as premature and he was requested to ask in writing that the same be filed on
October 19, 1903 that said request was made and papers received and were
being examined by the tract books when they mysteriously disappeared from
This

is

to certify that

T. 43 N., R. 2 E.,

;

r

j!

.

\
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the office and have never been seen since that the written descriptions of the
lands selected are the same in the written request to have them filed, and in
;

mentioned in the within affidavits of John Cronan and his attorney,
Skuse, hut the basis of the selection cannot be certified by me.

the list

John

J.

The record transmitted to the Department is evidently incomplete.
Not only the original application papers are missing from the files
but also the letter of counsel B. C. Tiffany, of February 16, 1904,
both the affidavits said to have been therewith forwarded and the cerIt is however
tificate of the register above set out in your decision.
accepted by the Department that such papers as the affidavits of
Cronan and Skuse, and certificate of the register must have existed
date of your decision February

in the record at the

The Department therefore

5,

1905.

as basis for this decision accepts

it

as

notwithstanding the evident defect of the record, that
October 19, 1903, Cronan. by Skuse. attorney in fact, filed application
under the act of June -1, 1897, supra, for the lands described in the
(established,

caption of this decision; that at the applicant's written request the

received them; that while the local officers were examining
book with reference to said lands Cronan's selection papers
were abstracted from the records or were lost by the local office and
that no action Avas taken by the local officers upon Cronan's applicalocal office

the tract

tion until

November

28, 1908,

when

it

was rejected because of three

several partial conflicts.

With

(1)

Sec

5, filed

Gilbert's homestead application as to the

August

21, 1903,

with an

SE.

\

SE. \,
and

affidavit of prior settlement

residence.
(2)
Sec.

1.

(3)

With Frei's timber and stone application as to the W. \ XE. J,
made October 21, 1903.
With West's application to file a second timber and stone

application as to the SE.

Your

office

]

SW.

].

held that the local

Sec.

3.

office

erred in even

r

action rela-

"except the action accepting the homestead application of Gilbert and the lieu selection of Cronan and ^impending the same pending the sixty day preference right period of selection by the State."
In so far your decision was correct and is
affirmed.
The preference right given by the act of March 3, 1893,
supra, is analogous to the preference right of a successful contestant
ami does not segregate the land against other applications, and they
tive to the case

are entitled to be received, subject to the State's right, and. if that

i<

from their presentation, if in form entitled
As August had 31 days, the State's preference right

not exercised, take effect
to be

approved.

expired October 20th.

Your

decision, however, rejected Cronan's entire selection, and in
doing was erroneous. The local office and your office should not
have rejected the selection entire.
(Frederick W. Kehl. July !>,
80
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1903. unreported: Aztec Land and Cattle Company. 34 L. D., 122.)
In so far as Cronan's application was rejected entire because of partial conflict with a prior selection it is reversed and the case is
remanded for further proceedings appropriate thereto.

school land -indemnity selection— purchaser.
Burtis
Where

<\

State of Kansas et

al.

public lands of the United States are in good faith purchased from a

State in the belief that the State has acquired title thereto under

its

school

such purchase are held and occupied for many years,
entry thereof by a third party should not be allowed without first affording
the State an opportunity to make good the title purported to be conveyed
by it. by assigning a proper and sufficient basis and .making selection of the
land under its school grant and in case of failure on the part of the
State to make the title good, the present claimant through purchase from
the State should be afforded opportunity to protect his rights by himself
making entry of the land under the public land laws.

grant,

and

in faith of

;

Secretary Hitchcock
(F. L. C.

to fix-

Commissioner of the General Land

December

10. WO.].

(F.

Office,

W.

C.

|

The Department has considered the appeal by Clyde L. Burtis
from your office decision of March 22, 1905, rejecting his application
to make soldiers' additional homestead entry, as assignee of Thomas
Marsh, under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes, of the SE. i of
XW. i, Sec. 34. T. 4 S.. R. 8 E., 6th P. M., Topeka land district, Kansas, and affording the State of Kansas the opportunity to make selection of said tract as school indemnity land upon furnishing a proper
basis therefor, and failing therein that Williams be permitted to
complete entry of the land.
December 14. 1901, Burtis was permitted to make homestead entry
of the tract here in question, the same appearing to be public land
open to such entry. In May. following, he tendered an application,
as assignee of Thomas Marsh, to enter the same tract under the provisions of section 2306 of the Revised Statutes.
Xo question seems to
be raised as to the validity of the right sought to be exercised. Marsh
being entitled to a soldiers* additional homestead right for eighty
acres, and Burtis was advised that he could not complete his original
entry made December 14, 1901, in this manner, but that should he
relinquish his homestead entry the additional right sought to be used
might be permitted. Before this was consummated, however, Edward
M. Williams, present claimant to the land, through the State of Kansas, filed certain corroborated affidavits showing his connection with
the land and the chain of title under which he claimed, upon which
hearing was ordered.
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at the instance

of

the Governor, over the objection of Burtis, filed a verified petition of
intervention, alleging, in substance, that the authorities of the State,
for a valuable consideration,

had conveyed

this tract to

one William

Smith by patent regularly issued by the Governor of the State
and other proper authorities; that title thereto had passed by mesne
conveyance to William-, who had for years held the title in the belief
that hi- grantors were the absolute owner.- of the tract, and it was
II.

was still the property of
proper officers, upon furnishing a proper basis therefor, he permitted to make selection of the
land a- school land indemnity, in order to protect the rights of those
who had held the land through the conveyance from the State.
asked that should

it

he held that the land

the United State-, the State,

through

its

U.pon the conclusion of the hearing, the local officers found,
other things, that on the 15th day of June. L871, the State of

among
Kansas

Executed and delivered to one William H. Smith a patent for the land
in
all

L.

controversy and that through mesne conveyances from .-aid Smith,
of which were warranty deeds, the land was conveyed to Edward

Williams; that

at

time- since the issue of said patent the land

all

owner- and that during all of such time
has been enclosed by a fence; that the present claimant
through the State purchased the land for a valuable consideration
and in good faith, and that during all the time he has been the owner
has been cultivated by

its

the land

same and has had it enclosed by a
and that taxes have been legally assessed annually upon said
tract since 1871 and paid by the several owners of the tract up to
[902; al-o. that the tract is now worth S40 per acre.
These findings are not seriously disputed, and while it is not clearly
made to appear how the error arose that misled the State into patenting this land, it is clear that it was supposed to be and was treated

of -aid land, has cultivated the
fence;

a- a

part of the land- granted to the State in support of

common

jfchools.

Hie land is in
number of

for a

a

community which has been

year-,

settled and farmed
and Burtis was undoubtedly fully apprised

a- to the actual condition of the

lands at the time he

first

sought to

make entry thereof.
Your office holds that the case falls within the category of cases
decided by the Supreme Court of the United State- beginning with
that

of Atherton

attempt to

v.

Fowler

make entry

('.><;
\\ s.. 513), declaring illegal any
of the public land- occupied and improved by

another honest claim and color of

title,

referring particularly to the

Arthur -J- L. I).. 235), Butler v. State of California
(29 L. I).. 610), and Ander-on y. Roray
L. I).. :Y.V.n
In the appeal from the office decision Burtis questions the application of tie- cases just referred to, claiming that William-, and those
20
5194—Vol. :'A—or, m
cases of

Jon.-

v.

i

(

:\'.\

.
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before him, were not occupying the land under color of

title because
not shown that the State ever formally presented an application
to select this land or ever intended to make selection thereof as school
it is

land indemnity.
The books define as color of title that which in appearance is title
but which in reality is not title. It is true that a title was not acquired by prescription as against the United States by reason of the
possession gained under the deed issued by the State for this land,
but it is nevertheless believed that Smith, and those claiming under
and through him, occupied this land under a color of title. Their good
faith in the premises is in nowise questioned and the Department
fully agrees with the decision of your office and the local officers protecting such long continuous possession as against one seeking to
appropriate the lands as against such prior occupants.
It is the opinion of this Department that the State should be
permitted to make its title good, and to that end it should be afforded
a reasonable time within which to make formal selection of the land,
upon a proper and sufficient base. Should the State fail to make
selection as allowed, the present occupant through purchase from the
State should be afforded a reasonable time in which to protect his
occupancy by himself making entry under the land laws, and upon
completion of selection by the State, or entry by Williams, the application by Burtis will stand rejected.
The decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.

uintah indian lands—mining claims—act of may

27, 1902.

Raven Mining Company.
The

limit of the grant to the

was the

Raven Mining Company made by the

act of

May

hundred
mining claims upon the unallotted lands of the Uintah and White River
tribes of Ute Indians, and neither that act nor any of the subsequent acts
27, 1902,

privilege to locate, under the mining laws, one

extending the time of opening said unallotted lands relieved said company
from compliance with the provision of section 2325 of the Revised
Statutes requiring payment to be made for lands embraced in a mining
claim as a condition to the issuance of patent therefor under the mining
laws.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)

December

19, 1905.

Land
(F.

Office,

W.

C.)

The act of Congress approved May 27, 1902 (32 Stat., 245, 263),
provides for the allotment of lands to the Uintah and White River
tribes of Ute Indians of eighty acres of agricultural lands which
can be irrigated, to each head of a family, and forty acres of such
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land to each other member of said tribes, and for the restoration to
the public domain of the unallotted lands on October 1. 11)03.

With reward

to the unallotted lands

it

was provided:

That persons entering any of said land under the homestead law shall pay
therefor at the rate of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall impair the rights of any
mineral lease which has been approved by the Secretary of the Interior, or
any permit heretofore issued by direction of the Secretary of the Interior to
mineral lease; but any person or company
negotiate with said Indians for
having so obtained such approved mineral lease or such permit to negotiate
with said Indians for a mineral lease on said reservation, pending such time
find up to thirty days before said lands are restored to the public domain as
aforesaid, shall have in lien of such lease or permit the preferential ri^ht to
locate under the mineral laws not to exceed six hundred and forty acres of
contiguous mineral land, except the Raven Mining Company, which may in
lien of its lease locate one hundred mining claims of the character of mineral
mentioned in its lease; and the proceeds of the sale of the lands so restored to
the public domain shall be applied, first, to the reimhursement of the United
Sfntes for any moneys advanced to said Indians to carry into effect the foregoing provisions; and the remainder, under the direction of the Secretary of
the Interior, shall he used for the benefit of said Indians.
;i

The time

for opening the unallotted lands in the Uintah reservaprovided for in the act of May 27, 1902, A\as extended to
October 1, 11)04. by the act of March 3, 1903 (32 Stat, 982, 998);
again to the 10th of March, 1905, by the act of April 21. 1904 (33
tion, as

Stat.,

189)

;

and again

to the 1st of September, 1905, unless the Presi-

same might be opened at an earlier
by the act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat, 1048, 1009). This latter
act provided that these lands should be opened to settlement and entry
by proclamation of the President, which proclamation shall prescribe the manner in which they may be settled upon, occupied and
dent should determine that the
date,

by persons entitled to make entry thereof. The plan contemplated was one that had been followed successfully in opening
the unallotted lands in other reservations and contemplated a draw-

entered

ing which would fix the order for presentation of claims, thus avoiding the difficulties

and vexatious contests incident

to

an unrestricted

rush and settlement upon the lands.

As the

act of 1902

had granted preferential rights

to locate

mining

claims not to exceed (>40 acres of contiguous lands generally to those

holding leases or permits to negotiate leases from the Indians, also

Raven Mining Company,

it became necessary
and separate the mineral claims located under these privibefore the opening of the general body of the lands under the

especial

rights to the

to identify

leges

plan to be prescribed in the President's proclamation.

March

3,

The

act of

1905, provides:

That hofore the opening of the Uintah Indian Reservation the President is
hereby authorized to set apart and reserve as an addition to the Uintah Forest
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Reserve, subject to the laws, rules, and regulations governing forest reserves,
to the mineral rights granted by the act of Congress of May twentyseventh, nineteen hundred and two, such portion of the lands within the Uintah

and subject

Indian Reservation as he considers necessary, and he may also set apart and
reserve any reservoir site or other lands necessary to conserve and protect the
water supply for the Indians or for general agricultural development, and may
confirm such rights to water thereon as have already accrued: Provided, That
the proceeds from any timber on such addition as may with safety be sold
prior to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty, shall be paid to said
Indians in accordance with the provisions of the act opening the reservation.
That the Raven Mining Company shall, within sixty days from the passage
of this act, file for record, in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county
in which its claims are located, a proper certificate of each location and it shall
also, within the same time, file in the office of the Secretary of the Interior, in
the city of Washington, said description and a map showing the locations made
by it on the Uintah Reservation, Utah, under the act of Congress of May
twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two (Statutes at Large, volume thirtytwo, page two-hundred and sixty-three)
and thereupon the Secretary of the
Interior shall forthwith cause said locations to be inspected and report made,
and if found to contain the character of mineral to which said company is
entitled by the act of Congress aforesaid and that each of said claims does
not exceed the size of a regular mining claim, to wit, six hundred by fifteen
hundred feet, he shall issue a patent in fee to the Raven Mining Company for
each of said claims: Provided further. That the Florence Mining Company
entitled under the act of Congress approved May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two, to the preferential right to locate not to exceed six hundred and
forty acres of contiguous mineral land in the Uintah Reservation, Utah, shall
within sixty days from the passage of this act file in the office of the recorder
of deeds of the county in which its location is made a proper description of its
claim, and it shall within the same time file in the office of the Secretary of the
Interior said description and a map showing the location made by it on the
Uintah Reservation, Utah, and thereupon the Secretary of the Interior shall
forthwith cause said location to be inspected and report made, and if found not
to exceed six hundred and forty acres he shall issue a patent in fee to said company, for the said land: And provided further. That the extension of time for
opening the unallotted lands to public entry herein granted shall not extend
the time to make locations to any person or company heretofore given a preferential right, but the Raven Mining Company and the Florence Mining Company
pending the time for opening to public entry the Uintah Reservation shall have
the right of ingress and egress to and from their respective properties over
;

;

and through said reservation.

In the proclamation issued by the President July 14, 1905, governing the opening of the unallotted lands in the Uintah Reservation
there was excepted from the lands to be opened " such mineral lands
as may have been disposed of under existing laws."
It will be noticed that by the act of May 27, 1902, the Raven Mining
Company was not restricted to 640 acres of contiguous mining lands,
but was authorized to " locate 100 mining claims of the character of
mineral mentioned in its lease." This act made no further provision
with regard to the completion of title to these mining claims which
the Raven Company was authorized to locate and there would seem
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no reasonable doubt but that, in the absence of other legislation,
title to these claims could have been obtained only in the ordinary
manner provided by the mining laws for the completion of title to
mining claims elsewhere upon the public domain, and this could
have been accomplished only by a compliance with section 2825 of the
Revised Statutes, which provides as follows:
to be

A

Sec. 2325.

patent for any land claimed and located for valuable deposits
in the following manner: Any person, association, or corpora-

may be obtained

authorized to locate a claim under this chapter, having claimed and located
of land for such purposes, who has, or have, complied with the terms of
this chapter, may file in the proper land office an application for a patent, under
oath, showing such compliance, together with a plat and field notes of the claim
tion

B piece

or claims

common, made by or under the direction of the United States
showing accurately the boundaries of the claim or claims,
be distinctly marked by monuments on the ground, and shall post a

in

surveyor-general,

which shall
copy of such

plat, together with a notice of such application for a patent, in a
conspicuous place on the land embraced in such plat previous to the filing of the
application for a patent, and shall file an affidavit of at least two persons that
such notice lias been duly posted, and shall file a copy of the notice in such land

thereupon be entitled to a patent for the land, in the manner folupon the filing of such application, plat,
field notes, notices, and affidavits, shall publish a notice that such application
has been made, for the period of sixty days, in a newspaper to be by him designated as published nearest to such claim; and he shall also post such notice in
The claimant at the time of filing this applicahis office for the same period.
tion, or at any time thereafter, within the sixty days of publication, shall file
with the register a certificate of the United States Surveyor-General that five
hundred dollars' worth of labor has been expended or improvements made upon
the claim by himself or grantors; that the plat is correct, with such further
description by such reference to natural objects or permanent monuments as
shall identity the claim, and furnish an accurate description, to be incorporated
At the expiration of the sixty days of publication the claimant
in the patent.
shall file his affidavit, showing that the plat and notice have been posted in a
conspicuous place on the claim during such period of publication. If no adverse
claim shall have been filed with the register and the receiver of the proper land
office at the expiration of the sixty days of publication, it shall lie assumed that
office,

and

lowing:

shall

The

the applicant
five

register of the land office,

is

patent, upon the payment to the proper officer of
and that no adverse claim exists; and thereafter no objec-

entitled to

dollars per acre,

:;

from third parties to the issuance of a patent shall be heard, except it be
shown that the applicant has failed to comply with the terms of this chapter.

tion

T

l

uder the act of March

the locations of the Raven
made, and they were made, in
The report of the inspector, appointed by the
3,

1905.

Mining Company were directed
the

form of lode claims.

xtij>i-<t %

to be

Secretary of the Interior to inspect the claims after their location,

shows that they contain the character of mineral mentioned in the
company's lease, and to which it is entitled under the act of May 27,
1902.
There would seem to he no question, therefore, as to the price
to he paid on account of these mining locations if. under the law.
any charge is required. The Raven Mining Company was. however,
by act of 1905, relieved from compliance with many of the conditions
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prescribed in section 2325 of the Revised Statutes, and the sole question here presented for consideration

is

as to

whether said company

has been relieved from the payment at the rate of $5.00 per acre,
generally required in completion of title to mineral lands located as
lode claims. Your office required that such payment should be made
preliminary to the issuance of the patent of the United States for
the lands located, and it is from this requirement, Avhich was contained in a letter addressed to said company, dated July 3 last, that
an appeal has been taken to this Department.
The matter has been fully and thoroughly presented, both orally
and by brief. The contention of the mining company is, in effect,
that the act of 1902 made a grant in presenti of the lands to be
located as mining claims made in consideration of the surrender of
its lease on account of which large expenditures had been made upon
the lands covered thereby, which grant acquired precision by the
subsequent locations made, the title vesting thereupon by relation as of
the date of the original act; that as the act of 1905 omitted any
requirement for a payment preliminary to the issue of patent, none
can now be exacted, and, as the other conditions prescribed in the act
of 1905 have been complied with, that the patent of the United States
should forthwith issue.
It must first be remembered that under the lease with the Indians
they would presumably have been entitled to large royalties, which
are terminated at least upon the opening of the lands to entry. The
company has indeed resisted the collection of any royalties after the
passage of the act of 1902, but under date of August 3, 1903, this
Department, in a communication to Mr. Le Roy D. Thoman, representing the company, concurred in the views of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs that this company must pay the prescribed royalties
under the lease until the date of the opening of the lands to settlement
and entry. The position thus taken by the Department negatives
the idea that the privilege granted this company by the act of 1902
to make certain mining locations amounted to an unconditional grant
of the lands located, and after further and full consideration, the
Department adheres to its former ruling and holds that the limit of
the grant made by the act of 1902 was of a privilege to locate, under
the mining laws, one hundred claims.

The

act of 1902

makes

it

plain that

it

was the intention of Congress

to appropriate for the benefit of the Indians, the entire proceeds de-

rived from the sale of any part of the unallotted lands, subject only to
the reimbursement of the United States for any moneys advanced to
said Indians to carry into effect the provisions of said act.

that act, homestead settlers

required to

make payment

upon the unallotted lands were

Under

specifically

for the lands entered at the rate of $1.25

per acre, a condition not ordinarily exacted, and although the subse-
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quent act of 1905, relating to these lands, contained no such provisions, yet, in the construction of the several acts bearing upon the
opening of these lands, it was the opinion of this Department that the
condition exacting payment of homesteaders found in the act of 1902
was not repealed by its omission from the act of 1905, thus preserving
the fund created under the act of 1902 and appropriated for the benefit

of the Indians.
is

It

(See 33 L.

1)..

610.)

not doubted that Congress

from the payment of any sum

might have relieved

this

company

completion of title to the lands
authorized to be located, but when the whole matter is considered it
seems more reasonable that Congress meant by the act of 1905 merely
to relieve the company from making the formal proof required under
the mining laws in the completion of title to mineral lands, and not to
relieve this

in the

company from a payment of money which it would have
make in completion of its title under the act of 1902

been required to

and which that act had, as before stated, specifically appropriated for
the use and benefit of the Indians.
In conclusion it may be added that the opening of the lands to entry
and location was without the formal consent of the Indians and it
seems unreasonable to assume that Congress meant to deprive them of
the benefits secured under their lease made with this company and to
grant away the lands without at least exacting the ordinary payment
required by the mining laws, a sum which is presumably but small
recompense for their right to royalties terminated by the disposition
of the lands.

The

ARID

decision appealed

from

is

accordingly affirmed.

LAND—WITHDRAWATr-SOUMERS' ADDITIONAL APPLICATIONACT OF JUNE 17, 1903.
Nancy

C.

Yaple.

to make soldiers' additional entry under section 230(3 of the
Revised Statutes, although tiled prior to the passage of the act of June 17,
1902, and pending ;it the date of an order withdrawing the lands covered
thereby under the provisions of said act. is not effective to except the lands
from such withdrawal.

An application

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)

December

19, 1905.

Land

office,

(C. J. G.)

An appeal has been filed by Nancy C. Yaple, remote assignee of
Meredith M. Hackett, from the decision of your office of July 3,
L905, rejecting her application to enter, under section 2306 of the
Revised Statutes, the W. | XW. ], Sec. 10, T. 10 X., R. 31 E., Walla
Walla. Washington.
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The
to

March 5, 1902, and forwarded
The land covered by such application,

application in question was filed

your

office

the same date.

together with other lands, w as withdrawn for irrigation purposes
by departmental order of June 24, 1903. under the provisions of the
r

reclamation act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388). The application
was rejected, as stated, because of this withdrawal. It is urged in
the appeal that the application having been filed prior to the passage
of the act, as w ell as prior to the withdrawal, it was not affected
by said act nor the order of withdrawal.
In the instructions of June 6, 1905 (33 L. D., 607), it is pointed
out that there are two classes of withdrawals authorized by the act
T

known as " Withdrawals under the first form,"
Withdrawals under the second form," but it does not appear
in the record under which form the land embraced in the present
application was withdrawn. That, however, is unimportant in the

of June 17, 1902,

and

"

determination of this case, as said instructions expressly prescribe,
with respect to both forms, that after the withdrawals are made all
applications for selections, locations, or entries of the lands covered
by such withdrawals, excepting applications to enter u only under the
homestead laws " lands withdrawn under the second form, shall be
rejected, regardless of whether said applications are presented before
or after the lands are withdrawn.
In the case of Cornelius J. McNamara (33 L. D., 520), it is held,
referring to the act of June 17, 1902, that " by directing withdrawal
of such lands from entry, except under the homestead laws, Con1

'

any mode of private appropriation of such
lands except by such entry under the homestead laws as requires setgress intended to inhibit

tlement, actual residence, improvement, and cultivation

"

and hence,
none of these things being required under a soldiers' additional entry
made under section 2300 of the Revised Statutes, that lands within
the exception provided for in said act of June 17, 1902, are not subA similar ruling was made in the case of William
ject to such entry.
M. Wooldridge (33 L. D., 525), wherein it is said
that

it

was

clearly not intended to leave lands

;

withdrawn under the act of

1902, as susceptible of irrigation, subject to be taken by

one holding a right

under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes.
filing of the application in question was not
except the tract covered thereby from the subsequent
action of Congress which led to its withdrawal for irrigation purposes.
Hence, the fact that said application was filed prior to the

Furthermore the mere

sufficient to

and the order of withdrawal, was not effective
The most that the application can be
said to have done was to protect any claim the applicant might have
It did not confer
as against other applicants for the same land.
upon the applicant any right in the land as against the government,
act of

June

17, 1902,

to defeat said withdrawal.

DECISIONS RELATING TO

THE PUBLIC LANDS.

313

or impair in any respect the power of Congress to appropriate the
land to any public use it might deem proper. It did not operate to
segregate the land so as to prevent its withdrawal by the government
for the specific purposes contemplated by the act of June 17, 1902.

In this respect a soldiers' additional application under section 2306
same rule applicable to any

of the Revised Statutes is subject to the

mere inchoate claim. The principle herein stated is well estabby the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Frisbie v.
Whitney (9 Wallace, 187), and The Yosemite Valley Case (15 Wallace, 77), and allied cases.
The decision of your office denying the application in question is
other

lished

hereby affirmed.

MARRIED WOMAN— SETTLEMENT— BITTER ROOT VALLEY LANDSSECTION 2, ACT OF JUNE 5, 1872.
Matilda
A married woman,

C.

Humble.

not the head of a family,

sions of section 2 of the act of

June

5,

is

not qualified, under the provimake entry of lands in the

1872, to

Bitter Root Valley opened to settlement by said act.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
December 19, 1905.
F. L. C.
(

An

appeal has been

of your office of

made under

filed

May

2,

the act of

Land
(

Office,

C. J. G.

by Matilda C. Humble from the decision

1905, holding for cancellation her entry,

June

5,

1872 (17 Stat., 226), for the

SW.

J

SE. \ NE. \ and NE. J SE. J, Sec. 15,
NW. i, NW. \ SW. i,
T. 7 N., R. 20 W., Missoula, Montana, on the ground that said
Matilda C. Humble, being a married woman at date of settlement,
was not entitled to make entry under said act. The appeal argues
that she was not disqualified under said act by reason of the fact
Sec. 14,

stated.

The tract involved is part of the lands in the Bitter Root valley,
opened to settlement by the foregoing act, section 2 of vvhich provides,
among other things:
Said lauds shall he opened to settlement, and shall he sold in legal subdivisions to actual settlors only, the saino being citizens of the

United States, or
having duly declared their intention to become such citizens, said settlers
being beads of families, or over twenty-one years of age.

The construction claimed

lor this section in the appeal
qualified thereunder if " the head of a family,

is

that a

whether
over the age of twenty-one years, or not, or if not the head of a
family, then the person seeking to make the entry must be over the
age of twenty-one years." And in this connection a distinction is

person

is
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preemption law of 1841. embodied in section
2259 of the Revised Statutes, under which married women were held
The language of the act
to be disqualified, and the law in question.
of June 5, 1872, is practically the same as that in the homestead law
of 186*2, found in sections 2289 and 2290 of the Revised Statute-, in
also claimed between the

part as follows:
Every person who is the bead of a family, or who has arrived at the age of
twenty-one years, and is a citizen of the United States, or who has filed his
declaration of intention to become such, as required by the naturalization laws.
shall be entitled to enter.

Thus the preemption and homestead laws contain practically the
same restrictions in the matter under consideration. The act of
February 11, 1874 (18 Stat., 15). which amended the act of June 5,
1872,

made

this provision in section

'2

thereof:

That the benefit of the homestead act is hereby extended to
on said lands who may desire to take advantage of the same.

all

the settlers

In view of the legislation with respect to the lands of which the
is a part, there is no doubt that the entry in question comes within the rules governing homestead entries, and it is
Avell settled under the homestead law that a married woman, in the
absence of evidence showing that she is the head of the family, is not
qualified to make entry under said law.
The act of June 6, 1900 (31
Stat.. 683), removed a woman's disqualification under the homestead
law resulting from marriage, but that act is effective only in cases
where a settlement claim had been initiated prior to marriage.
tract in controversy

The

decision of your

office

herein

is

affirmed.

MINING CLAIM— ADVERSE— OATH— SECTION

Mattes

v.

2335,

REVISED STATUTES.

Treasury Tunnel, Mixing and Reduction Co. (On
Review).

under the mining laws are required to be verified in accordance
with the provisions of section 2335 of the Revised Statutes, except where
authority for their execution is otherwise specifically given by statute.
The oath to an adverse claim, made by the agent or attorney-in-fact of the
adverse claimant, under the act of April 2C>. 1882. must be verified before
an authorized officer within the land district where the adverse claim is
situated, in accordance with the provisions of said section 2335.
Where the oath to an adverse claim is made by the agent of the adverse claimant outside of the land district, although before a notary public whose jurisdiction extends throughout a county lying partly within and partly without
the land district, such adverse claim is not properly verified within the
All affidavits

meaning of said section 2335.
Departmental decision in case of Lonergan v. Shockley, 33
as in conflict with this decision, overruled.

L. D.. 238, in so far
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Land

the General

(A. B. P.)

motion by the Treasury Tunnel, Mining and Reduction

for review of departmental decision of

May

12, 1905, in

William F. Mattes against said company (33 L. D., 553),
was held that an alleged adverse claim filed by the Company against the application for patent by Mattes to the Iron Side,
and seventeen other lode mining claims, survey No. 15,342, Durango,
Colorado, was not upon oath, as required by the statute, and was therefore invalid and without force or effect to stay the proceedings upon
From the facts as then presented, and undisthe patent application.
puted, it appeared that the agent of the Treasury Company had
pretended to make oath to the so-called adverse claim by the use of a
telephone.
He was at the time twelve miles distant from the officer,
the case of

wherein

it

who attempted

to

administer the oath over the telephone.

The

Department held that an oath could not be legally administered
in such manner, and that the requirement of the statute in this respect
had not been complied with.
The motion for review is accompanied by the affidavits of the agent
of the Treasury Company and tw o of its attorneys, which affidavits
T

are to the effect that the agent in fact

made oath

to the adverse claim

August 25,
and that it was after the oath had been administered and not
before, as was represented to be the fact when the decision complained
of was rendered, 'that the question arose as to the legality of an oath
taken outside of the land district in which the claim is situated, which
resulted in the agent going the next day into the land district and
there undertaking to make the oath by the use of a telephone.
The contentions of the motion for review are in substance as

before the notary, in Ouray, Colorado, on the evening of
1902,

follows:

That the Department erred in holding the adverse claim by the
Company not to have been legally verified by the proceed-

1.

Treasury

ings over the telephone.

That under

2.
filet

1

the additional facts set forth in the affidavits

the adverse claim should be held to

by the agent of the

company

in

now

have been actually sw orn to
the presence of the notary, and thus
T

legally verified.
:').

Thai

in

any event the Department,

in its discretion,

the patent proceedings until the suit instituted in court

panv

should stay
by the com

shall be determined.

The matters involved in
fully considered when the

and third contentions were carewas rendered, and
;is to them it is sufficient to say that the Department i^ not convinced
by anything in the motion, or in the brief of counsel accompanying
the same, that its ruling or. either of the points was wrong.
the

firsl

decision complained of
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The second
the

first

contention

is

now made for
Company in fact made

based upon the assertion,

time, that the agent of the Treasury

oath to the adverse claim in the presence of the notary.

The

transac-

tion is stated to have occurred outside of the land district.

Conceding that the formal proceedings usually attending the
administration of an oath were actually had, the question is presented
as to the legal sufficiency, under the mining laws, of an affidavit, by
the agent of an adverse claimant, executed before an officer outside of
the land district where the claim to which the affidavit relates

is

situated.

The United

States mining laws are contained in chapter six,

title

thirty-two, of the Revised Statutes, embracing sections 2318 to 2352,
inclusive, and in certain acts of Congress relating to mineral iands and
mining resources passed since the enactment of the Revised Statutes.
By section 2326 it is required that " where an adverse claim is filed
.... it shall be upon oath of the person or persons making the same,,
and shall show the nature, boundaries, and extent " thereof, etc. Sec-

tion 2335 provides,

among

other things, that

made under this chapter may be verified before
authorized to administer oaths within the land district where the
claims may be situated, and all testimony and proofs may be taken before any
such officer, and, when duly certified by the officer taking the same, shall have
the same force and effect as if taken before the register and receiver of the landAll affidavits required to be

any

officer

office.

By

act of April 26, 1882 (22 Stat., 49),

it is

provided

twenty-three hundred and
twenty-six of the Revised Statutes may be verified by the oath of any duly authorized agent or attorney in fact of the adverse claimant cognizant of the facts
stated and the adverse claimant, if residing or at the time being beyond the

That the adverse claim required by

section

;

limits of the district wherein the claim

is

situated,

may make

oath to the ad-

verse claim before the clerk of any court of record of the United States or of the
State or Territory where the adverse claimant

may

then

be, or

before any notary

public of such State or Territory.
Sec. 2. That applicants for mineral patents, if residing beyond the limits of
the district wherein the claim is situated, may make any oath or affidavit
required for proof of citizenship before the clerk of any court of record, or
before any notary public of any State or Territory.

This act does not

state

where the agent of the adverse claimant
designate any officer who
respect resort must be had

may make oath to the adverse claim, or
may administer it. For authority in this

to the provision of section 2335 that " all affidavits required to be

made under

this chapter

may

be verified before any

officer

authorized

where the claims may be
This general provision embraces all affidavits under the
situated."
mining laws except where authority for their execution is otherwise
specifically given by statute.

to administer oaths within the land district
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AVhile the oath of the agent of the adverse claimant in this case

was made before a notary public outside of the land district where
the claim to which the oath relates is situated, it appears that the
jurisdiction of the notary, which was coextensive with his county,
extended into and embraced a part of the land district. This, it is
contended, is sufficient to bring the execution of the oath w ithin the
In other w ords, the contention is, in
authority of section 2335.
effect, that under that section any officer authorized to administer
oaths, whose jurisdiction extends into and embraces any part of
a land district, may, anywhere within his jurisdiction outside of the
land district, administer oaths required under the mining laws relatr

T

ing to claims situated within such land district.

To support

Lonergan v. Shockley
where an application for
patent and certain affidavits filed therewith were sworn to outside of
the land district Avhere the claims applied for were situated, before a
notary public whose jurisdiction extended into a part of the land
district.
The Department, citing the case of Corning Tunnel,
Mining & Reduction Company v. Pell et al., decided February 17.
1877 (Sickels' Mining Laws and Decisions, 307, 308), and assuming
the same to be controlling authority, held, without discussion, that
the application and affidavits were properly verified.
In the cited
case, the Department, speaking through Secretary Chandler, of the
this contention the recent case of

(33 L. D., 238) is cited.

That was a

case

above provision of section 2335, said
I

am

of the opinion that

fster out

lis

under this statute an

within the land district

may

officer authorized to adminadminister the same without the district,

but within the jurisdiction.

Counsel have not referred to any other reported case of similar
import, and none has been discovered after diligent research.

On

the

appears that shortly after the passage of the act of
April 26, 1882, rules and regulations for the enforcement of its provisions were adopted by the Department, wherein, amongst other
things, it was provided (Circular of May 9, 1882, 1 L. D., 685) that:

other hand,

it

The agent or

attorney-in-fact

must make the

affidavit in verification of the

adverse claim within the land district where the claim

This rule has existed ever since
modification.

The Department

is

its

is

situated.

adoption without change or

advised, through informal inquiry

your office, that it has been continuously and consistently enforced,
and that, regarding it as an authoritative interpretation of section

at

2335, the

uniform practice of your office for more than twenty years
all affidavits under the mining laws, except where

has been to require

otherwise specially provided, to be verified before an
officer

authorized

within the land district' where the claims to which the affidavits

relate are situated.
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It needs

no argument to show that the adoption of the rule involved

a consideration and construction of section 2335.

No

officer is desig-

nated by the act before whom affidavits of agents or attorneys-in-fact
of adverse claimants may be executed, and the verification of such
affidavits necessarily falls within the general authority of section
2335.

Nor

argument required

prove that the two constructions of
fact that the construction of 1877
related to affidavits by adverse claimants themselves, and that of 1882
to affidavits by agents or attorneys-in-fact of adverse claimants, can
make no difference. In both instances the affidavits are verified
under the same authority, except, as provided in the act of 1882,
where the adverse claimant resides or is at the time beyond the
limits of the district wherein the claim is situated; and it would be
manifestly inconsistent to enforce one rule as to the verification of
affidavits by adverse claimants not residing or at the time being
beyond the limits of the district, and another and different rule as
is

to

The

the section are inconsistent.

to

the verification of affidavits by agents or attorneys-in-fact of

adverse claimants.
.The important question
of 1882 shall prevail.
Avhole subject the

true construction.

meaning of

is

Upon

whether the construction of 1877 or that
careful and mature consideration of the

Department
It is in

is

of opinion that the latter

harmony with

the language of the statute,

to the legislative intention.

is

the

the ordinary and natural

and

is

believed to give effect

Congress evidently had in mind both the

jurisdiction within which, and the officer before whom, the affidavits
were to be verified. Naturally, the jurisdiction would be one of federal
creation and control and it is expressly stated to be the land-district
where the mining claims may be situated. The officer is any person
;

authorized to administer oaths within such district. The reasonable
and natural interpretation is that it was intended the verification
should take place within the land-district that is, before any officer
;

within the land district who has authority, under either the federal or
local laws, to administer oaths.
This was the view taken of the matter by the Department when the
It was originally a part of the act of July
statute was first enacted.
was
reproduced in the act of May 10, 1872 (17
Stat.,
1870
(16
217),
9,
Stat., 91, 95), and was thereafter incorporated in the Revised Statutes.
The language is the same throughout. The question of its construction first came before the Department, so far as the reported decisions
show, in the case of The Dardanelles Mining Company v. The California Mining Company, decided October 18, 1873 (Copp's U. S.
Mining Decisions, 161-162). It was there stated and held as follows:
The instructions issued under the act of July
made before the Register or Receiver.

to be

26, 1866,

required

all affidavits

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

319

The acts of July 0, 1870, and May 10, 1872, authorized them to be made before
any officer within the land district who has authority to administer an oath.
This was done, doubtless, for the convenience of applicants, and the authority was limited to the land district, so as to make it practicable to punish those
who might be guilty of perjury in making the oath.

As contemporaneous construction

this interpretation by the ExecuDepartment whose duty it is to administer the law is entitled to
weighty consideration; and especially so in view of the fact that
except for the short period from 1877 to 1882 such construction has
Having so long prevailed, it should not
been uniformly followed.
be now departed from unless for very strong reasons, and none are
tive

apparent.

strengthened by a consideration of the subseBy the further provisions of the act of 1882 it is declared
(1) That the adverse claimant, if residing or at the time being

Moreover, this view

is

quent legislation by Congress on the subject.

"beyond the limits of the district wherein the claim

make

is

situated,

may

the required oath before the clerk of any court of record of the

United States or of the State or Territory where the adverse claimant
then be, or before any notary public of such State or Territory
and
(2) That an applicant for mineral patent, if residing beyond the
limits of the district wherein the claim is situated, may make any
oath or affidavit required for proof of citizenship before the clerk of
any court of record, or before any notary public of any State or

may

[Territory.

From this legislation it is evident that, at the time of its enactment,
Congress entertained the view that affidavits required by the mining
laws could not be lawfully verified under section 2335, the only
authority then existing on the subject, elsewhere than within the land
district where the claims to which the affidavits related were situated.
Such is the inference to be drawn from the provisions allowing oaths
in the two specified instances to be made without the land district; in
the one instance, where the affiant resided or was at the time beyond
the limits of the district,

and in the

other,

where the

affiant resided

be yo nd the limits of the district.

Again, by the act of January 22, 1880 (21 Stat., 01), section 2325
was amended by adding thereto the proviso:

of the Ivevised Statutes

Tbat where the claimant for a patent is not a resident of or within the land
wherein the vein, lode, ledge, or deposit sought to be patented is located,
the application for patent and the affidavits required to be made in this section

district

by the claimant for such patent may be made by his. her. or its authorized
agent, where said agent is conversant with the facts sought to be established
by said affidavits.

By this
make the

act

authority

is

affidavits only

given the agent of a claimant for pateitt to
is not a resident of or

where the claimant
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within the land district (Rico Lode, 8 L. D., 223) and the natural
inference is that it was in the mind of Congress when the act was
passed that affidavits by the claimant for patent were required to be
made within the land district.
From this review of the statute and its history it appears that the
construction of 1882 accords with that first given by the Department,
in 1873, and is in harmony with the ordinary and natural meaning of
the language used; that the legislation on the subject since the statute
wT as enacted is strongly indicative that such construction gives to the
law its intended effect; and that the uniform practice from 1873 to
1877 and from 1882 to the present time has been to require all affidavits under the mining laws, except where otherwise specially provided, to be verified within the land district where the claims to which
they relate are situated.
It is unnecessary to continue the discussion further.
In view of
what has been said, even admitting the statute to be reasonably susceptible of either of the two interpretations, if it were a matter of
first impressions, it is clearly the duty of the Department now to
adhere to the construction which was first adopted, and which,
except for the brief period stated, has been uniformly followed ever
The motion for review is accordingly denied. The case of
since.
Lonergan v. Shockley, in so far as in conflict with the views herein
expressed, is hereby overruled.
;

mill site— contiguity to vein or lode claim-section
Brick Pomeroy Mill

2337, r.

s.

Site.

" Where non-mineral
of section 2337 of the Revised Statutes that
land not contiguous to the vein or lode is used or occupied by the proprietor
of such vein or lode for mining or milling purposes, such non-adjacent surface ground may be embraced and included in an application for a patent
for such vein or lode, and the same may be patented therewith, subject to
the same preliminary requirements as to survey and notice as are applicable
Held: The words "vein or lode," in said
to veins or lodes," construed.
section, are not used in the restricted sense of indicating a body of mineral,
or mineral-bearing rock, in place, only, but are used in the larger sense of
designating a located vein or lode claim, and that only non-mineral land not
contiguous to a vein or lode claim may be appropriated for mill-site pur-

The provision

:

poses.

Direction given that all applications for mill-site patents which may be made
and carried to entry before July 1, 1906, or which may, by protest or otherwise, without the fault of the applicant, be prevented from being carried to

entry before that date, where the locations of the claims were made and perfected under the law in all other respects prior to January 1, 1904, shall
be adjudicated, in respect to the matter of contiguity of the mill-site
claims to vein or lode claims, under the practice which prevailed in the
General Land Office prior to the departmental ruling in the case of Alaska

Copper Company.
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Commissioner of the General Lund

Office, Beet rriber 26, 1905.

(A. B. P.)

December 23, L903, the Hehson Creek Lead Mines Company made
entry for the Brick Pomeroy, Wall Street, and Amazon lode-mining

Pomeroy mill-site, survey No. 16478 A &
The mill-site, which is in the form of a triBrick Pomeroy lode claim, its northwesterly bound-

claims, including the Brick
B, Gunnison, Colorado.

angle, adjoins the

ary

line,

throughout

length, being identical with the southeasterly

its

side line of the lode claim.

By decision of September 20, 1904, your office directed that the company he called upon to show cause why its entry should not be canceled as to the mill-site, because of the contiguity of such mill-site to
one of the lode claims embraced in the entry, and held that in default
of such showing and of appeal, the entry would he canceled.
The

company has appealed here.
The law allowing entry and patent
in

for mill-site claims,

section 2337 of the Revised Statutes,

Where non-mineral

Sec. 2337.-

is

contained

which provides:

land nol contiguous to the vein or lode is used
mining or milling purposes,

or occupied by the proprietor of such vein or lode for

such non-adjacent surface-ground may be embraced and included in an application for a patent for such vein or lode, and the same may be patented therewith,
subject to the same preliminary requirements as to survey and notice as are
but no location hereafter made of such non-adjacent
land shall exceed live acres, and payment for the same must be made at the

applicable to veins or lodes

;

same rate as

fixed by this chapter for the superficies of the lode.
The owner of
quartz mill or reduction-works, not owning a mine in connection therewith,
may also receive a patent for his mill-site, as provided in this section.
a

In the case of Alaska Copper Company (32 L. I).. 128), this statute
wih considered, and with respect thereto the Department stated and

held as follows (p. 131)

:

A further and equally fatal objection

to the entry,

with respect to the mill-site

Claims, lies in the fact that these claims are contiguous, as a group, to the group

which they are claimed. The statute in terms permits only
"non-mineral land, not contiguous to the vein or lode." to be appropriated for
mill-site purposes, and only "such non-adjacent surface ground" to be embraced
and included in an application for patent for the lode claim, and limits the area
of "such non-adjacent land'* to live acres.
These terms are too plain to invite
discussion.
In this case the lode and mill-site claims form one continuous, uninterrupted group, in manifest contravention of the plain terms of the statute.

Of lode claims with

The contentions of
struction

the appellant are.

of this statute was not

in

substance: (1) that

a

con-

necessary to the decision of the

Alaska Copper Company case, and what was said with respect thereto
was therefore obiter and not binding; (2) that the previous practice
of your office had been for years to allow entry and patent for millsites

contiguous to vein or lode claims,

rule stare decisis, the construction
5194

Vol.

34—05 m

lit

in

given

view whereof and of the
that case, even if not

in
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obiter,

is

wrong and should not be followed: and

struction, as an original proposition,

is

(3) that such concontrary to the statute, and

therefore erroneous.
1.

Whether

a

number

of mill-site claims lying contiguous, as a

group, to a group of lode claims could be lawfully included in an
entry embracing the lode claim-, was one of the questions squarely
presented by the record in the Alaska Copper Company case. To
pass upon that question it was necessary to construe the statute pro-

viding for entry and patent of mill-site claims, and one of the results
of such construction is stated in that part of the decision quoted
above. The opinion expressed was in no sense an obitt r dictum, but

was

a

direct

departmental adjudication of the question, and was

rightfully given force and effect as such, by your
2.

The doctrine

office.

based upon the a>sumption that
applies have been previously determined

of stare decisis

is

the rules of law to which it
by a tribunal having final jurisdiction of the questions involved.
While, perhaps, of doubtful application in any event to a ruling or
decision by an executive department of the government construing
an act of Congress, for the reason that the Supreme Court is the tribunal of ultimate jurisdiction in such matters, the doctrine has been
frequently recognized and applied by this Department in disposing
of cases that involved principles established by its own prior decisions of long standing, where such decisions have been uniformly

followed.

But such is not the situation here. The appellant has not cited
any decision by this Department where the statute in question was
con-trued differently from the construction given in the Alaska Cop
per Company case, and no such decision has been found, reported or
unreported. The doctrine of stare decisis can therefore have no
application to this case.
3.

The contention which

assails the correctness of the ruling

question in the Alaska Copper
effect, that

Company

case

is.

on

in substance

this

and

there is nothing in the statute to prevent the entry and

patent, for mill-site purposes, of land lying contiguous to a vein or

lode claim, provided the land be not contiguous to the vein or lode/

words " vt in or lode." used in the statute in this conmust be construed to mean the body of mineral, or mineralbearing rock, in place, as distinguished from the located claim embracing it: and that only land lying contiguous to such body of
that

is.

that the

nection,

mineral, or mineral-bearing rock,

may

not be patented for mill-site

purposes.
It is

not believed that this contention can be sustained upon any

ba>is of sound reasoning.

To

would be. in
and plain intent.
whole that the words " vein or

so interpret the statute

the opinion of the Department, to disregard
It

is

clear

from the

section read as a

its spirit

I
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lode." in this connection, arc not used in the restricted sense of indi-

body of mineral, or mineral bearing rock, in place, only, but
and intended to be understood in the larger sense, not infrequently applied to them in the mining laws, of designating a
Further on in the section these same
located vein or lode claim.
arc
unmistakably used in the Larger sense here stated, and in
words
intimate
and direct connection with their use in the earlier part
such
of the section as conclusively to show that their earlier use was in the
same larger sense. For instance, one of the later provisions of the
section is that the mill-site "may be embraced and included in an
application for patent for such vein or lode, and the same may be
patented therewith, subject to the same preliminary requirements as
to survey and notice as are applicable to veins or lodes:" clearly
meaning, by the words " application for patent for such vein or lode "
the same thing intended to he described by the woral " vein or lode*'
in the earlier part of the section, with respect to which it is provided
The portions
that the land in the mill-site must be " not contiguous."
of the mining laws which provide for obtaining patents to vein or
lode claims upon the public mineral land- (Sees. 2325 and 2326 of the
Revised Statute-) describes what may be patented thereunder as "a
piece of land " which has been " claimed and located " for mining
the claim or claims in common." the boundaries of
purposes, and as
which " shall be distinctly marked on the ground." etc. As to the
cating

a

are used

**

dimensions of vein or lode claims
"

may

it

is

provided (Sec. 2320) that they

equal, hut shall not exceed, one thousand five

length along the vein or lode" and

may

hundred

feet in

extend not to exceed "three

hundred feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the surface."
Construing section 2337 together with the other sections referred
to. all relating to the same general subject, it is clear that the words

etc.

" vein or lode." several

understood

in

times used in section 2337, are intended to he
each instance in the larger sense indicating the location

or claim, rather than in the restricted sen^e of indicating a

mineral, or mineralized rock, in place, technically

known

body of

as a vein or

lode.

Tin- view finds support

in

the decision of the

Supreme Court

in

Calhoun Gold Mining Company v. Ajax Gold
Mining Company (182 CJ. S., 499, 505), wherein was involved that
part of section 2336 of the Revised Statute- which provides that
'"where two or more veins intellect or cross each other, priority of
recent

the

title shall

case of

govern, and such prior location -hall he entitled to all ore
within the -pace of intersection." The ^no-

or mineral contained
tion

was whether

different

parties

in

at

a

case of intersecting or cross veins located by

different

times the provision giving to the prior

locator all ore or mineral within the spact
a

limitation

upon the provision of

of intersection constitutes

section

2322

which

gives

to
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mining claims (where there are no conflicting prior locaand enjoyment of all the
surface included within the lines of their locations, and all veins,
lodes, and ledges throughout their entire length, the top or apex of
which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically."
The court held that the provisions of the two sections are not in
conflict, thus giving to the word " veins," used in section 2336, the
larger meaning of indicating vein locations or vein claims, rather
locators of
tions)

" the exclusive right of possession

than indicating bodies of mineral, or mineral bearing rock, in place,
technically known as veins or lodes; and to the words "space of
intersection," the larger sense of indicating the conflict between the
intersecting or cross-locations, rather than indicating the point of
intersection of the bodies of mineral, or mineral bearing rock, upon
which the locations were based.
There are other considerations which support the view here taken.
Under the terms of section 2337 only non-mineral land may be embraced in a mill-site. In full, the descriptive terms of the statute
are, " non-mineral land not contiguous to the vien or lode," further
described as "such non-adjacent surface ground," and as "such nonadjacent land.
Under the mining laws, other than section 2337,
onl}< mineral land may be lawfully located and patented for mining
purposes. The word " adjacent," as generally defined and under" Nonstood, means lying near, or close, but not actually touching.
1 *

adjacent," representing the contrary or opposite situation,

means not

Considering therefore, that land, to be included in a
vein or lode location, and patented as such under the mining laws,
must be mineral land, and that land claimed for mill-site purposes,
to be lawfully " included in an application for patent for such vein
or lode, must be non-mineral land, and that the further descriptive
terms of the statute are that the " land " or " surface ground " of
the mill-site must be non adjacent, that is, not near or close, to the
" vein or lode," there would seem to be no room for reasonable ques-

near, not close.

1

'

" vein or lode " in the statute, are used in the

tion that the

words

larger sense

hereinbefore indicated,

rather than

in

their

strictly

within the meaning of the statute,
are intended to be situated some distance from, and in the manner of
their location wholly distinct from, the lines of vein or lode locations or claims.
What the distance should be is a matter as to
technical sense,

and that

mill-sites,

which there can be no hard and

fast rule, applicable to all cases.

The

statute should be applied to cases as they arise in such reason-

able

and

just

manner

as to give effect to its spirit

and

intent,

and

so as

not to leave narrow strips of the public lands incapable of disposal
under any other of the public land laws, a result which it is not to
be presumed was within the contemplation of Congress.
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unnecessary to continue the discussion further. The Department sees no reason to depart from the principle of the construction
announced in the Alaska Copper Company case, and the -ana- is adis

It

hered

to.

which obtained in your office prior to the
Department, on August 17. .>04. in response
to your recommendation, directed thai in cases of mill-site claims,
where the required survey had been made before the date of said
decision, and as t<> which payment and. entry under applications for
patent were made during the year L903, the -aid prior practice, with
respect to the question of contiguity of lode and mill-site claims,
should govern. Further considering the situation, in the light of the
circumstances presented in this case, the Department is of opinion
that it would he hut just to vein or lode claimants who. before the
In view of the practice

(

decision in that case, the

1

date of the decision aforesaid, or within such reasonable time thereafter a-

would be required

to give general publicity to that

decision

throughout the public land states, had or have, in accordance with
and in reliance upon the -aid prior practice of your office, incurred the
expense of perfecting their mill-site location-, in a lawful manner in
all

respects except a- to the contiguity thereof to vein or lode claim-.

should be afforded an opportunity to carry their said locations to
entry and patent under the said prior practice, for the reason that

otherwise they would,

in

most cases,

if

not

in

all.

sutler the loss of their entile mill-site claim-.

ingly hereby given that

all

be compelled to

Direction

is

accord-

applications for mill-site patents which

may

be made and carried to entry before July 1. L906, or which may.
by protest or otherwise, without the fault of the applicant, be pre-

vented from being carried to entry before that date, where the locations of the claim-

other

respects

prior

were made and perfected under the law
t<>

January

1.

L904,

shall

in

all

be adjudicated, in

matter of the contiguity of the mill-site claims to vein
under the -aid prior practice of your office. All other
be adjudicated in accordance with the ruling in the

respect to the

or lode claims,

cases

will

Alaska Copper

As
from

Company

case;

and the principles herein announced.

the present case fall- within this direction, the decision appealed
i-

modified to allow

ii^

adjudication

mining claim— mill. site section

Hard

('ami

\!:i:$7

in

the

manner

stated.

of the revised statutes.

and Otheb Mill Site Claims.

the Revised Statutes contemplates that m the time application
to a mill-site claim the land embraced therein is being
used or occupied for mining or milling purposes.

Section 2337
is

made

Beetion

'2:\'M

<>r

lor paten.1

does

not

sepcontemplate that patent may he obtained lor
group of Contiguous lode claims held and

arate mill site for each of a

:i
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worked under

a

common ownership, and where more than one

mill

site

applied for in connection with a group of lode claims a sufficient and
satisfactory reason therefor must he shown.
is

Secretary Hitchcock
(F. L. C.)

August

Commissioner of the General Land

to the

December

27, 1903, the

Office,

(G. N. B.)

27, 1905.

Giant Ledge Gold and Copper Company made

Cash, Athens, Morning Star, and Miama millsite claims, survey No. 4110, Independence, California, containing
It appears that the mill-sites are applied for in connec19.45 acres.
tion with four lode mining claims of the same names, situated about a
entry for the

Hard

half mile distant.

The records

of your

office

show that the four lode

claims were included in mineral entry No. 295,

pany August

May

27, 1904,

company
which

19, 1902,

to

your

made by

patent upon which was issued
office

the said com-

May

3,

1904.

directed the local officers to notify the

that it would be allowed sixty days from notice within
show cause why the entry for the mill-site claims should

not be canceled for the reasons, (1) that there is no evidence in the
record to show that they are used or occupied for mining or milling
purposes, and (2) that notice was posted on but one of the mill-site
claims.
It was stated that on failure to make the required showing

within the time named the entry would be canceled without further
notice.

In response to the requirement respecting the use or occupation
of the mill-sites for mining or milling purposes, an affidavit executed

by the president of the company, and one executed by the deputy
surveyor who surveyed the claims, were filed, in which, taken together, among other things, it is stated, in substance and effect, that
the topography of the claims embraced in the entry is such that it is
not possible to erect a proper reduction plant on the scale contemplated on a less area than is contained in all of the four mill-sites,
but that all four of the mill-sites are required for the buildings and
storage necessary, and for the accumulation of water essential for the
operation of any works built under plans now formulated, and awaiting only the question of title to the land; that there is no other tract
of land than that coA ered by the mill-site claims suitable to produce
the water for a reduction works; that two of the mill-site claims are
crossed by a granite dyke which forms a natural submerged dam that
can be added to at comparatively small cost, and thereby create a
reservoir of great capacity that wells have been sunk on three of the
mill-sites to supply water for storage and milling purposes; and that
ore from each lode claim is being stored on the mill-site of corresponding name.
T

;

The response
is

an argument

to the requirement respecting the posting of notice,
filed

by

local counsel for the

company,

in

which

it is
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contended that as a matter of law posting on one only of a number of
mill-site claims, included in one application for patent, is sufficient.

November

your

1904,

8,

office

shown by the

found that the use and occupation of

to satisfy the
requirements of the statute, hut held that notice of application for
patent must be posted on each mill-site claim, and the entry was
therefore held for cancellation, except as to the Miama mill-site.
The company has appealed to the Department.
The first question presented by the record, and which should be first

the mill-sites as

affidavits svas sufficient

determined, though not directly brought in issue by the appeal, is,
whether the use or occupation of the mill-sites for mining or milling
purposes, as shown by the affidavits, is such as to satisfy the requir<
-

ments of the

statute.

The portion
is

of section 2337 of the Revised Statutes here applicable

as follows

Where non-mineral land not contiguous

to the vein or lode is used or occupied

by the proprietor of such vein or lode for mining or milling purposes, such nontidjacenl surface-ground may he embraced and included >n an application for a

same may be patented therewith, subject
;is t<> survey and notice as are applicable
no location hereafter made of such non-adjacent land
and payment for the same must he made at the same

patent for such vein or lode, and the
t<>

to

same preliminary requirements

the

veins or hxles; hut

shall

exceed

live acres,

pate as tixed by this chapter for the superfices of the lode.

The
patent

statute clearly contemplates that at the time the application for
is

made

the land included in the mill-site claim

is

used or occu-

mining or milling purposes. Some step in or directly connected with the process of mining or some feature of milling must be
performed upon, or some recognized agency of operative mining or
pied for

milling must occupy,

tin mill-site at the time application for patent
(Alaska Topper Company, 32 L. I).. 128, 131.)
So far as
the record in this case shows, aside from the digging of three wells.
nothing has been done on the mill-sites. The (lesion to Use all of
them for the purpose of a reservoir for water, and the building of a

is

Hied.

reduction work's,

is

not the present active

agency upon the land or the direct
Neither

is

the storing of ore

stances of this case, such
patent

a

upon each

it

for milling purposes.

under the circumand
the Alaska Copper

mill-site,

use of the land as to warrant the entry

of the four mill-sites.

Company

employment of any mining

use of

It

was stated

in

no fixed rule can well be
established, it seems plain that ordinarily one mill-site affords abundant facility for the promotion of mining operations upon a single
body of lode claims." It follows that if more than one mill-site is
applied for in connection with a group of lode claims, a sufficient and
satisfactory reason therefor must be shown.
The storage of a quantity of ore upon each of the four mill-sites in this case, where there is
nothing to show but that the area embraced in one of them would be
case, supra, p.

L30, that " whilst
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ample for such storage, is but a mere colorable use of the
which does not satisfy the requirements of the statute.

mill-sites,

It thus appearing that the mill-site claims are not used or occupied for mining or milling purposes in connection with the lode claim
as required by law, the entry must be cancelled. This much deter-

mined,

it

becomes unnecessary to pass upon the question of the

suffi-

ciency of the posted notice.

The

decision of your

is

office

modified to conform to the views

herein expressed.

REPAYMENT-PARAGRAPH

13,

INSTRUCTIONS OP JANUARY

William

22, 1901.

B. Ardouin.

While paragraph 13 of the instructions governing repayments, approved January 22, 1901, provides that " where there has been a conveyance of the land
and the original purchaser applies for repayment, he must show that he has
indemnified his assignee or perfected the title in him through another
source, or produce a full reconveyance to himself from the last grantee
or assignee," any successor of such original purchaser in a line of conveyances is equally within the reason of the rule and should be given the same
standing as his grantor.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L.

C)

to

'

Office,

the

Commissioner of the General Lund

December

28, 1905.

(C. J. G.)

An appeal has been filed by William B. Ardouin, assignee of
Charles A. Nichols, from the decision of your office of January 5,
1905, denying his application for repayment of the purchase money
paid bv said Nichols on cash entry No. 7452 for the NW. J NE. J,
N. i NW. i, Sec. 34, and NE. J NE. J, Sec. 33, T. 55 N., R. 10 W.,
Duluth, Minnesota.
The entry was made December 30, 1884, and Nichols deeded the
land to Ardouin November 4, 1887, and the latter to John Daly, Henry
A. Sampson and William Scott November 11, 1887. The entry was
canceled December 21, 1888, " for failure to comply with the law as to
residence, such failure being apparent at date of entry," as stated by
your

office.

With

his application for

repayment Ardouin

files a

quit-

claim deed covering the land in question executed by him to the
United States; an affidavit that he has not been indemnified by his

and that

has not been
through other
sources a certificate of the register of deeds of the county where the
land is situated, stating that his records show said land to have been
deeded by Nichols to Ardouin and by him to Daly, Sampson and
Scott, and that the records do not show any other deed, either of sale

grantor, Nichols, for the failure of

perfected in
;

him by

title,

title

his said grantor or other party
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December

of

and December

30, L884,

strument, dated June

21, 1888;
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between the dates

and the following

in-

11. 11)00:

Know all men by These presents, That John Daley, Henry A. Sampson and
William Scott parties of the firsl part in consideration of the sum of two hundred fifty dollars to them in hand paid l»y William P.. Ardouin party of the
second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have remised, released
mid forever discharged and by these presents do for themselves their heirs and
legal representatives remise, release and forever discharge the said William B.
Ardouin, his heirs, executors and administrators from every liability and obligation incurred by reason of any covenants or agreements contained in that certain

warranty deed dated November 11th. 1887, made by William P.. Ardouin, single,
John I>aley. Henry A. Sampson and William Scott, purporting to con-

to the said

vey the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section thirty-three, the
northwest quarter of northeast quarter and the north one-half of the northwest

quarter of section thirty-four, township fifty-five north of range ten west of the
Fourth Principal Meridian, in Lake County. Minnesota, which deed was re-

corded

the office of the Register of Deeds in and for Lake County, Minnesota,

in

on the 16th day of November, 1887, in book E of deeds on page 172; intending
hereby to release the s.-ud William B. Ardouin from all liability by reason of any

covenants contained

in

said warranty deed.

This instrument it is claimed meets the requirements of paragraph
Instructions Governing- Repayments (30 L. D., 430, 434), which

Li.

provides

When

there has been a conveyance of the land and the original purchaser

must show that he has indemnified his assignee or
him through another source, or produce a full reconvey-

applies for repayment, he

perfected the title in

ance to himself from the last grantee or assignee.

While the instrument presented

open to criticism on the score
repayment and also does not
in terms reconvey the land, it may however be accepted as proof of
indemnification by Ardouin of his assignee and as sufficient compliance with the rule in that respect.
While the rule mentions only the
" original purchaser," any successor of such original purchaser in
B line of conveyances is equally within the reason of the rule and
should be given the same standing as his grantor. The applicant
hero having shown that he has indemnified his assignee and that he
has not been indemnified by his grantor for the failure of title, has
thereby demonstrated his right to receive the money, if it be a proper
case for repayment.
Your office did not express any opinion on this

that

il

doc- not

in

is

terms waive right

to

Question.

The

decision appealed

for further

for

repayment

the statute.

from

consideration with
if

the

is

a

vacated and tin papers are returned
view to allowance of the applicaion
4

showing upon the merits bring the case within
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homestead entry-qualifications of entryman.

De Wolf

v.

Moore.

In case of a contest against a homestead entry based upon the charge that the
entryman is disqualified to make entry by reason of being the owner of 160
acres of land, proof of the technical vesting in the entryman. by devise or
operation of law, of a naked legal title that is. or may he. subject to outstanding claims against the estate of the person from whom the title moves]
will not. in itself, be held to disqualify the entryman who thus acquires the
title, but it must be further shown that the title so acquired is a beneficial

one.

Acting Secretary Ryan

to

*

(F. L. C.)

Office,

Commissioner of the General Land

the

December

88, 1905.

(E. P.)

William H. DeWolf, heir of Dawn M. DeWolf, deceased, has filed
motion for review of departmental decision rendered May 18,
1905, in the case of Dawn M. DeWolf v. Nellie R. Moore (not reported), modifying* your office decision of August 1, 1904, and holding
that the evidence submitted at the hearing had in said case was
insufficient to sustain the charge that the defendant was disqualified
by reason of being the owner of one hundred and sixty acres of land
from making entry of the NE. J of Sec. 18, T. 2 S., R. 11 W., Lawton
land district, Oklahoma, but authorizing a rehearing.
The facts in the case are sufficiently stated in the decision under
review, and will not be here repeated except incidentally in passing
upon the points raised in the motion.
In the motion it is contended that
a

The record shows a complete chain of title from the United States to J. C.
Moore for this 320 acres in California. The deed to Moore was executed by
one Harry M. Shreve and is to " J. C. Moore of Rockford. County of Floyd,
State of Iowa." The record here shows that J. C. Moore, the husband of the
defendant, lived at Rockford, Floyd Co.. Iowa, his will having been admitted
This alone, in the absence of any evidence to the
to probate in said county.
contrary, would identify the husband of the defendant as the

owner of

said

land.

It appears from the record herein that the defendant's late husband was named John C. Moore, and that in his will, executed June
24, 1896, he described himself as " J. C Moore, of Rockford. Floyd
County, Iowa,'' but proof that the California land was on February
Moore, County of Floyd, State of
24, 1888, conveyed to one " J.
Iowa," does not raise the presumption that said land was conveyed

C

to the defendant's

husband, for the reasons:

name and initials are the same raises
no presumption that the parties are the same. (Louden v. Walpole,
(1)

The

fact that the family

1 Ind., 321; Bennett v. Libhart, 27 Mich., 489; Lidclen y. Hodnett,
22 Fla., 442; Andrews v. Wynn, 4 S. D., 40, 54 N. W. Rep., 1047:
Gardiner v. McClure, G Minn., 167. 176.)
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From

proof of the fact that the defendant's husband was domiRockford, Floyd County. Iowa, in 1896, it cannot be presumed
Presumptions are not retrothat he lived at that place in 1888.
The law never raises from the proof of the existence of a
spective.
present condition or state of independent facts any presumption that
(2)

ciled at

the

same condition of

Bootz, 92Cal., 617; State

Township.
Counsel

about
<,).

;

Mich..

in

his brief sets forth the following testimony given

1.)

it.

Has
Any

by

:

What do you know about

contestant

Q.

v.

/'.

7i>

the defendant
(}.

(Windhaus
Hubbard, 60 Iowa, 466 Blank v. Livonia

facts existed at a prior date.

the land referred to in the testimony for the
being situated in California? A. I don't know but very little
There has never been anything done about it.

—

;is

—

ever been divided between the heirs? A. No sir.
upon that part of the estate?

it

steps been taken to administer

— A.

Xo

sir.

and says
There is an express admission by the defendant that the California land
was a part of her husbands estate. Reference in the first question is made
expivssly to the land referred to in the testimony for the eontestant as being
in

The land so referred to is the 320 acres above described. If
Moore was not the owner of one-third of that land she had the bes'1

California.

Mrs.

opportunity

in

the world to so state in tins part of her testimony.

The testimony above set forth is the only testimony in the ease
upon to show that the defendant's husband ever had title to

relied

the said tract of land in California.

admission:

it

is

merely

a

This testimony contains no

statement of want of knowledge, and the

Department would not he justified, in view of its indefiniteness, in
assuming or deducing therefrom anything more than ignorance of
the matters inquired about, particularly in view of the fact that no
ellort whatever was made by the contestant, by way of cross-examination, to elicit further information on this point, the only question
asked the defendant on cross-examination being one relating exclusively to the land in Towa set apart to her.

Moreover, the defendant testified at the hearing that she had not,
death of her husband, owned in her own right, any land
except that set apart to her in Iowa, as hereinbefore stated, and the
tract involved herein.
In view of this testimony, the Department
is of opinion that, if it were proved, as contended by the contestant,
since the

that

the

defendant's husband

died seized of the California

land

there was cast upon the contestant the burden of proving
that the defendant took a beneficial interest in said California land.

referred

to.

to say. something more than a
might, so far as is disclosed by
defeated by the assertion of 'claims
having priority over hers. No such

that

that

is

mere naked

legal title thereto
the record herein, be wholly

against

her husband's estate

showing was made on behalf
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The Department does

the technical vesting in an

law of a naked legal

title

not believe that proof of

entryman by devise or by operation of

that

is,

or

may

be, subject to

claims against the estate of the person from

upon

whom

the

outstanding
title

moves,

entryman who thus
acquires the title, but that it should be further shown that the title
so acquired was a beneficial one.
In short, in order to work a forfeiture of this valuable right of entry, there should be some proof
of the alleged disqualification not mere theories, surmises or probabilities with no support other than inference dubiously drawn from a
fragment of the testimony.
It is asserted in the brief filed in support of the motion that the
land in Iowa (122^ acres) set apart to the defendant as her share of
her husband's real property situated in Iowa, passed to her under the
terms of her husband's will, and it is urged that this, together with
the established facts that Moore's estate in Iowa had been fully administered by the defendant and that the records disclosed no mortgage upon the California land, must be accepted as proof that all of
Moore's debts had been satisfied and that the undivided one third
interest in the California land which it is claimed vested in the
defendant by the terms of her husband's will was thus shown to be
free from any claim superior to her own.
The answer to this contention is
(1) Pursuant to the defendant's application the said land in Iowa
was set apart to her, not under the terms of her husband's will, but
under the law, which provides (Sec. 2366, Title XVII, ch. 4, Code of
should,

a contest, be held to disqualify the

;

t

Iowa, 1897), thatOne

third in value of the legal and equitable estates in real property pos-

sessed by the husband at any time during marriage, which have not been sold
on execution or other judicial sale and to which the wife had made no relin-

quishment of her

right, shall be set

apart to her in fee simple

if

she survives

him.

And

held that this right of the widow, called by the courts of
" right, is not subject to the debts of the husband,
(Mock v. Watson, 41 Iowa, 241; Kenthe interest of an heir.
it is

Iowa her
as

is

"

dower

dall v. Kendall, 42 Id., 464.)
(2)

The defendant's power

estate did not extend

as administratrix of her husband's

beyond the limits of the State of Iowa.

There-

fore the- administration of -such portion of her husband's estate as

Iowa had no effect on any portion of such estate as
in California.
It is therefore held that if
been
situated
may have
husband
died
seized
of
said California land, the
defendant's
the
portion
thereof passed to the
show
that
any
herein
fails
record
to

was

situated in

defendant free from any prior claim thereto.
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for review presents no reason sufficient to warrant the
it- previous decision, and none otherwise
accordingly denied.

modifying

in

Appearing, the same

Ls

SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL

John

ENTRY—SECTIONS
Mllllky

('.

3306

AND

3307, R.

S.

et al.

where the soldier rendered the requisite military service and made
homestead entry for less than one hundred and sixty acres prior to the
adoption of the Revised statutes, the proper foundation exists for an
additional entry under the provisions of sections 2306 and 2307 of the
Revised Statutes, notwithstanding the soldier may have died prior to the
enactment of said legislation.
Where a soldier qualified to make additional entry under the provisions of section 2306 Of the Revised Statutes dies without having exercised or disposed

In every case

Of such right, his widow is. in the first instance, entitled thereto, by virtue
of the provisions of section 2307, but if she remarry or die without having
exercised or disposed of the right, his minor orphan Children hecorne entitled
thereto, and if not exercised or disposed of by them, through a guardian.

during their minority, the right remains an asset of the soldier's estate.
•_ ."><i7
of the Revised Statntes do not contemplate more than
one additional right of entry, founded upon one and the same military
service; and the existence of a valid additional right based upon a homestead entry made by the soldier, precludes an independent additional right
to his widow, or after her death to the heirs of her estate, based upon a
homestead entry made by her.

Sections 2306 and

)

Acting Secretary Ryan

to

'

(F. L. C.)

Office,

Commissioner of
December 29, 1905.

the

The Department has before
your

the appeal of

it

decision of October

office

application,

as

L9,

assignee of the

the General L<m<l

John

W.)

(P. E.
C. Mullery

from

L904, holding for rejection

heirs

of Harriet

his

James, to make

homestead entry for the X. \ of the NW. ]. Sec.
\\\. Duluth, Minnesota, based on the military
service of John James and the homestead entry, No. 8182, of said
Harriet James, made on February 28, L872, for the W. J of the SE. |.
Sec 32, T. 6 X.. R. 26 VV., Dardanelle, Arkansas.
It
appear- that the said John James who rendered the requisite
military service, made a homestead entry, No. 694, on February 10,
and the NW. of the SE. j. Sec. 22,
L868, for the SW. J of the XF.
T. 6 X.. R.
W., Clarksville, Arkansas; that he died "in March,
1868 " leaving a widow, the said Harriet James, and two minor
children. Frank and Neely James; that -aid Harriet James made
said homestead entry. Xo. 8182, as the head of a family, for her own
exclusive use and benefit, never made any other entry or disposed of
any eight to enter land, remained single, and died in July. L887; and
soldier-" additional
85, T.

->\

X..

R.

K)

|

•_>(;

\
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the said Frank and Neely James, the sole
surviving children of said John and Harriet James, executed and
delivered to one William L. Taylor two certain assignments, each
of which purported to convey to him a soldiers' additional homestead
that on August

17,

1*901,

right for eighty acres of land.

In one of these instruments the said Frank and Neely James, as
John James, deceased, sold and assigned to said Taylor
such an alleged right, based upon the military service of said John
James and said homestead entry No. 694, made by him. In the
other, they, as sole heirs of Harriet James, sold and assigned to said
Taylor such An alleged right based upon the military service of said
John James and the homestead entry No. 8182, made by said Harriet
James.
The former alleged right passed by due assignment into the hands
of John O. Hanchett and the latter into the hands of said John C.
Mullery. Both Hanchett and Mullery applied to locate their said
alleged rights, and on December 11, 1903, your office rejected Mullery's application on the ground that the said homestead entry, No.
8182, made by Harriet James, did not constitute a proper basis for
an additional homestead right. Mullery appealed to the Department.
January 7, 1904, your office held, on Hanchett's said application,
that all necessary proof had been furnished, but suspended further
action thereon to await the final disposition of Mullery's application.
The Department, on May 11, 1904, decided that, owing to the
bearing of said two cases upon each other, they should be considered
together; vacated your said office decision of December 11, 1903, in
Mullery's case, and remanded the same with instructions to reconsider
both cases, upon -full argument by both parties, and then render
decisions in both cases, passing upon the following questions
sole heirs of

Is either of said rights of additional entry valid?

only one of them

is valid,

which one

is

Are they both valid?

If

the valid one?

Thereupon your office rendered the decision from which this appeal
taken, in which Mullery's application is rejected and Hanchett's
application is allowed, upon the ground that.

is

Frank James and Neely James, as heirs of Harriet
James, and based on homestead entry No. 8182 of said Harriet James, does not
constitute a proper legal basis for the additional right claimed by Mr. John C.
Mullery. for the reason that the additional right of entry predicated on the
military service of John James is properly based on the homestead entry. No.
694, of said John James and passed by assignment for value from said heirs of
John James to said John O. Hanchett, and thereafter they had no right remaining in them.
the assignment of said

In general, the questions presented by this appeal and the answer
same as those above stated which were propounded in
the former departmental opinion. But on behalf of the appellant the
thereto, are the
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view of the fact that the

enactment of any of the legislation conferring special privileges upon soldiers and their widow- and
orphans in the matter of homestead entries and residence on the land
entered, any soldiers' additional right ever existed in favor of the
estate or the heirs of said John James other than that which is
expressly provided in said legislation for his widow and Ids minor

John James, died prior

soldier.

to the

children.

This question involves the history, the intent and the proper construction of the legislation relating to soldiers' homestead,

and addi-

tional homestead, rights.

The

first act

of Congress in respect thereto was that of April

-t,

1872

(17 Stat, 49), which was amended by the act of June 8, 1872 (17
Stat., 333), and again amended by the act of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat.,
605), all of which legislation was subsequently carried into the

Revised

Statutes of the United

appearing

in sections

2304.

>

2: ,o:>.

States,

approved June

1874,

22,

2306 and 2307.

Section 2304 provides that
Every private soldier and officer who has served .... for ninety days ....
on compliance with the provisions of this chapter'as hereinafter modified,

shall,

upon and receive patents for a quantity of public lands not
exceeding one hundred and sixty acres.
he entitled to enter

Section 2305 provides that the period of the military service rendered shall be deducted from the required term of residence on the
land.

Section 2306 provides that

:

under the provisions of section twenty-three hundred
:iik1 four, to enter a homestead, who may have heretofore entered, under
lie
homestead laws, a quantity of land less than one hundred and sixty acres, shall
he permitted to enter so much land as. when added to the quantity previously
entered shall not exceed one hundred and sixty acres.
Every person

entitled,

i

Section 2307 provides that

:

any person who would he entitled to a homestead under
hundred and four, his widow, if unmarried, or in case of her death or marriage, then his minor orphan children, by a
guardian, shall he entitled to nil the benefits enumerated in this chapter
.;
but if such person died during his term of enlistment, the whole term of his
enlistment shall he deducted from the time heretofore required to perfect the
In case of the death of

the provisions of section twenty-three

.

.

.

title.

That the said additional homestead right was created

in

the case of

who rendered the requisite military service "during the
rebellion" and made the previous entry of less than one hun-

each soldier
recent

dred and sixty acres of land, regardless of whether he died he fore or
after the enactment of said legislation, clearly appear- from the closing linos of said section 2307, in which a soldier who " died during his
term of enlistment " is distinctly included in the category of such per-

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

336

sons as would have been " entitled to a homestead under the provisions

of section two thousand three hundred and four," and consequently to

an additional homestead under section 2306.
The same construction, purpose and effect was given to said legislation at the time of its enactment and in the discussion thereon< in
the United States Senate, when the passage of said act of June 8,
1872, supra, was under consideration (see the case of Anna Bowes, 32
L. D., 331, 337), the particular question being the construction of the
words in section 3 of said act, now said section 2307. supra:
In case of the death of any person who would be entitled, etc.
Mr. Morton.
The explanation of the Senator from Kansas I think is not satisfactory. He
makes this section to apply to any person who, after having made his location
should then die, but that is utterly inconsistent with the- proviso in the same
section, " provided that if such person died during the term of enlistment,"
showing that it applied to those who even died during the war and before the
passage of this bill. Therefore it does not refer to those who may make location
after the passage of this bill or at any time subsequent to the war. and shows
that it refers to soldiers without reference to the time when they died.

That this view prevailed may be argued from the fact that the said
proviso was retained as a portion of said section 2307.
under and by virtue of the said
was created an additional homestead right in the

It is clear, therefore, that

tion there

John James, who survived

said

made

a

case of

the requisite military service and

previous entry of less than one hundred and sixty acres of

land, but died before the enactment of said legislation.

upon

legisla-

his said service

and

entry,

it

Predicated

sprang into existence upon the

passage of the law.

Once

existing, the said right

continues until used, forfeited or

extinguished by some process known to the law.
Of the nature of this right and the intent and purpose of the legislation granting the same, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the case of Webster

v.

Luther (163 U.

S., 331,

340), said:

It was a mere gratuity. There was no other purpose but to give it as a sort of
compensation for the person's failure to get the full quota of one hundred and
sixty acres by his first homestead entry.

The

court further quoted with approval the language of the Circuit

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in the case of Barnes
Poirier (27 U. S. App., 500)

v.

:

It

was an unfettered

gift in the

nature of compensation for past services.

It

vested a property right in the donee.

The contingency of the death of the soldier whose services had
earned such compensatory gift and property right, whether during
enlistment, or prior to the enactment of said legislation, or subsequently thereto without having used the said additional right, is
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recognized and provided for in the said section 2307, which necessarily includes section 2306 with section 2304.

James became "entitled to all
chapter" a> the widow of said John
James and not otherwise, thus recognizing and emphasizing the compensatory and existing property right as earned by the soldier, and
extended to other persons only as they stood near to and represented
This harmonizes with the line of succession established in sechiin.
.>1 of the Revised Statutes of the United State- in the matter
tion
of perfecting title to land embraced in the entry of a deceased homeTherein the widow is given the first right to perfect
stead claimant.
said section the said Harriet

Under

enumerated

the benefits

^

in this

(

the claim but in ease of her death

it

So by said section 2307 the widow

accrues to " his heirs or devisee."

is.

the

in

first

instance, entitled to

appropriate the additional right based on the homestead entry of the
soldier, hut if she remarries or dies without having fexercised or disponed of the same, it remains a part of the soldier's estate -ubject to
appropriation by " his minor orphan children.*' In the present case,
therefore, it is clear that upon the death of the widow of John James
without exercising or disposing of the additional right based on his
military service and his homestead entry, such right did not
a

become

part of her estate.

Not having been exercised or disposed of by his orphan children,
during their minority, through a guardian, the estate of the soldier
was not divested of said right. See the case of Allen Laughlin (31
L. I).. 256), wherein it is said that such right can be legally assigned
only by the personal representative of the deceased soldier.
In the present case the assignment by Frank and Neely James, as
heirs of .John James, is accompanied by probate evidence that the
personal representative of said

John dames waived

his right to sell,

and obtained the approval, by proper order of court, of the sale made
by said heirs under which Hanchett claims herein. The present case
is therefore not in conflict with the rule in the case last cited.
But it is contended by appellant that
:

the right

which would have inured

to the soldier if

date of said act. by the express ten. is of section
Iii

he had lived until after the
was granted to his widow.

l::;<i7

support of this contention the case of the Sierra

pany (31

L.

I)..

349)

is

Lumber Com-

cited.

In that case the soldier

had not made

one hundred and sixty acres, which

a

previous entry for

in said legislation is

less

than

the basis for

and the whole right under the statute devolved
upon the widow as the " person entitled to all the benefits enumerated in this act." The widow Inning made a previous entry of
eighty acres, as a corollary the additional right was hers.
So in the case of Homer E. P>rayton (31 L. D., 443), where the

the additional right,
first

5194-

Vol. .U

05 M
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deceased soldier had

made no homestead

under said section
less
than 1G0 acres.
of
entry
previous

additional right arises
a

The Department
The

entry,
to the

it

was held that an

widow who has made

said

additional right conferred by sections 2306 and 2307 may be either for the
widow, and the circumstances of the case will control. If the

soldier or his
soldier

made the original entry, the additional right
made by the widow, the additional right is

entry was

is his,

but

if

the original

hers.

In that case there were no children, and the widow having died
without exercising the right, it was held that the right became an
asset of her estate, not subject to the control of the administrator
of the soldier's estate. Again, in the unreported case of E. J. McLaughlin, dated July 25, 1902, cited by appellants, the soldier died in
service and had made no previous entry.
The soldier's widow made
a homestead entry for eighty acres prior to the enactment of the
legislation here in question bat did not exercise or dispose of any
additional right of entry. There were no minor children of the
soldier.

The Department

said

The children took nothing by
entitled to this property right,

it

virtue of said section 2307, and
is

if they are
because of their being the heirs of their

mother and not because of any provision of said

But

section.

no case has it been held, directly or by necessary implication, that where the soldier made the previous entry of less than one
hundred and sixty acres, an additional entry right accrued to the
widow otherwise than by virtue of said section 2307, which passed
it to the soldier's minor orphan children in case she remarried or
died without using or disposing of the right. Where the soldier
made no original entry which would serve as a basis, no additional
right ever existed which could inure to him, even if he lived until
after the enactment of said legislation, and where the soldier had
made an original entry, thereby providing the necessary basis, the
additional right sprang into existence upon the enactment of said
legislation, even though he had previously died, and inured under
section 2307 in succession to his widow, while living and single, to
his orphan children during their minority, and then, if still unused,
to his estate.
In the former case the widow of the soldier could, upon
the basis of an original entry, made by herself, so long as she remained unmarried (see John S. Maginnis, 32 L. D., 14), assert an
independent additional right, and if she died without exercising or
disposing of the same, such right became and remained a part of her
estate.
The existence of a valid additional right based upon a
homestead entry made by the soldier, precludes the arising of such
an independent additional right to his widow, or after her death
to the heirs of her estate, based upon a homestead entry by her.
in
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Xo

rights.

indi-

cation can be found, in the purpose or history of the said legislation,

more than one additional

or in the discussion thereon, that

right,

based upon one and the same military service, was ever contemplated.

Neither does the construction since placed thereon by the Department
and the court- warrant or admit of the conclusion asked herein that
a

second additional right accrues to the

widow

of

a

soldier and to

her separate estate, in case -he. as well as the soldier, ha-

made

a

previous entry.

The conclusion

i>

August

inevitable that on

Frank

17. 1001, the said

and Xeelv James had no valid additional right as heirs of Harriet
James, and John C. Mullery took nothing under their assignment to

Taylor as such

As

heir-.

John James, the said Frank and Xeely James had

heirs of

a

which by due assignment became the property
of John (). Ilanchett. and affords a proper and sufficient basis for his
said application, which will accordingly be allowed.
valid additional right,

Your

said decision

is

herebv affirmed.

SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL

ENTRY—SECTIONS

Arch

Y.

t>:HM>

AND

2307, R.

S.

Alexander.

more than one
and the same military service.
portion of an additional righl based upon r
Location having been allowed of
homestead entry made by the widow of a soldier, and roeortihVation made
tor the remainder of the right, it is hold, upon application being made for
the allowance of a further additional righl based upon an entry made by

Sections 2306 and 2307 of the Revised Statutes do not contemplate

additional

rigb.1

<>f

entry, founded upon one
;)

the soldier himself, that no foundation therefor exists, the additional right

allowed on the homestead entry of the widow being considered as having
been based upon the homestead entry of the soldier.

Acting Secretary Ryan

[f.L.C.)

f<>

Office,

Commissioner of
December 29, 1905.
the

The Department has before
from your

office
(

i.

Arch V. Alexander

11)04, rejecting- his

application.

\Y. Stone,

of the United States, the X.
21, T. 5

the appeal of

administrator of the estate of William M.
enter, under sections 2306 and 2307 of the Revised Statutes

as assignee of

Lantz, to

it

decision of October 26,

Land
(P.E.W.)

the General

S.,

R. 24 W.,

\

SW.

J.

Sec. 20.

and SE.

\

NW.

',.

Sec.

Camden, Arkansas.

The application i> based on the military service of said William M.
Lantz and the homestead entry, No.
made by him on March 19,
(',:',<.).

1867, for the

W.

frl.

\

XW.

frl.

\.

Sec. 2, T. 20 N., R. 10

Rock, Arkansas, containing 51.24 acres.

W.

:

Little
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Rejection was upon the ground that the soldier's additional right

based on the military service of said Lantz had previously been
fully exhausted and therefore the assignment herein does not constitute a proper legal basis for the right claimed by this applicant, it
appearing from your office records that on October 13, 1883, your
office

issued certificate of right for 121.78 acres to said George

W.

Stone, guardian of G. X. Lantz, Lucinda Lantz and William Lantz.

minor orphan children of the

and that under date of January
was located on the X. i NE. £, XE. J
W., Las Cruces, New Mexico Territory,
soldier,

26, 1884, 120 acres of said right

NW.

i,

Sec. 27, T. 2 S.. R.

-1

for the said minor orphan children, and the unused portion of said
certificate,

December

1.78

acres,

10, 1901,

was

recertified

to

one John H. Howell on

but does not appear to have been located.

It further appears from your office records that under date of
Febuary 23, 1872, Julia A. Lantz, the widow of the soldier, made
homestead entry, No. 5547, for the NE. | XE. J, Sec. 7, T. 20 X..
11. 15 W., Harrison, Arkansas, containing 38.22 acres, for which
patent issued on final certificate 3755, on August 13, 1883, to the said
minor children of the soldier, by said George W. Stone, their

guardian.

The contentions of

this appeal are that the said additional right,

was based on said homestead entry of
A. Lantz, the widow, and not on that of the soldier, William
M. Lantz; that the heirs of the soldier are entitled to such an additional right, based on the homestead entry of the soldier, notwithstanding the fact that they have received the benefit or an additional
right based on the homestead entry of their mother, the widow of
the soldier; and that if but one additional right is allowed, that
based upon the soldier's homestead entry should take precedence over
that based upon his widow's homestead entry; and that no reason
exists why the same army service may not serve as a basis for such an
additional right to both the soldier's and the widow's homestead

located on January 20. 1884,
Julip.

entries.

The questions whether there may be two such rights based on the
same military service, and, if but one is allowed, whether that based
on the soldier's homestead entry or that based on his widow's homestead entry, is to be allowed, were before the Department in the case
of John C. Mullery, assignee of heirs of Harriet James, and John O.
Hanchett, assignee of heirs of John James, this day decided.
Upon careful review and comparison of previous like cases, and
full consideration of the legislation in question, the Department said
The existence of a valid additional right based upon a homestead entry
made by the soldier, precludes the arising of such an independent additional
based upon a homestead entry by her. There canright to his widow
not in any event be two such additional rights.
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26,

it
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follows that the

which the minor

orphan children of the soldier have received the benefit, together with
the -aid recertified portion which has not been located, was based
upon the homestead entry of tin' soldier, and such location and recertification exhausted the additional right based on the military

William Lantz.
The present application will be rejected, your

service of the soldier

said decision being

herebv affirmed.

SOLDIERS ADDITIONAL ENTRY-WIDOW-SECTIONS
9

I

X K EB M A X

I

^SO<>

AND

LELMER.

right accruing to the widow of a soldier, under
and 'SMu <»f the Revised Statutes, by reason of an entry for
hundred and sixty acres made by herself, is a property right
and is not forfeited by her remarriage or death; but in case
riage is held in abeyance during coverture, and in event
remains an asset of her estate.

The additional

Acting Secretary Ryan

to

'
i

F. L. C.)

Office,

^:J07, R. S.

the Commissioner of
December 29, 1905.

sections 2306

than one

less

vested in her,
of her remar-

of her death

the General

Land
W.

(P. E.

Counsel for Inkerman Helmer lias filed a motion for review of
departmental decision of July 8, 1005 (not reported), affirming

your

office

decision of

November

application, as assignee of J. J.

18, 1904. in

which you rejected

bis

Foster, administrator of the estate

Ann Morris, formerly
under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the SW. \ NE. \ and SE.
NW. i,
Sec.
\. T. 32 S.. R. IT E., Lakeview, Oregon.
The application is based on the military service of said Lewis W.
Matthews, and the homestead entry. No. 501, made by his widow on
January 29, L868, for eighty acres of land in the Clarksville, ArkanThe grounds for rejection, as stated in your said
sas, land district.
decision, are that the widow's said entry doe- not constitute a Legal
of Lewis
the

W. Matthew-,

widow of

said

deceased, and of Sarah

Matthew-,

to enter,

|

l

claimed herein because -he had remarassignmenl thereof to this applicant, and that the
by the administrator of the soldier's estate is without

basis for the additional righl
ried prior to her

assignment

whatever additional right existed belonged
widow
It appearing that the soldier had not made a homestead entrj
for
less than one hundred and sixty acre-, the right to make an additional
entry never existed in him or in his estate.
Hi- widow having made
a homestead entry for eighty acres before her remarriage, and prior

effect

to the

for the reason that
.
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to the enactment of the legislation under consideration, the said legislation

bestowed upon her, as an absolute

gift, the right to

make an

additional entry of eighty acres, and this right she could exercise
in

person or assign to others.

See the cases of Sierra

Lumber Com-

and Homer E. Brayton (31 L. D., 448).
The sole question to be considered upon this motion is whether her
said right of additional entry, compensatory for the failure to obtain
full one hundred and sixty acres under her said homestead entry, was
forfeited and extinguished by operation of law when she remarried on
April 21, 1889, without having previously used or disposed of the
pany (31 L.

D., 349),

same.
In the similar case of John S. Maginnis, (32 L. IX, 14), the Depart-

ment

said

widow of a deceased soldier,
been entitled to the benefits of section 2304, all the benefits
enumerated in that chapter, the right of additional entry being one of the benefits, but this is allowed her on the express condition that she be unmarried.
In the case at bar the widow was entitled to an additional right of entry so
long as she remained unmarried, but having failed to exercise the right during
her widowhood, it could not be asserted by her during coverture.
Section 2307 of the Revised Statutes allows the

who would have

Where,

as in the present case, the additional right

widow through her own previous homestead entry
hundred and

is

earned by the

of less than one

and does not come to her through the soldier,
and there is no forfeiture of such
right either by her remarriage or by her death, without having exerThe law granting the right does not
cised or disposed of the same.
prescribe a forfeiture and none will be presumed.
But the law does
declare against the exercise of the right during coverture, and, as in
the last case cited, it must be held to be in abeyance until the disability
it is

sixty acres,

a property right vested in her

In the latter event,

of coverture ceases to exist or her death occurs.
it remains a part of her estate.

As the record herein fails to show that such disability has been
removed, the said right could not be assigned and asserted as is herein
sought to be done, and for that reason the motion for a review cannot
be entertained. The motion is accordingly hereby overruled.

SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL

ENTRY—WIDOW-SECTIONS

2306

AND 2307, R. S.

John M. Maher.
The

additional right of entry accruing to the

widow

of a soldier under the pro-

and 2307 of the Revised

upon an
by her remarriage, but is merely held in abeyance during coverture, and upon removal of
such disability may be exercised or disposed of by her as though she had
remained the soldier's widow.
visions of sections 2306

entry

made by

Statutes, based

herself, is not lost, forfeited or extinguished
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Acting Secretary Ryan
F. L. C.

(

to

Office,

office

Co?nmisioner of the General Land

the

December

The Department has before
your
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29, 1905.

W.)

Maher from

an appeal of John M.

it

decision of April 21,

P. E.

(

L905, rejecting his application, as

assignee of Rebecca M. Day. widow, former

widow of

Isaac V. Herri-

under sections 2306 and 2307 of the Revised Statute- of
and MY. \ SW. t, Sec. 17, T. 159 N.,
the United States, the S. \ SW.
R. 69 W., Devils Lake. North Dakota.
ford, to enter

',

The application

is

based on the military service of said [saac Y.

Herriford and the homestead entry. No. 5238, of his said widow,

Rebecca M. Day,
9,

made on February

6,

1868, for the

XK.

NE.

|

!.

now
Sec.

T. 64, R. 24, Boonville, Missouri.
It

not

appears that the soldier died in service and that his widow had
remarried when she made her said homestead entry and when the

was enacted, but subsequently, on Dewithout having used or disposed of any additional
The latter died prior to
right, she was married to one Leroy Day.
legislation in question herein

cember

11.

1nn:>.

the assignment

under consideration and at date thereof she had not

remarried.

Your

said decision concedes that

During her widowhood

widow

of Isaac

A'.

Herriford, said Rebecca M.

Herriford possessed the additional right to enter

in

person, or assign, 120 acres.

The

.-is

the

single question presented by this appeal, therefore,

by her remarriage the said righl was

As

lost,

is

whether

forfeited or extinguished.

decisive of this point yon cite in the decision appealed

from the

unreported departmental decision of June 29, L904, which formally
affirmed your office decisions of April 4. L903, and March 21, 1904. in
the case of Robert E. Sloan, assignee of

former widow

of William

Sarah X. E. Prewitt, widow,
it was held that " by

Prewitt. wherein

remarrying she forfeited all such right."
Upon motion for review of its said decision of June 2 .>. 1904. the
Department in its unreported decision of November 22, 1904. said:
(

Upon further and more mature consideration of the questions involved in this
Department is <>t' the opinion that Mrs. Prewitl never became vested

case, this

with

right of additional entry.

a

Said statute confers the righl upon the widow upon the express condition Hint
she be unmarried.
At the time of its passage, Mrs. Prewitl \wis not unmarried
.

.

.

.

Therefore she never became seized of an additional righl of entry, and
right i>y her assignment.
For this reason the

hence she conveyed no such
motion for review is denied.

The
presenl

said case therefore differs
case on the vital

denial of

a

review, for herein

and must be distinguished from the
on which the Department based

point
it

is

conceded that, being

at

it-

the time

unmarried, the widow of the soldier became seized of such additional
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right by and upon the enactment of the legislation which conferred it.
Further inquiry into its precise nature and extent is necessary to
determine whether this right, once existing and never used, was forfeited and extinguished by operation of said law, when the widow

contracted a second marriage.

The proper

distinction is to be drawn between an additional right
based on a homestead entry made by the soldier and one
based on a homestead entry made by his widow. In the former case
the right is earned by the soldier and is extended by the legislation
in question to other persons only as they stood near to 'and represent
him, passing in the first instance to his widow. But if she remarries
or dies without having exercised or disposed of the same, it goes to his
minor orphan children, if any. If he has no minor children, or if
the right is not exercised or disposed of during their minority, it
reverts to his estate.
Where, by reason of the widow's remarriage
the right has passed to the soldier's minor orphan children or has
reverted to his estate, it is at an end so far as the widow, as such, is

which

is

concerned.

where the soldier had made no homebased on a homestead entry made by the
widow after his death, a very different condition is presented. Here
the additional right is earned by the widow and is vested in her in the
Two requirements only are stated in the legislation
first instance.
conferring such right and regulating its use, namely, that at date of
In the

latter case, however,

stead entry

and the right

is

T

the enactment of said legislation and at date of the use or disposal

of the right she be unmarried, and that prior to the enactment of

made a homestead entry of less than
160 acres, whereby her own independent' homestead right has been
exhausted. Where these requirements are met. as in the present case,
said legislation she shall have

the right of additional entry vested in the

widow and was

as abso-

complete and unfettered a right as that of the soldier himself in
This view is in harmony with the decithe former supposed case.
Thus in the case of Homer
sions of the courts and the Department.
E. Brayton (31 L. D., 443, 444), the Department, after a comparison
of previous like cases, and in harmony with them, said
lute,

The

additional right conferred by sections 2306 and 2307 may be either for the
widow, and the circumstances of the case will control. If the

soldier or his

soldier made the original entry, the additional right is his, but if the original
entry was made by the widow, the additional right is hers. Upon her failure
to exercise it during her life, it becomes an asset of her estate, and as such is
not subject to the control of the administrator of the soldier's estate.

when
Xowhere

If her death can not terminate such right
in the

widow, neither can remarriage.

under consideration

is

it

has once vested

in the legislation

there a provision, express or implied, for the

termination of such right, except where

it

was earned by the

soldier,

THE PUBLIC LANDS.
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and extended to his widow by said seel ion
and widowhood only. Where the soldier never
possessed the fight, and it was earned by the widow and vested in her
nested

iii

him and

2307 during her
in the first

dier's heirs

widow.

hi>

his estate,

life

instance, she took such right to the exclusion of the sol-

and \'wr from any condition that she remain
language <d' the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
the case of Barnes v. Poirier (27 U. S. App.. 500)

or estate
In the

Eighth Circuit,

in

was an unfettered

It

:

gift

....

It

vested

;i

property righl

in

the donee.

This language, defining the purpose, nature and extent of the right
question, was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the

in

United Stateand

it

in

the case of

was there said

Webster

v.

Luther

(

L63 V. S., 331, 340),

:

There was no other purpose hut to give it as a sort
iikmc gratuity.
was
compensation tor the person's failure to get the full quota of one hundred
;iik1 sixty acres by his lirst homestead entry.
It

;i

of

Such unfettered, compensatory gift and property right vested in
widow on the basis of her own previous homestead entry and not
upon the homestead entry made by the soldier, is not terminated by
her remarriage, although, as held by the Department in the case of
John S. Maginnis (32 L. I)., 14), if she fails to exercise or dispose
of it before she remarries, she cannot assert the right during
the

coverture.
It

should be observed that

in the

last-mentioned case the syllabus,

paragraph, was inadvertently made to state that the
additional right in such case was lost by remarriage, while in the
opinion it i> held that the right is held in abeyance during coverture,
and that in the language of said section 2307, she must be unmarried at the time she uses or disposes of the right.
in

the second

If no other valid objection appears, the application will be allowed.
your said decision being hereby reversed.

SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL

ENTRY—WIDOW—SECTIONS 2306 AM)

^;J07, R. S.

Charles W. Burdick.
In

soldier's widow entitled to make additional entry under sections
2300 and 'J.'loT of the Revised Statute's, by virtue of an entry for less than
one hundred and sixty acres made by herself, remarries, without having
exercised «>r disposed of such fight, it can not be asserted during coverture; nor can the fact that the only child of the soldier joined the widow
in an assignment of such righl in any wise affect the situation, in view of

case a

the fact that the right

by the soldier.

is

based upon an entry

made by

the

widow and not
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Acting Secretary Ryan

Charles

Office,
\Y.

decision of
office

Burdick has

March

9,

11)05

Commissioner of
December ,!<h 1905.

the

to

*

(F. L. C.)

the General

Land

(P. E.

W.)

motion for review of departmental

filed a

(not reported), formally affirming your

decision of October 29, 1004, wherein you overruled his motion

for review and adhered to the previous action of your

office

rejecting

his application, as assignee of Lorinda Cross, formerly the

of David

McManus,

widow

under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the N. J NW. j and the NW. { NE.J, Sec. 9,
T. 16 N., R. 78 W., Cheyenne, Wyoming.
The grounds assigned for the motion are that the said decision is
contrary to the law and the evidence. The application in question
was based upon -the military service of David McManus and the
homestead entry, ~$o. 6061, made by his widow, now Lorinda Cross,
on December 2, 1868, for the SE. J NE. |, Sec. 14, T. 38 N., R. 13 W.,
to enter,

Boonville, Missouri.

appears that the soldier died on or about the 29th day of Febmade a homestead entry, that he left only
one child, Margaret E. McManus, now Cross; and that his widow,
the said Lorinda Cross, had not remarried when she made her said
homestead entry, No. 6061, but has since remarried. The record does
not disclose the date of her remarriage or whether she was again a
widow at date of the assignment in question, but it does appear that
she had not used or disposed of any such additional right when she
contracted her second marriage.
The application herein is dated June 14, 190*2, and recites only the
assignment to the applicant of the additional right of the said widow,
Lorinda Cross, although it is accompanied by a joint assignment executed by the widow and the daughter of the soldier.
It

ruary, 1864, and had not

Rejection was upon the ground

:

That the original entry alleged does not constitute a proper

legal basis for

the right claimed by the applicant, for the following reason: the claimant having remarried before exercising the right, she cannot assert it during coverture.

Maginnis. assignee of Rose (32 L. D., 14). A daughter of claimant by her first
marriage joined in the assignment, but she is not named in the application.
There is also evidence in the form of affidavits tending to prove her to be the
soldier's only child.
If claimant is again a widow, it does not so appear.

As

it

does not appear that the disability of coverture has been

removed, this case

Maginnis (32 L.

The

is

controlled by the decision in the case of John S.

D., 14).

alternative contention that the assignment of the additional

right herein by the only child of the soldier
because, by joining therein, the

widow

is

valid and effective

of the soldier waived every

possible conflicting claim, cannot be sustained, for the reason that no

THE PUBLIC LANDS.
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additional right ever arose

for the soldier, his child or estate, he

made the homestead entry which is
right.
The motion for review is denied.

never having
for such
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essential as a base

FORT BUFORD ABANDONED MILITARY RESERVATION— RECLAMATK >\
A<

1

.

Opinion.
Lands formerly within the Fort Buford military reservation wore by the act of
May 19, 1900, restored to the public domain and made subjed to existing
laws relating to disposal of the public lands, except such laws as are not
specifically earned therein, and are subject to withdrawal under the reclamation ad as other portions of the public domain subject to entry under the
general land laws; and a withdrawal of such lands for reclamation purposes is effective as to all of the lands for which entry was not made
within three months from the filing of the township plat, and prior to the
withdrawal.

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Seen tary of the Interior,
(E. F. B.)
December 29, 1905.

am

by reference for opinion of a letter from the DiSurvey requesting to be advised whether the
withdrawal made August 24, 1903, under the act of June IT, 1002
(32 Stat., 388), of lands within the former Fort Buford military
reservation and within the irrigable area of the Lower Yellowstone
I

in receipt

rector of the Geological

project, will be effective as to entries of such lands

made subsequent

withdrawal, and after three months from the filing of the
township plat, and whether such entries are subject to limitations
to said

and restrictions of the reclamation act.
The lands in this reservation, which has been abandoned, are not
subject to disposal under the act providing for the disposal of
abandoned military reservations, but were restored to the public
domain by the act of May 19, 1900 (31 Stat., ISO), which provides
that they shall be subject to disposal under the homestead, townsite,
A\\<\ desert-land laws, with the proviso that actual occupants thereon
upon the first day of January. 1900, shall have a preference right to
make one entry not exceeding one quarter section; that land- occupied for town-site purposes, and lands shown to be valuable 1'or coal
or minerals, shall be subject to entry and sale under the "townsite.
coal, or

The

mineral-land laws, respectively."

effect of the act was to restore the land to entry
under existing laws except such law- as arc qoI specifically named.
It
is therefore subject to Withdrawal
under the reclamation act as
other portion- of the public domain which are subject to entry under

practical

the general land laws.
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Hence, where such lands have not been entered within three months
from the filing of the township plats in the local office and prior to
the withdrawal of the lands for reclamation purposes, the withdrawal will be effective, as all such lands and entries thereof will be
subject to the limitations and restrictions of the reclamation act.
Approved
Thos. Ryan,

A ding' Secretary.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-RESIDENCE- DURESS.
Cannon
A

v.

Johanson.

homestead entryman is entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of
the land embraced in his entry, and where he in good faith builds a house
upon the land with a view to establishing residence and complying with the
law, but is prevented by the threats of a rival claimant from establishing
residence upon the particular portion of the land selected by him for that
purpose, it is not incumbent upon him to establish his residence upon
another portion of the land, and he will not be held in default for failure
to

do

so.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Comtnisisoner of the General
(F. L. C.)

November U,

August W. Johanson has appealed
office

1905.
to the

Land

Office,

(E. O. P.)

Department from your

decision of April 13, 1905, affirming that of the local officers

holding for cancellation his homestead entry for lots 1, 2, 3, T and 5,
Sec. 5, and lot 1 of Sec. 6, T. 15 S., K. 8 E., San Francisco, California,
upon the contest initiated by James Cannon, charging abandonment
and failure to cultivate and improve the land as required by law.
A very careful examination of the entire record discloses, briefly
The entry in question was made
stated, the following material facts.
August 7, 1897. At that time said lot 5 was enclosed by Cannon's
fence and he was asserting a possessory claim to and a right of entry
for the tract. Within a month after making his entry, Johanson
hauled lumber to and began the erection of a house upon the dis2)uted
tract.
Before the house was completed Cannon destroyed the same
and removed the lumber but notified claimant of its location and that
he would be permitted to reclaim it but ordered him not to attempt
to rebuild.
Prior to filing on the land, claimant was informed by
Cannon of his claim thereto and that he proposed to file thereon and
that claimant and all others would be prevented from obtaining the
land, even though it became necessary for him to carry his dire
In February, 1898, Johanson again went
threats into execution.
upon the land and, with the assistance of others, built a dugout, in
which he placed a few personal effects, and slept therein one night.

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
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hands of Cannon shortly

further effort appears to have been

made on

fol-

the part of

claimant to establish his residence on the tract and no attempt was
ever made by him to reside upon or cultivate any of the land other
than said lot 5, though it is not entirely clear from the testimony
whether or not Johanson had reason to believe that his residence
on any other portion of the land would be molested or his attempts
Apparently Cannon asserted no claim
to cultivate it interfered with.
to any of the land except said lot 5, but his threats were in their
nature general and the drastic measures taken by him to enforce his
claim may have given some foundation to the belief on the part of
Johanson that it would be unsafe for him to attempt residence on or
There is some evidence in
cultivation of the remainder of the land.
the record to support this assumption.
Though he made no attempt

Johnson testifies that he
upon the land and on one occasion this action was resented
by Cannon and he viciously assaulted the party who accompanied
claimant, for which assault he w as arrested and fined.
Since the
initiation of contest Johanson has erected a house and established
residence on the land, though not upon lot 5, and apparently has
rebuild, prior to initiation of contest,

to

often slept

r

not been molested.

Your office, relying upon departmental decision in the case of
Swain v. Call (9 L. D., 22), held that even though Johanson was prevented by the acts of Cannon from occupying the portion of the land
entered by him and claimed by Cannon, he was not excused from
fully complying with the law as to the remainder of his entry to
which the claims and threats of Cannon did not extend.
Duress sufficient to excuse claimant from complying with the requirements of law has been repeatedly defined by the Department.
(Sec Kinman /•. Appleby, on review, 32 L. D., 526, and cases therein
cited).
That such duress existed as to said lot 5, through the threats
and acts of Cannon, is beyond controversy. Whether as a reasonable

man. exercising ordinary prudence, Johanson was justified in the
and acts of Cannon extended to the remainder

belief that the threats

of his entry.

dence

at

i<

not so clear.

Conceding that he was not

so justified,

presented as to whether he was bound to establish resianother place upon the land and cultivate and improve the

the question

is

land open to him.

The

object and intent of the law was to confer upon and secure to
homestead claimant, the "exclusive benefit <>f his homestead
right " (Anderson v. Carkins, 1-".:) CJ. S., L83, 1:89).
Alienation, conthe

trary to the usual rule in respect to land.

i>

restricted as against the

might defeat the enjoyment of
the exclusive right by the persons sought to be benefitted.
This right
extends to all the land covered by the homestead entr\ and the law
policy of the statute, for to permit

it

DECISIONS KELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
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has sought to protect

by suitable and

it

effective

safeguards.

It

follows therefore that the entryman's absolute right to the entire
possession and enjoyment of the land carries with

is

it

the right to

and any obstruction of this right
an interference with the exclusive possession and enjoyment of the

build his house wherever he sees

fit,

entire tract.

The good

faith of the claimant

was evidenced by his attempts to
and there can be no pre-

establish a residence on lot 5 of his entry,

sumption of bad faith because of his failure to maintain such
residence in the face of the unlawful interference by Cannon, which
excused such failure. Your office held, in effect, that as
between claimant and contestant, the equities of claimant were
superior and that cancellation should not be ordered if by such
action Cannon would be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
But as Cannon could secure no rights by his contest, under your said
decision, the question was left solely between the government and the
entryman and as to the government Johanson was bound to evidence
his good faith by establishing residence upon and cultivating and
improving the remainder of the tract. In other words, the government is permitted to take advantage of Cannon's wrong to the prejudice of the entryman. To this doctrine the Department is unwilling to accede. The general and more liberal rule that where good
faith is apparent and the controversy is one solely between the government and the entryman, the entry should be held intact, is more
in keeping with the spirit of the homestead law. and the Department
is of opinion the rule announced in the case of Parsons v. Hughes
clearly

(8 L. D., 593, 595) is controlling in the case at bar.

It

w as
T

there

held that where the claimant had been wrongfully ejected from that

was
not incumbent upon
go upon another portion of the land and
establish another.
right
The
of selection in such matters goes hand
with
to
in hand
the right
the exclusive enjoyment of the entire tract,
is
an interference with the other.
and a denial of one
In the case cited in your said decision (Swain v. Call, supra) it
was stated that "the evidence relied upon as showing duress on the
part of Swain is not by any means sufficient to sustain such finding."
That case should not therefore be allowed to control in cases similar
to the one here under consideration, where the evidence clearly
portion of the land upon which she had established residence,

it

her to

established the plea of duress.

For the reasons herein
affirmed in so far as

it

modified in so far as

upon

the

decision

appealed

from

is

holds for dismissal the contest of Cannon, and

it

holds for cancellation the entry of Johanson
by him. The entry

the rejection of the final proof submitted

will remain intact

showing as
entry.

stated,

to his

and he

will be permitted to submit a supplemental

compliance with the law during the lifetime of the
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ABTD LAND—IRRIGATION PROJECT—ACT OF JUNE 17,1903.
(

The

)PINI0N.

June

IT. 1902, affords authority for the purchase by the United
incomplete irrigation system to be used in connection with,
and to heroine a part of, a larger system contemplated by the government.

of

act

States of an

The provision of section 5 of the act of June 17. 1902, restricting the sale of a
right to use water for land in private ownership to not more than one hundred and sixty acres, v. ill not prerenl the recognition of a vested water right
for a larger area and protection of the same by allowing the continued flowage of the water covered by the right through the works constructed by the
government.
of the Interior has no authority to enter into any agreement providing that an entry of public lands may be consummated in any manner
or at any time other than as provided by the law under which such entry is

The Secretary

made.
'Assistant

Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the InU rior, January 6, 1906.
(W. C. P.)

In his Letter of

November

8,

1905, the Director of the Geological

Survey stated that the Umatilla project, in Oregon, had been found
feasible: that it would irrigate about 20, 000 acres of land east of the
Umatilla River, at an estimated cost of fifty dollars per acre, and

recommended that the stun of * 1.000,000 be set aside for the project.
With this letter he transmitted a copy of a proposed contract, by
which the Maxwell Land and Irrigation Company, which has parcompleted the construction of a canal system to irrigate its
by which said company is to turn over to the United States its
irrigation works and water rights and to place its lands under the
project and hind itself to make sale thereof in such manner as to con-'
form to the provisions of the reclamation act. The original of this
agreement, which had been signed on behalf of the company, had been
tially

lands,

returned for certain corrections.

This letter was returned to the Director for report on the following
propositions

Do not the provisions of paragraph 2 of the enclosed agreement conwith the provisions of paragraph 5 of the reclamation act prohibiting the
light to the use of water on land in private ownership in excess of 160 acres?
1.

flict

l*.

Are not the provisions of paragraph 11 likewise
paragraph 5 of the reclamation act?

in

conflict

with the pro-

visions of said

What authority has the Secretary of the Interior, under existing law,
approve the provisions of paragraph 13 of said agreement which contemplates the extension of time for compliance with the provisions of the desert
•"«.

to

land act

The

V

Director,

in

his report of

and second propositions
conflict

in

November

16,

first

act, and submits the
Department for consideration.

with the provisions of the reclamation

third proposition to the

answers that the

the reference are not, in his opinion, in
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opinion,

first,

upon the questions presented

herein, and, second, as

whether any legal objection exists to the approval of the accompanying agreement to sell of the Maxwell Land and Irrigation
to

c

'

Company."
Paragraph 1 of the proposed agreement provides that the Maxwell
Land and Irrigation Company will sell and convey to the United
States for the uses and purposes contemplated by the reclamation act

of June IT, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), its main canal, laterals, diversion
works, structures for impounding or distributing water, rights of

way, and all water rights held or claimed, with all appurtenances
in any wise used in connection with the company's canal system, for
the

sum

of $15,000.

Paragraph

2 reads as follows:

further agreed that the United States shall recognize a vested water
right in the said company, or its assigns for three hundred (300) acres, to be
hereafter selected by it in tracts, not less than twenty acres conforming to the
It

is

public land subdivisions within the limits of the East Umatilla project of the

Reclamation Service, to the extent of the water supply furnished to other lands
under the said project. The water right for the said three hundred (300) acres
shall be a perpetual water right, subject to the same regulations as to quantity
and time of delivery prevailing under the said project, but shall be subject to no
other condition than the payment to the United States of an annual maintenance
charge of the same amount as that fixed for other lands under said project.

Paragraph

3 provides that the

company

will place

under the pro-

visions of the reclamation act its lands irrigable under said project,

aggregating between 8000 and 9000 acres, excepting the tracts reserved in paragraphs 2 and 5.
Paragraph 4 provides that the lands referred to in paragraph 3
shall be conveyed to a trustee satisfactory to both parties, that they
may be sold to parties competent to take and hold the same under the
reclamation act.
Paragraph 5 provides that there shall be excepted from the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 a townsite of 160 acres, and in addition
thereto forty acres of land as a water-shed to protect the spring from
which water is supplied and intended to be supplied to said town-

and the right of way from said forty acres to the townsite.
Paragraph 6 provides that the company shall convey the premises
to the United States by a good and sufficient deed of conveyance.
Paragraph 7 provides that the United States shall purchase the
property upon the terms expressed in the previous paragraphs.
Paragraph 8 provides that existing liens or incumbrances of said
premises may be provided for by retention of a sufficient amount of

site,

the purchase money.

Paragraph 9 provides that the officers of the United States may
have unrestricted access to said premises for the purpose of surveying for the construction of reclamtaion works.
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to the

Slate- any land- required for reservoirs, canals, or other irrigation

work-,

at

a

consideration not to exceed six dollars per acre.

Paragraph 11 provides that the company may retain po-session of,
maintain and operate it- present water system so far as may be necessary to supply water to lands now irrigable by the same and dependent thereon until the government project shall replace the

same

and that the company may supply to the parties named in Schedule A
water sufficient to complete their cultivation under the deserl land act
of the tracts as set forth in said schedule.
12 and 13 provide that parties named in Schedule B,
under the desert land act and dependent upon water
claimantbeing
to be supplied them by the company under that portion of its system

Paragraphs

yet constructed,

not

may complete

the acquisition of said public

lands by obtaining water under the reclamation act,

"and

that they

have such extension of time in which to conform to the requirements of the desert land act as may become necessary on account of
their obtaining water for such lands from the reclamation project,"
with the provision that the lands so to be furnished with water shall
not exceed 160 acres to each claimant.
Paragraph 14 provides that the agreement shall not operate to bind
the United States to purchase said premises until approval by the
-hall

Secretary of the Interior, and

Paragraph 15 provides that the provisions of the agreement

shall

inure to the successors and assigns of the respective parties thereto.

The Director of
for

at

Least

the Geological Survey states that a water right
300 acre- ha- now vested in the company and that to

eliminate this water right by purchase would require a larger ex-

He Mates that the proposition to
water right in the company and to provide for the flowage
of the water through the canal to he constructed is the course usually
pursued by individuals under like condition-.
When an abstract of title in connection with the Klamath Falls
irrigation project was under consideration in this office it disclosed
an apparent obligation upon the property perpetually to deliver
water without charge for expense of operation or maintenance, to
certain parties, and the opinion was expressed that these obligations
penditure than would he justified.
leave this

were of such character as to prohibit acquiring the property under
the

irrigation

At

act.

that

matter was not before this
Reference

made

time the agreement

office

and

its

involved

conditions were not

in

set

that
forth.

stated that the agreement there
under consideration now. That
the act of June 17. L902, affords authority for the purchase of a
partially constructed irrigation system has heretofore been held by
23
5104—Vol. 34— or, m
is

is

to this because

substantially the

same

it

as the one

is
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the Department.

In

fornia Development

my

opinion of February

Company

6,

1905, in the Cali-

(33 L. D., 391, 404),

it

was

said:

system as now constituted is to be considered as a separate, distinct
and complete project there might be very potent argument produced against
its purchase and in support of the proposition that such a purchase would not
come within the purview of the law, but when considered as only a section of
the greater system to be constructed under the general project for utilization
of the waters of this river, its purchase clearly comes within the purview of
the law and may be consummated unless some other prohibitive obstacle is
If this

presented.

The

agreement, if it be completed, will be to transfer
to the United States the incompleted irrigation system of the company, to be used in connection with, and to become a part of, the
larger system contemplated by the government.
I have no doubt
that such a transaction in well within the powers conferred by the act
eifect of this

June 17, 1902.
Whether the reservations provided for in paragraph 2 of the agreement may be recognized presents another question. The water right
thus reserved has become vested and the purport of the agreement
of

is

to recognize this fact.

This right

is to

be recognized in the con-

and operation of the larger system and

to be protected by
allowing the continued flowage of the water covered by the right
through the works to be constructed by the United States. The plan
proposed is frequently resorted to in dealings between individuals.
The principle involved is recognized in the laws and upheld by the

struction

courts of most, if not

all,

of the States in the arid region.

Undoubt-

edly the sale by the United States to any one person of a right to the
use of water for more than 160 acres would be in conflict with the
provisions of section 5 of the reclamation

act.

The transaction

in-

volved here is not a sale of the water. The United States has no
title and does not propose to take any title to the water right reserved in paragraph 2 of the proposed agreement. The transaction
therefore not prohibited by the provision in section 5 of the
reclamation act restricting the sale of a right to use water for land
is

in private ownership.

The only obligation assumed by the United States is to allow the
water covered by this reserved right to flow through the canal to be
constructed under its project, and the company in whose interest the
reservation is made assumes its share of the annual maintenance
After careful consideration I am of opinion that the procharge.
visions of paragraph 2 of the proposed agreement do not conflict
with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the reclamation act.
By the proposed agreement the land reserved is apparently relieved
of any liability to contribute to the cost of the irrigation project in
other words, it is not brought within the limits of that project. The
;

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS..

355

burden placed upon the Lands within the project is proportionally
by the withdrawal of the reserved land- therefrom. It
has presumably been decided that the cost of the undertaking will

increased

not he so great as to
that
is

a

i-

render the scheme impracticable, hut.

question which this

office is not

at

any

rate,

position to determine.

in

It

even

an administrative question which arises in connection with

and therefore one for whose >olution the officers in charge of
work must be held responsible.
I do not find any ground for apprehension that the provisions of
paragraph 11 of the proposed agreement would he in conflict with the
of the reclamation act.
That paragraph simprovisions of section

project
the

.">

company may continue

ply provides that the

to

Bystem until replaced by the government project.

operate
It

i-

present

its

evidently in-

tended by this paragraph to protect existing rights pending the construction of the

No

government works.

legal objection to this plan

can he urged, but, on the other hand, any plan which
vide for the protection of the people

who have

lands

would

not pro-

now under

irri-

gation would be open to serious criticism.

By paragraph

18 of the

under the desert land

agreement

they would be able to obtain water

is

it

who have made

act

provided that claimants
upon the theory that

entries

from the company's system

so as

submit proofs within the time prescribed by law. -hall be allowed
such extension of time as may be necessary because of the proposed
change of ownership of the system. There is no authority in the
to

Secretary of the Interior to waive the provisions of the desert land

This proposition

law.

cuss

it

at

length.

i^

so plain that

The Director

it

seems unnecessary

of the Geological Survey

is

to dis-

of opin-

proof to be made at Mich time
would be possible under the reclamation project seems to be deducible from several departmental decisions, as. for instance, in the
case of Thompson i\ Bartholet (18 L. I).. 96)."
That decision does
ion that the authority " to allow final

as

not support the proposition that

the Secretary of the Interior

may

enter into an agreement that the plain provisions of the law uiay be

disregarded.

lie

ha- no authority to

ing that an entry for the public lands

make any agreement providmay be consummated in any

manner or at any time other than as provided by the law under
which Mich entry is made, and if he should enter into such agreement
it
would afford no protection to the entryman.
In hi- letter of
December 1. L905, the Director of the Geological Survey, referring to
this class of entries, -aid

would not

:

necessary for the Department t«» commit itself to an extension
of lime for the making of final proof on these entries.
All parties interested
would be satisfied with a declaration by the Department that, it' final proof on
these entries can not be made within the statutory lime for reasons falling
It

lie

within the rules of the Board of Equitable Adjudication they will be considered
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under such rules, good faith being shown on the part of these entrymen. An
approval of the contract with a qualification to this effect would, it is believed,
be accepted by the Maxwell Land and Irrigation Company. In the opinion
of this office such action, if deemed proper by the Department would be but fair
to these entrymen who should be informed as to the status of their entries if
they are to depend upon the project.

when

proof

is presented on any such entry, it is found
any rule for consideration by the Board of
Equitable Adjudication, it would be disposed of in that manner,
and there would seem to be no good, reason for refusing to make a

If,

that

final

conies within

it

statement to that effect.
The general question in the note of reference as to whether any
legal objection exists to the approval of this agreement seems to

demand a consideration of the whole instrument. The various paragraphs thereof and their effect have been set forth quite fully herein.
It is not believed that any provision thereof, excepting such as have
been pointed out in discussion of the specific questions submitted,
presents a legal objection to the approval of the agreement.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

OKLAHOMA LANDS-RESERVATION WITHIN VACATED TOWNSITE—ACT
OF

MAY

11, 189<{.

City of Enid.
Where

a patent has not issued for a public reservation in a townsite at the
date the townsite is vacated, and the original entryman for such reservation fails to make application therefor within six months from the vacation
of the townsite, it thereupon, under the provisions of the act of May 11,
1896, becomes subject to disposal as an isolated tract under section 2455 of
the Revised Statutes, and can not be disposed of in any other manner.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L.

By

C)

January

letter of

City of

September

Enid from your

5,

6,

1905,

decision of

Office,

you transmit the appeal of

May

cation for a patent to that part of the

9,

SW.

T. 22 N., K. 6 W., Kingfisher, Oklahoma,

1905, rejecting
i of the

NW.

of " McGuire's Addition to Enid,' and dismissing

its

its

the

appli-

\ of Sec.

commonly known

1

1

Land

(E. F. B.)

1900.

8,

as block

protest against

the sale of said land as an isolated tract.

The NW.

was entered by Luther M. McGuire
In 1895 the entryman commuted to cash
the SW. J of said NW. J under the provisions of section 22 of the
act of May 2, 1890 (26 Stat., 81, 92), which authorizes the purchase

as a

I of said section 8

homestead in 1893.
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any part thereof for townsite purposes," upon

the condition that reservations shall be

made

for public purposes.

patent thereupon issued for all the land embraced in that part

A

of the

homestead commuted

to cash, except the land reserved,

which

was designated on the plat as " Public square donated for parks,,
This was in conformity with the exschools, or other purposes."
press provisions of the statute.

Subsequently, W. II. McNeeley, who had acquired title to said
homestead, vacated the townsite plat- under authority of an act of
of

legislature

the

Oklahoma, approved February

27,

L895,

which

authorized the proprietor of such subdivision to vacate the >ame,
except the reservation for public purposes and one street leading to

any interior reservation, by

a

written instrument duly executed and

recorded.

The

act of

where

that

Congress of

not been issued,

Land
vation

May

11.

L896 (29 Stat..

IK').

117), provides

patent for a reservation in such vacated townsite has

a

it

shall be lawful for the

Commissioner of the General
entryman for such reser-

Office to issue a patent to the original

upon payment of the homestead price therefor (ten dollar-

per acre), and

if

the original

entryman

shall fail or neglect to

application for the reservation within six

make

months from the vacation

from the passage of said act, it shall be subject to
under the provisions of section 2455 of the Revised Statutes,
amended by the act of February 20, 1805. (See City of Enid,

of the townsite. or

disposal
as

30

I,.

I)..

352.)

The second
the patent

section of the act of

May

11.

L896, provides that

where

has issued, or shall hereafter issue, for such reservation,

town or municipality, upon the vacation of the townsite, may sell
same at public or private sale and convey the lands to the purchaser, and cover the proceeds of such sale into the school fund of
such town or municipality.
In this case the patent had not issued, and the original entryman
failed to make application for the purchase of the reservation within
six months from the vacation of the townsite.
It therefore became
subject to disposal as an isolated tract under section 2455 of the
Revised Statutes, and can not be disposed of in any other manner.
The city .of Enid can not be restored to its former right to such
reservation by the action of the owner of the townsite refiling the
the

the

'

plats as an addition to said city.
^

our decision

is

affirmed.
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applications fop use of name of united states in judicial
proceedings to forfeit rights of way.
Regulations.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, I). c7., January <l. 1906.
In any case of an application for the use of the name of the United
States in a suit or suits to be instituted to secure, on account of the
nonperformance of a condition subsequent, a judicial declaration of
forfeiture of rights of way granted over the public lands and reservations of the United States, the application should be addressed to the
Secretary of the Interior and filed with the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, and if upon examination proper grounds are
shown for the institution and maintenance of such suit, said Commis-

upon the grantee or his or their successor in interest,
be, to show cause within ninety clays why the proper
proceedings shall not be instituted. If no satisfactory showing shall
be made within the prescribed time the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, upon the execution of a good and sufficient bond to
sioner will call
as the case

may

indemnify the United States against

ward

all liability

for costs, will for-

the application to the Secretary of the Interior with appropriate

recommendation, whereupon such action will be taken as the circumstances of the case seem to warrant.

If the application

will be necessary that further application be

made

to the

is

allowed

it

Department

of Justice for a commission to the applicant's attorney as special

United States attorney, with nominal compensation, authorizing him
and defend the interests of the United States in such suit

to represent

or suits as

A
tice,

may

be allowed.

form of indemnifying bond, drawn by the Department of
is printed herewith and should be strictly followed.
Very respectfully,

W.

Jus-

A. Richards, Commissioner.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS
of

as principal,

:

That we,

and

a corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of
as surety, are held and firmly hound unto the United States of America in the full
and just sum of
thousand dollars, lawful money of the United
for which payment, well and truly to be
States, to be paid to the United States
made, the said
;

.

bind

,

heirs,

executors,
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and administrators, and the said
binds

successors and assigns, firmly

itself, its

by these presents.
In witness whereof, the said
as principal,

:

hand__and

hereunto set

caused these presents

lias

as surety,

seal__,

to

and the said

be sealed with

its

corporate seal and

signed by

.

day of

this

in the

year one thousand nine

hundred and

The condition

of the foregoing obligation

is

such that whereas the said

made and
tion for

by

applica-

tiled

permission to use the name of the United States in a suit to be instituted
for the purpose of declaring forfeited certain rights of way for

purposes, approved

in

favor of

which said rights of way

it

is

claimed

by the said

have been forfeited because of
comply with the laws relating thereto, and which said rights of way
Interfere with the right of way sought to be acquired by the said
failure to

;i

Now. therefore,
United States

in

the said application for permission to use the

if

name

said suit for the purpose above stated shall be granted,

said suit shall be instituted in the

name

of the United States,

of the

and the

and the said

judgment for money that may be awarded or rendered
and shall in every way save
the said United States harmless in respect of any order made in such proceeding
or any judgment for money or costs rendered therein, then this obligation shall
be void; otherwise, to remain in full force and virtue.
Signed, sealed, and delivered
shall

pay

all

costs or

againsl the 1'nitod States on account of said suit,

in the

presence of
Principal.

i

As

to principal.

Surety.

>

By

i

As

i<>

__.

surety

JUSTIFICATION BY CORPORATE SURETY.
[This form is to
surety thei
u

bond

used

hi-

is

ii

in

connection with the execution of the foregoing bond

guaranty Or surety company, and

this affidavit

must

tic

when

annexed

the

to the

I

Stale Of
J

County of

ss

\

Personally appeared before me,
on this

hundred and

one thousand nine

day of

known

to

me

to

be the

of

the corporation described

in

and which
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executed the annexed bond of
,

and who, being by me duly sworn, deposes and says that he
,

that he

in the State of

of the said

the

is

as surety thereon,

resides at

seal thereof; that said company is duly and
under the laws of the State of
that said company has complied with the provisions of the act of Congress of
August 13, 1894, allowing certain corporations to be accepted as surety on bonds
that the seal affixed to the annexed bond of

Company, and knows the corporate
legally incorporated

;

the corporate seal af the said

is

Company, and was thereto

affixed

by order and authority

of the board of directors of said company, and that he signed his

and authority, as
of said company and that he is acquainted with
and knows him to be the

by

name

thereto

like order

;

company; and

of said

_•

that,

the signature of said

to said bond,

is

in the

,

subscribed

genuine handwriting of said

and was thereto subscribed by order and authority of
and that the
assets of said company, unencumbered and liable to execution, exceed its claims,
debts, and liabilities, of every nature whatsoever, by more than the sum of
,

said board of directors, and in the presence of said deponent

;

dollars ($

).

Deponent further says that

,

residing at

,

,

has been duly appointed as the agent of said company

to accept service of process against said

company

judicial district of

appearance
against

it

Sworn
day of

in the State of

in the
,

in behalf of said

company

in

any

and

is

authorized to enter an

action, suit, or proceeding brought

in said judicial district.

to,

acknowledged before me, and subscribed
,

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS
of

in

my

presence this,

19

,

:

That we,

as principal, and

_.

as suret
are held and firmly
bound unto the United States of America in the sum of
thousand dollars, lawful money of the United States of America, to be paid to
the United States for which payment, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, and administrators, jointly and severally, firmly by
these presents. Signed with our hands and sealed with our seals this
one thousand nine hundred and
day of
The condition of the above obligation is such, that whereas the said
application
made and filed

of

,

;

,

,
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of the United States in a suit to bo instituted by

for the purpose of declaring forfeited certain rights of

purposes, approved

way

for

1

,

in favor

of

which said rights of way

it

is

claimed by the said

have been forfeited because of a failure to comply with the laws relating thereto.
and which said rights of way interfere with the right of way sought to be
acquired by the said

Now. therefore,
Tinted States

in

if

the said application for permission to use the

the said suit shall he instituted in the

shall

pay

costs or

all

name

of the

and
and the said

said suit for the purposes above stated shall he granted,

name

judgment for money

of the United States,
that

may

against the United States on account of said suit,

and

he awarded or rendered
will in every way save

any order made in such proceedany judgment for money or costs rendered therein, then this obligation
he void otherwise to remain in full force and virtue.

the said United States harmless in respect of
ing, or

shall

;

[l. s.]
[i- s.1
[l. s.]

[l. s.]

Signed, sealed,

and delivered

in

the presence of-

(As to principal.)

(As to surety.)

State of__

County

of.

},,

one of the sureties on the annexed bond,
I am worth, after paying my just debts,
the sum of
thousand dollars, exclusive of property exempt from execution by the laws of the State in which I reside.
I,

,

being duly sworn, depose and say that

Subscribed and sworn to before

me

day of

this

(The above statement should be sworn

to

,

A. D. 19.

by each of the sureties.)

CONTEST—SUSPENDED ENTRY— CHARGE.
PORTEK

/'.

CaRLILE.

A contest based solely upon the ground that the entry is invalid because the
land embraced therein is not' of the character subject to such entry, may
be allowed, notwithstanding the entry, at the date of the initiation of the
contest, was embraced in an order of suspension issued by the land depart-

ment
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In case of the suspension of an entry by order of the land department the entryman is not compelled to comply with the law during the period of suspension, and contest on the ground of failure to comply with the requirements
of the law during such period should not be allowed.

Where

contest against a suspended entry, on the ground of failure to comply
is erroneously allowed by the local officers, and hearing had

with law,

thereon, the testimony adduced at the hearing, having been taken without
jurisdiction, can not be considered

Secretary Hitchcock
(F. L. C.)

upon removal of the suspension.

Commissioner of the General Land Office,
January 9, 1906.
(E. O. P.)

to the

Herbert C. Porter has appealed to the Department from your
decision of July 31, 1905, reversing that of the local officers and
dismissing his contest against the desert land entry of James M.
Carlile for lots 1, 2, 3, 4, E. \ NW. \ and E. \ SW. J, Sec. 18, T. 17
K, K. 3 E., Greatfalls land district, Montana.
In said contest affidavit two grounds were alleged as a basis therethat the land entered was not desert in character, and
for, viz
failure to comply with the requirements of the desert land law.
office

:

The entry in question was made December 24, 1901. The land
embraced therein was covered by your office letter of October 8, 1903,
withdrawing certain lands from entry under the desert land law s
and suspending such entries already made, pending an investigation " by a special agent to determine their bona fides.^ Contest affidavit w as filed February 17, 1904.
On February 18, 1905, your office, upon an incomplete record, rendered decision sustaining the contentions of Porter and directing the
On appeal by Carlile, the Department,
cancellation of the said entry.
on July 19, 1905, remanded the case to your office for further consideration, in order that a decision might be rendered upon the record as
it then stood and the effect of said order of suspension upon the jurisT

T

diction of the local officers to entertain the contest determined.

from the decision rendered in accordance with
Department that the pending appeal was taken.
After alleging as error the action of your

It

is

instructions of the

office in

denying the

diction of the local officers to entertain the contest of Porter,

jurisit

is

contended, in the second and third specifications of error, that your
office w as without authority to take further action or render another
r

decision, after

an appeal from the decision

Had

first

rendered had been

such action been taken by your office after appeal, upon
its own motion, this objection might be w orthy of serious consideration, but under the circumstances here presented, it is difficult to determine upon what basis such contention may rest, as the authority of
the Department to direct such further consideration by you is not to
be denied. Had such action not been taken the Department would
taken.

r
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upon

a different

necessarily have been called

upon

to decide the case

record from that before your office, and to first con-true an order of
This the Department was unwilling to do,
suspension made by you.

and the action taken was in no way prejudicial to the rights of the
parties, because they were fully protected by the right of appeal,

whereby the whole matter could be brought before the Department
upon the merits.
In passing upon the question of jurisdiction the Department is of
opinion the decision appealed from is correct. Had the basis of contest

been only the invalidity of the entry

in

question by reason of the

character of the land, such contest, though filed subsequenl

to

the

order of suspension, might have been allowed under the rule an-

nounced in the case of A.dams v. Farrington (15 L. I).. 234, 237), but
By such a contest the sole purpose of the governfor no other cause.
ment in directing the suspension would be carried out, and of this
HoAvever, in view of the fact that
the entryman could not complain.
of
entry
the
an
by order of the land department
during
suspension
does
not
the
time
run against
suspended entry and the entryman is
with the law during the period of
compelled
to
show
compliance
not
suspension, it would be manifestly unjust to allow contest to be
brought upon that ground.

The

request of appellant that the local officers be directed to con-

sider the testimony taken in the present contest

now

in force

when

the su>pension

has been removed must also be denied, for two reasons:

than half the statutory life of the entry had elapsed at the
was suspended, and as time does not run against the entry
while under suspension, the claimant still has the remainder of the
statutory period, after the suspension is removed, within which to
show compliance with the law. and testimony taken long prior to the
expiration of such period would not be sufficient to warrant the Department in ordering a cancellation of the entry for failure to comply
with the law. and. second, the action of the local officers being a mere
nullity for want of jurisdiction, the Department is without authority
to validate that which was void from the beginning.
While the hardship complained of by appellant in prosecuting his
void contest at great expense i^ fully recognized by the Department,
yet it knows of no rule of law whereby the relief asked can be granted
without serious prejudice to the rights of the entryman.
For the
reasons herein stated, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.
first. les>

time

it
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NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD GRANT-ADJUSTMENT-ACT OF JULY

1,

1898.

Stafford

v.

Northern Pacific Ry.

Co.

Directions given that in case a selection by the Northern Pacific Railway Company is canceled for conflict, and thereafter, in the adjustment of the conflicting claims under the provisions of the act of July 1, 1898, the individual

claim

is

canceled upon relinquishment, the selection of the company be

immediately reinstated.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
F. L. C)
Jan vary 9, 1906.

Land

(

October

30, 1897, one Joseph
and 3, NE. J of SE. i and
R. 10 W., Olympia, Washington,
was issued to him September 1,
January 14, 1899.
lots 2

F. Juza

SE.

^ of

land
1898,

Office,

(E. J. H.)

made homestead entry
NE. J of Sec. 27, T. 17

district,

upon which

for
N.,

certificate

and patent issued thereunder

The described

tracts are within the indemnity limits of the grant
Northern Pacific Railroad (now Railway) Company, and lots
2 and 3 and NE. J of SE. ^ were selected by said company April 28,
1885, per list No. 5, rearranged list No. 5, filed August 20, 1892, and
supplemental list No. 5 of November 17, 1896, and canceled May 6,
1898. The SE. J of NE. ^ does not appear to have been embraced in
said selection lists, so that there was no conflict as to that tract between Juza and the railroad company. Subsequently action was
taken looking to an adjustment of said conflicting claims, under the
act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat., 597, 620), and Juza filed relinquishment
of all of the tracts covered by his entry, accompanied by a quit-claim
deed therefor.
January 16, 1905, Juza's entry and the patent issued thereunder
were canceled under the provisions of the act of 1898. Juza was
notified of his right to make entry of other lands in lieu thereof, and
the company that the tracts involved were subject to its claim.
January 25, 1905, said company filed its selection list No. 65 for all
of the described tracts, which was on the same day approved by the
to the

local officers.

March

14, 1905,

John Stafford tendered

his homestead application

for said tracts, alleging that he established residence thereon

Decem-

ber 17, 1904, with his family, consisting of his wife and two children,
and had continued to reside there, and that he had' made valuable

improvements on the land.

The

local officers rejected said applica-

tion for conflict with the indemnity selection of the Northern Pacific

company; from which Stafford appealed.
August 4, 1905, your office decision held, that inasmuch as it appeared that the company made its former selection of lots 2 and 3
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and the NE. \ of the SE. \ prior to the date of Stafford's alleged
and that the prior conflicting claims of Juza and the
company thereto had been adjudicated under the provisions of the act
settlement,

of L898, the action of the local officers in rejecting Stafford's application

was

correct, so far as

it

related to said tracts,

and the same was

affirmed.

NE. \. it was held that as the company did not
January 25, 1905, the adjustment of the conflictAs
ing claims of Juza and the company did not apply thereto.
Stafford alleged settlement prior to the company's said selection of
that tract, a hearing was ordered to ascertain whether he had a bona
•fide settlement thereon prior to the date of the company's selection.
From so much of said decision as related to lots 2 and 3 and the
NE. of SE. j. Stafford has appealed to the Department, contending
that as Stafford was an actual bona fide settler upon the land prior
to the railway company's selection of said tracts on January 25, 1905,
his claim thereto is superior to that of the company.
In disposing of this appeal it is deemed proper to say that your
office when cancelling Juza's entry under his relinquishment and election to transfer his claim to other lands, should have reinstated the
As

to the

SE.

j

of

the same until

select

|

railroad selection formerly canceled, so as to prevent a hiatus occur-

some other person into making claim
In this case however, Stafford was not so misled, for
he alleges settlement prior to the cancellation of Juza's entry, and at
the time of presenting his homestead application the selection as
again presented by the railway company was of record.
Under these
conditions your office decision as to said lots
and 3 and XE. J of
was correct, and the same is affirmed.
SE.
In future you will see that in disposing of like conflicts under the
ring which might have misled

for this land.

'1

J

act of L898,

the railroad selection

tion of the individual

is reinstated at the time of cancellaclaim preliminary to allowing the transfer to

other lands as provided for in said act.

SCHOOL LANDS

I

N

1 >

KM N IT Y SELECTION.

Regulations.

Department of the Interior,
rENERAL Land )i tick,
(

(

Washington,

The following

rules

/>.

('..

January

10, I!""'.

and regulations governing the -election

<>!'

indemnity school land- are prescribed for the purpose of preserving
a uniform method in all State- and Territories having a grant <>!'
lands for common schools prior to the passage of the act of February
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(26 Stat., 796), including the State of Utah, to which the
indemnity provisions of said act were made applicable by the act of
28, 1801

May

1902 (32 Stat., 188).
act of February 29, 1891. amending sections 2275 and 2276,
Revised Statutes, is general and provides that
3,

The

Sec. 2275. AVhere settlements with a view to preemption or

homestead have

been, or shall hereafter he made, before the survey of the lands in the

field,

have been made on sections sixteen or thirty-six, those sections shall be subject to the claims of such settlers; and if such sections, or
either of them, have been or shall be granted, reserved, or pledged for the nse

which are found

to

of schools or colleges in the State or Territory in which they

equal acreage are hereby appropriated and granted, and

may

lie,

other lands of

be selected by said

State or Territory, in lieu'of such as may be thus taken by preemption or homestead settlers. And lands of equal acreage are also hereby appropriated
and granted, and may be selected by said State or Territory where sections
sixteen or thirty-six are mineral lands, or are included within any Indian, military, or other reservation, or are otherwise disposed of by the United States:
Provided, Where any State is entitled to said sections sixteen and thirty-six,
or where said sections are reserved to any Territory, notwithstanding the same
may be mineral land or embraced within a military. Indian, or other reservation,

the selection of such lands in lieu thereof by the said State of Territory shall
be a waiver of its right to said sections. And other lands of equal acreage are

and granted, and may be selected by said State or Tercompensate deficiencies for school purposes, where sections sixteen or
thirty-six are fractional in quantity, or one or both are wanting by reason of the township being fractional, or from any natural cause whatever. And
it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior, without awaiting the extension of the public surveys, to ascertain and determine, by protraction or
otherwise, the number of townships that will be included within such Indian,
military, or other reservations, and thereupon the State or Territory shall be
entitled to select indemnity land to the extent of two sections for each of said
townships, in lieu of sections sixteen and thirty-six therein but such selections
may not be made within the boundaries of said reservations: Provided, however,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent any State or Territory from awaiting the extinguishment of any such military, Indian, or other reservation and
the restoration of the lands therein embraced to the public domain and then
taking the sections sixteen and thirty-six in place therein; but nothing in this
proviso shall be construed as conferring any right not now existing.
Sec. 2276. That the lands appropriated by the preceding section shall be selected from any unappropriated, surveyed public lands, not mineral in character, within the State or Territory where such losses or deficiencies of school
sections occur
and where the selections are to compensate for deficiencies of
school lands in fractional townships, such selections shall be made in accordance with the following principles of adjustment, to wit For each township, or
fractional township, containing a greater quantity of land than three-quarters
for a fractional township, containing a
of an entire township, one section
greater quantity of land than one-half, and not more than three-quarters of
also hereby appropriated
ritory to

;

:

:

;

a

township, three-quarters of a section

;

for a fractional township, containing a

greater quantity of land than one-quarter, and not more than one-half of a
township, one-half section and for a fractional township containing a greater
quantity of land than one entire section, and not more than one-quarter of a
;

township, one-quarter section of land: Provided, That the States or Territories
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be entitled to both the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections

have the right

to select

double the amounts named, to compensate
townships.

for deficiencies of school lands in fractional
1.

The

selections in

any one

List

must not

in the

aggregate exceed

160 acres.
'2.

All lists of selections must he prepared so that each selection will

correspond, approximately, in area with the base Lands, or lands in
It is preferred that a separate
lieu of which the selection is made.
base he assigned to each legal subdivision selected, hut in no instance

can any selection exceed

L60 acres, nor can

it

consist of noncontig-

uous tracts.

Where

the selection is based upon lands that have been disposed
under authority of any act of Congress, the base tract or
tracts must be described by legal subdivisions, each in its entirety,
except as provided in paragraph 5 hereof.
4. The cause of the loss must in each case be specifically stated.
If
caused by an entry based upon a settlement claim initiated prior to
survey, the number of the entry must he given.. If occasioned \)\ a
3.

of by or

reservation of the land, entitling the States to idemnity, the date,
name, and purpose of the reservation must he stated.
If the loss.
occurs by reason the fractional character of the township, or the
supposed mineral character of the land, it must he sel forth.
5.

Where

the selection

is

for a loss occasioned

by the fractional con-

township from natural or other causes, or for lands
included within a perfected claim, the survey of which is not in accordance with the rectangular system, any portion of the loss, not
Less than one acre, may he assigned as a basis, and any remaining portion, not Less than one acre, may he used in future selections.
Where lands are reserved for school purposes and are after survey included in any Indian, military, or other reservation, or have
heen reserved for school purposes,
whether surveyed or unsurveyed,'' and are assigned as the basis for selection, the list must in
every case he accompanied by a certificate of the officer, or officers,
charged with the care and disposal of such school Lands, that the
dition of the

(*>.

b

*

State has not

previously sold or disposed of. nor contracted to

sell

any of said lands used as bases, nor any part thereof;
that the said lands and every part thereof are free of all lien- for
taxes, costs, interest, and judgments, or any incumbrance of any
nature whatsoever, and that the said lands are not in the possession
or subject to the claim of any third party, under any law or permission of the State or Territory; and within three month- after the
tiling of any such list of -election- the State or Territory nui-t in
addition tile a certificate from the recorder of deed-, or official custoor dispose of

dian of the records of transfers of real estate in the proper county,
that

no instruments, purporting to convey or

in

any way incumber
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the title to any of said lands, are of record, or on file in his office,
and the failure to file such certificate within the required time may,
upon the report of the local officers, result in the cancellation of the
selection without previous notice from this office.
7. The selecting- agent must file a certificate with each list showing
that indemnity has not previously been granted for the assigned base,

and that no previous selection is pending for such assigned base.
8. The lands selected must be from the unappropriated surveyed
public lands, not mineral in character, within the State or Territory
making the selection, and their nonmineral character must be shown
by the affidavit of the selecting agent, or an agent appointed by him
for that purpose, and if by the latter, evidence of his appointment
should accompany his affidavits. A nonmineral affidavit can not be
made upon information and belief, but must be upon the personal
knowledge of the affiant and apply to every smallest legal subdivision
selected; and, if the selected land is not within six miles of any mining claim, entry, or location, that fact must be shown by affidavit.
9. The legal fees required by law must accompany each list of
selections.
10. No more than one number must be given to any list, notwithstanding the fact that it may contain more than one selection.
11. When a list of selections is received by mail on the morning

that the selected lands are open to settlement, entry, and selection,

it

will be considered as proffered after the claims of all persons present
at the time of opening of the office have been received (32 L. D., 648)
but a list received by mail prior to the day of opening will be rejected
because prematurely filed.
12. No application to select will be received for lands covered by
an existing selection or entry of record, nor will any right be -recognized as initiated by the tender of such an application (29 L. D., 29).
Where the base land, or any part thereof, for an indemnity selection
fails, no amendment thereof will be permitted.
13. The local officers are not authorized to accept the relinquishment of any State selection. All relinquishments will be forwarded
to the General Land Office through the local office, when, if accepted,
the local officers will be directed to cancel the same on their records,
and after such cancellation is noted, and not before, the land will be
subject to general disposition under the public-land laws.
14. The right to indemnity does not exist for the undisposed school
sections within abandoned military reservations, the lands within
which are subject to disposal underlets of July 5, 1884, and August
18, 1894, or special acts not making a specific disposition of the school
sections (29 L. D., 418, Jan. 19, 1900).
15. Selections made prior to time that decision of January 19. 1900
;

(29 L. D., 418),

was received

at the local office, in lieu of school lands
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within abandoned military reservations, or selections made in lieu of
abandoned military reservation- embraced within

school lands within

entries allowed prior to time that decision of

January

L9,

L900,

was

received at the local office, will, if otherwise regular, be allowed (act
of Feb. 11. 1903,32 Stat, 822).

When

L6.

and no claim
if at

all,

school section

a

at

is,

the

is

identified

date when

by the Government survey

the right of the State would attach.

asserted thereto under the

mining or other public-land laws,

presumption arises that the title to the land has passed to the
State, hut this presumption may he overcome by the submission of a
Claims of parties based upon
satisfactory showing to the contrary.
of
school section, asserting that
parts
a
covering
mineral locations
be
valuable
known
chiefly
for their mineral deposits at
to
same were
when
right
of
State would have attached
the
time
the
the
to
and prior
the

thereto, if at all, will be disposed of

the

under

patents
2

Lode

37; State of Utah, 32 L. I).. 117.)
State will not be permitted to make selection in lieu of land

Claim. 33 L.
17.

when applications for
(Mahoganey No.

mining laws are presented.

The

I)..

a

school section alleged to be mineral in character, whether

returned

by the surveyor-general as mineral or otherwise, in the

within

absence of satisfactory proof that the base land (designated

by legal

State of California, 81 L. D., 34) is known to
he chiefly valuable for mineral.
(Act of February 28, 1891, 28 Stat..

subdivisions.

Bond

/'.

796; case of State of California, 33 L.

I).,

356.)

The preliminary

show the kind of mineral discovered upon the land and the
extent thereof; when and by whom the discoveries were made, and, as
far as practicable, whether any claim to the land is asserted under the
mining laws, and if so. by whom; the nature and extent of the mining
improvements placed upon the land by the mineral claimant; and
what efforts have been made and are being made to develop the land
proof must

in

good faith for mineral purposes.

Upon submission by the State of an ex parte showing, conforming
substantially to the foregoing requirements, a hearing will be ordered
to

determine the character of the land, evidence to be submitted in
of the allegations contained in the preliminary showing.

support

Notice of Mich hearing shall be given by the State by publication of
at least

once

a

week for

five successive

designated by the register of the land

weeks

in a

newspaper

to be

published nearest to the
location of such base land, and proof that the notice has been given
must be filed in the local land office on or before the day of hearing
office as

(Sec. 2335, Rev. Stat.).
If in any case the proof submitted at the
healing does not clearly show that the base land contains valuable
mineral deposits, ami is chiefly valuable on account of such deposits,
u

selection in lieu thereof will not be permitted.

5194-
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A

determination by the land department that a portion of the
is mineral land will
place that entire subdivision in the class of lands that may be used
as a basis for indemnity or lien selection, and in all such cases there
must also be furnished certificates of the proper State authorities,
and of the officer in charge of the records in the county where the
base lands are situated, showing that such lands have not been sold,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of, as required by paragraph 6
18.

smallest legal subdivision in a school section

hereof.
19. Where the land sought to be selected in lieu of land within a
school section has been returned by the surveyor-general as mineral,

notice of the proposed selection

must

first

be given by publication for

and upon each

sixty days, with posting in the local land office

legal

subdivision of land applied for, during the same period, and satisfactory proof submitted as to the nonmineral character of the selected

Upon compliance with

land.

allegation that the land

is

this requirement

and

mineral, the selection

in the absence of

may

be received,

if

otherwise regular, certified and forwarded, as required hereafter.
20.

Where land sought

to be selected in lieu of land within a school

section has not been returned
is

alleged by

way

patent therefor

is

by the surveyor-general as mineral, but

of protest to be mineral, or where application for

presented under the mining laws, the proceedings

in such cases will be in the nature of a contest,

by the rules of practice

and

will be governed

in force in contest cases.

Where land sought

to be selected has not been returned as minwithin six miles of a mining location, claim, or entry, the
application to select must be accompanied with an application for
21.

eral,

but

is

publication of notice of the selection, which publication will be
at the expense of the State or Territory,

twenty days of the

filing

and continue for

and must commence
a

made

Avithin

period of sixty days, and

the notice must be posted for the same period in the register's

office

conspicuous place upon each legal subdivision applied for.
During such period of publication the local officers may receive protests or contests as to any of the tracts applied for, claimed to be

and in

a

more valuable for mining than agricultural purposes.
22.

Upon

the filing of any such application for publication of

and deswhich paper must
Should the State or

notice of selection the register will prepare the proper notice

ignate the paper in which same

is

to be published,

be within the vicinity of the selected land.

Territory fail to

make

the required publication

its

select will be rejected, subject to the usual right of

application to

appeal to

this

within thirty days after notice of the rejection.
23. No application which requires affirmative proof of the nonmineral character of the selected land, or of the known mineral character
office
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of the base land, will be accepted until the preliminary requirements
hereinbefore indicated have been complied with.
24. Where the State or Territory conforms to the preliminary
requirements governing -election- of land within six miles of a mining location, claim, or entry, or of the selection of land- upon alleged

mineral bases, the register will certify as to the date of filing, the

shown by the record-, and forward the
showing made either for or againsl the -election.

status of the land- selected, as

together with

li-t.

to this office

all

by special

letter,

without further action.

The

legal fees

payable upon such selection mu-t he tendered with the application to
selecl and will he received and held as unearned fee- and unofficial

moneys until the selection has been allowed or finally rejected by this
and in the meantime no action Looking to a disposal of the land

office,

will he taken.

The foregoing
are

tions,

hut

a

regulations, with certain modifications and restric-

of existing regulations, and

codification

.

designed to disturb pending selections

made

are not

accordance with pre-

in

vious regulations.

Indemnity -elections by the Territory of New Mexico, under act of
June 21, L898 (30. Stat., 484), must be made of lands as contiguous
as

may

be to the base lands.

Under the

practice heretofore prevail-

ing the law will be held to have been complied with
land
all

is

within the same township as the base land.

where the selected
In other respects

of the foregoing regulations are applicable to the Territory of

New Mexico.

W.
Approved. January
E. A.

L0,

A. Richards, Commissioner.

L906.

Hitchcock, Secretary

PRACTICE—APPEAL NOTICE—CONTEST—PREFERENCE RIGHT.
Tonn
The Rules

v.

Hays (On Review

).

Department shall
where decision in a case

of Practice require thai notice of an appeal to the

be served upon the appellee or his counsel

:

but

rendered by the Departmenl in the absence of proof of
such decision will not he disturbed <>n motion for
review, in the absence of a showing of reversible error, merely because of
want of proper service of the appeal.
The mere tender, by an applicant to purchase under the timber and stone act,
is

inadvertantly

service. of the appeal,

of the required proof,

purchase price and

U'i's.

which are properly refused

by the local officers, is not the equivalenl of an "entry." within the meaning of the act of May 11. 1880, ' according a preference righl to one who
contests and procures the cancellation of an entry.
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Secretary Hitchcock
(

F. L.

C

Commissioner of
January 10, WOO.

to the

the

Gene nil Land
(

J. L.

Office,

McC.

Your office, on December 22, 1904, dismissed the protest of Susan
Todd against the allowance of the application of Charles E. Hays
to make timber-land entry for the E. J of the SW. ]. and lots 3 and
O.

of Sec. 18, T. 2 N., R. 6 W., Oregon City land district, Oregon.
Hayes claimed the right to make said entry on the ground that he
had instituted contest against the application of one Eureka II. Quick
to make entry of said land, which application Quick had withdrawn,
executing a relinquishment of all right, title and interest in and to
the same, while his contest was pending.
4,

From

the action of your office in dismissing Todd's protest she

The Department, on June

appealed.

26, 1905, reversed said action of

"which has not
ripened into an entry does not segregate the land " that " a contest
against such an application, although conducted to a successful termiyour

office;

held that a timber-land application
;

nation, does not carry with

preference right

a

it

directed the cancellation of Hays's entry.

Hays

filed a

;

"

and therefore

(See 33 L. D., 655.)

motion for review of said decision, the

first assign-

ment of error being
That Todd's appeal from the Honorable Commissioner's decision of December
was never served on appellee, and that an examination of the record
will disclose tbe want of such service.
Under the Rules of Practice, an appeal
without service on appellee is a nullity. The Department never acquired jurisdiction of the case.
The case stands as if no appeal had been taken. The time
for filing an appeal has expired. The Honorable Commissioner's decision of
December 22, 1904, should be affirmed and the case closed.
22, 1904,

An examination of the record shows that there is no evidence that
Todd's appeal from your office decision was ever served upon the
opposite party. This omission was overlooked when the former
departmental decisions were made.
It does not follow, however, that the Department is without jurisdiction in the matter.
As was said in the case of the Pueblo of San
Francisco (5 L. D., 483, 494)
:

placing the whole business of the Department under the
supervision of the Secretary, invest him with authority to review, reverse,
amend, annul, or affirm all proceedings in the Department having for their
ultimate object to secure the alienation of any portion of the public lands, or

The

statutes,

in

tbe adjustment of private claims.

.

.

.

When

proceedings affecting

titles

Department, the power of supervision may be
cised by the Secretary whether or not those proceedings are called to his
tion by formal notice or by appeal. It is sufficient that they are brought

lands

notice.

are

before the

The

rules prescribed are designed to facilitate the

Department

to

exerattento

Iris

in the

dispatch of business, not to defeat the supervision of the Secretary.

it

Referring more particularly to the case here under consideration.
would be absurd indeed to hold that the for o-et fulness of an attor-
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ney to serve an appeal could place the Department in a position where
would be compelled to allow a palpable injustice or a manifest
it
error

law

in

remain uncorrected.

to

Rule 115 of Practice distinctly

provides:
rules shall ho construed to deprive the Secretary of the Interior

None of these

of either the directory or supervisory

power conferred upon him by law.

motion to reopen
first specification of error is intended as
and dismiss the appeal because it was not served, the Department could with propriety refuse to consider the motion, because that
was not served on the opposite party. It will not be thus considered,
If the

:l

the ease

however, hut will he treated as

a

specification of error.

Thus

treated,

though the rendering of the departmental decision in the absence of
proof of service of the appeal was a manifest inadvertence, it will

under the well settled rulings as

not.

cited, unless reversible error is

otherwise shown, he disturbed solely because of want of proper service
of the appeal.

Under the circumstances, therefore, the Department will re-examine
and consider the case on its merits, and on the specifications of error
filed by Hays, as if in answer to the appeal of Todd, tints giving him
his

day

in court,

The argument

which he ought

to

have had on appeal.

support of the motion for review, referring to
the departmental decision of June 26, 1905, concedes that, " under
in

the facts heretofore presented, the Honorable Secretary correctly
expounded the law;" but it contends that the facts set forth in certain documents accompanying the motion essentially change the condition of affairs.
Said documents consist of the application of said
Eureka II. Quick to make entry of the land in controversy, under
the timber-land law; the several affidavits and other papers usually
and properly accompanying such application; the testimony of two
witnesses as to the character of the land and the qualifications of

the applicant

:

the receiver's receipt for the fee ($*2.00) paid

him

for

taking the above-mentioned testimony; also a copy of the receiver's

endorsement upon the testimony:
Purchase price and tecs tendered this date. 23d Dec, 1890, upon the within
;ui(i the same refused by authority <>f Hon. Commissioner's telegram of
December 12, 1899.

proof,

Counsel for the movant contend-:
It

of

is

June

not

the holding of the decision
against a mere application to purchase hinds
(20 Stat., 89
though such contest he conducted

the purpose of this paper to controvert
that

a

under the act of June

3,

20,

1905,

contest

IMS

|

.

successful termination, does not carry with

it
a preference righl t<> entry
under the provisions of the act of May 14, 1880.
Our contention is that at the time of the initiation of the contest of Hays
againsl Eureka II. Quick
Quick had done .-ill that the law and the
regulations pursuant to it demanded, and had tiled all the proofs accessary to

to n
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make entry and

had paid the tees to the register
receive patent for the land
and receiver for the testimony submitted in support of her right, and had tendered the money in payment for the land: and hence that she, then and there,
possessed the legal equivalent of an entry, which to all intents and purposes
amounted to an entry within the meaning of the act of May 14, 1880, respectUnder the law and under the reguing contests and preference rights ....
lations, said Quick, having done everything required and demanded to he
done in the premises, became thereupon instantly entitled, under the law, to
make entry. Her right to the land then vested prima facie, at least ....
Quick had on the face of the record the legal equivalent of an entry. It was
that legal equivalent which Hays contested; and having done so, and succeeded
;

his contest, he was clearly entitled to the preference right of an entry
awarded by the act of May 14, 1880, not as contesting a mere application to
purchase, hut as contesting an entry dc jure, if not one de facto.

in

has always been understood by the Department that
on the one hand and of the local officers on the other, was requisite in order to make an entry of a tract
of land; but if this contention of counsel be correct, any person wishing to make entry of a given tract can do so unassisted in the face

Heretofore

it

joint action of the applicant

—

of the rightful refusal of the local

of your

office to

The contention

the contrary.

and in defiance of orders
most certainly not the case.

officers,

But such

is

of counsel regarding Quick's acts

taken by her segregated the land;

—

—that

" these steps

was equivalent

this segregation

an entry " is not well founded the money tendered must havl
been received, and receipt issued therefor, in order to render such
action " equivalent to an entry." As was said by the Department in
the case of Thomas y. St. Joseph and Denver City Railroad (3 C. L.
O., 197), quoted with approval in Gilbert v. Spearing (4 L. D., 463),
and again in Iddings v. Burns (8 L. D., 224)
to

;

:

Each of the three elements of which this transaction is composed forms
an essential part thereof the application, the affidavit, and the payment of
money
and when the application is presented, the affidavit made, and the
money paid, an entry is made, a right is vested.

—

;

Even more strongly against

the contention of the

movant

is

the

language of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Wither" When the entry is made, ami
spoon v. Duncan (4 Wall., 210, 219)
certificate give a, the particular land is segregated from the mass of
public lands, and becomes private property." Again (Hastings etc.
Railroad v. Whitney, 132 U. S., 357, 303)
:

:

Under the homestead law three things are needed
davit setting forth the facts which entitle him to
make formal application
and, third, he must
;

done in order to
must make an affi-

to be

constitute an entry on public lands: First, the applicant

make entry second, he must
make payment of the money
;

When these three requisites are complied with, and the certificate of
executed and delivered to him the entry is made the land is entered.

required.

entry

is

The rule thus established
timber and stone act.

—

is

equally applicable to entries under the
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As recently

August

as

30, L905, the

Department rendered

375
a

decision

the ease of Jones v. Northern Pacific Railway Company (34 L. D.,
L05), in which " Jones applied to purchase the tract under the timber-

in

and-stone act, supra, and after due publication and proof, made entry
At the date of the purchase, but not at
thereof, December 10, 1898.

was
virtue
departmental
order
of
entry
February
from
of
withdrawn
by
The Department held (page 111):
B8, L898."
the date of the application, the tract in controversy, with other-,

There wns no purchase until the money was paid .... lint it is conWhile
tended that the application of Jones was the equivalent of an entry.
such an application, if presented in accordance with law and for land subject
thereto, reserves the land from other disposition by the land department, no

and prior to the submission and
and the payment of the purchase price, the Secretary
of the Interior may suspend the same from disposition and sale under the public
State of Colorado v. Torrence, 32
(Board of Control, ("anal No.
land laws.
I7i\
This is precisely what was done in this case. The trad was
L. D..
withdrawn from entry by the order of February 28, L898; and the purchase of
Jones, allowed in violation of that order, initiated no right falling within the
pighl

is

initiated

acceptance of

;is

final

against the government;

proof,

.*'>.

)

remedial provisions of the act of July

1,

1898.

had the tender of the purchase money been a
wrongfully refused by the register and receiver, the rights of Quick would have been as fully protected, under
the decisions of the courts and of the Department, as though the
money had been accepted and receipted for. But Quick is not here
If she had rights in the
claiming that any wrong has been done her.
premises, it is more than questionable whether a mere contestant, by
virtue of his contest, i> subrogated to the equities of the contestee,
and can claim the benefit of them.
However, in this case the contestee, Quick, acquired no such rights or equities; for the tender was
not a proper one. because made in the face of the lawful and prohibitory order of your office- -made at a time when the register and
receiver could not accept the same: therefore it was properly rejected by them.
Consequently there was no legal tender: and the
case stands, in contemplation of law. as though no tender had been
made. The facts do not bring this case within the ruling of any of
the cases cited by counsel for the movant.
It
intended herein to decide that, tinder proper circumis not
stances, a timber-land application is not contestable under Rule No.
of the Rules of Practice, as stated on page 42 of the General Circular.
This may well he authorized to-be done by the Department.
But by Mich contest no preference right i> to be acquired, inasmuch
as Congress has thought proper to legislate on that subject, granting
a preference right as a reward, and giving it only where a party has
contested and procured the 'cancellation of an "entry," of the
classes named m the act of May II. 1880 (21 Stat.. U0).
There
having been no entry by Quick, there could be no cancellation of one.
It

i>

not denied that,

proper one. and been

1

1
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The

error thus exposed in the movant's contention invalidates his

entire argument, carefully built thereon

—which

therefore need not

be further discussed.

Inasmuch as the motion fails to show that the movant has been
any manner prejudiced by the appellant's failure to serve his
appeal from your office decision (of December 22, 1904), or that the
departmental decision (of June 2G, 1005, supra), contained any
in

why

reversible error, no reason appears

should be disturbed.
The motion for review
the

files

of your

is

said departmental decision

overruled, and herewith transmitted for

office.

In this connection the attention of your

office is

called to

Rule 82

of Practice, which directs

When the Commissioner considers an appeal defective, he will notify the
party of the defect and if not amended within fifteen days from the date of
the service of such notice, the appeal may be dismissed by the Secretary of the
;

Interior,

and the case

closed.

It is obviously implied

sented to your

office

by

this rule that

when appeals

they should be carefully examined, and

to be defective, that action should be taken as directed.

are preif

found

If an exami-

nation of the appeal in this case had been made,

it would have diswas no evidence of service thereof in the
record, and said appeal should have been returned for evidence of
service.
Such action would have p re vented the complications that
have subsequently arisen. You will direct that hereafter the
requirements of this rule be observed in each case, and that none be
forwarded to the Department until the rule has been complied with
by your office.

closed the fact that there

FOREST RESERVE LIEU SELECTION— CONTESTANT—PREFERENCE
RIGHT— ACT OF JUNE 4, 1897.

Bowlby
The

fact that a successful contestant

v.

who

Hays.
in the exercise of his preference right

applies to select the land under the act of

June

4,

1897, did not

have

title to

the land assigned as base for the selection at the date of the initiation of
the contest, furnishes no ground for rejection of the application, it being
only necessary that the selector have title to the base land at the time he
initiates the proceeding for

to the

an exchange under the act by relinquishing

it

United States.

General allegations

in a protest filed

with a view

testant's preference right, tending to

practice in other contests instituted

to defeating a successful con-

show a speculative intent and immonl
by the same contestant, are not suffi-

cient to bring into question his preference right in a case wherein his

conduct

is

unimpeached.
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The preference

May

11.

of entry accorded a

right

successful contestanl

by the act of

one who contests and procures the rejection
purchase under the act of June 3, 1878.

1880, does not accrue to

of an application to

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
January 10, 190G.
F. L. ( \
(

377

Land

Office,

(J. R.

)

W.)

Bowlby appealed from your decision of April 8, L905,
June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89),
to purchase the S. \ NE. J and lots 1 and 2, Sec. 3, T. 2 X.. R. 7 W.,
W. M-, Oregon City, Oregon.
Theodore

P.

rejecting his application tinder the act of

September

Edith Tuttle

1899,

20,

against which. July

ruary 20, 1904, Bowlby

pended
August

in

filed

I

a

similar

Febwhich was held susaction on Hays's contest.

final

Hays, by G. B. McLeod, attorney in

June

application,

lavs filed a contest.

his application,

the local office to await

15, 1904.

fact, filed appli-

1897 (30 Stat.. 36), to -elect the land
lieu of land relinquished to the United States in a forest reserve.

cation tinder the act of
in

filed

1901, Charles E.

8,

4.

August 29, 190!. your office canceled Turtle's application and awarded
Hays, as successful contestant, a preference right of entry. The local
office minuted Hays's application and September 19, 1904, recommended its approval. October 3, 1904, Bowlby filed a protest against
approval of Hays's selection and claimed prior right in himself as
second applicant to purchase.
Hays's selection of the land tinder his
preference right i> attacked on three grounds: (1) That the base
assigned for the selection was acquired after the initiation of contest;

('2)

that the contest

was speculative;

(3) that contest will not

against a mere application to enter and that no preference right

lie

from such proceedings.
Your decision held that it is

fcrises

sufficient if a selector

has

base land at the time he initiates the proceeding for an

relinquishing
ing.

it

United States.

to the

The ownership of the base

is

public lands by this form of entry.

man must
28 L.

I)..

testant
/•.

exist

at

198), and

exists at the time

Ludlow. 22 L.

I)..

There was no error

The

in so

hold-

qualification of an entry-

sufficient if qualification

is

the

the qualification to appropriate

the date of the entry (Gourley
it

title to

exchange by

''.

Countryman.

of a successful con-

he exercises the preference right.

(Reas

205.)

The allegations of the
proceeding are that

at

protest as to the speculative character of the
about the same lime that Hays initiated his

proceeding against Tuttle's application he took similar proceedings
of which resulted
were dismissals of the contests
accompanied by relinquishments of the original applications and of
tin preference and the lands in six of them were taken under state
school land indemnity lists, one by a Northern Pacific Railway Comagainst

thirty-five similar applications, eighteen

successfully,

1

and

in

ten others there

378
pany
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by

forest lieu selections,

selection

not named;

and

in three cases

by persons

that in the remaining seven cases the original applica-

and Hays took the lands, one by
timber and stone purchase and the other six by forest lieu selections.
The charge of speculative character of the contest in the present
instance is conclusively negatived by the record itself. Hays seeks
to exercise the preference right himself and it is not alleged that he
tions were canceled or relinquished

ever offered or negotiated to waive

it.

The

act of

May

14,

1880 (21

reward to the informer who discloses to the government facts that show an entry of
public lands to be in violation of law. Eight to the reward accrues
upon the successful result of a contest, The law does not require that
the contestant shall have a certain qualification, as, for instance, that
he was never guilty of violation of the land laws, or of the immoral
practice of bringing a contest with view to selling a waiver of his
preference right which is not assignable. It would tend directly to
defeat the object of the act to hold that misconduct or immoral practice of an informer in other cases affected the rights accruing to him
in a case wherein his conduct is unimpeached. It follows that such
a charge with view to defeating a successful contestant's preference
right must state facts tending to show a speculative purpose in the
particular instance and that general allegations tending to show
speculative intent and immoral practice in other contests instituted
by the same contestant do not alone bring in question his preference
right in a case where no special allegation of fact is made tending to
show that that particular contest was instituted with speculative intent.
No such fact is alleged and it follows that no charge of speculative intent justifying a denial of the preference right was made.
The third contention is that no preference right accrues by proceedings against a mere application when no entry has in fact been
made. Holding the contrary, your office cited and relied upon the
authority of Olmstead v. Johnston (17 L. D., 151). That decision is
not authority therefor. In that case Alice M. Milligan had made an
entry which Olmstead contested, and April 25, 1891, it was canceled
as the result of such contest.
May 4, 1891, Catherine Johnston Avas
permitted to file her timber land statement, and May 16, 1891, Olmstead, claiming a preference right by reason of his successful contest
of Milligaivs entry, presented his timber land statement for the same
Your office, April 23, 1892, held that Olmstead, by contest of
laud.
Milligaivs entry, acquired a preference right, and this was affirmed
by the Department by analogy to~the decision in Fraser v. Ringgold
(3 L. D., 69), which was a contest against a desert land entry.
Neither of these decisions recognized or was predicated upon a contest
against an application to enter.
Stat., 140), offers a preference right of entry as a
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By

ad

the

of

May

14.

granted to an informer

379

L880, supra, the preference right of entry

who pays

is

the land office fees, successfully con-

and procures cancellation of "any preemption, homestead or
By construction the word " preemption" was
held in Fraser v. Ringgold to include "desert land entry," and 1>\
parity of reasoning in ( )lmstead v. John-ton was held to include timber
Bui the Department has not held in any case cited
and -tone entries.
or that search by the Department has disclosed, that an application
to enter is within the statute offering a reward for proceedings
The contrary was held in Jacoby v. Kuhal (29
against an entry.
L. 1).. L68), a homestead application, and in Field v. Black (2 L. D.,
581 ). in an attempted contest against a pre-emption declaratory statement.
The preliminary application, or statement of intent. i>. under
the net of June 3, L878 (20 Stat.. 89), the analogue of and answers to
the declaratory statement under the pre-emption law. and i^ what
classifies a proceeding under that act as generically a pre-emption
tests

timber culture entry."

entry.
It

I

Hughes

v.

Tipton.

-2

L.

I)..

334.)

necessarily follow- that under the act of

erence right

obtained by such

is

a

May

A

proceeding.

11.

timber and stone

application doe- not segregate the land (California
391, 392), hut other applications

made

L.

1)..

})\

the local office must await action thereon.

1880, no pref-

v.

Nickerson, 20

thereafter and received
If one desire to acquire

make applicaconnection therewith, for protection of his own
He
protest against allowance of the application pending.

lands subject to Mich an application pending, he must
tion therefor,

right,

can

may

and

in

manner raise any question going to the right of the prior
make entry.
present case Hays made no application for the Land prior
(Todd
Bowlby. He got nothing by his attempted contest.

in that

applicant to
In the
to that
v.

of

Hays, 33 L.
It

I)..

655.)

has not been overlooked that paragraph

16,

page

L2,

General Cir-

January 25, L904, states that: "Contests may hi brought
against timber and stone land applications or entries in accordance
with rule
of Rules of Practice: " and that rule
of practice is that

cular of

1

1

1

may

"Contests

he

:

by an adverse party or other person
against a party to an entry, filing, of other claim under laws of Con
Egress relating to the public land-."
The land department entertains
such proceeding for its information and with view to prevent unlaw
lnl appropriation of public land-.
Congress ha-, however, granted a
initiated

preference right only to those

An entry
it-

i<

that

who

contest an entry.

action of record whereby the United States by

proper

a tract

officer recognizes that an individual right has attached to
of public land, and thai the United State- i- obligated to con

vey to

him the

T. S..

:j;,t,

legal title.

363-4.)

I

Hastings,

etc..

R. R. Co.

v.

Whitney, L32
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Courts of equity regard " an entry as the commencement of title."
(Hoofnagle v. Anderson, 7 Wheat., 212, 214; Brush v. Ware, 15 Pet.,
Upon an entry a contract arises for conveyance of the legal
93, 110.)
In Parsons v. Venzke (164 TJ. S., 89, 92), the court held that:
title.
An entry is a contract. AVhenever tbe local land officers approve the evidences
of settlement and improvement and receive the cash price, they issue a

re-

Thereby a contract is entered into between the United States
and the pre-emptor. and that contract is known as an entry.
The effect of
the entry is to segregate the land entered from the public domain, and while
subject to such entry it can not be appropriated to any other person or to any
ceiver's receipt.

.

.

.

other purposes.

All unreserved and unappropriated public land is subject to disposal
under the acts of Congress and in the modes thereby defined. Until
such land is entered it is subject to appropriation by the first legal
applicant, and the land department is not authorized to exclude
public land from appropriation of a legally qualified applicant by
awarding a preference right which Congress has not authorized it to
grant.

BoAvlby has therefore the clear prior right to consummate his
application by complying with the terms of the act of June 3, 1878,
supra.
In case he does so, Hays's selection, which is subject to

Bowlby's right, will be rejected.

If

Bowlby

fail

to

application, Hays's selection will be permitted to stand.

perfect

his

The papers

are herewith returned for further proceedings conformable hereto.

APPLICATION TO PURCHASE— TIMBER AND STONE ACT.

Santa Fe Pacific R. R. Co. et al

v,

Ranklev.

Applicants for public lands lose no rights by mistakes and laches of officers of
the land department but persons claiming the benefit of this rule must show
that they have an inchoate right and that they have not been so dilatory
in assertion of it as to give rival bona fide applicants a superior right.
No rights are acquired by an application to purchase under the timber and
stone act presented at a time when the land was not subject to such
;

appropriation.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(

F. L. C.

January

11, 1906.

David X. Winton, transferee of the Santa Fe

Company through mesne

Land
(J.

Office,

R. W.)

Pacific Railroad

appealed from
your decisions of June 15, 1905, and December 23, 1904, rejecting the
selection of the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company, number 6448,
your office series, under the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36), for the
SW. J, Sec. 19, T. 156 X., R. l>7 W., 5th P. M., Cass Lake, Minnesota,
in lieu of land relinquished to the United States in a forest reserve,
conveyances,

intervener,
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and awarding to Martin E. Ranklev the right to purchase the tract
under the acts of Juno 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89), and August 4, 1892
(27 Stat., 348).

December

22,

181)4,

the land, then unsurveyed,

was included

in

applications of E. J. Turney, under section 4 of the act of February
The appli8, L887 (24 Stat., 388). for allotments to Indian minors.
cations were noted on the local office trad books.

June

15. 1899,

they

were rejected.

July

L895, while such allotment applications were pending, the

15.

survey was filed in the local office. The next day
township
with the legal fees, his declaratory statement
tendered,
Ranklev
under the act of 1878, supra, which was also noted on the local office
Edwin T. Bigelow. also tendered his homestead application,
record.
plat of

alleging settlement,

which the

local office rejected

for conflict

with

Turney's allotment applications, and Bigelow appealed to your office.
Soon after, the date of filing not appearing, Ranklev filed in the local
office his protest, sworn to before a notary public July IT. 1805, corroborated by two witnesses, against the Indian allotment applica-

The Ranklev application and

protest were mislaid in the
and were not reported or transmitted to your office, as
should have been done. l>i<>-elow*s appeal was transmitted December
tions.

local

«.

office

1895.

1899, when Turney 's Indian allotment applications were
your office, not having Ranklev's application and protest
before it. or any report of their existence, directed the local office to
allow Bigelow 's entry, and he made entry July 5. 1899, which he
.)()().
relinquished January 6,
and applied to enter the land, as
assignee of soldiers' additional homestead rights, under section 2306
of the Revised Statutes of the United State-.
January 20, L900, in transmitting Bigelow's latter applications,
the local office transmitted Ranklev's declaratory statement and protest of July 16, and 17. 181)5. reporting that without action thereon
they were mislaid, and were finally found among the old files of the
office.
August 1. L902, your office held that, as Bigelow's additional
homestead applications were clearly fraudulent, it was unnecessary
to take any action upon Ranklev's timber and stone application, and
held it suspended pending final action upon Bigelow's applications.
October -J. 1902, the local office received the application of the Santa
Fe Pacific Railroad Company under the act of June 4. 18 .>7. supra,
;ind transmitted it. December L6, l'.Mlij. to your office, which appeal- i<.
have received and held it without action thereon, or objection thereto,
until June 15. 1905.

June

15,

rejected,

r

(

1

(

December 10. L902, Bigelow's additional
were rejected and the case was closed.

homestead applications
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September 29, 1904, your office took up Ranklev's application for
action and held that, as four years had passed since rejection of the
Indian allotment without Ranklev's publication of notice or any indication of his intent to pursue his application, he
it

was

had abandoned

it,

October 8, 1904, Ranklev was served with notice
of such order, and October 22, 1904. filed affidavit that when he filed
his application he was informed that the land was covered by the
Indian allotment application, and that if that were rejected he would
be notified and be allowed to complete his application to purchase;
that he then employed an attorney, and repeatedly made inquiries of
him and was informed that the matter was yet pending without action
by your office that he never received notice from his attorney or the
local office, and that he made the application in good faith, and has
always been ready to take out notice, to comply with the law. and to
complete his purchase, and asked leave to do so. December 23, 1904,
your office held the affidavit sufficient, and allowed him sixty days
Notice issued February 21, 1905, was duly posted and
therefor.
published, and May 18, 1905, on the day appointed, he made proof.
May 5, 1905, David N. Winton, remote transferee of the selector,
by deed of conveyance of January 31, 1903, intervened, and filed in
your office his objections to approval of Ranklev's purchase, and
prayed approval of the forest lieu selection, and June 6, 1905. he filed
a motion for reconsideration of your decision of December 23, 1904,

and

rejected.

;

allowing Ranklev to purchase.

June 15, 1905, your office denied the motion and held that the
allowance of Bigelow's homestead entry and his location of soldiers'
additional rights, and the action of your

were

in rejecting Ranklev's application,

office

all

September

29, 1904,

erroneous and in viola-

tion of Ranklev's right.

Error of the

local office in not

forwarding Ranklev's timber and

stone application can not be allowed to hold the land indefinitely

against appropriation by another proceeding in good faith under the
law to acquire it. Ranklev made his application at a time when the
land was not subject to such appropriation, being sub judice under

the allotment applications.

and declared policy of Congress to permit
from other appropriation by applications for purchase under the timber and stone act that are not diligently prosecuted. If he advertise, but for any reason, though not
due to his own fault, fails to consumate his purchase, he can not keep
his claim alive to the prejudice of an intervening adverse applicant.
James N. True (26 L. D., 529) Caleb J. Shearer (21 L. I)., 492)
It is against the intent

indefinite segregation of land

;

John M. McDonald (20 L.

;

D.. 559).

If Ranklev's application be regarded as made at the time the
allotment applications were rejected, June 15, 1899, he was bound to
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it
with reasonable diligence. lie conld not await indefithe land from other appropriation while others withholding
nitely
claim were proceeding to acquire a right to it. It
notice
his
of
out

prosecute

was held

in

Moran

Horsky

v.

One who. having an inchoate

(

17s U. S.. 205, 208) that:

righl to property,

abandons

many

to the
if

c.-ises

decided

in

neglected too long, must

enforce

will

.

.

.

this court

and elsewhere

for fourteen years,

it

permits others to acquire apparent title and deal with it
appeal to the favorable consideration of m court of equity.

;is

We

that

a

theirs,

does not

need only refer
neglected right,

ho treated as an abandoned right winch no court

There always comes

a

time when the host of rights will,

by reason of neglect, pass beyond the protecting reach of the hands of equity.
i>

It

genera] principle that applicants for public lands lose no

a

rights by mistakes

and laches of

officers of the

land department, but

persons claiming benefit of this rule must show that

they have an

inchoate right, and that they have not been so dilatory in assertion

Ranklev
October '1'2. 1904, he made
no assertion of right or sought information from the land department or action of any kind upon his lost and delayed application,
lie contented himself with inquiries of his attorney, and the attorney
took no action to bring his claim to the attention of the land office.
In the meantime others were expending efforts to acquire tin land.
Bigelow was allowed a homestead entry June 15, 1899, and relinof

it

bona

as to give rival

fide applicants a superior one.

From June

can do neither.

15, 1899, to

1

quishing that January
additional

rights,

made

6,

and.

1900,

made

the location of the soldiers'

they being rejected, October

'2.

1902,

the

conveyed whatever equity it had to Coffin,
who conveyed to Bigelow, who conveyed to Winton, the intervener.
In view of the Department, Ranklev acquired no right by his appli-

selector

its

selection,

made at a time when the land was not subject to his purchase,
and had he acquired an inchoate right, he is by reason of his laches
in no position to assert it against a later applicant who has filed and
prosecuted with diligence his application for the land.
cation

Your

office

decision

is

reversed

and Ranklev's application

is

rejected.

DESERT LAND ENTRY— CONTRACT TO CONVEY AFTER PATENT.

Herbert
Recognition

in

the act of

March

::.

C.

Oakley.

1891, of the right

of assignmenl of desert-

land entries furnishes no authority for recognizing a righl on the part of

desert-land entryman to outer into an executory contrad to convey the
land after the issuance of patent and to thereafter proceed with the submission of final proof in furtherance of such contract.

a

Departmental
modified.

decision

in

the

case

of

Wheaton

v.

Wallace,

ill

L.

l>..

loo.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

January

(F. L. C.)

Land
(E.

15, 1906.

Office,
().

P.)

Herbert C. Oakley has appealed to the Department from your
decision of February 25, 1905, approving the recommendation
of the local officers and rejecting final proof offered by him in support of his desert land entry for the E. £, Sec. 13, T. 15 S., Pv. 13 E.,
S. B. M., Los Angeles land district, California, and holding said
office

entry for cancellation.
The entry in question was

made September

thereon was submitted November

4,

and final proof
Original and supple-

12, 1900,

1903.

mental briefs have been filed by counsel and the questions presented
by the appeal have been orally argued before the Department. In
addition, supplemental showing in the form of various affidavits,
has been made and the record before your office for consideration and
upon which your decision is based, has been amplified and many of
the material facts, as originally presented, have been more fully set
out and explained. In the decision appealed from the facts disclosed by the original record are fully and correctly stated, but in
view of the supplemental showing since made, a re-statement thereof
is necessary to an orderly review thereof and a clear understanding
of the questions

now

presented for final determination.

was made the claimant, Herbert
member
of
partnership,
the additional members
was
a
a
C. Oakley,
Paulin.
Oakley
and
F.
The object of this
were
of which
J. W.
C.
estate
business,
general
real
with
its main offices
firm was to conduct a
December
California.
in Los Angeles,
On
4, 1901, J. W. Oakley
behalf
certain
agreement,
on
of the Oakley-Paulm
entered into a
Imperial
Land
transfer
to
the
Company,
a corporation,
Company to
" as soon as
entry
of
Herbert
by
the
Oakley,
all the land covered
C.

At

the time the entry in question

1

has been perfected,' together with certain
shares of stock in the Imperial Water Co. No. 1. The clear intent of
said contract was that it should be executory only and not operate
practicable after

title

any present interest in the entry, as in the case of an assignand the passing of the title was to depend upon the
condition precedent that Oakley submit final proof and receive
patent to the land in his own name. Your office found that the
claimant was a member of the said corporation and perhaps naturally inferred from the record then before you that he was a member
thereof at the time lie made the entry in question and at the time
said contract Avas entered into by the firm of which he was also a
member. From the supplemental proof since submitted, it appears

to pass

ment

thereof,

that while claimant

become such

until

is

now

a

February

ing the contract in question.

member

of said corporation, he did not
subsequent
to the time of mak13, 1902,
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There has also been filed with the Department a duly executed
annulment of said contract, dated March 18, 1905. Your office
found that the entry in question was fraudulent in its inception and
that the original contract to convey the land was a valid one and
The many suspicious circumstances surroundenforceable at law.
ing the transaction, as disclosed by the original record, arising out
of the apparent close relations existing between the entryman, the
partnership and the corporation, at the time the entry was made, and
the finding that the subsequent contract was a valid one, formed
the basis for the strong- presumption of fraud in the inception of the
The supplemental shoAving made on behalf of the entryman.
entry.
disclosing the real facts and explaining hi- various relations with his
co-partner- and with the corporation, tends strongly to overcome the
presumption, and in view of the facts presented by the complete
record now before it, the Department i> of opinion that no fraud
A
can be imputed to the claimant at the time he made the entry.
finding of fraud is only warranted by clear and convincing proof,
and upon less the Department is unwilling to question the bona fides
of the entryman.
Oakley, in an affidavit executed August 1. 1904, clearly and frankly
states his intention at and subsequent to the time of the execution of
the contract with the Imperial Land Company, on December 4, 1901,
by J. W. Oakley, on behalf of the firm of Oakley-Paulin Company.

He

states:

was not the intention at the time of the execution of the contract of Decem1901, that the same should <>i><r<itc as im assignment, hut that it was
for the purpose of guaranteeing to the Imperial Land Company that it would
be safe in subdividing, platting and contracting to sell lots of this subdivision
acting as the agents and for the benefit of Herbert C. Oakley and Frederick C.
Paulin, mid in the belief thai ho had a perfect right so to contract, and in
order to meet the pressing demand for more ground for townsite purposes, and
tor guaranteeing to the prospective purchaser that he would be safe in contracting t'<»r portions of the land and contributing by his efforts and improvements to the building np of said town of Imperial.
it

ber

I.

stoutly contended

that if the good
made, be established, then the
right of claimant to enter into an executory contract to convey the
land entered, after issuance of patent to him. must, under the departmental decision in the case of Wheaton v. Wallace (24 L. I).. 1<><>).
In

the brief of counsel

faith of

be

claimant

recognized.

(brief p. 28)
Bui

if

at

it

i-

the time of entry

Claimant's

contention

i>

thus

stated

by

counsel

:

in good faith, and for his own exclusive
two years after, having complied with all the
law. changes his mind and contracts to assign the entry at

an entryman makes entry

use and benefit, and then one or

requirements of

thai time to another, or to convey title after securing patent, he then baving
complied with the requirements of the law ami being entitled to make final

5194

Vol.

::t— o.l m

25
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proof and receive patent, there can be no objection to this sort of an arrangement under the statute as it now reads, and under the decisions of this Depart-

ment construing that

I

statute.

In the departmental decision relied on in support of this contention
v. Wallace, supra), and referring to an alleged executory
contract entered into by the entryman, the following statement
appears

(Wheaton

construed it, but it is harmless, since, if it were to be considered
terms show that it has reference to a transfer to he made after
final proof, and was entered into at a time when it would not have been unlawful to make an assignment of the entry under section seven of the desert land'
act, as amended by the act of March 8, 1891 (20 Stat, 1095).

Your

office

as evidence,

An

its

examination of the facts upon which the decision referred

was based

sIioavs

to

that a construction of the contract referred to therein!

or a consideration of its eifect

upon the entry

in question

was

unnec-!

essary to a complete determination of the issue involved, inasmuch
as

it

tract

was held that there was no proof of the existence of such conand the instrument purporting to be a certified copy thereof was

•

The language used is therefore
not properly a part of the record.
purely obiter. The effect of the rule as announced was probably not
fully considered and no more was intended than that such contract
might be upheld if limited in all respects the same as an absolute
assignment of a present interest. In any event the Department, in
upon the facts now:
by the narrow construction
urged by counsel upon the authority cited. While absolute assign-^

the consideration of the contention of claimant,

properly before

it,

will not be restricted

lnents of desert land entries are recognized as valid,

that the language of the act of

March

it

does not follow

1891 (26 Stat., 1095), allowing such assignments, recognizes the right of the claimant to execute!
3,

an executory contract to convey the land after the issuance of patent,
and thereafter proceed with the submission of final proof in furtherance of his contract. The result of the recognition of such a right
in the claimant is clearly manifest and the eifect thereof might easily
operate to nullify that provision of the act which declares that "no
person or association of persons shall hold, by assignment or otherwise, prior to the issuance of patent, more than three hundred andj
twenty acres of such arid or desert lands.''
In the case of absolute assignments of such entries, the assignee
assumes the position of an original entryman, so far as his qualification to take is concerned, and he being the person then charged with
the submission of satisfactory proof of compliance with the law, is
before the land department in his own right and all future trasactions
respecting the entry are conducted directly with him. The land department in such case has before it the real party in interest and can
deal with him personally. By the recognition of an executory con\
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•

convey after patent, leaving only a nominal party in interest
who would be permitted to submit proof of
and
compliance with the law, with no requirequalifications
own
his
ment as to proof of the right of the real beneficiary to take the land,
a far different end may be accomplished, directly contrary to the
By proceeding under such
spirit and intent of the desert land law.
contracts, any person or corporation might easily acquire a quantity
The Deparl
of land greatly in excess of that allowed under the act.
nient. while recognizing the validity of absolute assignments of
desert land entries, is clearly of opinion that any extension of the
privilege accorded by the plain terms of the act. especially in the
manner contended for by claimant, is entirely unwarranted, ami
proof of the existence of such contracts should prevent the acceptance
Otherwise the practical effect of an assignment is
of the final proof.
realized through the medium of such contracts, without any of the
incidents thereof attaching, and an easy method of evading that portion of the act which prevents a single individual, association or corporation from holding by "assignment or otherwise." under the
desert land law. more than three hundred and twenty acres, is opened
tract to

before the Department,

and this positive limitation effectively nullified. The clear
law forbids recognition of contracts to convey after patent, and this. too. irrespective of the time the contract
was made and regardless of whether or not the original entry was
made honestly and in good faith.
Your office, in passing upon the contract entered into by the Oakley-Paulin Company, signed by J. W. Oakley as a member of said
linn with the Imperial Land Company, to transfer the land entered
by Herbert C. Oakley, found that said contract was enforceable at
law. The general rule in cases of partnership is that one partner, by
virtue of his relation only, has no implied authority to transfer real
estate belonging to the firm* and the Department is of opinion that
one co-partner i> wholly without authority to convey realty owned by
another partner individually.
Realty, in order to become partnerhip property, "must have been bought with partnership funds, for
partnership purposes, though the deed may be made to the several
partners, to hold them and their heirs, and the same can only be
•onveyed by a det d xecutt d by those having the legal title."
Washburn on Real Property, Vol. 1. 668; Devlin on Deeds. Vol. 1, Sec.

to

all

intent of the desert land

<

If

110.)

it

(

be established that

within the rule announced,
I

a

contract be entered

it

into

real estate

>e

of the other

deemed

leld

to a

iibson

/•

a

partnership property.

modern

by one co-partner

to

doctrine, that

convey, without

with the knowledge and subsequent

spress authority therefor, but
issent

is

seems, tinder the

members of

the firm, such subsequent assent

performance thereof.
YV-.irrlnn
Id Wall

•>

">

1

1

may

and the member- of the firm
(Copp v. Longstreet, s Pac, 601;
Pn
Soanhraci
FTairnoc Huff

ratification of the contract

•

A'-

ii
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et

But in
1, Sec. 111.)
was thus departed from and the

13 la., 455; Devlin on Deeds, Vol.

'//..

instance where the English rule

each
doc-

trine of subsequent ratification recognized, the property sought to he

conveyed was partnership property, and the doctrine has no application to a conveyance by one co-partner of the individual property of
In the case at bar it is self-evident that all the land
his co-partner.
embraced in the contract was not and could not have been the property of the firm of Oakley-Paulin Company. There is no evidence of
any assignment by the entrvman to the firm and in his supplemental
affidavit accompanying the appeal he expressly denies the right of
the partnership to claim any interest in the land.
In view of the doubt cast upon the validity of the original contract and the further fact that there is now on tile with the Department an absolute revocation thereof, and the further finding of good
faith on the part of the entryman at the time he initiated his claim,
the Department is of opinion the proof offered, if in other respects
satisfactory, should be accepted.

Accompanying

the record on appeal

F. Kucera to contest the entry

i>

the application of Vaclav

In view of the action

question.

in

taken by your office, no consideration thereof was necessary and
the same is returned herewith for such disposition as your office

may deem

best, in

view of the present departmental decision upon

the other questions presented by the appeal.

The

decision of vour office

i>

modified accordingly.

settlers i'fox railkoad lands—act of april

Matthew
The

(

19, 1904.

)'Meara.

act of April 19, 1904, providing that settlers or entrymen upon lauds
within the indemnity limits of the grant in aid of the Chicago. St. Paul.
Minneapolis and Omaha railway, and also within the primary limits of
the grant in aid of the Wisconsin Central railroad, restored to the public
domain November 2, 1891, by order of the land department, who were prevented from obtaining title under the public land laws because under the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin Central Railroad
Company v. Forsythe the lands were held not to be excepted from the
granl to the Wisconsin Central company, has no application to lands
opposite the unconstrueted portion of the Wisconsin Central road, which
fall

within the forfeiture provisions of the act of September

Secretary Hitchcock
(F. L. C.)

Commissioner of
January IS, 1006.

to the

iM*.

1890.

the General Lain] Office,

(F.

W. C)

The Department has considered the appeal by Matthew (TMeara
from your office decision of September V.K 1905, rejecting the proof
offered in support of his homestead entry made October 22, 1903, for
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R.

16 E.,

of
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Sec. 8, T. 18

Washington, and
and receipt issued on

district,

holding for cancellation the final certificate
said

NW.

.

entry.

The proof submitted upon the entry in question did not show
settlement, residence and cultivation upon the land included in the
said entry, but claimed the benefit of a residence of five and a half
year-, and cultivation during that time, of the SE.
of Sec 29, T. -tl)
X.. R. 10 W., Ashland land district. Wisconsin, pursuant to the act of
Congress approved April 19, 190-1 33 Stat., 184). The act in ques|

(

tion provides

an order issued hy the Land Dehundred and ninetyone, mid taking effect November second eighteen hundred and ninety-one, made
settlement upon and improved any portion of an odd-numbered section within
That

all

qualified homesteaders who, under

partment, bearing date October twenty-second, eighteen

the

conflicting

limits

made

of the grants

aid of the construction of the

in

and Omaha Railway and the Wisconsin Central Railroad, and were thereafter prevented from completing title to the land
so settled upon and improved by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Wisconsin Central Company against Forsythe, One hundred and
and all qualified homesteaders who
fifth-ninth United States, page forty-six
made settlement upon and improved any portion of an odd-numbered section

Chicago, Saint Paul, Minneapolis

;

made in aid of the construction of
Northern Pacific Railroad and The Dalles military wagon road, under orders
issued by the Land Department treating such lands as forfeited railroad lands.
and were thereafter prevented from completing title to the land so settled
upon and improved by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Wilcox against Eastern Oregon Land Company, one hundred and
within the conflicting limits of the grants

the

United States, page fifty-one, shall, in making final proof upon
homestead entries made for other lands, be given credit for the period of their

seventy-sixth

bona fide residence upon and the
lands for

amount of

which they were unable

to

their

complete

improvements made on the
Provided, That no such

title:

who shall fail to make entry
And provided further. That
any person to make another home-

person shall be entitled to the benefits of this act

within two years after the passage of this act:
this net

shall not be considered

who

entitling

:is

have received the benefits of the homestead law since
being prevented, as aforesaid, from completing title to the lands as aforesaid
settled upon and improved by him.
stead entry

shall

The tract above described in the State of Wisconsin is within the
indemnity limits which were withdrawn on account of the grant
made by act of June
Stat.. 20), in aid of the construction
L856
:'>.

(

1

1

what was known as the Bayfield Branch of the Chicago, St. Paul.
Minneapolis and Omaha railway.
By the act of May 5, L864 (13
Stat.. 66), a grant was made to the State of Wisconsin in aid of the
lonstruction of what was known as the Wisconsin Central railroad.

of

within the primary limits of said grant as adjusted
At the time of the adjustment of
die Omaha grant in L891, lands within the indemnity limit- of the
Omaha grant and also within the primary limits of the Wisconsin
rod said tract fell

to

the line of definite location.

'
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Central grant were treated as excepted from the latter grant because
of the prior reservation on account of the

Omaha

grant, and

all

such lands, not needed for the adjustment of the Omaha grant,
were restored to the public domain, after due notice, on November
This tract was treated as a portion of the lands included
2, 1891.
in said restoration, and on the morning of November 2, 1891, one
John Hutchinson tendered a homestead application for said tract and,
there being no other application for the land, the same was accepted

and permitted to go of record.
month O'Meara tendered a homestead application for the same land and in support thereof alleged that he had
made settlement thereon between 7 and 8 o'clock on the morning of
November 2, 1891, and upon this allegation of settlement, which was
prior to the time of the opening of the local land office on that morning, hearing was duly ordered and held.
At the hearing Hutchinson introduced testimony showing that he
had made settlement upon the land on October 24, 1891, by clearing
off a piece of ground upon which he built a house and that he had
since maintained his claim thereto.
As to the settlement claim by
O'Meara, it was shown that on the morning of November 2, 1891, he
cut some brush and laid four poles in the form of a square, which he
stated was intended for the foundation of a house.
These poles were
in
diameter at the large ends and were not used for
onty four inches
the purpose named at the time he built his house, which was on the
25th of that month.
Regulations prescribed by the Department governing the restoration of the surplus Omaha lands refuse recognition of acts performed
prior to the day of opening, and for this reason the local officers, in
disposing of the case, held that Hutchinson acquired no right by
reason of the acts performed prior to November 2, 1891, but, upon the
record made, found in his favor because it was held that the acts performed by O'Meara did not constitute a valid settlement.
Your office decision affirmed that of the local officers upon the
ground that " the contestant's case is lacking in the necessary elements requisite to constitute his said settlement rights superior to
those of the defendant." The case was further prosecuted by appeal
to this Department, but in the meantime the Supreme Court had rendered decision in the case of Wisconsin Central Railway Co. v. Forsythe (159 U. S., 46), in which it was held that reservation for
indemnity purposes on account of the Omaha grant was not sufficient
to except the land so reserved from the operation of the Wisconsin
Central grant. This particular tract was opposite the unconstructed
portion of the Wisconsin Central grant, and therefore became subject
to disposition under the provisions of the general forfeiture act of
September 29, 1890 (2G Stat., 49G).
by the

On

local officers

the 25th of that
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the departmental decision

of April 28, 1896 (hot reported), thai "under the last-mentioned act
the acts performed by Hutchinson prior to November 2, 1891, must
be considered in the

made

am

I

disposition of this case, and

of opinion that he has clearly shown

the land even

upon the record
a

as

superior right to

though the claimed settlement by O'Meara were recog-

Your office decision was accordingly affirmed.
O'Meara now claims that hut for the intervening decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin Central Ry. Co. v. Forsythe,
nized."

supra, this land

Omaha

would have been treated as

when

lands and

part of the surplus

a

so treated that his claim

would have been

given precedence over that of Hutchinson, and that therefore he was
prevented from completing title to said land because of said decision, and. under the provisions of the act of April ID. 1904, supra.
ft'rfr residence upon
amount of his improvements made upon said land in making
proof upon the entry here in question.
From the above recitation it must be apparent that appellant's
Both your office and the local officontention can not be maintained.
disposing
of
the
between
in
contest
O'Meara and Hutchinson,
cers
the
lands,
held
that
his acts performed prior
Wisconsin
involving

should he given credit for the period of his bona

and the
I

opening of the land to entry as a part of the surplus Omaha
and to the entry by Hutchinson, did not amount to a valid settlement.
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Wisconsin Central Ry. Co.
Forsythe, siij>r<t it becomes unnecesto the

land-

/•.

sary to specifically pass

upon

y

this question in disposing of

O'Meara's
however, been necessary, upon the recitation made in
-aid decision, the concurring decisions of your office and the local officers would have been affirmed.
A further reason tor denying the contention is that in the opinion

Had

claim.

of this

it.

Department the act of 1904, was passed only for the protection
who had made settlement or entry of lands restored under the

of those

order of

November

2,

1891, as a part of the surplus

and were prevented from obtaining

Omaha

Lands.

under the public land Laws
because under the decision of the Supreme Court in the case referred
lo they were afterward held not to be excepted from the Wisconsin
Central grant but were embraced therein.
This is made plain in the
reporl of this Department dated February IT. 1902, upon II. R. Bill
t0,515, "to provide for the relief <>!' certain settlers upon Wisconsin
Jentral railroad and The Dalles military road land grants."
In this
eport

it

was

said

title

:

worthy one and should be expressed in a law
all who were misled by the departmental
iction in the two instances named.
The pending i>ill is imperfeel in thai it
"ily relates to those who made homestead entry and .loos not include the

The purpose of the

hill

is

a

vhich will give the intended relief to
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equally meritorious eases where qualified homesteaders

improvement with

a

made

settlement and

view to entry.

The bill is also limited as respects the Wisconsin Central grant to entries " of
lands appearing, on November 2, 1891, by the records of the Interior Department, as forfeited Omaha lands." No element of forfeiture was involved.
The only question was whether the lands were excepted from the Wisconsin
Central grant by reason of their prior withdrawal for the benefit of the Omaha
grant.

The Department, taking the

affirmative view of this question and find-

Omaha grant, restored them
and entry by order of October 22, 1891, which took effect November 2, 1891. The Supreme Court. June 3, 1895, in the Forsythe case, held that
the lands were not excepted from the Wisconsin Central grant, but were
embraced therein, and thus those who had made settlement or entry under the
order of November 2, 1891, were prevented from obtaining title under the
public-land laws, and if they obtained title to the lands upon which they had
settled and erected improvements they did so by purchase from the Wisconsin
Central Company.
ing that the lands were not needed to satisfy the
to settlement

The lands

were not opposite the constructed portion of
As a consequence, they Avere forfeited by
the act of 1890, which act made due provision for settlers upon the
forfeited lands and no further legislation w as necessary w ith regard
in question

Wisconsin Central road.

T

T

to said lands.

The
issued

decision of your

office

upon O'Meara's entry

is

affirmed

and the

final

certificate

will be canceled.

HOMESTEAD ENTRY-LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES—SECTION
AS AMENDED BY THE ACT OF MARCH 1, 1901.

3305, R.

S.,

Peter W. Tompkins.
By

virtue of the provisions of section 2305 of the Revised Statutes as

amended

by the act of March 1, 1001. proof of the death of a homestead entryman
while actually engaged in the military service of the United States renders
unnecessary any showing that would have been otherwise required touching
his compliance with law in the matters of residence, cultivation and improvement.
The properly-constituted administrator of the estate of a deceased homestead
entryman is authorized to submit final proof under the provisions of section
2305 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the act of March 1, 1001. as
his " legal representative."

Upon

satisfactory proof of the death of a homestead entryman while actually
engaged in the military service of the United States, leaving no widow or
minor orphan children surviving him, it is the duty of the land department,
under the provisions of section 2305 of the Revised Statutes as amended
by the act of March 1, 1001, to issue patent to his " legal representatives,"
leaving it to the courts to determine in whom the title shall vest.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)
Jan uary 16, 1906.
•

Land

Office,

(E. O. P.)

H. B. Grover, special administrator of the estate of Peter W.
Tompkins, deceased, has appealed from your office decision of April
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1905, reject ina" final

proof offered

in
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support of the homestead

See. 22, T. L59 X., R. 60 W.,
entry of* said decedent for the XK.
Dakota.
district.
Forks
hind
North
Errand
|

The entry

question was

in

.

made June

information furnished by the

15,

1897.

War Department

It

that

is

shown by

the entryman,

April 26, 1898, enlisted in Company C, 1st Regiment, Xorth
Dakota Infantry, and was killed in action April 12, 1899. The entryman was unmarried at the time of his death and left as his only heirs
at law his father and mother, residents of the Province of Ontario,
and citizens of the Dominion of Canada. The entryman died intestate
after having established residence on the land.
The final proof offered was rejected for the following reasons, viz:
on

show compliance with the requirements of the homestead law, either
improvements or cultivation. Furthermore, there is no statutory authority under which an administrator, as such, may suhmit final homeIt was held, in the case of Patten
stead proof. Vidal v. Bennis (22 L. D., 124).
r. Katz
(25 L. 1).. 453), that a homestead entry must he canceled when it is
ii

fails to

as to residence,

duly shown, after the expiration of the statutory life of the entry, that the

entryman died prior to the completion of his entry, and that there are no heirs
The alien heirs of a
Of the entryman who are entitled to perfect said claim.
deceased homesteader are incompetent to make proof and perfect title under
section 2291 of the Revised Statutes.

The appeal

based upon three distinct specifications of error,

is

which, briefly stated, are as follows:
First:

Error

in rejecting the final

proof for failure to show com-

pliance with the law as to residence and

Second: Error

in

improvement and

cultivation.

rejecting the proof offered because there

was no

statutory authority under which the administrator could submit the

same.

Third: Error

in

heirs are prohibited

rejecting the final proof for the reason that alien

from taking

title to

The contentions urged by counsel
stated.

To

this

end an examination of the language of section 2305,

amended by the

as

public land.

will be considered in the order

act of

March

1,

L901

(31 Stat., 847),

determination of the questions presented.
among other things, that
to

is

essential

It is therein provided,

in which a settler on the public lands of the United Slates under
homestead laws died while actually engaged in the army, navy, or marine
corps of the United States as private soldier, officer, seaman or marine, during
the war with Spain or the Philippine insurrection, his widow, if unmarried, or
in case of her death or marriage, then his minor orphan children or his or their
legal representatives, may proceed forthwith to make final proof upon the hind
SO held by the deceased soldier and settler and that the death of such soldier
in

every case

the

while so engaged

in

the service of the United states shall,

in

the administration

homestead laws, he construed to he equivalent to a performance of all
requirements as to residence and cultivation for the full period of five years,
and shall entitle his widow, if unmarried, or in case of her death or marriage,
then his minor orphan children or his or their legal representatives, to make

Of the
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final proof upon and receive government patent for said land; and that upon
proof produced to the officers of the proper local land office by the widow, if
unmarried, or in case of her death or marriage, then his minor orphan children
or his or their legal representatives, that the applicant for patent is the widow,
if unmarried, or in case of her death or marriage, his orphan children or his
or their legal representatives, and that such soldier, sailor, or marine died
while in the service of the United States as hereinbefore described, the patent
for such land shall issue.

The language used

clearly sustains the first contention of counsel.

By

proof of the entryman's death in actual service of the United
States, any showing that would have been otherwise required touching his compliance with the law as to residence, improvement and
cultivation, is dispensed with.
Under the authority cited and relied upon by your office denying
the right of an administrator to submit final proof, it would appear
that, unless the provisions of section 2305 clearly warrant such action,
the second contention of counsel must be denied. However, an examination of the decisions announcing such a rule discloses that they
were based upon a construction of section 2291 of the Revised Statutes, and involved the question of final proof submitted under the
provisions of said section. The language therein used leaves no room
for other construction or a different conclusion, for the reason that

among

those specifically designated to submit final proof the " legal
representative " is not mentioned. In the case of Heirs of Isidore

Department recognized the right of the
by virtue of the provisions of section 2305, supra,
to submit final proof, though it was also therein decided that the
Department would not undertake to determine who would be " entiDriscoll (32 L. D., 407) the

legal representative,

tled to take title " as such.

By

Code of North Dakota (1895) the adminisdesignated as the " legal representative " of the deceased. In
this respect there appears to be no material difference between a speIn the
cial and general administrator under the law of that state.
trator

section 6461 of the
is

y. Phelps (21 How., 294, 304) it was held that
one acting in the capacity of an administrator was the " legal representative." See also decision by the same court in the case of Briggs
v. Walker (171 U. S., 466 471)', wherein it was held that

case of Morehouse

The primary and ordinary meaning of the words " representatives " or " legal
representatives," or " personal representatives," when there is nothing in the
context to control their meaning, is " executors or administrators," they being
the representatives constituted by the proper court.

The record now

before the Department furnishes ample proof

that H. B. Grover, the party

who submitted

was the party

" constituted

the final proof rejected

by the proper court
administrator of the estate of the deceased entryman. It would
seem clear, therefore, that he was fully qualified to submit such proof.
by your

office,
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This brings us to the consideration of the third specification of
error, touching the qualification of the parties who may ultimately
take

title

the

to

Department

It
is settled
beyond controversy thai the
undertake to ascertain and identify the interests
Should it then, having before it a person qualified

land.

will not

of such persons.

submit the required final proof, look beyond him and seek to determine any further rights which may be involved in the distribution
Cerof the estate represented by the legal representative thereof?
tainly this is a question for the courts alone and with which, under
the language of said section 2305, the Department has no concern.
The closing words of section 2305, supra, are mandatory and declare
" that patent shall issue."
The condition determining this action
proof by the proper parties, of
is the submission of satisfactory
while in the service of the United Statethe death of the entryman
No other condition is annexed. The
as hereinbefore described."
usual requirement of proof of residence, cultivation and improvement of the land is specifically waived. There is no limitation to
be found in the words of this section, similar to that contained in
section 2291, supra, touching the qualifications of the persons to
to

v

whom
The

*

patent shall issue.
rule

announced

in

departmental decision in the ease of Heirs

of Isidore Driscoll (supra, p. 410) that

The Department

may

persons

be

will

no more undertake to decide what particular person or

deceased entryman, than
ests of the " heirs " of
is

not

to

entitled

it

take

will

as

title

the

"legal

representatives"

undertake to ascertain the identity and

of

a

inter-

such an entryman

inconsistent with the rule here adopted, for the reason that

the term "legal representatives" as therein used refers only to the

persons

who may

eventually take the absolute

has no application

title to

the land,

and

appointed by the
court and who could not under his order of appointment, take an
to

the

absolute title to the land in his
In the opinion of the
tion 2305,

representative

le<>-al

own

Department

under which the

final

right.
a

reasonable construction of secin question was submitted,

proof

clearly waives all requirements

imposed in other cases as to residence,
improvement of the land entered, leaving proof of the
death of the entryman in the actual service of the United State- the
only requisite to the issuance of patent, and warrants the acceptance
of such proof whenever offered by the properly-constituted legal
representative, in those cases where there i> no surviving unmarried
widow of the soldier. In other words, by his death under the condition- prescribed, the soldier has earned the patent, and the Depart-

cultivation and

ment has no concern, after proof thereof has been regularly submitted, as to who may ultimately enjoy the benefits that have accrued
and will not. inquire into their identity, qualifications or interests in
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The adjustment of these questions is properly within the
province of the courts.
For the reasons herein stated, the decision appealed from is reThe proof offered should be accepted and final certificate
versed.
the land.

issue to the " legal representatives " of Peter TV.

Tompkins, deceased,

pursuant to the provisions of said section 2305, supra.

contest—practice— residence-official employment.
Dahlquist

v.

Cotter.

In case a contest is erroneously dismissed upon motion of the entryman, the
General Land Office is without authority to reverse such action and then
dispose of the case on the evidence theretofore submitted by contestant,
without first affording the entryman an opportunity to present his defense.
Where the testimony in a case is authorized to be taken elsewhere than at the
local office, neither party should be permitted to submit further testimony
on the day set for the hearing at the local office, except upon due notice
to the other and proper order therefor.
Failure of a homestead entryman to reside upon his claim, necessitated by

employment in the public service, will not be construed an abandonment
thereof, where he in good faith established and maintained residence prior
to engaging in such service and has continued to comply with the requirements of the law in the matters of cultivation and improvement but such
employment will not relieve from the necessity of establishing residence nor
;

excuse the entryman's failure in that respect.

Secretary Hitchcock
(

F. L. C.

Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( A. W. P.
January 1 7, 1906.

to the

Separate appeals have been filed on behalf of Peter Dahlquist
and James Cotter from your office decision of June 23, 1905, wherein
you reverse the action of the local officers in dismissing Peter Dahlquist's contest against James Cotter's homestead entry No. 3432, made
January 29, 1900, for the SW. \ of Sec. 9, T. 161, R. 91, Minot, North

Dakota, land district, but, because of the evident misapprehension
under which counsel for claimant, as well as the local officers, labored
in the treatment of the case, you remanded the same to afford the
claimant opportunity to submit evidence in support of his entry,
with like opportunity to contestant to submit rebuttal evidence.
On behalf of Dahlquist it is urged, in substance, that error was
committed in ordering such further hearing, the entryman not having
requested same; while on behalf of claimant it is contended that you
erred in reversing the action of the local officers dismissing the con-

ordering a further hearing; and in holding that he was called
upon under the notice of contest served therein to defend against the
charge of never having established a residence on the tract involved.

test; in
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In conclusion,

it

is

also urged, that final

397

judgment be rendered on the

record as presented.

Upon

careful examination of the record the

Department

finds that

the material facts in this case, a- well as the law applicable thereto,

have been fully and very fairly stated in your office decision appealed
In view of the
from, and hence need not be here repeated at Length.
case
of
was disposed
by the local officers in dismanner in which the
missing the content on the ex parte showing and motion of claimant,
your office in remanding the case for further hearing

the action of

was clearly warranted. In fact, the Department has repeatedly held
where a contest' has been erroneously dismissed upon motion of
the defendant, your office is without authority to reverse such action
and then dispose of the case on prior evidence submitted by the contestant without first affording the entryman an opportunity to preInasmuch, however, as claimant ieclines to avail
sent his defense.
that

himself of such opportunity to offer testimony, the case will be adjudicated on the record as presented.

The

by Dahlquist, upon which this proceeding was
entryman has wholly abandoned said tract:
that he has failed to reside thereon since making entry: and that
said tract is not settled upon and cultivated by said party as required
affidavit filed

based, charged that the

by law.

The

notice of contest issuing thereon was as follow-:

That said .entryman has wholly abandoned said tract; that he has failed to
more than six months last past and that said tract is not
settled upon and cultivated by said party as required by law; and that the
absence of said entryman is not due to his employment in the U. S. army, navy,
or marine corps in time of war.
reside therein for

:

While the wording of the above notice

is

slightly different

from

charges the entryman with having
wholly abandoned said tract, and was sufficient to permit the introduction of contestant's testimony showing claimant's entire failure
to establish residence on the land.
This testimony is in the form of
thai

of the original affidavit,

it

general statement of the four witnesses for contestant, subscribed
and sworn to before the notary public authorized to take the testimony. Neither claimant nor his counsel appear to have been present
at such time, and the affidavit and motion which you set out as being
filed on that date seem to have been transmitted to said notary under
date of May 2, four days prior to that set for taking the testimony,
with the request that he forward the same with his report to the local
a

officers.

Where, as in this case, testimony i> authorized to be taken elsewhere than at the local office, neither party should be permitted on
the day of lustring to submit further testimony without due notice to

and appropriate order therefor made by the local office.
Hence, the local officers should not have received and considered

the other,
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claimant's affidavit and motion thus submitted, nor should any consideration have been given the subsequent ex parte affidavit filed on

behalf of the contestant.
The Department has repeatedly held that where an entryman has
in good faith established and maintained residence on his entry, engagement in public service requiring residence elsewhere will not be
construed into an abandonment thereof so long as such efforts are
made to maintain improvements as manifest good faith. Such official employment, however, does not excuse a failure to establish such
And in the face
residence, or relieve from the necessity of so doing.
of a contest alleging abandonment and failure to comply with the requirements of the homestead law as to residence and cultivation, such
official employment following prior residence must be established by
competent testimony, the same as any other evidence offered on be-

half of the defendant.

No such showing has been made on behalf of Cotter in this case,
though he has been given ample opportunity to present his defense,
and considering carefully the testimony regularly submitted before
the notary public authorized to receive the same, the Department
concurs in the conclusion of your office, as reached in the decision
now appealed from, that " the testimony pointedly and positively
shows that contestee had never established his residence on the land."
The finding of the local officers adverse to the plaintiff appears to
have been largely due to the erroneous consideration given the statements contained in the affidavit filed by claimant, and their recommendation based thereon that the contest be dismissed can not therefore be approved.
In view of the conclusion reached herein, your order remanding
the case for further hearing is hereby recalled and vacated, and said
decision of June 23, 1905, as thus modified is affirmed, and it is
directed that the entry be canceled.

PRACTICE— COST OF DEPOSITIONS—ACT OF JANUARY
Delfelder
The

r.

81, 1903.

Slattery.

entire cost of depositions taken under and by virtue of the provisions of
the act of January 31, 1903, must be paid by the party in whose behalf they
are taken.
•

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

January

(F. L. C.)

The Department has

19, 1906.

Land
(J. L.

Office,

McC.)

before it for consideration the case of John
Alva H. Slattery, upon appeal of the latter from your
office decision of April 3, 1905, affirming the judgment of the local
officers, and holding for cancellation his homestead entry for the E. \

Delfelder

v.
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SW.

of the

Rapid City land

The

NW.

and the

!

district,

\

of the

SW.

J

399

of Sec. 10, T. 12

S„ K.

G E.,

South Dakota.

facts as to the defendant's acts in connection with the land

controversy are fully set forth in your office decision appealed
They clearly sustain your
from, and need not be herein repeated.

in

conclusion that he never established or maintained residence

upon the

land.

Another question, however,
testimony

in

the case

is

is

raised

by the appeal.

A

part of the

shape of certain depositions, taken
United States Commissioner at Chadron,

in the

3, L904, before a
Nebraska, upon the application of the defendant. The latter contends that, under the act of May 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 140). the expense
of taking all the testimony in the case should he borne by the contest-

January

your office (May
forwarding their report and recommendation:
There was a controversy in regard to who should pay the costs of taking the
above deposition; we find that the contestant and contestee each paid for their
own testimony in said deposition, which we believe to he in harmony with and
according to the act of January 31, 1903, which reads in pari ;is follows: "The
ant.

Upon

this point the local officers reported to

27, 11)04), in

Ices of the officer

taking the deposition shall he the same as those allowed in
courts, and shall be paid by the party taking the

State or Territorial

the

deposition."

Before said United States Commissioner the testimony of four witintroduced by and in behalf of the defendant, was taken
(orally).
Under the above-quoted ruling of the local officers, "the
contestant and contestee each paid for their own testimony" i. e.,
nesses, all

—

testimony elicited in response to questions put by the attorney
for each respectively; the contestant paid two dollars and fifty cents,
and the defendant nine dollars and fifty cents. Your office decision
Tor the

appealed from holds:
Said depositions were given only by witnesses for the defendant, and included
their testimony on direct

•ill

and cross-examination.

of the further fact thai the proceeding in question

In view of these facts,

was had under

and

the provisions

.".1.
P.><>.">, the entire cost of the depositions was taxable to
Said act expressly requires that the costs of any depositions
procured thereunder shall he paid by the party taking them.
The
defendant's appeal in the case effectually admits that the proceedings were
under said act. but urges that its provisions do not relieve the contestant from

<»f

said act of

January

the defendant.

.

ultimate payment of

the costs.

.

.

Said act. in addition to

its general provision
matters requiring a hearing before
Iced offices, provides a special method for obtaining testimony desired for use in
Midi cases by any party litigant.
This method is independent of and additional
t<> the one already afforded by
Rules 23 to 27 of Practice,
it is not exclusive in
its operation, and may he invoked, under proper circumstances, ;it the party's
option.
It is collateral to a trial had before the local office, or under Rule 35, in
all

lor

compulsory attendance of witnesses

the

same general sense as

is

the

in

method provided by said Rules 23 to
among which

differing therefrom in certain particulars, conspicuous

27,
is

though
the fact

th.it the testimony or depositions need not be taken on written interrogatories.
That said act intended the costs of any depositions taken thereunder to he home
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by the party

in

whose behalf the same are taken

is

manifested by

its

express

language.

From
your

this decision the

office

defendant has appealed, contending that

erred

In holding that this eontestee should pay any part of the expense of the taking
it being the legal duty of said contestant to

of the depositions of his witnesses,

pay

all

the costs of his contest.

In holding that, by the act of January 31, 1903, this eontestee was required
to pay any part or portion of the cost of his depositions, except in the first
instance, and then to be repaid by said contestant before being allowed to proceed with his contest.

There are other allegations, presenting substantially the same consomewhat different language.
The above ruling of your office undoubtedly expresses the meaning
and intent of said act of January 31, 1903 (32 Stat,, 790; also Circu*
lar of March 20, 1903—32 L. D., 132), wherein said act provides that

tentions in

the fees of the officer before

whom

a deposition is taken " shall be

paid by the party taking the deposition."

This conclusion is strongly
immediately following

reinforced by the further language of the act

—

that above quoted

That whenever the taking of any depositions taken in pursuance of the foregoing provisions of this act is concluded, the opposite party may proceed at once,
at his own expense

not to cross-examine the witnesses introduced by the opposite party,

but—
to take depositions in his

the same

As

own

behalf, at the

same time and

place,

and before

officer.

an integral part of the testimony given
it follows that when the law requires
the cost of the deposition to be paid by the party taking the deposition, it unquestionably means the cost of the whole deposition
both
on direct and cross-examination.
The first section of said act sets forth that the same is applicable,
" in all matters requiring a hearing before " the local officers.
It can
not be presumed that the legislative mind was ignorant or forgetful
of the fact that among the most important " matters requiring a
hearing" before local officers are contest cases; and if it had been
the intention that in such cases the expenses paid by the eontestee
under sections 4 and 5 of said act should be repaid to the eontestee
by the contestant before being allowed to proceed with his contest,
The
a provision to that effect would have been embodied in the act.
Department has no authority to import into said act any language
or provision which it does not contain.
Said act (of January 31, 1903, supra) is to be regarded as providing
an additional and special means of procuring testimony. Its employment is entirely a matter of election on the part of either party to the
case. The party, whether contestant or eontestee, employing the means

by

the cross-examination

is

a witness in his deposition,

—
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provided by this act to secure testimony, must of necessity observe
Said
the requirements of the law as to payment of costs thereunder.
act and the act of May 14, 1880, are not necessarily inconsistent with

when

each other,

it

is

remembered

that the recent law

a specific

is

provision left to the choice of either party, and for that reason does
effect upon section 2 of the act of May ^0, 1880,
payment of land office fees is concerned. In other
words, it may be considered as being in effect amendatory of and supplemental to said act of lss(). and to that extent make- an exception
to the genera] rule that all the land office fees must be paid by the
contestant in order that he may acquire preference right under the

not

seem to have any
far a- the

in so

of 1880.

act

The

decision of

your

office

was

correct,

and

hereby affirmed.

is

MIM\(; CLAIM—ADVERSE PROCEEDINGS—LODI WITHIN PLACER.

The Eli Mining and Land
(On Review.)

Mining Co.

Tin: Clipper

v.

Co. et al.

The general principle of the exclusive judicial cognizance of controversies
involving the right of possession as between rival mineral claimants and
the binding force of a court's award in such a case lias in view a possessory
right which is the essential hasis of, and which may ultimately ripen into.
the legal title obtainable from the government under the mining laws;
hut it necessarily remains for the land department, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction and in the discharge of its duty, to determine in any such case
the force and effect as against the United States of the possessory right
so awarded by the court.
Where a placer adverse claimant, on the strength of his placer location, prevails
in a suit under section '2:W>. Revised Statutes, against an applicant for
patent to lode claims within the placer limits, and the placer location should
thereafter be found by the land department, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to embrace non-placer land, the possessory right so awarded would
fail

as a hasis of title to the portion of the placer location in controversy

and equally

essential to the foreclosure of

in the patent applicant
and the latter
by reason of the judgment of the court.
:

Having prevailed

would fall short of that
any purely lode rights
would have suffered no prejudice

the lodes therein embraced, and

to

effective basic right

in

the adverse suit solely by virtue of his placer location, any

additional rights which the successful adverse claimant might set up under

SUDSequenl lode locations by him of the ground
wholly independent of the court's award.
s
i

i

I'.

controversy would he

Commissioner of the Gt neral Land Offla
V U.K.)
January ,!,!, 1906.

tary Hitchcock to the

L.C.)

I

A motion
L.

in

I)..

for review of

660),

Land Company
5194

Vol.

departmental decision of June

et al.

:

:;»— 05 m

The

27, L905 (33

Mining and
was entertained by the Department upon the

the above-entitled case, filed by

in

.

.

l><;

Eli
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usual conditions as to service thereof,

etc.,

and has

since matured.

The case is stated in that decision.
The motion challenges the second

or concluding division of the
the merits of that portion of the case
briefs have again been filed on behalf of the contending parties, and

Upon

decision in question.

For conThe Clipper
Mining and Land Company et al., as

opposing counsel have again been heard in oral argument.
venience and brevity the designation of the parties,

Mining Company and The Eli
and " respondents,"

" petitioner "

respectively, observed in the deci-

under review, will be followed here.
Complaining of that decision, counsel for respondents

sion

set out four
assignments of error, the first being in part closely allied to the
second and in part to the third and fourth, the latter two presenting

in

different'

substantially the

aspects

same question.

sequence and arrangement of these assignments
to depart

it

From

the

will be convenient

somewhat.

The primary

error, it is argued, lies in according

any further

rec-

ognition to petitioner's application for lode patent, and to petitioner

thereunder, since the final judgment in the adverse suit between the
parties.

Counsel contend that by the legal

the right of petitioner to press

its

effect of that

judgment

application or to receive patent

under it has ceased; and they deny the jurisdiction of the land
department to treat that application as now in any proper or legal
sense before

it.

It is conceded

by them that when an adverse claimant who has

prevailed in an action pursuant to section 2326, Revised Statutes,
presents his judgment roll and asks for patent the land department

may inquire as to his compliance with the law in respect of any
matter aliunde and as to the character of the land involved, but it is
insisted that all proceedings following the judgment are ex parte and
that the defeated applicant can not thereafter properly be recognized or heard as an actor upon the assumption that his former
application has any further existence in fact or law or can be made
the basis of any patent proceeding in his behalf. The basis for this
conclusion, it is argued, is that the " right of possession," thus
awarded to his adversary, is the foundation of and indispensable
prerequisite to the paramount title under the mining laws.
Concerning the judgments which may be rendered by the courts
the following extract from Lindley on Mines (2nd Ed., Vol. II, Sec.
765, p. 1376) is cited

The

by counsel:
may result in one

of four judgments: (a) in favor
favor of the defendant, the patent
applicant; (c) adjudging that neither party has complied with the law and (d)
trial of the action

of plaintiff, the adverse claimant;

(b)

in

;

dividing the conflict area between the parties.

And

with respect to the

verse claimant,

who

effect of a

judgment in favor of the adjudgment roll, etc., and

thereafter presents his
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controversy, the following

is

cited

:

The Department

thereupon proceed to investigate the character of the
and the compliance by the adverse claimant with the
requirements of the law. So far as the premises thus applied for arc involved.
the former patent applicant is eliminated from the proceeding, and thereafter
the matter rests between the government and the adverse claimant.
will

land, the proofs submitted,

Counsel also repeat certain expressions

in that

treatise

and

in the

Richmond Mining Co.
Rose (114 U. S., 576) in recognition
of the binding force of the judgment upon the land department, as
well as an expression in the case of Alice Placer Mine (4 L. I).. 31 1.
317), that "the judgment of the court ended the contest between
case of

/'.

and determined the right of possession."
Passing to the consideration of these contention-, the Department

the parties

recognizes and reaffirms to
so often

of

tion

it- fullest extent the geHeraJ principle,
declared by the courts and the Department, that " the ques-

the

claimants

is

right

of

possession "

as

between contending mineral

exclusively of judicial cognizance, and that the

award of

competent jurisdiction is binding upon the
parties and the land department.
In the final analysis, however.
this principle has always in view the "right of possession " which is
the essential basis of the legal title obtainable under the mining laws.
That the principle conas counsel for respondents affirm it to be.
that right by a court of

templates, as

tin-

subject of judicial disposition, a right of possession

which shall thereafter be found by the land department, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to be effective for patent purposes is manifest
from the provisions of section 2326 whereunder the adjudged right
may. upon submission of the judgment roll and " without giving further notice/* be

made

connection. Gwillim

/'.

the basis of the

paramount

Donnellan (115 U.

S., 45,

title.

See. in this

50-1).

The
as
hi-

court determines only the question of the right of possession
between the litigating parties -that one has acquired by virtue of

mining location

a right

of possession which entitles

vail against the other, or that

can not by

its

(163

160, L68).

him

to pre-

neither has established such right.

It

judgment establish in either a right of possession of
binding force and effect as against the United States, since the government is not a party to the suit and a right thus effective depends
finally upon the character of the land involved.
Perego
Dodge
/'.

l

:
.

S..

In a judicial controversy pursuant to section

2326 the court necessarily takes for granted the mineral character of
the land, upon which both parties rely and which is a question ulti-

mately and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the land department.
It must be considered, therefore, that the court assumes the right of

which it award- to be such a- may ripen into the legal
accordance with the provisions of that section of the stat-

possession
title

iii
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utes

— a right of possession of mineral land, lode or placer as the case

may

be, within the meaning of the mining laws.
In the case at bar a lode applicant, the present petitioner, was confronted by placer claimants, the respondents. Relying wholly upon
their placer location the latter prosecuted their adverse proceedings
against the lode application, averring that no lodes were known to
exist within the placer limits at the date of the placer location or
had been discovered at the time the adverse proceedings were commenced, and opposing their claimed placer possessory right to petiThe court found " from the
tioner's claimed lode possessory right.
evidence that the Searl placer was duly located, as required by the
law. in 1877" and that the prescribed annual labor had continuously
been performed to the time of trial. The court also found that the
lodes involved were discovered after the date of the placer location.
Because of the invasion of the placer location, as valid in its inception and uninterruptedly maintained by performance of annual

labor, the court

awarded the right of possession not of the lodes

or

lode claims but of the ground in controversy, as part and parcel of the

placer claim, to respondents.

And

only as incident to their placer

upon which respondents stood solely and squarely before the
court, could they take those lodes under the proceedings thus had.
With these considerations in view it follows that the integrity of

location,

r

the general principle

is

not assailed in the decision under review, as

counsel contend. Under no circumstances can the land department
undertake to determine the question of the right of possession as
between opposing mineral claimants that controversy must be heard
in the courts.
As before pointed out, hoAvever, there remains in every
case for determination by the land department the force and effect of
the right of possession (awarded by the court to one or the other) as
against the United States. And in the process of this jurisdiction
this case is distinguishable from the usual cases merely in the result
which may follow the establishment of the non-placer character, for
patent purposes, of the land embraced in the placer location, if that
be the fact. This distinction, which the Department sought to make
clear in the decision under review, rests upon the difference in origin

—

of the possessory claims litigated before the court, arising out of

and which do not present the
immediately antagonistic aspect of locations of the same species

locations of wholly unlike character,

irrespective of the actual character of the land.

awarded

The

placer right of

would in the event suggested prove
to fall short of that possessory right which is the essential basis of
the legal title under the mining laws and within the court's contempossession

to respondents

plation in recognition of
tion.

it in bar of petitioner's lode-patent applicaFailing thus as a basis of title to the portion of the placer

location in controversy,

it

would equally

fail as a basis of title to
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the lodes therein embraced.
to those lodes,

a

would

And.

fall short

failing as an available basis of title

of that effective basic right essential

any purely lode rights

foreclosure of

to the

Mich

it
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case, therefore,

in the petitioner.
In
can not be held that the unsuccessful litigant

it

from the proceeding" by the judgment of the

ha- been "eliminated
court.

Nothing inconsistent with these view- i- contained in the ease of
Richmond Mining Co. v. Rose or of Alice Placer Mine, supra, cited
by counsel, and in both of which judicial award- of the right of
The first of these, pursuant to section
possession were considered.
between
lode claimants the immediate
a
was
controversy
2326,
and involved prinell'cct of a judgment in such a case being clear
cipally the question of the right of the officers of the land department to resume active control of patent proceedings and issue patent
thereunder during the pendency of the -nit in court upon their own
determination of a waiver of the adverse claim because of delay in
the judicial proceeding.-.
In the second case an applicant for placer
patent had prevailed in court against an adverse lode claimant, who
pressed no further claim, and the only question before the Department was a- to the authority of your office to order a hearing,
following the judgment of the court in the applicant'- favor, to

—

—

As was pointed out in
Supreme Court of the United

determine the placer character of the land.
the decision

here under review, the

States, in

decision in this case and in considering the effect of the

its

judgment below, had clearly

in view the inseparable question of the
character of the land as affecting the ultimate result and the recog-

nition which might yet thereafter be accorded petitioner by the land
department, as the language of that decision discloses.

As conclusive upon petitioner in the premises, and to support
it
was error to order a hearing upon the present

their contention that

record to determine the placer patentability of the land, since re-

spondents' adverse claim had

been recognized by the Department
and by the courts and " was founded upon a placer mining location
which the court- have declared was a valid location both in fact and
law." counsel cite the following expressions in the case of Belk

in

Meagher

283,284)

104 U. S., 279,

I

A mining claim perfected under the law
Hint term.

.

.

:iinl

all

a

is

property

in

the highesl

sense of

.

*

•x-

Hence

u.

:

•::•

-x-

relocation on lands actually covered at

subsisting location

is

-x-

*

the time by another valid

void; and this not only against the prior locator, but

the world, because the law allows no such thing to he done.

And

in

(

iwillini

v.

Donnellan (115 U.

S., t5,

li>)

:

A valid and subsisting location of mineral lands, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

406

grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession of
If, when one enters on land to make a location there is another location in full force, which entitles its owner to the exclusive possession
of the land, the first location operates as bar to the second.
;i

the lands located.

Coupled with

a contention raised in this as in a preceding con-

became defunct by reason
was error to treat it as a
basis for the order for hearing, is the contention in this same behalf
that inasmuch as the placer location has been adjudged to have been
valid and subsisting at the date of the lode locations the latter,
under the principle laid down by the Supreme Court as above, were
wholly void and no rights thereunder could accrue to petitioner.
nection, that petitioner's patent application

of the

judgment of the court and that

Neither contention

is

it

tenable in the view taken by the Department.

Certainly, those judicial expressions are not susceptible of reduction
to a doctrine that a valid

completely within

all

and subsisting mining

location,

however

the provisions and requirements of the mining

laws, constitutes an insuperable barrier to the acquisition by another

of rights, present or prospective, under a subsequent location upon
the

same ground.

If they were so susceptible, and could be taken in

them apart from the
which they were addressed, it would unavoidably follow that
a junior locator of land embraced in a valid and subsisting location
who should duly and regularly prosecute patent proceedings therefor and without opposition by way of an adverse claim would nevertheless take nothing by his proceedings, notwithstanding the statutory
assumption in his behalf of the absence of an adverse claim; for it
is axiomatic that no validity can be infused into a " void " thing.
Obviously, the assumption which negatives the existence of adverse
claims has its predicate in the proceedings upon the application for
patent and is for their benefit.
The doctrine thus announced by the court, more especially in Belk
v. Meagher, seems more or less generally to have been given an extreme or literal interpretation. Since its operation was not involved
in either case, the court had no occasion to consider that significant
provision of the mining laws which compels the arbitrary and indisputable assumption, in favor of an applicant under the requisite
the literal sense which might be attached to
facts to

proceedings to secure mineral patent, of the absence of adverse claims
when none has been filed, or its equivalent in the waiver of an adverse

claim for failure to prosecute

it,

and whereunder valid and vested
may be wholly avoided and

possessory rights under a senior location

become as

if

they had never been.

The

court itself has

made

it

clear

that the extreme or literal interpretation of the language quoted from
In
the opinions in those cases, standing alone, can not be accepted.
the later case of Del

(171 U.

S.,

Monte Mining Co.

v.

Last Chance Mining Co.

55), after referring to those cases as going no further than
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to establish the genera] doctrine that a second location is ineffectual

appropriate land covered by

to

the court held,

among

a

prior subsisting* and valid location.

other tilings, that for certain essential pur-

poses the lines of a junior location

may

the surface of a valid senior location;

be laid within, upon or across

and

that, as

it is

not provided

by the statute or contemplated that judicial proceedings to establish
the invalidity or failure of a prior location shall precede the right to

make

a later one, a

once,

and thereafter,

junior locator
in the

i-

make

at liberty to

manner provided by

his location at

the statute, litigate,

necessary, the question of the validity of the earlier as well as of

if

his

own

Belk

location.
v.

Meagher was

a

simple action in ejectment, involving no

application for patent and brought independently of section 2326,

Donnellan the junior locator and
applicant for patent prevailed against the senior locator and adverse
claimant by reason of the fact that the latter had theretofore permitted a partial conflict with his location and embracing his discovery shaft to pass by patent to a third person. The restricted application of the doctrine of the Belk-Meagher case is apparent upon comparison with the recent case of Lavagnino v. Uhlig (198 U. S., 44o),
involving an essentially similar state of facts but which arose under
section 2326.
In the latter case the claims embraced in the applicafor
patent had been located in pari upon what was then a valid
tion
and subsisting location, known as the Levi P. claim, which the adverse
claimant alleged to have become afterwards forfeited and to have
been thereupon relocated by him pursuant to the appropriate provisions of section '2824, Revised Statutes.
The Supreme Court, concurring in the judgments below, sustained the applicants for patent
substantially and in effect upon the ground that, by reason of the
absence of an adverse claim on behalf of the Levi P. claim, the statutory assumption effectually negatived as to it any bar to the acquisition by the applicants of the rights essential to them in the premises
(and this, it was held, would undeniably have resulted had the patent
proceedings been prosecuted under like circumstances prior to forfeiture of the Levi P. location), and left for consideration only the relocation by the adverse claimant, subsequent in time and therefore
Revised Statutes.

In (iwillim

v.

of no avail as against the applicants.

duly awarded under

Indeed,

a

right of possession

judgment pursuant to section 2326 in a suit
involving locations of any character, even such a possessory right
as would be found to l>o effective for all purposes, may equally thereafter be avoided, where upon termination of the litigation (which,
alter all, is but a step in the particular patent proceedings and imerely in aid of the land department -163 U. S.. L67) the successful
party fails or neglects to secure patent under his judgment roll and
patent proceedings de nor,, become the only remaining recourse.
In
a
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that event the unsuccessful litigant in the former proceedings
file

the

new

oppose his

may

which his former adversary must
adverse claim and duly support it by a suit in court or
application, against

abide the indisputable assumption of the absence or waiver of an

adverse claim.
It is obvious, therefore, that a location embracing a prior valid and
subsisting location is not ipso facto void and ineffectual, but if unop-

posed may properly thereafter become the subject of mineral patent.
Thus, a valid and subsisting location will in no case avail to defeat
a junior location, as to which patent proceedings are regularly prosecuted, except upon the invocation of judicial intervention, and
equally a placer location, notwithstanding a favorable judgment of
a court, will not avail to defeat a lode location within the placer
limits if those limits be thereafter found by the land department to
embrace a tract which is not patentably placer in character. A location which the courts will recognize as valid may be predicated
upon a discovery of mineral which would fall short of establishing
the mineral character of the land under the settled and approved
rule of determination; but to prevail eventually the location must
be shown to embrace mineral land of corresponding character, lode
or placer, which may become the subject of mineral patent.
Commenting upon the doctrine of rights arising under a valid
location, as applied

respondents
clear

The

sum up

by the several courts

in this case, counsel for

the situation presented here, in the following-

and concise statement contained

in their brief:

judgment, thus affirmed, under the clear language of section 2.">2<; leaves to the adverse claimants as the successful litigants the privilege of appearing with this judgment roll in the United States land department
and making thereon the statutory proof and payment and receiving patent.
effect of this

The soundness of this conclusion the Department readily affirms.
But the conclusion suggests in itself the pertinent question What
proof would be required? And in the answer, proof of the patentably placer character of respondents' claim must be included.
:

Should that proof
roll would fail.

Under

fail,

respondents' rights under their judgment

and the foregoing views it
can not be held that petitioner's patent application became defunct by
reason of the judgment of the court and is an improper basis for
the order for hearing. That application was the cause of the controversy which had ultimately in view the right to patent and which
now presents the question of respondents' rights under their judgment roll as dependent upon the character of the land. Should the
result of the hearing be favorable to respondents it would dispose of
the circumstances of the case

petitioner's application; should

by

it

would merely

it

be unfavorable, a new application

invite circuity of action.
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opposing

Whilst

a

hearing to determine

this
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question

at

the

instance of -petitioner, counsel for respondents concede that, as a logical result

of the filing of an adverse claim and the assertion therein

and consequent prior right' to acquire
from the United States, the land department mighl treat the
adverse claim as an application for patent and cite the claimant to
show cause why it "should not be canceled.*" a concession which,

of prior right of possession
the fee

strangely, counsel for petitioner question.

Any

such connecting link

mining location and the land department may afford warrant for an investigation of any and all rights against the irovernnient to which claim i- therein laid, and this may always he had at
the instance of the land department itself, or of one asserting any
And if the
interest in the land, or even of an entire stranger.
claimed rights be negatived as the result of the inquiry and deterbetween

a

may

mination, the land
fact- are

found

to

thereafter be otherwise disgpsed of as

tin

1

warrant.

As of the date of

petitioner's application for lode patent, out of

which the controversy arose, and

which time the petitioner sub-

at

mitted to the land department its claim to the land involved, the question of the character of the land embraced in the placer location must
he determined.

Did

it

appear, as

in

Michie

v.

Gothberg (30 L.
had

407). that sufficient time within which to develop the claim

D.,
not

would be afforded, hut at that date
had stood for almost sixteen years and came
wholly within the purview of the correlative case of Purtle v. Steffee

then elapsed a further period
the

placer location

(31 L. D., 400).

But counsel for respondents

Supreme Court

in this case

cite

an expression of the United States

(104 U.

S..

220, 223) as follows:

Undoubtedly when the Department rejected the application for a patent it
could have gone further and set aside the placer location, and it can now. by
direct proceedings upon notice, sot ii aside and restore the hind to the public
domain.

Mutual reliance upon this utterance seems to be had.
respondents interpret

it

to

mean

Counsel for

that the placer location, the validity

and priority of which have been adjudged, operate- to withhold the
land within its limit- from other appropriation, and that only when
the land department, upon its own initiative and independent action,
shall by direct proceedings and upon notice set the placer location
aside

"and

jurisdicton

and

re-tore the land to the public
to entertain

the

first

legal

domain"

will

application vest.

unfettered

Emphasis

upon the concluding clause of the quotation.
The Department finds no difficulty here and no obstacle opposed
to the course outlined in the decision under review.
The question of
the force and effect of a mining location of itself to preelude <>r defeat
a subsequent location by another is sufficiently discussed above, and
stress are laid
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do contrary opinion

And

whilst the court

is

expressed

b}^

the court in this connection.

must be well aware that

a

mining location

of record before or connected with the land department, and

is

not

is

not

knowledge until application for patent is filed or it is properly called in question by another,
the court must be equally well aware that these locations are constantly in legal and practical effect set aside and annulled by the
so connected or usually within the latters

issuance of patent to another after proper proceedings involving the

question of the character of the land or other sufficient question

within the jurisdiction of the land department, upon notice to the
and opportunity afforded him to be heard. Nor does the
court say that the land department must formally " restore the land
locator

can be made of it,
nor would that course be practicable or necessary: the tract is subto the public

ject to other

domain

and

" before other disposition

final disposition the instant its present unavaila-

mineral locator is determined. These customary proceedings before the land department must therefore be the " direct
proceedings upon notice " which the court had in contemplation.
In connection with respondents' motion for review an additional
question is presented in the record. It is stated that since the judgment of the court in the case and while respondents were in possession of the premises by virtue thereof their development of the
ground disclosed the existence of genuine lodes, which are now embraced in and held under lode locations by them or those in privity
with them. In fact, proof of such further locations is submitted on
behalf of petitioner, the date of discovery of the lodes and their existence within the knowledge of respondents being made a subject of
bility to the

Urging that

dispute.

which

" the actual possession

" respondents enjoy is predicated

the court,

it is

contended that

if

and right of possession
upon the final judgment of

they are not entitled to placer patent

at present they are clearly entitled to hold the

ground under

these

lode locations as against all the world, and that as against petitioner

become res adjudicata.
Department is unable to agree. Again
it may be pointed out that the only possessory right which the trial
court awarded, and which under the issue it could have awarded to
respondents, was a placer right of possession and any additional
rights which might arise under the later lode locations would be
the question of right of possession has

With

these contentions the

;

The only adverse claim opposed
was the placer adverse of respondpetitioner became entitled, upon the expira-

wholly independent of the award.
to petitioner's patent application
ents,

and except as

to

it

tion of the period of publication of notice of its application, to the

assumption that no adverse claim existed.
These lode locations thereafter made, on behalf of respondents and
their privies, could, aside from other considerations, be of no avail as
benefit of the statutory
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against any claim under petitioner's patent proceedings; and the
judgment of the court could not have the effect to foreclose or defeat

any rights adverse to Mich as mighl be asserted under the recent lode
locations, now set up by respondents, apart from the placer claim.
Finally, counsel urge that the Department erred in holding that if
the land embraced in the placer location is found to be non-placer in
the patentable sense, etc., no obstruction to the completion of petiproceedings, " if in themselves regular, would then
support
this assignment they now call in question any
remain." To
lodes
discovery of the
upon which the petitioner relies until long
tioner's

patent

after

patent application was

its

certain affidavits in

Reference is made by them to
respondents' behalf and to statements by petifiled.

and counsel, appearing in the record of the judicial
proceedings of the case, as tending to establish an absence of earlier
tioner's witnesses

lode discoveries.

On

the other hand, counsel for petitioner have, since the motion for

review was entertained,

filed

in the

Department a motion
under review and to

the order for hearing in the decision

petitioner under

ents to

its

lode application.

On

to rescind
issue pat-

behalf of their

motion counsel for petitioner, in their turn, refer to what are conceived to be admissions of the " known existence" of the lodes long
prior to petitioner's lode locations.
It

needless here to cite the particular matters

is

now

so pointed out

by opposing counsel as bearing upon the time at which these lodes
were discovered and their existence established.
It is sufficient to say
the records of the several judicial proceedings heretofore

that

in

this

time

is

variously stated; and

admission by counsel

around

in

it

may

had

be added that the specific

for respondents of the lode character of the

controversy, referred to by opposing counsel and quoted in

the decision under review, was made at and as of a very recent time
and does not concede any lode discovery by or on behalf of petitioner
at any time.
Certainly, the Department did not intend, in the deci-

under review, notwithstanding any apparently contrary expresadjudge any right in petitioner to receive patent if the placer
location should be found to embrace non-placer land, any such question being regularly cognizable by the local officers and your office

sion

sion, to

before

its

ever, the

consideration here.

Upon

the record then before

Department understood no question

covery of these lodes by petitioner or
local ions, as

claimed by

its

it,

how-

to be raised as to dis-

grantors

at

the time of

it-

it.

The only finding by the trial court in this behalf was that the lodewere discovered by petitioner's grantors after the date of the placer
location.
Their discovery may/have occurred, therefore, at any time
between that date and the trial of the cause: and the award of the
court,

under the issues raised and findings made, leaves

to the land

412
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department the determination of this question. See Aurora Lode y.
Bulger Hill and Nugget Gulch Placer (23 L. D., 95). Manifestly, if
these lodes were not discovered until long after petitioner's patent
application was filed, as now claimed, it can take nothing by its proceedings thereunder, and the application must in that event be reAnd the controverted question can not be determined from
jected.
the records containing the evidence at various times adduced before?
the State and Federal courts, in the several controversies involving
portions of the placer location, or from ex parte affidavits or exhibits,
but only after hearing regularly had before the local office at which
opportunity has been afforded both sides for submission of such
may have and for cross-examination of the opposing
Besides these considerations, no admission of the nonwitnesses.
placer character of the land embraced in their location has been made
by respondents; and the motion for rescission of the pending order
for hearing is denied.
Upon application by respondents to your office, within a reasonable
time, the hearing heretofore ordered will be broadened to include the
question of the date of discovery of the lodes embraced in the land in
full

evidence as they

controversy.

For the reasons above given the Department adheres to the decision
and the record is returned for such proceedings and
action in the case as may appropriately be had in accordance with the
foregoing views and directions.

under review

;

indian lands-liquor clause in deeds by heirs of deceased
allottees.
Opinion.
Opinion expressed that the "liquor clause'' now inserted in deeds by heirs of
deceased Indian allottees, prohibiting the sale or storage of liquor on the
land conveyed, and providing for a reversion of title in ease of violation
of the prohibition, should be modified by a further provision " that the
rights of mortgagees in good faith, their heirs and assigns, shall not be
voided or jeopardized by such reversion.

Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior.

January

You have

referred for

ence of December

8,

my

(W.

25, 1906.

C. P.)

consideration, in connection with a refer-

1905, a letter of the

Affairs reporting on a communication of L.

Commissioner of Indian

W. Clapp

suggesting

cer-

by heirs of
deceased Indian allottees respecting the sale of liquor on the premIn his report the Commissioner says that the clause in
ises conve}^ed.

tain modifications in the clause to be inserted in deeds

THE PUBLIC LANDS.

DECISIONS RELATING TO

413

was prepared by "the law officers of the Department " upon
Recommendation of his office.
When a deed from an heir of a Winnebago allottee for land which
the purchaser intended to use for a townsite was presented for your
approval, this office was informally asked whether a clause prohibitquestion

ing the sale of liquor on the land to he conveyed, could he sustained.
was found that the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in which State
It

proposed

the lands affected by the

dml

are situated,

the case of

in

Jetter v. Lyon, decided December 2, L903 (97 Northwestern Rep.,
It
was con59C), had held such a condition valid and enforceable.
informally
that
answered,
and
question
so
a clause
the
such
cluded,

would in all probability he sustained in the
was then asked to formulate a clause, and did
so. adopting in substance the clause in the dwd that was before the
The form as adopted reads as follows:
court in that case.
the proposed (U^(\

in

State of Nebraska.

It

That no malt, spirituous, or vinous liquors shall ho kept nor disposed of oil
and that any violation of this condition, either by the
grantee or any person claiming rights under said party of the second part,
Bhall render the conveyance void and cause the premises to revert to the party
ef the firsl part, his heirs and assigns.
the premises conveyed,

November 21, 1905, to the Commissioner of Indian
Department directed that this clause he inserted in all
Afterward the grantee
deeds by heirs of deceased Indian allottees.
in the i\(^^\ which brought up for consideration this question, sugBy

letter of

Affairs, the

gested that the clause he modified by limiting the forfeiture to the

particular

lot

or tract

4

upon which liquor was kept or disposed of,
office it was advised in

and upon reference of that suggestion to this
opinion of
not

November

17.

L905, that

the modification suggested

he

made.

It is now suggested that a proviso he added to the clause as follows:
"And provided further, That the rio-hts of mortgagees in good faith,

their heirs,

reversion."

and assigns, shall not he voided or jeopardized by such
It

is

stated

that before the clause in question

serted in these deeds loans could he

ance

company

time

in

was

in-

the land as security,

without some modification of the provision

hut that

taining

made with

"no

life

insur-

would lend a dollar at any
the future upon any land held under a dvr^l or title con-

a

or other careful investor

provision that rendered the iUn^l absolutely void as to the

grantee and

all

persons acquiring rights under him.

in

case

any of

such persons should violate this liquor clause."

The Indian
he

if thus modified, might
sought to he attained by the original

Office suggests that the clause,

used to defeat

the object

and by way of illustration suggests, (1) that if a mortgage
a tract held under such a deed, the mortgage
foreclosed and title acquired by virtue of the -ale thereunder, the

clause,

should he placed on
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purchaser under such sale might be relieved of the condition, (2)
that the purchaser from the Indian might mortgage the land for a
sum nearly equal to its full value and upon violation of the condition
the title would not revert to the Indian until he had paid and discharged the incumbrance.
It is believed that the first of these suggestions is not entitled to
great consideration.

mortgage of

A

a tract of

j^nrchaser at a sale under foreclosure of a

land affected by this clause would be a person

claiming rights under the original grantee of the Indian. At any
under foreclosures would be so infrequent as
to constitute a negligible factor in determining the course to be pursued.
The second suggestion contemplates a condition that may be
presented at any time though not probably exactly as the Indian Office
puts it. Mortgages will be placed on these lands, at least if the proposed modification be adopted, and whether the amount of such an
incumbrance be large or small the reversion of the' title, if the
amendment suggested be adopted, would become effective only upon
the payment by the Indian of the amount of the incumbrance. This
would, in most instances, constitute a barrier to the effectual and
complete reversion of title. The Indian would, as a rule, be unable
rate, instances of sales

to discharge the

incumbrance and the

would be largely

in the control of the mortgagee.

lodgment of the title
This would no
doubt open the Avay for secret dealings between the mortgagor and
mortgagee with a view to defeat of the liquor clause. It is quite
improbable that such cases will be presented so frequently as to constitute a grave objection to the proposed amendment.
Holders of
these lands will not generally resort to any such proceeding for the
purpose of defeating the inhibitory clause. The practical operation
of the clause will be to depreciate the price of these lands and any
modification that will remove any part of the objections thereto
will benefit the Indian holder.
Whether the objections to the incorfinal

poration of the amendment are sufficient to cause its rejection in the
face of the assertions of disadvantage to the Indian that would grow
out of the retention of the clause in

its

original form, can not in the

nature of things be definitely determined.
problematical.

I

am

inclined

to'

The

actual results are

the opinion, however, that the

dis-

advantages to the individual Indian growing out of the clause in

its

original form, especially where the lands affected are agricultural,
will be greater than the difficulties that will be presented if the modification be adopted.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
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YANKTON INDIAN RESERVATION—LIQUOR CLiATJSE
AUGUST 15, 1894.

IN
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DEEDS—ACT OF

Opinion.
Opinion expressed that it is inadvisable to insert in deeds by heirs of deceased
allottees in the Yankton Indian reservation the " liquor clause," prohibiting
the sale or storage of liquor on the land conveyed and providing for a
reversion of title in ease of violation of the prohibition, the agreement with
the Yankton Indians and the provisions of the act of August 15, 1894,
ratifying the same, being the proper authority which should be invoked for

the protection of the Indians in that respect.

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior
January 25, 1906.
( W. C. P.

In his letter of December 7, 1905, the Commissioner of Indian
says that he has informally received a protest from residents

A flairs

upon the Yankton Indian reservation. South Dakota, against the
clause prohibiting the sale of liquor being inserted in deeds for
lands within that reservation, made under sales by heirs of deceased
allottees, and submits the matter for instruction. This letter has been
(referred to me for opinion upon the matter therein presented.

The

clause protested against is:

Provided that no malt, spirituous or vinous liquors shall be kept nor disposed
premises conveyed, and that any violation of this condition, either
by the grantee or any person claiming rights under said party of the second
part, shall render the conveyance void and cause the premises to revert to the

of on the

party Of the

lirst

part, his heirs

and assigns.

agreement with the Yankton
Sioux or Dakota Indians on the Yankton reservation ceding
these lands and of the act of Congress approved Augusl 15, 1891
(28 Stat.. 286), ratifying said agreement, amply provides for the
It

is

insisted that the provision in the

tribe of

situation so far at
vision in the

least

The

pro-

shall ever be sold or given

away

as that reservation is concerned.

agreement (page 818)

is

as follows:

No intoxicating liquors nor other intoxicants

upon any of the lands by this agreement coded and sold to the United States,
nor upon any other lands within or comprising the reservations of the Yankton
Sioux or Dakota Indians as described in the treaty between the said Indians
and the United States, dated April 19th, 1858, and as afterward surveyed and
Bet off to

the said Indians.

be such as Congress

The provision

may

in

The penalty
prescribe

in

for the violation of this provision shall

the act ratifying tins agreement.

the ratifying acl (page 319)

is:

That every person who shall sell or give away any intoxicating liquors or
other intoxicants upon any of the lands by said agreeemenl ceded, or upon any
Of the lands included in the Yankjon Sionx Indian Reservation as created by
the treaty of April nineteenth, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight, shall be punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years and by a line of not more
than three hundred dollars.
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Submitting the matter the Commissioner says
I shall be glad to be instructed by an opinion from the law officers of your
Department whether, after a parcel of land had passed entirely out of Indian
ownership and become subject to taxation by, and all other jurisdiction of, the
State of South Dakota, an act of Congress providing for the punishment of an
offense committed on that land could be successfully enforced.

I am not informed whether the effectiveness of the provision
against the sale of liquor within the boundaries of the former reservation has been tested in the courts.

Article 7 of the treaty with the

Chippewa Indians of May

Ked Lake and Pembina band

of

1864 (13 Stat,, 668), provides:

5,

The laws of the United States now in force or that may hereafter be enacted
prohibiting the introduction and sale of spirituous liquors in the Indian country,
shall be in full force and effect throughout the country hereby ceded, until
otherwise directed by Congress or the President of the United States.

The validity of this provision was before the Supreme Court in
United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey (93 U. S., 188). The power
of Congress to make this provision was fully sustained. Speaking
of it the court said (page 197)
:

This stipulation was not only reasonable in itself but was justly due from a
weak people it had engaged to protect.

strong government to a

It further said (page 197)
Besides, the

power

to

make

seen, coextensive with that to

:

treaties with the Indian tribes

make

is,

treaties with foreign nations.

as

we have
In regard

to the latter, it is, beyond doubt, ample to cover all the usual subjects of
diplomacy. One of them relates to the disability of the citizens or subjects of
either contracting nation to take, by descent or devise, real property situate
in the territory of the other.
If a treaty to which the United States is a party
removed such disability, and secured to them the right so to take and hold
such property, as if they were natives of this country, it might contravene
the statutes of a State
but, in that event, the courts would disregard them,
If this
and give to the alien the full protection conferred by its provisions.
result can be thus obtained, surely the Federal government may. in the exercise
of its acknowledged power to treat with Indians, make the provision in question,
coming, as it fairly does, within the clause relating to the regulation of commerce.
;

When

came before the Supreme Court again (United
43 Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U. S., 491, 494), the authority
of the United States to make the provision there in question was more
States

the case

v.

clearly asserted, as follows:
legal and constitutional questions were raised on the
and it was held that Congress, under its constitutional power
to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, may not only prohibit the introduction and sale of spirituous liquors in the Indian country, but extend

Several

argument

important

here,

that
such prohibition to territory in proximity to that occupied by Indians
competent for the United States, in the exercise of the treaty-making power,
to stipulate in a treaty with an Indian tribe that within the territory thereby
ceded the laws of the United States, then and thereafter enacted, prohibiting
;

it is
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the introduction and sale of spirituous liquors in Indian country, shad be in
full force and effect until otherwise directed by Congress or the Presidenl

United States, and that a stipulation
and he binding upon the courts,
situated within an organized county of
stated in a very clear ami able opinion by
\\ S., 188.
r. i:; Gallons of Whiskey.
of the

to that effect will

vigore,

although
a

the

operate />r>j/>rii>
coded territory is

State.
These conclusions are
Mr. Justice Davis, United States

«):'>

A question arose as to the power to prevent the sale of liquor in
the town of Odenah, Wisconsin, located within the boundaries of
Bad River Indian reservation and was submitted to this office for
opinion.
The provision affecting that land, found in the treaty of
September
Xo
set

1854 (10 Stat., 1100).

30,

is:

spirituous liquors shall he made, sold, or used on any of the lands herein

apart for the residence of the Indians and the sale of the same shall be
in the territory hereby ceded until otherwise ordered by the

prohibited
President.

same treaty certain missionaries, teachers, and other perupon the reservations made
therein, were allowed to enter the land occupied by them.
Certain
tracts were entered under this provision and patents issued therefor.
Some of the hinds so entered were sold and it was upon stich a
tract that the saloons complained of were being conducted, the
owner- claiming that the land was not a part of the reservation
and that the United States had no control over it. In the opinion
of August [0, 1900, it was held that the sale of liquor upon such
The clause construed by the court
tracts was contrary to the law.
same
as
the
i- substantially
the
provision in the Yankton agreeact
the
and
case
cited would justify the conand
ratifying
ment
clusion that the latter provision would he upheld and declared effectWhile
ive to prevent the sale of liquor upon any of these lands.

By

the

sons residing in the territory ceded or

in

S., 488), the Supreme Court hold- that
regulations respecting the persons of Indians who have he-

Matter of Heff (197 U.

police

come citizens

fall

within the domain of state jurisdiction, uothing

said there can he held as

overruling the decision in United States

/•.

Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, supra, or of denying the declarations there

sion

made

as to the authority of

prohibiting sale of liquor upon

Congress

to

lands allotted

make
to

a

provi-

and ceded

Until the court has made some declaration to the
contrary this Department should go upon the theory that the act

by the Indians.
of

August

L5,

L894,

was within the power of Congress and can

he

enforced.

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs says: " My own opinion, for
whatever il may be worth, is that no punishment byfineand imprisonment would have the same deterrent effect in any event asa forfeiture
<d* title."
It should he remembered, however, that the clause in question would prevent sales on only a comparatively small portion of
5194—Vol. 34— (to m

27
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.

Yankton reservation; that is, only on
by heirs of deceased allottees. The allotments to Indians
cover only a portion of the reservation, the remainder being open to
settlement and entry by whites. Only a portion of the allotted lands
will be subject to sale as inherited lands under the act of May 27,
1902 (32 Stat., 245, 275). Tracts entered under the law providing
for the disposal of unallotted lands, and tracts conveyed by allottees
after removal of restrictions on alienation by issue of patents in fee
or otherwise, would not be affected by the clause in the deeds for
inherited land; in other words, the provision in the law attaches to
all the land while the clause in the deed would attach to onl} a comthe lands formerly within the
tracts sold

7

paratively small portion.

It is

doubtful whether,

if

the clause be

any large degree of protecTo prevent sales upon one tract while
tion against the evil aimed at.
the traffic may be carried on without let or hindrance upon an adjacent tract, would not prove of great benefit to the body of the Indians.
Real protection to the Yanktons must be found in the law as it now
stands or in some provision to be hereafter enacted affecting the whole
body of these lands.
Any condition imposed will naturally diminish the chances of sales
and depreciate the price to be obtained by the heirs of deceased Ininserted in these deeds,

it

will of itself give

dian allottees for their lands. The injury resulting to this class of
Indians from insertion of this clause in their deeds should be taken
into consideration and if it outweighs the probable benefit to the body
of Indians, the clause should be rejected. As pointed out above,
the prevention of sales upon only a small portion of the land inhabited

by these people would afford no

effective

moral protection, while

the imposition of the condition most probably would result in a

considerable financial injury to the individuals whose lands will be
affected.

It

would seemingly w ork clisadvantageously
T

to

them with-

out any compensating advantage to others.
For these reasons I doubt the advisability of inserting this clause
in deeds for lands formerly within the

Yankton

reservation, or for

lands in like condition elsewhere.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

TOWNSITES IN OSAGE INDIAN RESERVATION— SALE OE LIQUORS-ACT
OE MARCH 3, 1905.
Opinion.
There is no provision in the act of March 3, 1905, relating to townsites in the
Osage Indian reservation, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to insert
in deeds for lots in such townsites a clause prohibiting the sale or storage
of liquor on the premises conveyed and providing for a forfeiture of title
in case of violation of the prohibition.
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The general laws prohibiting the introduction of intoxicating liquors into the
Indian country are applicable to towns in the Osage Indian reservation.

Campbell to the Secretary of
January 25, 1906.

Assistant Attorney -General

You have

referred

i'or

my

the Interior,

(W. C. P.)

opinion on the questions presented,

a

Commissioner of Indian Affairs of January 5, .»<)C.
This letter embraces two matters, the first being the question of incorporating in deeds for lots in the towns of Pawhuska, Bigheart,
Foraker, Fairfax and Hominy in the Osage Indian reservation, the
letter of

the

(

1

clause recently adopted

for insertion in all conveyances of Indian

inherited lands, prohibiting the sale or storage of liquor on the prem-

conveyed and providing for forfeiture of title in case of violation
and the second being the modification of that
clause to protect mortgagees of the land.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs says that it lias been assumed
jby his office that as these townsites are within the reservation the general laws prohibiting the introduction of intoxicating liquors into
"the Indian country" were applicable and would suffice to prevent
ises

of the prohibition;

liquor traffic there.

He

further says this position was taken in 1003

with reference to the townsite of

Washunga

in the

Kaw

reservation

and that so far as known no trouble has been experienced there in
preventing the sale of liquor under the general law. He evidently
now entertains a doubt as to the correctness of that position and
regards the omission of a specific inhibition against the sale of liquor
on these lots in the law authorizing the sale of the lots as
that

legislation

and

is

a

defect in

of opinion that the defect might be more

surely cured by including in all deeds covering lots in those townsites
a clause similar to that

now

inserted

in

deeds of inherited Indian

lands than by seeking additional legislation.

The act of March :\. 1905 (-33 Stat.. L048, 1061), designates the
lands to be reserved for these different towns and directs that they be
surveyed, appraised, and laid

oil'

into lot-, blocks, streets,

and

alleys

by the Osage townsite commission "and sold at public auction after
due advertisement to the highest bidder by said townsite commission
under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary

of the

Interior."

This law doe- not

attach

any condition

respecting the sale of liquor on the premises nor doe-

it

authorize

Department to attach any such condition. Hie -ale i- to be
absolute and unconditional.
It is not the province of the executive
department to remedy a supposed defect in the law in the manner
proposed here, nor has it any power to do that. The insertion of a
clause of the nature proposed here, which would amount to the imposition of a condition subsequent upon the title, i- purely a legislative
If
function and therefore outside the -cope of the executive action.
this
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it be deemed necessary to have such a condition imposed Congress
should be asked to grant authority therefor or to enact such additional
legislation as may be needed.
It is believed, however, that the position heretofore assumed in the
Indian Office is correct and that the general laws prohibiting the

introduction of intoxicating liquors into the Indian country will
prevent the introduction and sale of such liquors in these towns. The
Osage Indian reservation is Indian country beyond question, as
defined by the

Supreme Court of the United States in Bates v. Clark
The sale of lots within these several townsites would

(95 U. S., 204:).

not destroy the character of the reservation as Indian country.

The
Department of Justice was asked whether there was anything in
the laws of the United States in relation to the Indian territory
which would prevent the establishment of a distillery on lands
therein where the Indian title is extinct.
In reply to that question

Attorney-General Griggs, after referring to the case of Bates
Clark, said (22 Ops., 232):
In the above decision in Bates
country, except as the Indian

where the

v.

title

v.

Clark, all this territory remains Indian

thereto has been extinguished, and as

it

proposed to be erected, its
erection is obviously forbidden by the section above referred to, unless the
Indian title thereto has become extinct in the sense in which that expression is
used in the case above cited.
Just to what extent over this vast territory thus described as Indian country
the Indian title must be extinguished in order that, under the decision referred
to, a particular locality therein shall cease to be Indian country is not apparent.
But, in view of the evident object and purpose of Congress in this and kindred legislation to prevent the introduction of intoxicating liquors among the
Indians or into localities inhabited by them, it is obvious that much more in
this direction is required than that the Indian title shall be extinct as to the
particular lot or parcel of land on which the distillery is erected or proposed
to be erected.
In view of this and of existing facts in the Indian territory, the question
submitted is somewhat indefinite. You ask in substance whether there is
anything in the laws of the United States that prevents the establishment of
a distillery in the Indian territory " on lands therein when the Indian title is
includes the place

distillery in question is

extinct."
If this

means merely that the Indian

the distillery

is

proposed to be erected

is

title to

the particular lands on which

extinct, the first part of the question

should be answered in the affirmative, while if it means that the Indian title is
extinct there over such an extent of territory as that such territory has, under
the doctrine of Bates

v.

Clark (supra), ceased to be Indian country, then the

section above referred to does not itself prohibit such distillery.

The
Indian

sale of lots in these townsites
title

would surely not render the
would cause

extinct over any such extent of territory as

the Osage reservation to cease to be Indian country.

The laws

of

the United States prohibiting the introduction of intoxicating liquors
into the Indian country

would

still

remain in force as to

all

the
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in these

sufficient to
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prevent the sale of liquor

towns.

The question

as to the modification of the " liquor clause " in deeds

of inherited Indian lands has been considered in another opinion of

which reference is hereby made.
Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

this date to

ARID

LAND-WITHDRAWAL-INCOMPLETE CLAIMS-ACT OF JUNE

17,

1902.
(

)PINI0N.

Uncompleted claims to lands withdrawn under the provisions of the act of
June 17, 1902, and determined to he needed for construction of irrigation
works in connection with a project that has heen found practicable, should
not he allowed to lie perfected, hut should remain in the same status as
existed at the time the determination was made and the rights of the
claimants adjusted upon the hasis of that status.

Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
(E. F. B.)
January ,!',. WOO.

Assistant Attorney -General

I

am

in receipt of a report

from the Director of the Geological

Survey upon a letter from the Commissioner of the General Land
Office relative to proposed instruction to be given to the register and
receiver at Boise, Idaho, to " accept all final proofs offered for laudin Deer Flat reservoir site but issue no final certificates thereon pending further notice and forward said proofs to this office."
The Director is of the opinion that such instructions should not be
given, and the matter is referred to me for opinion "as to which,
under the law and the regulations of the Department, is the proper
action to take in this matter, that recommended by the Commissioner
of the Genera] Land Office or that recommended by the Director of
the Geological Survey."
I
understand the lands in question have been withdrawn for use
in the construction and operation of the irrigation works of the
Payette-Boise project and hence have been appropriated by the
government.
The different withdrawals to be made under the reclamation act
were described and the proper course to be followed in such matters
was pointed out with considerable detail in instruction- approved
June 6, L905
It
was there said that withdrawals
L. I).. 607).
under either form would not defeat any valid entry, location or
(

,

,

>:

>

which had the effect df segregating the Lands and that all
such entries, -election-, and location- should be permitted to proceed

selection
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to patent or certification the same as if such withdrawals had not been
made " except as to lands needed for construction purposes." The

eighth paragraph of these instructions reads as follows
In the event any lands embraced in any entry under which final proof has
not been offered, or in any unapproved or uncertified selection, are needed in the
construction and maintenance of any irrigation work (other than for right of

way for ditches or canals reserved under act of August 30, 1890) under the
reclamation act, the Government may cancel such entry or selection and appropriate the lands embraced therein to such use, after paying the value of the improvements thereon and the enhanced value of such lands caused by such
improvements.

The matter of the effect of withdrawals on existing entries was
again considered in instructions of October 12, 1905 (34 L. D., 158).
The course to be pursued in respect of entries within a withdrawal for
construction purposes is set forth in paragraph 2 (page 163), as
f ollowT s

As soon as it shall be determined that the project is practicable and advisable
and the construction of the same is approved and authorized by the Secretary
of the Interior, a withdrawal will be made of all public lands shown by the examination and survey to be required for use in the construction and operation
of the works, and all persons who may have made entry of such lands within
such withdrawal prior to the preliminary withdrawal and who have not acquired a vested right thereto, will be notified of the appropriation of their lands
for irrigation purposes and that their entries will be cancelled and their improvements paid for by the government as provided for by the 8th and 9th
sections of the circular of June 6, 1905 (33 L. D., 607), unless sufficient cause
be shown within sixty days from the date of such notice.

It has been

determined that the Payette-Boise project

is

feasible

and that certain lands will be needed for construction of the Deer
Flat reservoir in connection with that project. The instructions referred to certainly do not contemplate that claims to lands thus determined to be needed for construction of irrigation works in connection with a project that has been

purpose

to

found practicable, should thereafter

On

the other hand, it wT as the evident
maintain a status existing at the time the determination

be allowed to be perfected.

was made and

to adjust the rights of all claimants

upon the

basis of

that status.

The recommendations
in accord

of the Director of the Geological Survey are
with said instructions and should be adopted.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
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NAVlGABIiE STREAMS—ISLANDS—RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

East Kansas City Land Co.
Upon the admission of
<»f

Congress

Heirs of Mensing et

State into the Union

a

capacity the right to

power

v.

all

to

the

regulate

it

acquires

under navigable

soil

in

rivers,

its

al.
sovereign

subject to the

commerce among the States and with

foreign nations, and all lands that

may afterward form upon

the beds of

such streams become the property of the sovereign State, or of the proprietor of the shore lands, in virtue of his riparian right, according to the
law of the State in which the land is situated.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
January 27, 1906.
(F. L. C.)

This motion

is filed

Land

Office,

(E. F. B.)

by the East Kansas Land Company and the
for review of the decision of the Depart-

Guinotte Land Company

ment of June
in

*27,

controversy

1005 (not reported), so far as

it

holds that the land

public land of the United States subject to the

is

and control of the land department.
The contention of the Land Company is, first,
known as Mensing's Island was not in existence

jurisdiction

that the land
at the

now

date of the

admission of the State of Missouri into the Union, and having been

formed since then,
second, that even

it

if

inured to the State in virtue of its sovereignty;
existed as an island at the date of the admis-

it

sion of the State into the

surveys,

it

Union and

at the date of the

township

passed by the original patents from the government con-

veying the surveyed

lands on the opposite shores and has since

belonged to the adjacent riparian proprietors.

That was the contention of the Land Company upon the appeal
from the decision of your office and the argument in support of it was
the same as now submitted in support of this motion.
Upon the first proposition, however, they allege additional facts
bearing upon the question as to the non-existence of the island at the

survey which were not presented when the cases were considfrom your office and which it is contended overcomes every presumption as to the existence of the island at that date

•

laic of

ered on the appeal

that

may

rested,

it

arise

from the facts upon which tlu* decision complained of
is no direct proof as to the actual

being conceded that there

existence of the land as an island at the date of the admission of the
State.

The additional

allegation of the

Land Company

is

that in the

majority of the plats of survey along the Missouri river the existence
of islands adjacent to such surveys is shown, and it must therefore

presumed that where a plaj of survey show- no island, none
Hence it is contended that the practice of noting islands
along the meander line of the surveys must have prevailed at that

he

existed.
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date as to surveys along the Missouri river and that abundant proof
of a prevailing practice to that effect would have been found in the

records of the General

Land

Office

had they not been overlooked.

It is also asserted that the records of the

General Land

Office

evidence other facts not noticed in the decision and not considered,

which, it is contended, conclusively negative the existence of the island in controversy as early as 1821. The alleged facts are that in
1819 the Government entered into a contract with David Deshler for
the survey of the islands in the Missouri river from the then Western

boundary of the State

at the

mouth

of the

Kaw

river to its confluence

with the Mississippi river; that Deshler's surveys were systematic,
commencing at the Kaw river he surveyed down stream numbering
the islands as he found them in regular and consecutive order from 1
to 103 that some of the islands surveyed by Deshler are not shown on
the original township plats and some that are shown on the township
;

plats are not

He

shown upon the

plats of Deshler's surveys.

did not survey any island between township 50 north, range 33 west and

township 50 north, range 29 west, a reach in the river from the initial point, of
24 miles. He then found and surveyed an island which he numbered 1 and then
proceeded down the river to its mouth, surveying and numbering in consecutive
order. It must be presumed that at the time there were no islands existing in
the river adjacent to township 50 north, ranges 33-32-31 and 30 west or they
would have been surveyed and numbered by him.

The other contention

is

that even if

it

be conceded that the island

Union the
by the rulings

existed at the date of the admission of the State into the

company's right as

a riparian proprietor is controlled

of the highest court of the State at the time of the issuance of the

patent and not by the latest adjudication of that court holding that
the right of a riparian proprietor in Missouri extends only to the

waters vdge, citing in support thereof, the case of Gelpcke
of

Dubuque

A

y.

City

(1 Wall., 175).

re-examination of the facts has been

made and

a careful consid-

eration given to the authorities cited in support of the alleged errors
of law.

While the grounds of error

in the findings of fact

and the rulings

of law as alleged in the motion do not appear to be sustained, there
is a

well-established rule of law governing the proprietorship of the

beds and shores of rh

T

ers, that

was not given consideration

in the deci-

sion complained of, which, if applied to the facts as found by the

Department, would determine this case adversely to the government.
That rule, as expounded by the Supreme Court in St. Louis y. Rutz
(138 U. S., 226, 245), is " that if an island or dry land forms upon
that part of the bed of a river which is owned in fee by the riparian
proprietor, the same is the property of such riparian proprietor. He
retains the title to the land previously owned by him with the new
deposits thereon."
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This rule grows out of the well-established doctrine that the State
upon its admission into the Union acquired in it- sovereign capacity
the absolute right to all the navigable water- and to the soil under
them subject only to the power of Congress to regulate commerce
among the State-, and with foreign .nation-, and that all land- that
afterwards formed upon such beds become the property of the sovereign state, or of the proprietor of the shore land- in virtue of his

which the land is
Keokuk. 94 U. S., 324.)
The land in controversy was held to be public land upon the theory
that a part of the island as now formed existed at the date of the
admission of the State, and the United State- under its right as a
riparian proprietor, was entitled to the land that subsequently formed
riparian right according to the law of the State in

(Barney

situated.

v.

thereon as accretion.

from the facts
is evident, however, from the testimony and
found by the Department, that the greater part if not all of this
accretion is now formed upon the bed of the river south of the center
of the main channel, to which the State at the date of its admission
acquired proprietorship under its sovereign right, so that, whatever
It

as

may

be the extent of the riparian right of the shore proprietor as

against

the State, the United States, under the rule

announced

in

Rutz, cannot lawfully assert any claim to that part of
the island formed upon the bed of the river south of the center of the
main channel as it existed at the date of the admission of the State
St.

Louis

into the

There

v.

Union.

no direct proof of the existence of the island earlier than
At that time an island known as Choteau island was on
the north side of the river which some of the witnesses believed was
the same as what is now known as Mensing's Island. The main channel was then south of that island, and between the north of the
island and the mainland there was a slough about 300 yard- wide.
There i- no proof as to the width of the island. The river, between
the north and south banks of the mainland, was about forty chains
1837 or

is

l«s:>«s.

wide.

Choteau island had any connection whatever with Mensing's
it is evident that after L837, and prior to L857, the river forced
a channel through the slough on the north side of the island, cutting
away a large part of it. This channel has since been the main channel of the river and the land has continued to form, filling up what
Was formerly the main channel of the river and attaching in the
If

island,

Bouth shore.

must be admitted that the evidence is not satisfactory ;i- to the
what was known a- Choteau island, with reference to
the center of the main channel of the river in L837 or L838, or what
part of the land in controversy, if any. lies north of the center of the
It

exact locus of
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old channel.

The

fact,

however,

is

well established that there

was an

island on the north side of the old channel opposite the site of the

land in controversy as early as 1837 or 1838, which was well timbered,
and the land in question was identified by some of the witnesses as
If that
that island which was formerly known as Chotean island.
is true, it is probable, as was found in the decision complained of,
that after the new channel was formed there was a part of the island
known as Choteau island left on the south of the new main channel
as a nucleus upon which land was formed on that part of the bed
north of the center of the old channel, but that is a mere inference
resting upon slight and uncertain testimony.
After the survey of the island in 18.57 by the United States, the
island was from time to time encroached upon by the washing of the
north shore, and a considerable part of the island at this time is
evidently on the bed of the river south of the old main channel. "What

part of the land in question is so situated can not be determined, nor
can it be determined from the testimony what part of the land as
surveyed by the United States army is now north of the center of the
old channel. It is certain that there is very little of it. if any.

In view of the uncertainty as to the existence of the land in controversy at the date of the admission of the State into the Union, and of
the fact that the present value of the land

ments placed upon
public interest will

is

due solely to the improve-

by the interveners, it is not believed that any
be subserved by attempting to dispose of any part
it

of said island as public lands, especially as

it is

not likely that any

bid will be offered because of the uncertainty and doubt as to the

title

of the government.

The decision of June 27, 1905, is hereby vacated, and your decision
holding that the land in controversy is public land is reversed.

DESERT LAND ENTRY—SUSPENSION—CONTEST—HEARING.
Langer
A

V.

Wasman.

direction by the Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of the General

Land Office to withhold the issuance of patent on all desert-land entries
within a given land district does not amount to a suspension of such entries,
and the jurisdiction of the local officers to consider contests against the
same is in no wise affected thereby.
The authority of the local officers to order a hearing on a contest against a
desert-land entry is in no wise affected by an order of the land department
suspending all desert-land entries in the township in which the entry in
question is situated, where the order of suspension was not issued until
after the expiration of the statutory lifetime of the entry.
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Land

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
.;

January

V. L. C.)

An appeal
office

lias

decision of

been

filed

May

2,

-//.

1906.

I

on behalf of Rose

1905, wherein
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you

Office,

W.

A.

Wasman from

P.)

your

affirm the action of the

and hold for cancellation her desert-land entry No. 5015,
|. Sec. 33, T. 19 N., II. 4 E., and lots 1 and 2
T. 18 N., R. 4 E., Greatfalls, Montana, land district.

local officers

for the E.

of Sec.

4,

J

of the SE.

of the record it appears that claimant made
on August 28, 1899, and submitted the required annual
proofs for the first, second, and third years, on August 22, 1900, November 11, 1901, and October 16, 1902, respectively: that prior to
Agnes Langer filed
to wit, on August 5, 1902
the last-named date

From an examination

said entry

—

—

an affidavit of contest against the said entry, alleging, in substance,

was non-desert

that the land involved

quired

sum had not been expended

in

in

character,

and that the

re-

annual improvement

the

thereof; that as a result of hearing regularly

had the

local officers,

found that the land was desert in character, and
that claimant had substantially complied with the law in the matter
of improvements, and hence recommended that contest be dismissed;
that on December -J9. 1902, contestant appealed therefrom, and during the pendency of the same before your office claimant, on July 13,
on December

5,

1902,

gave notice of her intention to submit final proof in support of
On August 18, 1903, contestant filed
s.id entry on August -JO, 1903.
of
against
contest
said entry and the allowance
protest and affidavit
of Mich final proof, again setting out the allegations contained in the
former contest affidavit, and. in addition thereto, charged that the
land had not been reclaimed from its desert character.
Xo action
190)),

was taken thereon pending the

final disposition

of the former contest,

and on the date named proof was submitted by claimant, protestant
not appearing, which proof was held by the local officers to await

outcome of the above- described proceedings.
The local officers, by letter of September 23, 1903, transmitted to
your office the application of contestant to be permitted to dismisher former contest and appeal then pending before your office, and to

the

he allowed to proceed with the later contest.

Your

office,

by decision

of October 20, 1903, granted this request as to the dismissal of the

and appeal, but. considering the case as between the govern
and the claimant, affirmed the finding of the local officer- as to
the character of the land and sufficiency of the improvements, dismissed the contest, and closed the case.

contest
ni'Mit

[Jpon receipt of notice of -aid decision, the local

officer-,

on

(

)ctober

Langer's protest and affidavit of
contest, proper service was had. and on the day set for hearing both
parties appeared generally and submitted testimony of a large num-

26,

L903,

issued

ber of witnesses.

notice

On

on

Julv

Mrs.

l!7.

l'.M)!.

the local officers rendered their
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finding thereon, holding that as a result of the prior contest

it

had

been finally determined that the land was desert in character, and
that the required annual expenditures had been made by the claimant, and that these questions would be considered as res adjudicate
leaving only for determination the question as to whether the land
had been reclaimed from its desert character. On this ground they
found against the claimant and recommended the cancellation of
said entry.

In this connection it appears that by departmental
your office was addressed as follows

letter of

July

15, 1903,

You are hereby
made or that may

directed to withhold the issuance of patents on

all

entries

hereafter be made, under the desert land act, in the Greatfalls district, Montana, until further ordered by this Department.

It further

appears that your

office

by

letter "

P

" of

October

8,

1903, addressed to the local officers of the Greatfalls district, after

reciting certain townships investigated

by

embracing

a special agent,

the tract covered by the entry in question, concluded as follows

made by Agent Chadwick the land above described
withdrawn from entry under the desert land law and all desert entries
covering any of said lands will stand suspended until investigated by a special
In view of the showing

is

•

agent to determine their bona fides
You will make the necessary notes on your plats and tract books and after
receipt hereof allow no entry to be made under said act, for any of the abovedescribed lands, except in cases where the application or claim was initiated
prior to receipt of this letter in your office.

From the adverse action of the local officers claimant appealed to
your office, assigning errors going to the general issue, and also
urging that they were without authority or jurisdiction to hear said
contest because of the prior order of suspension of October 8, 1903,
supra.

By

decision of

May

2,

1905, your office affirmed the finding of the

local officers as to failure to reclaim the land, holding, as to their

authority to hear said contest, that

As

to the question of jurisdiction,

which

is

raised for the

first

time on this

and protest
and the final proof itself
submitted, before the order of October 8, 1903, was made, and which order of
suspension remains unrevoked. But contestant having filed her contest against
the entry, as before stated, charging facts which, if true, would necessarily call,
for its cancellation, it is competent for this office to allow the prosecution of
such contest, and to approve your action in proceeding therewith, especially as
by means thereof the result contemplated by the order of suspension, referred
appeal,

it

will be observed: that Langer's second affidavit of contest

against the allowance of the final proof

is

to,

was

filed,

attained.

From

that decision claimant has appealed to this Department,

and

assigned errors as follows
1.

Error to maintain that the register and receiver or the Commissioner of
Land Office had jurisdiction of the case or were authorized to

the General
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consider and act upon the contest against said entry, in view of the departmental order of Oct. 8, 1903, suspending action on desert land entries in said
land district, which order of suspension remains unrevoked.
2.

Error

to

was submitted

hold the contestee had
a sufficient

acquired

at

the time her final proof

water supply, permanent

in

character, to reclaim the

qo1

land.
:;.

Error

to

hold the cultivation' was not sufficient under the decisions and
department at that time, a " marked increase in the growth of

rule of the land

grass" being accepted as meeting the requirements of cultivation.
4. Error to hold the entry for cancellation on the record presented.

From

examination of the somewhat voluminous record,
which is very fully and fairly stated in your office
decision, and need not be here repeated, the Department finds that a
clear preponderance of the testimony sustains the charge and warraids the concurrent finding and conclusion of the local office and of
your office, in effect, that there had been no sufficient reclamation of
Did the local officers
the tract in question from its desert character.
have authority to order this hearing at which Mich testimony was
a careful

the substance of

submitted

I

now urged

in support of the appeal that the

departmental letyour office, was a general
order of suspension and was in full force and effect August Is. 1903,
when the present contest affidavit was filed, and therefore the local
officers were without jurisdiction to act on the same.
The Department, however, can not concur in this contention. The letter in
question directed only that your office withhold the issuance of patents on all desert-land entries in the Greatfalls, Montana, land district, until further ordered.
There was no direction that this information he conveyed to either the local officers or the entrymen. This
order would not prevent the former from receiving final proofs and
issuing certificates thereon, or excuse the latter from compliance with
It

i>

ter of

July

L5,

L903, sitpra, i\(\i\v(^>cd to

the requirements of the desert-land law.
it
is further urged that, while the affidavit of contest in the
now under consideration was filed with the local officers prior
to your order of suspension of October 8, 1903, supra, notice had
not issued thereon, and that subsequent thereto the local officers
were without authority to issue such notice ordering a hearing for
the purpose of submitting testimony in support of the charges
against the entry and final proof.
The Department has carefully considered this phase of the pres-

But

case

ent

proceeding.

Where

the statutory

life

of an entry ha- not

pired at the date of suspension, time doe- not run against

it

ex-

during

such suspension, but where this period ha- elapsed, a subsequent susit a new life or afford the entrynian opportunity
comply with the law and submit final proof showing such

pension does not give
thereafter to

compliance.

It

will he observed

that

the statutory

lifetime of the
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entry in question had -expired prior to the issuance of your said order
of suspension; and that shortly before such expiration claimant

gave notice of her intention to submit final proof in support thereof
showing " complete irrigation and reclamation " of the land. This
Avas an announcement to the public generally to appear and show
cause why said proof should not be accepted and final certificate
issued.
Contestant herein accepted this challenge by filing protest
against the allowance of the final proof and affidavit of contest
against the entry, alleging failure to reclaim the land from its desert
character.
This filing of protest, submission of final proof, and expiration of the life of the entry, having antedated the order of suspension, the right of the contestant to a hearing on such charge was
It does not appear, nor does the
not thereby delayed or defeated.
claimant so allege, that she was in any manner injured by notice
issuing and hearing being held promptly following the final determination of the prior contest, rather than to await a time when the
order of suspension shall have been revoked. Claimant was served
personally with a notice which informed her of the charge against
her entry. At the hearing she made a general appearance, crossexamined contestant's witnesses, testified, and introduced a number
of witnesses in her own behalf, without offering any objection whatever to proceeding with the hearing and determination of the contest.
For the reasons stated, and upon careful consideration of this
case, the Department is of the opinion that the judgment of your
office holding said desert-land entry for cancellation on the evidence
thus adduced, should be affirmed, and it is accordingly so directed.

desert eaxd entry—corporation—qualifications.
Silsbee

Town Company.

In case of an application by a corporation to make desert-land entry, it is
within the power and it is the duty of the land department to inquire into
the qualifications of the individuals composing the corporation to make
entry in their own right under the provisions of the desert-land law.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

February

(F. L. C.)

The Department has before

Town Company,

it

J.

appeal

Lund

Office,

(E. O. P.)

1006.
filed

on behalf of the Silsbee

from your office decision of April
1905, calling upon the company to show the qualifications of the
dividuals composing it to make entry, in their own right, under
a corporation,

18,
in-

the

provisions of the desert land law. in connection with the application
of the

company

17. T.

16

S.,

to

make such entry

for the

SE.

]

.

Sec.

8.

XE.

j.

Sec.

E. 13 E., S. B. M., Los Angeles land district. California.
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as

is

to the

authority of the Secretary of the Interior, in his administration of
the public land law, to look beyond the corporation, as a legal entity,
to

determine

its

make

right to

desert land entry.

In the administration of the several statutes,

public land

under the provisions

sought to be acquired by individuals,
associations or corporations, the Secretary of the Interior is charged
with the duty of requiring a strict compliance with such provisions,

of

which

title to

is

The right of the Dedeems requisite, touching the
qualification of applicants for entries under the public land laws,
follows naturally from duty resting upon the Department to investigate fully all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
applications before allowing them. This right is not to
proffered
be defeated nor the performance of this duty circumvented by the
employment of a legal fiction.
The language of the act under which the application in question
in

accord with their broad spirit and intent.

partment to call for such evidence as

made

was

under

touching the right of the applicant to take or hold land

provisions,

its

it

plain

is

no person or association of persons shall hold, by assignment or otherwise
t<>
the issuance of patent, more than three hundred and twenty acres of

hut

prior

such arid or deserl land,
It

i

Sec

7,

act

March

3,

1891, 26 Stat., lour.,

i

contended on behalf of appellant that the holdings of an

is

individual, represented by shares of stock in a corporation, do not

represent a holding of any portion of the land entered by the corpo-

an individual capacity. That this is the general rule at
But that the courts
is it- soundness doubted.
have power and have frequently exercised it. to go behind the corporate organization and examine the acts of the individuals composing it. when to totally disregard them and look only t<> the legal
entity before them would close the door to a full investigation of the
actual facts and thereby permit the accomplishment of an end by the
body corporate when such action was forbidden to the individual
members, i> equally well settled.
The language quoted clearly discloses the legislative intent that
ration, in

law

is

not disputed nor

no person or association of persons -hall obtain (he benefit incident
to the

acquisition of title to

desert-land law. and
exercise

and

in

directly,

in

it

the intent

through

more than 320 acre- of land under
not

a

the

(he

the intention to permit a person to

an individual capacity, the benefit

addition, obtain

same right

was

like benefit,

conferred,

by the indirect exercise of the

instrumentality

of

a

legal

With

fiction.

of the act clearly before u>. the solution of the question

here involved presents less difficulty, a-

a

sufficienl

reason

presented for looking beyond the -ingle qualification of

is

tin-

at

once

corpora-
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and examining the

lion as such,

bers

who compose
"

The word
bers

corporation "

who compose an

poration

mem-

is

bur a collective

name

for the corporators or

mem-

and where it is said that a corperson, or being, or creature, this must be understood in a

itself a

is

qualifications of the respective

it.

incorporated association

;

figurative sense only.

(See Morowetz on Corp., Sec. 1; also Sec. 227.)
In those cases where an observance of the rule at law that a corporation is a distinct and separate entity, may operate to conceal the
real interest of the individual members, and those interests may be

contrary to the policy of the law, equity will disregard the

fiction.

So the idea that a corporation may be a separate entity, in a sense that it
can act independently of the natural persons composing it, or abstain from acting, where it is their will that it shall, has no foundation in reason or authority,
is contrary to the fact
and, to base an argument upon it. where the question
;

is.

as to whether a certain act

was

the act of the corporation, or of

holders, cannot be decisive of the question,

may

and

is

its stock-

therefore illogical

;

for

it

as likely lead to a false, as to a true result.

(State ex

ret.

r.

Standard Oil

Co.,

40 Ohio

St., 137,

178.)

In the case at bar the question involved is one solely between the
government and the applicant, and the government has the same right
to inquire into all the facts as would the sovereign state which
brought the corporation into being, if the question were one between
it and the corporation respecting an evasion or infringement of the
In such cases the
policy of the law.

may not prevent the success of ingenious
evade or violate the law. There can be no immunity for evasion of
the policy of the State by its own creations.
(Ford v. Milk Shippers' Ass'n, 155 111., 10(3, 180.)
courts are not so powerless that they

schemes

to

It is well established that where concerted action has been taken
by the stockholders of a corporation in their individual capacity,
tending to affect the rights, duties or obligations of the corporation
itself, and inquiry into the result of such action becomes material, the

courts will look to the acts of the individual shareholders as the acts
of the corporation.

As between the corporation and those with whom it deals, the manner of
exercise usually is material, but as between it and the State, the substantial
inquiry is only what that collective action and agency has done, what it has,
in fact, accomplished, what is seen to be its effective work, what has been its
its

conduct.

(People

It
v.

ought not to be otherwise.
North River Sugar Refining

Co., 121 N. Y., 582, G22.)

In the case under consideration the question involved is the same,
What has in fact been accomplished, though the positions are
reversed and the inquiry here concerns the acts of the corporation as
affecting the rights of the individual members.
viz

:

j

|
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In the decision last cited the court held (p. 625) that a corporation
not necessarily, and under all circumstances, entitled to exercise

was

same rights as an individual. The Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking through Mr. Justice Brewer, has affirmed this docthe

following language:

trine in the

A

(

some purposes as a person
endowed with the inalienable

corporation, while by fiction of law recognized for

purposes of jurisdiction as
rights of a natural person.

;iik1

tor

Nor. Sec. Co.

Neither

is

v.

U.

S.,

193 V.

S.,

a citizen, is not

197, 362.)

when the policy of

a corporation,

the law

is

involved,

to be considered, in all cases, as possessed of all the legal rights

natural

of a

person, especially in those cases where by combining the

and

rights of a person, as an individual,

member of

a corporation,

to the spirit of the

it

his rights as a

component

tends to confer a double benefit contrary

law granting but one right

one thing for the State to respect the rights of ownership and protect
them out of regard to the husiness freedom of the citizen, and quite another
thing to add to that possibility a further extension of those consequences by
creating artificial persons to aid in producing such aggregations.
(People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., supra, p. 625.)
lor

it

is

With

this

power of the courts

so firmly settled,

it

is difficult

to see

upon what grounds the contention of appellant may rest, when urged
to question this authority of the Department to inquire into the real
facts surrounding, and the direct effect of. the allowance of an application to enter

and eventually acquire

title to a

portion of the public

domain.

The Department is clearly of opinion, for the reasons herein stated,
announced in the case of Jacob Switzer Co. (33 L. D.,
383) should, in the interests of good administration, be adhered to.
that the rule

In relation to the proof of incorporation offered by appellant, the

Department

is

of opinion the same

sufficient, under the provisions
and the same should be accepted.
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.
is

of section _>,.>7. California Civil Code,
,

In

other respects,

all

SURVEY—WITHDRAWAU—SCHOOL. LAND-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS—ACT OF
AT GUST 18, L894.
Ensign

v.

State ok Montana.

The provision of the ad of Augusl

is, 1894, authorizing the survey, on applicabehalf of the State, of any unsurveyed townships of public lands
therein, and the withdrawal thereof from the date of the application until
the expiration of sixty days from the Qling of the township plat, with a

tion

in

view to satisfy the public land grants
the

withdrawal of

application

is

(ill

to the state,

authorizes and requires

of the lands in the townships for the survey of

made on

5194r- Vol. 34-ror. M

behalf of the State.
28

which

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

434
The

act of February 28, 1891, amending section 2275 of the Revised Statutes,
protects all rights acquired by settlements made prior to survey in the field

upon sections sixteen or thirty-six, reserved for school purposes, but where
a township is ordered surveyed on application in behalf of the State, under
the act of August 18, 1894, and the lands are withdrawn for the purposes
specified therein, such settlements only as were made prior to the withdrawal are protected as against the State.
(Secretary Hitchcock to the

Commissioner of the General Land

(F.L. C.)

May

The above

entitled case

of the plaintiff,

Edgar

S.

is

Office,

(E.J. H.)

28, 1905.

before the Department upon the appeal

Ensign, from your

office

decision of

Novem-

ber 28, 1904, sustaining the action of the local officers in rejecting
his homestead application tendered upon the filing of the township
plat of survey, on April 26, 1903, for the

NW.

J of Sec. 36, T. 11 N.

R. 19 W., Missoula, Montana, land district, for conflict with the rights
of the State under

its

school land grant.

Ensign alleged settlement on the land March 14, or 15, 1902, and
This was prior
that he had resided thereon continuously ever since.
to survey in the field, but it appears that upon application of the
Governor of the State for the survey thereof, the township was withdrawn from settlement, entry, or other disposition adverse to the
State, on July 17, 1899, under the provisions of the act of August 18,
1894 (28 Stat., 394), and that due notice thereof was published as
required by said act.
It is claimed on behalf of Ensign that your office erred in holding
that all of the land in said tow nship was withdrawn from settlement,
entry or other disposition adverse to the State, under the act of 1894,
supra; that such attempted withdrawal is in conflict with section 2275
of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of February 28, 1891
(26 Stat., 796), which amended section protects settlement rights
made prior to survey in the field upon reserved school sections 16 and
36; and that Ensign was entitled to make homestead entry of the
land applied for under said amended section 2275.
T

Said act of 1894, in substance, authorizes the governors of the sevnamed therein, which list includes Montana, to apply to
the Commissioner of the General Land Office for the survey of any
township or townships of public lands remaining unsurveyed in said
States, and for the withdrawal of said lands, " with a view to satisfy
the public land grants made by the several acts admitting the said
States into the Union " and provides that upon such application
being made, the Commissioner of the General Land Office shall notify
the surveyor-general thereof, who shall proceed to have such survey
made, " and the lands that may be found to fall within the limits of
eral States

;
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such township or townships, as ascertained by the survey, shall be
reserved upon the filing of the application for survey, from any
adverse appropriation by settlement or otherwise except under rights
that may be found to exist of prior inception, for a period to extend

from such application for survey until the expiration of sixty da} s
from the date of the filing of the township plat of survey in the
proper district land office, during which period of sixty days the
State may select any of such lands not embraced in any valid adverse
claim, for the satisfaction of such grants," etc.
The language of the foregoing quotation from the act of L894,
clearly authorizes and requires the withdrawal of nil of the lands in
the townships, for the survey of which application has been made,
to enable the State to satisfy the several grants of public lands made
by the act admitting said State into the Union, and in the case of all
of said States one of the grants for which the lands were to be thus
reserved " from any adverse appropriation by settlement or otherwise,
except under rights that may be found to exist of prior inception,"
was the school land grant of sections 16 and 36 in the several town7

ships.

made upon sections 1G and 30
an protected, but under the subsequent
act of 1894. where a township has been ordered surveyed upon application of the Governor of the State, and the lands therein withdrawn
Under

the act of 1891, settlements

prior to survey in the held

1

purpose specified, such settlements only as were made prior to
withdrawal are protected as against the State. The provisions
of the later act control, and as Ensign does not claim settlement prior
to the withdrawal, his application must be rejected.
for the

the

Your

office

decision

is

accordingly affirmed.

SECOND HOMESTEAD ENTRY—ACT OF

Cox
The

act of April 28,

1904,

v.

Wells (Ox Review).

known

as the " Kinkaid Act," authorizes a second

much

or additional homestead entry of so
in

land, within the limits defined

the act, as added to that embraced in the

six

APRIL. 28, 1904.

first

entry shall not exceed

hundred and forty acres, regardless of the fad that the entryman may

have relinquished his

first

entry for

a

valuable consideration.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the (lateral L<tn<l Office,
(V. L. C.)
(E. P.)
February ;. 1906.

July 29, L904, Levi P. Wells made homestead entry <>f the NE.
1, T. 34 X., R. 11 W., O'Neill land district. Nebraska, againsl

|

of Sec.
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which Peter
charging, in

(i.

Cox. on August 24.
Wells had. on

effect, that

11)04, filed

May

affidavit of contest,

29, 1892,

made homestead

entry of the SE. \ of the SW. \ of Sec. 26 and the X. \ of the XE. J
and the XE. J of the NW. \ of Sec. 35, T. 33. R. 8, O'Xeill land dis-

Nebraska, which he relinquished for a consideration, and was
make another homestead entry. This affidavit was rejected by the local officers on the ground that it did not
state a cause of action, it being by them held, in effect, that Wells's
former entry having been lost prior to the passage of the act of
June 5, 1900 (31 Stat.. 267), the circumstances surrounding such loss
could not be inquired into. Cox appealed, and your office, by detrict,

not therefore qualified to

cision of

On

December

29. 1904. sustained the action of the local officers.

further appeal by Cox. however, the Department, by decision of

June

26. 1905 (33 L. D.. 657). held that the said act of June 5, 1900,
supra, was modified by the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat.. 527).

which provides,

make

in

effect,

that

any person thereafter applying

to

second homestead entry, he having failed to complete his
former entry, must show that the former entry was not relinquished
a

for a consideration, and that, as Wells's second entry
the passage of this act. the charge

was

sufficient.

was made

A

after

hearing was

therefore directed to be ordered on said charge.

The attention of the Department is now, by your office letter of
January 29, 1906, for the first time directed to the fact that the land
embraced in Wells's second entry is within the limits subject to disposition under the act of April 2s. 1904 (33 Stat.. 547). known as the
" Kinkaid law." which, after authorizing homestead entry by one
person of not more than six hundred and forty acres situated within
certain defined limits, provides that " a former homestead entry shall
not be a bar to the entry under the provisions of this act of a tract
which, together with the former entry, shall not exceed six hundred
and forty

acres."

Considering the fact that the land in question is within the limits
described in the act last mentioned and that the combined area
embraced in Wells's first and second entries does not exceed the maximum quantity allowed to be entered under the act. in connection with
the herein quoted provisions of the act. the Department is of opinion
that it is immaterial whether Wells relinquished his first entry for a

consideration or not, and hence that the charge stated does not conTherefore the order for a hearing issued
stitute a cause of action.
in accordance

with the directions contained in departmental decision
is hereby directed to be revoked.

of June 26, 1905,
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APPLICATION—ENTRY OF RECORD—PJELINQTHSHMENT— CANCELLATION.

O 'Stiff,

v.

La

Croix.

instituted on behalf of the Government solely for the
purpose <it* clearing the record of an existing entry, do question of a preference right is involved, and where a relinquishment is subsequently filed
and there are no valid adverse rights outstanding, the rule that no application to enter shall he received until proper notation of the cancellation of
the entry is made upon the records of the local office, has no application.

Where proceedings arc

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F.

L

February

C.)

,9,

Land
(E.

1906.

Office,
(

>.

P.)

O'Shee has appealed to the Department from your office
17. 1904, denying his application to locate military bounty land warrant. No. 115,616, upon the XA\'. j. Sec. 22, T.
7 X.. R. 2 AY.. New Orleans land district. Louisiana, because of conflict with the prior application of John L. La Croix to locate military
bounty land warrant No. 1!).71!>. upon the same tract.
The land involved was formerly embraced in the homestead entry
of one James M. Arrington, against which entry proceedings had
been instituted on behalf of the government looking to its cancellaOn February 24, 1904, subsequent u> the hearing, but prior to
tion.
final action by your office upon the testimony submitted, the relinquishment of Arrington and the application of La Croix to locate,

James

L.

decision of

were

filed

November

in the local office, but

was then made upon the record.

May
of

23,

May

no notation of said relinquishment
This notation was not made until

1904, following the direction contained in
19, 1904.

On May

21, 1904,

O'Shee

your

filed his said

office letter

application,

which was rejected by the local officers for conflict with the prior
On June 3, 11)04. O'Shee again made simiapplication of La Croix.
lar application, which was likewise rejected for the same reason.
In the decision appealed from, affirming this action of the local
officers, the case of Walters
Northern Pacific Railroad Company
(23 L. I).. !'.>•_!). is cited, but no reference is made to the rule announced in departmental decision in the case of Stewart
Peterson
(28 L. I).. 515), nor to the case relied upon by appellant to sustain
(he contentions urged in his appeal, viz., Young
Peck (32 L. D..
/•.

/•.

/•.

102).

In the case of Stewart

>'.

Peterson, supra,

it

was held and directed

lliatimportant matter of regulation may be perfectly clear, it
no application will he received, or any rights recognized as
initiated by the tender of an application tor a tract embraced in an entry of
ln order that this

is

directed that

upon the records of the local office.
Thereafter, and until the period afforded a successful contestant has expired.
<>r he has waived his preferred right, applications may be received, entered, and
record, until said entry has been canceled
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held subject to the rights of the contestant, the same to be disposed of in the
order of filing niton the expiration of the period accorded the successful contestant or upon the filing of bis waiver of bis preferred right.

Circular of instructions, containing language equally broad, was
prepared in accordance with the direction contained in this decision
?29 L. D., 29).
The broad language used would appear to extend to all cases, but
an examination of these cases, out of which the necessity of the
rule seems to have arisen, discloses that it was not intended to apply
in cases where no action on the part of your office was necessary to
clear the record of an existing entry and restore the land covered
thereby to the public domain.
So long as no final action had been taken by your office upon the
proceedings had before the local officers, and there had been no
transfer of the interest in the land, the right of the entryman to
is unquestioned, and upon the filing of such relinquishment
was the duty of the local officers to make proper notation thereof
upon the record. On the filing of such relinquishment, by operation
of law the entry was canceled and no further action was necessary to
The making of the notation thereof was purely a
effect that end.
ministerial act and it was clearly the duty of the local officers to

relinquish
it

promptly perform it. Had the proceedings here involved been
brought by a party having a potential preference right of entry, as
in the case of an ordinary contest, the benefit flowing from the filing
of the relinquishment might have inured to him, and the acceptance
of another application, pending the exercise of that right, would
cause embarrassment yet this would have had no bearing upon the
plain ministerial duty of the local officers to note the filing thereof
;

upon the record.
Clearly the rule announced in the case of Stewart
6upra, was not intended to permit the local

v.

Peterson,

officers, in their discre-

tion, to decline to make such notation.
The effect of a relinquishment duly executed and filed before final cancellation of an entry is

well settled, and
r.

it

attaches eo instanti the filing thereof (Walters

Northern Pacific Railroad Company, supra) and there

is

no

dis-

cretion vested in the local officers relative to the action to be taken by
l

hem.

Final certificate had been issued in the case at bar, yet it does
is it contended, that there had been any transfer or

not appear, nor

incumbrance of the equitable title of the claimant.
Arrington states in his affidavit of A,pril 27, 1904

On

the contrary,

that be has never sold, conveyed or disposed of, nor incumbered in any manner,
the bind embraced in bis relinquished homestead entry.

While it is true the government will refuse to recognize relinquishments made after issuance of final certificate and in fraud upon bona
fide incumbrancers or transferees (Addison W. Hastie, 8 L. D.. 618;
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H

L. I).. 224, Richard F. Hafeman, il>.. 644; Paul v.
Harlan P. Allen,
I)..
Wiseman, 21 L.
12; Alfred A. Anscomb, 26 L. I).. 337), it seems
claims existed in this ease nor was the
no
such
adverse
clear that
officers
the
local
of
based
upon any such claim. In any event
action
of such relinquishment, should have
upon
the
local
filing
officers,
the
enter,
subject to any adverse claim that
to
applications
accepted
presented.
have
been
might
Where proceedings are instituted on behalf of the government
solely for the purpose of clearing the record of an existing entry,
no question of a preference right is involved, and where a relinquishment is subsequently filed and there are no valid adverse rights outstanding, the rule that no application to enter shall he received until

proper notation of the cancellation of the entry
office, has no application.

is

made upon

the

records of the local

The

case under consideration

is

therefore not covered by depart-

mental circular of July 14, L899 (20 L. I).. 29), and the contention
of appellant, based upon departmental decision in the case of Young
r.

Peck, supra, can not be sustained.
For the reasons herein stated the decision appealed from

hereby

is

affirmed.

manner of proceeding on special agents' reports.
Instructions.

Department of the Interior.
General Land Office,
Washington,

To Special

I>. (

'..

February

/.£.

1906.

.[(/cuts <m<I Registers <m<l Receivers,

United States Land

Offices:

The following rules are prescribed for the Government of proceedAll existing
ings had upon the reports of special agents of this office.
instructions in conflict herewith are superseded.
1.

The purpose hereof

is

to secure

speedy action upon special agents'

adverse reports upon claims to the public lands, and to allow entry-

man, or other claimant of record, opportunity to

denial of the

file a

charges against the entry or claim, and to be heard thereon

if

he so

desires.
2.

the

Upon

receipt of the special agent's report this office will consider

same and determine therefrom whether the charges,

if

true,

would

warrant the rejection or cancellation of the entry or claim.
3.

Should the charges,

if

not

disputed,

justify

the

rejection

or

cancellation of the entry or claim the local officers will be duly notified

thereof and directed to issue notice of such charges in the manner
for. which notice must be served upon

and form hereinafter provided
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the

entryman and other parties

in interest

shown

to be entitled to

notice.

The

4.

notice

must be written or printed and must

state fully the

charges as contained in the letter of this office, the number of the
entry or claim, subdivision of land involved, name of entryman or

claimant or other

The

5.

true,

(a)

notice

known

must

parties in interest.

also state that the charges will be accepted as

entryman or claimant

unless the

files

in the local office

within thirty days from receipt of notice a written denial of said
charges with an application for a hearing, (b) or if he fails to appear
at any hearing that may be ordered in the case.
If the entryman or
claimant applies for

a

hearing he

may

indicate therein the time and

place for such hearing, subject to the approval of the local officers,

the time to be not less than 60 days from date of his application
therefor.

Notice of the charges may be personally served upon the proper
party by the local officers at their office, but if this can not be done
they will deliver the notice to the special agent for service under the
(').

rules.

may

If the special agent can not secure personal service, notice

be served, upon sufficient showing by the special agent or other

qualified person,
lication to be

by publication.

made under

The

register

w ill
T

require such pub-

the rules.

7. If a hearing is asked for, the local officers will consider the same
and confer with the special agent relative thereto and fix the hearing
for the date and place stated in the application, if practicable under
the rules, due notice of which must be given entryman or claimant.
The above notice may be served by registered mail.
8. The special agent will duly submit, upon the form provided
therefor, to the Receiver of Public Moneys an estimate of the probThe special
able expense required on behalf of the Government.
agent will also serve subpoenas upon the Government witnesses and

take such other steps as are necessary to prepare the case for prosecution.
9.

and

The

special agent

must appear with

his witnesses on the date

at the place fixed for said hearing, unless

he has reason to believe

that no appearance for the defense will be made, in which event no

appearance on behalf of the Government will be required. The
whether the defendant intends to appear at the hearing.
10. If the entryman or claimant fails to apply for a hearing, or
fails to appear at the hearing ordered, without showing good cause
therefor, such failure will be taken as an admission of the truth of
the charges contained in the special agent's report and will obviate
any necessity for the Government's submitting evidence in support
special agent must, therefore, keep advised as to

thereof.
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Upon

day

the

set

for the hearing

and the day
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which

to

it

may

be continued the testimony of witnesses for cither party

may

be sub-

if present, may examine and cross-examine
under
the rules, the Government to assume the burden
the witnesses,
special
agent's charges.
of proving the
12. If the entryman or claimant fails to apply for a hearing or to
appear at a hearing applied for, as provided in paragraph 10, or if
a hearing is had, as provided in paragraph 11. the Local officers will
render their decision upon the record, giving due notice thereof in the
usual manner.
13. Appeals or briefs must be filed under the rules, but need not
be served upon the special agent, nor will the special agent Hie any

mitted, and both parties,

appeal or brief unless directed to do so by this

office.

14. The above proceedings will be governed by the Rules of PracAll notices served on claimants or entrymen must likewise be
tice.
served upon transferees or mortgagees, as provided in Rules 8-J of

Practice.

Very respectfully,

W.
Approved
E. A.

A. Richards, Commissioner.

:

Hitchcock. Seen

tary.

SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL

HOMESTEAD—APPROXIMATION.

.John S. Morton.
Only one application of the rule of approximation

is

allowed to each original

and where the 'ighl is divided, the
rule may be applied only in the location of one portion thereof; but where
a portion of
righl is located for
tract of land embracing merely a
fraction of an acre excess, such small excess will not. under the rule de
minimis non <-nr<tt lex, i>e regarded as preventing the holder of the remainder of the right, in making location thereof, from applying the role of
right

of soldiers'

additional

entry,

i

;>

;i

approximation.

Land

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(

February

F. L. C.)

John

S.

Morton has appealed

decision of April 24,

76*,

1906.

to the

Office,

W.

P. E.

Department from your

|

office

L905, rejecting his application, a> assignee of

Anna MeXally. widow of William MeXally.
2307 of the

(

T. 33 N.. R. 31 E., (iroat falls.

under section

to enter,

Revised Statutes of the United States,

lot

Montana, containing 7.60

7.

Sec.

28,

acres.

Said application is based on a military service of said William
MeXally and the homestead entry. No. 3281, made by him April 22,
18(31),

at

Omaha. Nebraska,

for eighty acres of land.

Ili>

additional
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right for eighty acres of land was duly assigned by his widow, and

subsequently divided into two parts, each for forty acres, which were
used as bases for the following entries:
(1)

The application

certificate

(2)

June

of Oscar Keeline, transmitted

for 35.96 acres, Sundance,

Wyoming, allowed March

12, 1902,

31, 1904, final

No. 668, patent issued December 2, 1904.
of Albert L. Colthrop, transmitted

The application

March

14,

North Dakota, allowed April 19,
1904, final certificate No. 9093, patent issued December 31, 1904.
The applicant herein, John S. Morton is the admitted owner of
the remaining right for 4.04 acres acquired from said Keeline, and
the only question presented by this appeal is his right to enter 7.60
1902, for 40.43 acres. Devils Lake,

acres in accordance with the rule of approximation.

In the case of William C. Carrington (32 L. D., 203) the Depart-

ment directed the preparation of

a circular of instructions announcing

that in all future entries under said section
the rule of approximation will be applied only when the entire additional right
originally due to the soldier, his widow, or orphan children, is offered as a basis
lor the entry.

This circular was issued August

7,

1903 (32 L. D., 206), and con-

tained the following instructions additional to the foregoing:
If part of the right is located

upon a tract of land agreeing

in

area with such

right surrendered or located, then this circular will not prevent the application

of the rule of approximation as to the remainder,

if

offered in its entirety as a

basis for the entry.
If the right

has been divided, and a part located and entry allowed therefor,

before the date of this circular, the rule of approximation

may

the outstanding and unused portion of such right, in the

be applied as to
to the

manner and

extent above directed as to the additional right originally due.

In the case of
One

Guy A. Eaton

(32 L.

application of the rule of approximation

of soldiers' additional homestead entry,

may

D„

644)
is

it

was held that:

allowed to each original right

and where the right

is

divided, the rule

be applied only in the location of one portion thereof.

Following the views expressed in the case of Vernon B. Matthews
and in the opinion of date June 30, 1900 (30 L. D.,
105), the Department is of the opinion that the allowance of Colthrop's said application for 40.43 acres, instead of 40 acres, should
be regarded as coming within the rule de minimis non curat lex, and
not as an application of the rule of approximation, which was not
(8 L. D., 79),

considered in connection therewith.
It thus not

appearing that the rule has been heretofore invoked
1

in connection with this soldiers additional right,

ent application exhausts the right,

approximation
4.04 acres,

may

it

is

and

since the pres-

believed that the rule of

properly be applied herein, the right being for

and the excess being only

3.56 acres.
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If no other valid objection appear the application will be allowed,
your said decision being hereby reversed.

DESERT LAND ENTRY— CORPORATION—QUALIFICATIONS OF MKMHKIJS.
J. II.

within the power and

is

It

is

McKnight Company.
the duty of the land department to require a cor-

poration, seeking to acquire title to a desert land entry as assignee of the

show that the individual members composing the corporation are not disqualified under the desert land law to hold and acquire
original entryman, to

title to

such entry.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(

February

F. L. C.)

19, 1906.

Land

Ofti<<\

(J. R.

W.

>

J. H. McKnight Company, a corporation, assignee of GusAdolph Roensch, appealed from your decision of June 8,

The
tavus

1905—
show the extent to which each individual member of said corporation has
exhausted his right under the desert land law. and that the members of said
corporation do not hold in the aggregate by assignment or otherwise more than
and upon failure
320 acres of such desert or arid land;
to

....

the assignment of said
It

is

Roensch

to said

company

.

will stand rejected.

argued that
"

terms and limitations
applying to or affecting such taking and
none other than the terms and limitations of the desert-land law
itself
that "no person or association of persons shall hold by assignment or otherwise, prior to the issue of patent, more than three hundred
and twenty acres of such arid or desert land." Sec. 7. act of March
1891,

The only

'*

holding, can be

....

.'*>.

16 Stat.. 1095.
It

is

then argued,

at

great length and citation of a great mass of

law " a person " and " citizen " of
the State wherein it is organized, and as such is entitled to enter
such land, to the limit allowed, irrespective of the holdings of its

authority, that a corporation

constituent

members or

is

in

stockholders.

There can be no question that the object and purpose of the limitation in the act was to prevent the entry of large areas of public
lands by few or by one person.
This being the purpose of the provision, it is obviously the duty of the land department so to interpret
and administer the law as to effectuate the purpose, and not to permit
the evasion and nullification of the law by mere legal fiction.
A corporation is "a person" only by legal fiction for convenient
administration of justice.
v.

Pugh

It

(3 Burr, 1243) that

:

was

held by Lord Mansfield

in

Morris
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Fictions of law bold only in respect to the ends and purposes for which they
were invented. When they are urged to an intent and purpose not within the
reason and policy of the fiction, the other party may show the truth.

A
it

corporation

is

by

fiction of

law

which

a citizen of the State in

created for purposes of the administration of justice and the

is

removal of suits to or jurisdiction of the federal courts, but

not

it is

a citizen within the meaning of that clause of the constitution which
guarantees that " the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all

Paul

the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
v.

Virginia (8 Wall., 108)

410)

;

;

Ducat

v.

Chicago (48

111.,

172; 10 Wall.

Wright (23 N. J. L., 429). The fiction of relation
muniment of title to the date of the entry,
of inception of the proceeding out of which it resulted, is

Tatem

v.

of a patent or other
or act

allowed to operate only " for the security and protection

?1

of justice,

and not so as to work injustice.
101) Bear Lake Irrigation Co.

Gibson v. Chouteau (13 Wall., 92,
Hussv. Garland (104 U. S., 1, 23)
man v. Durham (165 U. S., 144, 148). Legal fictions are sufficiently
transparent that they are penetrated by the light of real fact when
justice requires it, or they are seen to be invoked to defeat the policy
;

;

of the law.

A

case recently came before the Department wherein one who
his right to appropriate public lands had recourse
exhausted
had
to the device of organizing a corporation in which he held four,

hundred and ninety-eight shares, and two other persons held one
share each. Jacob Switzer Company (33 L. D., 383). The Department held that the real person was not well hidden behind the
The subject was fully considered in Silsbee Towii
fictitious one.
Company (34 L. D., 430), and the same result was reached.
The court looked through the fiction in McKinley v. Wheeler 130
U. S., 030, 030), and followed its decisions in Bank of the United
States v. Devereaux (5 Cr., 01, 87), and Society for Propagation of
(

the Gospel

New Haven

v.

United States

v.

held that a corporation

and when necessary
regarded as
persons, and

it

is

is

(8

Wheat,

404, 491), in so doing.

Trinidad Coal Company (137 U:
is

S.,

In

100) the court

in legal fiction " a person," that

it is

in fact,

and purpose of a law will be
an aggregation and association of natural

to enforce the policy

in fact,

within the inhibition of section 2347 of the Revised

Statutes, inhibiting an association of persons
coal lands than therein limited.

The opinion

from acquiring more

(ib.,

109) holds that:

The reasons that suggested the prohibitions in respect to " associations of persons " apply equally to incorporated and unincorporated associations. But the
purpose of the government would he defeated altogether, if it should he held
that corporations were not " associations of persons " within the meaning of
the statute, and subject to the restrictions imposed upon the latter by sections
2347 and 2350. It is unreasonable to suppose that Congress intended to limit
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the right of entering coal lands to one hundred and sixty acres in the case of an
individual, and to three hundred and twenty acres in the ease of an unincor-

porated association, and leave the way open for an incorporated association
to acquire public coal lands without any restriction whatever as to

.

.

.

.

quantity.

The language

of the statute, to say nothing of the policy

which under

does not require or permit any such interpretation of its provisions. The
words "association of persons" are often, and not inaptly, employed to describe
An incorporated company is an association of individuals acting
corporation.
lies

it.

,i

As this court has said,
a single person, and by their corporate name.
"private corporations are hut associations of individuals united for some common purpose, and permitted by the law to use a common name and to change
as

its

members without

a dissolution of

R. R. Co./". Fifth Baptist

Church (108

the association."
U.

S., 'Ill,

Baltimore and Potomac

330.)

pursue the discussion. There is no limit
may be formed by one person.
holding nearly the entire interest, associating with himself two others
having only nominal interests. If, under each of such unlimited
number of corporate organizations and adopted names a new right
i> acquired to appropriate public lands, then the policy and purpose
It

is

to the

useless further to

number

of the law
to the area

is

of corporations that

violated, the limitation

is

nullified,

and no

limit exists as

of land that one individual can acquire, save the total area

and the means the individual can command.
urging a legal fiction, in the words of Lord Mansfield, "to an intent and purpose not within the reason and policy of
the fiction."
The Department will not sanction it.

of the public lands

Manifestly this

is

Your decision

is

affirmed.

arid land-withdrawal-

v<

t of june

17,

h>02.

Opinion.
All entries of lands

withdrawn under

the provisions of the act of

June

17, 1902.

thereof, and a revocation
are subject to the conditions imposed 5y section
of the withdrawal operates to remove those conditions and leaves the
.">

same situation as entries made prior to the withdrawal, and
such conditions can not. by force of a second withdrawal, he reimposed
upon such of the entries made during the period of the first withdrawal
as had not been perfected at the date of the second withdrawal.
entries in the

Assistant Attorney General

Campb< II t<> the Secretary of the Interior,
(K. F. B.)
February 20,1906.

By order of the Department, dated April

20, 1903, lands within

the irrigable area of the contemplated Okanogan irrigation project
in the State of Washington, were withdrawn from entry, except

under the homestead law. tinder authority of section 3 of the reclamation act of June IT. VMY2 (32 Stat.. 388)-, which provides that all
entries made under the homestead law
of lands within the limits
7

,
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of such withdrawal and during such withdrawal, shall be subject to
all

the provisions, limitations, charges, terms, and conditions of the

act.

withdrawal was in force, certain entries were allowed
its limits.
Subsequently (July 8, 1904) the withdrawal was revoked, but afterward (August 23, 1905) the lands
were again withdrawn for use in the construction and operation of
the irrigation works under what is commonly known as the first form
of withdrawal.
A letter from the Director of the Geological Survey relative to
such withdrawal, with a report from the Commissioner of the General Land Office thereon, has been referred to me for opinion " as to
whether the entries made while the land was withdrawn under the
second form, from April 20, 1903, to July 8, 1904, are now subject
to limitations and restrictions of the reclamation act and should be
so treated in the classification of the irrigable lands under the

While

this

of lands within

project."

As long as the withdrawal continued in force, the lands covered
thereby were subject to entry only under the conditions imposed by
Those conditions attached by force of the statthe reclamation act.
ute to each and every entry allowed during the period of the withdrawal.

The revocation

of the withdrawal of

its

own

force subjected

the lands to entry and disposal under the general land laws free from
all

conditions except such as are imposed by those laws and with

equal force removed the conditions prescribed by the reclamation

had attached to entries made during the withdrawal.
After the revocation of the withdrawal and while the lands formerly covered thereby were subject to disposal under the general
land laws, all entries of such lands whether made during the period
of withdrawal or after the revocation thereof, could have been perfected free from the conditions and limitations prescribed by the
third section of the reclamation act. The question now presented
is whether those conditions can, by force of a second withdrawal, be
re-imposed upon such of the entries made during the period of withdrawal as had not been perfected during the restoration of the lands
to entry and disposal under the general land laws.
That such conditions cannot be imposed upon entries that were
made after the revocation of the withdrawal, is too plain to admit of
If the revocation of the withdrawal of its own force
controversy.
subjected the lands to disposal under the general land laws and with
act that

equal force removed the conditions that had attached to the entries

made during

the period of withdrawal, the logical result must be

that these entries are to be treated as having been

withdrawal.

made

prior to any
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effect of

made

entries

withdrawals made under the reclamation

prior to such withdrawals

paragraph of the instructions of June

6,

is

447
act

upon

thus stated in the fifth

1905 (83 L. D., 607, 008)

:

Withdrawals made under either of these forms do not defeat or adversely
affect any valid entry, location, or selection which segregated and withheld the
lands embraced therein from other forms of appropriation at the date of such
withdrawal and all entries, selections, or locations of that character should
be permitted to proceed to patent or certification upon due proof of compliance
with the law in the same manner and to the same extent to which they would
have proceeded had such withdrawal not been made, except as to lands needed
;

for construction purposes.

In his letter of January 8, 1906, the Director says
The township in question is located in the midst of the

irrigable district,

and is the center of the active operations under the project in view of which
and upon recommendation of this office, the township was again withdrawn
by the Department August 23, 1905, under the first form of withdrawal.
;

He

also states that the engineers are iioav at

work

classifying the

lands and desire to have an authoritative opinion as to the status
of the entries in question.

The
to

status of the lands depends

in fact they are

If they are, all of such lands to which a vested right

the works.

had not attached
to

upon whether

be appropriated for use in the construction and operation of
at the date of the last

appropriation for such uses.

affected

withdrawal will be subject

If they are not, they will not be

by the mere technical form of withdrawal, and should be

permitted to proceed to patent or certificate upon compliance with
the law as directed in the instructions above referred to.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

McKibben

e.

Gable.

Motion for review of departmental decision of October

18, 1905,

34 L. D., 178, denied by Secretary Hitchcock February 20, 1906.

coal land-declaratory statement-preferexce right.

Lehmer
Where an

v.

Carroll et

al.

(On Review.)

association of four persons has expended not less than five thousand

working and improving a mine or mines of coal on the public
association, in the absence of any prior or superior claim,
may enter under the coal land laws not exceeding six hundred and forty
acres, including such mining improvements, even though no declaratory
statement may have been filed for the lands.

dollars in

lands such
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The

object and purpose of a declaratory statement under section 2349 of the
Revised Statutes are to give notice of, and to preserve for the period specified in section 2350, a preference right of entry already acquired under section 2348
and such preference right of entry is not created or initiated by
;

the tiling of a declaratory statement.
If the privilege of postponing entry in the manner provided by sections 2341)
and 2350, after a preference right of entry shall have been acquired under
section 2348, be not desired by the claimant, the filing of a declaratory
statement before application or entry is not necessary or required and
in such case, even if the claimant should fail to make application to enter
and to pay for the lands within the sixty days allowed by section 2349
for filing a declaratory statement, neither the failure in this respect nor
failure to file a declaratory statement would operate to forfeit the right
to purchase and enter the lands except in favor of some other qualified
;

applicant.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

February

(F. L. C.)

This

is a

decision of
et al.

motion by Frank

Xovember

10,

Land

W. Lehmer

Office,

(A. B. P.)

20, 1906.

for review of departmental

1905, in the case of

Lehmer

v.

Carroll

(34 L. D., 207), wherein the application by Carroll et

al.

to

purchase under the coal land laws (sections 2347 to 2352, inclusive,
of the Kevised Statutes) certain described public lands, aggregating six hundred acres, situated in the Bozeman land district, State

Lehmer against
was dismissed. For convenience of reference the
lowing extracts from said decision are here quoted
of Montana, was sustained and the protest by

application

said
fol-

was accompanied by the separate indiand two other persons. In these papers it is
set forth in substance that the lands applied for are of the class and character
subject to sale under the coal land laws, that the applicants are severally qualified to purchase, and apply to purchase, as an association under section 2348, and
that they have expended the sum of $8,000, in developing and improving mines

The

application itself under oath,

vidual affidavits of the applicants

of coal on the lands.

With the application to purchase' were presented what purport to be deeds
release and quitclaim to the associated applicants, embracing, severally,
portions of the lands applied for, and for which the persons who executed the
of

deeds had, respectively, previously filed coal declaratory statements, under section 2349.
From the official records it appeared that other declaratory statements had been filed covering portions of the lands. The local officers thereupon notified the coal declarants, as well those from whom deeds of release and
quitclaim had been obtained, as those who did not appear to have released their
claims, that they would be allowed until December 28, 1903, to show cause, if
any they could, why the associated applicants should not be permitted to purchase and enter the lands applied for. None of the parties so notified ever
appeared in the proceedings.
December 26, 1903, one Frank W. Lehmer, a stranger to the record, filed
his sworn protest, corroborated by the affidavit of one H. H. Griffith against
the application to purchase. On this protest a hearing was had at which the
protestant submitted the testimony of one witness. The applicants introduced no
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upon the proofs filed in support of their appliand the cross-examination of the witness introduced by the

evidence, but rested their ease
cation to purchase

pro testa nt.

*

In his protest Lelnner asserts no right, or claim of right, in himself to any of
the binds

embraced

in

the application to purchase.

He

does not deny that the

lands arc chiefly valuable for coal and in other respects subject to sale under

land laws.

the coal

Ilis

charges are,

in

substance and

effect,

(1)

that no

preference right of entry was acquired by any of the parties from whom the
applicants obtained deeds of release and quitclaim to themselves of the lands

covered by the declaratory statements filed by said parties, respectively, because
none of them ever opened and improved any coal mine or mines on the lands;
wherefore the declaratory statements were illegal and of no effect, and consequently no rights were conveyed by such deeds, (2) that the applicants to purchase had not themselves, either collectively or individually, prior to the time

any time, opened and improved any coal mine
upon any of the lands applied for other than the SE. i of the SYY. | and the SE. i
of the NE. i of Sec. 10, T. 5 S., R. 23 E., and (8) that the applicants to purchase
had not, either as an association or as individuals, expended the sum of $5,000
in working and improving any mine or mines of coal on any of the lands

of filing their application, or at

applied for.
It is
set

not denied that the decision correctly represents the matters

forth in the proofs and papers submitted with the application to

had with respect to the prior coal declaraand the charges contained in Lehmer's protest.
The Department held 1 that the prior coal declarants having
failed to appear as required by the notice given them were thereafter
purchase, the proceedings

tory statements,

(

)

out of the case, and, the record being thus cleared of all claims to the

lands other than that asserted by the associated applicants to purchase,

it

could

make no material

difference

whether the coal declara-

(2) that it was not essential to
the validity of the application to purchase that the associated appli-

tory statements were valid or not;

have opened and improved a mine or mines of coal on
it appearing from the proofs that a
coal mine had been opened and improved on one of said tracts; and
(3) that on the question of the amount expended in working and
improving such coal mine the testimony at the hearing did not
weaken but tended to strengthen the showing made by the application
cants should

the several tracts applied for,

and proofs.

The main contention

in the

motion for review

the associated applicants to purchase

is

that inasmuch as

had themselves

filed

no declara-

tory statement for the lands applied for, if the declaratory statements

by the prior claimants from whom deeds of release and quitclaim
had been obtained were invalid, a matter which upon the record was
held to be immaterial, said applicants had no preference right under
any declaratory statement, and' for that reason could not enter more
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than 320 acres of coal lands: wherefore the Department erred

in

sustaining the application in this case.
Section 2347 of the Revised Statutes provides that
Every person above the age of twenty-one years, who is a citizen of the
United States, or who has declared his intention to become such, or any association of persons severally qualified as above, shall, upon application to the
register of the proper land office, have the right to enter, by legal subdivisions,
any quantity of vacant coal lands of the United States not otherwise appropriated or reserved by competent authority, not exceeding one hundred and
sixty acres to each individual person, or three hundred and twenty acres to
such association, upon payment to the receiver of not less than ten dollars per
acre for such lands, where the same shall be situated more than fifteen miles
from any completed railroad, and not less than twenty dollars per acre for such
lands as shall be within fifteen miles of such road.

By

section 234S

Any person

it is

provided that

or association of persons severally qualified, as above provided,

who

have opened and improved, or shall hereafter open and improve, any coal mine
or mines upon the public lands, and shall be in actual possession of the same,
shall be entitled to a preference right of entry, under the preceding section, of
the mines so opened and improved: Provided, That when any association of
not less than four persons, severally qualified as above provided, shall have
expended not less than five thousand dollars in working and improving any
such mine or mines, such association may enter not exceeding six hundred
and forty acres, including such mining improvements.
It is further provided by section 2349 that all claims under the
preceding section (2348) must be presented to the register of the
proper land district within sixty days after the date of actual posses-

and the commencement of improvements on the land, by the
and by section 2350, that
shall
claiming
under
section
2348
all persons
prove their respective
for
the
lands
filed
upon
within
one year from the
rights and pay
claims,
filing
their
and
that
failure to do so
time prescribed for
lands
entry
by
any
other
subject to
shall render the
qualified applision

filing of a declaratory statement therefor,

cant.

argued that these sections of the statute furnish no authority
for the entry, by an association of four persons, of more than three
hundred and twenty acres of coal lands, notwithstanding the expenditure by or on behalf of the association of the full amount required
by section 2348 in working and improving a mine or mines of coal
on the lands, unless the association shall have first filed a declaratory
statement under section 2349 for the lands sought to be entered, or
shall have acquired rights under declaratory statements filed by
others for the lands; and this, even though there be no conflicting
claim to the lands at the time the application to enter and the proofs
In other words, that before an assoto support the same are filed.
It is

ciation of four persons
coal lands, the

may

lawfully enter six hundred acres of

amount involved

in this case, such association

must
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under one or several declaratory statements

under section 2349.
No authority is cited to support the contention, and the Department knows of none; nor is there anything in the statute to warrant
The provisions that bear upon the
the construction contended for.
present
simple
and
no matters of intricate or doubtvery
question are
with
which the contention is urged,
The
persistency
ful solution.
for
review
in
the
motion
and
brief of counsel accompanythe
in
both
understand
except
upon
difficult
to
the theory of a misappreis
it,
ing
hension of the

office

or function of

a

coal declaratory statement.

The preference right of entry provided for in section 2348 is not,
nor indeed is any right of entry, created, or initiated, by the filing of
Such preference right
a declaratory statement under section 2341).
arises only where a person or association of persons, severally qualified to enter under section 2347, have opened and improved a mine
or mines of coal upon the public lands, and are in actual possession
The object and purpose of the declaratory statement
of the same.
are to give notice of, and to preserve for the period specified in section 2350, a preference right of entry already acquired.

words, the

office

of a declaratory statement

is

In other

to preserve the right,

it.
(McKibben v. Gable, 34 L. I)., ITS.)
The declaratory statement is useful and has a purpose to serve
only where time is desired within which to make payment for the
lands, as to which a preference right of entry exists, and to complete

not to create

the entry

proceedings.

gives notice of the right

In such a case the declaratory statement

and operates

to preserve

it

for the period

has no other function under the statute.
Such being the only purpose of the statute in providing for the
filing of a declaratory statement it must be apparent that where there
is no such purpose to serve, no declaratory statement is required.
What would be the reason or sense of requiring a declaratory statement in a case where its filing would be but a vain thing?

specified in section 2350.

It

can

make no

It

difference whether the application to enter be

by

an individual person for one hundred and sixty acres, or by an association of persons for three

hundred and twenty acres; or that the

application be for six hundred and forty acres by an association of

not less than four persons who have expended $5,000 or over in
working and improving a coal mine upon the lands. The principle
is the same in all cases.
If the privilege of postponing entry in the
manner provided by sections 2349 and 2350, after a preference right
of entry shall have been acquired under section 2348, be not desired

by the claimants, the filing of a declaratory statement before application or entry is not necessary and is not required.
And, in such
a case, even were the claimants to fail to make application to enter
and to pay for the lands within the sixty days allowed by section
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2349 for filing the declaratory statement, neither their failure in
this respect nor their failure to Hie a declaratory statement would
operate to forfeit their right to purchase and enter the lands except
in favor of some other qualified applicant.
Their preference right
of entry would be gone, but the forfeiture provided by section 2350,
upon failure to file a proper declaratory statement, or to pay for the
lands within the required period, would operate only to render the
lauds subject to entry by another qualified applicant. In the absence
1

of any other qualified applicant there would be no forfeiture been use
there would be no one in whose favor the forfeiture could operate;
and there is nothing in the statute that would prevent the claimants,
as between themselves and the government, from paying for and
entering the lands, provided the law be complied with in other
Such is in substance the holding in the decision complained
respects.
of, and the holding is clearly right.
Any other construction would
not only give rise to confusion but would be contrary to the spirit
and plain intent of the statute.
It is further contended that there was error in refusing to order
another hearing in the premises upon the recent proceedings instituted by Lehmer and one B. W. Metheny, referred to and set out in
the latter part of said decision. The action in this respect was
clearly justified by the facts and circumstances disclosed by the
record, and is adhered to.
There are other minor contentions presented by the motion for

review,

all

relating, however, to matters heretofore fully considered

by the Department.
of any error in

its

them out in detail.
them that the Department is not convinced

It is unnecessary to here set

It is sufficient to say as to

former decision.

The motion

for review

is

accord-

ingly denied.

uintah indian reservation— extension of time within which
to establish residence-act of january 27, lj)oc>.
Instructions.

Department of the Interior.
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C. February 20. 1906.
Register and Receiver.
Vernal, Utah

Gentlemen: Your
proved January

attention

is

27. 1906 (Public

invited to the act of Congress ap-

— Xo. 7), which provides:

That the homestead settlers on lands which were heretofore a part of the
Uinta Indian reservation, within the counties of Uinta and Wasatch, in the
State of Utah, opened under the acts of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred
and two. and March

third, nineteen

hundred and

three,

and March

third, nine-
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and they are hereby, granted an extension of time in
upon the lands so opened and filed upon until
the fifteenth day of May, anno Domini nineteen hundred and six: Provided,
however, That this act shall in no manner affect the regularity or validity of
such filings, or any of them, so made by the said settlers on the lands aforesaid
and

teen hundred

which

five, be.

to establish their residence

;

only intended hereby to extend the time for the establishment of such
residence as herein provided, and the provisions of said acts are in no other

and

it is

manner

to be affected or modified.

This act

November

given effect as to

is

15,

all entries

who have

Soldiers and sailors

filed

section 2309 of the Revised Statutes
lief

granted by the

filed

before

made

of said lands prior to

190;").

act,

November

declaratory statements under

come within the

spirit of the re-

and where such declaratory statement has been
15, 1905, are entitled to the extension,

both as

to settlement and entry.

Very

Approved

W. A. Richards, commissioner.

respectfully,
:

E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

DESERT LANDS— STATE SELECTION— ACTS OF AUGUST

JUNE

Yakima Development
The Department declines

18, 1894,

VXD

17, 1902.

Co.

v.

State or Washington.

approve the application of the State of Washington
under the provisions of the
act of August IS, 1804. known as the Carey act, and further declines to
adopt the suggestion of. the State to the effect that the government proceed
with the reclamation of the lands, which fall within the irrigable area of a
contemplated irrigation project under the provisions of the act of June 17,
1902. and, after reclamation shall have been accomplished under the proposed project, to allow the State the benefits thereof as though performed
by it under the provisions of the Carey act.
to

for the segregation of certain lands in that State

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

February

(F. L. C.)

By departmental
office

decision

decision of

May

herein of October

IT,

5,

1905

1904,

Land

Office.

(G. B. G.)

23, 1906.

(not reported), your

dismissing the protest

The Yakima Development Company against the application
made by the State of Washington, on behalf of the Washington
Irrigation Company, for the segregation of 55,584.99 acres of land,
list Xo. 7, under the provisions of the act of August 18, 1894 (28
Stat., 372, 422), known as the Carey act, and acts amendatory
thereof, was affirmed.
That decision was put upon the ground mainly that it was not
shown that the protestant company had such rights in the premises

of
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as called for a denial of the State's application, and your office
was directed to submit the same for departmental approval.
Your office submitted the application in accordance with this
direction, but there having in the meantime arisen certain prob-

reclamation of the lower Yakima basin, in conwith
the
administration
of the act of June 17, 1902 (32
nection
Stat., 388), known as the reclamation act, it devolves upon the
Department to consider whether the Secretary of the Interior would
be justified in entering into a contract with the State for the reclamation of the lands here involved under the act of August 18,

lems

affecting* the

1894, supra.

In this case the State proposes to reclaim 55,584.99 acres of land.
It is asserted by the State and not disputed that the Washington
Irrigation Company has a water location or locations on the Yakima River sufficient to reclaim this land, but the data collected
by the reclamation service raise grave doubts as to whether there
is sufficient water in the stream in the latter part of the summer
and early fall to satisfy its claimed appropriations. It is further
suggested that said company will not be permitted to appropriate
this water to a beneficial use, except after litigation with many
other appropriators and irrigators, and in any event, if it succeed
in this litigation, the result will be to remit large bodies of lands
now irrigated from the waters of this river to their desert condiBetion to the irreparable injury of a large number of people.
sides, it appears that a large portion of the lands covered by the
State's scheme are of the alternate even-numbered sections within
the limits of the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
and the Department questions whether it will not be a misuse of
the AAaters of this stream to attempt to irrigate a checker-board area.
If it be suggested that the State may contract for the irrigation of
its lands, the answer is that there is not sufficient water in the
river as now conserved, or as may be conserved under the State's
Besides, the railroad company,
scheme, to accomplish this end.
through its land commissioner, has expressed to this Department
the opinion that the best interests of all concerned demand that
the United States reclamation service be given full opportunity to
investigate and determine the best method of further developing
the irrigation possibilities of the valley named, and

meantime the existing
vate,

falling

within

that

in

the

status of all lands, whether public or pri-

the

government's

project

should

be

main-

showing that the company had no intention at this
time of entering into a contract other than such as might be entered
into with the United States for the reclamation of its lands. Moreover, it is not shown that the State has an enforceable contract

tained, thus

with the irrigation company for the utilization of such water supply
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law and fact own. So far as appears from
Department has been able to ascertain, the company has merely agreed to enter into a contract with
the State to reclaim these lands, and the agreement provides for
a nominal forfeit of $'250 in case the company " fails to so conIt thus appears that the damages which might grow out
tract."
as the
this

in

record, or so far as the

of the failure of the

company

to execute the contract in question

have been definitely ascertained by agreement of the parties, and
it seems clear that upon such failure the company's liability could
be satisfied by the payment of the sum named, and it appearing
that said company has agreed to sell its properties, including the
water rights in question, to the United States, the conclusion seems
justified that said company considers its agreement with the State
at an end, and that it does not intend to enter into a formal contract
for the reclamation of these lands.
Upon the other hand, the United States reclamation service purposes, if it be given full opportunity in this valley, to reclaim, by
impounding the flood waters in certain natural basins, a much larger
The
area than is possible by the State under its proposed scheme.
government's engineers report that this project is feasible, that sufficient funds are available for its accomplishment, and the reclamation

Department that it will be undertaken at an early
proposed contract be made with the State, in which
event it is said with considerable reason that the government's project
must be abandoned.
The preliminary surveys for the government's project have been
executed and a withdrawal of the lands necessary in the maintenance
of the proposed storage reservoirs was made more than a year ago.
But it is now contended on behalf of the State, though it was not
so urged or said in the earlier presentation of this matter, that the
State's scheme for the reclamation of these lands under the Carey act,
and the government's Yakima Valley project, which includes them,
may stand together; that a segregation thereof may be made under
the Carey act, and the contract therein authorized between the State
and the Secretary of the Interior executed, and that the reclamation
service may still proceed to reclaim the lands for the State, and thus
give the State the benefit of certain charges which may be assessed
against them under the Carey act, to be used by the State in the
service assures the
date, unless the

reclamation of other lands.

This contention has been most carefully considered, not only
it is novel, but because it was earnestly hoped that the Department might see a way to allow it. But it is not believed that this
can be done. Not only are grave doubts entertained as to the legality
of such procedure, but it is not thought as a matter of administrative
because
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policy that this Department would be justified in approving this very

complicated, questionable, and perhaps impracticable scheme, which

end would necessarily result in the patenting to the State of a
body of lands which will not have been reclaimed by the State,
but which in fact will have been reclaimed by the United States.
The difficulties presented upon the whole case are believed to be
insuperable, and therefore fatal to the State's contention.
The Secretary of the Interior is charged by section 441 of the
in the

large

Revised Statutes with the supervision of the public business relating
This means, as said by the Supreme Court of
to the public lands.
the United States in the case of Knight v. Land Association
112
U. S., 161, ITT), that in the administration of the trusts devolving
upon the government, by reason of the laws of Congress, that officer
" is the supervising agent of the Government to do justice to all
claimants and preserve the rights of the people of the United States."
Under all the circumstances of this case, looking to what is conceived to be the best interests of the whole people, and in the exercise of the discretion thus vested in the Secretary of the Interior, I
must decline to enter into the proposed contract with the State,
and the State's list is hereAvith returned without my approval.
(

desert land entry-suspension— contest.

Whitman
A

v.

Hume.

contest against a desert-land entry, based solely upon the ground that the
land is non-desert in character, may properly be entertained during sus-

pension of the entry but a contest charging that the entryman has failed
to comply with the requirements of the law should not be entertained
during such period where the suspension becomes effective prior to the
expiration of the statutory life of the entry.
;

Secretary Hitchcock

Dalton

Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(E. O. P.)
February 23, 1906.

to the

(F. L. C.)

Whitman has appealed

decision of

November

10,

to the

Department from your

office

1905, dismissing his contest against the

Hume for the E. J NE. J, SW. \
land district, Montana.
Greatfalls
3
E.,
T.
19
N.,
R.
Sec. 23,
desert land entry of Sadie A.

NE.

J,

was made March 2, 1901, and by direction of
8, 1903, which suspension remains unyour
affidavit
was
filed February 7, 1905, and notice
revoked. Contest
made,
as shown by the return, February
issued, service of which was
At the final hearing, April 6, 1905, claimant asked that the
11, 1905.
contest be dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the part of the local

The entry
office

in question

suspended October
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entertain a contest initiated during the term of suspension.

The motion was overruled and testimony was submitted on behalf
of the parties.

As

a basis of the contest

it

is

charged in the

affidavit filed that

claimant
no water on the land, no
that said land is not
desert in character hut will raise good crops without irrigation; that claimant
has not expended the sum of $1.00 per acre each year for three years.
has not complied with the desert land law

:

there

ditches built, no system of irrigation to reclaim the

is

same

;

Your

office found that the action of the local officers in denying
motion to dismiss the contest was correct, and considered all the
testimony introduced touching the contest charges.
The manifest object of the suspension of the entry in question was
to ascertain the character of the land in order to determine whether
This
it was properly subject to entry under the desert-land law.
question is one going directly to the validity of the entry in its inception, and one which, in the interest of both the government and the
claimant, should be determined with as little delay as possible.
Especially does the interest of a claimant demand an early determination of this question that his rights may be definitely fixed and his
subsequent expenditure of labor and money in the required improvement of the land protected. Improvements made upon land afterwards declared to be non-desert in character, though ample under the
requirements of the desert land law, would not render an entry made
under that law valid, for if such entry was invalid because of the
non-desert character of the land, no act of the claimant performed in
an attempted compliance with the law would prevent cancellation, as
an entry of land not desert in character is unauthorized by the
desert-land law and is not merely voidable but absolutely void.
Therefore justice demands the speedy ascertainment of the character
of the land, and the rights of a claimant are not prejudiced by permitting, at any time, the initiation of a contest for that purpose, as
his rights remain the same whether the object of the suspension be
accomplished either by contest or hearing ordered on behalf of the
government. It is clear, therefore, as announced in departmental
decision in the case of Porter v. Carlile, dated January !), 1906 (34
L. D., 361), that contest based solely upon the ground that the land
is non-desert in character may properly be entertained during the

the

suspension of the entry.

As time does not run against an entry during

its

suspension, the

permit contests against entries suspended
prior to the expiration of the statutory life thereof, based upon allegations of non-compliance with the law.
(See departmental decision of January 31, 1906, in the case of Langer v. Wasman, 34 L. D.,
rule cannot be intended to

426.)
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your

It is clear, therefore,

office

and the

local office erred in consid-

ering any testimony offered in support of the allegations charging
failure on the part of claimant to comply with the provisions of the
desert-land law, but properly passed upon the testimony touching

In the case of Porter v. Carlile, supra, two
grounds of contest were joined in the affidavit and the Department,
without specifically finding that one of the grounds alleged was sufthe character of the land.

denied the jurisdiction of the local officers.
found that the land was desert
in character and the only valid ground of contest was thus refuted,
and the jurisdiction of the local officers denied upon the other ground
ficient basis for contest,

However,

in that case the local officers

alleged.

In cases where other counts are joined with an allegation of nondesert character of the land, as a basis for contest against suspended
entries, the local officers in order to

prevent the introduction of

irrele-

vant testimony, might properly require contestants to strike from the
affidavits all allegations not going to the character of the lands.
In the case at bar the testimony tends to support the concurrent

and the local office that the land covered b/y the
and as no other question is in issue, the
The character of the land having been
contest should be dismissed.
findings of your

entry

is

office

desert in character,

determined favorably to the claimant, the suspension as to the land

embraced in her entry should be revoked and she permitted to proceed with the perfection of her entry.
For the reasons herein stated, the action of your office dismissing

Whitman

is hereby affirmed.
copy of final proof submitted by claimant since the
hearing accompanies the record transmitted, but as this is no part of
the contest proceedings and not properly before the Department at
this time, no consideration will be given thereto.

the contest of

A

certified

FOREST RES ERVE- LIEU SELE( TION— AC TS OF MARCH

JUNE

W.
Where

E. Moses

1905,

AND

Land Scrip and Realty Company.

at the date of the act of

sions of the act of

8,

4, 1897.

June

1,

March

3,

1905, repealing the

1897, no selection

had been made

exchange

provi-

in lieu of lands

n forest reserve relinquished to the United States in accordance
with the provisions of the act of 1897, the land department is without
authority to now permit such selection to he made.

within

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)

February U, 1906.

The W. E. Moses Land Scrip and Realty Company,
styled the selector, appealed

Land

Office,

(J. K.

W.)

hereinafter

from your decision of April

18, 1905,
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rejecting its application (your office docket A., 615), under the act

1897 (30 Stat,, 36), to select the NW. i of the NW. J, Sec.
36 E., N. M. M., Clayton, New Mexico, in lieu of the
SE. ] of the NW. J, Sec. 32, T. 10 N., R. 13 E., N. M. M., in the Lincoln forest reserve, Lincoln county, New Mexico, relinquished to the

June

of

4,

29, T. 25 N., R.

United States.

March

which, for purassumed, but not decided, to be in strict compliance with existing rules and regulations respecting the forms of
proof of the character and condition of the land selected required in
such proceedings. Therewith was filed a duly authenticated abstract
of the selector's title to the base tract, showing that patent of the
United States was issued January 18, 1896, for the base tract and
other lands to John H. Phillips, who, with his wife, conveyed that
title, December 17, 1904, to the selector, which, January 12, 1905,
filed in the proper record office its deed, in due form, relinquishing
the title to the United States, in consideration of the act of June 4,
1897, supra, and the right thereunder " to select in lieu thereof a
tract of vacant land open to settlement. "
The abstract of title shows
that the land was at the time free of all other claim of title, tax, or
other incumbrance, and the recorded deed of relinquishment was
filed with the abstract of title and application for selection.
You
30, 1905, the selector filed its application,

poses of this decision,

is

rejected the application solely because the act of

repealed by the act of

March

June

4,

1897.

was

1905 (33 Stat., 1264), which enacted:

3,

That the acts of June fourth, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, June sixth,
March third, nineteen hundred and one, are hereby repealed so far as they provide for the relinquishment, selection, and patenting of
lands in lieu of tracts covered by an unperfected bona fide claim or patent
within a forest reserve, hut the validity of the contracts entered into by the
Secretary of the Interior prior to the passage of this act shall not be impaired
Provided, That selections heretofore made in lieu of lands relinquished to the
United States may be perfected and patents issue therefor the same as though
this act had not been passed, and if for any reason not the fault of the party
making the same any pending selection is held invalid another selection for a
nineteen hundred, and

like

quantity of land

The
effect

may

be

made

in lieu thereof.

rejection of the selection

of the act of

March

3,

1905,

is
is

claimed to be erroneous, and the
the sole question here considered.

Counsel in argument say

was reconveyed to the United States prior to March 3.
and most essential requirement of the exchange act of June 4,
1897, has been fulfilled, in consequence of which the Government must have entered into an implied contract then and there to complete the transaction whenever thereafter a proper lieu tract is designated and applied for and this parWhere

a base tract

1905, the first

;

....

to
performance prior to the repeal binds the United States
complete the exchange and give value received for the reconveyance; the refusal to complete the exchange would be tantamount to the repudiation by the
The partial performance
United States of its own solemn agreement.
tial

.

.

.
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and the surrender of the consideration by the selector prior to the repeal does
not bar his right to receive from the United States the equivalent guaranteed
by the act of June 4, 1807 in other words, that partial performance by the
moving party in the transaction entitles him to the completion of the terms of
;

the contract by the United States.

"so far as they provide
in

lieu

.

.

.

The

forest lieu laws are repealed

for the relinquishment, selection

and patenting of lands

The relinquishment and patenting are taken

of tracts," &c.

in

con-

Palpably no lands may be relinquished after the date of the act.
But where a relinquishment had previously been made, it may be inferred that
Congress intended, notwithstanding the absence of express unambiguous terms,
to except such initiated claims against the United States from the operation of

junction.

the statute of repeal.

The

act of

March

3,

1905, repeals not merely the invitation to pri-

vate owners to relinquish their lands, but
tract.

The

rights in

all

the other provisions

An

exchange is essentially a single conthe things exchanged mutually vest at the
Lessieur v. Price (12 How., 59, 74). While

looking to an exchange.

same point of time.
the regulations under the act of June L, 1897, require the private
owner of such lands to record his deed and to prepare and file an
abstract and deed at the time he makes his selection, it can not
be held that good equitable right to the land relinquished passes to
the United States by record of the d^ed, for some officer of the United
States must examine the title, pass upon its sufficiency, and accept it.
Cosmos Company v. Gray Eagle Company (190 U. S., 301, 312).
It is a general principle in the

pass until the deed

is

law of real estate that

delivered to the grantee.

title

does not

Though acceptance

under some circumstances, presumed from its
it will be seen from examination of
such cases that there was a lapse of time with an entry into possession by the grantee, or other evidence of circumstances raising a
presumption of the grantee's acceptance of the conveyance. Xo case
is cited, and none has been found by the Department, where acceptance of a conveyance of title is presumed from mere filing of the
conveyance for record by the grantor. If the grantee is bound to
render an equivalent or consideration for the conveyance, it is manifest that to hold the grantee obligated to pay a consideration where
he has not received the conveyance is unsound in principle as creating a contract which the grantee never actually considered or deterof a title conveyed

is,

being beneficial to the grantee,

mined
The

to enter into.

act of

June

4,

1897,

was

a

contract arises until a selection

base tract

is

filed in the

mere proposal for an exchange. Xo
is made and the conveyance of the

land department.

Until

it

is

so filed the

United States can know nothing of it, and no officer authorized to
act on part of the United States can determine whether such proposed exchange can be approved or not. There is not only no con-
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but no existent facts from which a contract of exchange can
It all rests solely in the one mind of the private owner as
something he merely contemplates doing, and there can be for that

tract,
arise.

two minds, which is essential to the relation
June 1, 1897, it is the filing of the
of contract.
office
the selection of land in lieu of that
local
and
the
land
in
deed
Until that time the
relinquished which initiates the exchange.
exchange is not initiated, and is merely a purpose in the private

reason no concourse of

Under

the act of

owner's intent.

A

proposal

the act of

may

March

be
3,

withdrawn at any time before acceptance. That
*.)0r»,
was a withdrawal of the proposal of exJ

change hardly admits of question. Were it not so intended, the proIf it was intended that selections might
viso was wholly unnecessary.
be made to satisfy all relinquishments of land made with intent in
future to make selections, then it was unnecessary to permit the perfecting of incomplete selections actually made, or to permit reselections upon bases assigned in previous ones that failed without the
The proviso necessarily implies that Congress inselector's fault.
tended to withdraw its general proposal of exchange, and to limit
Congress has plenary
future selections to the specified excepted cases.
power over the subject of disposals of public lands, and the land department is without authority to dispose of public lands unless
granted to it by Congress. If it assumed to do so, patents to lands
issued without authority of law would be mere nullities, conveying no
As held in Burfenning o. Chicago, St. Paul, &c. Railway Comtitle.
pany (163 U. S., 321, 323)
:

The action of the land department ran not override the express

will of Conconvey away public lands in disregard or defiance thereof. Smelting
Wright v. Roseberry, 121 IT. S., 488, 519 DooCo. v. Kemp. 104 U. S., 630, 646
lan v. Carr, 125 U. S., 618, 625; Davis's Adm'r v. Weibbold, 139 U. S., 507, 529;
Knight f. U. S. Land Association. 142 U. S., 161, 176; Morton v. Nebraska, 21

gress, or

:

;

Wall., 660. 674.

The argument, based upon the supposed hardship and injustice of
withdrawing the proposal as to lands relinquished before date of the
repealing act. is one proper to be addressed to Congress, not to the
land department, which has no longer any power to allow an exchange,
nor yet power to reconvey the title to the relinquished land, if that
vested by record of the deed of relinquishment.
Congress has the
matter under consideration in various bills, now pending before it.
This refutes the charge of injustice. No doubt Congress will afford a
remedy proper to the case.

Your

decision

is

affirmed.
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mining claim-statute of limitations- section
Capital No.
An

5

23.32,

s.

i?.

Placer Mining Claim.

applicant for patent to a mining claim who, invoking the provisions of section 2: >>32 of the Revised Statutes, proves that he. or his grantors, has held

and worked the claim for the period of time prescribed by the local statutes
of limitation for mining claims, is not required to produce record evidence
of his location, or to give any reason for not producing such evidence.
Section 2332 simply declares what proof shall he sufficient to show possessory
title in an applicant for patent, in the absence of any adverse claim, and
does not dispense with the requirement of section 2325 of an expenditure of
five hundred dollars in labor or improvements upon the claim, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a patent.

Secretary Hitchcock to the
(

F. L. C.

C omm,issioner

February

-

)

of the General
1906.
27,

Land
(

Office,

A. B. P.

Mining Company made entry for the
embracing the NE. \ of the NE. \,
mining
claim,
Capital No. 5 placer
NE.
Sec. 5, T. 15, and the SE.i of the
J, and E. \ of the. SE. J, Sec. 32,
Harrison
land district, Arkansas. From
T. 16, all in range 16 west,
was
entry
allowed
it appears that the comthe proofs upon which the
January

5,

1904, the Capital

pany, invoking the provisions of section 2332 of the Revised Statutes?
submitted evidence showing that it had held and worked the claim for
the period of three years the time prescribed by the statute of limitations for mining claims in the State of Arkansas
and had expended the sum of $100 each year in working the claim.
By decision of November 11, 1904, your office held that the entry
was not warranted by the provisions of section 2332 of the Revised

—

—

Statutes, for the stated reasons, in substance, (1)

i

that said section
j

applies only where the record of the mining location

is

imperfect,

or has been lost, or where for some other reason possessory

title

cannot be shown by record evidence, none of which conditions

is

made to appear in this case; and (2) that said section does not do
away with the requirement of section 2325 of the expenditure by an
applicant for mineral patent of $500 in labor or improvements upon
the claim, which requirement has not been here met.

The claimant

from notice within which to show
cause why the entry should not be canceled, in default of which and
of appeal, it was stated the entry would be canceled without further

company was allowed

notice.

The

The company has appealed.
provisions of section 2332, here involved, are as follows:

Where such person
worked

sixty days

or association, they

and

their grantors,

have held and

their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of

limitations for mining claims of the State or Territory where the same may
be situated, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such
period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this
chapter, in the absence of any adverse claim.

»
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nothing in this section to warrant the construction by
where applicants
for patent, or their grantors, have held and worked their claims for
the period of time prescribed by local statutes of limitation for
mining claims. All that is required in such a case to establish the

There

1.

your

office

is

as to proof of possessory title in cases

in the absence of any adverse claim, is evidence
showing that the claim was so held and worked for
the time prescribed; and it can make no difference whether record
evidence of the location is in existence and might be furnished or
An applicant for patent who has made such showing is not
not.
required to produce record evidence of his location, or to give any
reason for not producing such evidence. On this question the de(Little Emily Mining
cision of your office cannot be sustained.

possessory

title,

satisfactorily

and Milling Company, 34 L. D., 182.)
2. But on the question of the amount of expenditure in labor or
improvements upon the claim, your office decision is clearly right.
Section 2332 simply declares the kind of proof that shall be sufficient,
where the stated conditions exist, to establish the possessor}' right in

The

an applicant for patent, in the absence of any adverse claim.

no manner relates to or involves any other matter of
proof in patent proceedings, and does not dispense with the requirement of •action 2325 of an expenditure of $500 in labor or improvements upon the claim as a prerequisite to the issuance of a patent.
(Barklage v. Russell, 29 L. D., 401; Lindley on Mines, p. 1274.)
The proofs in this case show the expenditure of only $300 upon the
claim, and for this reason the entry was improperly allowed, and
On this question the decision of your office is
cannot be sustained.
affirmed.
In other respects said decision is modified to conform to
section

in

the vieAvs herein expressed.

AFFIDAVIT OF CONTEST-CHARGE.

McMl
An

LLEX

affidavit of contest against a

V.

PlRKEYPILE.

homestead entry, charging,

in effect, that the

entrywoman had, since making entry, married and gone to reside with her
husband upon his uncompleted homestead entry, hut containing no charge
that she had abandoned her claim for more than six months prior to the
initiation of the contest, does not state facts sufficient to warrant cancellation of the entry, and should not be entertained.
Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
(F. L. C.)
February 27, 1906.
(J. L. McC.)
Belle Purkeypile, on

December

29,

1900,

made homestead

for the S. i of the SE. J of Sec. 28, and the SW. J of the
Sec. 27, T. 28 N., R. 16 W., Alva land district, Oklahoma.

entry

SW.

I of
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On

October

5,

190;},

Burr McMullen

which alleged

latter of

affidavit

filed

against said entry, and on the next day filed an

amended

of contest

affidavit, the

:

Said defendant since making said entry was married to one Charles M. Cline,
is now living with him as his wife on the homestead entry of said Cline,
being homestead entry 11,374, made April 9, 1900, for lot 4 and SW. J of SW. J
of Sec. 1, and lot 1 and SE. J of NE. -| of See. 2, T. 27, R. 16, Woods County,
O. T., both of said entries being less than five years old, and both being intact
at the date of filing the original affidavit of contest herein, and are now intact.

and

At the hearing had in the case the defendant appeared by her attorwho demurred to said amended contest affidavit, on the ground

ney,
that

did not state facts sufficient to warrant the cancellation of the

it

This demurrer was overruled, and testimony taken, as the
which the local officers found that the allegations of the
contest affidavit had been sustained, and they recommended the canThe defendant offered no evidence,
cellation of the contested entry.
but stood on her demurrer, and appealed.
entry.

result of

Your

office,

by decision of

May

8,

1905, sustained the action of the

Counsel for the defendant has

filed an appeal to the
Department.
The appeal contends, in substance, that your office erred in not
holding that the local officers should have sustained the demurrer;
in not holding
in not finding that the contest was filed prematurely
admitting
as
officers
erred
in
testimony
to
facts occurlocal
the
that

local officers.

;

ring subsequently to the filing of the contest affidavit (to wit, that
the husband and wife, after the filing of the affidavit and up to the

and in not finding
right
given
the
elect
which
should
be
to
of the two entries
they
that
they would hold. In his argument in support of the appeal counsel
hearing, continued to live together on his land)

;

says

We

contend for nothing in this argument except that the contest was premaand that the defendant and her husband have the right to elect which of
the two entries they would hold.
ture,

The
that

is

basis of this contest

not cause for contest.

ing the marriage.

was not the marriage of the woman, for
But the basis was abandonment, follow-

Section 2297 of the Revised Statutes authorizes

abandonment only where the entryman has " abandoned
the land for more than six months." In this case it was neither alleged nor proven that the abandonment existed for " more than six
months," the proof showing the contrary.
The rulings of the Department on this point have been uniform and
numerous. In the case of Hay v. Yager et al. (10 L. D., 105), a contest affidavit was filed, alleging

contests for

That Yager had wholly abandoned said tract before the filing of the original
by removing to the State of Indiana with the intention of permanently

affidavit,

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

465

remaining there; that he had been residing in the State of Indiana since four
months prior to the filing of the original affidavit

the contention in that case being that such removal to the State of
Indiana, " with the intention of permanently remaining there." raised

presumption that he had abandoned his claim in California
here under consideration it is contended that Mrs.
as
her husband's residence immediately upon her marto
going
Cline's
legal
presumption that she had abandoned her claim.
raised
a
riage
HayYager
case the Department ruled:
in
the
But
a legal

in the case

was not sufficient. In order to sustain a contest against a homeabandonment it must be shown that such abandonment had conperiod of six months; and as a consequence it must be so alleged

Said affidavit
stead entry for

tinued for a
in

the complaint.

To

the

Baxley

same

effect see

151)

(ib.,

;

Baxter

Hemsworth

v.

v.

Cross (2 L. D., 69) Bennett
Miller
(8 L. D.. 400)
;

Holland

;

v.

v.

TTorner (27 L. D., 247) and many others.
In the case here under consideration, the contest affidavit did not
allege abandonment for six months, and the demurrer thereto should
;

When, upon

have been sustained.

found that

it

failed to

it was
months prior to

the taking of the testimony,

show abandonment for

six

have been dismissed.
The action of your office in holding the defendant's entry for cancellation under the circumstances set forth was erroneous, and is
the initiation of contest, said contest should

herebv reversed.

desert land entry— improvements.
Instructions.
The

act of

March

3,

1891, contemplates that the expenditures

made upon a

desert land entry in compliance with the requirements of section 5 thereof

permanent improvements necessary to the irrigation, reclamaand cultivation of the land, and as residence upon a desert land entry
is not required, the erection of a dwelling-house thereon is not a permanent
improvement in contemplation of the act.

shall be for

tion

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(

February

F. L. C,

The Department

is

27, 1906.

in receipt of

your

190G, directing attention to the case of

wherein

it is

(

office letter

John W.

Land
A.

Office,

W.

P.

of February

5,

Bill (20 L. D., 61),

held (syllabus) that

may be properly shown as an expenditure authorized
under section 5 of the desert land act of March 3, 1891
The

cost of fencing

to the case of

Frederick H. Weltner (Ibid., 81), holding (syllabus)

that—
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The proof of annual expenditure in permanent improvements upon the land,
required under the desert land act of March 3, 1891, may properly embrace
money expended for fencing the tract involved

and the case of Holcomb v. Scott (33 L. D., 287), wherein are enuamong the improvements on claimant's desert-land entry,
substantial two-story house " and " a stable sufficient to house
a
eight or ten head of stock," and in conclusion gives expression to the
opinion that the improvements placed on the land " were far above

merated, as
ww

the average."

The above

reference

was made preliminary to calling attention to
Holcomb v. Williams (33

the departmental decision in the case of

L. D., 547), holding, inter alia, that the expenditure

made

in the

erection of a dwelling-house on such an entry can not properly be

considered as compliance with the requirement of the desert-land law
in the matter of permanent improvements.

Finding
case of

as you state, to harmonize this holding in the
Williams, supra, with the said former depart-

it difficult,

Holcomb

y.

mental rulings and the practice of your

office

from and after the

passage of the act of March 3, 1891 (20 Stat,, 1095), in effect determining that, if fencing may be considered a permanent improvement,
as therein contemplated, the same status could not be denied as to a
dwelling-house, you ask to be advised as to the scope intended to be
given this latter decision, and whether it was intended to overrule

former holdings, and limit the allowance for expenditures on desertland entries to the necessary acts performed in the furtherance of the
scheme of contemplated irrigation of the lands so entered.
The act of March 3, 1891, supra, added five sections numbered
from four to eight, inclusive to the original desert-land act of
March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 377). Section 5 of said amendatory act
provides as follows:

—

—

That no land

shall be patented to

any person under

this act unless he or his

assignors shall have expended in the necessary irrigation, reclamation, and cultivation thereof, by

means of main canals and branch

improvements upon the land, and

in

ditches,

irrigation of the same, at least three dollars per acre of

and patented

in the

manner following

and

the purchase of water

:

in

permanent

rights

for

the

whole tract reclaimed

Within one year after making entry

for such tract of desert land as aforesaid, the party so entering shall expend

not less than one dollar per acre for the purposes aforesaid and he shall in
like manner expend the sum of one dollar per acre during the second and also
during the third year thereafter, until the full sum of three dollars per acre
;

is so expended.
Said party shall file during each year with the register, proof,
by the affidavits of two or more credible witnesses, that the full sum of one
dollar per acre has been expended in such necessary improvements during such
year, and the manner in which expended, and at the expiration of the third
year a map or plan showing the character and extent of such improvements.
If any party who has made such application shall fail during any year to file
the testimony aforesaid, the lands shall revert to the United States, and the
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payment shall be forfeited to the United States,
and the entry shall be canceled. Nothing herein contained shall prevent a
claimant from making his final entry and receiving his patent at an earlier
date than hereinbefore prescribed, provided that he then makes the required

twenty-five cents advanced

proof of reclamation to the aggregate extent ol three dollars per acre

:

Provided,

That proof be further required of the cultivation of one-eighth of the land.
It is to be observed that the object of this law is to provide a
method for reclaiming unappropriated, non-segregated public land,

arid or desert in character.

The above

section in part provides that,

in order to secure patent therefor, at least three dollars per acre

must

be expended in the purchase of water rights, necessary irrigation by

means of canals and ditches, in permanent improvements thereon,
and in the required cultivation of such an entry; and that within
three years the entryman must submit annual proofs showing that
the full sum of one dollar per acre has been expended in such
necessary improvements during each of said years.
Thus it appears that this expenditure must be for purposes necessary to the irrigation, reclamation and required cultivation of the
land. To this end, water-rights must be secured, and canals, branch
and lateral ditches constructed sufficient to distribute the water to
In order to protect this work
the several minor legal subdivisions.
of construction and subsequent cultivation, as has been uniformly
held by this Department, fencing is a permanent, and presumably a
necessary, improvement. The same may also be said of a barn and
well, sufficient to house and care for stock needed in the accomplishment of such an undertaking.
Residence on such an entry, however, is not required by the desertland law, and it would not seem, therefore, nor has the Department
ever so held, that the erection of a dwelling-house theron would be
considered as a necessary permanent improvement in contemplation
of this act.
In the case of Holcomb v. Scott, supra, the only material
question presented for consideration was as to whether such an entryman, who became the owner of improvements placed upon the land
by a prior entryman in compliance with the requirements of the
desert-land law, was entitled to credit for such improvement the same
as if placed thereon by himself.
The character or sufficiency of the
improvements was in no way questioned. It is true that the house
was enumerated with other improvements, consisting of a twentyeight foot well, curbed up and supplied with a windlass: a stable
sufficient to house eight to ten head of stock; tract fenced on one
side, with posts supplied in part for the other sides; that about twenty
acres of the land had been thoroughly cleared of sage brush and about
fifteen acres leveled that water had been secured from a company operating and maintaining a large canal, and ten acres irrigated and
cultivated to crop one season. In view of the fact that the entry was
;
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but for forty acres, it was found that these necessary improvements
were far above the average, and that good faith was manifest.
In the case of Holcomb v. Williams. .suj>r<{. proof was offered, and
by your office approved, setting forth that claimant had, during the
first, second, and third years, made the improvements required by the
desert-land law, specifying in each case a house only, which he had
built on the land during the time lie had held the. same under the
homestead law. As a result of evidence adduced at the hearing
held on Holcomb 's contest, however, it was disclosed that other
and necessary improvements had been made on the tract sufficient to
meet the requirement as to annual expenditures, aside from the
dwelling-house, which, it was directly held, could not in this respect
properly be considered as compliance with the desert-land act.
While it is not disclosed from an examination of the reported decisions that this question had ever been before the Department for
consideration prior thereto, yet, in so holding, it was not intended,
nor does it appear, as herein indicated, to in any way modify the
former decisions allowing the enumeration of the cost of fencing, as
well as any other necessary permanent improvements, in the proof
of annual expenditures required by the said act contemplating the
irrigation and reclamation of vacant public arid or desert lands,

and which improvements are in promotion of the purposes of the
law.

HOMESTEAD ENTRY-ADDITIOXAL-KINKAID

ACT.

James W. Luton.
The

act of April 28, 1904, commonly
only one additional entry under

known
its

as the Kinkaid act, contemplates

provisions

made, even though for an amount of land
the right

is

less

and where such entry is
than authorized by the act,
;

thereby exhausted.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

February

(F. L. C.)

James W. Luton, on September
the

NE.

28, 1906.
8,

Land

Office,

(J. L.

McC.)

made homestead entry for
W., Valentine land district,

1902,

i of Sec. 6, T. 34 N., R. 23

Nebraska.
On July 26, 1901, he made additional entry under the act of April
28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547— commonly known as the "Kinkaid act"),
for the SE. i of the NW. J, and the E. | of the SW. i of said section

0.

On December

2,

1904, he applied to be allowed to "

additional entry, so as to include also the

R. 23 W., same land

district.

NW.

^ of Sec.

amend
5,

" his

T. 24 N.,
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was rejected by your

this action the applicant has

office letter of July 18,
appealed to the Depart-

ment,

The use of

the

word

"

amend," taken by

would indicate that

itself,

the applicant wished to substitute the land last-described in place of
that

first

applied for under the Kinkaid

But an examination

act.

shows that he desires to enter it
tered by him September 8, 1902, and July

of the record

in addition to that en20,

1904.

The appeal

states

At the time the entryman made his additional
could

make

a filing for the land that

was then

his application to include other land that

filing

he was informed that he

subject to entry, and later

might become subject

amend

to entry, if it

that at the time he made said additional filing he had
bargained for a relinquishment covering the NW. i of Sec. 5, T. 34, R. 23, but
the relinquishment had not been executed, and affiant was unable to secure the
relinquishment at that time; that at the time of making said additional entry
he had no thought of exhausting his homestead right, but fully intended to
secure the relinquishment and make application to amend his filing, as he has
lay adjoining his entry;

since done.

The

act referred to provides,

among

other things

That from and after sixty days after the approval of this act. entries made
under the homestead laws in the State of Nebraska, west and north of the following line
shall not exceed in area six hundred and forty acres.

....

limits named are to be entered " under the homeThis language clearly implies that, except as the act
itself shall distinctly provide, the provisions of the homestead laws
then in existence shall apply. Among these is one to the effect that
by making one entry thereunder the right is exhausted. The second

Lands within the

stead laws."

section of the act provides that its provisions shall be applicable to
persons owning and occupying land " heretofore " that is, prior to

April 28, 1904

—entered by them.

—

The

third section contains a pro-

any former homestead entryman who shall be
an " additional entry shall have, etc.
If the contention of this applicant were correct, a person who had
already entered one hundred and sixty acres of land would be author-

viso to the effect that

entitled to "

ized to

make twelve

other entries, of forty acres each, at irregular

he might secure relinquishments. The undoubted intention of Congress was to permit a person who had already made entry
of one hundred and sixty acres (or less) to make " an " additional
entry not a series of entries of land sufficient to aggregate six
intervals, as

—

—

hundred and forty acres.
The Department is of opinion that by making one entry under said
act of April 28, 1904, the entryman exhausted his right under said
act.
Your office decision in rejecting his second application under
said act was therefore correct, and is herebv affirmed.
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mining claim—blanket lode—end lines.

Jack Pot Lode Mixing Claim.
In case of a mining location upon a blanket lode or vein, the lode line may not
be extended in zigzag form so as to make the distance between the side
lines of the claim exceed the width of six hundred feet allowed by law in
the location of vein or lode claims.

The mining laws contemplate
stantial existence in fact,

that the end lines of a lode claim shall have suband in length shall reasonably comport with the

width of the claim as located.

Secretary Hitchcock
(F. L.

Commissioner of the General Land Office,
February 28, 1006.
(A. B. P.)

to the

C)

December 28, 1903, E. M. Thompson made entry for the Jack Pot
Lode Mining Claim, survey No. 1779, Huron land district. South
Dakota. By decision of January 13, 1905, your office required an
amended survey of the claim, and directed that the entryman be
allowed sixty days from notice within which to apply for such survey or to appeal in default whereof it was stated the entry would be
;

Thompson has

canceled without further notice.

As described
based the claim

hundred

in the plat
is

and

field notes

of very irregular shape.

appealed.

upon which the entry is
One end line is over eight

feet in length, while the other is only two-tenths of a foot

in length,

and

a large part of the claim is over six

hundred

feet in

width, the distance between the side lines at the widest point being
over nine hundred

feet.

It appears from the record that the mineral deposit on account of
which the claim was located is of horizontal or blanket formation and
An assumed
is probably co-extensive with the limits of the location.
lode line of three courses and of zigzag form is represented on the
official plat, so extended apparently on the theory that a greater width
than six hundred feet might be thus embraced within the side lines

of the claim.

The purpose of the amended survey required by your office was to
bring the claim within the limits as to width provided by statute for
the location of lode mining claims.

The appellant contends,

in substance, that the present survey ac-

cords in principle with the doctrine of the case of Homestake Mining Compairy (29 L. D., 689), and therefore should be accepted. In
that case there were a

number

of exclusions from the claim applied

for, leaving two small tracts widely separated from each other, for

which entry had been allowed, though it appeared that the point of
principal discovery had gone with the exclusions. It was shown that
the claim was located upon a horizontal or blanket lode which covered
the entire area within the limits of the side and end lines, as well the
said two small tracts as the point of principal discovery and other
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excluded portions of the claim. One of the questions was whether
the location could be sustained notwithstanding the loss of the point
As the ore body was shown to extend uninterof original discovery.
ruptedly over the entire claim, including the two small tracts, the
Department considered the apex of the lode as co-extensive with the
distance between the side lines of the location,

and held that the loss
some other

of the original or principal discovery by its inclusion in

mineral claim did not affect the validity of the location.
goes no further, and

The

case

no sense authority for the proceeding attempted in the case at bar. There is nothing in the principle to justify the extension of a lode line in the zigzag form here presented,
whereby the distance between the side lines of the claim is made to
exceed the maximum width of six hundred feet allowed by law in the
(Sec. 2320, Revised Statutes.)
location of vein or lode claims.
On
this question the decision of your office is manifestly right, and is
is

in

hereby affirmed.

There
by your

is

another equally fatal objection to the entry, not mentioned

office.

of the claim

is

It has been stated already that one of the end lines
only two-tenths of a foot in length, while the other is

over eight hundred feet in length.

Neither of these lines can be con-

meaning of the statute. As vein or
lode claims may not be located to exceed six hundred feet in width, it
is manifestly not within the contemplation of the statute that an end

sidered an end line within the

line in case of a

blanket vein, such as here involved,

distance in length.

may

exceed that

Certainly not, unless there be some justifiable

And while there
it, which does not appear in this case.
no express provision to govern the length of an end line where
within the general limitation of six hundred feet the Department is
of opinion that a line less than three inches in length is not within
reason for
is

The end lines, required in all
important features of a vein or
lode location (The Hidee Gold Mining Company, 30 L. D., 420), and
the statute (Sec. 2320) clearly contemplates that such lines shall have
substantial existence in fact and, in length, shall reasonably comport
with the width of the claim as located.
The order of your office for an amended survey will therefore be
enlarged so as to require end lines of the claim to be established and
shown according to law.
the spirit or intent of the statute.

cases to be parallel to each other, are

repayment— overcharge—non-alienation affidavit.
Pablo Baldez.
An

applicant for repayment of mon,ey paid by reason of an overcharge for area
in excess of that actually embraced in the entry, will be required to furnish
non-alienation affidavit or to show fully the nature, terms and conditions
of any sale

and conveyance of the

land.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

March

(F. L. C.)

1,

1906.

Land

Office!

(C. J. G.)

A motion has been filed by Pablo Baldez for review of departmental decision of November 17, 1905 (not reported), affirming the
action of your office requiring him to furnish additional evidence
in support of his claim for repayment of the overcharge paid by him
on preemption cash entry No. 1743, Las Cruces, New Mexico.
In passing upon this case on appeal, following the description in
the letters of your office, Baldez's claim was treated as an application
for repayment of excess purchase money, that is, money paid for a
number of acres embraced in an entry over and above the area
allowable' under the preemption law.
But his claim for repayment
is in fact for an overcharge, that is, he was charged and he paid for
a greater number of acres than was actually contained in the entry.
The tract purchased by Baldez was represented in his cash certificate
as containing 167.44 acres, whereas the true area was 147.48 acres.
In such a case it has been held that " repayment may be allowed of
money paid for land in excess of the area actually embraced within
W. J. Chambers (7 L. D., 32). However, as a prerepayment your office called upon Baldez to furnish
evidence showing that he had not alienated the land under his entry.
This requirement was undoubtedly on the theory that if he sold the
land embraced in his entry the assignee might be the proper party
The reto whom repayment of the overcharge should be made.
quired evidence Avas not furnished, but it is urged that the claim
arising as it does " from an overcharge and not from the cancellation of an entry," the assignee of the land would have no right to
repayment but that the right would remain in the original entryman.
It is not believed the distinction contended for warrants the
waiving of a requirement of a non-alienation affidavit or in the event
of sale, of a disclosure of the nature, terms and conditions of such
sale, for as said in the decision complained of, " it is exclusively
the province of the land department to determine, in case of alienation, whether the claim for repayment passes with the land to the
assignee, and said department is therefore entitled to all the facts
The proper course in this case would have been to
in each case."
require either a non-alienation affidavit or full showing as to the
nature, terms, and conditions of any sale of the land and conveyance
the entry."
requisite

to

thereunder.

You

Avill

make

this requirement giving a reasonable

time for compliance therewith.
The departmental decision of November
of your office are accordingly modified.

17, 1905,

and the decision
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Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co.

By

opinion of

March

3,

1906,

approved by Secretary Hitchcock,

Assistant Attorney-General Campbell,

upon reconsideration of the

matters involved in his opinion of March 14, 1905, 33 L. D., 470,
reaffirms and adheres to the views therein expressed.

CONTEST—NOTICE—PUBLICATION- AFFIDAVIT.

Krawl
Where the

v.

Pettengill.

an order of publication of notice of conan entry does not specifically allege that the entryman is a
nonresident of the State or Territory in which the land is located, it should
show the date or dates upon which inquiries as to the entryman's whereabouts were made, that they were made with a view to obtaining personal
service of the notice, and that at that time the contestant was prepared
to make personal service of the notice if the entryman were found within
the State or Territory wherein the land is situated.
affidavit filed as a basis for

test against

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

March

(F.L.C.)

On

8,

1906.

Land

Office*

(D. C.H.)

.

10, 1901, Charles Z. Pettengill made homestead entry
and 2 and the S. ± of the NE. J of Sec. 6, T. 25 N., E. 20
W., Woodward, Oklahoma, land district, against which William
Krawl on April 11, 1903, filed affidavit of contest alleging abandonment and failure to establish residence upon the land, and that the
entryman's absence from the land was not clue to service in the army
or navy of the United States.
Notice of contest was issued on the
same day, and July 14, 1903, was fixed as the day for the taking of
the testimony before the local officers.
On June 30, 1903, con-

October

for lots 1

testant's attorney filed his affidavit to

notice

by publication,

he has

made

in

diligent search

procure an order for service of

which he alleged that
and inquiry

for the defendant; that he has

made

personal inquiry of the postmaster at Ellendale, O. T. also of the postmaster
at Lathrop, a postoffice near the land, that being the nearest postoffice to the
land involved, as to the place of residence or whereabouts of said
and
;

made the like inquiry of Hayden Parsons,
Hayes, also at Woodward, O. T. record address of contestee, who reside in the immediate neighborhood of said land, and from his own personal knowledge as well as the information acquired from said parties, states that the said Charles Z. Pettengill
abandoned said land and went to parts unknown in the state of unknown oh or
about
day of August, 1002; that he has since that time been absent from
said land and that his place of residence is unknown and on account thereof a
personal service of the notice of said contest cannot be made, wherefore affiant
asks for an order to serve said notice by publication.

that he

Xotice by publication issued on the same day, June 30, 1903, and
appears to have been duly given as required by the Rules of Practice.
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On

the clay fixed for trial the contestant appeared in person and by

attorney.

The defendant

to dismiss the contest for

specially appeared

want of

by attorney and moved

jurisdiction for the reason that

the service of the notice by publication had not been made in
accordance with the Rules of Practice, which motion was overruled
by the local officers and the defendant excepted to said ruling. The
defendant's attorney again stated that he appeared specially and
moved that the contest be dismissed on the ground that the defend-

ant was in the military service of the United States at the time the
affidavit of contest

statement of the
effect,

was made and

officer in

filed

command

which said motion was

with said motion the unsworn

of defendant's

also overruled

by the

exceptions thereto reserved by the defendant.

company

to that

local officers,

The

and

plaintiff then

introduced testimon}^ in support of the allegations in the contest
affidavit, at the close of which the attorney for the defendant again

moved that the contest be dismissed for the reason that the evidence
submitted by the contestant was not sufficient to prove the allegations
of the contest.
The local officers found that while it appeared that the defendant
had abandoned the land and failed to improve and cultivate same
as required by law, the testimony failed to show that the alleged
absence of the entryman from the land was not due to his employment
in the military service of the United States and they therefore recommended that the contest be dismissed. Contestant appealed to your
office, which, by decision of April 27, 1905, sustained the action of
the local officers in overruling defendant's motions to dismiss the con-

but reversed their action in recommending
want of proof as to the non-military
service of the entryman and held that the evidence sustained all the

test as hereinbefore stated,

that the contest be dismissed for

allegations set forth in the affidavit of contest

and that the entry

should be canceled.
The defendant has appealed to the Department, and assigned errors
in substance as follows
(1) Error in holding that the service of the notice of contest was
sufficient and in accordance with law.
(2) Error in finding and holding that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the charges of the contest affidavit and to warrant the cancellation of the entry.

The first question to be considered is whether or not the service of
the notice of the contest was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
the law, or, in other words, was the affidavit filed by contestant as
the basis for the order of publication sufficient to warrant such service.

Rule 9 of practice requires that " Personal service shall be made in all
cases where possible if the party to be served is resident in the state or
territory in which the land is situated," and rule 11 authorizes service
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of notice by publication only when it is shown after the exercise of
due diligence that personal service cannot be made. The affidavit

upon which the order of publication in this case was made does not
state when, or for what purpose, the inquiries as to the whereabouts
of the defendant were made, or that contestant was prepared to make
personal service upon the defendant could he have been found in the
Territory of Oklahoma, where the land is situated.
In the case of E. E. Duff v. Edmonia Dautel, decided by the
Department on April 18, 1905 (unreported), it was held that the
affidavit filed as the basis for an order of publication " should show,
among other things, the date or dates upon which inquiries as to the
contestee s whereabouts were made, that they were made with a view
to obtaining personal service of the notice, and that at that time the
contestant w as prepared to make personal service of the notice upon
the contestee, if he could have been found within the State or Terri?

T

tory wherein the land lay."

The reason

for the ruling that the

affi-

show the date or dates upon which the inquiries as to the
whereabouts of the contestee were made is clear and apparent. The
davit should

jaw recognizes the fact that although the defendant may be once
from the jurisdiction he may return thereto, and his absence

absent

an existing fact. It should therefore appear from the
endeavor to ascertain the whereabouts of the defendant, as required by rule 11 of practice, was made at a time so reasonably near the date of the filing of said affidavit as to satisfy the local
officers of the absence of the defendant from the jurisdiction at the
cease to be

affidavit that the

when they are called upon to act
when the order of publication is to take
time

tion clearly did not

judicially in the matter,
effect.

The

and

affidavit in ques-

meet the requirements of the law

;

therefore did

and sufficient basis for the order of publication.
It is stated in your said decision that inasmuch as the record
shows that at the time service was made in this case, the defendant
was a non-resident of the State, he therefore should not be heard to
not furnish a good

question the sufficiency of the affidavit used as a basis for publication
in so far as it relates to the degree of diligence exercised in attempt-

ing to secure personal service, citing as authority for such holding,
5 L. D., 456.
It will

by your

be noted that the facts in the case at bar and the one cited
are materially different. In that case the affidavit of

office

was adjudged sufficient and it was alleged in said affidavit,
among other things, that the defendant was not a resident of the
State of Nebraska, where the land was situated, and that personal
service could not be had upon him in that State, and the defendant
having admitted that at the time the said affidavit was filed and the
order for service by publication was issued, he w as actually residing

diligence

T
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it was held that under such circumstances he
should not be allowed to question the truthfulness of the affidavit.
In the case at bar there is no averment in the affidavit filed as the
foundation for the order for service of notice by publication that
the defendant was a non-resident, and no admission by him to that
effect, and as the said affidavit does not conform to the requirements

in the State of Illinois,

of rule 11 of practice as interpreted by the Department in the unre-

ported case of Duff

v.

Dautel, hereinbefore quoted,

ficient to authorize service
office

finds

by publication, and the

it

was not

suf-

your

fact that

from the record of the testimony that the defendant was

a non-resident does not cure the error, for, as has been repeatedly

held by the Department, the affidavit must show upon
the facts necessary

to.

its

face all

authorize service by publication, or no juris-

upon the local officers.
Apart from the question of the insufficiency of the affidavit
basis for the order for service by publication, it is found upon
diction will be conferred

as a
care-

ful examination of the record that the proof submitted at the hearing

not sufficient, in the opinion of the Department, to show that the
entryman's absence from the claim was not due to his employment in
the army, navy or marine corps of the United States, as charged in
the affidavit of contest, and for this reason also the contest should
not be sustained.
This leaves the matter between the entryman and the government,,
and in view of the long military service of the entryman as shown
by the record, the Department is unwilling to cancel the entry in his
absence. The decision of your office is reversed. The contest will be
(Sec. 2308, Revised
dismissed and the entry will remain intact.
is

Statutes.)

TIMBER AND STONE ACT-NON-AEIENATION AFFIDAVIT.

John
An

C.

Long.

applicant to purchase under the timber and stone act does not become the

owner of the land applied, for, with legal right to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the same, until the required proof has been furnished, the
purchase price tendered and received, receipt given therefor, and final certificate issued, and at any time prior thereto the land department may
require the applicant to furnish an affidavit of non-alienation.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

March

(F. L. C.)

John

C. Long, on

8,

1906.

Land
(J. L.

Office,

McC.j

September 15, 1902, applied to purchase, under
and the W. h of lot 7, Sec. 2,
1, 2, and

the timber-land act, lots

('»,

T. 28 N., E. 10 E., Susanville land district, California.
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It appearing from the record that said lands were included in a
temporary withdrawal for forestry purposes, by departmental order
of October 15, 1902, your office, on August 15, 1903, rendered a
Long appealed, and the Departdecision rejecting said application.
ment, on October 7, 1903, reversed said decision, and directed that
the applicant " be allowed to complete his purchase in accordance
with the terms prescribed by the statute."
The application was accordingly allowed, November 3, 1903; and
on January 16, 1904, Long submitted final-proof testimony. On
that day a special agent of your office appeared at the local office,
and cross-examined the entryman and his witnesses. This led to a
delay in action upon said proof; and it was not until January 24,
1905, that the claimant was notified by the local officers that upon
receipt of $406.50, and a non-alienation affidavit, his case would be
taken up with a view to issuing final receipt.
From this action of the local officers Long appealed and your
office, on July 6, 1905, affirmed the action of the local officers.
Long has appealed to the Department. The gist of his contention
is to be found in the following extracts from his appeal
;

Appellant showed that he was duly qualified made legal proof that the land
was such as the act provides for the sale of; tendered his money and asked
in short, did all he possibly
to be permitted to pay for and enter the land
;

;

He

was, however, denied the right to make payment for and enter the land, which the act awards him his proof was held up
and not examined for a year all contrary to his wishes, as well as contrary
to the terms of the act, and not by reason or in consequence of the least fault,
failure, or neglect on his part
and now a demand is made that he furnish an
affidavit for which there is no requirement of law whatever.
When he
made his proof (which is admitted to be perfect), and tendered the coin to
pay for his land, he had done everything in his power to perfect his entry; he
thereby acquired a perfect and complete equity to have, and was entitled to
have, the land patented to him at any time upon payment of the purchase price
and if at any time after making his proof he had seen fit to sell, or bargain
to sell, or to mortgage or otherwise encumber the land, he would have been
legally entitled to do so and whether he did or did not so sell, bargain to sell,
or encumber, the land, is a question in which the government has not the

could to perfect his claim.

;

;

;

.

.

.

;

slightest interest.

appears from the record, and, indeed, is clearly indicated by
language of the appellant (supra)
that he "tendered his
money," but was " denied the right to make payment for and enter
the land " that the purchase price tendered was not accepted. His
It

—

the

—

proof was not, by the local
it been so admitted by your

officers,
office,

admitted to be perfect; nor has
it would not have rendered the

or

adverse opinion from which he has appealed.

The contention of

the appellant that his presentation of final proof

payment (which was
substantially the same as that

(since held to be sufficient), arid his tender of

rejected), entitled

him

to patent, is
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made by defendant Hays
Department
371, 374)

in the case of

Todd

v.

Hays, in which the

exposed the fallacy of said contention thus (34 L. D.,

:

has always been understood by the Department that joint action
and of the local officers on the other, was
requisite to make an entry of a tract of land; but if this contention be correct,
any person wishing to make entry of a given tract can do so unassisted.
The money tendered must have been received, and receipt issued therefor, in
As was said by the
order to render such action "equivalent to an entry."
Department in the case of Thomas v. St. Joseph & Denver City Railroad (3
C. L. O., 197), quoted with approval in Gilbert v. Spearing (4 L. D., 463), and
again in Iddings r. Burns (8 L. D., 224)
" Each of the three elements of which this transaction is composed forms
an essential part thereof the application, the affidavit, and the payment of the
money; and when the application is presented, the affidavit made, and the
money paid, an entry is made a right is vested."
Heretofore

it

of the applicant on the one hand,

.

.

.

:

—

—

Further in support of the same ruling the Department (in said
case) cited Witherspoon v. Duncan (4 Wall., 210, 219)
Bastings, etc. R. R. Co. y. Whitney (132 U. S., 357, 363) Jones v.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co (34 L. D., 105, 111).
A similar conclusion is reached by the Department in the case
of Bowlby v. Hays (34 L. D., 376), which cited in support of the
same ruling, Hoofnagie 'v. Anderson (7 Wheat., 212, 214)
Brush vl
Ware (15 Pet., 93, 110) Parsons y. Venzke (164 U. S., 89, 92)— the
last of which says:

Todd-Hays

;

;

;

;

Whenever the local land officers approve the evidences of settlement and
improvement, and receive the cash price, they issue a receiver's receipt.
Thereby a contract is entered into between the United States and the pre-emptor,
and the contract is known as an " entry." The effect of the entry is to segregate the land entered from the public domain.
Until this appellant had not only tendered the purchase money,

had been received, and receipt given therefor, and final
had he become owner of the land, with legal right
mortgage, or otherwise encumber the same. The action of

but until

it

certificate issued,

to sell,

your

office

certificate

in requiring a non-alienation affidavit before issuing final

was therefore

correct,

and

is

hereby affirmed.

reclamation act— settlement rights-improvements.
George Anderson.
No such

rights are acquired by settlement

upon lands embraced

in the entry

of another as will attach upon cancellation of such entry, where at that time

the lands are withdrawn for use in connection with an irrigation project
under the act of June 17. 1902; nor is tbere any authority in said act for
purchase by the government of the settler's claim or of the improvements
placed upon the land by him.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Director of the Geological Survey,

10,1906.

(F.L. C.)

am

March
LP.)

(J.

your communication of the 5th instant, submitDavid C. Henny, on
behalf of the United States, with Mr. George Anderson, whereby
the latter agrees to sell to the United States, for the sum of $3,000,
the improvements on lots 8 and 9 in section 7, and the NE. \ of the
NW. J, and the NW. \ of the NE. \ of section 18, T. 35 N., R. 25 E.,
W. M., and -all his right, title and interest therein, and all claim to
said lands, for use in connection with the Okanogan project, in Washington.
The agreement is accompanied by an affidavit of disinterestedness executed by the engineer.
The facts in this case, as disclosed by the correspondence, appear
I

ting for

in receipt of

my

consideration an agreement by Mr.

to be as follows

Mr. Anderson, who,

at the time,

was

qualified to

make entry under

the homestead law, settled on this land in 1892, the land at that time

being covered by

a homestead entry.
Anderson subsequently conwhich contest was decided adversely to him. Later
he filed a relinquishment obtained from the mother of the minor
heir who had succeeded to the entry.
He then made homestead
entry of the land, which was accepted by the local office but was
rejected by the General Land Office and the prior entry permitted
to remain intact.
The prior entry was canceled, however, by the
General Land Office on January 13, 1906, and Anderson advised that
he had thirty days' preference right to make entry of the land.
When he submitted his application, however, it was rejected by the
local land office for the reason that the land had been withdrawn
from all forms of entry (first form of withdrawal), under the reclamation act, on July 30, 1904.
Since Anderson settled on the land he has placed improvements
thereon, the reasonable value of which is now placed at $3,000, and you
have submitted this agreement, entered into between the engineer
and Anderson, with the recommendation that if in the opinion of
the Department there is authority of law for the purchase of the
rights of Mr. Anderson, and his improvements upon this land, the
agreement be approved by the Secretary and returned to your office.
After careful consideration of this matter, I have to advise you
that in the opinion of the Department there is no authority of law for
the purchase of the so-called rights of Mr. Anderson, or of the
improvements he has placed upon this land.
At the time Anderson settled upon this land it was covered by a
homestead entry, and by that settlement he acquired no rights whatever against either the entryman or the government.
See McMichael
v. Murphy et al., 20 L. D., 147, and authorities there cited.

tested the entry,
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Department has held that where a settler is
by an entry at the date of cancellation
thereof, his rights as a settler attach eo instantly without any specific
act of settlement on his part, where he is in possession of the tract
when the entry is canceled. See authorities above cited and Pool v.
Moloughney, 11 L. D., 197, and authorities there cited. But that
rule does not apply in this case, for the reason that in paragraph 7
of the circular approved by the Department June G, 1005, it is held:
It is true that the

residing on

When

tract covered

a

an entry for lands embraced within a withdrawal under the

first

form

canceled by reason of contest or for any other reason, sneh lands become subject immediately to sueh withdrawal, and cannot thereafter, so long as they
is

remain so withdrawn, be entered or otherwise appropriated either by a sucany other person.

cessful contestant or

The only
graph

improvements is found in paraapproved June 6, 1905, which provides

rule for the purchase of

8 in said circular

In the event any lands embraced in an entry under which final proof has not
been offered, or in any unapproved or uncertified selection, are needed in the
construction and maintenance of any irrigation work (other than for right' of
way for ditches or canals reserved under act of August 30, 1890), under the
reclamation act, the Government may cancel such entry or selection and
appropriate the lands embraced therein to such use, after paying the value of
the improvements thereon and the enhanced value of such lands caused by such
Improvements.

Paragraph

9 provides a

method for determining the value of such

improvements.

As Anderson never had any entry, the rule above quoted, as to the
purchase of improvements, does not apply to his case.
It will be seen, therefore, that this Department is without any
authority to authorize the payment from the reclamation fund of
$3,000, or any other sum, for Anderson's so-called rights and improvements.

The agreement

enclosed with your letter of the 5th instant

is re-

turned herewith, not approved.

reclamation act— lease of reserved or purchased lands.
Opinion.
of the Interior has authority to make temporary leases of lands
reserved or acquired by purchase for use in connection with an irrigation
project contemplated under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902,

The Secretary

where use under the proposed lease
control of the lands

when needed

reservation or purchase.

will not interfere with the use

and

for the purposes contemplated by the

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

481

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
(E. F. B.)
March 10, 1906.
I

am

in receipt,

by

reference, of a letter

from the Director of the

Geological Survey re-submitting to the Department the question
whether lands purchased for reclamation purposes may be leased for

one or more years pending construction, or until such lands are
needed. The letter is referred to me for opinion upon the question

submitted in said letter.
This question was first submitted to the Department by the Director
of the Geological Survey in his letter dated August 31, 1903, stating

was about to acquire lands that will be
and as it w ill take several years
to construct the dam and flood the lands, the government w ill be in
possession of several tracts of good farming lands for two or three
He stated that if it were possible to lease the lands it would
years.
afford a great saving to the government, and he requested " the views
of the Department upon the proposition to purchase these lands on
terms involving leases as indicated, for one or more years, until the
that the reclamation service

flooded by the Salt river reservoir,

r

T

lands shall be needed for the use of the reservoirs.

Also whether

lands so purchased could be leased to others than the former owners

under like conditions."
In replying to this request the Department, in its letter of January
28, 1904 (32 L. D., 416), said that, as a general rule, an executive
officer has no authority to use property of the United States for any
purpose other than that for wdiich it w as acquired. That as there is
no authority to use property acquired under the provisions of the
reclamation act except for the purpose of constructing and maintaining reservoirs, he cannot use such property in any manner not directly involved in the construction of them.
It was said, however, that " if in any case it be found that land can
be purchased for a less price if arrangements can be made to allow
the vendor to retain possession until the time when the land is actually
needed for use by the government, there is full authority under the
act to make such arrangements."
This view contemplates that the consideration to be paid by the
vendor for the use and occupation of the land until it is needed by the
government is the diminished price to be paid by the government for
T

T

the land.

There does not seem to be any difference in principle in acquiring
property under an agreement to allow the vendor to retain the use
and occupancy of it after the purchase and in acquiring such property

by purchase without condition and afterward leasing it to the vendor or to another. In either case it is a lease or permission to use and
occupy property of the United States.
3]
5194— Vol. 34—05 m
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be stated as a cardinal principle that the Secretary of the
power of supervision and

Interior has no authority, under his general

control over the public lands, to lease them, unless expressly authorized

by Congress.

The

disposal of the public lands having been
any other mode or manner of disposition is

specially provided for,

excluded, being impliedly prohibited.

But while the lands acquired

for the construction

and operation of

reservoirs are lands belonging to the United States, they are not public

lands within the technical meaning of that term and are not conby the laws governing the disposition of public lands. Hence,

trolled

the fundamental proposition involved in this inquiry

is whether
property of the United States acquired for particular uses may be
temporarily leased by executive authority for other uses, where such
use and occupancy will not interfere with the use of the property for
the purpose contemplated by its acquisition, whenever it is needed

for that purpose.

There does not appear

to be

any constitutional or statutory

inhibi-

tion against the exercise of such power, and in the absence of an

express prohibition as to the particular property it may be safely
asserted that where public property is placed in the custody and care
of any of the executive departments to be appropriated and used for

a particular purpose the head of such department may, until the
property is actually needed for the purpose intended, exercise his

judgment and discretion as to the proper care and disposition of such
property, and any use of it not incompatible with the purpose intended

is

neither a violation of law nor an abuse of the supervisory

authority and discretion reposed in the executive department over

matters confided to

its care.

There can be no dissent from the proposition that property of the
United States can not be taken or employed by executive authority
for any purpose other than that for which it was acquired, but the
proposition must be taken in its proper sense to mean that the property can not be diverted to other uses. A temporary use or disposition of the property that will not interfere with the proper use and

control of the lands

when needed

a diversion of it to other use,

for

but

for the purpose contemplated

may

is

not

be in furtherance of the object

which the property

cially so

The

This would seem to be espeAvas acquired.
with reference to lands acquired under the reclamation act.

third section of the act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 288) authorwithdrawal of lands required for the construction of irriga,

izes the

tion

works under said

act.

The lands withdrawn

for such purpose

are permanently appropriated for a specific purpose.

The

seventh

section of the act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire

rights or property, by purchase or by condemnation, under judicial
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whenever the acquirement of such right or property becomes

process,

necessary in carrying out the provisions of the reclamation act, and
to pay from the reclamation fund sums which may be needed for that
purpose.
tion, is

by purchase or reservapublic property placed by the act under the control of the

The property

so acquired, either

Secretary of the Interior, for use in the construction of irrigation
works for the storage, development and diversion of waters. He is
required by the act to

make examinations and

surveys, to estimate,

the cost of construction of all contemplated works, the quantity and
location of land which can be irrigated therefrom, and " all facts
The cost
relative to the practicability of each irrigation project."
factor
determining
practicaimportant
the
in
of construction is an
Therefore
economical
project.
use
of the
any
bility of an irrigation
diminished,
or
increased,
such
cost
can
be
the
fund
property by which
not inconsistent with the purpose of the irrigation act, is a material
The power
fact that may be considered in determining the question.
irrigation
is
practicable
whether
an
project
as a finanto determine
implies
right
the
to
so
use
and
control
the
necessarily
cial scheme,
is
in
progress,
as
work
secure
while
the
to
the
construction
property,
If the land needed for the construcof the works at the lowest cost.
made
productive
works
be
by any practical use not
the
can
of
tion
inconsistent with the object to be attained in the construction of the
works, but in furtherance of it, no reason appears why it may not be
so used, there being no express prohibition against it.
In the letter of January 28, 1904, supra, it was suggested that if a
plan for the leasing of such lands was determined upon it would be

necessary to designate some officer to execute the leases, to receive the
rental accruing thereunder, to deposit the

same in the United States

treasury or some other depositary of government money, and to devise

some plan by which the money could be withdrawn and applied

to the

The

work of construction.
act of March 3, 1905

(33 Stat., 1032), to

which attention has

been called by the Director in his letter and which has received a liberal interpretation
difficulties.

That

by the Comptroller of the Treasury, obviates these
act provides

That there shall he covered into the reclamation fund established under the
June seventeenth, nineteen hundred and two, known as the reclamation
act, the proceeds of the sales of material utilized for temporary work and
structures in connection with the operations under the said act. as well as of
the sales of all other condemned property which had been purchased under the
provisions thereof, and also any moneys refunded in connection with the operations under said reclamation act.

act of

I

to

am

of the opinion that the Secretary of the Interior has authority

make

a

temporary

lease of

any of the lands acquired for any

irri-

gation project, provided the use of the land under the proposed lease
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will not interfere with the use and control of the lands when they are
needed for the purposes contemplated by the purchase or reservation
of such lands.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

11AILROAD GRANT—PATENTED LANDS—NORTHERN PACIFIC ADJUST-

MENT.

Northern Pacific Railway Company.
The

provisions of the act of July

1,

1898,

are applicable to patented lands,

whether patented before or after the passage of the act, if such lands are
in dispute between the company and the individual claimant and belong to
either of the classes described therein, and where patents issued to individual claimants prior to the passage of the act, under rulings then in force,
which under rulings now governing would have to be held to have been
improperly issued, the conflicting claims to such lands are subject to adjustment under the provisions of said act, provided the company has not,
by the selection of other lands in lieu of those in controversy, or otherwise,

abandoned

its

claim thereto.

'Secretary Hitchcock to the

(F. L. C.)

With your
cate,

what

is

office letter

Commissioner of
March U, 1906.

the General

Land Office,
(F. W. C.)

of the 7th instant was transmitted, in dupli-

denominated as

list

No. 52, State of Montana, embracing

certain lands included in individual claims within the limits of the

Northern Pacific land-grant in the State of Montana, the same being
submitted for approval under the provisions of the act of July 1,
1898 (30 Stat., 597, 620), preliminary to inviting- the Northern
Pacific Railway Company, successor in interest to the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, to make relinquishment thereof under the
provisions of said act, the individual claimants having elected to
retain the lands included in their several claims.
It is gathered from your said letter of transmittal and from informal inquiry of your office that the several individual claims included
in said list were all patented prior to the passage of the act of July 1,
1898, under rulings then in force, which held the lands involved to
have been excepted from the operation of the Northern Pacific landgrant, but that under present rulings of the courts the departmental
action was improper, there being no such claims as served to defeat
the operation of said grant, so that, unless barred by the statute of
limitations, the individual claimants would be likely to lose the lands
upon the suit instituted by the railroad grantee for possession of the
lands under the grant. It is learned that the lands were only pat-
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Department and that the railroad

grantee has not, by the selection of other lands in lien of those here
in question, which are within the primary limits of its land-grant,

abandoned

By
t\

its

claim to the lands involved.

the decision of the supreme court in the case of

Avery

et al.

{

L95 U. S., 480, 506),

it

is

Humbird

et al.

held, in effect, that the act

of 1898 is applicable to lands patented both before

and after the

such lands are in dispute and belong to either
Under the circumstances herein
of the classes described in said act.
detailed it can be safely said, although these lands were patented to
passage of the act,

if

the individuals prior to the passage of the act of

July

1,

1898, they

nevertheless remained in dispute, as a case involving the principle

which was determinative of the contests between these several individual claimants and the railroad company was prosecuted to the
Supreme Court of the United States, resulting in a decision in favor
of the company (Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. De Lacey,

and

174 U. S., 622),
that

it is

these patents were

claims.

They

and the

by reason of said decision that it is now held
improperly issued upon these individual

are otherwise in the classes described in the act of

Department herewith
approved, with instructions that one copy be retained
in your office and the other transmitted to the Northern Pacific Railway Company with an appropriate request for relinquishment of the
land therein described under said act.
1898.

returns the

entire matter considered, the

list,

SCHOOL LANDS-MINING CLAIM-UN SURVEYED LAND-ACT OF FEBRU-

ARY

State of South Dakota
The grant of

sections. sixteen

and

22, 1889.

v.

Trinity Gold Mining Company.

thirty-six

for school purposes by the act of

made

February

to the State of
22,

1889,

South Dakota

took effect on the
that date identified

admission of the State into the Union, as to lands at
by the government survey, but as to such of the indicated sections as had
not been surveyed at the date of the admission of the State, the right of
the State does not attach unless and until identified by survey, and if at
the time of survey they are known to be mineral in character, they are
excepted from the grant.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)
March 16, 1906.

Land

Office,

(G. J. II.)

December 28, 1903, the Trinity Gold Mining Company made entry
No. 1466 for the Llewellen and seven other lode mining claims, in
T. 5 N., R. 2 E.,

Rapid

City,

South Dakota.
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The records of your office show that the exterior boundaries of the
township in which these claims are situated were established by
official survey in November, 1899, but that the section lines have not
It appearing, however, that the larger part of this
yet been run.
group of claims is located in what, when surveyed, will be section 36,
the State was notified of the allowance of the entry in question and
afforded opportunity to show cause, if any, why the entry should not
be permitted to stand, sections 36 being included in the grant to the
State for school purposes made by the act of February 22, 1889 (25
Stat., 676).

December

24,

1904, the State filed a

alleging, in substance

and

effect,

protest against the entry,

that the land had passed to the State

under its school grant.
January 13, 1905, your office dismissed the protest, on the ground,
in substance and effect, that the public surveys have not been extended
over the lands in question, and until it is definitely ascertained by
government survey what particular lands will be embraced in the
sections granted to the State for school purposes, no rights attach
under the grant to any specific lands.
The State has appealed to the Department.
It is contended to support the appeal that the grant of school
lands made by the act of February 22, 1889, supra, is a grant in

upon

praesenti; that the right of the State thereunder attached

its

admission into the Union, whether at that date the granted sections
were surveyed or unsurveyed; and that lands containing valuable
deposits of mineral were not excepted from the grant unless known
to be mineral in character at the time of the State's admission.

The State does

not allege that the particular lands here in contro-

known to be mineral at
apparently proceeding upon
the assumption that they were not known to be mineral on that date.
The provisions of the school grant to the State of Utah (sections
versy are nonmineral, or that they were not

the date of the State's admission, but

6

and

10, act of

July

is

16, 1894, 28 Stat., 107), are in all essential

respects identical with those of the grant here in question.

struing the

Utah grant

In con-

the Department has uniformly held that

it

took effect on the admission of the State into the Union, as to lands
at that date identified by the government survey (State of Utah in

Allen et at, 27 L. D., 53 State of Utah, 29 L. D., 418, 419 Law u\
State of Utah, 29 L. D., 623; State of Utah, 32 L. D., 117; Helen
but as to such of the indicated sections as
Tibbals, 33 L. D., 223)
had not been surveyed at the date of the admission of the State, the
;

;

;

Department
L. D., 37),

held, in the case of

Mahoganey No.

2

Lode Claim

(33

that—

the right of the State to the lands mentioned does not attach unless and until
by the government survey (State of Colorado, G L. D., 412; Barnhurst

identified
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and if at that time they are of known mineral
V. State of Utah, 30 L. D., 314)
(See State of Utah r.
character they are reserved from the grant to the State.
Allen et ah, 27 L. D., 53 State of Utah, 32 L. D., 117.)
;

;

This decision

is

harmony with

in

Heydenfeldt

v.

decisions of the

(See Cooper

of the United States.

Daney Gold and

Silver

States of South Dakota and

The

v.

Supreme Court

Boberts, 18 How., 173, 179;

Mining Co., 93 U. S., 634.)
Montana (with others) were

admitted under the same enabling act (supra) and the grant for
made by said act is the same as to both of said States.
In instructions to the Director of the Geological Survey, August 9,
1904 (33 L. D., 181), the Department, construing the school grant to

school purposes

the latter State, said

The people of Montana by adoption of a constitution accepted the grant,
which became operative by executive proclamation of November 8, 1889 (26
Stat., 1551), and title as of present grant for the specific sections vested in the
State subject to their future identification by the public land surveys. The
later act of February 28, 1891 (26 Stat., 796), amending sections 2275 and 2276,
Revised Statutes, saves the rights of settlers before survey, but, otherwise than
the grant of the specific sections

for protection of settlers,

(Noyes

v.

is

not affected.

State of Montana, 29 L. D., 695.)

urged on behalf of the State that this construction of the
by the Department amounted to a determination that
the grant was one in praesenti, and that, therefore, mineral lands are
not excepted therefrom unless known to be mineral at the date of the
State's admission into the Union.
The question involved and considered by the Department in those
instructions was whether or not the State w as entitled to the school
sections in certain townships formerly embraced within an Indian
reservation, and it was held that the State is " entitled to claim the
specific sections in place within the boundaries of the former reservation where they have not been appropriated by a bona fide settler
prior to their identification by survey." No question touching the
rights of the State as between it and mineral claimants was involved
or discussed, and it was not intended by the language there employed
to overrule or in anywise modify the decision in the case of Mahoganey
No. 2 Lode Claim, supra, rendered but two months before. The
It is

school grant

T

decision in that case

is

controlling here.

urged on behalf of the State, in substance and effect,
that as the exterior lines of the township in which the land in question
is situated have been established by government survey, thus fixing
the south and east lines of what when surveyed Avill be section 36, the
section is " as definitely designated as if the township had been fully
surveyed," and the mineral claimant could therefore have ascertained
that the land was within a school section and should not have made
location thereof unless the lands were known to be mineral at the date
It is further

of the State's admission.
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It appears from the abstract of title in the record that seven of the
eight claims embraced in the entry in question were located prior to

the survey of the township lines, and also prior to the admission of
the State into the Union. It can not be said, therefore, that the

claims were located with knowledge that the land was embraced in a
But in any event, the Department has held (Barn-

school section.

hurst

State of Utah, 30 L. D., 314), that " the survey of the townis not a survey of a section within that township, two sides

v.

ship lines

of which are described and fixed by the township lines."

Bullock

Rouse, 81 Cal., 590.)
Your office decision dismissing the protest

(See also

v.

is

affirmed.

desert land entry-reclamation— cultivation.

Brandon
The

March

desert-land act of

3,

v.

1877, as

Costley.

amended by the

act of

March

1891,

3,

requires that sufficient water be conducted upon the land embraced in the

entry to reclaim

from its desert character and render it suitable for
and that one-eighth of the land be placed under

it

agricultural purposes,
cultivation.

As proof

of

tillage

within contemplation of the desert-land act

cultivation

Secretary Hitchcock

An

Commissioner of the General Land

to the

March

(F. L. C.)

appeal has been

of your

office

of

filed

May

31,

19, 1906.

by Thomas

J.

and

0, Sec. 23,

and NE.

J

Office,

(C. J. G.)

Brandon from the

decision

1905, dismissing his contest against the

NE.

±,

NW.

NW.

\ and lots
J
Sec. 22, T. 8 X., R. 41 E., Blackfoot,

desert land entry of Rebecca Costley for the
5

actual

must as a rule be shown.

Idaho, and holding said entry intact.

The entry was made July

25,

1902, final proof

was submitted

thereon December 21, 1903, and final certificate issued January

Brandon's affidavit of contest was
alleged that
he
which
1904.

filed

January

9,

5.

1904, in

the said Rebecca Costley has failed to comply with the law in that she has not
cultivated or caused to be cultivated £ of the land and has not conducted water
upon the land embraced in said entry so as to irrigate and reclaim the same
from its former condition to such extent that it will produce an agricultural
crop, and that water has not been distributed through and by means of ditches
over all the lands in each legal subdivision of said entry and that said defaults

continue

down

to this date.

A

hearing was ordered and had before the local officers, who rendered decision recommending cancellation of the entry. Upon appeal your office reversed their action, dismissed the contest, and held
the entry intact, as stated.
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made

desert

land entry for this same land in 1898, but, as testified to by him, at
the expiration of four years, thinking he did not have sufficient water

he relinquished the same and his wife made the
entry in question. He turned his improvements over to her and had
his water stock in what is known as the Dewey canal transferred on
This is said to have
the books of the company to her in her name.
<>1
the
certificate
water
in
July,
but
stock thirty1903,
been done
to irrigate the land,

four shares

—was not actually issued

—

to her until

She also held
in
the
Last
Chance
canal.
stock
water

the date of final proof.

December

21, 1903,

certificate for three shares of

In her final proof Mrs. Costley stated,

among

other things:

lias been conducted upon said land during the fall of 1903, said land
been reclaimed to such extent that it will now produce an agricultural
Two main ditches, dimensions 3 feet wide, capacity about 200 inches^
crop.
two laterals about same size and capacity, $1035.00 expended in the aggregate
which equals more than $3.00 per acre of the entire area thereof. Water has
been distributed upon each legal subdivision with a view to the proper reclamation thereof, during October of 1903, about one inch per acre used, for a few
days at each time, on part of it during the entire season of 1003. No agricultural crop has been raised as the water was too late for a crop in 1903, except
on a portion of the land used for pasture the growth of grass has been con21 acres under plow and about ten acres of meadow,
siderably increased.

Water

lias

made

as a result of the irrigation.

She also stated that there are no high points or uneven surfaces
which are not practically susceptible of irrigation.
The source of the claimed water supply for the irrigation of the
Costley tract is the North Fork of Snake river, through the Dewey
canal, the construction of which Avas begun in 1898.
The point of
diversion from the river is a mile or more above the land.
According to a plat filed in the case, which is recognized by the parties as
being practically correct, the

XE.

}

of the

SW.

Dewey

J of Sec. 14,

canal enters the east side of the

and extends in a general

soutliAvest-

through the X. J of said SW. J. The SW. i of 14,
which adjoins the Costley claim on the north, Avas entered under
the desert law June 6, 1902, by one Samuel M. Maupin, upon relinquishment of L. C. Rice ayIio made desert entry for the land in 1898
and who Avas at one time Secretary of the DeAvey Canal Company.
Maupin assigned his entry, June 12, 1902, to Alice T. Rice, wife of
said L. C. Rice, and it is stated the laterals from the DeAvey canal
were built to water both the Rice and Costley tracts.
A large portion of the expenditure credited to Mrs. Costley in her proof Avas
undoubtedly made in the construction of said canal while the land
in question Avas embraced in <R. J. Costley's entry.
Two laterals
were taken out from the DeAA'ey canal, one, the west lateral, on the
west side of the SW. I of Sec. 14, and extending practically on the
erly direction
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between the NE. J of the NE. J of Sec. 22 and the NW. J of
of Sec. 23 the other, the east lateral, running in a southThese
easterly direction across the E. J of the SW. J of Sec. 14.
laterals, as stated, were intended to water both the Rice and Costley
claims.
At date of hearing it had not yet been estimated how much
Mrs.
Costley was entitled to on account of her stock in the
water
line

the

NW |

Dewey

canal.

;

It

was

testified that she

owns one-sixth of

water stock and one-ninth of the land controlled by the

all

the

Dewey

canal stockholders, which it is claimed entitles her to more than
enough water to irrigate and reclaim this land.
The Last Chance canal, which one of contestee's witnesses says
was completed in 1902, and another that it has been constructed
'"
five or six years any way
may be more," enters the NE. J and
goes diagonally and southwesterly across lots 5 and 6 of the Costley
tract.
No laterals were taken out from the Last Chance canal, it
being claimed on behalf of contestee that it was unnecessary owing
to the fact of sufficient sub-irrigation from said canal.
The " main ditches " mentioned in Mrs. Costley's proof undoubtedly refer to the Dewey and Last Chance canals. The testimony on
behalf of contestant is to the effect that prior to proof and contest the
land was in its native state except three small pieces of plowing and
one canal, the Last Chance, running through it. This plowing was
on the southern portion of the entry, one piece being between the
Last Chance and North Fork of Snake River. The pieces of plowing were measured with a fifty-foot tape line and found to aggregate
13.07 acres. The sage brush had not been cleared therefrom.
The
west lateral from the Dewey canal w as made by plowing two furrows
each way and cleaning them out. It would carry a very small stream
of water and was not in condition to carry it all the way through,
as there were low places where it would have to be banked up. The
lateral did not reach the plowed ground; it went to a swale which
was three or three and a half feet lower than the plowed ground, and
if water had gone in that direction it would have run into this swale.
This was the only ditch on the land in the fall of 1903 and water did
not at that time flow in that. It crossed two legal subdivisions and
was about one-half mile long. There was no water being conducted
upon the land at time of contest except through a waste ditch from
the Last Chance canal there were no laterals from said canal except
this waste ditch and it did not irrigate any of the ploAved ground.
After contest some plowing and clearing were done, more ditches
made and portions of the land put in crop. But there was not sufficient water on the land in the fall of 1903 to produce a growth of
grass, and the only vegetation was sage brush and some grass along
the river. At no time during the fall of 1903 was there any irriga;

T

;
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ditch

upon

lots 5

and

6 of Sec. 23.

Water flowed

in the

491

Dewey

backed up and overflowed the banks. The place of overflow was above point where the
west lateral diverted its waters from the canal, and there was no
water in said lateral during the season of 1903. No water was beingdistributed on the land on December 21, 1903, date of proof, except
through the waste ditch from the Last Chance canal. All of the
canal for three days in October, 1903, but

it

from the Dewey canal
Prior to final proof no agricultural crop
had been raised on said claim, there was not an increased growth of
grass thereon, due to irrigation, and one-eighth of the land had not
been cultivated. Some of the land lying southeast of the Last
Costley claim

is

susceptible of irrigation

except five or ten acres.

Chance could be irrigated therefrom if laterals were carried out, but
very little to the northwest. There were two laterals leading from
the Dewey canal prior to December 21, 1903, the west one already
referred to, and the east one which was only three hundred yards
long and on the SW. J of Sec. 14, the Rice tract, a quarter to a half
mile from the Costley claim. The east lateral extended in the direction of said claim but it also ran into a sag or swale

—

against a knoll
higher than the ditch. The land in question would produce
crops of more value than grass, as the climatic conditions are not
such as to render it valuable solely for hay. But it would not in the
condition it was in prior to contest produce sufficient to support stock.
There were not enough laterals or ditches nor were they large enough
to make grass, wheat, oats or anything else grow.
And even if crops
had been put out, or stock kept off, the same could not have been harvested because of the sage brush which was left on the plowed ground.

4

feet

contestee shows that prior to December
something like $900 had been expended in securing a w ater
supply and about twenty acres had been plowed. One witness estimated the acreage of the plowed ground by guessing and another by
stepping.
One witness saw water in the west lateral going past the
southwest corner of the Rice tract in the fall of 1903 but he did not
follow it down and thinks the time was after final proof advertisement. He saw water on the Costley claim prior to December 21,
1903, but it w as from the Last Chance.
The east lateral only extended part way across the Rice claim in the fall of 1903, but there
was water in it. At date of proof there was a pond of water at the
terminus of this lateral on the Rice claim, there being at that point

The testimony on behalf of

T

21, 1903,

T

The lateral was constructed in the same manner
was partly built in the fall of 1903 and completed
in the spring of 1904.
It was intended to go through to the Costley
claim but the water froze up in the canal and the contractor had other
work to do. It is claimed that no laterals are needed on the land

quite a little rise.

as the west one, it
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south of the Last Chance, being an increased growth of grass there
due to sub-irrigation. It is said the land sub-irrigates very easily on

account of the substratum of lava rock being so near the surface. It
is admitted the plowed ground was not prior to contest cleared of
brush, leveled nor harrowed, as the custom is not to do these things

On

until crops are put in.

cross-examination of contestee's witnesses

water was turned into the laterals solely for the
purpose of enabling her to make final proof, but on re-direct that
testimony is explained by saying it was for the purpose of testing the
efficiency of the irrigation system.
A witness said that water was not
upon every legal subdivision prior to or at date of proof, but still
the land had been reclaimed at that time sufficient to produce an
agricultural crop " a good many times over/' It is difficult to understand to what particular part of the claim this statement refers, or
One of contestee's
to reconcile it with the other testimony in the case.

it

was

testified that

was practicable to irrigate the east part of the NE. ^
from the west lateral but that a good deal of
the land has a ridge running through it and it would require another
lateral to water the northwest corner of said tract.
Another witness
who did the plowing on this claim in the fall of 1903 testified there
witnesses said

of the

NE.

it

^ of Sec. 22

were fourteen and one half acres of it, in addition to the piece of
plowing under the Last Chance canal, which contained six or seven
Nothing was done except the plowing, in doing which, when
acres.
large sage brush was struck they plowed it right up or " would dodge
around " it. The ground was not harrowed nor was the sage brush
cleared up. He saw water going the entire length of the west lateral
the first of November, 1903, and thinks half of the claim could be
This lateral was the only one that
irrigated from it, if necessary.
conducted water to the Costley claim in the fall of 1903. Prior to
December 21, 1903, water ran past the terminus of this lateral it was
turned off because they " got it down to where we wanted to go "
not certain whether
turned' it in next evening and it ran all one night
these two times were the only times water was in that lateral prior
The lateral terminates in a low gulley but it
to December 21, 1903.
can be conducted around.

—

—

Was

Q.

time?

—A.

there any lateral upon the XE.

No

}

of the

NW.

i of See. 23, at that

sir.

Q. State whether or not on December 21, 1903, water had been distributed
through or by means of ditches over all of this land on each legal subdivision
these two fractions, this fraction you are speaking
thereof.
A. No, it had not
of in here there is not any lateral except the Last Chance canal.

—

;

Witness said the tract southeast of the Last Chance sub-irrigated
1902

—could not say just

of the tract that

much
sub-irrigates now
as

as

it

does

now

in

but greater portion

sub-irrigated then.

The testimony
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on behalf of contestee likewise shows that the land in controversy
would produce paying crops of grain, the character of the land and
climatic conditions not being such as to prevent the raising of such
crops.

At time

was flowing
were plowed, cleared and in

of hearing water

forty or fifty acres

in both laterals

and

cultivation.

The first section of the act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 377), entitled
"An act to provide for the sale of desert lands in certain States and
" conductsecond section provides " that all

Territories," provides for the reclamation of such lands

ing water upon the same."

The

by

lands exclusive of timber lands and mineral lands which will not,

without irrigation, produce some agricultural crop, shall be deemed
desert lands within the meaning of this act."

The act did not specify how or to what extent land was to be
reclaimed thereunder, except " by conducting water upon the same,"
nor did it contain any penalty or forfeiture clause for failure to
properly reclaim the land. In this respect the instructions of March
12,

1877 (2 C. L. L., 1375), merely followed the language of the act.
required, as an assurance of good faith, to advance

The entryman was

twenty-five cents per acre of the price fixed for the land at the time

was given three years in which to submit proof of the reclamation of the land " in the manner aforesaid."

of filing his declaration, and he

and upon payment of an additional sum of one dollar per acre a patent
be issued to him. The act granted 640 acres of desert lands,
an area larger than under the pre-emption and homestead laws,
because it was deemed that a lesser area would not justify the outlay
of capital and labor necessary to procure a water supply, the subject
of reclamation being at the time more or less problematical.
The
instructions of March 12, 1877, supra, were supplemented by those of
September 3, 1880 (2 C, L. L., 1382), wherein it was said:
Avas to

I am of the opinion that it* it be shown that a sufficient quantity of water
has been brought upon the land to irrigate the irltolc thereof, and the water is
properly distributed, so that the entire tract is, in fact, irrigated in a manner

and the whole thereof is in good condition for agriwould be likely to use the land, and
in a manner that evinces the good faith of the claimant and the actual and
practical reclamation of the irltolc of the land, and that an agricultural crop
has been raised on some portions thereof, the proof should be deemed sufficient.

suitable for cultivation,

cultural purposes, as a practical cultivator

In preparing the blank forms for final proof under the act of 1877

was deemed proper to insert questions as to the cultivation and
growing of agricultural crops upon the lands entered, and upon the
suggestion of your office "that there is nothing in the language of
the statute requiring proof of cultivation or of the growing of agricultural crops upon the land entered as a prerequisite to the issuance
of patent therefor," it was held in the case of Wallace v. Boyce
it
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(1 L. D., 26),

August

2,

1882, after stating that the blank forms of

act, and that they were drawn
with direct reference to the proof of such facts as will show com-

proof were not in contravention of the
"

pliance by showing results

:"

The primal question to be determined is the signification of the word " resame is used in the statute. It is presumable that Congress
used this word in its ordinary acceptation, which, according to Webster, is
claim," as the

"To

reduce by discipline, labor, cultivation, or the like, to a desired state;
from being wild, desert, waste, submerged, or the like; as to reclaim
wild land, overflowed land, etc."
Hence, I am of the opinion that the intendment of the statute is to provide
for the reclamation of such lands from their desert condition to an agricultural
Congress specified water as the means to that end, but the mere constate.
veying of water upon the land is not a fulfillment of the law, unless in sufficient quantity to prepare such land for cultivation.
It would be imputing a
to rescue

vain intent to the statute to interpret the same as requiring a mere occasional
seepage of water upon such land, which in itself would not materially change
the original status of the same so far as agricultural purposes are concerned.

In the case of Babcock
1883,

it

was

v.

Watson

et al.

(2 L. D., 19),

August

7,

said:

The expression

"

some agricultural crop

"

does not refer solely to the amount
be grass, it may be wheat or barley,
or some other crop to which the country and climate in the region of the land
are generally adapted.
of the crop

And

:

it

also refers to kind.

in Miller

v.

It

may

Noble (3 L. D., 9), under date of July

14,

1884:

v. Boyce (1 L. D., 54), this Department held substantially that
proof must show that the land from a desert condition has been reduced
to an agricultural state. But in the case of Babcock v. Watson (2 L. D., 19), it
was said, in referring to the phrase "some agricultural crop," that it meant
not only the amount of the crop, but also the kind, and that it might include
grass, wheat, or barley, or such other crop as the country and climate were
adapted to. Hence it would seem that " results " might be shown after a sufficient lapse of time, even though no attempt was made to cultivate the land by

In Wallace

final

plowing and sowing seed.

In departmental circular of February 9, 1885 (3 L. D., 385). it
was said, referring among other things to the questions in the printed
form for taking proof and the case of Wallace v. Boyce, supra:
nothing in the act that requires such proof be furnished, and in the
to, I said I did not think a regulation of the office that such proof
be furnished can be said to be in contravention of the act. I am disposed to
modify the views thus expressed as it may be a hardship in many cases to
require proof of this character. The fact to be ascertained is, has the claimant
of desert lands reclaimed the lands within the meaning of the act
He has
three years to make such reclamation which can only be done in one way, and
that is with water. It is true that evidence that such reclamation is perfect
and complete will be by proof of an agricultural crop raised on such land by
the aid of the water so brought on the land .... But it is not the only proof,
and might not be at all times the best proof .... The act very clearly contemplates that the reclamation must be from a desert state to an agricultural one,

There

is

case referred
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and that is proved where it shows that the claimant is the owner of a sufficient
quantity of water to irrigate the land claimed, sufficiently for agricultural purposes and has conveyed such water on the lands in such manner that he can use
it

for the purpose of irrigating his crop.

land

not sufficient

is

:

it

must he

The mere carrying

of water on the

in sufficient quantities that a crop

can be raised

by the aid of the water so conveyed on the land. I do not think it is necessary
to distribute the water over the land as is done in the course of irrigation.
That would be to require a useless thing of the claimant, but the water must be.

conveyed to the highest portions of the land.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Your regulations should therefore be so amended as to allow other evidence
The raising of an
of the reclamation of land besides that of a growing crop.

may

not the only evidence
with actual
proof as to the character of the ditch, quantity of water, etc., owned by the
agricultural crop

be evidence of reclamation, but

that ought to be received,

and ought not at any time

is

to dispense

claimant.
i

In instructions of your

office

of July 23, 1885 (4 L. D., 51),

it

was

said
irrigation is not evidence of reclamation.
But
without artificial irrigation, produce any agricultural
crop, it must be reclaimed by conducting water upon it and upon every subdivision of it.
There must be a proprietorship of sufficient water to continue
And the reclamation must
the irrigation and make the reclamation perpetual.
be proven by evidence showing its manner and extent, and the results attained,
as indicated in the forms of proof prescribed by official regulations.
I shall require evidence that the law has been complied with in form and
spirit
I do not think the fact that crops can be raised is established until it
is shown that crops liarc been raised, and it must also be shown that the raising
of the crop is the result of a reclamation without which the crop could not have

The raising of a crop without

where land would

not,

been raised.

The purpose of the desert land act is not to enable persons to acquire title
hundred and forty acre tracts of public land by mere formalities and
The purpose is to secure the actual and perconstructive compliance with law.
manent reclamation of land which in a natural state is unproductive.
to six

The decision of date September 1,
Ramsey (5 L. D., 120), after referring

1886, in the case of

George

to 3 L. D., 385, contains this

statement
than my predecessor, and hold that the whole
which proof is offered (unless it be possibly some high points or
uneven surfaces which are practically not susceptible of irrigation) must be
actually irrigated in a manner indicative of the good faith of the claimant.
In
this connection the right to the water used, the quantity of it, the manner of
its distribution, and the permanency of the supply are all to be taken into

But

I

will go one step further

tract for

consideration.

In the case of Charles H. Schick (5 L. D., 151), September 14,
was held that proof of crops raised may be regarded as supplementing proof of irrigation, but should not be held as an essential
188C), it

requirement in final proof.
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In the circular of June
person

who makes

27,

1887 (5 L. D., 708),

it

was stated that

a

a desert land entry before he has secured a water

own

and that the whole tract and each legal
offered must be actually irrigated.
parte
William
Eudd
In ex
G.
(7 L. D., 167), August 8, 1888, it
was held
right does so at his

risk,

subdivision for which proof

is

In his appeal he admits that he had not reclaimed the land nor conducted
water thereon as required by law, but avers that as the proof shows that a
large amount of work had heen done with a view to reclamation of the land by
conducting water thereon, and since the failure to conduct water upon said land
within the time required by law was owing to no fault of his, but was caused
by matters over which he had no control, therefore said proof should have been
accepted as satisfactory and as evincing his good faith. The contention of
appellant cannot be sustained. A showing of his intentions, however good they
may have been, cannot avail in the absence of proof showing that what the law
requires to be done in the matter of reclamation has been done.
It appears from the proof which was offered and which the local office and
your office rejected, that ditches had been dug to conduct water upon the land
but that no water had been so conducted.
Iii ex parte Adam Schindler (7 L. D., 253), August 22, 1888,
although the proof showed that a large portion of the land had been
cultivated to wheat, barley and vegetables, supplemental proof was
required because the original proof failed to show what proportion of
each legal subdivision had been irrigated.
The following is an extract from the decision in ex parte Emma J.

Warren
Upon

(8 L. D., 113),

January

22, 1889:

the other point appealed from, your decision

also affirmed in requir-

is

ing additional proof, showing a satisfactory reclamation of the land by such

means as

will give reasonable promise of permanence.
It must be qualified,
however, so far as it insists upon an actual raising of crops as an absolute conCharles
dition or evidence of reclamation. See George Ramsey (5 L. D., 120)
H. Schick (ibidem, 151). The raising of crop is not made by law a necessary
fact the reclamation may be established without it yet, as the object of
reclamation is to raise crops among which I would include crops of grasses
that would not otherwise grow upon the land it is one evidence of reclamation
When, therefore, the proof
usually to be expected as an accompanying fact.
fails to show that any crops have been produced upon the land, it ought to be
required of the entryman to give satisfactory and trustworthy testimony of
other facts which will satisfy the mind that the reclamation has in fact been
made.
;

;

—

;

—

See also case of Vibrans v. Langtree (9 L. D., 419), of date September 26, 1889.
In the case of Gilkison v. Coughanhour (11 L. D., 246), September
5. 1890, a contest charging the non-desert character of the land Avas
dismissed, but as the proof failed to show definitely what proportion
of each legal subdivision had been irrigated, claimant was required to
furnish supplementary proof, although " the water may have been
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Possibly,

the water would have been
but for the freezing weather
running over and through each subdivision of the land but the inci.

.

.

;

dent of the freezing weather and the consequent failure to irrigate the
land, can not excuse claimant from showing its reclamation."

From

may

the foregoing a fair conception

be had as to

how

the

desert

land act of 1877 was construed up to the passage of the

act of

March

3,

1891

While

(26 Stat., 1095).

it

can not be said

force must
an act was being construed which only requires
reclamation of desert lands " by conducting water upon the same."
The act of March 3, 1877, was amended by the act of March 3, 1891,
supra, and the significance of this new legislation can very well be
determined by reference to the limited provisions of the act of 1877
and the constructions placed thereon by the land department, as it
must be presumed such provisions and constructions were fully in the
mind of Congress when the act of 1891 was framed. The distinguishing features of said act necessary to be stated here are Proof of the
that such construction has been entirely uniform, yet

be given the fact that

:

cultivation of one-eighth of the land
that

may

be entered

which the land

is

is

is

required

;

the quantity of land

reduced to 320 acres; and the time within
extended to four years. It is also

to be reclaimed is

provided in said act
That this act shall not affect any valid rights heretofore accrued under said
March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-seven, but all bona fide claims
heretofore lawfully initiated may be perfected, upon due compliance with the
provisions of said act, in the same manner, upon the same terms and conditions,
and subject to the same limitations, forfeitures, and contests as if this act had
act of

not been passed.

Explanation

is

found

in the foregoing for the fact that depart-

mental decisions, to which reference

made

is

in attorneys' briefs,

have been rendered since the act of 1891, which follow the rules and
decisions under the act of 1877, with no reference to the new legis-

were made prior to the amendand were therefore not necessarily controlled by
the stricter provisions of said act.
In this connection see William
Skeen (14 L. D., 270); John H. Kirk (15 L. D., 535); Meads v.
Geiger (16 L. D., 366); Dickinson v. Auerbach (18 L. D., 16);
Thompson v. Bartholet (18 L. D., 96) Rider v. Atwater (20 L. D.,
Gage v. Atwater (21 L. D., 211) and United States v. Mc449)
Kinney (27 L. D., 516).
The act of March 3, 1891, in addition to its other requirements
lation.

But

in those cases the entries

atory act of 1891

;

;

;

provided " that proof be further required of the cultivation of
Therefore, as to one-eighth of the land at
least, the proviso clearly contemplates something more than, something distinct from, reclaiming said land " by conducting water upon

also

one-eighth of the land."
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the same."
legislation

it

During the course of the debates
was said

in Congress

upon

this

Under this bill public lands that are susceptible of cultivation can not be
acquired except in one of two ways either under the homestead law by an
actual settler, or under the modified desert-land law upon actual reclamation.
There must be either actual reclamation or actual settlement by a homesteader
:

upon the public land.

Water

means of reclamation under the

desert land law, and
even under the act of 1877, water must
be conveyed in sufficient quantities upon each legal subdivision and
But this is not
so distributed as to thoroughly irrigate the land.
is

the

to secure actual reclamation

the sole requirement under the act of 1891

;

in addition a specified

is nothing from which
can be inferred that the word " cultivation " was employed in the
act in any different sense from what is ordinarily understood by that
term, namely, tillage, which, as defined by Webster, is " the operation,
practice, or act of tilling or preparing land for seed, and keeping the
ground in a state favorable for the growth of crops." The evident
purpose of the additional requirement of proof as to cultivation
of one-eighth of the land was to show the sufficiency of the irrigation
system. The primary object of the act of 1877 was the change of
lands from a desert to an agricultural state, " to secure the actual
and permanent reclamation of land which in a natural state is unproductive," and that title might not pass upon a mere constructive compliance with the law, the additional requirement of cultivation was

portion of the land must be cultivated.

There

it

put in the amendatory act of 1891. The definition of " reclaim " as
given by Webster, is " To reduce to a desired state by discipline,
labor, cultivation, or the like; to rescue from being wild, desert,
waste, submerged, or the like; as, to reclaim wild land, overflowed
land, etc." The act of 1877 designates desert lands to be lands
" which will not, without irrigation, produce some agricultural crop."
In construing said act it is held by the Department that the term
" crop " means such an agricultural production as would be a fair
reward for the expense of producing it, and within that term may
be included grass, wheat or barley, or " some other crop to which the
country and climate in the region of the land are generally adapted."
Therefore it would seem that the necessary corollary would be, even
under the act of 1877, that reclamation of an arid, unproductive
tract is not an accomplished fact until it is at least in condition to
produce an agricultural crop, notwithstanding it has been held under
said act of 1877 that " the fact of reclamation may be established
without showing crops as the result of irrigation."
The desert land law has undoubtedly been construed along the same
lines as other laws having reference to agricultural lands, as the
primary object of said law is to change desert lands as such to an
:

:

|
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Under exceptional circumstances acts performed
good faith which do not come strictly within the ordinary meaning of the term " cultivation " are sometimes accepted in lieu of the
Thus, clearing the land of timber for the
actual tillage of the soil.
purpose of planting it, is cultivation within the meaning of section
2301 of the Revised Statutes. John E. Tyrl (3 L. D., 49). " There
was some planting done for three years, and some little stirring of
This is not sufficient
the ground every year since the date of entry.
He should have shown that this breaking and cultivating
of itself.
was done in a proper manner at the proper season of the year, and
that the planting was also done in that manner." Taylor v. Huffman
The cultivation contemplated by the homestead law
(5 L. D., 40).
is undoubtedly the preparation and use of the soil for agricultural
purposes, whereby the land is reclaimed from its wild state and made
productive. John T. Wooten (5 L. D., 389). Proof of the requisite
improvements to secure pasturage and the production of grass, may be
properly accepted in lieu of the usual proof of cultivation, where it
appears that the land is better adapted to grazing purposes than to
Mary A.
the cultivation of crops that require tillage of the soil.
Taylor (7 L. D., 200); Michael McKillip (7 L. D., 455). While
cultivation ultimately includes the planting and raising of crops,
there may be cultivation without this one definition of the word being
"improvement for agricultural purposes." George W. Johnson (7
L. D., 439).
In this case claimant used the land principally for
pasturage. This, with the value and permanent character of his
buildings and the fact that he had broken between two and three
acres, was considered sufficient cultivation.
In the commutation of
homestead entries breaking may be accepted as satisfactory proof of
cultivation if good faith appears and the proof is satisfactory in
other respects. T. H. Quigley (8 L. D., 551) Caroline Welo (8 L. D.,
Thomas C. Burns (9 L. D., 432) Rosa B. Riggs (10 L. D.,
612)
In the case of timber-culture entries made prior to the regula526).
tions of June 27, 1887, the preparation of the land and planting of
trees are acts of cultivation.
Christian Isaak (9 L. D., 624). But
no fixed rule can be laid down as to what shall constitute satisfactory
cultivation under the timber-culture law.
Costello v. Jansen
10
L. D., 10).
Planting a crop with no expectation or intention of
securing a return therefrom is not compliance with the homestead law
in the matter of cultivation.
Reas v. Ludlow (22 L. D., 205). Residence alone will not be held sufficient compliance with the law and
is not considered by decisions of the department to be so.
Settlement
and cultivation are both required by section 2290 of the Revised
Statutes, and cultivation is required by section 2291 of the Revised
Statutes, as construed by decisions.
Norton v. Ackley (29 L. D., 561).
agricultural state.

in

;

;

;

;

(
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In the case of John Cunningham (32 L. D., 207), referring to the
George W. Johnson, supra, it was held, syllabus

case of

A

showing on the part of a desert-land entryman that as a result of irrigation
is a marked increase in the growth of the native grasses

of the land there

thereon, sufficient to support stock,

The

is

sufficient proof of cultivation.

instructions of February 17, 1904 (32 L. D., 456), in which
is made to the Cunningham decision, were issued for the

reference

reason, as stated therein, that possibly some expressions in said decision

might

" be taken as indicating a

purpose to encourage the

offer

and sanction the acceptance of final proofs in desert land entries that
do not clearly establish a strict compliance with all the requirements
of law." These instructions do not, and were not designed to, as has
been contended, enunciate any additional or more rigid rule than previously existed. On the contrary, they expressly state that they were
prepared " for the purpose of laying down with greater exactness the
proper rule to be observed in passing upon final proofs in desert land
entries."
Not a new rule, but the rule already in existence, the enforcement of which had in some cases become unduly lax. From
what is hereinbefore set forth it can readily be seen that these instructions not only do not constitute a new rule but are fully justified
by the amendatory act of 1891, which expressly imposes an additional
requirement over the act of 1877 and at the same time gives an additional year in which to comply with said requirement.
While the
mere conducting of water to or upon the land so as to render it available for distribution when needed, may have satisfied the act of 1877,
it plainly does not fulfill all the requirements of the act of 1891.
As to the material points in this controversy the evidence as a whole
By a preponderance of said evidence it is
is entirely reconcilable.
shown that prior to final proof and contest only one lateral, that on

main Dewey canal, was constructed to this land.
Whether the carrying capacity of said canal was sufficient, and the
quantity of water therein at the time was sufficient, and whether
the west, from the

contestee

by reason of her alleged ownership of water stock entitled

her to an adequate supply for her claim, or not, the fact remains that
at time of proof water was not, and could not be in the nature of

shown by the evidence, distributed over the whole susceptiand reclaim it. The
east lateral, which it is said was also for the purpose of conveying
water to this land, was not constructed to said land at date of proof.
things, as

ble area of said claim so as to actually irrigate

It is

admitted on behalf of contestee that only half of the claim could

be watered from the west lateral.

Only

a

small portion of the claim

could have been irrigated from the Last Chance canal even though
The mere fact that this canal traversed
laterals had been taken out.
this claim is not sufficient in itself to constitute reclamation of the
territory traversed.

Nilson

v.

Anderson (23 L.

D., 138),

There was
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an area in the northeast of the claim in section 23, dependent upon
the east lateral, which, as stated, was not completed until the spring
of 1904, and not all of the land in section 22 could have been watered
from the west lateral. But under the act of 1891 no amount of water
stock nor available water can take the place of the work required to be
done in the way of cultivation. It is doubtful whether the requisite
number of acres had been plowed even. Other things being equal, the
testimony of persons who actually measure a tract of land with a
measuring instrument would ordinarily be accepted in preference to
an estimate by those who merely view or step the premises. But
whether the required acreage had been plowed or not is immaterial in
this instance because the manner in which the plowing was done could
in no sense be accepted as a compliance with law in the matter of
cultivation, even if plowing might possibly in proper instance be
accepted as cultivation. Desert land can not be said to be changed
to a condition suitable for agricultural purto an agricultural state
poses

—

—

if

there be left

upon

it,

growth of sage brush
plowing itself, but would

for instance, a

that not only seriously interferes with the

render the harvesting of crops well-nigh impossible in the event they
were planted.

Applying the instructions of February

17, 1901, the

evidence here

shows there was not even a marked increase in the growth of grass
on one-eighth of the land, clue to irrigation, and that grass sufficient
to support stock had not been produced by reason of the irrigation
system proper and probably not otherwise. It was shown that
climatic conditions are not such as to prevent the raising of good
and paying crops of both hay and grain and that tillage of the soil
would not injure its productive qualities. While contestee may have
an absolute right to sufficient water to irrigate the land, it conclusively appears that at time of proof the system of ditches was
entirely inadequate to conduct water to and distribute it over the land.
In fact, no ditches had at that time been taken out from the laterals.
Certainly the turning of water once or twice into an inadequate
lateral does not satisfactorily demonstrate the sufficiency of the water
supply nor the effectiveness of the irrigation system. It is true
the proof was prematurely made, in the sense that it was made prior
to the expiration of the statutory period, that at time of hearing the
irrigation system was in working condition
and that a large number
of acres were broken, cleared and in cultivation.
These considerations might possibly be given weight were the case one between the
entryman and the government, but as contestee saw fit to submit
;

proof at the time she did, and in the presence of a successful contestant

whose rights

in the premises

can not justly be ignored, they

can not avail.

The

decision of your

question will be canceled.

office

herein

is

reversed,

and the entry

in
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nOMESTEAD ENTRY-QUALFFICATIOXS—KINKAID ACT.
Arthur
The

act of April 28, 1004,

known

J.

Abbott.

as the " Kinkaid Act," does not repeal any of

the provisions of the homestead laws, but merely amends said laws by
allowing entry of a greater number of acres, within the limits designated,

than

is

permitted thereunder, and one disqualified to

make

entry under

the general homestead laws, by reason of being the owner of

more than
one hundred and sixty acres of land, is therefore likewise disqualified to
make entry under said act.
The qualifications of an applicant to make additional entry under the act of
April 28, 1904, must be determined as of the date of the presentation of the
application and not as of the date when his original entry was made.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

An

to the

Office,

Commissioner of the General Land

March

23, 1906.

(C. J. G.)

by Arthur J. Abbott from the decision of
your office of November 18, 1905, approving the action of the local
officers in rejecting his homestead application under the act of April
28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547), for the W. J, NW. J NE. J, S. J SE. J, lots 1
and 4, Sec. 11, T. 24 N., R. 38 W., containing 478.1G acres, Broken
Bow, Nebraska.
In said application, which was filed November 21, 1904, Abbott
stated that he made homestead entry for a quarter section of land at
Oberlin, Kansas, upon which proof was made in 1889 after five years'
In an affidavit accompanying said application, he stated
residence.
that he " at this time is the owner of more than one hundred and sixty
That
acres of land the title to which is vested in affiant by purchase.
the land so owned by affiant is located in the townships and ranges in
or near which the lands herein applied for are located. That said
lands are used for pasture and grazing purposes and are of no value
That the lands herein applied for are
for agricultural purposes.
valuable only for grazing and pasture and that affiant desires to enter
the same for that purpose and no other." The rejection of Abbott's
application to ener the land in question is on the ground that he is
disqualified by reason of the ownership of more than 160 acres of
appeal has been

filed

however, that he is qualified to enter said land
regardless of the fact that he has acquired other lands by purchase
since his original homestead entry.
The act of April 28, 1904, supra, entitled " An act to amend the
homestead laws as to certain unappropriated and unreserved lands in
land.

It is urged,

Nebraska," provides in part
That from and after sixty days after the approval of this act entries made
under the homestead laws in the State of Nebraska west and north of the followshall not exceed in area six hundred and forty acres.
ing line, to wit
.

.

.

.

.

.
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That entryrnen under the homestead laws of the United States within

2.

the territory above described who own and occupy the land heretofore entered
by them, may, under the provisions of this act and subject to its conditions,
enter other lands contiguous to their said homestead entry, which shall not,
with the land so already entered, owned and occupied, exceed in the aggregate
six

hundred and forty acres

;

and residence upon the original homestead

shall

be accepted as equivalent to residence upon the additional land so entered, but
final entry shall not be allowed of such additional land, until five years after

entering the same.
Sec.

3.

.

.

.

That the commutation provisions of the homestead law

shall not

apply to entries under this act, and at time of making final proof the entryman
must prove affirmatively that he has placed upon the lands entered permanent

improvements of the value of not

less

than one dollar and twenty-five cents per
Provided, That a former homestead

acre for each acre included in his entry

:

a bar to the entry under the provisions of this act of a tract which
together with the former entry, shall not exceed six hundred and forty acres.
shall not be

It is

under this

here in question

May

last provision (first proviso)

is

made.

The

that the application

circular of instructions under said

1904 (32 L. D., 670), as amended by circular of
August 21, 1005 (34 L. D., 87), provides:
act,

dated

31,

any person who made a homestead entry
make an
additional entry for a quantity of land which, added to the area of the land
embraced in the former entry, shall not exceed 640 acres, but residence and cultivation of the additional land will be required to be made and proved as in
ordinary homestead entries.

By

the

first

proviso of section

3,

prior to his application for entry under this act, will be allowed to

The

circular also provides:

Under said act no bar

is

interposed to the making of second homesteads for

the full area of G40 acres by parties entitled thereto under existing laws,

and

applications therefor will be considered under the instructions of the respective

laws under which they are made.

was evidently not the intention of Congress by this act of April
any of the provisions of the homestead laws, but
merely to amend said laws, as shown by the title of said act, and only
in the manner specifically indicated therein, namely, to allow a
greater number of acres over what could ordinarily be entered under
said laws, owing to the character of the lands, and upon final proof
to require a showing of a certain expenditure per acre, also due to
the character of said lands which are not susceptible of cultivation
but fit only for grazing purposes.
Beyond this the existing laws are
to remain in full force and they prohibit homestead entry to one who
is owner of more than 160 acres.
This is clearly indicated by the
language of the act and the purpose for which it was passed, as well
as by the circular instructions thereunder.
In this case the former
homestead entry of Abbott was no bar under said act to his making
additional entry of enough of' these lands to equal 640 acres, provided
he was otherwise qualified under the homestead law s. Not being so
It

28, 1904, to repeal

r
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by reason of
was properly

ownership of more than 160

qualified

His

cation

rejected.

operative regardless of the

w as
T

acres, his appli-

The disqualification so resulting is
manner in which title to the other hind

obtained, and there can be no exception on account of the owner-

fit only for grazing purposes.
Then too, also
following the general rule, Abbott's qualification to enter these lands
must be determined at date of his present application and not as of
the date when his former entry was made.
The foregoing is on the assumption that Abbott, in saying he desired to enter these lands only for grazing purposes, did not also

ship being of lands

mean

it was not his intention to reside on said lands
but
making his home theron he expected to use the lands

to say that

that although

;

only for grazing purposes.

The

decision of your office herein

is

affirmed.

RAILROAD GRANT— RIGHT OF WAY— SECTION

13,

ACT OF FEBRUARY 28,

1902.

Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co.

The

right of way granted by section 13 of the act of February 28, 1902, is a
mere easement, for " depot grounds, terminals, and other railway purposes,"
and the grantee has no authority to extract oil from the grounds embraced
in a right of

way

acquired under said

act.

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
March 23, 1906.
(G. B. G.)

By reference of the 3d instant I am requested " to consider and
report as to the proper course to be pursued " in the matter of the
alleged extraction of mineral oils by one J. B. Showalter, of Butler,

Pennsylvania, from the right of way of the Missouri, Kansas and
Texas Railway Company, near the town of Cleveland, Oklahoma.
It seems that Mr. Showalter is operating under a lease from said
company several oil-bearing wells upon a portion of the right of way
near said town, acquired by said company under section 13 of the act
of February 28, 1902 (32 Stat., 43).
In my opinion of March 14, 1905 (33 L. D., 470), I advised you that
the grant of the right of way to said company, found in the act of
July 26, 1866 (14 Stat., 289), is similar to the grant of right of way
made to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company by the act of July 2,
1864, and, upon authority of the case of the Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Townsend (190 U. S., 267, 271), said that the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company is not authorized to use
or permit the use of

its

right of

way

for a purpose not contemplated
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by the granting act, and that although said company took a base fee
under its grant of right of way, yet it did not acquire the right to
take mineral oils therefrom.
The opinion referred to would be conclusive of the question here
presented except for the fact, above stated, that the matters involved
in this reference relate to a portion of the company's right of way
acquired under the act of February 28, 1902, instead of under the
act of

July

2G, 1866.

Section 13 of the act of February 28, 1902,

is

as follows:

That the right to locate, construct, own, equip, operate, use, and maintain a
railway and telegraph and telephone line or lines into, in, or through the
Indian Territory, together with the right to take and condemn lands for right
of way, depot grounds, terminals, and other railway purposes, in or through any
lands held by any Indian tribe or nation, person, individual, or municipality in
said Territory, or in or through any lands in said Territory which have been or
may hereafter be allotted in severalty to any individual Indian or other person
under any law or treaty, whether the same have or have not been conveyed to
the allottee, with full power of alienation, is hereby granted to any railway
company organized under the laws of the United States, or of any State or
Territory, which shall comply with this act.
I do not think there can be any doubt that a right of way acquired
under this statute is a mere easement a title of even less dignity
than that given by the granting act of 1866 and therefore with
better reason it follows that the company is not authorized to use it

—

—

except for " depot grounds, terminals,

and other railway purposes."
underneath this right of way are part of the
realty, do not appear to be needed for any railway purpose, and are
clearly not within the privilege granted by the act of February 28,
1902.
The appropriation thereof is a manifest invasion of rights
belonging to the owner of the fee. I advise you that such owner,
whether it be an individual Indian, or an Indian tribe or nation, is
entitled to the protection of the United States government, and that
the matter should be referred to the Department of Justice for the
institution of such proceedings in that behalf as it is thought may be

The mineral

oils

successfully maintained.

Approved
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.

Burtis

v.

State of Kansas et

al.

Motion for review of departmental decision of December

U L. D., 304, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, March 23,

16, 1905,

1906.
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PRIVATE LAND CLAIM— CONFIRMATION OF TITLE—ACT OF MARCH

3,

1891.

Ely's Administrator

Magee et

v.

(Rancho de San Jose

al.

de

SONOITA.)

March 3, 1891, requiring one claiming a comthrough the Spanish or Mexican government to
lands situated within the territory embraced in the Gadsden Purchase,
who does not come into court voluntarily for the purpose of having his
title confirmed under section 8 of said act, but is brought into court by
the United States without his consent, to except from his claim, and, as a
condition to the confirmation of his title, to recognize the title of the United
States to. such portions of the lands claimed by him as may have been sold
or disposed of by the United States.
The United States may, under the provisions of said act, bring the grant claimant into court without his consent, for the purpose of determining whether
he has any title to the lands claimed, and, if so, the extent of such title,
but not for the purpose of confirming the title to portions of said lands sold
or disposed of by the United States.
The Commissioner of the General Land Office is without authority or discretion
to adjudge and determine whether the survey of a private land grant conforms to the decree of the court confirming the grant, but has simply to
perform the ministerial duty of issuing patent for the land according to the
lines of the survey as approved by the court and in accordance with tbe
terms of the decree.

There

no provision

is

plete

in the act of

and perfect

title

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

to the

Office,

Commissioner of the General Land

March

(E. F. B.)

26, 1906.

This case comes before the Department upon the appeal of Santiago
Ainsa, administrator of the estate of Frank Ely, from the decision of

your

office

of

November

9,

1904, requiring

him

to

show cause why

the lands within the limits of the private land claim

known

all

as the

Rancho de San Jose de Sonoita that were disposed of and patented
by the United States prior to the decree of confirmation by the Court
Land Claims " should not be specifically excepted from the
patent proposed to be issued in favor of said grant."
Appellant insists that the confirmation of said claim was for the
entire tract embraced in the survey, free from all claim of the
patentees under the United States; and, further, that the Commissioner of the General Land Office has no office to perform except
the simple and purely ministerial duty of issuing a patent in conformity with the approved survey made in pursuance of the decree.
of Private

The

private land claim

known

as the

Rancho de San Jose de

So-

Arizona acquired by the
United States under the Gadsden purchase and is one of the claims
recognized and protected by the stipulations in Articles 8 and 9 of
the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo, which were reaffirmed in Article
noita

is

5 of the

in that part of the Territory of

Gadsden Treaty.
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made for the adjustment of these claims by the
July 22, 1854 (10 Stat., 308), which made it the duty of the
Surveyor-General of New Mexico (which then included what is
now the Territory of Arizona) to ascertain, under instructions from
Provision was

act of

Secretary of the Interior, the origin, nature, character and
under laws, usages and customs of Spain

the

extent of all claims to lands

and Mexico originating before the cession of the territory to the
United States, and the same powers and duties were conferred upon
the Surveyor-General of Arizona by the act of July 15, 1870 (16
Stat, 304).

A

petition for the confirmation of this grant

under said acts was

with the Surveyor-General, but it had never been acted upon
by Congress and the claim had never been surveyed by authority
of the United States until the survey made in accordance with the
Prior to that decree
decree of the Court of Private Land Claims.
the United States had extended the public-land surveys over a portion of the claim, as defined by the survey made in conformity with
filed

said decree,

and had disposed of and patented

a

number of claims

within said limits to pre-emption settlers as public lands of the

United States.

Such was the status of the claim and of the lands
at the

date of the passage of the act of

establishing a Court of Private

Land

March

in controversy

1891 (26 Stat., 854),
Claims for the adjustment and
3,

confirmation of claims under grants from the Mexican government
to

lands in Arizona and the other States and Territories

therein.

and

all acts

Under

'

i

That

act repealed section 8 of the act of

or parts of acts inconsistent with

its

a provision of section 8 of said act of

July

named

22, 1854,

provisions.

March

3,

1891, the

United States filed a petition in the Court of Private Land Claims
against Ainsa, as administrator of Ely and others, alleging that
said administrator claimed to be the owner through mesne conveyances of a tract of land known as the Rancho de San Jose de Sonoita
under a complete and perfect title, emanating from the Mexican
government prior to the date when the United States acquired

had not voluncome into court seeking a confirmation of his title under the
provisions of said section 8; that his title was open to question, was
invalid and void, and the land had never been segregated and located.
It was also alleged that the United States had, many years prior to

sovereignty over said territory; that said claimant
tarily

the filing of said petition, surveyed a portion of the land so claimed

and had disposed of and patented the same to the other defendants
named in the petition, as public lands of the United States. The
prayer of the petition Avas that all of said defendants should be
required to answer,

and that defendant Ainsa be required to product'
and if it be adjudged to be valid,

his title papers, for adjudication,
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may be settled and
determined " excepting any part of such lands that should be found
to have been disposed of by the United States."
The answer of the administrator admitted that he was holding
under a complete and perfect title and had not voluntarily come into
court for a consideration of such title. It denied every allegation as
to the invalidity of the title and that it had not been located, and
averred that if any patents had been issued by the United States for
any of said lands, they were wholly invalid and void. No answer
w as filed by the defendants holding the patents of the United States.
In an amended answer he set out his title and averred that the possession of the defendants holding under patents from the United
States was entirely without his permission and that said patents conveyed no title whatever, as the complete and perfect title in fee was
in the owner of the grant at the time of the Gadsden purchase and
the United States never had any title to the same.
The United States denied all matters and things set up in the
answer except so far as they were admissions of the allegations in
the petition and upon the issue thus made the court decided that " the
entire proceedings set forth in the expediente of this title and the
final title issued thereon were without warrant of law and invalid."
Upon appeal the Supreme Court held that this grant was one
which, at the time of the cession in 1853, was recognized by the government of Mexico as valid, and therefore one which it was the duty
that the extent and boundaries of the claim

T

of the government to respect

and enforce.

Ely's

Adm'r

v.

United

States (171 U. S., 220, 234).

The judgment of the Court of Private Land Claims was reversed
and the case was remanded with directions to the court " to examine
and decide whether there be sufficient facts to enable it to determine
the true boundaries of the one and three-fourths sitios," the extent of
the grant as found by the Supreme Court.
The final decree made in obedience to the mandate of the Supreme
Court adjudged that the title to said claim was perfect and complete
at the date the United States acquired sovereignty over the territory
and was such a valid title as the United States are bound upon principles of the public law and by the provisions of the treaty of cession
to respect as a valid, complete and perfect title at said date. It therefore decreed that the title be confirmed in said grantee, his heirs,
successors

in

interest

and

assigns,

to

the

extent

defined

by

the

boundaries therein described," subject to such of the limitations and
terms of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1891, as are applicable hereto."

A

From

this there

survey of the grant was

the court for

its

was no appeal.

made accordingly and was

returned

approval in compliance with the statute when

to

a
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was presented by the defendants who claimed under patents
from the United States as public lands, asking that the lands so
patented and claimed be expressly excepted from the decree or order
approving the survey. The court overruled and dismissed the petition, found that the survey conformed with the decree, and directed
that it be approved and returned to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office. No appeal was taken from this ruling.
As to the effect and scope of the decree, an important and decisive
question is whether the act of March 3, 1891, imposes as a condition
petition

to the
title

confirmation of every Mexican grant, the recognition of the

of the United States to such portions of the grant as

disposed of as public lands, irrespective of the
claim

came before the court

;

in other words,

manner

it

in

may have
which the

whether the condition

that attaches to confirmation by force of the statute, in cases where
the claimant invokes the aid of the court to confirm his title, applies

with equal force and effect in cases where he does not voluntarily
is brought in by the United States to have his
and adjudicated.
Another material and controlling question is whether the duty of
the Commissioner in issuing the patent is not purely ministerial,
without any authority or discretion to adjudge and determine, and,
if this should be answered affirmatively, it may at least be questioned
whether the claimant has selected the proper forum to enforce his

come into court, but
title

settled

right.

The 6th

section of the act provides for the confirmation of such in-

complete and equitable claims to lands as the United States were

bound to recognize and confirm by the treaties of cession. Under
United States were invested with the full legal title,
burdened only with the treaty obligation that such claimants shall be
allowed to perfect their titles to the same extent that they would
have been allowed if the land had remained under the jurisdiction
and sovereignty of the foreign government. As the legal title to
the lands so claimed would not be perfected until confirmation, the
United States could convey, at any time prior to such confirmation,
a valid title to the lands, notwithstanding the treaty obligations,
and could therefore add any condition to such confirmation that the
political department of the government chose to impose.
One of the
conditions prescribed by the 13th section of the act is that it shall be
those treaties the

upon such claimants to seek confirmation of the claims
within the time limited by the act or to be forever barred from asserting any claim to such lands.

obligatory

Section 8 of the act, under which the petition in this case

was

filed,

provides for the confirmation <and adjustment of claims to lands

where the legal

title

was acquired by the claimant from the foreign
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government prior

to the treaty of cession

and where the United.

States

never acquired or held any title to such lands. As every part of that
section has a material bearing upon the question at issue, it will be
given in

full.

That any person or corporation claiming lands

Sec. 8.

in

any of the

States

or Territories mentioned in this act under a title derived from the Spanish or

Mexican government that was complete and perfect at the date when the
United States acquired sovereignty therein, shall have the right (but shall not
be bound) to apply to said court in the manner in this act provided for other
cases for a confirmation of such title and on such application said court shall
proceed to hear, try, and determine the validity of the same and the right of
the claimant thereto, its extent, location and boundaries, in the same manner
and with the same powers as in other cases in this act mentioned.
If in any such case, a title so claimed to be perfect shall be established and
confirmed, such confirmation shall be for so much land only as such perfect
title shall be found to cover, always excepting any part of such land that shall
have been disposed of by the United States, and always subject to and not to
;

any conflicting private interests, rights, or claims held or claimed
adversely to any such claim or title, or adversely to the holder of any such
claim or title. And no confirmation of claims or titles in this section mentioned
shall have any effect other or further than as a release of all claim of title
affect

and no private right of any person as between himself and
other claimants or persons, in respect of any such lands, shall be in any manner

by the United States

;

affected thereby.

be lawful for and the duty of the head of the Department of Justice,
any claimant shall
require it, to cause the attorney of the United States in said court to file in
said court a petition against the holder or possessor of any claim or land in
any of the States or Territories mentioned in this act who shall not have
voluntarily come in under the provisions of this act, stating in substance that
It shall

whenever

in his opinion the public interest or the rights of

the title of such holder or possessor is open to question, or stating in substance
that the boundaries of any such land, the claimant or possessor to or of which
has not brought the matter into court, are open to question, and praying that
the title to any such land, or the boundaries thereof, if the title be admitted,
be settled and adjudicated; and thereupon the court shall, on such notice to
such claimant or possessor as it shall deem reasonable, proceed to hear, try, and

determine the questions stated in such petition or arising in the matter, and
determine the matter according to law, justice, and the provisions of this act.
but subject to all lawful rights adverse to such claimant or possessor, as
between such claimant and possessor and any other claimant or possessor, and
subject in this respect to all the provisions of this section applicable thereto.
It is a proposition too well settled to be controverted that the

States never acquired by treaty of cession the
at the date of the cession

was not

title to

United

any land which

in the foreign government.

"A

cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the property

belonging to
to cede."

The

inhabitants.
The King cedes that only which
lands which he had previously granted were not

its

longed to him

:

United States

v.

Percheman, 7 Peters,

be-

his

51, 87.

case cited involved the validity of a grant in the territory

acquired by the Florida cession of February 22, 1819.

Perfect and
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lands in that territory made by Spain prior to
were confirmed by the treaty. They needed no confirmation by Congress but could be asserted in the courts upon the
documents under which they were issued. See also United States v.
Wiggins, 14 Pet., 334; United States v. Arredondo, G Pet., 691.
The principle, however, applies with equal force as to lands acquired under every treaty, for the reason that private rights of property within the ceded territory are not affected by the change of
jurisdiction and sovereignty and are protected by the usages and
laws of nations independently of the treaty stipulations. Ainsa v.
United States, 161 U. S., 208, 220; Ainsa v. New Mexico and Arizona
R. R. Co., 175 U. S., 76.
But the duty of securing such rights, and of fulfilling treaty obligations imposed upon the United States by the treaty, belongs to
It may prescribe the
the political department of the government.
forms and manner of proceeding in order to obtain confirmation, and
may establish tribunals to investigate and pronounce upon their
fairness and validity.
De la Croix v. Chamberlain, 12 Wheaton, 599,
" Even grants which were complete at the time of the cession
601.
may be required by Congress to have their genuineness and their
extent established by proceedings in a particular manner before they
can be held to be valid." Ainsa v. Railroad Company, 175 U. S., 76,
And, although the treaty provisions may be violated, the courts
79.
will follow the statutory enactments of its own government, as they
have no power to enforce the provisions of a treaty with a foreign
nation which the government of the United States, as a sovereign
power, chooses to disregard. Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S., 238,
247.
Florida v. Furman, 180 U. S., 402. " But where no such proceedings are expressly required by Congress, the recognition of grants
complete

January

titles to

24, 1818,

of this class in the treaty itself

is sufficient

to give

Railroad Company, 175 U. S., 76, 80.
The opinion of the court in the case last cited

Ainsa

them

full effect."

v.

is

an elaborate review

upon the different treaties under which
foreign territory has been acquired by the United States, and of the
legislation by Congress securing rights and fulfilling obligations
under such treaties, showing in what respect the recognition of the

of the decisions of that court

validity of a grant

As shown by

is

affected

by such

legislation.

the court in that opinion, the effect of the repeal of

the act of July 22, 1854, "

and all acts amendatory or in extension
supplementary thereto, and all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act " (March 3, 1891), was to give
full effect to complete and perfect grants of lands in the States or
Territories mentioned in said act by reason of the recognition given
to the grant in the treaty itself and to leave them free to be asserted

thereof, or
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in

the ordinary courts of justice

manner

upon their title papers in the same
and Louisiana could be asserted.

as grants to lands in Florida

Speaking- of the effect of said repeal the court said:

The

that the United States, by the act of 1891, have prescribed and
method by which grants incomplete before the cession can
be completed and made binding upon the United States but have neither made
it obligatory upon the owner of a title complete and perfect before the cession
result

is

defined the only

:

to resort to this method, nor declared that his title shall not be valid if he does

not do

A

so.

New Mexico, which was complete and
New Mexico to the United States, is in the same

grant of land in

cession of

perfect before the
position as

was

a

Louisiana or in Florida, and is not in the position of one under the
peculiar acts of Congress in relation to California and may be asserted, as
against any adverse private claimant, in the ordinary courts of justice.
like grant in

:

(Page

90.)

From

the well-established principles so lucidly stated and applied

in that case

we are led to the inquiry whether there is any provision
March 3, 1891. that requires the owner of a complete

in the act of

and perfect title to recognize, without his consent, the title of the
United States to any part of "his lands, as a condition to the recognition by the United States of the validity of his title to the full
extent acquired by him from the foreign government.
There is no doubt that while the act was in force the United States
could have invoked the aid of the court to have the validity of any
Mexican grant in said States and Territories adjudicated and determined, and a decision of the court upon such proceedings adverse to
the claimant would be final unless reversed by the supreme court,
and no court could thereafter recognize such title for any purpose.
In short, the United States, at their election, may have the validity of any
Mexican grant, whether complete or incomplete, determined by the Court of Private Land Claims, so far as concerns the interest of the United States and pro;

ceedings to establish against the United States private titles claimed under
incomplete Mexican grants are within the exclusive jurisdiction of that court;

but the private holder of any complete and perfect Mexican grant may. but is
not obliged to. have its validity as against the United States determined by that
court; and no rights of private persons, as. between themselves, can be
mined by proceedings under this act. (Page 89.)

The purpose of

the act

is

very plain and the scope and

decree in a case where confirmation by the court

is

deter-

effect of the

voluntarily sought,

from a case where the claimant is involunbrought before the court, in order that the United States may
have it determined by the court whether he has any title or not.
A decree of confirmation being final and conclusive as to the validity of the title, so far as the interest of the United States is concerned,
would avoid the.neces-ity thereafter of having to assert and defend
such title upon the documents under which it was issued and it was
is

easily distinguished

tarily

therefore a valuable right.

The

act did not require a claimant

who
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go before the court to test its validity, but perdo so upon the condition that " such confirmation shall
be for so much land only as such perfect title shall be fo*md to cover,
always excepting any part of such land that shall have been disposed
of by the United States," and by the 14th section of the act it was

had

a complete title to

mitted

him

to

provided
That if in any case it shall appear that the lands or any part thereof decreed
any claimant under the provisions of this act shall have been sold or granted
by the United States to any other person, such title from the United States to
such other person shall remain valid, notwithstanding such decree, and upon
proof being made to the satisfaction of said court of such sale or grant, and the
value of the lands so sold or granted, such court shall render judgment in favor
of such claimant against the United States for the reasonable value of said
lands so sold or granted, exclusive of betterments, not exceeding one dollar and
twenty- rive cents per acre for such lands, and such judgment, when found, shall
be a charge on the Treasury of the United States.
to

In such cases lands lying within the limits of the grant that had
w ere expressly excepted from
confirmation by force of the statute and were confirmed to the patentbeen disposed of by the United States

T

by virtue of any title possessed by the United States but solely
by consent of the grant claimants. Having invoked the aid of the
court for confirmation, they w ere bound by all the conditions of the
ees not

T

and having accepted its benefits they also accepted the conditions
Juan de la Cruz Trujillo, 28 L. D., 541.
How then can the title to such lands as the United States may have
sold be confirmed in any case where the claimant did not voluntarily
come into court, if he was not bound to invoke the aid of the court to
It may be urged that the United States
test the validity of his title.
had the right to bring him before the court without his consent, but
that was to determine whether he had any title as against the United
States, and if so, what was the extent of the title he acquired. It was
not intended as a means of enforcing an arbitrary right to confiscate
the claim or any portion thereof against the consent of the claimant.
If the United States never acquired any title to this land by the
treaty of cession and the absolute fee at that time Avas in the grant
claimant as determined by the court, and if after the passage of the
act of March 3, 1891, it was not obligatory upon such claimant to go
before the tribunal created by that act to have his title recognized
and its validity determined, and such title could be asserted before
act,

imposed.

the ordinary courts of justice,

it is

utterly inconsistent to hold that

such rights could be invaded or impaired by being brought into court
involuntarily

Besides

a

upon the

petition of the United States.

statute prescribing a

mode by which

a party

may

be

divested of his property for the benefit of another without his consent

is

in

derogation of

5194— Vol. 34—05 m

common
33

right and must be strictly construed.
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Nothing can be taken by intendment,

it

must

clearly appear

from

the

statute.

was hc;yev(T contended

It

in this case that the claimant voluntarily

consented to the conditions imposed by the statute

amended answer

when he

filed his

to the petition "

praying that the validity of his
title may be inquired into and decided, and that his title to said lands
be declared valid." It is insisted that this was in effect an original
bill under the provisions of the act, and having sought the confirmation of his grant, he could only do so upon the terms prescribed in
the act.

no substantial ground upon which this contention can be
The prayer of the government's petition was strictly in
conformity with the express direction contained in the act, " that the
title to said lands be settled and adjudicated, and if the title be adjudged to be valid, that the extent and boundaries thereof be then
Whether the amended answer had or had
settled and adjudicated."
have been the same, for the reason
the
decree
would
not been filed,
of
the
proceedings
filed on behalf of the govthat the very object
ernment was to test the validity of the title, and if adjudged to be
There was nothing in the
valid, that the boundaries be determined.
amended answer either in the nature of an original bill or of a crossbill or that converted the proceeding into a suit in behalf of claimant,
or that sought to enlarge or extend the decree in his favor beyond
what would have been decreed under the prayer of the petition with-

There

is

sustained.

|

out the amended answer.

Nor was

there anything in the answer from which the slightest

inference could be

recognized the

title

drawn that he consented

session of the defendants claiming
titles

to such proceedings or

of the United States or the legality of the pos-

under

it.

On

the contrary, the

of the United States were denounced as wholly null and void;

that the possession of the defendants holding under such

titles was
unlawful and without permission of claimant and that he (claimant) was entitled to confirmation of the whole grant in accordance
with the metes and bounds set forth in the original survey and grant.
The answer set up no new matter, nor required a response from the
United States, but on the contrary it was strictly responsive to the
prayer of the petition.
But if it be conceded that lands within the limits of the survey,
which had been disposed of by the United States prior to the decree
of confirmation, were excepted from such decree, it does not appear
that any jurisdiction or authority was conferred upon the Commissioner of the General Land Office to adjudicate and determine what

lands should be patented and what should be excepted and
ally excluded

from the patent.

specific-

j
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The act of March 3, 1891, repealed all prior acts of Congress and
laws providing for the investigation and adjudication of claims and
titles to lands in said States and Territories protected by said
and conferred upon the Court of Private Land Claims
Whatever jurisdiction or
in such matters.
power the Commissioner of the General Land Office has therein is
expressly conferred by the act and he cannot assume or exercise any
authority in such matters by virtue of the general authority conferred
upon him in disposing of the public lands, but must look strictly
treaties,

exclusive jurisdiction

to the act for the source of his authority.

His duties in this behalf are defined in the tenth section of the
After the final decree of the court, it is made the duty of the
clerk of said court to " certify that fact to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, with a copy of the decree of confirmation,
which shall plainly state the location, boundaries and area of the
tract confirmed." The Commissioner " shall thereupon without delay
cause the tract so confirmed to be surveyed at the cost of the United
act.

States."

provided that after the survey shall have been made, notice
given thereof, and it shall remain in the office of the Surveyor-General for ninety days. If, at the expiration of such period,
no objections are filed, the Surveyor-General " shall approve the
same and forward it to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office."
If objections are filed " by any party claiming an interest
in its confirmation, or by any party claiming an interest in the tract
embraced in the survey or any portion thereof," the SurveyorGeneral shall, at the expiration of the ninety days, " forward such
survey, with the objections and proofs filed in support of or in opposition to such objections, and his report thereon, to the Commissioner
of the General Land Office."
It is

shall be

Immediately upon receipt of any such survey, with or without objections
Commissioner shall transmit the same, with all accompanying
papers, to the court in which the final decision was made for its examination of
the survey and of any objections and proofs that may have been filed, or shall
be furnished
and the said court shall thereupon determine if the said survey
is in substantial accordance with the decree of confirmation.
If found to be
thereto, the said

;

upon the face of the plat its
found to be incorrect, the court shall return the same for correction
in such particulars as it shall direct.
When any survey is finally approved by
the court, it shall be returned to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
who shall as soon as may be cause a patent to be issued thereon to the
correct, the court shall direct its clerk to indorse

approval.

If

confirmee.

The
limited

specific

by the

duty of the Commissioner

is

so clearly defined

act as to impliedly prohibit the exercise of

tion or authority to adjudicate

and determine.

Even

any

and

discre-

in the matter
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work of

it is the approval of the SurveyorGeneral that is required, whose report is to be forwarded, but none
from the Commissioner is required. See Maese v. Hermann, 183

of the field

IT. S.,

the survey,

572.

Furthermore, the very question that your office assumed to determine had already been determined by the court. If the court had
the power to determine whether the survey was in conformity with
its decree and that the patent should issue according to the boundaries
defined by said survey, notwithstanding- the objection to

its

approval,

without first eliminating the lands claimed under the patents of the
United States, how can the Commissioner pass upon that question
without infringing upon the prerogatives and jurisdiction of the
court

?

If the lands within the surveyed limits of the grant which have

been patented to the United States are excepted from the operation
of the decree of confirmation, as claimed, it is by force of the statute
itself and not by virtue of any authority in the Commissioner of the

General Land Office to determine, nor upon any adjudication of the
Court of Private Land Claims. If such is the case, the patent of the
United States antedating the decree would be the source of title confirmed by force of the statute, and could be asserted in the ordinary
courts of justice as fully as if the land covered thereby had been
expressly excluded from the patent to the claimants of the grant.
The issuance of the patent according to the boundaries defined by
the survey without excluding any lands therefrom will no more
determine or affect the rights of these patentees than would the issuance of a patent for a townsite of lands known to be mineral at that
date affect or determine the rights of mineral claimants. In both
cases the operation of the patent

is

limited and restricted by the

statute.

If there

is

would seem

no power to adjudge, or discretion to exercise, the duty
and your refusal to act would

to be purely ministerial

a personal matter, not strictly subject to be controlled and
reviewed by the supervisory authority.
When a mere ministerial duty is imposed upon an executive officer,
which duty he is obliged to perform without any further question,
a writ of mandamus will lie to compel him to perform his duty.
Roberts v. United States, 176 U. S., 221, 230.
In this view it may be questioned whether this is such an appeal
as the Department should entertain.
It may however always advise
and where the good order and conduct of the business of the Department is involved, it should exercise this privilege.
Entertaining the views herein expressed, the Department- is of the
opinion that your duties under the act of March 3, 1891, require the

be

issuance of this patent in accordance with the decree of the court,
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leaving the question as to the rights of the parties to be determined

by the courts.
As this survey was approved by the Commissioner prior to June
ftO, 1904, no reference has been made in this decision to the provision
of the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat, 452, 485)

—

That

all

the powers

now

exercised by the Court of Private Land Claims in
under its decrees of confirmation shall he con-

the approval of surveys executed

ferred upon and exercised by the Commissioner of the General Land Office from
and after the thirtieth day of June, nineteen hundred and four.

MOBILE AND GIRABD GRANT— HOMESTEAD ENTRY— ACT OF FEB-

RUARY

24, 1905.

James A. Bryars.
The act of February

24, 1905, relating to

lands within the Mobile and Girard

railroad grant, according to a homestead entryman coming within

pro-

its

visions the privilege to transfer his claim to other lands, does not contem-

an entryman who has completed his entry under the commutation
of the homestead law and received final certificate thereon
shall, in the exercise of the privilege accorded by said act, make a second
homestead entry and submit proof thereon, after due notice, as required in
making an original homestead entry, nor that the lands applied for shall be
a compact body of contiguous land, but where not contiguous all the land
must be within the same land district, and where the aggregate of the legal
subdivisions applied for exceeds the acreage embraced in the original entry,
the entryman will be required to pay for such excess.
An application to exercise the privilege of transfer accorded by the act of February 24, 1905, is not required to be made by the entryman in person nor
is he required to furnish an affidavit under the act of August 30, 1890, to
plate that

provisions

;

the effect that he has not since that date made entry of or acquired title to
a quantity of land under the agricultural land laws, which, with the land

now

applied for, will exceed three hundred and twenty acres.

Acting Secretary
(F. L. C.)

Ryan

to

the

Office,

Commissioner of the General Land

March

26, 1906.

(F.

W.

C.)

The Department has considered the appeal by James A. Bryars
office decision of February 16, last, affirming the action of
the local officers at Miles City, Montana, in rejecting his application
filed by James Deering, as attorney-in-fact, to transfer, under the
provisions of the act of February 24, 1905 (33 Stat,, 813), his homestead claim upon the S. \ of NE. J and S. \ of NW. £, Sec. 5, T. 1 S.,
R. 4 E., St. Stephens Meridian, Alabama, covering 134.84 acres, to lot
1 and the SE. \ of SE. \ of Sec. 10, lot 3, Sec. 11, and SE. \ of NE. J,
Sec. 9, T. 27 N., R. 5G E., Montana Meridian, Montana.
Said application was on November 28, 1905, presented at the local
land office at Miles City, Montana, by James Deering, as attorney-infrom your
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fact for

James A. Bryars, and was

rejected by the local officers for the

following reasons
(1) That the application is not offered and a new entry sought to he made
by the original entryman in person.

(2) That the application is made for a non-contiguous tract made up of four
separate subdivisions in three different sections, and is therefore not in compliance with the provisions of the homestead law.
(3) That the application is for an excess of 14.82 acres over the entry relinquished, and that no tender of payment for such excess acreage has been made
by the applicant.

(4) That the applicant has not furnished with his application an affidavit
that he has not since August 30th, 1900 (1890), filed upon or acquired title
to, under the agricultural land laws of the United States, such a quantity of
land which would, with the entry now applied for, amount to more than 320
acres.

From

such rejection appeal was taken to your

considered in your

office

office,

the same being

decision of February 16, last, appealed from.

In said decision your office held that the fact that Bryars proffered
by an attorney instead of appearing in person was not a

his entry
sufficient

reason for rejecting the application, neither was

it

neces-

sary for the applicant to furnish an affidavit under the act of August
30, 1890 (26 Stat., 391), to the effect that the

that date

made

entry of or acquired

title to a

entryman has not

since

quantity of land under

the agricultural land laws, which, with the land

now

applied for, will

exceed 320 acres, for the reason that such an affidavit was made by
Bryars at the time of making his entry of land in Alabama, which

was sought to be transferred to the land here in question.
The rejection of the application was, however, sustained upon the
ground that no two of the tracts applied for are contiguous, lot 1 of
Sec. 10, and lot 3 of Sec. 11, cornering the SE. i of SE. i of Sec. 10,
being one-half mile distant from that lot, and the SE. ^ of NE. J of
Sec. 9, being a mile or more distant from the other lands included in
the application, and, consequently, did not constitute a compact body
of land subject to entry under the homestead laws.

Also, that as

the aggregate area included in the present application, as

the

official

plat of survey,

former entry of 11.82

The theory

is

shown by

119.66 acres, being an excess over the

acres, it should be

paid

of the decision appealed from

for.
is

that the right accord-

ing the transfer of a homestead claim under the act of February 24,
1905, supra, is but the equivalent of the right to make a second homestead entry, and that as a consequence the applicant should be required to make a formal application under the homestead laws and
publish notice of his intention to submit proof thereunder, being
entitled when making such proof to credit upon the second entry for
such compliance with law as was made under the first entry.
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So much of the act of February 24, 1905, as is material
by the appeal now considered is as follows

to the ques-

tions raised

That where any homestead entry heretofore allowed under ruling of the Land
Department, for lands within the limits of the grant made by act of Congress
approved June third, eighteen hundred and fifty-six (Eleventh Statutes, page
eighteen), to the State of Alabama in aid of the construction of the railroad
known as the Mobile and Girard Railroad has been canceled because of a
superior claim to the land through purchase from the railroad company, which
claim has been held to have been confirmed and a confirmatory patent issued
for the land under the provisions of section four of the act of March third,
eighteen hundred and eighty-seven (Twenty-fourth Statutes, page five hundred
and fifty-six), such homesteader is hereby accorded the privilege of transferring his claim thus initiated under the homestead laws to any other nonmineral unappropriated public land subject to homestead entry, with full credit
for the period of residence and for the improvements made upon his homestead
hereinbefore first described prior to the order of its cancellation, provided he
has not forfeited or voluntarily abandoned his homestead claim and that his
application for transfer is presented within one year from the date of the
passage of this act.

with regard to Bryars's original homestead entry made
Alabama, as gathered from your office decision, are as follows
September 13, 1897, James A. Bryars made homestead entry, No. 31686, at the Montgomery, Alabama, land office, for

The

facts

for lands in the State of
:

the S. i of NE. i and S. i of NW. i, Sec. 5, T. 1 S., R. 4 E., St.
Stephens Meridian, Alabama, containing, according to the approved
plat of survey of said township, 134.81 acres, which entry he com-

muted

to cash, after the submission of

commutation proof and pay-

ment, on June 19, 1899. By your office decision of December 2, 1899,
said entry was canceled for conflict with the claim of Louisa A.

Carney, administratrix of the estate of James A. Carney, deceased,
under the provisions of section 4 of the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat.,
556), and thereafter Mrs. Carney was permitted to make entry of the
land under the act of 1887, upon which the patent of the United
States issued for said land February 2, 1900.
Following the passage of the act of February 24, 1905, to wit,

August

Bryars filed in your office his election to transfer
under the provisions of said act, at the same time relinquishing all right, title and interest in and to the tracts embraced in his
former homestead entry. This relinquishment was accepted by your
office and thereupon Bryars became entitled to transfer his claim
initiated to the land in the State of Alabama, under the homestead
laws, " to any other nonmineral, unappropriated public land subject
to homestead entry, with full credit for the period of residence and
for the improvements made upon his homestead."
Where the homestead made for land in the State of Alabama had
been completed by the offer of satisfactory proof of compliance with
27, 1905,

his claim
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the homestead laws,

upon which

final certificate for patent

had been

Department, no necessity in
transferring such claim under the provisions of the act of February
24, 1905, to make a second homestead entry upon which proof was to
be submitted after due publication of notice, the law having been
fully satisfied by the compliance shown and the proof submitted upon
The right to transfer was a completed right.
the tract in Alabama.
and this being- so there can be no good reason for restricting the
applicant to a compact body of contiguous land such as he would be
required to enter in making an original homestead entry. In the
making of soldiers' additional homestead entry under the provisions
of section 2306 of the Revised Statutes, it is not required that the
tracts entered be contiguous or compact in form.
See case of Edgar
Boice (29 L. D., 599). Again, in the exchange of lands provided for
in the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 11, 36), where the title to the
land relinquished has passed out of the United States, or where cerissued, there was, in the opinion of this

tificate

for patent thereto has issued, the selection

embrace contiguous or noncontiguous tracts
See Emil S. Wangenheim (28
The Department is of opinion, as

trict.

if in

the

is

permitted

same land

to

dis-

L. D., 291).

nothing in the statute
under the act of Februcompact form, in view of the libthere

is

specifically limiting the transfer authorized

ary 24, 1905, to contiguous lands in
eral construction heretofore placed

upon

statutes of a

lar nature so far as applied to the transfer of

somewhat

simi-

completed claims, that

no good reason exists for restricting or limiting the right of transfer
authorized under this act, so far as applies to the transfer of comThe rule estabpleted claims, to contiguous lands compact in form.
lished under the act of 1897, above referred to, limiting the selection
to lands in the same land district, should, however, be applied, and
the transfer limited to one entry. In so far therefore as your office
rejected the application under consideration because of the fact that
the lands applied for w ere non-contiguous and not compact in form,
the same is reversed.
It will be remembered from the foregoing recitation, that Bryars
r

made for lands in the Montgomery land district,
making such commutation his payment was limited
the acreage included in that entry. While no question seems to be

commuted

the entry

Alabama, and
to

in

raised as to his right to the transfer applied for because of the excess

make payment to the United
In the opinion of this Department such
requirement is but reasonable and fair. Had Bryars entered the
same amount of land here applied for at the time of his original entry
he would have been required Avhen making commutation proof to pay
in area, it

is

required that he should

States for such excess.

for the

same because the payment under the commutation clause of

the homestead law

is

according to acreage.

No hardship

is

therefore
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upon him when making his transfer to require the additional
payment for the excess over the amount included in his original entry
where, as in this case, the original entry was perfected under the commutation provisions of the homestead law. The requirement made
by your office and the local officers for such payment is sustained and
Bryars should be
to this extent your office decision is affirmed.
advised hereof and afforded a reasonable time within which to make
payment as demanded. Should he make the payment within the
time allowed and no other sufficient reason appears for denying the
transfer, the same should be accepted; otherwise, his application for
visited

transfer will stand rejected.

desert-land entry— suspension— contest— charge.
Porter

c.

Carlile (On Review).

Where

a desert-land entry is suspended by the land department prior to the
expiration of the statutory life of the entry, for the purpose of investigating

the character of the land, a contest against the same, charging that the land

non-desert in character, and also that the entryman has failed to comply
with the law in the matter of reclamation, may be entertained in so far as it
charges the non-desert character of the land, but should be dismissed as to
the charge relating to non-compliance with law and if as a result of the
contest it be determined that the land is of a character subject to entry
under the desert-land law, the suspension should be removed.
is

;

Acting Secretary
(

Ryan

F. L. C.

Herbert C. Porter has
decision of

your

office,

to

the

Office,

January

Commissioner of the General Land

March

filed a

28, 1906.

(

J. L.

McC.

motion for review of departmental

1906 (34 L. D., 3G1), affirming the action of
dated July 31, 1905, in the matter of his contest against
9,

James M. Carlile for lots 1, 2, 3, 4, the E. ^
and the E. J of the SW. J, of Sec. 18, T. 17 N., K. 3 E.,
Greatfalls land district, Montana.
This entry is one of a number that were investigated by Special
Agent Chadwick, and upon his report were suspended by your office
letter of October 8, 1903.
Porter filed contest affidavit February 17,
1904, charging that the land was non-desert in character: that one
dollar per acre each year had not been expended on the land: that
it was not susceptible of irrigation for the reason that there was no
means by which it could be irrigated.
A hearing was had, as the result of which the local officers found
that the land was desert in character; but that the entryman had
the desert -land entry of

of the

NW.

i

not complied with the law as' to irrigation, reclamation, and cultivation: that there were
' ;

neither of

them

is

two small reservoirs on the land, but that

of sufficient size to hold water enough,

if filled,
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ground;

to properly irrigate one-half acre of

tend from either of them,

1
'

and that

if

11

that

"no

there did they

ditches ex-

would be

" of

no practical use for irrigating purposes," inasmuch as the land embraced in the entry is nearly all higher than the reservoirs; and
that the total value of the improvements was about $300. Therefore
they recommended that the entry be canceled.
Your office, on February 18, 1905, sustained the judgment of the
An appeal was taken to the Department. Subselocal officers.
quently it was discovered that the action of your office had been
taken upon an incomplete record, it not having been observed at
the time it was taken that the entry had been suspended prior to
the initiation of contest. Thereupon the Department, on July 19,
Your
1905, returned the record to your office for read judication.
office, on July 31, 1905, supra, readjudicated the case, instructing the
local officers as follows

The suspension of this entry, with the others, is parallel to the action taken
concerning a large number of entries made in the Visalia, California, land district, by departmental order of September 12, 1877, in order to investigate the
character of the land covered by such entries. Where a contest was filed
against the Visalia entries during the period of suspension, it was held that
there was no jurisdiction to entertain the contest until after the revocation of
Under the docthe order of suspension.
(See 15 L. D., 234, and 1G L. D., 35.)
trine announced in the cases above referred to it is accordingly held that you
were without authority to entertain this contest, which, when filed, should have
been suspended and held subject to the result of the proceedings instituted by
the government. Therefore the decision of this office, of February 18, 11)05,
is hereby vacated, there being no jurisdiction to entertain the contest
and in
the event of this decision becoming final the contest will stand suspended pending the result of the investigation ordered by the government.
;

This

is

the action of your

in its decision of
filed a

January

office
9,

that

was affirmed by the Department
which the contestant has now

1906, of

motion for review.

The

errors alleged are, in substance, that the departmental decision
heretofore rendered erred in not holding that " all contests, though
filed

during the suspension of desert-land

entries, stand as initiated,

will entitle the contestant to a hearing upon the withdrawal of
the order of suspension " in dismissing the contest, " for the reason

and

;

that the testimony fully showed,
sive,

and was satisfactory and conclu-

that the land in controversy was non-desert in character, that the

entryman was not acting in good faith, and that there was no method
by which the land could be reclaimed, or water placed thereon artificially " and in not passing upon the question as to whether the
land in controversy was non-desert in character.
The movant and for that matter, the local officers, your office,
and the Department in its decisions heretofore rendered appear to
have confused the issues in this case, to some extent, because of
;

—

—
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having embraced in his affidavit of contest two diverse
must receive different treatment at the hands of the
which
charges,
department
(1) the charge that the land is non-desert in characland
that the defendant has not complied with the law
charge
the
ter; (2)

contestant's

:

as to reclamation.

Regarding the

first

Whitman

case of

This question

is

v.

charge the Department, in the very similar

Hume,

held as follows (34 L. D., 456, 457)

:

one going directly to the validity of the entry in its inception,

and one which, in the interest of both the government and the claimant, should
be determined with as little delay as possible. Especially does the interest of
a claimant demand an early determination of this question, that his rights may
be definitely fixed, and his subsequent expenditure of labor and money in the
required improvement of the land protected. Improvements made upon lands
afterward declared to be non-desert in character, though ample under the requirements of the desert-land law, would not render an entry under that law
valid, for if such entry was invalid because of the non-desert character of
the land, no act of the claimant performed in an attempted compliance with
the law would prevent cancellation, as an entry of land not desert in character
is unauthorized by the desert-land law, and is not merely voidable, but absoTherefore justice demands the speedy ascertainment of the charlutely void.
acter of the land and the rights of a claimant are not prejudiced by permitting,
at any time, the initiation of a contest for that purpose, as his rights remain
the same whether the object of the suspension be accomplished by contest, or
by hearing ordered on behalf of the government.
;

The departmental decision heretofore rendered (January 9, 1906,
supra) made no finding as to the character of the land involved in
under consideration. In view of the ruling in the
case, above quoted, it would have been proper that
such finding should have been made. The record has been informally withdrawn from your office, and carefully examined with referIt is found that the preponderance of evidence
ence to this question.
clearly shows that the local office and your office committed no error
the case here

Whitman-Hume

in finding that the

With
that the

entryman has not complied with the law

attention

—

is

directed to the

fact

that

Carlile

as to reclamation

made

his entry on

and that the same was suspended on October 8,
one year, nine and one-half months after entry. This fact

December
1908

land here in controvesy was desert in character.

reference to the second charge of the affidavit of contest

24, 1901,

brings the case within the ruling in the case of
syllabus (supra)

Whitman

v.

Hume,

:

A contest charging that the entryman has failed to comply with the requirements of the law should not be entertained during such period, where the
suspension becomes effective prior to the expiration of the statutory life of
the entry.

It is clear, therefore,

that the local officers and your

office

erred in

considering any testimony offered in support of the allegation charg-
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ing failure on the part of the claimant to comply with the requirements of the desert-land law. They were (as was held by your
office and by the Department in its decision heretofore rendered)

without jurisdiction to try that question.
Inasmuch as the testimony supports the concurrent findings of
your office and the local office that the land covered by the entry is
desert in character, and as no other question is in issue, the contest
should be dismissed. The character of the land having been determined favorably to the claimant, the suspension as to the land embraced in his entry should be revoked, and he permitted to proceed

with the perfection of his entry.
This is, not only in effect, but in fact, the substance of the decision
heretofore rendered. The language in the last line thereof, stating
that your decision was affirmed, when in fact it was affirmed only
in part, and in part reversed, is evidently an inadvertence; it should
have said, the contest is dismissed. This is what the movant clearly
understands to be the meaning and intent of said decision, as is
shown by his first allegation of error, which begins by saying, " The
decision

With

is

erroneous in dismissing the

contest,'' etc.

the verbal correction above indicated, the departmental de-

adhered

cision heretofore rendered is

to.

The motion

for review

dismissed.

is

settlement prior to opening of land to entry.

Hanson

v.

Gammanche.

Settlement upon lands in advance of the hour of opening, in violation of an order
of the land department prohibiting such settlement, confers no rights upon
the settler as against the first legal applicant to enter the land after the
hour of opening, and such settler can not, by virtue of his mere presence
upon and occupancy of the land after the hour of opening, with the improve-

ments made prior

to that time, secure a settlement right.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(

F

L. C,

to

the

Office,

Commissioner of the General Land

March

28, 1006.

(

E. F. B.

This appeal involves the right to the E. \ SE. J, Sec. 5, T. 145, R.
(Chippewa series), Cass Lake, Minnesota, embraced in the homestead entry of Dolphus Gammanche, made June 15, 1904, and claimed
by George Hanson, who alleges priority of right in virtue of settlement upon the tract prior to the allowance of the homestead entry.
The land in question is part of the Chippewa lands that were
opened to settlement and entry at 9 A. M. June 15, 1904. A notice
was issued by the Department warning all persons not to go upon
31
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said lands with a view to settlement thereon " until such lands have

been formally opened to settlement and entry," and declaring thatand dealt with as trespassers, and when

All such persons will be considered

the lands are actually opened, preference will be given the prior legal applicant,

notwithstanding such unlawful settlement.

by Hanson alleging priority of right,
was ordered, and upon the testimony taken at such hearthe local officers found that Hanson, having gone upon the land

Upon

the filing of an affidavit

a hearing
ing,

prior to the hour of opening in violation of the order of the Depart-

ment, could not acquire by his illegal settlement superior right as
against the

first

whom

legal applicant, to

was
They
Han-

the preference right

given by the express terms of the order of the Department.

recommended that Gammanche's entry remain

intact

and that

son's application be rejected.

Your
a settler

office

reversed their decision and held that as

upon the land

at 9 A. M.,

when

Hanson was

the inhibition ceased, his

occupancy of the land prior to the date of the opening did not affect
his right as a settler, which attached from that moment.
Gammanche's entry was held for cancellation and Hanson's application
was allowed.
It has been held by the Department, in construing similar orders
prohibiting settlement upon lands in advance of the hour of opening,
where no statutory penalty is attached, that the premature occupancy
of the land in violation of the order will not affect the right of the
settler

except so far as to preclude

from an

him from deriving any

benefit

on the land at the hour of
opening, he may, from that moment, secure a right by settlement,
if he perform some personal act of settlement at that time or thereafter, by making a substantial improvement upon the land, and
his right as a settler will commence from the making of such
improvement.
He cannot, however, by his mere presence upon the land, with the
improvements made prior to the hour of opening, secure a settlement right by virtue of mere occupancy alone, as that would be allowing a settlement commenced as a trespass and in violation of the
order, to be perfected merely by lapse of time.
The testimony of Hanson is to the effect that he went upon the land
at 2 A. M. the morning of the 15th of June, 1904, and moved in a
house that he placed on the land in March previous and had furnished.
He left the claim at 8 80 A. M. and did not return until
dinner, but he left his family on the land and two men to put up
notices and commence digging a well.
On direct examination he
testified that he commenced digging the well on the 15th, "right
illegal settlement;

but

if

he

is

:

after dinner

—one o'clock."

On

cross-examination he testified that he

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

526

commenced

the addition to his improvements after he got through

with the well, and when asked
A. Well,

my memory

mid digging

cellar.

the addition that

I

if it

was the same day,

said

very good. On June 17th, I commenced the well,
had one man at the well and they dug the cellar under
isn't

I

Did you commence digging your well on the 17th?
A. On the 16th, I commenced.
Q. Digging your well?
A. But we didn't finish it it was incomplete.
I had one man on the 17th ou
the well, and one man on the cellar under the addition.
Q. You commenced digging your well on the 17th?
A. On the 16th or on the 15th I commenced.
Q.

—

—

H. Larson, a witness for Hanson, testified that he went to Hanon the morning of the 15th, reaching there about a quarter
to nine.
No one was in the house at that time, but Mrs. Hanson and
Miss Hanson came there about 9 o'clock. He went there for the purpose of witnessing Hanson's settlement and posted notices. He also
testified that he was on the land with Hanson at 9 o'clock A. M., and
took dinner with him that day, but he makes no mention of the digging of a well, or the commencement of any other improvement that
day, after 9 o'clock. He was asked when Hanson made his additional
improvements, and answered that he did not know the exact date;
that he would notice them when he would go upon the land from time
When he was on the land on the 26th of June, he noticed
to time.
that Hanson had started work on the addition to his house by digP.

son's claim

ging the

cellar.

daughter of contestant, who was claiming land
was not on her father's
claim at 9 o'clock but at that hour she was on her own claim. She
said she could not tell the day the well was commenced.
Gammanche testified that he first went upon the land at 1 o'clock
P. M., the 15th of June, 1904, and made his entry at 3 o'clock that
day. This is all that is material in his testimony, except his statement
that Hanson did not commence the addition to his house until about
lour weeks prior to the date of hearing, and that he (Gammanche)
had continued to reside on the land with his family since the first

Helga Hanson,

a

in the adjoining section, testified that she
;

week

in July, after the entry.

The

contestant went upon the land in violation of the order of the
Department with the evident purpose of placing himself in such
situation as to acquire an advantage over others who had complied
with the order when the hour of opening arrived. At 9 o'clock he
was upon the land in a continued occupancy that was commenced in
violation of the express order of the Department.

As he

could

acquire no advantage by his occupation of the land at the hour of
opening that was commenced in violation of the order, and could

DECISIONS RELATING TO
derive no

benefit

THE PUBLIC LANDS.

527

from the improvements placed upon the land

prior to the hour of opening, he could only initiate a settlement right
after that hour by making some substantial improvement, independent of the improvements he had already placed on the land and
that must be shown by clear and satisfactory proof in order to defeat
The removal of the
the entry made by the prior legal applicant.
inhibition by the arrival of the hour of opening did not convert
unlawful occupancy into a valid settlement.
There is no clear and convincing testimony that Hanson performed
any substantial act of settlement on the land the 15th day of June,
1904, after the hour of opening, independent of his previous acts.
His testimony as to the day the digging of the well was commenced,
is so indefinite that it can not be determined with any degree of cerHe testified that on the morning
tainty when it was commenced.
he
left
two
on
the
land
to post notices and commence
the
15th
men
of
digging a well. Larson testified that when he went on the land,
just before 9 o'clock, no one was there; but at 9 o'clock he was on
the land with Hanson and his wife and daughter. He testified that
he posted the notices. If he was one of the men to dig the well,
he certainly could have testified as to the time it was commenced, and
as he went there to witness the settlement of Hanson, it is hardly
probable that such an important act as the digging of a well could
have been performed that day without his attention being called
to it and he surely would have known of the presence of the men
who were to do the work if they were on the land on the morning
;

of the 15th.

Your decision

is

reversed,

and the entry of Gammanche

will

remain

intact.

homestead entry—additional— kinkaid
Graves

v.

act.

McDonald.

Residence upon the land embraced in the original homestead entry is an indispensable prerequisite to the preference right to enter additional contiguous
land accorded by the act of April 28, 1904.
An additional entry under the act of April 28, 1904, even though for a less
amount of land than authorized by the act, exhausts the right but where
at the time the entryman sought to exercise his additional right, part of the
lands contiguous to his original entry and subject to his preference right
and desired to be entered by him, were found to be embraced within an
;

made by another under said act,
and he thereupon made entry for a less amount of land than he was entitled
to enter, and thereafter by means of a contest procured the cancellation of

existing though invalid additional entry

the invalid entry covering the 'remainder of the lands desired by him, he
to enter

may, upon the cancellation of such invalid entry, be permitted
such lands in accordance with his original intention.
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Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

May
E. J

Office,

25, 1901,

NE.

i,

SW.

Commissioner of the General Land

to the

March

28, 1900.

(G. C. R.)

Henry E. McDonald made homestead entry for the
i NE. J, SE. J NAY. J, Sec. 10, T. 24 N., R. 11 W.j

O'Neill, Nebraska.

July

1,

section

2.

the SE. i

NW.

J

?

1904, he

made an

additional and preferential entry under

act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547), for the

SW.

J SE.

J, S.

Sec. 10, the N. J

J,

NW.

SW.

NW. J NE. J,
NW. J, Sec. 11,

Sec. 3, the
J,

SE.

J

J,

Sec.

2j

the

NE.

i

all in said

township.

Walter O. Graves, who entered the NE. J of Sec. 11 of said townwho claimed as a preferential right under
the act of 1904, supra, nearly all the land entered by said McDonald
July 1, 1904, filed a contest against McDonald's additional entry July
18, 1904, alleging, among other things, that McDonald was not enship January 30, 1900, and

titled to exercise a preferential right of entry for said lands for the
reason that he had never established an actual bona fide residence on

the land embraced in his original entry

made

in 1901.

Hearing was duly had and the register and receiver, December 12,
1904, found that McDonald, the contestee, was not residing on his
original homestead on April 28, 1904, and therefore had no preferential right to the

Upon

land in question.

receiver held for cancelation

this finding, the register

and

McDonald's said preferential entry

the land and awarded to contestant the right to

make entry

of

thereof

as additional.

On

appeal, your

register

and

original entry

From

office,

made

June

Your

receiver.

22, 1905, affirmed the action of the

office also

as aforesaid,

held for cancelation contestee's

May

25, 1901.

that action contestee has appealed to this Department, alleg-

ing error both of law and fact and especially contending that

it

was

error to hold for cancelation contestee's original entry.

The second

section of the act of April 28, 1904, supra, reads as

follows

That entrymen under the homestead laws of the United States within the
who own and occupy the land heretofore entered by
them, may, under the provisions of this act and subject to its conditions, enter
other lands contiguous to their said homestead entry, which shall not, with the
land so already entered, owned, and occupied, exceed in the aggregate six hundred and forty acres; and residence upon the original homestead shad be
accepted as equivalent to residence upon the additional land so entered, but final
territory above described

entry shall not be allowed of such additional land until five years after
entering the same.

It is obvious from a careful reading of
upon an original entry is a pre-requisite

first

this section that residence

to the acquisition of con-
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tiguous lands under the preference right awarded thereby to those

who seek to avail themselves of that privilege.
The testimony has been carefully examined. Without
same in

setting forth

appears from a preponderance thereof that the defendant-entryman up to the time of
the initiation of this contest had not established and maintained a
the

detail,

is

it

sufficient to say that

it

upon the tract originally entered by him, nor
improved the same. On the other hand, it clearly appeal's
that Graves, the contestant, has resided with his family upon, and
improved his original homestead entry from March, 1901, his imbona

fide residence

sufficiently

provements thereon being of considerable value.

from the finding, which is in harmony with that of the
and your office, that Graves has the better right in the

It follows
local office

premises.

This

is

not an ordinary contest as provided for in the act of

May

14,

1880 (21 Stat., 140), where the contestant on securing the cancelation
of an entry has a preference right to enter the land covered thereby.

The contestant does

not seek to enter the land covered

by McDonald's

original entry, but desires to enter other lands under the act of 1904,

which are contiguous to those embraced in bis original entry and
which are not embraced in any original entry.
The lands embraced in McDonald's (contestee's) original entry,
Eire

not involved in this contest except in respect to the question as to

whether
act

lie

was such

a

resident thereon as

of 1904, and on this proposition

it is

is

contemplated in the said

seen that he has failed to

inasmuch as the matter

make

wholly between
no
adverse
claim,
and as he may
him and the government, there being
yet be able to make a better showing of compliance with the law, his
original entry may remain intact.
Another question, not raised by the appeal or referred to by you,
It appears that Graves, the contestant, on July 19,
presents itself.
1904, entered the SW. ] SE. J, Sec. 2, of said township, as additional
under the said act of April 28, 1904. Having made that entry, the
question arises as to his right to make another additional entry under
a satisfactory showing, yet,

is

said act.

The Department has repeatedly held, notably in the recent case
W. Luton (34 L. D., 468), that one who has made

ex parte James

1

entry under the act of April 28, 1904, has exhausted his right, and
will not be

Your

permitted to

office states

local office to

make

make

a

second entry.

that the contestant, July 19, 1904, applied at the

additional entry under said act of April 28, 1904,
under his additional entry

for the lands claimed by the defendant

Finding the lands desired by him covered
by the additional entry of the defendant, and believing the latter was
54
5104— Vol. 34—05 m
(or portions thereof).

1

DECISIONS KELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

530

not qualified to

make

the entry because he

had abandoned

his origi-

nal entry, he immediately sought to remove the barrier by bringing
the contest, charging that

him

default.

One

of the

forty-acre

tracts

was not embraced in the defendant's
additional entry, and contestant entered it and immediately sought
to remove the barrier which prevented his entry of the balance of
desired by

as additional

the contiguous lands.

Under

these circumstances, his entry of the rest of the desired

lands under said act of 1904 can hardly be regarded as a second entry,

proposed entry is in accordance with his clearly expressed
purpose when he first appeared at the local office to make the addias such

tional entry.

Under

the facts disclosed, his right to

make

the additional entry

support in the case of Daniel L. Hartley (26 L. D., 663;
Joseph Heisel, idem., 69; Hadley v. Walter, 25 L. D., 276; and Ella
finds

Pollard, 33 L. D., 110).
as

Graves will be allowed to enter such of the tracts in controversy
will comply with the requirements of both compactness and

contiguity.

With

the above noted modifications, the action appealed from

is

affirmed.

oklahoma townsite-keservation of lot for public purpose-section 4, act of may 14, 1890.
Opinion.
of a lot in a townsite in the Territory of Oklahoma for the purpose of erecting thereon an armory for use of a company of the Oklahoma
National Guard, constitutes a reservation for " the public interest " within
the meaning of section 4 of the act of May 14, 1890, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to reserve any undisposed-of lots in townsites in said
Territory for " public use as sites for public buildings " if in his judgment
" such reservation would be for the public interest."

The reservation

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior, March 28, 1906.
( G. B. G.

By your

am asked for opinion upon
by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office in a communication addressed to you February 19, 1906.
It appears from said communication and from other papers accompanying the reference that lot 19, in block 41, of the townsite of Alva,
Oklahoma, is desirable for the purpose of erecting an armory thereon
for the uses of Company I, Oklahoma National Guard, and it is
claimed that a dedication of the lot to such use would save the expense
to the United States government of the rent of a building for that
reference of the 26th ultimo, I

the question presented
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sufficient

funds will be raised by

private subscription to erect a suitable building on said

The

531

lot.

has heretofore been the subject of contest
between two claimants, which contest resulted in it being held as
an unclaimed lot, the claims of both contestants thereto having been
in question

lot

rejected
in said townsite was entered under the act of
1890 (20 Stat., 109), as extended to the Cherokee Outlet
September 1, 1893 (28 Stat., 11). Section 4 of said act of May 14,
1890, provides

The land embraced

May

14,

That

all lots

not disposed of as hereinbefore provided for shall be sold under

the direction of the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of the municipal

government of any such town, or the same or any part thereof may be reserved
for public use as sites for public buildings, or for the purpose of parks, if in
the judgment of the Secretary such reservation would be for the public interest,
and the Secretary shall execute proper conveyances to carry out the provisions
of this section.

The

act of

July

for townsites in

General
thereto.

7,

1898 (30 Stat., 674), abolished boards of trustees
in the Commissioner of the

Oklahoma, and vested

Land Office authority to complete
The title to the lot in question is

the use of said town,

the trust with reference
in the

and the Secretary of the

United States for

Interior, being the

officer of the land department, is charged with the ultimate execution of that trust and the question submitted is, " whether
under the provisions of section four of said act of May 14, it would
be proper to reserve said lot for the purpose mentioned."
I am of opinion that the reservation in question may be made.
The legislation above quoted directs the sale " for the benefit of the
municipal government " of all lots not disposed of as thereinbefore
provided, but in terms also provides that " any part thereof may be

supervisory

;

reserved for public use, as sites for public buildings."

Inasmuch as the Oklahoma National Guard is established and
maintained for the preservation of the public peace, and inasmuch
as its maintenance in the town of Alva would contribute directly
to the well-being of the inhabitants of that town, there would seem
to be no doubt, and I advise you, that the reservation of the lot in
question for the uses of said
for " the

company would constitute a reservation
meaning of the statute, and

public interest " within the

therefore within the powers of the Secretary of the Interior.

The question which

arises incidentally in the consideration of this

United States may permit the erection of a
public building upon its property by private subscription, is not
within the reference, and is one upon which I express no opinion.
matter, whether the

Approved
Thos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.
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Bowlby

v.

Hays.

Motion for review of departmental decision of January
L. D., 376, denied by Acting Secretary

Ryan March

10, 1006, 34

28, 1906.

RECLAMATION ACT—HOMESTEAD ENTRY—AGREEMENT TO CONVEY
LAND.
Opinion.

A

homesteader whose entry is within the irrigable area of an irrigation project
under the act of June 17, 1902, but not subject to the restrictions, limitations and conditions of said act. can not, under the law, prior to the acquisition of title to the land, enter into an agreement to convey to a water-users
association any portion of the land embraced in his entry, to be held in
trust by such association and sold for the benefit of the homesteader to
persons competent to make entry of such lands.

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
March '20, 1006.
(E. F. B.)

A

letter

from the Director of the Geological Survey

relative to the

Okanogan
upon the ques-

disposal of excess holdings of lands •within the limits of the
irrigation project, has been referred to

me

for opinion

tion presented therein.

The

question submitted by the Director

whose entry

is

is whether a homesteader
within the irrigable area of an irrigation project, but

not subject to the restrictions, limitations and conditions of the

reclamation

act,

The purpose

may

sell

a relinquishment of part of his entry.

is to ascertain whether a homesteader,
having such entry, who has not acquired title to his land, may convey,
or agree to convey, to a water users association one or more legal subdivisions of his entry, to be held in trust by such association, and sold
for the benefit of the homesteader to persons competent to make entry
of such lands, under the same form and in the same manner now provided for the conveyance and sale of lands in private ownership lying
within the limits of an irrigable area.
He cannot. One of the indispensable conditions of the homestead
law is that the entry must be made for the exclusive use and benefit of
the applicant and not " either directly or indirectly for the use or
In
(Revised Statutes, Sec. 2290.)
benefit of any other person."
submitting final proof, the entryman is required to make oath that
" no part of such land has been alienated, except as provided in section twenty-two hundred and eighty-eight" (Sec. 2291), which provides for alienation for church and cemetery purposes. Under such
prohibition, " a contract by a homesteader to convey a portion of the
tract when he shall acquire title from the United States is against
public policy and void." Anderson v. Carkins (syllabus), 135 U. S.,

483.

of the inquiry
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Until the homesteader has acquired either a legal or equitable

title

he cannot make an agreement to convey any portion of it
that will secure to another any right or interest therein.
He may
relinquish all or parts of it, but the relinquishment must be to the
United States and the land relinquished becomes public land subject
If the land relinquished is
to entry by the first legal applicant.
irrigable
the
area
of
reclamation
project, it becomes subject
a
within
to the land,

to the provisions of the reclamation act.

Approved

:

Tuos. Ryan, Acting Secretary.

reclamation act—authority to drill wells.
Opinion.
The

drilling of wells in the vicinity of an irrigation project, for the purpose of
determining whether underground water exists that may he made available
in connection with the project, comes within the power conferred by the
second section of the act of June 17. 1902, "to make examinations and
for the development of waters."
surveys
.

.

.

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the interior,
March 30, 1906.
( E. F. B.

A
by a

from the Director of the Geological Survey, accompanied
contract entered into by the Reclamation Service in behalf of the

letter

United States for the drilling of wells within the limits of the Salt
River irrigation project, has been referred to me for opinion " as

whether or not the enclosed contract, under the facts stated in this
letter, can be lawfully approved."
It cannot be ascertained from the face of the contract whether the
work stipulated for is or is not authorized by the act, but the Director
to

in his letter states that

The proposed wells are for the purpose of determining the depths to water
and are strictly analogous to the Diamond drill work so extensively carried on
by the Reclamation Service for determining the conditions of foundations for
various structures.

The underground supply

will

form an important factor

project and will furnish irrigation for a considerable area.
tion

in

the

The

Salt River

wells in ques-

are for the purpose of determining the conditions upon which future
is to be based and other wells will be required before contracts

construction

can be

let for

the necessary pumping plants.

It appears

from the statement of the Director that the wells

stip-

ulated for in the contract are not artesian wells and hence there

nothing in the opinion of March
to

3,

1903

by the Director, that bears directly upon the question involved

this reference.

is

(82 L. D.. 278), referred
in
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The Director

states that the feasibility of the

method of irrigating

lands from the underground water supply has been fully demonstrated and

is

This, as I understand,

not experimental.

stated as

is

proposition without reference to any particular locality,
and the drilling of the wells referred to in the contract is for the
purpose of determining whether the underground water in the
a general

depth as to be made availby means of pumping and thus form an important factor in the
The practicability of this scheme can only be
Salt River project.
ascertained by experimental investigation, not with reference to the
method, but whether such method is practical in the locality contemplated. Such investigation would seem to be authorized by the power
conferred by the second section of the act " to make examinations and
for the development of waters."
surveys.
The feasibility of the Salt River project has already been determained. The action now contemplated is for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the water supply can be increased from the
underground flow by practical methods and thus enlarge the irrigable
area.
That fact can only be properly determined in the manner
suggested by the Director.
locality referred to can be reached at such

able

.

.

I

am

.

of the opinion that the execution of the contract

exercise of the

power and authority conferred by the

act

is a

and

valid
it

can

lawfully be approved.

Approved
T-hos.

Ryan, Acting Secretary.

contest— notice-charge—act oe june
College

v.

16, 1898.

Sutherland.

office, on the ground that the record
does not afford due proof of service of notice of contest, is not well
founded where the fact of legal service is not denied.
In case of a contest against a homestead entry on the ground of abandonment,
it is not essential that the charge in the affidavit of contest, required by
the act of June 16, 1898, that the entryman's absence was not due to

Objection to the jurisdiction of the local

navy or marine corps, shall follow the wording of the
being sufficient if the language employed in effect or by necessary
implication excludes military, naval and marine corps service as the cause

service in the army,
statute,

it

of the entryman's absence.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

to

the

Office,

Commissioner of the General Land

March

30, 1906.

(D.

C

.H.)

The record shows that on March 31, 1900, Isaac E. Sutherland made
homestead entry for the NE. J of Sec. 13, T. 154 N., R. 81 W., Minot,
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North Dakota, and that on July

11, 1004, Jesse
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College filed contest

abandonment and failure to reside upon
said
land
required
by law, and that the entryman's
as
and cultivate
from
claim
was
due
to his employment in the army
the
not
absence
the
in
time
of war.
United States
Notice issued and on
or navy of
set
for
trial,
contestant appeared in person
September
190-t,
the day
8,
and by attorney. The defendant appeared specially by attorney and
objected to the jurisdiction on the ground that there was no proof of
service of the notice of contest on file in the case, and offered in evidence the record as it then stood, in which appeared an affidavit
made by E. W. Hockspier in which it is stated that on the third day
against said entry, charging

of August, 1904, he served the attached notice of contest on Isaac E.

Sutherland by delivering to and leaving with said Sutherland a copy
and that he knows the person so served to be the iden-

of said notice,
tical

person

named

in said notice as the contestee therein.

tion of the local officers being directed to the fact that

was attached

notice

to the affidavit of service

The

atten-

no copy of the

and that neither the

original notice, nor a copy thereof, appeared in the record at that
time, the case Avas then

when
made the aforesaid

adjourned until 2 o'clock P. M. of the same

the parties again appeared as before, and Hockspier,

day,

affidavit, identified a

who

copy of the notice, then pro-

him on the contestee,
which said copy was then attached to his affidavit of service. Whereupon the contestee, still appearing specially, moved that the contest
affidavit be rejected and the contest dismissed on the ground that the
affidavit of contest was insufficient to warrant the cancellation of the
entry, which motion was sustained, and the local officers also at that
time ruled that there was no evidence of proof of service of the conThe local officers on
test notice filed with the papers in the case.
December 6, 1904, filed a formal decision in the case in which they
duced, as a true copy of the notice served by

was insufficient in that it did not
the claim was not due to emfrom
allege that defendant's absence
of
war, and dismissed the conin
time
ployment in the marine corps
test on that ground alone, and held that such disposition of the matter

held that the affidavit of contest

rendered

it

unnecessary to consider the question as to the proof of

service of the notice of contest.

Your

office,

upon appeal by contestant, on June

80, 1905, reversed

and the
and remanded the case

the action of the local officers, held the affidavit of contest
service of notice sufficient to give jurisdiction,

hearing upon the charges set forth in the
Defendant has appealed to the Department and
has based his appeal upon the following alleged errors:
to the local officers for a
affidavit of contest.

(1)

Error

in

holding that the local officers had jurisdiction upon proof of

service made, to take testimony in the case.
(2)

Error

cient to

in

holding that the allegations of the contest affidavit were

warrant a cancellation of the entry.

suili-
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First

:

It will be noted that the defendant does not question or

was duly served upon him,

the fact that notice of the contest

deny

the ob-

jection being only as to the proof of the service of said notice.

The

question presented and involved was well and carefully considered

by the Department in the case of Franson
and it was therein held that
An

objection to the jurisdiction of the local

v.

office,

record docs not afford due proof of service of notice,
the fact of legal service

See also Hansen

Second
of

error

is

Baker, 21 L. D., 383,
on the ground that the
not well taken where

is

not denied.

Ueland, 10 L. D., 273.

v.

It not being specified in appellant's second

:

what

in

insufficient,

essential

particular

the

affidavit

of

assignment
contest

is

said assignment will be considered as challenging the

affidavit generally,

and

contained therein.

In the

as intended to apply to all the allegations
first place, it

ma}^ be said that in order

to determine the sufficiency of an affidavit of contest as the basis

for a hearing, it is only necessary to consider whether or not, if any
one or more of the charges taken singly, or all the charges taken
together as a whole, be established, the entry should be canceled.

(Harper

v.

The

Eiene, 26 L. D., 151.)

affidavit here in question

entryman has not resided on said tract as
required by law
that he has changed his residence therefrom for
more than six months since making his entry; that said tract is not
settled upon and cultivated by said party as required by law; and
that his absence from the land is not due to employment in the
United States army or navy in time of war. Considering these
alleges that

the said
;

allegations together as a whole,

it

seems clear that

if a

hearing be

had thereon and the truth of said allegations be established by proper
proof, defendant's entry must be canceled.
(Smith v. Johnson, 9 L.
D., 255, 258.)

The act of June 16, 1898 (30 Stat., 473), provides that thereafter
no contest against a homestead entry shall be initiated on the ground
of abandonment unless

it

be alleged in the preliminary affidavit of

from the land was not due to
army, navy or marine corps of the United
States in time of war, and as the local officers held the affidavit of

contest that the entryman's absence
his

employment

in the

contest in the case at bar to be fatally defective in that

it

did not,

in

express words, state that the defendant's absence from the claim

was not due
States,

and

employment

to his

as

your

their said holding,

office

it

may

marine corps of the United
appealed from, reversed
be well to consider and pass upon this
in the

in the decision

matter in this appeal.
The law recognizes marines as part of the navy. In the case of
the United States v. Dunn (120 IT. S., 249,254), which involved the
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question of the proper position of the marine corps in the militar}^
service, the court held that

The marine corps is a military body designed to perform military services.
and while they are not necessarily performed on hoard ships, their active service
in time of war is chiefly in the navy, and accompanying or aiding naval
expeditions

;

and
that the primary position of that body in the military service
of the navy,

and

its

chief control

is

is that of a part
placed under the Secretary of the Navy.

Marines being recognized and considered a part of the navy, the
bad because it does not
in express words charge that the entryman's absence from the claim
was not due to his employment in the marine corps.
It may be added that while a contest against an entry involves the
forfeiture thereof, and must be sustained by full proof, yet it is not
technically such a penal proceeding as requires that the allegations
of the contest affidavit shall be set forth with the same degree of
particularity as is required in framing an indictment for a criminal
affidavit in question is therefore not faulty or

otfense.

The

use of any words in the affidavit which in effect or by neces-

sary implication exclude military, naval or marine corps service as
the cause of the entryman's absence will suffice to satisfy the require-

ment of the

June 16, 1898, supra, whether the technical words
employed or not, such words being in substance a com-

act of

of the act are

pliance with the statute.

The

affidavit of contest in this case

Department

being in the opinion of the

sufficient in all the material allegations as a basis for a

hearing, the decision of your

office is

hereby affirmed.

HOMESTEAD—ADJOINING EARM— ADDITIONAL— SECTIONS
OF MARCH

3,

5

AND

6,

ACT

1889.

John Denny.
One who has exercised the homestead privilege, even though for less than Kin
acres, and thereby exhausted his homestead right, is disqualified to make
an adjoining farm entry under section 2289 of the Revised Statutes.
The right to make an additional entry accorded by section 5 of the act of
March 2, 1881), arises only where the original entry was made prior to the
passage of said act, and can he exercised only upon land contiguous to
that embraced in the original entry; hut the additional entry provided for
by section 6 of said act may he allowed whether the original entry was

made

prior or subsequent

to, the passage of said

tiguous or noncontiguous to the original entry.

act

and

for

land con-
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Acting Secretary Ryan
(F. L. C.)

to

the

Office,

Commissioner of the General Land

March

30, 1906.

(D. C.

II.)

appears from the record that on February 21, 1891, John Denny
made homestead entry at the Springfield, Missouri, land office for
of Sec. 30, T. 28. N., R. IT W., containing eighty
the N. i of the NE.
It

j-

and that he received patent for same March 18, 1897; that on
September 10, 1898, said Denny made at the same land office an
additional homestead entry for the S. h of lot 1, SW. J of Sec. 7, T.
24 N., Iv. 14 W., containing forty acres; that proof in support of
said entry, as and for an adjoining farm entry, was made February
27, 1905, and final certificate issued thereon March 1, 1905, the entryman stating in his final certificate that he owned and has continued
to own and reside upon the SW. J of the SE. \ of Sec. 7, T. 24 N., 11.
14 W. (which constitutes his original farm and deeded tract), since
November 18, 1898, and it appearing from the final proof that claimant has resided upon the said SW. J of the said Sec. 7 and has cultivated the same in connection with the tract covered by his additional
acres,

entry since the aforesaid date.

Your

office,

by decision of September

20, 1905, held that the ad-

is no prowhich an additional homestead entry may be made
as an adjoining farm entry, and allowed claimant sixty days within
which to show cause why his additional entry and the final certifi-

ditional entry should not have been allowed, because there

vision of law under

Denny
cate issued thereon should not be canceled for illegality.
has appealed from your said judgment to the Department, and in
his appeal represents that the additional entry was made as an adjoining farm entry and that since making said entry he has continued
to reside upon his adjoining deeded land and has improved and cultivated the same in connection with the forty acres here in question
and that in making his additional entry he was misled by the local
officers, who informed him that he had a right to make the entry as
an adjoining farm entry, and claimant now asks in his appeal to
be allowed to amend the character of said entry to that of actual
residence and cultivation under such regulations as may be proper and
equitable.

From

apparent that Denny's last entry and
It cannot be allowed to
stand under section 2289 of the Revised Statutes as an adjoining farm
entry to the land purchased by and deeded to him, because by his
original homestead entry of the now patented land, he exhausted his
homestead right under that section. It cannot be permitted to stand
under section 5 of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), because
his original homestead entry was made subsequent to the passage of
that act, and also because the land now sought is not contiguous to
the facts disclosed

final certificate

it is

thereon must be canceled.

7
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the cancellation of Denny's said last

is seen why he may not, if he so
allowed to enter the land included therein as an additional
homestead entry under section 6 of said act of 1889, subject to full
compliance with the law under the provisions of said section.
You will so advise claimant, allowing him a reasonable time within

entry as herein directed,

no reason

desires, be

which
tion.

to make said additional entry, if there be no other
Thus modified, your decision is affirmed.

valid objec-

timber and stone ac t—execution of affidavit.

Annie
The

Davies.

affidavit or sworn statement required of an applicant to purchase under the
timber and stone act must be sworn to in the county, parish or land district
where the land is situated; and where in such statement the land intended
to be taken is incorrectly described, and an application to amend the original statement so as to properly describe the lands desired is filed, the
amendatory affidavit must be sworn to in the same manner as required in
east' of an original affidavit.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(¥. L. C.)

to

the

Office,

Commissioner of the General Land

Manh

(G. C. R.)

31, 1906.

Annie Davies applied to purchase under the timber
and 4 and SE. J NW. i, Sec. 3, T. 2
Notice was duly pubN., Iv. 43 E., Lagrande land district, Oregon.
lished fixing September 22, 1904, for offering proof before the register and receiver.
June

30, 190-1,

and stone

October

act, lot 1, Sec. 4, lots 3

3,

1904, she filed in the local office her petition to

her entry and re-advertise to
desired, intended to describe,

SW.

J

NW.

asked to

J,

Sec. 3,

and

make

proof.

In

it

amend

she alleged that she

and thought she had described, lot 4 and
and 2 of Sec. 4 of said township. She

lots 1

amend accordingly.
was supported by

Her

petition

The

register

three witnesses and was sworn to
before a notary public " residing at Spokane," Washington.

and receiver, erroneously passing upon the merits of
amend, instead of transmitting it for your action, as
they should have done under the rule, rejected the same, atid, on
appeal, your office affirmed that action, August 21, 1905.
The application to amend the entry was rejected because the same
Avas sworn to before an officer who was not qualified, that officer not
living in the county, parish or land district in which the land is situated not even in the same state.
Claimant, through her attorney,
has appealed to the Department.
the petition to

—
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Section 2294 of the Revised Statutes, as

March

4,

amended by the

act of

1904 (33 Stat., 59), provides:

That hereafter
to be

made by

all proofs, affidavits, and oaths of any kind whatsoever required
applicants and entryinen under the homestead, pre-emption, timber-

and timber and stone

culture, desert-land,

authorized

take such

to

affidavits,

may, in addition to those now
and oaths, be made before any

acts,

proofs,

United States commissioner or commissioner of the court exercising Federal
jurisdiction in the Territory or before the judge or clerk of any court of record
in the county, parish or land district in

That

in

which the lands are situated: Provided,

case the affidavits, proofs, and oaths hereinbefore mentioned be taken

out of the county in which the land is located the applicant must show by affidavit, satisfactoy to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, that it was
taken before the nearest or most accessible officer qualified to take said affidavits, proofs, and oaths in the land districts in which the lands applied for are
located but such showing by affidavit need not be made in making final proof
in the town or city where the newspaper is published in
it* the proof be taken
;

which the final proof notice is printed. The proof, affidavit, and oath, when
made and duly subscribed, or which may have heretofore been so made and
duly subscribed, shall have the same force and effect as if made before the register and receiver, when transmitted to them with the fees and commissions
allowed and required by law.
so

Appellant contends that a mere application to amend is not required to be sworn to in the county, parish or land district where the
land is situated; that the applicant in fact swore in her original
application that she wished to enter the land as describe^ in her
amended application that is, she had that in mind, and her oath
referred to it, and not to the land erroneously described by the writer,
whose mistake it was.
It is insisted that the affidavit to amend merely explains the error
made in the original affidavit, and that she is not attempting to make
a new sworn statement, but only to explain the first one.
Practical difficulties are suggested in the statement that the corroborating witnesses are now far away from the land, and their pres:

7

ence in the district

difficult, if

that she has already spent

to secure the land

not wash to be burdened with the expense incident to

sworn statement in the county,

She adds
and does
making another

not impossible to procure.

much money

district, etc.

where the land

is

situated.

unfortunate that the alleged error was made in the

It is very

matter of the description of the desired lands. That mistake, however, claimant, through her agent, is solely responsible for.
If these affidavits describe the Avrong lands or lands not desired by
the applicant, the essential requisite for the allowance of an entry
is

An

wanting.

make

a

new

While the
mistake

application to enter, of necessity,

and

specific tract,

to correct

is

an error in that respect

addressed to a
is,

in effect, to

application.
affidavit

made

supporting the petition to amend explains the

in the first affidavit,

it is

nevertheless the only affidavit
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which correctly describes the lands desired. Claimant does not want
the land her original affidavit described; hence that affidavit is useHer so-called explanatory affidavit is really the only affidavit
less.
which expresses her wishes

in

respect

to

the lands desired.

To

require her to make the affidavit before a qualified officer may cause
her much inconvenience, but the law requires it and this Department

has no power to relieve her.

The

action appealed

from

is

affirmed.

rejected homestead application-notice— appeal.
Spalding

v.

Hake.

Where

a foreign-born homestead applicant fails to file with his application
proof of naturalization, or that he has declared his intention to become a
citizen of the United States, it is within the discretion of the local officers
to receive and hold the application and afford the applicant an opportunity

which
can have no effect to segregate the land from other appro-

to furnish the required proof, or to reject the application outright, in

latter event

it

priation.

An appeal from the

rejection of a defective application to enter does not
operate to reserve the land and entitles the applicant only to a judgment
as to the correctness of such action at the time it was taken, and where
the application was properly rejected, it is immaterial, in the face of an

adverse appropriation of the land, whether the applicant received proper
notice of such action.

Acting Secretary

Ryan

(F. L. C.)

An

to

the Commissioner of the General Land
March 31, 1006.
(C. J. G.)

Office,

by Martin Hake from the decision of your
homestead entry
for the
Sec. 5, T. 158 N., R. 81 W., Minot, North Dakota,
and finding that Albert Spalding has the superior right to the land.
January 2, 1908, Spalding made homestead application for said
land, stating therein: "That T have declared my intention to become
a citizen of the United States.
That certified copy of such declaration of intention is hereto attached."
The application was rejected
by the local officers February 28, 1903, " for the reason that there
are no citizenship papers accompanying same."
On the same date
notice of the rejection was sent to Spalding, in care of D. C. Greenleaf, Minot, North Dakota, although Spalding's post office address
was stated in his homestead application to be Lamberton, Minnesota.
He was allowed thirty days in which to appeal to your office. March

office

appeal has been

of

May 31,
SW. I of

filed

1905, holding for cancellation his

L903, Martin Hake filed homestead application for the land, which
was held in abeyance pending Spalding's exercise of his right of

6,
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appeal, and April 11, 1903, no such appeal having been

was allowed to make the homestead entry in question.
September 10, 1903, Spalding filed an appeal to your

filed,

Hake

office, alleg-

ing error on the part of the local officers in rejecting his application
without giving him opportunity to furnish his citizen papers; in
allowing the Hake entry in the absence of notice of the rejection of
his

own

application; and in not sending notice of the rejection of his

In an affidavit accompanying the
appeal Spalding alleged that he employed I). C. Greenleaf to act
as scrivener for the sole purpose of making out his homestead application papers; that said Greenleaf did not at any time have authority
to further represent him in the matter and that he had no knowledge
application to the record address.

;

until recently of the rejection of his application.

With

his appeal

Spalding filed a certified copy of his declaration of intention to
become a citizen of the United States.
January 13, 1904, your office called upon Hake to show cause why
his entry should not be canceled and the application of Spalding
allowed, finding that while the action of the local officers in rejecting
the application of Spalding

omission to properly notify

was

him

"

undoubtedly correct," yet their
was error that should not

of the fact

be allowed to defeat his rights.

Hake answered, stating that he made his entry in good faith,
having been informed and believing that Spalding's application
was properly rejected; that ever since he has been in undisputed
possession of the premises, having established residence thereon
within six months from date of entry; that he has erected thereon
a dwelling house, habitable at all seasons of the year, and broken eight
acres and put the same in condition for next season's crop; and that
Spalding has never established residence nor made any improvements
whatever on the land. Your office found, however, that while these
things show Hake's good faith, there is nothing in his answer to
controvert the claim of Spalding who under all the circumstances
has the superior right to the laud.
A foreign-born applicant is required under the homestead law to
furnish proof of naturalization, or that he has declared his intention
to become a citizen of the United States, the usual method in the latter
event being to accompany his application with a certified copy of his
This proof is a condition precedent to making entry
declaration.
under said law. The local officers were undoubtedly warranted, as
held by your office, in rejecting the application of Spalding for
absence of the required citizenship proof, and it is no answer to their
action to say they might have held said application and notified
Spalding with a view to his curing the defect. It is true they might,
within their discretion, have done this thing, in which event his
application would for the time have been a pending application
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barring the receipt of any other. But they did not take this course
and their action was fully justified. As said in the case of Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad Company (33 L. D., 161): "Power to reject an
improper application is incident to their office under the laws for
organization of the land department." In the analogous case of
Charles H. Cobb (31 L, D., 220), it was said
:

An imperfect
officers

selection,

at once,

upon

its

such as

this,

presentation.

should have been rejected by the local
It

was not incumbent upon them

invite the selector to present the requisite proofs

and

to

await his action

to
in

Unless his selection conformed to the law and regulations, he
was not entitled to have it received by the local officers and noted upon the

that matter.

records of their

office.

Therefore Spalding gained nothing as against an adverse claim by
the filing of his imperfect application.
It is contended on his behalf,
however, that as said application stated that he had declared his

become a citizen, it was the duty of the local officers to
him of the failure to attach the necessary evidence thereto, so
afford him an opportunity to furnish the same, and for this rea-

intention to

notify
as to

son his application, although rejected, " in a
tract."

your

For

office

measure -segregated said

obvious reasons this point can not be sustained.

holds that because of the failure of the local

But

officers to

properly notify Spalding of the rejection of his application, the
application of

Hake was prematurely

allowed, that

is,

before the

Spalding had expired. This would
undoubtedly be true if it had been found that Spalding's application
was impropely rejected. Otherwise he could gain nothing by appeal,
and consequently he was in no way prejudiced by the alleged want of
proper notice. An appeal from the action of the local officers rejecting his application could have entitled him only to a judgment as to
thirty days' right of appeal of

the correctness of such action at the time

it

was taken.

Eaton

et al. v.

Northern Pacific Railway Company (33 L. D., 426)
It is well settled that an appeal does not operate to save or create rights not
secured by the application itself.
Maggie Laird (13 L. D., 502).
An application to enter properly rejected does not operate to reserve
the land covered thereby, even though an appeal is taken from the
order of rejection. Mclnturf v. Gladstone Townsite (20 L. D., 93).
Hence, Spalding's application having been properly rejected because
defective, and it not being incumbent upon the local officers to notify
him with a view to affording him an opportunity to cure the defect,
and especially as they did not do so in this case, an appeal by him
could not have operated to reserve the land from Hake's entry and
he could not have been allowed to complete his application in the face
.

of the adverse claim.

There is another cogent reason for holding intact the entry of
Hake. Granting there has been no bad faith en the part of either of
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the parties to this controversy,
that

it is a

when one of two persons must

who by

that one

error in the

first

instance here

the part of Spalding, and as a result of that error

make

by

his conduct, acts, or omissions, has rendered the

The

injury possible.

well established theory in equity

sutler a loss it should be borne

was

clearly on

Hake was

per-

He

has since established residence on the land
and has expended time, money and labor in its improvement. Under
the circumstances it is entirely appropriate to invoke equitable consideration in behalf of his claim.
Each case of this character must be determined on its particular
facts and merits.
It is not believed the conclusion reached herein
conflicts with the decision in the case of Johnston v. Bane (27 L. D.,
mitted to

entry.

156), nor that in Junkin

v.

Nillsson (28 L. D., 333), the facts in those

cases not being identical with the facts of the one here

As

eration.

stated, the equities in favor of

Hake

under consid-

constitute one of the

controlling features of this case.

The

decision of your office

rejected,

and Hake's entry

will

is

reversed, Spalding's application

remain

is

intact.

reclamation act—applications for water rights.
Circular.

Registers <m<l Receivers,

Gentlemen

:

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, April 4, 1906.
United States Land Offices.

In connection with the various reclamation projects

which have been undertaken by the Government under the provisions
of the act of June IT, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), the Department has
adopted the plan of having water-users' associations organized within
such projects, the incorporators and holders of which are owners and
occupants of the land embraced therein, and when so organized the
Secretary of the Interior enters into contracts with such associations
and they become, as it were, an integral part of the project and
directly associated with the Government in carrying out the details
thereof.

Upon

Government as the representative of the water users
the medium of communication between the water users and

association to the

and as

the execution of such contracts, the relation of the

the Government,

4

is

formally determined.

means of accomplishing this object, the Department has
adopted two forms of applications for water rights, viz., Form "A"
(4-021) for homesteaders avIio have made entries of lands withdrawn

As

a
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under the second form of withdrawal, and Form " B " (4-020) for
private owners of lands embraced within said project, and these forms
(copies of which will be furnished you) will be used in all applications for water rights in any of the reclamation projects within your

For the procedure contemplated in filing and acceptance
you are informed that
1. Upon notice authorized by the Secretary of the Interior that the
Government is ready to receive applications for water right for
described lands under a particular project, all persons who have made
entries of lands under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902 (32
district.

of water rights

Stat., 388), will

Form

A

be required to

file

application for water rights on

number of acres of irrigable land in the farm unit
shown by the plats of farm units approved by the Secre-

for the

entered, as

tary of the Interior.

Upon the issuance of such notice private land owners shall, in
manner, apply for water rights for tracts not containing more
than 160 acres of irrigable land, according to the approved plats,
unless a smaller limit has been fixed as to lands in private ownership
by the Secretary of the Interior. Form B is intended for use by such
2.

like

applicants.
3.

The amount

of water to be furnished per

annum

per acre of

irrigable land will be fixed 'by the Secretary of the Interior for each

depend upon the varying local conditions.
Information as to the number of annual installments required to
be paid, the amount of each, and the time when the same shall be due,
will also be furnished prior to the time Avhen water right applications
project, as it will
4.

can be received.

made a contract with a
under the project, due notice
the registers and receivers, and applications

If the Secretary of the Interior has

5.

water-users'

organized

association

thereof will be given to

for water rights should not be accepted in such cases unless the certificate at the

end thereof has been duly executed by the said association.

The Reclamation Act provides that a private land owner who
makes application for w ater right thereunder shall be " an actual bona
0.

T

on such land, or occupant thereof residing in the neighborhood of said land." Each application on Form B must contain a
statement as to the distance of the applicant's residence from the land

fide resident

for

which

a

water right

is

desired.

The

limit of distance will be fixed

by the Secretary of the Interior for each project, depending on the
local conditions.

limit

when

accepted.

notice

The
is

local land officers will be notified as to this
given that water-right applications may be

If a greater distance

is

shown

in

any application, the case

should be reported to the Commissioner of the General
for special consideration
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upon the
35

facts shown.

Land

Office

If the applicant

is
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an actual bona fide resident on the land for which water-right application is made, the clause in parentheses of Form B, regarding residence elsewhere, must be stricken out.
7. The applicant on Form B must state accurately the nature of his
If this interest is such that it can not ripen into
interest in the land.
a fee-simple title at or before the time when the last annual installment for water rights is due, the register and receiver must reject
the application.

Very

respectfully,

W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved, April 4, 1906.
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

homestead-nebraska lands-act of april

28, 1904.

Circular.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, April 10, 1906.
Registers and Receivers,
United States

Gentlemen: The

Land

Offices,

Nebraska.

circular of instructions relative to the act of

Congress approved April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547), entitiled "An act
amend the homestead laws as to certain unappropriated and unreserved lands in Nebraska," which was approved May 25, 1904 (32
L. D., 670), was amended August 21, 1905 (see 34 L. D., 87), and is
hereby reissued, modified as follows:
It is directed by the law that in that portion of the State of Nebraska lying west and north of the line described therein, which was
marked in red ink upon maps transmitted with said circular, upon
and after June 28, 1904, except for such lands as might be thereafter
and prior to said date excluded under the proviso contained in the first
section thereof, homestead entries may be made for and not to exceed
640 acres, the same to be in as nearly a compact form as possible, and
must not in any event exceed two miles in extreme length.
Under the provisions of the second section, a person who within
the described territory has made entry prior to April 28, 1904, under
the homestead laws of the United States, and who now owns and occupies the lands theretofore entered by him, and no other disqualification to make homestead entry exists, may make an additional entry of
a quantity of land contiguous to his said homestead entry which,
added to the area of the original entry, shall make an aggregate
area not to exceed 640 acres; and he will not be required to reside
to
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upon tho additional land so entered, residence upon the original
homestead entry being accepted as equivalent to residence upon the
But residence either upon the original
additional land so entered.
homestead or the additional land entered must be continued for the
period of five years from the date of the additional entry.

A

person

who has

not been submitted
visions of section 2

a homestead entry upon which final proof has
and who makes additional entry under the proof the act, will be required to submit his final

proof on the original entry within the statutory period therefor,

and

final

proof upon the additional entry must also be submitted

within the statutory period from date of that entry.

Such additional entry must be for contiguous lands and the tracts
embraced therein must be in as compact a form as possible, and the
extreme length of the combined entries must not in any event exceed
two miles.
In accepting entries under this act compliance with the requirement
thereof as to compactness of form should be determined by the relative location of the vacant and unappropriated lands, rather than by
the quality

By

and

desirability of the desired tracts.

the first proviso of section 3 any person

who made

a

homestead

entry prior to his application for entry under this act, if no other disqualification exists, will be allowed to

make an

additional entry for a

quantity of land which, added to the area of the land embraced in the

former entry, shall not exceed 040 acres, but residence upon and cultivation of the additional land will be required to be made and proved
as in ordinary homestead entries.
But the application of one who has
an existing entry and seeks to make an additional entry under said
proviso, can not be allowed unless he has either abandoned his former
entry, or has so perfected his right thereto as to be

obligation to reside thereon;

and

under no further
and

his qualifying status in these

other respects should be clearly set forth in his application.

making of second homeby parties entitled thereto under
existing laws, and applications therefor will be considered under the
instructions of the respective laws under which they are made.
Upon final proof, which may be made after five years and within
seven years from date of entry, the entryman must prove affirmatively
that he lias placed upon the lands entered permanent improvements
of the value of not less than $1.25 per acre for each acre, and such
proof must also show residence upon and cultivation of the land for
the five-year period as in ordinary homestead entries.
In the making of final proofs (he homestead-proof form will be
Under

said act no bar

is

interposed to the

steads for the full area of 040 acres

used, modified when necessary in case of additional entries made
under the provisions of section 2.
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provided by section 3 that the fees and commissions on all
under the act shall be uniformly the same as those charged
under the present law for a maximum entry at the minimum price,
viz
At the time the application is made $14, and at the time of
making final proof $4, to be payable without regard to the area emIt is

entries

:

braced in the entry.
In case the combined area of the subdivisions selected should, upon
applying the rule of approximation thereto, be found to exceed in area
the aggregate of G40 acres, the entryman will be required to pay the
minimum price per acre for the excess in area.
Entries under this act are not subject to the commutation provisions of the homestead law.

In the second proviso of section 3 entrymen who had made their
were allowed a preferential right for
ninety days thereafter to make the additional entry allowed by secentries prior to April 28, 1904,

tion 2 of the law.

Very respectfully,
W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

school land— right of

way—act of june

Territory of

New

21, 1898.

Mexico.

and thirty-six made to the Territory of Neyv Mexpurposes by the act of June 21, 1898, is a grant in praesenti,
and any question as to the authority of the Territory to grant rights of
way for railroads across any such lands is one for determination by the
officers of the Territory and not by the Secretary of the Interior.

The grant

of sections sixteen

ico for school

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior, April 11, 1006.
(G. B. G.)

In a communication of February

5,

1906, addressed to the Secre-

tary of the Interior by the Commissioner of Public

Lands

for the

New

Mexico, it is stated that applications have been
made by railroad companies for rights of way across school sections
sixteen and thirty-six, it being contended by such companies that

Territory of

these applications should be allowed in accordance with section 13,
chapter III, Territorial Laws of New Mexico, of 1905, the material

part of which

is

as follows:

That the Commissioner of Public Lands may grant the right

of

or upon any portion of the territorial lands upon such terms as he

way across
may deem

any ditch, reservoir, railroad
and sign on behalf of the territory a proper deed or instrument of writing

for the best interests of the territory for

such right of

way

or sale.

.

.

.

for
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Said Commissioner asks to be advised " with reference to the rights
of the Territory in the matter of a light of

way

to a railroad

company

and by your reference of the 27th ultimo I
am asked for opinion upon the question presented.
I have to advise you that in my judgment the question is not one
The act of June 21, 1898
for the consideration of this Department,
across a school section,"

(30 Stat., 484),

made

a grant in praesenti of the lands in question to

New

Mexico, with a restriction upon the power of

the Territory of

alienation, it being therein provided that these lands might be
" leased only " by the Territory.
Yet, while it is true that this grant

was a present one (Territory of New Mexico, 29 L. D., 364), it is also
undoubtedly true that the Congress of the United States may still
enforce the conditions of the grant in any appropriate manner (see
Emigrant Co. v. County of Adams, 100 U. S., 01, 69) but I fail to
perceive that the Secretary of the Interior is charged with any duty
If a situation were prein the premises, advisory or otherwise.
sented which would seem to require investigation as a basis for a
report to Congress, in the discharge of general duties devolving upon
the Secretary of the Interior under section 442 of the Revised Statutes, it would, I think, be your duty to direct the investigation, but
(See my opinion of February 19,
no such situation is here presented.
Here is an act
1906, 21 Opinions Assistant Attorney-General, 890.)
of the territorial legislature, a copy of which has presumably been
filed with the Congress of the United States, pursuant to the provisions of section 1850 of the Revised Statutes, and if that body should
not choose to take action thereon, it remains for the courts eventually
to determine the legality of such legislation.
There is nothing to investigate, and I think the Commissioner of
Public Lands should look to the law officers of the Territory for
opinion as to his authority and duty in the premises.
;

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

uintah indian lands-withdrawal fok reservoir purposesact of march 3, 1905— lease.
Opinion.
no authority for leasing lands formerly within the Uintah Indian
withdrawn generally for reservoir purposes under the act
of March 3, 1905, where such lands have not boon appropriated for any
particular purpose so as to take them out of the category of public lands.

There

is

reservation and

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
(E. F. B.)
April 11, 1906.

A
17,

letter
1<)()G,

from the Director of the Geological Survey, dated March
me for opinion as to whether lands

has been referred to
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formerly within the Uintah Indian reservation, and now withdrawn
for reservoir purposes under authority of the act of March 3, 1905
(33 Stat., 1048, 1070), may be leased for grazing purposes until the
lands are needed for the uses contemplated by their withdrawal.
Reference is made by the Director to my opinion of March 10, 1906
(34 L. D., 480), as authority for the leasing of such lands.
That opinion was given upon the question as to the right of the
Secretary of the Interior to lease lands withdrawn or purchased for

i

reclamation purposes under the act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388),
but it was based upon the general principle that in the absence of any
express prohibition as to the particular property, the head of the
executive department in whose care and custody public property is

placed to be used for a particular purpose, may, until the property is
needed for the purpose intended, exercise his judgment and discretion
as to the proper care and disposition of such property and an}^ use
of it not incompatible with the purpose intended is not a diversion to
other uses and is neither a violation of law nor an abuse of the supervisory authority and discretion reposed in him.
It was also stated that the Secretary of the Interior has no authority under his general power of supervision and control over the public
lands to lease them unless expressly authorized by Congress. Special
provision having been made for the disposal of public lands, any

manner of disposition is excluded, being impliedly prohibited.
The lands in question were withdrawn under authority of the act
of March 3, 1905, supra, which empowered the President, prior to
other

the opening of the Uintah Indian reservation, " to set apart and
reserve any reservoir site or other lands necessary to conserve and

protect the water supply for the Indians or for general agricultural

development."
If these lands have been permanently appropriated to a particular
use, as in the case of lands appropriated for the construction of
irrigation works under the act of June 17, 1902, and have been disposed of so far as to take them out of the category of public lands,
the principle announced in the opinion of March 10, 1900, would
authorize the leasing of them.
It does not appear, however, that they have been appropriated for
any purpose. They are simply reserved public lands that may, or may
not, be used for the purposes intended by their reservations, and the

vacating of the order of reservation would, of

them

its

own

force, subject

to disposal as other lands of the reservation.

As they

are not a part of an irrigation project to be constructed

under the act of June

17, 1902, the rental

from these lands would

be covered into the treasury as a part of the reclamation fund
if

there

was no question

as to the authority to lease.

not

—even

|
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no authority to lease these lands and* the appli-

cation should be rejected.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary

REPAYMENT—PAYMENT

IN CASH

AND BY LAND WAKRANT.

Heirs of Jose G. Soma via.
A pre-emption entryman who paid double minimum

price for lands supposed
within the limits of a railroad grant, but which were subsequently
held not to be within such limits, is entitled to repayment of the excess of
one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre paid by him but where payment
was made partly in cash and partly by land warrant, the Secretary of the
Interior has no authority, in making repayment, to draw his warrant for an
amount greater than the cash payment made by the entryman; and in such
case, where the amount of the cash payment is not sufficient to make the
repayment due the entryman in full, he may be permitted to make an additional cash payment of such an amount as added to the sum originally paid
by him in cash will aggregate the cost of the land at one dollar and twentyfive cents per acre, and thereupon have the land warrant returned to him
to be

;

unsatisfied.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
April 12, 1906.
(F. L. C.)

The

heirs of Jose G.

15, 1905,

Offices

(J. R.

W.)

Somavia appealed from your decision of July

refusing to return to them military bounty land warrants

Nos. 113411 and 33104, act of
tively for

Land

March

3,

1855 (10 Stat., 701), respec-

one hundred and sixty and eighty

acres.

Somavia made final proof of his pre-emption
claim to lots 1, 2, 3 and the SW. J of the NW. i, Sec, 2, T. 17 S., R. 4
E., M. I). M., San Francisco, California, and in payment located warrant 113411 for 160 acres on lots 1, 2 and the SW. \ of the NW. J, 98.82
In payacres, and paid $47.05 as and for an excess of 18.82 acres.
ment for lot 3, 45.47 acres, he located warrant 33104, and as and for
an excess of 5.47 acres he paid $13.08. This occurred from the fact
that the lands entered were at that time by the land department held

November

12, 1878,

and supposed to be double minimum lands within the limits of the
grant to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, made by the
act of July 27, 1866 (14 Stat., 292), but was afterward held not to be
within such limits by decision of March 23, 1886, in Atlantic and
Due to the former erronePacific Railroad Company (4 L. D., 458).
ous holding Somavia's warrants were credited upon his entry for
half of their area, and he was required to pay and did pay two
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and

dollars

fifty cents per acre for the excess of 24.29 acres of his

—

pre-emption 144.29 acres over the area of his 240 acres of landwarrants credited at half their area or 120 acres. April 15, 1880,
patents issued to

him

for the lands so entered.

June 21, 1902, application was made to your office by J. T., J. R
and R. M. de Somavia for return of these warrants. Therewith was
filed an affidavit by Robert A. Fat jo and Eugene M. Don that they
were personally acquainted with Jose G. Somavia, the entryman, and
know of their own knowledge that he died about May 1C>, 1900, that
the applicants are his sole heirs, and are all of full age of twenty-one
years.
The applicants offer to pay the full sum of one dollar and

,

twenty-five cents per acre of the entry, less the $60.73 paid at the

time as excess.

Your

decision held that (1) the warrants were satisfied, at least in
by the entryman's acceptance of the patents, which would have
to be returned and canceled, and title to the land be reconveyed to the
United States before return of the warrants; (2) that while the
double minimum price should not have been exacted, and an equity to
reimbursement exists, yet your office is not authorized to return the
part,

warrants; (3) that the proof of right in the applicants
in that their relation to the

entryman

is

is insufficient,

not stated, or facts upon

which their heirship is based are not stated, but a mere conclusion of
law only, and the application was denied.
The result is that he paid, under an erroneous ruling of the land
department, part in warrants and part in money, the double minimum
price for land that afterward Avas found not to be within the limits of
a railroad grant, and, had the entire payment been made in money, he
would be entitled under section 2 of the act of June 10, 1880 (21 Stat.,
287), to repayment of the excess above one dollar and twenty-five
Frederick W. Frese (5 L. D., 437). But as it was a
cents per acre.
mixed payment— only part in money the Secretary of the Interior
has no authority to draw his warrant on the Treasury for repayment
of the one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre of the entry in money.
Sylvester

But

Kipp

(24 L. D.,-538)

in the latter case it

;

Albert Nelson (28 L. D., 248).
for such part of the excess

was held that

paid as remains in the custody of the Department, the error may be
In that case the entire payment was in surveyor's scrip,
and the excess amount was returned. In discussion of the subject the
Department held
corrected.

It was wrong to exact this, and to retain it would be to continue the wrong.
While the consideration remains in the hands of this Department the mistake
may and should be corrected. It comes within the principle announced by
Attorney-General John Nelson, in 4th Opinions of Attorney-General, page 227,
wherein he said:

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
"In reference

cases of error arising out of miscalculations of the

to

553
amounts

have had more difficulty. Money thus paid is never properly in
It is paid and received by mutual mistake
the treasury of the United States.
can perceive no
and as lon^; as it remains in the hands of the receiving officer
good reason why, upon the discovery of the error, lie should not be authorized
After it has found its way into the treasury, however, like all
to correct it.
other money, it should he withdrawn in strict fulfillment of the requirements
of* the law, which the administrative power or the executive department of the
government can not control."
The certificates surrendered by the applicant as the consideration for the land
are in the custody and under the control of the Department, and justice and
equity demand that the mistake should he corrected.
to be paid,

I

I

The obligation

on governments as on persons.
granting relief arises from
the peculiarity of their organization, but when brought to the bar of
the court, the same principles determine their obligation in business
transactions as apply to individuals.
In the present case the land
department in disposal of public lands exacted from the pre-emption
claimant warrants for 240 acres of land and the price of 48.56 acres
more for half the quantity, 144.29 acres. This exaction was not a
voluntary payment, as, under the erroneous construction of law then
prevailing, his pre-emption would have been forfeited and his right
lost.
The obligation remains to return the exaction, now that the
The land warrants can not be divided, but the
error is confessed.
real transaction was a pre-emption entry for 144.29 acres, for which
he made proof and in payment located a land warrant for eighty
acres, and should have paid $80.87, but actually paid only $60.73 in
money. Adjusting the considerations that actually passed as ratably
as the indivisible character of the land warrants, permits, without
exacting more than he was required to pay, the warrant for eighty
acres can be satisfied
the parties can complete the cash payment by
paying $19.64, and the warrant for one hundred and sixty acre's can
be returned unsatisfied.
This is within the power of the land department, and in view of the character of mixed considerations is the
equitable and nearest possible approximation to an accurate ratable
In case of

to be just rests alike

governments the

difficulty in

;

adjustment.

The

objection

made by your

office to

the sufficiency of proof of the

right of claimants to Somavia's succession

proved.

The

is

well taken and

claimant, however, should be permitted to

is

ap-

make proper

proof.

Your decision is vacated, and your office will return the one hundred and sixty acre warrant, upon the applicants making proof
satisfactory to your office that they are the sole heirs of the entry-

man and

entitled

by succession

$19.64 to complete the entry.

to
'

him

to claim the property,

paying
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mining claim—notice of application for patent—exclusion
of conflict.

Richmond and Other Lode Claims.
A

an application for patent to a
mining claim as effectually eliminates the conflict area as it" the exception
and exclusion were in terms declared in the application for patent itself.

recital of exclusion of conflict in the notice of

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)
April 12, 1000.

Lund
(F.

Office,

H. B.)

August 25, 1904:, X. E. Bag-ley made entry (No. 1720) for the. Richmond, Argonaut, and Sunny Jim lode mining claims, survey No.
16933, Durango, Colorado, land district.
In the entry and in the
published and posted notice of the application for patent all conflicts
with surveys Nos. 1125, 1179, 1335. and 2183, the Bond, Wolverine.
Mountain Maid, and Cacique lode mining claims, respectively, were
expressly excluded.
It appearing, however, from the field notes of survey that the area
claimed and paid for includes two tracts, "A" and " B." described
in those notes

embraced

and indicated on the

in the excluded conflicts

official

plat of survey, which are

with the

first

three claims above

by decision of February 28, 1905, held in substance and effect that, as it does not appear that the claimant has
been awarded the tracts by judgment of a court, if he desires to retain
any portion thereof it will be necessary regularly to republish and
repost notice of his application as to so much, and that, if no adverse
claim is filed, he may thereafter enter and pay for the additional
land.
Failing such supplemental proceedings and in the absence of
appeal, it was stated, within sixty days from receipt of notice, the
entry would pass to patent exclusive of all conflicts with the surveys
mentioned. Your office also remarked an unexcluded conflict with
the Pacific lode claim, survey No. 835 A. for which, it was stated.
application for patent had been hied.
The claimant has appealed to the Department. In that behalf
he cites paragraphs 39 and 46 of the mining regulations (31 L. D.,
474. 181, 182). prescribing the data which the published and posted
all of the
notice must contain, and urges that in the present case
data required by said paragraphs was contained in the various notices
He also
and no question as to this has been raised by your office.
provides
52
of
regulations
portion
paragraph
the
which
that
of
cites
that upon submission of proof of publication and posting, etc., the
register will " permit the claimant to pay for the land according to
the area given in the plat and field notes of survey." which he avers
to have been done in this instance: and he concludes as follows:
mentioned, your

office,

* w

**

All of the conflict

with the conflicting surveys named is not excluded from
is asked for, and payment

this entry either in statement or in fact, but patent
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of acres, to-wit, 26.035 acres, exclusive of con-

with certain surveys, exactly as stated in the field notes.
A comparison of the field notes and plats of the several surveys in conflict
will disclose the fact that patent is asked for in this case for such area as was
heretofore excluded from the other surveys and abandoned by claimants .,t
Sur. No. 835 A.
flict

There can be no doubt that the two tracts in question arc not
available to the claimant under his pending patent proceedings.

The

present difficulty with respect to those tracts would seem to have
arisen

from a too literal regard for the general language of portions
mining regulations and a corresponding disregard of the
and purpose of the mining statutes themselves.

of the
letter

provided by those statutes that of each application
and posted, whereby
all others who may have or claim adverse interests may be warned
and afforded opportunity to assert their claims in season. In other
words, precisely what is sought to be secured by the application
must be disclosed by the published notice, the notice posted in the
It is carefully

for mineral patent notice shall be published

local office,

Upon

and the notice posted upon the claim.

these several

elements or parts of the prescribed notice, and each of them,

who may have

others

to rely;

and any

all

or claim conflicting interests have a full right

recital therein of exclusion of conflict as effectually

eliminates the conflict area as if the exception

and exclusion were in

terms declared in the application for patent.

by
and controlling advice of the
locus and extent of the claim or claims for which patent is sought.
It by no means follows, however, that the claimant is entitled to
It is true that the data contained in the field notes, illustrated

the official plat, constitute the official

receive

1

,

or

may

secure, patent to all the land described in the field

and shown upon the plat as embraced in his claim or claims.
It often happens that in the official survey of a claim a conflict with
another claim is included as part and parcel of the former and so
described in the field notes and exhibited on the plat, but that thereafter and even after his application is tiled, threatened with an
adverse claim and a suit thereunder, the claimant waives his claim
to the conflict area by an express exclusion thereof recited in his
published and posted notice.
In this case unqualified exclusions, embracing the two tracts in
question, were recited in the published and posted notice of appellant's application for patent, and as such were carried into the
entry; and the contrary assertion made and conclusion expressed in
notes

his appeal, as above quoted, are inaccurate.

nection, that in scanning the

It

is

clear, in this con-

mining regulations, whose provisions

he invokes, appellant did not give due observance to the concluding
clause of paragraph 39, whereby, speaking of the notice to be posted
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each case in a conspicuous place on the claim concerned, the

in

claimant

is

admonished that

Too much care cannot he exercised

much

in

the preparation of this notice, inas-

as the data therein are to he repeated in the other notices required by

the statute, and upon the accuracy and completeness of these notices will
depend, in a great measure, the regularity and validity of the proceedings for
patent.

The

decision of your office

is

affirmed.

mining claim-expenditure-wagon roads.
Douglas and Other Lodes.
The

cost of construction of such portions of

wagon

roads, used in the transpor-

tation of supplies to and ore from a mining claim or claims, as extend

beyond the boundaries of the latter can not be accepted in satisfaction of
requirement with respect to the expenditure in labor or
improvements for patent purposes, the connection between the outlying
portions of the roads and active mining operations or development being
too remote to justify their acceptance.
the statutory

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L.

C)

April 13, 1906.

Land
(F.

Office,

H. B.)

H. E. Miller et al. made entry (No. 715) for what
Douglas group, consisting of the Douglas and ten other
lode mining claims, survey No. 1990, Carson City, Nevada, land dis-

June

is

24, 1903,

called the

trict.

The

eleven claims are contiguous.

appearing that the Douglas and Lookout were the only claims
of the group upon or for the benefit of which the requisite improvements had been made, the entrymen were called upon to show, by
proper certificate of the surveyor-general, that the statutory expenditure had been made upon each of the claims prior to expiration of
the period of publication, upon pain of cancellation of the entry
except as to the Douglas and Lookout claims.
In response there was submitted, on behalf of the entrymen, a supplemental certificate by the surveyor-general and corroborated affidavit of the deputy mineral surveyor who surveyed the claims, in
which a number of buildings on the group and several miles of road
are given as additional to the improvements originally certified, and
from which it appears that subsequent to the survey and prior to the
It

expiration of the period of publication a tunnel improvement upon
the Douglas and Lookout claims had been extended at a cost of
$11,174.00.
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consideration of the supplemental showing your

decision of

January

16, 1005, said

and held
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office,

by

as follows:

A within the Lookout and Douglas locations and the
and winzes in connection therewith is valued at $11,174.60.
Of the buildings mentioned only the hoarding house valued at $780, the bunk
The extension

of tunnel

shafts, raises, inclines

house valued at $560, can be accepted as having been constructed in compliance
with the statute requiring certain expenditures on lode claims.
No specific showing is made as to how the roads mentioned tend to promote
the extraction of mineral from the claims except that some of them are necesThe
sary for the transportation of machinery and supplies to the mines.
other portions are used for the transportation of ores to the smelter to be
treated. The smelter is not an improvement tending to promote the extraction
A similar holding was made
of mineral from the claim (see 31 L. D., 37).
by this office in letter " N " of April 15, 1904, to the local officers at La Grande,
Oregon. This being the case, the road leading thereto could not be accepted
;is
an improvement tending to promote the extraction of mineral from the
Only a small portion of the road was constructed except that leading
claim.
to the smelter. This portion, together with the buildings, which, as above stated,
might be accepted as proper improvements, distributed pro rata among the
claims is not sufficient to make the expenditure on any individual claim amount
excepting the Morning Star, Francis, Douglas and Lookout claims. The
to, as stated in Mr. Mack's affidavit, is shown to have
been made for the benefit of the Lookout and Douglas and has been extended
toward and is shown to tend toward the development of the Francis claim also.
to $500,

tunnel above referred

The Morning Star

is

separated from the Lookout, Douglas and Francis claims

by the Constitution and Relief locations, upon which but a small amount has
been expended, and therefore in case of cancellation of the entry as to the Constitution and Relief locations, could not be embraced in the same entry with
the Lookout, Douglas

and Francis claims. Aside from the Morning Star and
the showing made is not considered sufficient. The

named claims

the three last

is accordingly held for cancellation as to
Lookout, Douglas and Francis locations.

entry

From

all

of the claims except the

that decision the entrymen have appealed to the Department.

The expenditures upon the

several claims of the group, in improve-

ments consisting of tunnels, shafts, and

cuts,

were originally

certified

as follows

Morning Star claim
Azurite claim

$419.22
71.96
27.96
256.84
88.89
410.83

Relief claim

Sunlight claim

Coppersmith claim
Francis claim

Douglas claim
Lookout claim

'.

37
149.99

7, 21:;.

claim

13.33

Golden Gate claim

7.50
20.00

Constitution

Hope claim

Total

Of
with

i

8,

679. 89

the claims of the group the Douglas alone was thus accredited
sufficient individual

improvements

to sustain

an entry.

It

was
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remarked by your

office

that the improvements upon that claim ap-

peared to benefit the Lookout claim.
The tunnel, referred to in the supplemental certificate as having
been extended at a cost of $11,174.60, has its .portal at or near the
northerly boundary of the Lookout and extends in a northerly direction for some distance within the boundaries of the adjoining Douglas
claim and in the direction of the next adjoining Francis' claim. It is
specifically certified,

with respect to this extended tunnel, that

it

de-

velops the mineral deposits of the Douglas and Lookout claims, tends

and will, when extended
from its face into the Francis claim, develop and be a means of working and mining the mineral-bearing rock in place in the Francis.

to develop the deposits of the Francis claim,

Under

this certificate

your

office

accepts the extended tunnel as an

improvement for the common benefit of the three claims mentioned in
that connection, and the Department sees no reason to question that
This disposes of the tunnel improvement as it now stands.
finding.
Additional individual improvements upon the Douglas and Lookout claims are given, but are of no concern here.

The

buildings and structures upon the claims consist of a boarding

office, two bunk houses, two cellars, blacksmith shop, stable
and powder house, of the total value of $2,030. With respect to them

house,

it is

certified

that said structures hereinbefore mentioned are

work of mining on said

claims, as the

workmen

all necessary to carry on the
are obliged to live and eat upon

the claims, by reason of the distance between said mines

and any other houses,

blacksmith shop, cellars, stable and powder house were also
constructed for and used to carry on the business of mining upon said claims.

and that said

office,

In the same connection, in an affidavit by H. E. Miller, one of the
entrymen, it is alleged
As for the house, stable, cellars, blacksmith shop, they have been in almost
constant use since construction and are now being used with material enlargements.

The long distance from supplies, such as fresh meats, milk, and vegetables,
makes the provision of store house, cellars and powder houses necessary.
it were decisive of the question here, it being affirmatively made
appear that these improvements are essential to mining operations
and are utilized and employed for those purposes, the Department
would be disposed to hold that they might be accepted as improvements for the benefit of the claims within the requirements in that

If

to

behalf.

However, by an apportionment of the value of the structures
the eleven claims of the group, and for which the credit is

among

offered, as additional to the certified individual credits set forth in

the foregoing table, the requisite

amount would not be reached with

respect to others than the Francis, Douglas, Lookout (which shared
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the tunnel improvement) and Morning Star claims, and the latter
being some distance removed from the three first mentioned, could
not be embraced in the entry. Other sufficient genera] improvements
,

must therefore appear.

Two

of the principal roads mentioned in the supplemental certifi-

cate are

shown by

a

blueprint diagram thereto attached to traverse

Coppersmith, Sunlight, Lookout, Douglas, and Francis claims.
the last mentioned claim one road extends first to the north and
then to the west, without the group, reaching and entering upon the
Azurite and cutting the northwesterly corner of the Morning Star.
Another of the roads, marked on the diagram " Road from tunnel A
to Bluestone smelter," extends from the southerly end of the group in
the

From

a

northeasterly direction, cutting the southeasterly corner of the

its course, for much the greater part outside the
road, marked on the blueprint " road to Douganother
group. Still
from
what is indicated as junction 4, a little south
las office," extends

Golden Gate claim in

boundary of the Francis claim,

of the northerly
direction, almost

its

with the " road from tunnel

two and

a half

in a northeasterly

entire length outside the group, to a junction

A

to Bluestone smelter."

In addition,

miles of road, wholly outside the group and leading

" to water,"

extend to the south and west of the group.
These roads are stated, both by the deputy mineral surveyor and by
the affiant, Miller, to have been constructed by the entrymen and their

grantors, prior to the survey, for the purpose, and are used, for haul-

ing machinery and supplies to the claims as well as ore therefrom;
and their total value is given as $2,150. Affiant Miller alleges that
the road leading to the Bluestone smelter connects with a road leading to a near-by town and some distance further to a station on a line
of railroad.

In the view which the Department has taken of wagon roads genas mining improvements, particularly where they are not

erally

wholly upon the claims involved and are devoted to the transporta-

and ore fromihe claims, but a fraction of the value
and representing such portions of the roads as
are within the boundaries of the group, could be accepted, in the most
favorable view of their serviceability in the direct promotion of the
development of this group. See Copper Glance Lode (29 L. I).. 542
Highland Marie and Manilla Lode Mining Claims (31 L. I)., 37,

tion of supplies to

of those certified here,

)

;

The connection between the outlying portions of the roads
and active mining operations or development is too remote to justify

38-9).

their acceptance as a credit.

The addition of

the acceptable fraction,

were feasible to determine the availability of the roads actually
within and upon the claims,' would still fail to satisfy the statutory
requirement so far as concerns others of the group than those last
above named. The Department fully recognizes the good faith of
if it
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entrymen as manifested

these

the various improvements

;

in an expenditure of nearly $25,000 in
but the bulk of this expenditure is repre-

sented in the tunnel improvement for the benefit of the Douglas,
Lookout, and Francis claims, to which it is specifically accredited in
the certificate, and is therefore unavailing as to the remainder of the
group.
The decision of your office is affirmed.

APPLICATION-WITHDRAWAL UNDER THE
ACT OF JUNE 17. 1902.

SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL

Charles A. Guernsey.
An

application to enter under the provisions of section 2306 of the Revised

Commissioner of the General Land
allowance of entry thereon, prevent a withdrawal of the land covered thereby under provisions of the act of June 17,
Statutes, even though approved by the

Office,

will not, prior to the

1902.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C)
April 13, 1906.

Land

Office,

(E. O. P.)

Charles A. Guernsey has appealed to the Department from your
decision of July 13, 1905, holding for cancellation his entry,
made under the provisions of section 2306, Revised Statutes, for the
office

S. i

SE.

J,

Sec. 33, T. 27 N,, R. 66

Wyoming,

W., 6th P. M., Cheyenne land

was erroneously
by the local officers after the withdrawal of the land in
question under the provisions of the act of June IT, 1902 (32 Stat.,
district,

for the reason that said entry

alloAved

388).

The claimant, claiming as assignee of Jeduthun L. Twitchell, upon
whose military service and original homestead entry his claimed
right

is

based, filed his application to enter the land in question with

June 4, 1901, which application was transmitted by
them to your office and its allowance directed by your office letter of
May 27, 1902. Final certificate, however, was not issued by them
until November 11, 1904.
February 14, 1903, the land in question
was withdrawn from entry under the provisions of the act of June
the local officers,

17, 1902, supra.

The

first,

second, fourth and fifth specifications of error allege,

was in
any manner subject to withdrawal under departmental order of
February 11, 1903, and in the argument in support of this contention it is urged by counsel that the application of Guernsey, filed
June 4, 1901, the allowance of which was directed by your office May
in substance, that your office erred in holding that said land
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1902, prior to the issuance of said order of withdrawal,

when

followed by the payment of the required fees and issuance of final
certificate,

November

formed one transaction, which upon
from the date of the initial act,
complete segregation of the land from that date,
11, 1904,

completion took

effect,

and operated as
June 4, 1901.

a

The third

by

relation,

specification of error

is

believed to have reference to

made necessary because
purposes. As there is nothing

cancellation of entries

the land was needed

show
was canceled for the reason assigned in
the third specification of error, and as it is not necessary to a decision
of the question presented to rely upon such ground to sustain the
action of your office, it will not be further considered by the
for construction

in the record to

that the entry in question

Department.
The naked contention that an application to enter under the pro-

amounts to a segregation of the
withdrawal of the land applied for under
the terms of the act of June 17, 1902, supra, finds no support in the
prior decisions of the Department.
(Nancy C. Yaple, 34 L. D., 311.)
Paragraph 4, of departmental instructions of June 6, 1905 (33 L. D.,
607, 608), referring to lands which "may be irrigated" under the
visions of said section 2306, supra,

land, sufficient to prevent a

contemplated project, reads as follows:
Lands withdrawn under the second form can be entered only
homestead laws and subject to the provisions, limitations, charges,
conditions of the reclamation act, and all applications to make
locations, or entries of any other kind should be rejected whether
presented before or after the lands were withdrawn.
It

under the
terms, and
selections,

they were

has been decided by the Department that applications to enter

under the provisions of said section 2306 are not such applications
as may be allowed under the language used in this paragraph.
(Cornelius J. MacNamara, 33 L. D., 520 William M. Wooldridge, 33 L. D.,
By the further terms of said paragraph it is wholly imma525.)
terial whether the applications to enter be presented " before or
after the lands were withdrawn," and the Department is firmly of
;

opinion this direction

is

fully

warranted by the

letter

and intent

of the statute.

Applications to purchase under the provisions of the timber and
stone act are in all essential respects similar in effect to applications

made under the provisions of

and

section 2306, supra,

it

has been

repeatedly held by the Department that such applications do not
operate to segregate the land applied for nor prevent

its

withdrawal

under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902, supra. Board of
Control, Canal No. 3, State of Colorado v. Torrence (32 L. D.. 472)
Jones v. Northern Pacific By. Co. (34 L. D., 105) Todd v. Hays,
;

:

5194— Vol. 34—05 m
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on review (34 L.

I).,

timber and stone

act,

Applications to enter under the proto purchase under the

371).

visions of said section 2306,

and applications

give to the applicant, as against other individ-

uals, a preference right to proceed under the application to perfect
title to

the land sought to be entered, but until the entry

is

complete,

no rights are acquired against the government. The reason appears
from the clear language of the act authorizing a withdrawal of the
land for reclamation purposes. No specific lands are excepted from
the operation of the order of withdrawal by the terms of the act,
and in the departmental instructions prepared in accordance therewith, the only lands specified are those covered by " any valid entry,
location, or selection which segregated and withheld the lands embraced therein from other forms of appropriation at the date of
such withdrawal" (33 L. D., GOT).
That an application to enter under section 2306, supra, is not an
entry of the land applied for is self evident, and that it is not a
" selection or location " which segregates or withholds the land applied for, as against the United States, is equally well settled by
departmental construction of the act in question.
Until an entry is complete there is no vested right, and until an
applicant is in position to maintain a claim to such right there is no
segregation of the land within the meaning of the act of June 17,
1902, supra.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in
Whitney (9 Wall., 187, 195), in defining the

the case of Frisbie

v.

rights of the United

States as against a person claiming a right under the pre-emption

law, quotes with approval the language of different Attorneys-General, as follows:

Attorney-General dishing, in an opinion given in 1850, says " Persons who
go upon the public land with a view to cultivate now, and to purchase hereafter,
possess no rights against the United States, except such as the acts of Congress
confer and these acts do not confer upon the pre-emptor, in posse, any right
or claim to be treated as the present proprietor of the land, in relation to the
government."
In the matter of the Hot Springs tract of Arkansas, Attorney-General Bates
says "A mere entry upon land, with continued occupancy and improvement
thereof, gives no vested interest in it.
It may, however, give, under our
national land system, a privilege of pre-emption. But this is only a privilege
conferred upon the settler to purchase land in preference to others
His settlement protects him from intrusion or purchase by others, but confers
no right against the government.
In the matter of this same Soscol Ranch, Attorney-General Speed asserts
the same principle. He says: "It is not to be doubted that settlement on the
public lands of the United States, no matter how long continued, confers no
right against the government
The land continues subject to the absolute disposing power of Congress, until the settler has made the required proof
of settlement and improvement, and has paid the requisite purchase-money."
:

;

:

....

.

.

.
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a pre-emptor, acquired

by the

by settlement, was
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essentially

an application. to enter under
of
supra,
and like it can be set up
provisions
said
section
2306,
the
us against individuals but cannot prevail as against the government.
similar to that secured

In neither case
the application

term " entry
sense is the

"

is
is

filing of

The right vests only
followed by actual entry, properly allowed.

the right a vested one.

when
The

has a definite and well-settled meaning, and in no
,?
equivalent in effect.
(Hastings, etc.

term " application

Railroad Co. v. Whitney (132 U. S. 357, 363) Todd v. Hays, on
review (34 L. D., 371, 374). An entry can only be made of lands
subject to individual appropriation (Chotard et oil. v. Pope et al.
;

(12

Wheat,

586, 588).

If at any time prior to completion of an

withdrawn, it ceases to be subject to
appropriation except in accordance with the terms of the order of

entry, the land applied for be

withdrawal, the mere preference right gained by the filing of the
up to defeat such withdrawal by the gov-

application can not be set

ernment.

The fact that the allowance of the application by the local officers
had been directed by your office prior to the passage t>f the act by
virtue of which the withdrawal was subsequently made, does not, of
itself, give any greater force and effect to the application, and if,
prior to the actual entry of the land and issuance of final certificate
thereon, in accordance with such direction, the land is withdrawn
from entry, the inchoate right conferred by the filing of the application is, as against the government, cut off and determined, and an
allowance of such application and the issuance of final certificate
by the local officers subsequent to such withdrawal, is erroneous and
such entry should be canceled. In such case the withdrawal of the
land applied for prior to a full compliance with the directions to
the local officers to allow the application,

is

a revocation of such

and an entry thereafter allowed by them, unless in strict
accord with the order of withdrawal, is invalid. The entry in question was not such a one as could properly be allowed under the order
of withdrawal withdrawing the tract involved, and was, therefore,
direction

subject to cancellation.

Counsel for appellant lays much stress upon the fact that this appliall that he could do to make entry of the land and that
a cancellation of his entry under such circumstances involves a hardship not contemplated by the statute authorizing the withdrawal
thereof.
An examination of the records of your office discloses that
on May 27, 1902, you notified claimant's attorney of record of the
action taken by you directing the allowance of the entry in question,
yet no steps w ere taken to perfect the entry until November 11, 1904,
nearly two and a half years thereafter.
Surely it cannot be seriously

cant had done

r
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contended that the preference right conferred would, unless the laches
were excused, be extended over such a period even as against other
Yet if it be conceded
applicants, much less against the government.
that claimant's contention is well founded, still his rights can be no
greater than those conferred by the statute granting them, and must,
as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Frisbie

y.

—

Whitney (supra, 197)

be measured by tbe acts of Congress, and not by what be may or may not be
if a sound construction of these acts shows that be bad acquired
no vested interest in tbe land, then, as bis rights are created by the statutes,

able to do, and

tbey must be governed by their provisions, whether bard or lenient.

See also Rector y. Ashley (6 Wall., 142, 151).
It having been decided that prior to the withdrawal of the land
claimant had acquired no vested interest therein, no act of his could
relieve against the application of the terms of the statute, and no
exception been found therein sufficient to protect his claimed right,
the same must be denied and his entry, erroneously allowed by the
local officers after

The

withdrawal of the land, must be canceled.
from is accordingly hereby affirmed.

decision appealed

FOREST RESERVE-LIEF SELECTION-ACTS OF JUNE

MARCH

Mary

4, 189Y,

AND

3, 1905.

E. Coffin.

In case a selection under the exchange provisions of tbe act of June 4, 1897,
is canceled for conflict with a prior settlement claim, and another selection
for a like quantity of land is

tbe act of March

8,

made

in lieu thereof,

under tbe proviso

to

1905, tbe abstract of title of tbe relinquished land as-

signed as a basis for the selection must be extended to tbe date of the later
application.

Secretary Hitchcock
(F. L.

C)

to the

Commissioner of the General LatuJ
April 16, 1906.
(C.

Office,

J. G.)

Mary E. Coffin has appealed from the decision of your office of
August 1G, 1905, cancelling her selection No. 2164 made under the act
of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 36), for the E. ^ NE. J, Sec. 12, T. 65 X.,
R. 18 W., Duluth, Minnesota, in lieu of the SE. ] SW. i, Sec. 8, T.
28 N., R. 14 W. (excepting one acre in the northwest corner), and the
NW. } SE. £, Sec. 8, T. 29 N., R. 3 W., W. M., in the Olympic forest
reserve, Washington, relinquished to the United States.
There were two deeds of relinquishment covering the tracts designated as base lands, dated February 5, and March 6, 1900, recorded
March 9, and 10, 1900, respectively, and the lieu selection was made
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Your office
16, 1900, the same being for unsurveyed land.
approved the selection December 16, 1902, making the approval
thereof and the issuance of patent dependent upon the adjustment of
the selected land to the lines of public survey when the plat of survey
The official plat of survey was filed in
of said land should be filed.
the local office February 8, 1905, and on that day, as reported by the
local officers, " there was filed an affidavit by the selector conforming
said selection to the plat of survey."
On the same date one Polydore
Aubin filed homestead application for the land covered by the lieu
selection, alleging settlement thereon in 1898.
A hearing was had in
the matter with the result that on March 28, 1905, the local officers
rendered decision in favor of Aubin. Mary E. Coffin acquiesced in
this decision and on April 11, 1905, she, by F. A. Coffin, attorney in
fact, filed application to be permitted, by reason of the conflict with
the prior settler's claim, to change her lieu selection so as to substitute
and SE. \ NW. i,
for the land embraced therein, the SW. i NE.
Sec. 19, T. 64 N., E, 17 W., Fourth P. M., Duluth, Minnesota, at the
same time relinquishing and releasing all her right, title and interest
There was also filed a nonin and to the land originally selected.
mineral and non-occupancy affidavit as to the land sought to be
March

-j-

substituted.

In the decision herein appealed from your

in

office,

view of the

acquiescence of the selector in the decision of the local officers adverse
to her,

You

its letter of December 16, 1902, which approved
and canceled said selection, concluding as follows

revoked

tion No. 2164,

selec-

will notify the selector that she will he permitted to tile in a reasonable

new

application accompanied with deed, non-mineral and non-occupancy
and abstract of title brought down to date with usual certificates as
to title not being encumbered with judgment liens, taxes, etc.
At same time
furnishing an affidavit that she is not the owner of the one (1) acre of land

time a

—

affidavit,

situated in the northwest corner of SE. i
mentioned in deed as excepted.

The appeal

alleges error

requiring an entirely

new

SW. h

"in canceling said

(1)

application, deed,

applicant's affidavit of adjustment of Feb.

continuation of said application
of title to be brought

The

act of

June

4,

down

;

Sec. 8, Tp. 28 N., R. 14 W.,

"

and (2) "

etc.,

8,

selection

and

instead of regarding
1905, as a part

and

in requiring the abstract

to date/'

1897, supra,

was repealed by the

act of

March

3,

1905 (33 Stat, 1264), the proviso thereto being as follows:
That selections heretofore made in lieu of lands relinquished to the United
may be perfected and patent issue therefor the same as though this act
had not been passed, and if for any reason not the faull of the party making
the same any pending selection is hold invalid another selection for a like
States

quantity of land

may

be

made

in lion thereof.
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The

circular instructions of

May

1905 (33 L. D., 558), issued

16,

to local officers in relation to said proviso, prescribes,

among

other

things:
Should application be presented under this provision of the law you will be
same is in strict compliance with the instructions of* July 7,
1902 (31 L. D., .372), except that instead of the showing specified in section 22
of such instructions the selector will be required to file his affidavit setting out
careful to see that

the facts as to the prior selection in lieu of the relinquished tract, including
when and place where such selection was made; the description of the

the date

land selected

when

finally

;

the General

Land

Office

number

rejected and canceled, so that

that the original selection

it

was pending and not

of such selection,

may

and the date

clearly appear therefrom

finally

adjudicated on March

3,

.1905.

From all of which it may fairly be deduced that the language of
the act, " another selection,'' contemplates not a change or substitution of description in the

a

new

application.

It is

pending invalid selection application but
not entirely clear what object the selector

can have in view in insisting that her affidavit of adjustment of
February 8, 1905, be regarded as a part and continuation of the
original application. In no event could a substitution of other land
be held to relate back and be effective from the date of the presenta-

Another selection whether
by way of substitution or new application could be effective only
from the date it is made, accompanied by the required proofs, especially as to the character and condition at that time of the land
applied for. Even if it were held that the original selection might
be completed by the substitution of another tract of land in place
of that covered by the invalid selection, still the proofs would have
to be brought down to date in any event. In this connection, answering appellant's second assignment of error, the rule is well established that where an application to select lieu lands is rejected because
defective and a corrected application is subsequently filed, the
abstract of title of the relinquished land must be extended to the
date of such subsequent application. C, W. Clarke (32 L. D., 233)
Thomas F. Arundell (33 L. D., 76). The reasons for applying the
same rule are equally cogent in a case where another selection is
made under the proviso to the act of March- 3, 1905.
If it was intended by your office to require the selector to execute
tion of the original invalid application.

;

a

new

deed, or deeds, of relinquishment, that

was unnecessary

;?s

the

deeds already furnished and on file, if in proper form, are sufficient
upon which to base the new selection.
With the modification indicated the decision of your office herein
7

is

affirmed.
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reclamation act— construction of irrigation works by contract or bt "force account."
Opinion.
Under the authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior hy the act of
June 17, 1002, he may. in his discretion, enter into contracts for the construction of irrigation works or construct such works by labor employed
and operated under the superintendence and direction of government
officials.

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
April 16, 1906.
(E. F. B.)

A

from the Director of the Geological Survey of April 12,
me for opinion as to whether the Secretary
of the Interior has authority to construct irrigation works by " force
account," and if so, to what extent.
The second section of the act of June IT, 1902 (32 Stat., 388),
authorizes and directs the Secretary of the Interior to " construct,
as herein provided, irrigation works for the storage, diversion and
development of waters." He is authorized and directed to withdraw
lands for that purpose and to determine whether or not said project
is practicable, and by the fourth section of the act it is provided:
letter

1906, has been referred to

That upon the determination hy the Secretary of the Interior that any
gation project
tion

is

practicable, he

of the same,

in

may

cause to he

let

such portions or sections as

irri-

contracts for the construcit

may

he practicable to

construct and complete as parts of the whole project, providing the necessary

funds for such portions or sections are available in the reclamation fund.

In view of the specific direction that the Secretary "

may

cause to

be let contracts for the construction of the same," an opinion

may

is

works by labor
employed and operated under the superintendence and direction of
the government officials.
The solution of this question depends upon whether the power
conferred by the fourth section of the act is mandatory or directory
only, or whether it is such a specific direction as to the manner in
which the work is to be performed as to exclude all other.
The word " may " as it is ordinarily used signifies that it is authorization and not command, unless the power conferred is to be exercised
requested as to whether he

also construct such

for the public interest, or to enforce a private right; or unless

evident from the plain scope and purpose of the act that

and not to confer
Black on Statutory Construction, Sec. 69.

intention to impose an imperative duty

tionary power.
States

v.

Again,
the

Thoman, 156 U.

"when

manner

in

it

a

it

is

was the
discre-

United

S., 353, 359.

words of a statute are affirmative, and relate to
which power or jurisdiction vested in a public officer
the
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or body

is to

be exercised, and not to the limits of the power or juris-

may be, and often are, construed to be directory."
Black on Construction, Sec. 1:24.
The primary power conferred by the act upon the Secretary of the
Interior is to construct irrigation works for the storage and development of waters, when in his judgment the cost of the works, considered
with reference to the quantity and character of the lands that may be
diction itself, they

irrigated therefrom, will justify their construction.
struction

is

The

cost of con-

therefore a controlling factor in determining whether an

irrigation project

is

practicable.

The duty imposed upon

the Secre-

tary of the Interior to estimate the cost of construction of a contemplated project with a view to determine whether
itself

it is

practicable, of

implies a power to adopt the most feasible manner and means

of executing the work, and to accomplish the purpose intended by the
act, unless there is

some positive limitation as

to the exercise of such

can only be found in the fourth
section of the act, but as the language employed implies discretion
rather than command, and as nothing can be gathered from the spirit
and purpose of the act or from the context, to indicate that it was the
intention to impose an imperative duty, the word " may " as used in
that part of the section quoted from, must be taken to confer a discretionary power and not to limit or restrict the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to employ such means in the construction of
works as in his judgment would be most feasible.
I am of the opinion that the Secretary of the Interior may construct and fully complete irrigation works under the provisions of the
reclamation act by " force account."
power.

If there

is

such limitation

it

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

MINING CLAIM— APPLICATION— CORPORATION— NOTICE— ADVERSE
CLAIM.

Holman

v.

Central Montana Mines Company.

The mining laws do not require

that the notice of an application for patent to

a mining claim by a corporation shall designate the State or Territory under

An

the laws of which the corporation was organized.
adverse claim under section 232(> of the Revised Statutes is required to be
filed " during the period of publication " of notice of the application for
patent, and where the last day of such period falls on Sunday, an adverse
claim filed on the following Monday can not be recognized by the land
department as an adverse claim within the meaning of said section and can

not have the effect to stay the patent proceedings upon the application.
Case of Ground Hog Lode v. Parole and Morning Star Lodes, 8 L. D., 430, overruled.
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Montana Mines Company
made application for patent

1903, the Central

company)

the

Office,

(G. J. H.)
(hereinfor

the

Exchange and twenty-two other lode mining claims, surveys Nos.
7040 to 7062, inclusive, Lewiston, Montana, land district.
With the
application was filed a certified copy of the articles of incorporation
of said company, showing that it was organized under the laws of the
Territory of Arizona. Notice of the application was posted and pubPublication began on Wednesday. December 2, 11)03, and on
lished.
Monday, February 1, 1904, Alfred D. Holman filed an adverse claim
against the application, alleging that he is the owner of the Banner
lode claim, which conflicts with the Cliff, Hillside, Moshner and
Extra lode claims, embraced in the application. Within thirty days
from the filing of the adverse claim Holman instituted suit in the
district court, tenth judicial district, State of Montana, against the
Central Montana Mines Company of West Virginia. It appears that
there were two corporations bearing the name " Central Montana
Mines Company " doing business in the State of Montana and having
their articles of incorporation

the county in

on

which the claims

file

in the office of the recorder for

in question are situated, one organized

under the laws of the State of West Virginia, and the other, the
applicant for patent herein, organized, as hereinbefore stated, under

and that Holman, in ignorance
two corporations bearing the same name,

the laws of the Territory of Arizona,

of the fact that there were

from an examination of the county records in the recorder's
was a Central Montana Mines Company of West Virand believing the same to be the applicant for patent, insti-

finding
office

that there

ginia,

tuted suit against that corporation, as above stated.

learning that the proper party

such proceeding,

had not been named

Holman attempted

Subsequently

as defendant in

to cure the defect

by

filing

an

amended bill of complaint in which the Arizona corporation was
named as defendant. The court refused to allow such amendment,
on the ground that it would in effect be the substitution of a new
party defendant and the institution of a new suit, which, in view of
the fact that the thirty-day period fixed by statute within which
proceedings in court upon adverse claims may be commenced had
then expired, it was held could not be permitted. Holman thereupon
appealed to the supreme court of the State, which on November 23,
1904, dismissed the appeal.

April 30, 1904,
that the

company

for patent,

Holman

filed in the local office a petition

praying

be requirecl to republish notice of its application

contending

to

support the same, in substance and

that the notice as originally published

was

effect,

insufficient, in that it

<li'l
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not show under the laws of what State the company was incorporated, and that by reason thereof he was misled, resulting in the
institution of proceedings in court against the
11, 1904, the local officers

overruled the petition;

Holman appealed

to

the action below.

Holman has

The only question

your

office,

wrong

party.

May

from which action

which, December 31, 1904, sustained

further appealed to this Department.

directly presented

by the appeal

as to the

is

is, howcontended by appellant that the dismissal by the supreme
court of the State of the appeal from the action of the lower court
refusing to allow the amendment of the bill of complaint in the proceeding instituted by him in attempted compliance with the require-

sufficiency of the notice of the application for patent.

It

ever,

ments of the

statute, as hereinbefore set forth,

was not

a final deter-

mination of that proceeding and that the land department should
take no further action in this matter until such proceeding is finally
disposed

There

of.
is

in the record a certificate

by the clerk of the

district court,

tenth judicial district, State of Montana, in and for Fergus county,

being the county in which the mining claims in question are situated,
dated March 3, 1904 (which is subsequent to the expiration of thirty
days from the filing of the adverse claim by Holman), to the effect
that no suit of any character was ever instituted in said court against
the Central Montana Mines Company, a corporation organized under
the laws of the Territory of Arizona. A certificate by the clerk of
the circuit court of the United States for the ninth circuit, district
of Montana, dated

March

7,

1904, to the effect that there

is

no

suit

or action of any character pending in that court in which the com-

pany

is

a party, is also with the record.

It is clear

from the foregoing

recital that, so far as

appears from

by Holman
by the
statute.
The rulings of the courts in the action brought by him were
upon matters solely within their cognizance, with which the land
department has nothing to do. The dismissal of the appeal by the
supreme court of the State, as hereinbefore set forth, would seem to
be a final determination of such action; but whether it be or, not is
wholly immaterial. It is not shown, that a proceeding such as contemplated by section 2326 of the Revised Statutes, involving the conflicting claims of Holman and the company to the lands in question,
is now pending in any court, and the period of thirty days within
which such proceeding might have been commenced under the statute
having long since expired, it is obvious that Holman can not be
recognized as an adverse claimant within the meaning of the statute.
His status before the land department in this proceeding is merely
the record, no proper proceeding in court

upon

was

instituted

his adverse claim within the period of thirty days fixed
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that of a protestant charging insufficiency of notice of the

company's

DECISIONS RELATING TO

application for patent.

Section 2325 of the Revised Statutes provides,
that a corporation
claim.

may make

among

other things,

application for patent to a mining

Section 2321 provides that

....

Proof of citizenship under this chapter may consist
in the case of
a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or any State or
Territory thereof by the filing of a certified copy of their charter or certificate
of incorporation.

Paragraph 44 of the mining regulations approved June

24, 1899

(28 L. D., 594, 601), in force at the time the application for patent
in question Avas filed, requires, among other things, that the notice
posted upon the claim shall give the " name of the claimant, the name

number of the survey, the mining district and
names of adjoining and conflicting claims as shown
by the plat of survey." Paragraph 51 of said regulations requires,
among other things, that the published notice " must embrace all the
data given in the notice posted upon the claim."
There is nothing in the mining laws or the regulations of the land
of the claim, the

county, and the

department requiring the published notice of an application for patunder the
laws of which the corporation was organized. It was held by the
ent by a corporation to designate the State or Territory

Department
104, 108)
It

is

—

in the case of Hallett

and Hamburg Lodes (27 L.

believed to be the intent of the statute

....

D.,

that the notice of

and published, should contain such matter as
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence having an interest in

application for patent, both posted

inform a
mining location conflicting with the one applied for, that application is made
for patent to the ground in conflict, thereby giving him an opportunity -to file
and prosecute an adverse claim and thus assert and protect his rights as provided by section 2320, Revised Statutes.
will
a

The

notice in the present case was sufficient to convey information
Ilolman that the company's application embraced ground claimed
by him, and gave him an opportunity to assert and protect his rights
to the ground in conflict, and it is immaterial that it did not show
under the laws of what State or Territory the company was incorporated.
Had he made inquiry at the local office, where the certified
copy of the articles of incorporation was on file in compliance with
the requirement of the statute, he could readily have ascertained the
That he did not do so. and as a consecitizenship of the company.
quence instituted his proceeding in court against the wrong party,
is not sufficient reason to warrant an order by the land department
directing republication of the notice, in view of the fact that it is not
shown that the notice as published fails to conform to the provisions
to
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of the statute and the requirements of the regulations.
suffer the consequences of his

own

He must

neglect.

This disposes of the question raised by the appeal, but there is yet
another question presented by the record, not discussed or passed
upon in your office decision appealed from, namely: Was Holman's
adverse claim in time, in view of the fact that the sixtieth day following the date upon which publication of the notice commenced
fell on Sunday and his adverse claim was not filed until the following

Monday

\

Section 2325 of the Kevised Statutes provides,

among

other things,

that

The

register of the land office,

upon the

such application, plat, field
such application has
been made, for the period of sixty days, in a newspaper to be by him designated
as published nearest to such claim
If no adverse claim shall have
been filed with the register and the receiver of the proper land office at the
expiration of the sixty days of publication, it shall be assumed that the applicant is entitled to a patent, upon the payment to the proper officer of five dollars per acre, and that no adverse claim exists.
notes, notices,

The

and

filing of

affidavits, shall publish a notice that

statute declares that the notice shall be published for a period

Xo

made

Sundays or holidays. At
it fall on Sunday or any
other day of the week, the period of publication is at an end.
The
only adverse claim which authorizes a stay of proceedings, and upon
which suit may be brought under the provisions of section 2320 of
of sixty days.

exclusion

is

of

the expiration of the sixtieth day. whether

"

an adverse claim filed during the period
during the period of sixty days. An
adverse claim filed after the sixtieth day is not filed within the period
of publication, as required by the statute, and can have no effect to
stay the patent proceedings with a view to the institution of suit.
With the very first moment of the sixty-first day following the commencement of the publication of notice, the statutory assumption
The land department has no
arises that no adverse claim exists.
authority to extend the period of publication beyond the sixty days
fixed by statute, or to recognize an adverse claim filed after such
period has come to an end. In the case of Gross et <il. r. Hughes
the Kevised Statutes,
of

publication "

et al. (29 L. D.,

is

—that

4('»7.

is.

469), the Department held:

The provisions of sections 232o and 2326 of the Revised Statutes limiting the
time within which an adverse claim may be filed to the close of the period of
the former section, indeed, providing that if no
such claim shall have been filed in the local office at the expiration of that
The land department is without
period, it shall be assumed that none exists.
authority to extend that period to include a single additional day.

publication are mandatory,

The

case of

Ground Hog Lode v. Parole and Morning Star Lodes
harmony with that case or the views

(8 L. D., 430), not being in

herein expressed,

Your

office

is

hereby overruled.

decision

is

affirmed.
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act.

Green Piggott.
Where one

entitled to

make an

additional entry under the act of April 28, 1904,

amount of land than he is entitled to enter,
and at the time of making such entry announces his intention to amend his
additional entry to include other lands desired by him, sufficient to aggregate the quantity to which he is entitled under the act, as soon as he succeeds in clearing the records of other claims to such additional lands, and
takes prompt action to that end. he may he permitted to amend his entry
in accordance with such purpose when the additional lands desired by him
become subject to entry, provided the rule as to compactness be observed.
exercises his right for a less

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

Land

April 17, WOO.

(F. L. C.)

(E.

Office,
().

P.)

Green Piggott has appealed to the Department from your office
August 14, 1905, rejecting his application to amend a
former homestead entry made October 20, 1904, for the S. ^ SE. }
and NAY. \ SE. J, Sec. 34, and SW. J SAY. J, Sec. 85, T. 27 X., R.
11 W., O'Neill land district, Nebraska, so as to include therein the
E. J NE. J, E. J SE. J, Sec. 27, NE. J SE. J, SW. J NE. J, E. J NE. J,
Sec. 34, in the same township and range.
decision of

The record

SW.

discloses that Piggott's original entry for the

was made September

\,

and form
the basis for his claimed right to make entry of the land embraced in
his rejected application as additional thereto, under the second secSec. 34 T. 27 N.,

Pv.

11 W.,

23, 1903,

tion of the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547).

clearly entitled to

acres entered

for 320 acres

make

He was

therefore

his said entry of October 20, 1904, for the 100

by him, and might have, had he so desired, made entry
more at the same time. It appears also that at the time

lie made his second entry, he did not intend to exhaust the right
which he was entitled to exercise under the terms of the act of April
28, 1904, supra, but expected to exercise the same to its full extent by
entering the lands now covered by his amended application, which
lands were then covered by existing entries, the cancellation of which
he was endeavoring to secure by contests initiated on the same date
his second entry was allowed. While it has generally been held that a
homestead right is exhausted by one entry, though for a less quantity
of lands than is allowed by law, exception has been made where at the
time the original entry was made for less than the full amount
.

.

...

allowed, the claimant clearly disclosed his intention to

.•

amend

his

when he had cleared tin record
(Joseph Heisel, 26 L. D., 69; Daniel
Tn j.he recent departmental decision in the
L. Hartley, ib., 663, 665.)
case of Walter O. Graves v. Henry E. McDonald, decided March 28,
1906 (34 L. D., 527), involving the question of an amendment similar

application to include additional land,
of existing entries covering

it.

1
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to the one here presented, the rule announced by the earlier departmental decisions cited was adhered to and the amendment allowed.
Where there is no evidence in the record to show the fixed intention
to amend, existing at the ti?ne the original application is filed, the
right has been denied, notwithstanding the applicant subsequently
made affidavit that such was his original intention. (James W.
Luton, 31 L. I)., 468.) An intent formed subsequent to the filing of
the original application forms no ground for amendment thereof.
The doctrine of amendment is a purely equitable one and can not
be insisted upon as a matter of abstract right, and while the doctrine
is liberally applied, the prevailing equities to support it must be
clearly established.
Amendment has been allowed where, through
io-norance or misinformation, an entrvman. acting in good faith,
has been misled to his prejudice.
Josiah Cox. 27 L. I).. 389: Charles
In none of the cases where amendment
Carson. 32 L. D.. 176.)
has been allowed was there any valid intervening adverse claim and
no legal objection to the allowance of the application other than that
the entryman had previously exhausted his right of entry.
The doctrine being equitable, its application necessarily rests upon
the facts and circumstances surrounding each particular case, and the
Department is unwilling to attempt to establish a hard and fast rule
by which the allowance or rejection of applications to amend shall
(

be determined.

In the case at bar it appears from your office decision that there
an additional objection to the allowance of said application, to
the effect that the lands embraced therein are not " as nearly compact
i>

form
was for

in

Piggott in his affidavit
asks to
I

filed

amend expressly declared

reserve the right to

See. 34.

by the terms of the statute, and it
was rejected.
with his application which he now

as possible," as required

this reason the application

and

E. A

NE. &

amend

that

this entry to include

NE. SE..

E. * NE.,

E. I SE. of See. 27, all in Tp. 27. R. 11, this

SW.

NE.,

day contested

by me.

His application clearly disclosing his intention to later claim the
amended application, was received by the local
officers and the entry for 100 acres allowed.
It might have been competent for the local officers, treating the
application as a conditional one. to have rejected it because of the
condition and reservation therein, and their acceptance of the same
conferred no right upon the entryman and established no contract
between him and the government, executory or potential, as they are
Whilst
entirely without any contractual authority in the premises.
the right to make the second additional entry was not inherent in, or
tracts included in his
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otherwise possessed by, the entryman, so that his declaration to the
that " I reserve the right " etc., was without force for that pur-

effect

party can not reserve a right he does not possess, yet that
made under oath, is of great value as showing his present
intention and desire to enter the described tract, and when followed
so promptly by his contests shows such good faith in his purpose and
conviction of his right as to entitle him to most favorable consideration and to justify the Department, for the purposes of the case, to
pose, as a

declaration,

treat the

second application as complementary of the

first,

or the two

as one transaction.

With regard to your rejection of the proposed entry because of its
want of compactness, it is to be observed that whilst it reaches, it
does not exceed, the maximum length of two miles fixed by the statute.

No
its

sufficient reason,

however,

shown why

is

it

should be allowed in
is other vacant con-

present non-compact form, as you state there

tiguous land.

however, there are no such lands which

If,

may

be

entered by him, the present application should be allowed as presented.

The decision appealed from is,
and returned for appropriate

fied

for the reasons stated, hereby modiaction.

northern pacific grant— adjustment—act of july

1,

1898.

Northern Pacific Railway Company.
tract of land falling within the Northern Pacific land grant and not
excepted therefrom was sold hy the company prior to January 1. 1898, and
the purchaser thereafter, because of the erroneous decision of the land
department holding said land to have been excepted from the railroad grant,
sought to supplement his title by purchase of the lands from the United
States under the provisions of section 5 of the act of March 3, 1887, these
facts alone do not present such conflicting claims to the land on January 1,
1898, between the purchaser and the company, as are subject to adjustment
under the act of July 1, 1898.

Where a

Acting Secretary

Ryan

IF. L. C.)

Your

to the

Office,

office letter

Commissioner of the General Land

April

04, 1906.

(F.

W.

C.)

of the 13th instant submits for departmental con-

sideration the question as to whether the conflicting claims to the

X. i of

NW.

J,

Sec.

1,

T. 22 N., R. 4 E., Seattle land district,

Wash-

ington, are subject to adjustment under the provisions of the act of

July

1898 (80 Stat., 597, 020).
is within the primary limits of the Northern
Pacific land-grant along its Cascade branch line and opposite the
1,

The

tract in question
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March

portion thereof definitely located
tation

made with regard

26, 1884.

to this tract in

From

your said

the presenletter, it

office

seems that upon the contest of one John T. Hunter this tract was
erroneously held to have been excepted from the Northern Pacific
land-grant, it having been freed from all claims at the date of the
definite location of the company's road, as above stated.
Because
of such decision one Jeremiah Dwyer, who held this tract under warranty deed from the company, dated October 26, 1880, made application to purchase the land under the provisions of section 5 of the act
of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556). Upon said application a hearing
was ordered between Dwyer and Hunter which resulted in a decision
in favor of Dwyer, who was permitted to complete claim to the land
under his application to purchase on November 19, 1897, upon which
purchase the patent of the United States was issued.
In letter of July 10, 1905, resident counsel for the Northern Pacific
Railway Company requested the adjustment of the conflicting claims

under the provisions of the

to this land

act' of 1898,

and

it

is

upon

submitted to the Department for
consideration, attention being called to departmental decision of
November 17, 1904 (unreported), in the matter of the case of the

this application that the matter

is

Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Victor E. Cline, involving lands
Bozeman land district, Montana.
It may be stated first that in the case of Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
r. Biggs et al.
(31 L. D., 254), in considering the question as to
whether a purchaser of lands within the Northern Pacific land-grant,
under the provisions of section 5, act of March 3, 1887, has such a
conflicting or adverse claim as is subject to adjustment under the act
of July 1, 1898, supra, it was said, at page 256:
in the

The claims

of these purchasers under the act of 1887 do not

tions above described.

It is clear

meet the condithat the purchasers do not claim adversely

It is true that they have sought to perfect title to these
lands through the United States, hut it is only because of their claim under
the railroad grant that, upon failure of the railroad title, the act of 1887

to the railroad grant.

them upon certain conditions,

a right to purchase the lands of the
Further, these claims can not he held to have heen initiated
prior to January I, 1898, for it was not held until long after that date that
these lands did not pass under the railroad grant, and an application to make
purchase under section five of the act of 1887 can not he entertained until it

affords

United States.

has heen finally determined that the land sought to he purchased
excepted from the grant. Nicholas Cochems (11 L. D., G29).

In the Cline case
Your

it

was

is

in fact

said

decision rests upon the decision of the

Department in the case
Biggs et ah (31 L. D., 2r,4). the material
points of difference, however, between that case and the one now under conoffice

of Northern Pacific

Railway

Co.

r.

DECISIONS KELATING TO

THE PUBLIC LANDS.

577

sideration are these: In the case under consideration it is shown that at the
time of the erroneous decision of this Department canceling the railroad listing,
to wit, April 17, 1807, (Mine was in possession of the land under a contract of
purchase with the company on account of which several payments had heen
made. Following said decision, however, he seems to have repudiated his
contract with the company and looked to the United States for title, and that

United States the company has brought
ejectment which suit is still pending.
It thus appears that on January 1, 1898, Cline was in possession of this
land claiming adversely to the company and under a purchase made directly
from the United States. In the Biggs case the land involved was not held
to have been excepted *froni the railroad grant until September 16 and October
ISPS, subsequently to the passage of the act of July 1, 1898, and, as said
in the decision of the Department in that case, "these claims can not be held
to have heen initiated prior to January 1, 1898, for it was not held until long
after that date that these lands did not pass under the railroad grant, and an
application to make purchase under section 5 of the act of 1887 can not he
entertained until it has been finally determined that the land sought to be
purchased is in fact excepted from the grant."
Upon the record made in this case it is the opinion of this Department that
necessary to invoke the adjustment provided for in the act of 1898 for
it is
the protection of Cline, who, as before stated, had purchased this land directly
from the United States prior to January 1, 1898. Your office decision is therefore reversed and the papers in the case are herewith returned for the adjustment of the conflicting claims in accordance with this decision.
since the issuance of patent of the
suit in

">,

In the present case, upon the record

now

before the Department

appears that the Northern Pacific Railway
claim to this land on January 1, 1898, nor has
it

since

it

passed

its title to

Dwyer October

26, 1880.

Company had no
it

had any claim

As

it is

admitted

Department holding that the tract included in
Dwyer's purchase was excepted from the grant was erroneous, the
title to the land in reality passed to the company and by its deed
to Dwyer who still holds that title supplemented by the purchase
from the United States. Said purchase having been erroneously
allowed, it may be that upon proper application he could recover
his purchase money and would still be fully protected through his
purchase from the railway company. If it were shown that Dwyer
had recovered his purchase money, paid to the railway company for
its title, or the relation between himself and the company been otherwise changed prior to January 1, 1898, a different condition would
the decision of this

he

j)

resented.

On

this record

the

Department must hold that there does not

appear to be such adverse conflicting claims to this land on January 1, 1898, as are subject to adjustment under the act of July 1.
L898.
The company's request must therefore be denied and you will
advise

it

5191

accordingly.

—
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FOREST RESERVE— LIEU SELECTION— ACTS OF JUNE

MARCH

3,

1897,

4,

AND

1905.

Robert Leslie.

A

under the provisions of the act of June 4, 1897, for a less area than
embraced in the relinquished land offered as a base, not the result of
mischance or misprision on the part of the local officers, is a waiver of the
excess and there is nothing in the act of March 3, 1905, repealing the act
of June 4, 1897, authorizing the selector to make a further selection based
upon such excess area.

selection

;

Acting Secretary Ryan

Commissioner of the General Land
April 2JH 1906.
(J. R. W.)

to the

'

(F. L. C.)

Office,

Robert Leslie appealed from your decision of August 18, 1905,
his selection, not serially numbered, under the act of June
4, 1897 (30 Stat, 30), for lot 8, Sec. 0, T. 21 N., R. 29 W., 17.22 acres,
Missoula, Montana, to satisfy the excess of land relinquished to the
United States in a forest reserve, which had been assigned as base for
selection 11,710, your office series, under the act of 1897, made at Denver, Colorado, for a smaller area than that relinquished.
By deed recorded May 7, 1904, Leslie and wife relinquished to the
United States certain tracts having the aggregate area of 133.26
acres, in the Lincoln forest reserve, New Mexico, and, September 13,
1904, at Denver, Colorado, he selected in lieu thereof certain tracts
aggregating 120 acres. Your office May 15, 1905, called attention of
rejecting

office to the excess of base, and directed the local office to
notify the selector that he " will be required to file a waiver of his

the local
right to

August

make
1,

filed there

a

further selection in lieu of the said excess base."

1905, the Missoula local office transmitted an application,

by Leslie, to

select lot 8, Sec. 6, T. 21 N., R. 29

W., M. M.

17.22 acres, in lieu of the above-mentioned 13.26 acres excess, referring
to selection
title to

11,710 for the deed of relinquishment and abstract of

the base assigned, and tendering to

Your

excess of the tract so selected.

pay for the

3.96 acres

decision rejected the latter appli-

cation, because (1) instructions of March 6, 1900 (29 L. D., 578),
required selection of a tract of equal area, and relinquishment of the

excess

Was therefore implied;

(2) the act of

1264), repealed the act of June

March

3,

1905 (33 Stat.,

and no right of further selection exists; (3) that the selection attempted was presented at a different local office contrary to the rules and regulations of your office, and
The
to good administration and orderly conduct of public business.
appeal contends (1) that no waiver of excess was implied; (2) the
waiver of excess or selection to fill the base is at selector's option; (3)
there was a pending selection and the right is saved by the proviso of
4,

1897,
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1905, supra; (4) the original
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same
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and additional

selec-

local office.

These contentions are evidently founded upon a misconception of
June 4, 1897, upon the theory that it gave to one relinquishing land to the United States a right substantially like that given to
Valentine by the act of April 5, 1872, as compensation for a wrongful
disposal by the United States of lands belonging to him under a perfect grant of the former government, which, like that of similar
the act of

June

character, under, section 11, act of

located
ised

upon irregular subdivisions,

is

22, 1860 (12 Stat, 85), if
not satisfied, for the law prom-

an equal area as compensation for a wrong done, with no other
Frederick W. McRey-

limitation than location by entire subdivisions.

nolds (31 L.

I).,

259).

No wrong had

been done, and no taking of the land without the
By the act of June 4, 1897,
the United States merely offered to the owner an exchange, limited,
however, by the condition that area should control, and he could
select only an equal area, not more, upon a claim of greater value
owner's consent in this class of cases.

of that relinquished.

The

is

was his privilege, but the
The nature of the contract of exchange

full equal area

proposal was of «an exchange.
that equivalence of value

is

imported.

party to the other by any implication.

No

debt arises from one

The Department

in its first

and refused to approve relinquishments or accept titles tendered unaccompanied by selection of
lieu land in exchange.
F. A. Hyde (28 L. D., 284)
Opinion (28
William S. Tevis (29 L. D., 575).
L. D., 472)
There was, however, an earlier erroneous practice in the local
offices, and this the instructions of March 6, 1900, were intended
to correct.
Where partial selections had been erroneously received,
This was
the selector was permitted to perfect and fill his selection.
because the land department was participant in the irregular proceeding and had not warned the selector.
There is also another distinctive class arising out of accident and
mistake when a selector, through ignorance and mischance, intending
to make exchange by full equivalent areas, includes in his selection
construction of the act so defined

it

;

;

In such case the
than was his
right, and show that he did not intend to exchange otherwise than by
equal area.
In such case remedy for mistake is justly due him, and he
is permitted to fill what by mere mischance proved to be a partial
selection and to hold as much of what he first selected as was subject
to his appropriation.
Frederick W. Kehl, July 9. L903, unreported;
Aztec Land and Cattle Company
William A. Orser (33 L. 1)., 352)
lands not subject to his attempted appropriation.

facts in themselves negative intent to select a less area

;

(34 L. D., 122)

;

Cronan

v.

West (34

L. D., 301).
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In the present case neither misprision of the local office nor mischance contributed to make Leslie's selection deficient to the area
of the base assigned.

The

instructions of

promulgated and in force for
sively presumed to know the
He can not be heard to assert
base assigned by him in that

March

6,

1900,

had been

over four years, and he was concluestablished construction of the law.
that he did not intend to satisfy the

transaction, for that

is

the necessary

implication of the contract of exchange, which no intent or act then
declared or manifested, afterward defeated by mischance, in any

way

negatived.
This disposes of the first and second contentions,
and your decision was the only proper one to be made, unless, as
contended, the act of March 3, 1905, gave him a right to make a
further selection for the base already assigned in the former one.
That act, except in specified cases, repealed the act of 1897. Three
exceptions were made as to which classes of cases the repeal was not
to operate: (1) contracts for exchanges made prior thereto by the
Secretary of the Interior; (2) selections initiated prior thereto might
be perfected; (3) new selections might be made for bases theretofore
assigned in selections held invalid for any reason not the party's
It is not claimed that there was any prior contract with the
fault.
Secretary; the only selection initiated and pending was the one at

Denver.

The

statute

was plainly not intended

to give

selection, but to terminate all rights of selection,

new

rights of

saving those ex-

good faith to be exercised. The Denver
pending selection was imperfect in but one formal respect, that the
selector had not complied literally with the regulations of March 6,
1900, in that he did not expressly state in writing the intent to waive
the excess which was necessarily implied by his conduct in presenting
it.
He can not claim that he was misled by the action of the local
office in not requiring the filing of an express written waiver, for
the deficiency of area did not result from conflict with a prior right
unknown to him. It appeared from his own act on the face of his
application. If he did not intend to w aive the excess, he confesses to
an intent not to comply with the regulation and that his Denver
selection must be rejected as a partial and incomplete one, rejected for
his own fault, putting himself outside the proviso and not protected
by the statute.
This effectually disposes of the Ith assignment of error, for, as he
had no right, nor any equitable claim, to make an additional selection,
it is immaterial whether an additional selection may or may not be
made at another office thar that at which the original partial one was
made.
cepted, because attempted in

T

Your

decision

is

affirmed.

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

581

TIMBER AND STONE ACT— SPECULATIVE ENTRY.
Granville M. Boyer.
into by a timber and stone entryman, prior to
proof and the issuance of certificate, for the sale of the timber on the

An agreement or contract entered
final

land, is in violation of the provisions of the act of June 3, 1878, against
the speculative entry of timber lands for the benefit of another.

Acting Secretary Ryan
(

F. L. C.

to

Commissioner of the General Land
(RE. W.
April U, 1906.

the

Office,

October 11, 1902, Granville M. Boyer made timber and stone
sworn statement for the W. J NE. J, Sec. 29, SW. \ SE. \ and SE. J
SW. j. See. 20, T. 32 S., R. 65 W., Pueblo, Colorado, and on August
Upon adverse
20, 1903, he made cash entry, No. 8844, for said land.
report by a special agent of your office said entry was suspended February 29, 1904. A hearing was had on June 15, 1904, and thereupon
the local officers

recommended that the entry be

relieved

from

sus-

pension.

June 23, 1905, your office held the entry for cancellation, on the
ground that it was made under a collusive agreement for the sale
of the timber before final proof and in violation of law.
Boyer has appealed to the Department.
This case was consolidated, for trial purposes, with the similar
cases of Frank Stites, Amos F. Hollenbeck and Carl J. Kaapcke,
involving contiguous lands under a like state of facts, the testimony
submitted here to be considered in determining all four cases.
The essential facts shown by the evidence, as found by the local
officers and accepted by your office, are as follows:
The lands involved were originally well timbered, but at date of
entry fully one half of the timber had been removed by depredators;
they are non-mineral, non-agricultural, broken, rocky, arid, and properly subject to timber and stone entry; they are fit only for grazing
and for that purpose are not worth more than two cents an acre per
annum.
One day before filing his declaratory statement, the applicant,
Boyer, entered into a written agreement, and the applicants Stites.
Hollenbeck and Kaapcke at about the same time made verbal agreements, with one Richard Kaapcke, the president of an incorporated
lumber company, whereby the latter purchased " all the timber standing" on said lands at the rate of one dollar and fifty cents per thousand feet, the purchase money to lie used in paying the government
for the lands in each case; and the latter further agreed to loan to
the applicant for five years, at ten per cent interest,

all

money

re-

quired for the purchase of the land from the government over and
above the amount realized from said sale of the timber thereon.
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was further provided

It

in said

agreements that

between the parties hereto that this agreement
does not convey any interest in the title to said land, but is intended only to
dispose of timber growing thereon.
It

is

distinctly understood

Pursuant

made

be

1903,

to said agreement,

and without waiting for

final

for these lands, the said Richard Kaapcke, in

began cutting and removing timber therefrom, and

of the investigation by said special agent in

March

proof to

December

at the time

had cut
and removed nearly all the timber, the applicants ratifying such
action and receiving payment for the timber according to the stated
1903, he

agreements.

The Department

is of opinion that the said agreement in this case
such a violation of the act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat., 89), as to call
for the rejection of the proof offered by Boyer and the cancellation

is

of his cash entry.

Under

the said act the applicant must, in his sworn statement,

declare

same on speculation but in good faith to
use and benefit and that he has not directly or indirectly made any agreement or contract in any way or manner with any person
or persons whatever, by which the title which he might acquire from the
government of the United States should inure in whole or in part, to the benefit
that he does not apply to purchase the

appropriate

it

to his

own

:

of any person except himself.

The

said act further provides that in case of a false statement in

the application, the applicant
shall forfeit the

and

money which he may have paid

and

for said lands,

all

right

the same.

title to

While Boyer did not make any contract by which the

title to this

land should inure in whole or in part to any other person than him-

he did make this entry with money furnished him for that
purpose by another and under a collusive agreement whereby such
other obtained the substantial and practically the only benefit to be
derived from said entry, namely the timber standing on the land.
Not only was such an agreement made but it Avas consummated before
self,

was

the entry

fact

in

made and when

the applicant received his

its timber and Avas of no
asking for title thereto for " his own use and
Clearly this is but another of the many forms and devices
benefit."
under which it is sought to accomplish indirectly that which the
statute declares shall not be done, the speculative entry for such land

certificate the

laud had been denuded of

him Avho

benefit to

is

The final proof required by the act in question
that the applicant " does not apply to purchase the same

for another's benefit.

must

s1ioaa

t

on speculation but in good faith to appropriate
use and benefit, " yet the facts are that the "

it

main

u exclusive
use and benefit " of
t

to his oaa

the land has previously, under cover of this filing, been appropriated
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by another not only with this applicant's knowledge and consent, but
upon his written agreement made prior to the filing of his sworn
statement.
It

cannot be claimed that the value of the land for which the
is in any appreciable proportion to the value of the

applicant asks

timber which has been removed therefrom, and the conclusion
inevitable that this entry

The entry

was speculative and not

will be canceled,

right of

way for

in

good

is

faith.

your said decision being hereby affirmed.

railroads, canals, reservoirs, etc
Regulations.

In accordance with the agreement made by and between the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture, paragraph 2 of the circular of February 11, 1904 (32 L. D., 481), and
paragraphs 3 and 06 of the circular of September 28, 1905 (34 L. D.,
212), except the last clause in each relative to construction in advance
of approval or specific permission, which will remain as at present,
are hereby amended so as to read as follows
Whenever a right of way is located upon a forest or timber-land reserve, the
must enter into such stipulation and execute such bond as the Secre-

applicant

tary of Agriculture

may

require for the protection of such reserves.

This amendment applies to forest or timber-land reserves only, not
to national parks.

W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved, April 25, 1906
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

MINING CLAIM— PATENT PROCEEDINGS-PROOF OF POSTING OF NOTICE.

Mojave Mining and Milling

Co.

v.

Karma Mining

Co.

Section 2325 of the Revised Statutes requires that an applicant -for patent under

with his application an official plat of the claim
shall post a copy of such plat, together with a
notice of the application for patent, in a conspicuous place on the land embraced in the plat, previous to the filing of the application. " and shall file
an affidavit of at least two persons that such notice has been duly posted."
The words " such notice " have been uniformly construed by the land department to embrace both the plat and notice referred to. Held: That the
requirement as to the affidavit is mandatory, and where such affidavit is not
filed all proceedings upon the application for patent are without authority
the mining laws shall

file

or claims applied for,

and

of law.
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Secretary Hitchcock

to the

(F. L, C.)

December

6,

1902, the

for patent to the

Karma

Angeles, California.

Commissioner of the General Land Office.
(A. B. P.)
April JO. J 906.

Karma Mining Company

filed

application

lode mining claim, survey No. 3957, Los

Notice of the application appears to have been

published and posted for the required period and no adverse claim

was hied.
November 18, and December 2, 1903, the Mojave Mining and Milling Company, claiming to be the owner of two lode mining claims
in conflict with the Karma claim, filed its original and supplemental
protests against the application for patent, alleging amongst other
things, in substance, (1) that the applicant company failed and
neglected to post

a

copy of the claim applied

for, together

with

a

notice of the application for patent, in a conspicuous place on the

land embraced in the application, as required by law, and (2) that
said company failed and neglected to file, at the time of filing the
application for patent, or at any time, an affidavit of at least two persons that a copy of such plat had been posted on the claim previous
to the filing of the application for patent.

In the view the Department takes of the case

it is unnecessary to
charged in the protest.
Among the things required of an applicant for mineral patent by
section 2325 of the Eevised Statutes, are that he shall post a copy of
the plat of his claim, together with a notice of his application for
patent, in a conspicuous place on the claim previous to the filing of
the application, and shall show the fact of posting by an affidavit of
The posting is required to be done before the
at least two persons.
filing of the application for patent, and the affidavit showing the fact
of posting is required to be filed before any proceedings may be had

state the other matters

in the

land

office

upon the application.

When

all

precedent condi-,

tions have been met, the section provides that the register shall publish a notice of the application for patent, for the

days, in a newspaper to be by

him designated

the claim, and shall post such notice in his

period of sixty

as published nearest to

office

for the

same period;

no adverse claim shall have been filed with the register
and receiver at the expiration of the sixty days of publication, it
shall be assumed, where all further requirements have been complied
with, that the applicant is entitled to a patent, and that no adverse
claim exists, and thereafter no objection to the issuance of a patent
shall be heard from third parties except it be shown that the applicant has failed to comply with the terms of the statute.
The Mojave company did not file an adverse claim, but contends
through its protests that the applicant company failed, in certain
also, that if
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comply with the terms of the statute in
and therefore is not entitled to a patent, or

stated particulars, to

patent proceedings,
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its

to

assumption that no adverse claim exists. It is
the protests that the required statutory proof of posting
also, that the plat and notice were in fact posted as re-

the benefit of an

denied in

was

filed;

quired prior to the filing of the application for patent.

The terms of the

statute are that an applicant for mineral patent
with his application a plat of his claim, or claims in common, made by or under the direction of the surveyor-general, showing
accurately the boundaries of the claim or claims, etc., " and shall post
a copy of such plat, together with a notice of such application for a
patent, in a conspicuous place on the land embraced in such plat
previous to the filing of the application for a patent, and shall file an
affidavit of at least two persons that such notice has been duly
shall file

posted,"

etc.

The requirement
notice,

and the

and
show that such notice has been

as to posting specifically includes both plat

affidavit is required to

The words such notice, used in connection with the
were evidently intended to embrace the official plat as a
part of the notice. Obviously the proof of the posting on the claim
must have been intended to embrace all that was required to be
Such has been the construction by the land department ever
posted.
Parasince the general mining statute of May 10, 1872, was enacted.
graph 30 of the general regulations under the mining laws, issued
June 10, 1872 (Copp's U. S. Mining Decisions, p. 270-282), provided
duly posted.
affidavit,

as follows
After posting the said plat and notice upon the premises, the claimant will
with the proper register and receiver a copy of such plat, and the field notes
of survey of the claim, accompanied hy the affidavit of at least two credible
file

witnesses, that such plat

and notice are posted conspicuously on the claim,

giving the date and place of such posting; a copy of the notice so posted to

ho attached

to.

and form

a part of. said affidavit.

This regulation has continued unaltered to the present time. It
appears as paragraph 40 of the last general mining regulations,
issued July 26, 1901 (31 L. D., 474, 481).
it

Under the statute, thus uniformly construed from the beginning,
was incumbent upon the applicant here to file with the register

and receiver an
official

affidavit of at least

two persons that

a

copy of the

plat of the claim applied for, together with a notice of the

application for patent,

had been posted

in a

conspicuous place on the

land embraced in such plat previous to the filing of the application.

This was not done but there was filed an affidavit of two persons
was present on a given date (which was prior to

stating that each
the filing

()

f

the application' for patent)

intention of the

Karma Mining Company

"when
to

the notice of the

apply for a patent for
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the

Karma mine was

claim, to wit,
easily

upon

posted in a conspicuous place upon said mining
Karma shaft-house, where the same could be

seen and examined, a copy of the notice so conspicuously

being attached hereto, and marked
The affidavit contains no statement that the plat of
Exhibit 'A.'
the claim was posted, nor does it in any manner mention or refer
The ordinary and only reasonable interpretation of
to such plat.
the affidavit as a whole is that it was not intended to embrace posting
posted upon said

Karma mine

r

of the plat.

The attached Exhibit "A,"

referred to as a copy of the

by the

notice stated to have been posted, purports to be a notice

about to make application to the
United States for a patent for a certain mining claim known as the
Karma mine, and to give a description by courses and distances of
such claim. The description is preceded by the statement " Said
mining claim being designated in the field notes of survey and on the
official diagram herewith posted, as Mineral Survey No. 3957, and
more particularly described as follows:" This statement is not a
part of the affidavit, and cannot be so construed. It is merely an
unsworn statement in the posted notice, and is in no sense proof of

Karma Mining Company

that

it is

:

what is stated.
The statutory requirement that the fact of posting shall be shown
by an affidavit of at least two persons is mandatory, and one against
which the land department is without authority to grant relief.
Until such affidavit

is

filed the register is

without authority to pro-

ceed upon the application, and should not attempt to do so in any
case.

ings

As the required affidavit was not filed in this case the proceedupon the application for patent were without authority of law.

In this particular the terms of the statute were not complied with
and there is therefore no assumption that the applicant company
is entitled to a patent and that no adverse claim exists.
Such being
the state of the record, the patent proceedings must fall, and it is
not material to inquire whether the plat and notice were in fact
posted as required or not.

The entry

will be canceled, but without

prejudice to the renewal of patent proceedings should the applicant

company

so desire.

This disposition of the case renders it unnecessary to consider
any of the other questions suggested by the record.
The decision of your office is reversed.

DESERT LAND ENTRY— CITIZENSHIP.
PETTET

A

V.

McCORMICK.

one State or Territory who goes to another State or Territory
with the avowed intention to make his permanent home therein, and in
his sworn application to make desert land entry declares himself to be a

citizen of
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resident of such State or Territory, is held to he a " resident citizen
thereof within the meaning of the desert land law and in that respect
qualified to make such entry therein, where in pursuance of his expressed

intention he

may

makes

his

not, at the date of

home in such State or Territory, even though he
making the entry, have acquired a political resi-

dence in the State or Territory such as would entitle him to the voting
privilege.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)

April SO, 1906.

Land

Office,

(P. E.

W.)

Benjamin T. McCormick made desert land entry,
J, Sec. 15, T. 18 8., R. 25 E., Roswell, New Mexico
Territory, and on July 27, 1904, Nancy E. Pettet initiated contest
againsl said entry, alleging that at date thereof the entryman was
not a resident citizen of said territory and had not since become such.
April

12, 1904,

No. 1462, for the S.

Upon

a hearing the local

officers

rendered dissenting opinions,

recommending the cancellation of the entry, the receiver
recommending that the entry be held intact. May 20, 1905, your
office affirmed the decision of the register and held the entry for canthe register

cellation.

McCormick has appealed

to the Department.
no dispute as to the facts in the case. It appears that
claimant went to New Mexico in April, 1904, in company with a
brother who had previously located there, leaving his wife in Kentucky, with the understanding between them that if he found the
country suitable for their future and permanent home, he would
make entry for a tract of land and then return .to Kentucky to close
his affairs and remove his family.
Having decided .to cast his lot in and with said Territory, he purchased the relinquishment of the former entryman and made entry
for this land, observing, and being assured, that it was the common
and prevailing practice to make entry for lands and then return to
close up business elsewhere and within six months remove the family
to the land.
Having invested his all and announced his intention of
returning with his family as soon as he could make the necessary
arrangements, he returned to Kentucky where his wife was stopping
with her parents while awaiting his return. While trading off his
effects they farmed a few acres of corn and garden truck, but did
not as theretofore put in a crop of tobacco, for the reason that it
would prevent their early removal to the land in question. While
so engaged at his former home, an election was held at which claimant did not vote because of his announced change of residence in
April to New Mexico.
The claimant testified that he spent the interval in disposing of
his stuff, live stock and real estate, and returned with his family to

There

is
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New Mexico and

to this land about the first of September, that being

the earliest possible date he could return without unnecessary sacriof his property.

fice

On

cross-examination the claimant testified that prior to making

the entry he

made up

his

and wrote

said Territory

mind

" thoroughly " to

his wife that they

become a citizen of
would move out there as

made

the affidavit of residence

soon as they could get there, and then
for filing in good faith.

The wife of claimant testified
My husband and myself talked it over

before he came out here in April and if
he liked it out here when he came in April he would take up land and we would
come out here and make it our home. When he came back, he came to sell and
dispose of his property and to go back as quick as he could, so we came.

The two brothers of claimant who had previously located in New
testified that while claimant was there in April and prior
to this entry, they between them agreed upon and arranged for
the disposing of property in Kentucky which they owned jointly
and that claimant then stated to them that " he was going back there

Mexico

and

sell

out everything and bring his wife and child here to live."

him that " he was
going back to straighten his affairs and bring his family here."
There is nothing in the record to contradict or impeach the testimony and the good faith of the claimant. The receiver found
B. N. Bell testified that claimant in April told

came

that the defendant

to

New Mexico

in April 1904,

with the intention of tak-

ing up his residence in this territory in case he should find that the country

made up his mind and declared
Kentucky, settle up his business, bring his
family here, and make their future home. With this object in view and for this
purpose, he made entry
returned to Kentucky, closed up his business as
far as possible
and came back to New Mexico with his wife and child
in September, 1904.
As there is no evidence going to show bad faith on the part of the defendant,
or that he made entry of this land for speculative purposes, I am of the opinion
that his entry should not be canceled.
suited him

.

.

.

.

.

being well pleased, he

.

his intention to return to

.

.

.

.

The
It

.

.

.

.

.

register held

appears that the defendant was a resident of Kentucky at the time he made

said D. L. E. No. 1462, and that he continued to reside in Kentucky until after

he was served with notice of contest.
I

am

therefore of the opinion that said D. L. E. No. 1462, should be canceled.

change of residence was contemplated and agreed
his wife before he left Kentucky in April, 1904,
subject only to his favorable impression of the country where his
brother had already located. That conclusion had been reached and
that purpose declared prior to and at the time when the entry in
question was made. It will not be questioned that, had he remained
in said Territory from that time forward and sent for his family to
It is clear that a

upon by claimant and
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would be unassailable.
must be for the reason that
he again departed from said Territory. But he took his departure
with the declared purpose of disposing of his effects and returning to
this land with his family, and this purpose was carried into effect
within the six months allowed after entry, under the general
join

bis resident citizenship

If the entry

is

his entry

to be canceled, therefore,

it

homestead law, for establishing residence on the land. Manifestly
the Territory in which he was, which he had chosen for his permanent
home, and which he left with the avowed purpose of returning thereto
and remaining permanently therein, is to be regarded as the place of
his residence and citizenship rather than the State which he left with
the avowed purpose of seeking and making his home elsewhere, to
which he returned for the sole purpose of disposing of his effects and
removing his family therefrom, and where he ceased to exercise the
voting privilege of a citizen by reason of his said announced purpose
and procedure of removal.
It it true that at date of this entry he had not become a voting
The proper distinction is to be drawn
resident of that Territory.
between the political residence to be acquired before voting, and the
actual being and living in a State or Territory with the intention of
making a permanent home therein. In this latter sense the Department is of opinion that the claimant w as in position properly to make
the affidavit required and that the entry must be held intact.
Your
T

said decision

is

therefore reversed.

desert lands— state selection—act oe august

18, 1894.

State of Oregon.
Directions given that a bearing be bad for the purpose of determining the character of certain lands in the Burns land district, Oregon, alleged to be
desert lands

and selected by the State under the act of August

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(

F. L. C.

By

May

2, 1906.

18, 1894.

Land
(

Office,

G. B. G.

departmental decision of August

Pacific Live Stock

Company

5, 1904, the protest of the
against the application of the State of

Oregon under the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 372, 422), for the
segregation of 58,344.57 acres of public land in the Burns land disOregon, was dismissed, but because of a suggestion in said prosome of the lands embraced in said list are non-desert in
character, your office was directed to carefully consider that phase of
the case from all available -sources of information and "if in your
judgment the great body of these lands are desert lands within the
meaning of the act of August 18, 1894, supra, to resubmit, with your
trict,
test

that

590
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recommendation upon
contract for

Your

my

this question, the State's

map and

tentative

approval."

communication of September 30, 1905, in response to
from sundry ex parte affidavits executed by
numerous persons, which have been filed with the record since it was
considered by this Department, that of the lands involved 19,000
acres, or nearly one-third of the whole area, are permanently nondesert, suggests that the fact as to this can only be determined by a
hearing ordered for that purpose, and asks to be advised " whether
the remaining 39,000 acres, which are probably desert lands, constitute the great body of the land as contemplated in the instructions."
This Department has no hesitancy in saying that if there is any
considerable body of the lands involved non-desert, the list in quesoffice

said direction, finds

But this question can not be tried
on ex parte affidavits, and as the State does not admit the truth of
the matters therein stated, I have to direct that your office order a
hearing herein, at the district land office, Burns, Oregon, after thirty
days' notice, by publication in a newspaper published nearest the
land involved, the date of the hearing to be fixed beyond such reasonable time as will permit a thorough examination of said lands by a
special agent to be detailed by your office for that purpose, who
should be directed to appear at said hearing and testify as to the
tion as such can not be approved.

results of his investigation.

In view of reports of engineers of the United States reclamation

and the recommenDepartment upon the subject of avail-

service to the Director of the Geological Survey,

dations of that

officer to this

which strongly question the feasibility of the
scheme for the reclamation of these lands, the State should
be advised that it will be allowed to introduce at the hearing testimony upon this subject and also upon any other matter bearing upon
the feasibility of its proposed scheme.
able water supplies
State's

Nancy

C. Yaple.

Motion for review of departmental decision of December
34 L. D., 311, denied by Secretary Hitchcock,

May

2,

19, 1905,

1906.

mining claim— application pop patent.

Extra Lode Claim.
Proceedings to secure a mineral patent by one without interest in, or control
over, the lands applied for, are without authority of law and no rights can
be acquired thereunder.
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

May

(F. L. C.)

By

decision of

December

directed that a hearing be

against the application, filed
to the

4,

1906.

29, 1903

Land

Office.

(G. N. B.)

(unreported), the Department

had upon the

May
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protest of

15, 1902, by

Extra lode mining claim, survey No.

M.

Fred R. Lewis

L. Jones, for patent

15,721, Leadville, Colo-

rado, land district, to determine whether the tie line

from a corner

of the claim to a corner of the public land surveys described in the

with the other data, correctly defines the position of
and staked upon the ground. The facts are
stated in the above mentioned decision and need not be restated here.
The hearing was duly had, June 24, 1904, at which the parties
appeared and submitted evidence. August 9, 1904, the local officers
found, in substance and effect, that corner No. 1 of the Extra lode
claim was tied to the north quarter corner of section 4, T. 10 S.,
R. 79 W., 6th P. M., which has been recognized for many years as
the true position of the north quarter corner, and to which a number
of claims are tied, and that the tie line and other data correctly define
the claim as located and staked upon the ground. They recommended
Upon appeal, your office, by decision
that the protest be dismissed.
of February 25, 1905, reversed the finding of the local officers, and
held that the tie line from the claim to a corner of the public surveys
as described in the notice is materially erroneous as to both course
and distance, and stated, in effect, that if further proceedings for
patent to the Extra lode claim as located were had, an amended survey correctly to show the course and distance of a line to connect a
corner of the claim with a regularly established corner of the public
surveys would be required, and that patent could not issue for the
notice, together

the claim as located

claim except upon republication and reposting of notice to describe

shown in the amended survey. The appliwas held for rejection on the further ground that
the applicant was not the owner of the claim at the date the application was filed. Your office also held that Charles J. Moore, transferee
of the applicant for patent, and who had applied to make entry of
the claim, would not be permitted to do so because he is now. and
the claim

and

tie line as

cation for patent

was

at the date

he sought to make entry, a deputy mineral surveyor.

Moore has appealed to the Department.
The question first to be considered is: Was Jones the owner of the
mining claim

at the date he filed application for patent?

If not.

must be vacated from the beginning. Prosecure mineral patent by one who is without

the patent proceedings

ceedings instituted to

interest in or control over the, lands applied for are without statutory
authority (South Carolina Lode and Other Claims, 29 L. D., 602,

604),

and therefore

ineffective for

any purpose.
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Paragraph 42 of the Mining Regulations (31 L.
amongst other things, that

I)..

474. 481), pro-

vides,

Where
of

title,

the applicant claims as sole locator and does not furnish an abstract
his affidavit should be furnished to the effect that he has disposed of

no interest

in the

land located.

Jones's application for patent was filed

May

15, 1002.

he claims as sole locator, but did not furnish an abstract of
his affidavit as required by the above regulation.

August

22, 1902, Charles J.

make entry

Under
title

Moore, transferee of Jones, applied

of the claim, and at the same time filed an abstract of

it

nor
to

title

brought down to July 11, 1902. The abstract is certiby the county clerk and recorder of the county in which the mining claim is situated to be true and correct, and to set forth all transfers of the Extra mining location to or from the parties named in it
The abstract recites that
as appears from the records of his office.
the certificate of the location of the claim made by Jones is dated
January 24, 1902, and was filed for record January 25, 1902, and
that Jones conveyed the claim to Moore by deed, upon consideration
of one dollar, dated May 12, 1902, acknowledged May 13, 1902, and
filed for record July 9, 1902.
No other transfer of the claim is
shown by the abstract.
It is contended by the appellant that under the statutes of Colorado deeds take effect as of the date they are recorded, and therefore
the abstract shows that the title to the mining location was in Jones
Section 446 of Mills Annotated Statutes of Colountil July 9, 1902.
rado is cited to support the contention. The section referred to proto the claim
fied

vides that
All deeds, conveyances, agreements in writing of, or affecting title to real

may be recorded in the office of the recorder of
the county wherein such real estate is situate, and from and after the riling
estate or any interest therein,

thereof for record in such office and not before, such deeds, bonds, and agree-

ments in writing shall take effect as to subsequent bona fide purchasers and
cumbrances by mortgage, judgment or otherwise, not having notice thereof.

in-

nothing in the statutes of Colorado which makes ineffectmining claim or other interest in real estate by
deed as between the parties upon delivery without reference to its
Deeds take effect from delivery, and the general prerecordation.
sumption is that a deed was delivered at the time it bears date. It
is, however, held by some authorities that the law does not presume
Devlin on Deeds, Vol. 1, Par.
delivery prior to acknowledgement.

There

is

ive the transfer of a

265,

and authorities there

the presumption

is

cited.

that the deed

Applying

w as
y

either rule in this case,

delivered prior to the filing by

Jones of his application for patent, There is nothing in the record
show that the deed was not delivered on its date or on the date it
was acknowledged. On the face of the record it appears that when

to
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application for patent he had no interest in or control

filed his

over the mining claim, and the application must therefore be rejected.
The rejection of the application operates to vacate all proceedings
it, thus leaving no further question raised by the appeal or
suggested in the record that requires to be considered to effectually
dispose of the case.

under

The

decision of your office so far as

patent for rejection

The hearing had

is

it

held the application for

affirmed.

discloses that the only controversy is as to the true

which
was tied. With the
evidence is a plat showing the Extra claim and a number of patented
mining claims adjoining and in its vicinity. This plat is certified
by the surveyor-general of Colorado. The certificate states that the
position of the north quarter-corner of the said section 4 to

corner No.

1

of the Extra lode mining claim

position of the north quarter-corner of section 4, T. 10 S., R. 79 W.,

shown by the plat, and to which the Extra claim was tied, is the
and true position of the north quarter-corner as shown by
If the records of your office do not agree
the records of his office.
with those of the surveyor-general, as certified to by that officer, with
respect to the location and position of the north quarter-corner in
as

original

question, the surveyor-general should be directed to definitely fix

by proper survey on the ground, and
and of your office should be made to corres-

the true position of the corner
the records of his office

pond therewith.

right of way-railroad-act of march

San Antonio and Eastern Ry.
No

Co.

v.

3, 18y5.

New Mexico Midland

Ry. Co.

rights can be initiated for the use or benefit of

any railroad company under
the provisions of section 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, prior to the organization of such company under the laws of a State or Territory.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F.'L. C.)

This

is

fee,

the appeal of the

pany from your

office

May

4,

1906.

Land Of(G. B. G.)

San Antonio and Eastern Railway Com-

decision of October 13, 1904, dismissing

protest against the approval of the application of the

its

New Mexico

Midland Railway Company under the

act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat.,
over the public lands of the United States from
San Antonio to Carthage, a distance of 8.76 miles.

482), for right of

way

The San Antonio and Eastern Railway Company has also pending
an application for right of way over substantially the same ground,
and

its

pute.

protest

The

is

based upon

-a

claimed prior right to the line in dis-

decision of your office

5194— Vol. 34—05 m

38

is

put upon the ground that the
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application of the

New Mexico Midland Railway Company

in point of time to that of the

Company, and

is

prior

San Antonio and Eastern Railway

holds, without regard to other considerations, that

such priority of application creates priority of right. It is, however,
suggested by your office that, aside from the conflict of claims, the
San Antonio and Eastern Company's application could not, under the
decisions of this Department, be approved, because of the fact that
the engineer of that company, in his affidavit on the
cate, states that its

June

11, 1904;

map and

dupli-

survey was commenced on June 9th and ended

whereas the president of the company

certifies that

such survey was adopted by the board of directors of said company

June

10, 1904.

This case was heard orally by the Assistant Attorney-General for
this Department, and it developed thereat that it was the intention of

from this Department alone upon the
San Antonio and Eastern Company against the application of the New Mexico Midland Company, without present consideration of protesting company's application on its merits. It was
therefore suggested that it was the purpose of this Department to
the parties to secure a decision
protest of the

consider the whole case at once, and in this view of the case, both

companies desiring to file some additional showing upon the regularity and sufficiency of the protesting company's application, aside
from the main question of priority, the proceedings were informally
suspended and the parties given time to make such showing. Since
that time the San Antonio and Eastern Company has filed a satisfactory showing that its survey had in fact been completed in the field,
and that the result of this survey, with partially completed map
thereof, was submitted to the board of directors of that company, and
was before such board at the time of its adoption, June 10, 1904.
This, it is thought, disposes of the objection suggested by your office
against the application of the San Antonio and Eastern Company,
and inasmuch as there has not been filed since the hearing anything
in support of the New Mexico Midland Company's tentative objections to the sufficiency of the San Antonio Company's application,
although nearly six months have elapsed since said hearing, there
would seem to be no objection to now considering these respective
applications upon their merits, and the case apparently resolves itself
into a question of priority of right.

The record

no special equities in favor of either of these
appearing to have been a race between them to secure
a legal right in advance of construction to appropriate this way to
the exclusion of the other, and it is quite probable that the haste
shown by each was more because of a desire to exclude the other than
from any immediate necessity for the utilization of the right. It
applicants,

it

discloses
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therefore remains to determine which occupies the better legal position.

The San Antonio Company was duly organized

as a corporation

under the laws of New Mexico upon the filing of its articles of incorporation with the Secretary of the Territory, June 8, 1904. The survey of its line on the ground was, as has been seen, made on the 9th
and 10th of the same month, and on the 14th its application was
filed in the local land office.
The New Mexico Midland Company was duly organized as a corporation under said laws upon the filing of its articles of incorporaIt is shown
tion with the Secretary of the Territory, June 11, 1904.
that some party, or parties, made a survey of the line in question from
June 9th to 11th, of the same month, which was before this company
had a corporate existence. This line was afterward adopted by the

New Mexico Midland Company and
way

was

in question

was the day before the

Under

its

application for the right of
office June 13, 1904, which
San Antonio Company.

the local land

filed in

filing

made by

the

the circumstances of this case, priority of application does

not carry with

it

priority of right.

Department

This question was definitely

Phoenix and
Arizona Eastern Railroad Company
(33 L. D., 617), upon authority of a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of the Washington and Idaho Railroad Company v. Coeur d'Alene Railway Company (160 U. S., 77),
that no rights can be initiated for the use or benefit of any railroad
company under section 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, supra, prior to
the organization of such company under the laws of a State or TerIt appearing, therefore, that the survey upon which the
ritory.
New Mexico Midland Company relies was made before the incorporation of that company, it secured no right by the adoption of that
survey as against the San Antonio and Eastern Company, which
was in law the first upon the ground, and executed and adopted a
survey of the route in question, followed immediately by the filing
of its application in the local land office, with due proofs of that comsettled

by

this

Eastern Railroad

Company

As

in the similar case of the
v.

company the survey, made the
basis of the New Mexico Midland Company's application, is as though
Washington and Idaho Railroad Company
it had never been made.
v. Coeur d'Alene Railway Company, supra.
pany's organization.

It results that

reversed.

The

your

against this

office

decision

application of the

must

be,

and the same

is

hereby,

New Mexico Midland Company

i>

approval of the San Antonio and Eastern
Company's map, which your office is directed to forward for such
approval, unless objections 'appear other than such as are herein
rejected, subject to the final

considered.
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Since the preparation of this paper a brief has been
of the

New Mexico Midland Company, which

filed on behalf
has received due con-

sideration.

mining claim— townsite— character of land.

Brophy et

al. v.

O'Hare.

To sustain an

application for mineral patent, as against persons alleging theland to be non-mineral, it must appear that mineral exists in the land in
quantity and of value sufficient to subject it to disposal under the mining
laws.

In determining whether an alleged mineral location is a " valid mining claim
or possession " within the meaning of the general townsite laws and section
16 of the act of March 3, 1891, relating to townsite entries by incorporated
towns and cities on the mineral lands of the United States, the question of
the character of the land is a primary one and if the mineral claimant has
had ample time and opportunity to show by exploration and development
whether valuable mineral deposits exist on the land, and has not done so,
and has not in any manner established that the location embraces mineral
land under the well-settled rules of determination in cases where the
character of the land is directly in issue, his location can not be held to be
a valid mining claim or possession within the meaning of the law.
;

Secretary Hitchcock

to the

Commissioner of the General Land

May

(F. L. C.)

Office,

(G. N. B.)

4, 190.6.

April 13, 1904, Martin O'Hare filed application for patent to the
Mountain View lode mining claim, survey No. 1852, Phoenix (formerly Tucson), Arizona, land district.
June 26, 1904, W. H. Brophy
and eight other persons filed a joint corroborated protest, in which,
amongst other things, it is alleged, in substance and effect, that the
land embraced in the mining claim is within the townsite of Bisbee,
Arizona that the protestants are residents of Bisbee that the mineral applicant has failed to discover any vein, lode or deposit of
;

;

quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin,
copper, or other valuable deposits as required by the mining laws;
that he has failed to expend $500 in labor and improvements on the

and that the application for patent is not made in good faith
mining claim, but to secure title thereto
because of its value for building purposes, and also to secure title to
valuable improvements on the land by the protestants.
A hearing on the protest was ordered by the local officers, and had
October 26, 1904, at which the parties appeared and submitted evidence.
On that day John S. Taylor, mayor of the incorporated town
claim

;

to acquire the land as a

of Bisbee, presented his corroborated protest against the mineral
application,
as

m*de

which protest contains substantially the same allegations
Brophy et al. This protest was received by the

in that of
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record, no action
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was taken

thereon by them.
It is

shown by the record, that March

town of Bisbee

filed

8, 1904, the mayor of the
townsite declaratory statement, embracing, with

other lands, the land here involved; that entry thereof

allowed, October
test

IT,

was duly

1904; that April 10, 1905, O'Hare filed his pro-

against the issuance of patent upon the townsite entry, in so far

with the land embraced in his mineral application, on
had been
segregated from the public domain by such application; that April
27, 1905, your office dismissed the protest on the stated ground that
as

it

conflicts

the alleged ground that prior to the townsite entry the land

would not injuriously affect any rights
O'Hare might have acquired under his application for patent, or
otherwise under the mining laws; and that upon appeal the Department by decision of July 25, 1905 (unreported), affirmed the decision
the issuance of townsite patent
that

of your

April

office.
2f),

1905, the local officers, after an exhaustive review of the

evidence submitted at the hearing on the protest of

Brophy

et al.,

found that the mineral applicant had failed to discover mineral on his
claim of quantity and value sufficient to entitle him to patent under
the mining laws, and that he had failed to make improvements or to
perform labor to the value of $500 on the claim. They recommended
that the application for patent be rejected.
Upon appeal, your
office, by decision of November 20, 1905, considering the protest by
the mayor of the town of Bisbee as properly to be disposed of under
the hearing had, held, amongst other things, in substance, that the
protestants have failed to show affirmatively that the land embraced
in the mineral application is not mineral in character, and have
failed also to show that the improvements placed on the claim fall
short of the statutory requirement of $500 in value.
The finding of
the local officers was reversed and the protests were held for dismissal.
Brophy et al. and the mayor of the town of Bisbee have filed
separate appeals to the Department.
The mineral applicant has made a motion to dismiss the appeal by
Brophy et al. on the ground that the protestants are without interest
in the premises, and therefore have no right of appeal.
The evidence
shows that eight of the nine protestants claim lots covering portions
of the land embraced in the mineral application within the townsite
of Bisbee, and each of them owns one or more dwelling houses on the
land, and at least three of. them have been residing on the land continuously since sometime prior to the riling of the application for
mineral patent.
It thus appears that the protestants are asserting an
interest in the land involved, and have therefore the right of appeal.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
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The mineral applicant contends that his mining location was valid
when made, that the required annual expenditures have been made
thereon since, and that for these reasons he
his claim as against the protest ants.

The

is

entitled to a patent for

question presented

is

not

one simply of the validity of the location when made, or of possession thereof by means of annual expenditures. The applicant is asking for patent to the land, and the protest alleges a failure by him to
make any discovery of mineral thereon as required by the mining
laws.

This raises the question of the character of the land.

To

sus-

tain the application for mineral patent, as against persons alleging

the land to be non-mineral, it must appear that mineral exists in the
land in quantity and of value sufficient to subject it to disposal under
the mining laws. In other words, the land applied for must be shown
to contain valuable deposits of mineral, which means more than a
mere discovery that might be sufficient to support a location in the
first instance.

It is

provided by the general townsite act (Sec. 2392, E. S.), and

March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), relating to
townsite entries by incorporated towns and cities on the mineral

by

section 10 of the act of

lands of the United States, amongst other exceptions from such

no title shall be acquired thereunder to any valid mining
claim or possession held under existing law. In construing these provisions of the statute the Department has held that a townsite patent
entries, that

issued under the general townsite laws, or under the provisions of
said section 16 of the act of

March

16, 1891, is inoperative to

convey

any valid mining claim or possession held under the mining
laws at the date of the townsite entry. Lalande et al v. Townsite of
Hidings v. Ward Townsite (29 L. D., 21).
Saltese (32 L. D., 211)
The provisions of the statute are cited and relied on in the brief of
title to

;

The contention is that the applicant has a valid mining claim and possession within the meaning of

counsel for the mineral applicant.
the law, and that the same

is

therefore excepted from the townsite

entry.

In determining whether the claim here involved is a valid mining
claim or possession, the question of the character of the land raised

by the proceedings is a primary one. If the applicant has had ample
time and opportunity to show by exploration and development
whether valuable mineral deposits exist on the land, and has not done
so, and has not in any manner established that the location embraces
mineral land under the well-settled rules of determination in cases
where the character of the land is directly in issue, his location can
not be held to be a valid mining claim or possession within the meaning of the law. Purtle v. Steffee (31 L. D., 400, 402).
It is in view of these principles that the evidence adduced at the
hearing must be considered.

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

599

mining claim was located January 1,
no systematic work
for the purpose of developing the land as a mining claim has been
done thereon. No mineral of value has ever been secured from the
claim, or from lands adjoining or in the immediate vicinity.
At no
time since the location of the claim has there been more than very

The evidence shows

that the

1895, nearly ten years prior to the hearing, but

slight indications of

mineral veins or deposits therein.

The evidence

behalf of the mineral claimant, not considering that of the protestants, fails to show that the land contains mineral in such quantity
in

and of such value as to justify expenditures for its extraction, nor
does it warrant the belief that further expenditures would disclose

Under such circum-

the presence of valuable deposits of mineral.

must be held to be non-mineral
disposal under the mining laws.

stances the land
subject to

in character,

and not

This being determined, the question of the value of the improvements, and other questions suggested by the mineral claimant's coun-

a written argument, and by the record, need not be considered.
This disposition of the case also renders it unnecessary to give
separate consideration to the appeal by the mayor of the town of

sel in

Bisbee.

The

decision of your office

is

reversed.

school lands-new mexico— forest reserve.
Territory of

New

Mexico.

title to school sections has vested in the Territory of New Mexico
under the grant made by the act of June 21, 1808, and such sections are
subsequently embraced within a reservation created by executive order,
the Territory may, under the provisions of section 227;*) of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of February 28, 1891, waive its right thereto
and select other lands in lieu thereof.

Where the

Assistant Attorney-General Campbell to the Secretary of the Interior,
May 9, 1906.
(G. B. G).

By your reference of the 23d instant I am asked for opinion
whether the Territory of New Mexico may relinquish to the United
States section 36, township 16 south, range 13 west. N. M. P. M.,
within the Gila River forest reserve, granted to the Territory by the
act of June 21, 1898 (30 Stat., 484), and select other lauds in lieu
thereof.

This matter arose upon a communication from the Forester of the
Department of Agriculture to the Governor of New Mexico request-
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ing that no stock be allowed on said section, because of the fact that a
forest nursery had been established at Fort Bayard, on portions of the
Fort Bayard military reservation, it being thought that such use of
said section would be destructive to the nursery.
The Governor of New Mexico responding to this communication,
after consultation with the

Territory, suggested that
ties to

it

Commissioner of Public Lands for the

was the

desire of the territorial authori-

aid the forestry service in every reasonable way, but that said

section had been leased for a term of years ending some time in the
year 1907, and that under territorial laws the Commissioner of Public
Lands would not be authorized to reject a proper proposal for the
renewal of the lease. It was further said that the authority of the

Territory to relinquish said section and take other lands in lieu
thereof involves legal questions that should be carefully considered.

Moreover, the Governor suggested that inasmuch as under the rulings
of this Department lands taken in lieu thereof must be selected within
the same township, no desirable exchange could be made so long as
this ruling obtained.

—

The question submitted therefore involves two propositions first,
whether the exchange can legally be made, and, second, if it can be
legally made, and the consent of the territorial authorities secured,
whether the fact that it has been leased would prevent the exchange.
The first question has been repeatedly determined by this Department in the affirmative. See State of California, on review (28 L. D.,
Territory of New Mexico (29 L. D.,3G-4)
Id. (29 L.D.,399).
57)
The two later cases involved the grant here in question, and it was
therein specifically held that where the title to school sections has
vested in said Territory under said grant and such sections are subsequently embraced within a reservation created by executive order, the
Territory may under the provisions of section 2275 of the Revised
Statutes, as amended by the act of February 28, 1891. waive its right
to such sections and select other lands in lieu thereof.
It is noted that the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of California, in the case of Hibberd r. Slack (8-1 Fed.
Rep., 571), has held that the act of February 28, 1891, amending
sections 2275 and 2276 of the Revised Statutes, does not contemplate
an exchange of lands between a State and the United States, but
only indemnity for loss to a State by reason of lands to which it is
entitled being disposed of by the United States.
Said decision is
not binding upon this Department, and will not be followed.
The question of whether an exchange could not be made without the
consent of the lessee is one upon which I am not able to render an
opinion upon the record.
This question would in my judgment
depend upon the terms of the lease a copy of which is not with
the papers or in the files of this Department. There would seem to
;

;

—
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be,

however, no immediate necessity for passing upon this question,

as

other objections to the exchange suggested by the territorial

authorities

make

it

altogether improbable that the Territory will

consent thereto in the present state of legislation. Your attention is,
however, called to the fact that there is now pending before the

Congress of the United States House Bill 11940, the purpose of
which is to place the Territory of New Mexico upon the same footing as other States and Territories in the matter- of selection of
school indemnity lands under the act of February 28, 1891 (26 Stat.,

Should this bill become a law, it is probable that there will
difficulty
in securing a relinquishment of this section of land to
no
be
the United States, and I think no further action should be taken pending such legislation. I suggest, however, the territorial authorities
should be advised, in event of the failure of such proposed legislation, that inasmuch as it would not be possible for the Territory
to make a lieu land selection within the township where such section
sixteen is situated, the entire township being within the reserve, this
796).

Department

will,

selection that

may

because of the exigencies of the case, consider any
be proffered for an exchange.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

rules to be observed ix passing on einal proofs.
Circular.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, May 9, 1906.
Circular of July 17, 1889 (9 L. D., 123),

following rules substituted therefor, viz

is

hereby revoked and the

:

all cases where the same are required by the genlaws or regulations of the Department, must be taken in
accordance with the published notice: provided, however, that such
testimony may be taken within ten days following the time advertised
in cases where accident or unavoidable delays have prevented the
applicant or his witnesses from making such proof on the day speci1.

Final proofs in

eral land

March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854).
proof or any part thereof has not been taken on the
day advertised, or within ten days thereafter under the exceptions and
as required in Kule 1, you will direct new advertisement to be made;
aud if no protest or objection is then filed the proof theretofore
submitted, if in compliance with the law in other respects, may be
fied.
2.

Section 7 of the act of

Where

accepted.

final

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

602

taken at a differif in his opinion
same is required, cause new advertisement for the proof to be taken at
such place as he may deem advisable, or if in his opinion new adver3.

If the testimony of either claimant or witness

is

ent place than that advertised the Commissioner may,

tisement is unnecessary, and no protest or objection has been filed, the
proof theretofore submitted, if regular in all other respects, may be
accepted without further testimony.
4. When a witness not named in the advertisement is substituted for

an advertised witness, unless two of the advertised witnesses testify,
require new advertisement of the names of the witnesses who do testify at such time and place as you may direct and if no protest or
;

objection

is

then

filed,

in all other respects,

Where

the proof theretofore submitted,

may

if

satisfactory

be accepted.

taken before an officer not named in the
if otherwise sufficient, provided the
proof is taken at the time and place designated in the printed notice,
or within ten days thereafter under the exceptions provided in Rule 1
5.

final

advertisement,

it

proof

may

is

be accepted

and provided further, that both the officer advertised to take such
proof and the officer taking same shall officially certify that no protest
was at any time filed before him against the claimant's entry.
6. Evidence of declaration of intention to become a citizen of the
United States or other evidence necessary to establish citizenship of
foreign-born applicants should be received only when under the hand
and seal of the proper officer of the court in which such papers appear
of record. However, where it is shown that the judicial record has
been

lost

or destroyed, proof of citizenship in such cases

may

be

established under the rules governing the introduction of secondary
evidence.
7.

When

proof

is

made

before the register or receiver and the final

certificate does not bear the date of proof, the register

must indorse

on the back of the final certificate of entry, at the time of its issuance,
a brief statement of the reason for the delay in issuance of final
papers, the indorsement to be in each instance signed by the register.
If the delay was caused by failure of applicant to tender the money
or other consideration at the time of making proof, additional evidence must be furnished showing that the claimant had not, at date of

which evidence may consist of his
In
appears that the delay in issuance of final papers was

certificate, transferred the land,

affidavit

cases

taken before some

where

it

officer

authorized to administer oaths.

not the fault of the claimant, the proofs being otherwise regular, the
Commissioner of the General Land Office may in his discretion pass

same
8.

to patent.

When

proof

is

made

before any

officer

other than the register or

receiver a reasonable time will be allowed for the transmission of

papers to the local

office,

and

if a

longer interval

is

shown between
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date of proof and date of certificate, if the proof is otherwise sufficient and the record contains no reason for the delay, the register will

upon the back of the final certificate the statement required
by Rule 7; and if such delay was the fault of the claimant, require
the additional evidence prescribed by Rule 7.
indorse

9. Where final proof has been accepted by the local officers prior to
promulgation of this circular, if in other respects satisfactory except
that the register and receiver have failed to submit an explanation as
to delay in issuance of final papers as required by Rule 7, the Commissioner of the General Land Office may, if in his opinion the facts
and circumstances so warrant, pass the cases to patent in the absence

of other objection.

W. A. Richards, Commissioner.
Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

FOREST RESERVE— LIEU SELECTION— UNSURVEYED LAND -ACT OF

MARCH

Gary

3,

1905.

B. Peavey.

Where

prior to the repeal of the exchange provisions of the act of June 4, 1807,
by the act of March 3, 1905, Selection was made and approved for unsurveyed lands described in terms of legal subdivisions of the public surveys,
and upon survey some of the subdivisions were shown to be fractional and
to contain a less area than contemplated by the selection, the selector may,
under the saving provisions of the act of March 3, 1905, make additional
selection to cover such deficiency.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

May

(F. L. C.)

An
your

appeal has been
office

filed

12, 1906.

Land

Office,

(C. J.'g.)

by Gary B. Peavey from the decision of
him to waive his right to

of January 26, 1906, requiring

excess in area of land offered as base for his selection, No. 2687,

made under

the exchange provisions of the act of

June

4,

189T, (30

Stat., 36).

June

Peavey filed application to select under said act the
and E. \ SW. J, Sec. 19, T. 25 N., Pv. 2 W.,
i
W. M., then unsurveyed, Seattle, Washington, in lieu of lots 9, 10, 11,
and X. \ SW. i, Bee. 5, T. 27 N., R. 12 W., W. M., containing 142.20
acres, relinquished to the United States in the Olympic forest reserve.
The recordsof your office show that 16.58 acres of the base lands above
described were tendered as'base for selection No. 3053, covering lot
12, Sec. 6, T. 36 N., R. 6 E., W. M., same land district, which was
patented July 23, 1904, leaving 125.62 acres as base for the present

NW.

2,

1900,

NE.

i, Sec. 5,
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Said selection, which was described as containoffice as for nnsurveyed land
July 28, 1903, and the official plat of survey of township 25 north
was filed in the local office September 21, 1905, showing said township to be fractional. Thereupon Peavey applied to have his selection adjusted to the plat of survey, setting forth that said plat shows
the lands embraced in his selection to be more correctly described as
lot 2, Sec. 5, and NE. J SW. \ and lot 8, Sec. 19, T. 25 N., R. 2 W.,
and that the lands last described are the same as covered by his
In the decision appealed from your office
original application.
selection,

No. 2687.

ing 120 acres, was approved by your

and held

stated

The plat of survey
1905, and the records

was filed in your office September 21,
show that the NW. i NE. i, Sec. 5, is designated as lot 2, area 29.68 acres, and the E. \ SW. \, Sec. 19, is designated as the
NE. \ SW. i, area 40 acres, and lot 8. area 41.85 acres, total area 111.53 acres,
accordingly, the selection is so adjusted and you will note the fact on your
of said township

of this office

records.

The area
days

which

in

you
such excess, giving him sixty

of the base land being 14.09 acres in excess of that selected,

will require the selector to

waive

his right to

to comply, or to appeal, in default of

which the selection

will be

rejected.

urged in the appeal, among other things, " there was nothing
to guide the selector in this case as to the probable amount that would
be shown in the survey to be subsequently filed ;" that " it can not be
said that due diligence was not exercised in the attempt to adjust the
It is

base lands to the selection in order to equalize the area."

The forest lieu law of 1897 was repealed by the act of March 3,
1905 (33 Stat., 1264), the proviso thereto, which is the part material
here, being as follows:
That

selections heretofore

may

made

in lieu of

lands relinquished to the United

same as though this act
had not been passed, and if for any reason not the fault of the party making
the same any pending selection is held invalid another selection for a like
States

be perfected and patent issue therefor the

quantity of land

may be made

in lieu thereof.

The application of Peavey was made

prior to said act and described
which if not fractional would contain the quantity
of land applied for by him, namely, 120 acres. That quantity does not
equal the right remaining to him under his assignment of base lands,
which is 125.62 acres, and while it is a reasonable implication that he

legal subdivisions

elected to take the tract applied for in full satisfaction of said right,

yet

it

does not necessarily follow that he intended to also waive the

excess in case the tract

than 120

acres.

No

upon survey should be found

to contain less

error can be attributed to the government for

accepting the application of Peavey for a

less

quantity than that

relinquished, the same being for an nnsurveyed tract which

vey might be shown to contain more or

less

upon

than the quantity

suresti-

*
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It is also true that he had no means of knowing what
would be upon survey.. Under such circumstances the
justifiable course would be to afford the selector an opportunity either
This would have
to fill his selection or waive his right to the excess.
been the selector's privilege and the proper course to pursue prior

mated by him.

the exact area

to the

repealing act of

March

3,

1905.

It is believed said act invests

Department with discretionary powers

the

provided therein that selections theretofore

in a case like this, as it is

made

"

may

be perfected

and patents issue therefor the same as though this act had not been
passed." The phrase " may be perfected " fairly includes such selections pending at the date of the act as might properly have been
completed prior to its passage.
The decision of your office herein is accordingly modified, and
Peavey will be afforded a reasonable time, to be fixed by your office,
in which to make additional selection to cover the excess in question,
or waive his right to the same.

employee of general land office -section

452,

revised

statutes.
Circular.

Department of the Interior,
General Lanh Office,
Washington, D. C, May 12, 1906.
To

all

Officers,

Clerks,

and Employees of

the

United States who are in any way connected
with enforcement of the Public Land Laivs:
1.

Your

Statutes,

attention

is

which reads

called to section 452, United States Revised

as follows:

The officers, clerks, and employees in the General Land Office are prohibited
from directly or indirectly purchasing or becoming interested in the purchase of
any of the public land; and any person who violates this section shall forthwith
be removed from his office.
(See 11 L. D., 348.)

In construing this statute the Department has held (10 L. D.. 97)
that

its

provisions

extend to

and employees in any of the branches of the public
and supervision of the Commissioner of the General
the discharge of his duties relating to the survey and sale of the

officers,

clerks,

service under the control

Land

Office in

public lands.

law and the decisions referred to,
recommend the removal or dismissal of any of the
above-named officers, clerks, or employees who shall, either for themselves or others, in any manner negotiate for, buy. sell, or locate, any
warrant, scrip, lieu land selection, soldiers' additional right, or any
2.

Acting under the

this office will

spirit of this
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other negotiable right or claim under which an interest in public
may be asserted, as well as such officers, clerks, or employees

lands

who

discharge of an

official duty, help or in any
any such negotiations, purchases,
sales, or locations as may be made by others for speculative purposes,
or who shall in any manner whatever, except in the discharge of an
official duty, furnish any information whatever to, or in any manner
be in communication with, any person, firm, or corporation dealing
in any such rights, in relation to such rights.
3. While section 452 of the Revised Statutes does not prohibit the
acquisition of title to the public lands of the United States under appropriate laws by the wives of officers, clerks, and employees of the
land department, it is not deemed advisable or proper in the interest
of good administration that they should do so. Accordingly, such
officers, clerks, and employees are advised that the application, entry,
purchase, or acquisition of title, directly or indirectly, to any of the
public lands by their wives, prior to the separation from the service
of such officers, clerks, or employees, will be deemed a sufficient cause
upon which to base a recommendation for removal or dismissal from
the service of the officer, clerk, or employee whose wife acquires or
seeks to acquire title to any of the public lands.
4. All of such officers who shall be in charge of and maintain offices

shall, except in the

manner whatever aid or

assist in

are hereby directed to bring this circular to the attention of their sub-

and

ordinates,

their respective

to hereafter

keep the same conspicuously posted in

offices.

W.

A. Richards, Commissioner.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

MILITARY BOUNTY LAND WARRANT-ASSIGNMENT.

Andrew M. Turner.
Where two

military bounty land warrants are erroneously issued upon the

same

military service, both can not be recognized, and where in such case the

warrantee, having both warrants in his possession, assigns one of them, he
is estopped thereafter to assert the validity of the other, and an assignee of
such invalid warrant has no higher legal right than the warrantee.

The

cases of

Andrew Anderson

et

aU

1 L. D., 1,

and

L. C. Black, 3 L. D., 101,

overruled.

Secretary Hitchcock

to the

(F. L. C.)

Commissioner of the General Land

May

15, 1906.

Office,

(J. R,

W.)

Andrew M. Turner appealed from your decision of October 9, 1905,
him military bounty land warrant, No. 29118,
issued May 31, 1856, under the act of March 3, 1855 (10 Stat, 701).
refusing to return to
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warrant 29118 issued to Joseph Chapman for service
company, 40th regiment United States infantry,
war of 1812. There is also a certificate that June 9, 1856, warrant
28014 had been issued to Joseph Chapman, a private in Captain Job
Wright's company, 46th United States infantry each for one hundred and sixty acres.
The latter warrant was not transmitted by your office with the
record, though it is included in the schedule as: "A. Warrant No.
28014, 160 acres, act of 1842, and accompanying papers." The
contents, however, of the enclosure "A." are, (1) a certificate of the
Commissioner of Pensions of June 9, 1856, that such warrant " has
been issued," upon this is an assignment of it, (2) to this is attached
the local land office certificate of location of this warrant, but no warrant is attached, nor do these papers indicate that any other paper has
ever been attached, nor is such warrant in the enclosure "A." or elsewhere in the record. Its presence, however, is not necessary to deci31, 1856,

in Captain Wright's

—

sion of the case.

The two warrants being thus erroneously issued for the same servon June 20, 1856, Chapman assigned the certificate 28014 to John
Z. Smith, and the papers purport that he, July 25, 1856, assigned
29118 to William R. Turner, of Gentry county, Missouri. The handwriting and ink of the body of the assignments are in each different
from the assignees names, which may have been left blank. Chapman's signature is by mark, with J. S. Warner as witness in both
assignments, joined in 28014 by E. F, Smith, and in 29118 by William
Morton. Both assignments were executed before C. M. Griswold,
ice,

1

Steuben county, New York.
warrants
having
been assigned, 29118 was located at PlattsBoth
Missouri,
February
burg,
28, 1857, upon the northwest fractional
quarter and north half of the southwest quarter, section five, township sixty-five, range thirty-one, and November 11, 1858, the Commissioner of Pensions filed a caveat against issue of patent on this
warrant, and the location was suspended. June 28, 1860, No. 28014
was located at Stevens Point, Wisconsin, on the SE. ^, Sec. 26, T. 28,
justice of the peace,

R. 10 E.

March

4,

1864, your office transmitted No. 29118 to the

sioner of Pensions, for examination,

and April

19, 1864,

Commis-

he advised

you that reasonable suspicion still existed that the papers upon
which No. 29118 issued were false and forged, and that it was necessary for Mr. Turner to establish by satisfactory proof the identity
of the warrantee as the man who rendered the military service and
executed the assignment, and, further, that if Mr. Turner failed to
produce the requisite proof, *^t his request the warrant will be canceled and returned to your office for his use in recovery of his purw
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May 14, 1864, your office directed the local office to notify Mr.
Turner of suspension of his location, of the requirements of the Commissioner of Pensions, and that he might make substitution for the
warrant. He made cash substitution June 8, 1805, which the local
June 20, 18G5, your office reported to the Commisoffice reported.
sioner of Pensions Mr. Turner's failure to furnish the required proof,
and November 18, 1865, the Commissioner canceled warrant 29118
and returned it to your office, which transmitted it, November 28,
1865, to the local office for delivery to Mr. Turner for use in recovery
of his purchase money. December 1, 1865, patent issued to Mr. Turner on his substituted cash entry. He never reclaimed (lie canceled
warrant, and July 8, 1885, it was returned to your office, where it has
March 8, 1904, Andrew M. Turner filed in your office a
since lain.
power of attorney to counsel to reclaim the Avarrant 29118, with
affidavit of two witnesses that Andrew M. Turner died at Eureka,
Kansas, February 22, 1870, and that claimant is his son, only descendant, and sole heir.
Your office held that a location of this warrant on public lands
should not be allowed; that Chapman received all he was entitled
to by issue and satisfaction of warrant 28014; that return of warrant 29118 would be merely to furnish a means to defraud some innocent party, and declined to return it.
Claimant alleges for error that

....
....

that said warrant was properly issued and was asIt appearing
signed in due form by the warrantee, and that the said warrant was wrongit is error to refuse to return the warrant to the
fully canceled
owner of the same with a certificate from the Commissioner of the General

Land

Office, to

the effect that the same

is

a valid

warrant and

will be recognized.

The record shows that this warrant was invalid when Chapman is
claimed to have assigned it. He had but one claim, and when two
evidences of that right were inadvertently issued to him, the right
was not doubled, as it is not in the power of the Commissioner of
Pensions to create, enlarge, or double the liability of the United
In this respect the case is like that of C. L. Hood, this day
States.
decided, to which reference is made.
Also on this subject the Attorney-General (5 Op., 387, 389) held:
The power and authority of public officers are just what the law makes them.
The law is the measure of their authority and their acts. The Commissioner of

....

Pensions
had authority only to issue on each claim one warrant for
In issuthe specified bounty that was the limit of his lawful power
ing more than one he has transcended his power, gone beyond the limits of his
special authority and jurisdiction and his acts, upon the clearest legal principles, are null and void
The issuing more than one warrant on the
;

;

same claim was what the Commissioner had no power or
It was done, therefore, without

state of the case to do.

My

discretion under any

law,

and contrary

to

one issued, all the other
warrants that have been issued on the same claim are of no legal validity.
law.

strong conviction

is,

that, except the first
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of the first warrant as being the

one to be regarded as valid. Granting for argument that both warrants were issued on one claim, and that both were duly assigned,

another principle determines this case, modifying that rule. Had
warrant 29118 been first assigned the rule stated would control. But
Chapman had both warrants in his hands at the same time. He
first

assigned warrant 28014 to

John

Z.

Smith, June 20, and July 25,

185G, held no right, for the only obligation he ever held against the

United States was then divested from him, and vested in his prior
He and his assigns are estopped to say that warrant 28014
was not validly issued. When Andrew M. Turner's location was
suspended, he was advised of the facts, and was given opportunity
to show, if he could, that the papers on which his warrant 29118
was issued were not false and forged. At that time an issue might
have been made between him and Smith as to which one held the
Not attempting that, he substituted cash, and thereby
valid warrant.
in effect confessed the validity of warrant 28014 and the invalidity
Nothing in the record impugns Chapman's good faith in
of 29118.
the prior assignment of June 20, 1850, but whether so or not, Turner
had opportunity to take issue and to show validity of his assignment. He failed to do it. Credit is due this action of more than
forty years ago. Turner and those claiming by succession are in no
better place than Chapman would be were he now here a claimant.
Chapman, after his assignment of June 20, 1856, would not be heard
Bounty land warrants
to claim return of warrant 29118 as valid.
The assignee
arc not negotiable instruments, though assignable.
takes only the right the assignor had, and stands in his place, subject to the same defenses as might have been then made against him.
As Chapman, after his assignment of June 20, 1856, had no right.
Turner obtained none by the later assignment,
There are decisions of the Department that seem to hold the contrary.
No. 622, Lester's Land Laws, Vol. 1, p. 612, holds (syllabus)
that " Two warrants being erroneously issued to the same party,
though one be obtained by fraud, both must be respected;" (ib. 621.
No. 636, syllabus) that, "Where a land warrant was erroneously
issued for one hundred and twenty acres, and the claimant was only
entitled to eighty acres, the warrant may be located by an assignee
who is purchaser for consideration and without notice, for its full
quantity;" (ib. 622, No. 637) that "Where both the original warrant and the duplicate are located, both must be satisfied, except in
cases of forgery;" Andrew Anderson et <tl. (1 L. D., 1, syllabus)
u
The Commissioner of Pensions has no authority to cancel a military bounty land warrant in, the hands of an innocent assignee:*
L. C. Black (3 L. D., 101) to the same effect.
The two decisions last
assignee.

:

5194— Vol. 34—05 m
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upon opinion of the Attorney-General of March 15,
1856 (T Opin., 657), and departmental decisions in Lester, Nos. 636
and 637, supra.
It does not appear in the report in any of these cases that the valid
cited are based

and invalid warrants were both in the hands of the warrantee when
was made. It is sufficient for decision of this
The warrantee. Chapman, was estopped
case that such was the fact.
by his assignment of warrant No. 28014 thereafter to assert validity
of 29118. The paper is not negotiable and that estoppel concludes
all privies under him claiming warrant 20118; so that the decisions
bis first assignment

above cited are not controlling or applicable.
But these former departmental decisions are unsound in principle
in recognizing the United States as bound by misfeasance of its
officers in acts not warranted or authorized by the law prescribing

The Revised

their duties.

Statutes of the United States provides

that
Sec. 2414. All

warrants for military bounty-lands which have heen or may

hereafter he issued under any law of the United States, and
of the same, which have heen or
!)c

assignable

original

It is

owner

....

may

made

all

valid locations

are hereby declared to

so as to vest the assignee with all the rights of the

warrant or

of the

hereafter he

location.

only warrants " issued under any law of the United States

"

that are assignable, and the assignee takes by the assignment merely
" all the rights of the original

Chapman

could himself have

owner."

made

It is folly to

contend that

location of both warrants and

have demanded patent upon both. If he could not, his assignee,
under this section, can not, for he takes only Chapman's right.
When Chapman made the assignment of warrant 29118, he had no
The decisions above cited, and any others to such effect, so
right.
far as they hold that the validity of a military bounty land warrant,
after assignment,

is

not subject to inquiry, or must be recognized as

law granting such bounty,
the Attorney-General (7
Opin., 657), upon which such departmental decisions were founded,
was examined, criticised, discredited, and the fallacy of its reasoning
shown by Dillon, Circuit Judge, in Bronson v. Kukuk (3 Dill., 490,
494). The earlier opinion (5 Op., 387) appears to be the better
valid, if issued in excess or violation of

are

hereby overruled.

The opinion of

reasoned.
,

Your

decision

is

affirmed.

MILITARY BOUNTY LAND WARRANT-DUPLICATE.

C
The

L. HOOD.

issue of a duplicate military bounty land warrant under the provisions of
the act of June 23, 1860 (now section 2441, Revised Statutes), in the belief
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that the original has been lost or destroyed, creates no new liability or
where the original warrant had

obligation on the part of the United States,

been located and satisfied prior to the issue of the duplicate.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)
C. L.

May

Hood appealed from your

decision of July

his application for return of duplicate military

No. 19257; issued under the act of March

Land

Office,

(J. R.

16, 1906.

3,

W.

1905, rejecting

3,

bounty land warrant

1855.(10 Stat., 701).

George W. Mitchell for
eighty acres, was assigned March 3, 1856, to Jesse Taylor, and June
7, 1856, w as located at Decorah land office, Iowa, on the W. J of the
NW. J, Sec. 24, T. 95 N., E. 20 W., upon which patent issued to Taylor August 13, 1867.
August 9, 1895, the Commissioner of Pensions issued to Mitchell
a duplicate, which he assigned August 21, 1858, to James Farasey,
who located it at La Crosse land office, Wisconsin, January 20, 1859,
upon the N. J of the SW. J, Sec. 22, T. 15 N., R. 6 W. December 6,
1864, the Commissioner of Pensions canceled it and declared it void,
February 6, 1886, the entryman was permitted to substitute cash for
the warrant location, and patent issued for the land November 19,
1886.
November 19, 1904, C. L. Hood appeared by attorney, alleging
that through Farasey he became owner of the N. ^ of the SW. -j, Sec.
22, and sold it by warranty deed, filing an abstract of title of the
land showing such fact, after which he discovered that patent had
not issued, and to make title good had to pay the United States $100
in substitution for the canceled duplicate warrant, and asking return
of the duplicate warrant. July 3, 1905, your office denied the application, and on Hood's motion for review adhered to that decision.
The evident theory and basis of the application is that the duplicate warrant is valid and may be located on public lands, although
The duplicate was issued
the original has been located and satisfied.
under the act of June 23, 1860 (12 Stat., 90), now codified as section
2441 of the Revised Statutes, which provides

The

original, issued

January

21, 1850, to

T

Whenever it appears that any certificate or warrant, issued in pursuance of
any law granting bounty-land, has been lost or destroyed, whether the same
has been sold and assigned by the warrants or not, the Secretary of the Interior is required to cause a new certificate or warrant of like tenor to be issued
in lieu thereof; which new certificate or warrant may be assigned, located, and
patented in like manner as other certificates or warrants for bounty-land are
now authorized by law to be assigned, located, and patented and in all cases
where warrants have been, or may be, re-issued, the original warrant, in whoseever hands it may be, shall be deemed and held to be null and void, and the
assignment thereof, if any there be. fraudulent; and no patent shall ever issue
for any land located therewith, unless such presumption of fraud in the assignment be removed by due proof that the same was executed by the warrantee
in good faith and for a valuable consideration.
;

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

612

This statute authorizes issue of a duplicate warrant only when the
original has been " lost or destroyed " that the duplicate is to stand
;

which

deemed null and
and any assignment of it fraudulent, and no patent shall be
issued upon it, unless such presumption of fraud be removed by due
It is
affirmative proof that it was executed in good faith for value.
evident from the statute that no power is given by issue of a duplicate warrant to create a new liability or a double liability where only
one existed before. Had such power been given, the last clause,
"unless such presumption of fraud in the assignment be removed,"
could have no purpose.
When the duplicate of this warrant was issued, the land warrant
upon which it purported to issue no longer existed as an obligation
of the United States. It had been duly located June 7, 1856, at
Decorah, Iowa, more than two years before issue of the duplicate,
and by appropriation of public land was satisfied. George W.
in place of the original,

is

to be thenceforth

void,

Hendry

The

is in strict analogy to the
warrant once paid and satisconcerning which Dillon (Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., Sec.

(4 L. D., 172, 173).

case

unauthorized reissue of a debenture or
fied,

409) says:

Payment by the treasurer or proper officer of a municipal corporation of its
orders or warrants ipso facto extinguishes them. If lent, reissued, or put into
circulation again by the officers after he has once obtained credit therefor, they
it seems, in the hands of an innocent holder,
Canal Bank v. Supervisors, 3 Denio, N. Y., 517 Halstead v. Moyer, 3
Comst, N. Y., 430 Sweet v. Carver, 16 Minn., 106.

are not valid securities, not even,
citing

;

;

The

authorities are clear that a liability against the

government

can not be created by the mistake, misprision, or fraud of its officer
acting without authority of law. It was held in Robertson v. Sichel
(127 U.

S., 507,

515), that:

The government

not responsible for the misfeasances, or wrongs, or

itself is

negligences, or omissions of duty of the subordinate officers or agents

whom

it

employs since that would involve it, in all its operations, in endless embarrassments and difficulties and losses, which will be subversive of the public
;

interests.

It

was held

in

Moffat

v.

United States (112 U.

The government does not guarantee the
idity

of their acts.

It

conditions.
its

31), that:

integrity of its officers, nor the val-

prescribes rules for them,

faithful discharge of their duties,

S., 24,

requires an oath for the

and exacts from them a bond with stringent

provides penalties for their misconduct or fraud, but there
They are but the servants of the law, and, if they
requirements, the government is not bound. There would be a

It also

responsibility ends.

depart from its
wild license to crime

if

were
though performed in compliance with it.

their acts, in disregard of the law,

to protect third parties, as

to

be upheld
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In Whiteside

v.

United States (93 U.

Torts committed by an

officer in

S., 247,

257)

it
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was held that

the service of the United States do not render

the government liable in an implied assumpsit, even though the acts done

were

apparently for the public benefit.
It

was held

in

Hart

v.

United States (95 U.

S., 316,

318) that:

A government may be a loser by the negligence of its officers, but
becomes bound to others for the consequences of such neglect, unless
express agreement to that effect.

The mistake

it

never

it

be by

of the officers of the United States in issuing this

duplicate warrant could not revive the obligation of the warrant then

The

already satisfied by location of the original upon public lands.

was thereby discharged and satisfied, and no authority of
law existed for its reissue. While no actual fraud is shown leading
up to issue of the duplicate, the case is strictly analogous in principle
The issue of the duplito that of Marvin Hughitt (33 L. D., 544).
cate being unauthorized, it is not and was never of any validity or
evidence of any right of its holder. To surrender it would simply
set afloat an instrument useful for no purpose but attempts to perpetrate fraud against interests of the United States in the public
lands.
Its return was therefore properly denied.
It is impossible
obligation

that Farasey took assignment of the duplicate without notice.

duplicate carried on

its

face conspicuously written in red ink "

importing necessarily that

plicate,"

but merely a copy of

it,

it

was not the original

The
Du-

obligation,

the validity of the original obligation as

continuing and unsatisfied being necessary to the validity of such

copy substituted for it, and pointing to the conditions on which
validity and the power of the officer to issue it depended.

Your

decision

is

its

affirmed.

school laxds-indemnity selection-indian reservation.
State of California.
Where

a school section is embraced within the limits of an Indian reservation,
the State may, under the provisions of section 2275 of the Revised Statutes,
as amended by the act of February 28, 1891, waive its right thereto and

notwithstanding such section was identiby survey prior to the establishment of the reservation.

select other land in lieu thereof,
fied

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)

May

(

The State of California has appealed from your
January

9,

Land

22, 1906.

1906, holding for cancellation

its

office

F.

Office,

W. C)

decision of

indemnity school laud
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selection, 'filed at the

Stockton land

office,

California, July 11, 1899,

K. and R, No. 388, State No. 3236, for the SE. i of NW. J, Sec. 14,
and fractional N. \ of SW. J, Sec. 18, T. 9, S., R. 7 E., M. D. M., in
lieu of ,82 acres deficit in Sec. 36, T. 5 N., R. 23 W., S. B. M., within
a forest reserve,

and the N. \ of SE.

\

and SE.

\ of

SE.

J,

Sec, 36,

Yuma

Indian Reservation,
because of the fact that the title to Sec. 36, T. 15 S., R. 21 E., S. B.
M., passed to the State prior to the executive order of January 9,
1884, creating the Yuma Indian Reservation, by the terms of which
there were excepted from said order all tracts to which valid rights
had attached. Said last-mentioned tract is therefore held not to constitute a valid base for an indemnity selection, the case of State of
California (17 L. D., 71) being cited as authority.
In its appeal the State urges that the Department has already
granted indemnity to the State in lieu of most of the school sections
within the Yuma Indian Reservation, and that the State has also
selected and received indemnity for sections 16 and 36 within other
Indian reservations in California, and that the indemnity is permissible under the provisions of the act of February 28, 1891 (26 Stat.,
796), amending sections 2275 and 2276 of the Revised Statutes.
In the case of State of California, on review (28 L. D., 57), the
matter at issue was the right of the State under the provisions of the
act of February 28, 1891, to take indemnity in lieu of a section 36
within the boundaries of the Sierra Forest Reserve, established by
executive order dated February 14, 1893. In said decision it was
stated that the section was surveyed prior to the establishment of the
reservation and that it was conceded that the State had full title to
the tract in that section and that it was not therefore within the power
of the Executive to reserve the same or in any way impair the State's
right thereto. While it was therefore within the boundaries of the
T. 15

S.,

R. 21 E., S. B. M., within the

reservation, it was clearly not reserved.
Nevertheless, the
Department held that it was possible for the State to take indemnity
under the act of February 28, 1891, referring to that part of the act
which provides
forest

and other lands of equal acreage are also hereby appropriated and granted,
and may be selected by said State or Territory, where sections 10 or 36 are
mineral land, or are included within any Indian, military or other reservation,
or are otherwise disposed of by the United States.

The township in question, namely, township 15 south, range 21
B. M., was surveyed in 1856, the approved plat having been

east, S.

February

There is nothing suggested to defeat the
became complete upon the identification
of the land by the filing of the township plat.
The order of January 9, 1884, creating the Yuma Indian Reservation, included section 36 of said township within the boundaries of
filed

6,

1857.

State's claim, so that its title
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the reservation thereby created, but the order provides " that

any

tract or tracts included within the foregoing described townships, to

which valid rights have attached, under the laws of the United States,
So far as
are hereby excluded out of the reservation hereby made."
this tract is concerned, the effect would have been the same had there
been no exclusion, so that the case is in all important particulars
similar to that considered in departmental decision in 28 L. D., 57,
before referred to, with the exception that there the lands were
included within the boundaries of a forest reserve, while here they are
included within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, both created
by executive order.
Under this presentation of the matter no sufficient reason appears
for permitting the selection in one case and denying it in the other.
While the case reported in 17 L. D., 71, was not specifically referred
to and overruled in the case last mentioned, the instructions of
December 19, 1893 (17 L. D., 576), were modified accordingly.
Those regulations provide by paragraph 4 " that selections, upon
the base of surveyed school sections within the said forest reservations will not be allowed under any circumstances," and there
does not appear to have been any specific ruling of the Department warranting this paragraph of the regulations, except the case
in 17 L. D., 71, hereinbefore referred to.
Without, therefore, at this
time, attempting to distinguish the case under consideration from
that in 17 L. D., 71, it is believed, as before stated, that the case under
consideration is controlled by the decision in 2<S L. D., 57. hereinbefore mentioned, and in view of the previous adjustment of similar
matters made by your office in apparent harmony with this decision,
the case is remanded for your further consideration and disposition
in accordance w ith the rule announced in the case reported in 28
T

L. D., 57, supra.

CONTESTANT—PREFERENCE RIGHT.
Michael
A

successful contestant

case

is

finally closed

is

L. vVeichselbaum.

entitled to the full period of thirty days after the

and no longer open

to

proceedings on review or appeal.

within which to assert his preference right of entry.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)
May 22,1906.

Land

Michael L. Weichselbaum bas appealed to the Department
your

office

decision of

June

Office,

(P. E.

W.)
from

23, 1905, affirming that of the local officers
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and rejecting his application

to enter,

under the act of June 3, 1878
NE. J SE. J, Sec. 11,

(20 Stat., 89), the E. J NE. J, SW. J NE. J and
T. 151 N., R. 26 W., Cass Lake, Minnesota.

Rejection was upon the ground of conflict with the prior application of

Malcolm

C. Barry, under section 2307 of the Revised Statutes,

in the exercise of a preference right gained

by successful contest of

a

previous entry.

The undisputed record facts are that Barry's contest case against
was closed, by decision of your office, on May 28,
l'.M)4; the annotation of cancellation of the previous entry was placed
on the tract book of the local office on June 2, 1901; Weichselbaum

the previous entry

application to enter the land on June

filed his

6,

1901; registry

letter-

notice of the cancellation of the previous entry and of his preference

was mailed to Barry by the local officers on
received
Barry
the notice on June 10, 1904, and filed
8,
on
July 12, thirty-two days after notice. His
his said application
application was held to be seasonably filed and was allowed.
To the general rule that where notice is given by mail five days
additional are allowed for its transmission and five days for a return
right to enter the land

June

1904;

thereon, AYeichselbaum urges the objection, basing this appeal thereon,

that

it-

does not and cannot operate to extend the time in which to make application
under a preference right that the time is designated and stated in the act itself
;

and cannot he extended.

The real matter of inquiry on the record herein, however, is not
whether the said rule may extend the time granted by the act of May
14, 1880 (21 Stat., 140), for the exercise of a preference right of entry,
but whether the allowed period of thirty days, properly set running,
had terminated before the application of Barry, in the exercise of
was filed.
of Lawrence v. Seeger, on review

his preference right,

In the case

(25 L. D., 377), the

Department said
he was required under the law and regulations of the Departdays from notice of the cancellation of the contested entry.
This he did not do.
He filed his application in less than thirty days after the motion for review had heen disposed of,
which, under the circumstances, is held to be in time.
It is true that

ment

to assert his preference right within thirty

.

A

.

.

is found in the fact that the
might be sustained and thus the application
to enter, under preference right, would be confronted with an existing entry. Clearly, the period of preference right cannot, by notice
of cancellation of the former entry, be set running beyond control of
the Department under subsequent developments, or to the impairment

sufficient

reason for such holding

said motion for review
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that the contestant shall have notice of the cancellation of

former entry and shall have

a

period of thirty days for

filing,

after the time for a review has passed or the right to review has been

waived.

Thus in the
held that—
The period of

case of Kiehlbauch

/'.

Simero (32 L.

IX, 418)

thirty days accorded a successful contestant within

it

was

which

to

exercise his preference right of entry ddes not begin to run until the case arising
niton his contest is finally closed.

former entryman had relinquished on June 28,
and thus waived any right of review, yet it was held that the
preference right application, filed within thirty days after July 22,
L902, when the contest case was closed by your office, was seasonably
filed, and this without regard to the date when notice was given the
successful contestant.
In the present case it is clear, from the stated
dates and acts, that the notice to Barry of cancellation, and of his
preference right, was premature, having been served during the time
within which the former entryman might proceed in review or appeal,
and it cannot be held to have set running the thirty days period to
which Barry was entitled after all possibility was gone of further
proceedings by said entryman.
In the case of Kleven v. Lundrigan (unreported), decided April
3, 1905, the Department, upon motion for review-, recalled its previous affirmative decision and reversed the decision of your office
wherein it was held that
In that case the

1902,

1

mistake due to any cause whatsoever could not add to the period during which
his preference right suhsisted, which right began on the day upon which lie
received the notice of the cancellation of Nelson's entry and of said preference
right.

Said departmental decision was upon the ground that the successful
a second and mistaken notice of his
preference right to delay his application to enter beyond the period
of thirty days from receipt of his first notice.
Following the said former decisions and the manifest reason and
contestant had been induced by

intent of the act in question to give the successful contestant a prefer-

ence right for the full period of thirty days after his contest case

is

and on longer open to proceedings in review or on appeal, it must be held that Barry seasonably exercised his preference
right and has the superior right to make entry for the land in conflict.

finally closed

Your

office

properly allowed Weichselbaum to so amend his applica-

tion that the land applied for

may

be contiguous and that there

be no conflict with Barry's application.

Your

said decision

is

affirmed.

may
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repayment—assignee— mortgagee.
Canadian and American Mortgage and Trust Company.
Repayment is not authorized under the provisions of the act of June
where entry is properly allowed on the proof presented, but

16, 1880,
is

subse-

quently canceled upon a showing that such proof is false
and in this
respect an assignee has no bettor right than the entryman.
applicant for repayment of the purchase money paid on a commuted home;

An

who claims the right to repayment as mortgagee under a
mortgage executed prior to completion of the entry, is not an assignee
within the meaning of the statute and is therefore not entitled to repaystead entry,

ment.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(

May

F. L. C.

23, J 906.

Land
(

Office^

C, J. G.

An appeal has been filed by the Canadian and American Mortgage and Trust Company from the decision of your office of February 10, 1906, denying its application for repayment of the purchase money paid by Archie Alley upon making cash entry No.
7287, for the SE. \ of Sec. 20, T. 162 N., R. 44 W., Crookston, Minnesota.

Alley made homestead entry for the land described May 3, 1900,
which he commuted to cash entry October 9, 1902, his final proof on
its face showing compliance with law.
A contest affidavit was filed
by Hiram Crawford July 11, 1908, in which it was alleged that
Alley never resided upon nor cultivated the land and that " his final
proof was made in fraud and contrary to law." A hearing was
had, notice having been personally served upon the entryman.
Crawford and his witnesses appeared and submitted testimony but
Alley made default. The local officers rendered decision recommending cancellation of the entry, which action your office affirmed upon
appeal, finding that the testimony presented at the hearing showed
that the statements made in Alley's final proof were false, and upon
further appeal the decision of your office was affirmed by the Department.

The Canadian and American Mortgage and Trust Company is
The action of your

claiming as the assignee or mortgagee of Alley.

denying

repayment is based on the rule laid
under the act of June 16, 1880 (21
Stat., 287), to the effect that where an entry is properly allowed on
the proof presented but is subsequently canceled upon showing being
made that said proof was false, then repayment is not authorized
underpaid act and that in this respect an assignee can have no better
right than the entryman. Or, as set forth in the instructions governing repayments (30 L. D., 430, 435)
office

down

its

a'pplication for

in several cited decisions

;

:

If a tract of land were submitted to entry, and the proofs showed a compliance
with law, and the entry should be canceled because the proofs were shown to
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be false, it could not be held that the entry was "erroneously allowed; " and
such case repayment would not be authorized.

October

in

was made

to Alley through the
Fargo Loan Agency
American Mortgage and Trust Company, the company taking a
mortgage on the land embraced in Alley's cash entry. The mortgage
having been executed prior to the date of said entry, which was October 9, 1902, the mortgagee company is therefore not an assignee
within the meaning of the repayment statute. The rule given in the
instructions governing repayments, supra, is as follows:
6,

1902, a loan of $275

of Fargo, North Dakota, by the Canadian and

Those persons are assignees, within the meaning of the statute authorizing
who purchase the land after entries thereof
are completed and take assignments of the title under such entries prior to

the repayment of purchase money,

complete cancellation thereof,
contemplated by law.

when

the entries

fail of

confirmation for reasons

Hence, the cash entry of Alley not only did not fail of confirmation
contemplated by law," in which respect the company
can occupy no better position than Alley, but as the transaction
under which the company claims, even if it be regarded in the nature
of an assignment, took place prior to the completion of said entry,
the company is not an assignee within the meaning of the repayment
act.
As shown by an accompanying abstract, title to the land in
question is now claimed to be in the Canadian and American Mortgage and Trust Company, and for the purposes of this application
for repayment the company quit-claims said land to the United
States. All the transactions set forth in said abstract, including the
formal sale and deed of Alley, took place subsequently to the complete cancellation of Alley's entry.
Such transactions can not be
regarded as a consummation in the company of its mortgage transaction with Alley, said mortgage having been executed prior to the
completion of Alley's entry. It follows therefore that title to the
land has been in the United States since said cancellation, and that
the purported conveyances set out in the abstract were void and are
ineffective.
Nor can it be justly claimed that the company is without
ladies or blame in the matter, since those who purchase or take
assignments of land prior to the completion of the entry therefor
do so at their own risk.
The decision of your office denying repayment herein is affirmed.
" for reasons

1

RAILROAD GRANT—SETTLEMENT-RED LAKE INDIAN LANDS.
Cathcart et
No

al. v.

Minnesota and Manitoba R. E.

Co.

ritfbts were acquired by settlement upon lands within tbe ceded portion of
the Red Lake Indian reservation prior to their opening to settlement and
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and where snch settlement was entirely upon lands selected with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior prior to the opening, by the Minnesota and Manitoba Railroad Company, under its grant made by the act
of April 17, 1900, of right of way and necessary lands for terminal facilities
at the crossing of Rainy River, no entry can now be allowed of such lands.
entry,

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner* of the General
(

May

F. L. C.

26, 1906.

Land
(

E.

Office,
J.

H

.

Lots 3 and 4 of Sec. 35, T. 161 N., R. 31 W., Grookston, Minnesota,
land district, are a part of the lands in the Red Lake Indian Reservation,

ceded to the United States under the provisions of the act of
11, 1889 (25 Stat., 042), and were embraced in the schedule

January

of lands approved by the Department on September 22, 1903, publi-

was made by circular of that date, and were opened
and entry on November 10, 1903.
The status of said lands with respect- to settlement and entry prior
to the date of said opening was defined in departmental circular of
August 1, 1899, wherein it was stated that there had been* no appraisal, order for sale or opening to settlement, or for the advertisement thereof, and all parties were warned not to make settlement
thereon, and that no rights could be secured thereby.
cation of which

to settlement

-

,

By

Congress of April 17, 1900 (31 Stat., 13-1), the right of
to the Minnesota and Manitoba Railroad Company,
fifty feet in width on each side of the center line of said railroad,
through the ceded lands of said reservation to a point on Rainy
River; also land adjacent to such right of way for station buildings,
machine shops, side tracks, turn tables, water stations, and such other
Structures as it might deem to its interest to erect, not to exceed 300
feet in width and 3000 feet in length for each station, to the extent
of one station for each ten miles of road, " except at the crossing of
act of

way was granted

said

Rainy River,

at

which point said railroad company may take

not exceeding forty acres in addition to the grounds allowed for
station purposes for the corresponding section of ten miles: Pro-

That no part of such lands herein granted shall be used except
in such manner and for such purposes only as are necessary for the
construction, maintenance, and convenient operation of said railroad."
July 13, 1900, the railroad company, in accordance with the terms
of said grant, filed in the local office a map showing the definite location of its line of road and station grounds selected by it at the Rainy
River crossing, including all of lots 3 and 1 and a strip 110 feet in
width along the entire west line of the E. -| of SW. ^, Sec. 35, the
same being based on a survey completed June 4, 1900. An amended
map thereof was filed November 8, 1900, and December 5, 1900, the
same was approved by the Secretary of the Interior, " subject to all
the conditions, limitations and provisions of the act of Congress of
vided,

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

621

March

3, 1875 (18 Stat., 482), and the act of Congress of April IT.
1900 (31 Stat., 134), and subject also to all valid existing rights."
By the act of Congress of February 9, 1903 (32 Stat., 820), the
general townsite laws were declared to be extended and applicable

any lands within said ceded Indian reservation.
4, 1903, prior to the opening of said lands to settlement
and entry, as hereinbefore shown, upon the petition of certain parties
claiming to be inhabitants of the village of Beaudette and engaged
in business there, M. A. Spooner, Judge of the District Court of the
15th Judicial District of Minnesota, in which Beltrami county is
situated, wherein the lands in controversy are located, filed in the
local office, his declaratory statement to the effect that it was his
intention to enter said lots 3 and 4 as a townsite, under the provisions of sections 2387, 2388 and 2389 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, for the use and benefit of the inhabitants of said
to

November

village of Beaudette.

November

1903, Thomas Cathcart tendered
make homestead entry of said lots,

13,

application to

in said

office

his

together with the

SW. i of said Sec. 35, T. 161 N., R. 31 W. His application
was suspended pending the disposition of the townsite application,
from which action he appealed.
January 21, 1904, your office issued notice of a hearing upon the
townsite application and set April 5, 1904, therefor.
Due service of
said notice was made and on said date the parties all appeared.
Cathcart hied a protest against the proposed entry of said lots 3 and 4

E. i of

for townsite purposes.

The

railroad

company

also filed a protest

7

against the allowance of the townsite application, claiming that by

company of
was the owner of said

map

the approval to said

its

grounds,

lands.

it

way and station
The townsite claimants and

of right of

Cathcart submitted testimony. Upon motion of the railroad company the case was continued for the purpose of taking the deposition
of Hector Baxter, president of said company, which deposition was
subsequently taken and filed September 15, 1904.

October 14, 1904, the local officers in their decision recited the testimony of said Baxter to the effect that on June 27, 1901, he paid to
the United States the sum of $1458.26, in payment for the right of
way, station grounds, and additional land (lots 3 and 4) granted said
company at Beaudette, this payment being made at the rate of $1.25
per acre, the sum at which the special agent of the government appraised said land; that it was and still is the intention of the company to use all of the land taken at Beaudette for terminal purposes,
and that the company had never permitted the use of said land for
other than railroad purposes.
It was found from the testimony of Cathcart and his witnesses,
which was undisputed, that he was 73 years of age and made settle-
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ment on the land in October, 1890; that he at once built a house and
commenced to clear land that in 1891 he moved his family upon the
Jand and had ever since resided there; that he continued to make
improvements until at the time of the hearing he had between 45 and
;

50 acres cleared, at a cost of $90 to $100 per acre, the land having
been heavily timbered, a dwelling house 50 feet square with wings

which he had been offered $4000, also barns, stables for
and numerous other buildings, all of his improvements being
of the value of $7000 to $8000; that he took the land for a home,
without expectation that a railroad would be built in there; that he
made no protest against the same and had never made any agreement with the company regarding right of way, but had ordered off
parties who were building on the land.
It was also found from the testimony submitted on behalf of the
townsite claimants that the village of Beaudette was unincorporated
and was not regularly divided into blocks and streets; that at the
time of the hearing there were on the land six stores, five saloons,
three hotels, a meat market, school house and church combined, newspaper office, feed store, barber shop, brewing company, warehouse,
depot and freight shed, and other buildings numbering in all about
thirty, some of which Avere substantial and others merely shanties,
and that they were nearly all located within the railroad station
grounds, which are 200 feet w ide on each side of the track; that the
inhabitants numbered, at the time of the filing of the townsite application, between 80 and 100, many of whom were holding homestead
thereto, for
stock,

T

claims elsewhere.
It was held that the money paid by the company to the government was not a payment for the land taken as right of way and
station grounds and the additional forty acres at Beaudette, but a
payment made under section 2 of the act of April 17, 1900, supra, for
" the amount of damages resulting to the tribe of Indians in their
tribal capacity, by reason of the construction of said railroad through
such ceded lands of the former Red Lake Indian Reservation," and
therefore " that by the payment of this sum of money to the government, the title to the land did not pass from the government, but the
lands were simply granted to the company for railroad purposes,
and that a subsequent entryman or claimant could take the lands
only subject to the right of the railroad company to use those lands

for railroad purposes."

was therefore recommended that the townsite application be
company be dismissed, and
that Cathcart be permitted to make homestead entry of the lands
applied for by him, subject to the rights of the railroad company for
right of way and station grounds.
It

rejected, that the protest of the railroad
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of said decision as denied the right of townsite entry

of said lots 3 and 4 of Sec. 35, T. 161 N., R. 31 W., Judge Spooner,
on behalf of the Beaudette townsite applicants, appealed. The Minnesota

and Manitoba Railroad Company

portion of said decision which denied
right of possession of

all

of said lots 3

from that
and exclusive
and 4 under and by virtue of

its

also appealed

absolute

title

the provisions of the act of April IT, 1900. supra.

April 21, 1905, your

office

decision said, substantially, that what-

was acquired by the Minnesota and Manitoba Railroad
Company to the lands in question, under the act of April IT, 1900,
supra, vested in said company on July 13, 1900, the date on which its
map of definite location was filed, and that if the company on that
date acquired such title or right to the lands as would entitle it to
demand and enforce exclusive possession and use thereof, it necessarily followed that no rights thereto had been acquired by Cathcart or
ever

title

the townsite settlers, in view of the fact that settlement on said lands

prior to

November

10, 1903,

mental circular of August

As

had been expressly prohibited by depart-

11, 1899.

grant to the railroad company, the cases
United States Trust Co. (1T2 U. S., lTl), and
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v. Roberts (152 U. S., 114);
and Melder v. White (28 L. D., 412), in each of which cases said
As a result thereof it was
question was in issue, were considered.
found that " the Minnesota and Manitoba Railroad Company acquired and holds, by virtue of the grant made by Congress, a conditional fee in the lands covered by the approved map of the definite
location of its right of way and station grounds at the Rainy River
crossing, including all of lots 3 and 4, and 140 feet in width along the
of

to the character of said

New Mexico

v.

entire west line of the E. $ of

SW.

\

of Sec. 35, T. 161 N., R. 31

W. ;"

and that such a fee, as well as a fee simple, leaves nothing in the
United States which can be passed to another.
It was held that as the railroad company, on July 13, 1900, filed
a map designating its right of way and station grounds, which had
departmental approval on December 5, 1900, and had constructed its
road, its title was superior to any rights which Cathcart might have
by virtue of his extensive and valuable improvements and residence
for many years on the land.
Regarding the townsite settlers, the most of whom, it was said.
came upon the land subsequently to the completion of the railroad in
1900, or with notice of its intended construction, it was held thai
they must be conclusively presumed to have had knowledge of the
company's right to the lands, and that there was not sufficient evidence to establish a meritorious townsite settlement prior to July 13,
1

1

1900, or for

some time subsequent

thereto.
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said decision Cathcart,

and

also

Judge Spooner. acting

as

trustee for the townsite settlers, have appealed to the Department.
It is claimed on behalf of Cathcart that the grants in the cases cited
by your office as having conveyed a base or qualified fee, differ materially from the grant made to the Southern Kansas Railway Company by the act of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat., 73), which was under consideration in the case of Smith v. Townsend (148 U. S., 490), wherein
said grant was held to convey merely an easement that the grant to
the last-mentioned company contains a limitation upon the use of
the land not found in the other grants named, to wit: "That no
part of such lands herein granted shall be used except in such manner
and for such purposes, only, as are necessary for the construction, maintenance and convenient operation of said railroad; " also that in said
grant the right to amend or repeal is given without reservation, which
is not the case in said other grants; that it was mainly these provisions
in said act of 1884, which caused the court to hold that the grant made
therein was a mere easement, and it is urged that as said provisions
;

are contained in the act of 1900,
the Minnesota

making

the grant in question to

and Manitoba Company, which grant

it is also claimed
very similar in terms to the grant of 1884, said grant of 1900 should
be held to convey merely an easement and Cathcart be allowed to
make entry subject to the rights of the railroad company for right of

is

Way and

station grounds.

It should be noted that the grant in question to the railroad

com-

pany was for right of way and station grounds, and in addition
thereto forty acres at the Rainy River crossing.
Lots 3 and 4 selected
by the company at said point, under its grant of forty acres, contain
31.35 and 27.90 acres, respectively, or 59.25 acres in the aggregate.
The right of way passes through said lots and the station grounds
No claim is made that more than forty acres
are mainly thereon.
of said lots remain after allowing for said right of Avay and station
grounds, so that no part of said tracts would be left to Cathcart under
his homestead claim, unless he has the right to make entry thereof

company under its grant.
In the case of Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Smith
(171 U. S., 260), the title to certain lots in the city of Bismarck was
involved.
Said lots were wholly within the right of way of 400 feet
in width, granted to said railroad company by the act of July 2, 1864,
and were claimed by the company thereunder. The road was constructed in 1873, the report of acceptance thereof approved by the
President on December 1, 1873, and the company had maintained
and operated said road ever since. Smith claimed title under deed
of conveyance from the corporate authorities of the city of Bismarck,
as part of a townsite plat patented to the mayor of said city on July
subject to the right of the railroad

21, 1879.

It

was held that:
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By granting a right of way 400 feet in width Congress must be understood to
have conclusively determined that a strip of that width was necessary for a
public work of such importance and it was not competent for a court, at the
suit of a private party, to adjudge that only 25 feet thereof were occupied for
railroad purposes, in the face of the grant and of the finding that the entire
land in dispute was within 200 feet of the track of the railroad as actually constructed, and that the railroad company was in actual possession thereof by its
tenants.

The

precise character of the business carried on by such tenants

is

not dis-

presume that it is consistent with the public
duties and purposes of the railroad company; and at any rate a forfeiture for
closed, but the court is permitted to

mis-user could not be enforced in a private action.
Ill

the case under consideration herein the lands were a part of the

Red Lake Indian Reservation and were not opened to settlement and entry until November 10, 11)03. The railroad company
ceded

had, on July 13, 1900, filed its map of definite location of right
of way and station grounds, and showing the appropriation of
all of lots 3 and 4.
The road was constructed and the amount of
damages resulting from the construction thereof paid long prior to
the opening of the lands to settlement and entry.
Cathcart secured
no rights to the land by reason of his settlement prior to such opening, but it would seem that the railroad company's rights, under its
grant, attached on July 13, 1900, the date of the filing of its map.
If it were held that, under the terms of the grant, the railroad
company would be required to show that lots 3 and 4 were needed
for terminal purposes, it would seem that the approval of the ma]) of
definite location of the right of way and station grounds, and selec-.
tion of said lots, was an adjudication by the Secretary of the Interior
that the same were needed for such purposes.
And while it does not
appear that said lots, outside of the right of way and station grounds,
have as yet been used by the company in the construction, maintenance and o2)eration of its road, testimony was submitted to the
effect that it was and still is the intention of the company to use the
same for terminal purposes.
If there was any part of lots 3 and 4 left to which Cathcart's right

under this settlement could attach, after the appropriation by the
company for its right of way and station grounds and the
forty acres to which it was entitled under its grant, he might be
allowed to make entry of said lots subject to the company's rights
to the portion claimed by it under its grant, but said company's
railroad

rights appear to cover the entire lots.

In view of the situation

in this case

it

would not seem

difference whether the grant in question to the railroad

held to convey a base fee, or merely an easement.

Under

make any
company be

to

the decision

of the court in the case of Northern Pacific Railroad Co.

v.

Smith.

supra, until a forfeiture has been declared for mis-user or non-user,
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said lots can not be entered by Cathcart, and such forfeiture " could

not be enforced in a private action."

As

it appears that the rights of the railgrant attached on July 13, 1900, upon the

to the townsite applicants,

road company under

its

filing of its map of definite location of right of way and station
grounds and appropriation of lots 3 and 4, and that the road was
constructed through said lands long prior to the passage of the act
extending the townsite laws to lands within said reservation. Most
of the townsite settlers came upon the land subsequently to the completion of the road or with the knowledge of its intended construction.
It was held in the case of Link v. Union Pacific Railroad company (6 L. I)., 322), that "the construction and operation of a railroad is sufficient to put subsequent settlers within the limits of the
grant on inquiry as to the rights of the road, and parties claiming

adversely thereto."

Moreover, it appears that the buildings of Cathcart and store building of J. M. Loughlin, who is not a townsite applicant, are the only
ones built upon brick or stone foundations and really permanent in
character.

Those of the applicants are wholly within the limits of

the station grounds, except four or five small shanties and stables

whj^h are outside and quite scattered. Several of the parties enumerated as such settlers appear to have been merely at work, or staying there for a short time, also quite a number were holding homestead entries and claiming residence on other lands in the vicinity.

The Department
lish the fact

is

of opinion that the evidence fails to estab-

that there was a meritorious townsite settlement on the

land prior to July 13, 1900, or prior to the completion and operation
of the road.

Your
cation

is

office

decision

is

accordingly affirmed.

The townsite

as to said lots 3

and

4.

umatilla indian lands-acts of march 3, 1885, and july
preferfnce right— proof.
Burroughs
The

appli-

denied, and the homestead application of Cathcart rejected

v.

1,

190^2-

Carroll.

act of July 1, 1902, supplementary to the act of March .3, 1885, relating to
the disposition of lands in the Umatilla Indian reservation, accords to bond
fide settlers a preference right to

purchase the lands settled upon for the
period of ninety days, and where during that period purchase is made by
one claiming the preference right, but who in fact is not entitled thereto,
the entry allowed thereon will not be canceled for invalidity on that ground
alone,

where there was no existing preference right

at the time such entry

was made.

in

another to the lands
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in the act of March 3, 1885, within which a purchaser
thereunder must make the required proof of residence and cultivation, but
it rests with the claimant when it shall be submitted, so long as it be
within a reasonable time, and when submitted, the claimant, in the face of
a contest charging failure to comply with the law in the matter of residence,
must stand or fall upon the showing made, and will not be permitted, if
the proof be insufficient or fraudulent, to cure the -default.

tinio is specified

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F.L. C.)
May 31,1906.

Land

Office,

(E. O. P.)

Rosa Carroll has appealed to the Department from your office
September 14, 1905, holding for cancellation her cash
entry, made August 19, 1902, for lots 11, 12, 19 and 20, Sec. 7, T. 1 S.,
R, 33 E., untimbered lands, and the NE. J of NE. J, Sec. 22, T. 1,
R,. 35 E., timbered lands, La Grande land district, Oregon, upon
contest initiated against said entry by B. L. Burroughs.
The entry
in question was made under the provisions of the act of March 3,
1885 (23 Stat., 340), as amended by the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat,,
decision of

730).

The

affidavit of contest sets out as

grounds for the cancellation of

the entry

That the said Rosa Carroll was not prior to the first day of July, 1902, or at
any other time, a bona fide settler or resident on the above described tract of
land or any part thereof, nor had she prior to said date, settled upon or lived
upon said tract of land or any part thereof, as by law required, or at all.
That the said Rosa Carroll did not in any way comply with the act of Congress which was approved the first day of July, 1902, entitled an act to provide
for the sale of the unsold portions of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, so that
she might procure a preference right of ninety days from said date to purchase
said land as a bona fide settler.
That the said Rosa Carroll did make application to purchase said tract of land
under the preference right clause of said act of Congress.
That the said Rosa Carroll was, on the nineteenth day of August, 1902, and
for a long time prior thereto had been, the lawful wife of William J. Carroll,
and that while they were husband and wife, the said William J. Carroll also
purchased a quarter section of said land on said reservation, as follows, to wit,
cash entry number five hundred and ninety five, being lots numbered three,
eight, fifteen and sixteen of section number eighteen, township one south, range
thirty three E., W. M., and made October 22, 1902.
That the said Rosa Carroll made application to purchase said land at the
instance and request and for the use and benefit of Henry Wade.
That said Rosa Carroll has not at any time before or since making said entry
established a residence or lived upon said tract of land or any part thereof, nor
has she in any manner improved said land.

A

by the appeal makes
determine the sufficiency of the charges
made to sustain the contest, and this in turn depends upon a correct
it

correct decision of the questions presented

necessary

at the outset to
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construction of the acts under which the entry under investigation

was made.

But

for departmental decisions heretofore rendered

it

would be

necessary, in this connection, to fix the relation of the separate acts

and

to discover

what,

statute in so far as

provisions, as

if

it

any, effect the latter act has upon the original

might modify,

by the

it is

restrict, or

enlarge any of

its

latter act alone that the preference right to

is conferred.
However, this question has
been settled by departmental decisions in the cases of Davis v. Nelson
(33 L. IX, 119), and Hoover v. Jones (ib., ±7'2) wherein it was

enter any of these lands

,

decided that the two acts are

in

pari materia, and that the effect of

was not restrictive but on the contrary was supplemental
enlarged the original act by permitting a disposition
and
to the
private
sale as well as at public sale, but upon the same
lands
at
of the
as
provided by the original act governing public
conditions
terms and
the later act
first

sales.

The second

act also enlarged the first to the extent that a

was conferred upon a
v. Nelson, supra, it was

preference right to enter

In the case of Davis

specified class.

said:

Reading the two acts together and looking to the purpose of Congress, it is
obvious that the acts should be read as if the second were merely another section
of the first and provided that the remaining lands, which were not disposed of
at public sale, should be subject to private cash entry.

In addition, the preference right mentioned was conferred, but
beyond this no greater effect can be given to the second act to extend
the terms of the first.
This brings us to an examination of that part of the contest charge
touching the alleged wrongful assertion of such preference right b}'
The opinion of the Department, after a careful examinaCarroll.
tion of all the evidence before

formed the necessary

it,

any

briefly stated, is:

asserted,

it

act of

bona

She had not per-

on the
land at the time she asserted the preference right of entry, and was
not therefore entitled to claim such right. That she did claim it is
evident from the statements made and relied upon by her in her
applications, but, even conceding that the claim was erroneously
acts or

fide settlement

does not necessarily follow that the validity of her entry

any manner affected thereby. If at the time she asserted such
right she might as easily have made her entry without claiming the
benefit thereof, the Department is of opinion that it is wholly immais

in

terial

so far

proceeded.

as the

Had

validity of her entry

is

concerned,

how

she

there been an intervening adverse preference right

up within the ninety-day period allowed for asserting it, then as
between the parties claiming such right the question must be determined, and in such case if entry has been made by one under a
preference to which he is not entitled, his entry must be canceled

set
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a party entitled to a superior right.

not believed that an entry

made by one during
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But

it

is

the ninety-day period

even though under a mistaken claim of preference, can, under the
statute, be canceled for invalidity on that ground alone, if no superior
adverse preference right is set up until after the expiration of that
Certainly it can not be canceled where there is no such
period.
superior adverse right existing, for in such case the entryman

was

not compelled to seek the protection of such right but might as well

have based his right to enter solely upon his naked application. In
other words, where there is no existing preference right in another
at the time of entry, the assertion of such right by the claimant is
wholly unnecessary and can not therefore be held to be more than a
mere irregularity in no way affecting the validity of his entry. The
contest in so far as it rests upon allegations touching the preference
right of Carroll

must

fail.

contended that the allegations going to the failure
of Carroll to maintain residence on the land are insufficient as ground
In the opinion of the Department there is no lack of
of contest.
proof of her failure in this respect. The finding of your office that
Carroll was not the head of a family at the time she made the entry
is undoubtedly correct, and she could not therefore, coincident with
the maintenance of marital relations with her husband, who, it is
admitted, never resided on the land after entry, establish her claim
of separate residence thereon.
However, the original statute not
having been modified, except as already stated, must govern as to
residence, and unless it warrants the bringing of contest upon this
ground, the contention of claimant must be sustained. The statute,
after reciting the manner of making entry, payment, etc., declares:
It is further

And

before patent shall issue for untimbered lands the purchaser shall

make

satisfactory proof that he has resided upon the lands purchased at least one

year and has reduced at least twenty-five acres to cultivation.

In

departmental decision

in

the

case

of

Charles O.

Fanning

(20 L. D., 297, 298), construing the effect of the statute as to residence,

it

was

held, defining the action to be taken

tory proof of residence

where no

satisfac-

had been made

While you should refuse to issue patent upon a purchase of these lands until
and cultivation, as required, is shown, yet, if
llie payments are made within the time required, an entry can not be avoided,
and I have, therefore, to direct that Fanning be advised of the rejection of his
proof and that said entry be suspended until satisfactory proof is made showing compliance with the law in the matter of residence and cultivation.
satisfactory proof of residence

It is clear that upon this construction contest can not be sustained
upon the charge that claimant has failed to comply with the law in
the matter of residence until the time within which such proof shall
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be submitted

is fixed.

This the statute does not do.

But

it

does not

necessarily follow that because of this the fulfillment of the condition

may

be indefinitely postponed.

But

conveyance upon condition, where a prompt performance

in a case of

necessary to give the grantor, or the one who is to avail himself of
the same, the whole benefit contemplated to be secured to him, or where its
immediate fruition formed his motive for entering into the agreement, the
grantee shall not have his lifetime for its performance, but must do it in a
[Wash. Real Prop., Vol. 2, p. 11.]
reasonable time.
thereof

is

When

the claimant submits his proof he elects to stand or fall

By

own

which proof
which before was indefinite
and determinable only by the grantor, and in the face of a contest will
thereon.

his

act he determines the time within

shall be submitted; he fixes the period

not be permitted, if the proof
default.

is insufficient

The broad language used

in the

or fraudulent, to cure his

Fanning

case {supra)

was

not intended to extend the general rule beyond well established
limits.
The submission of final proof is a declaration on the part of
all the requirements of law have been honestly and
(Langer v. Wasman 34 L. D., 426, 430.) By such act
contest is invited and if by such means the fraudulent nature of the
proof is disclosed, claimant has no equitable right remaining upon
which to base a request to submit new proof. If there were no
adverse claims and the proof submitted was in some respect unsatisfactory but untainted with fraud, as in the Fanning case (supra),
further opportunity might be afforded claimant to submit other

claimant that
fully met,

proof.

Final proof having been submitted by Carroll, her entry thereupon
became contestable for failure to establish and maintain residence on
the land, and the charge having been fully sustained, her entry must
be canceled.
The judgment of your office is accordingly hereby
affirmed.

settlers upon

st.

paul, minneapolis

and manitoba railway lands.

Circular.

Registers and Receivers,

Gentlemen: The

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, May 22, 1906.
United States Land Offices.

act of April 17, 1906 (Public, No. 106), reads as

follows

That all qualified homesteaders who made settlement upon and improved
any of the land hereinafter designated and who were prevented from securing
title to

such land by reason of the contracts hereinafter described

shall,

in
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proof upon homestead entries made for other lands, be given credit
bona fide residence on and the amount of their respective

for the period of their

improvements upon the land for which they were so prevented from completing
including the time of continuous residence upon and improvements of said
land while defending in good faith their respective claims thereto as homestead settlers. The land above referred to is that part of the indemnity grant
to the Saint Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company defined. by the
acts of Congress dated, respectively, March third, eighteen hundred and fiftyseven (Eleventh Statutes, page one hundred and ninety-five, chapter ninetynine), and March third, eighteen hundred and sixty-five (Thirteenth Statutes,
page five hundred and twenty-six, chapter one hundred and five), which by reason of certain contracts between Reverend John Ireland and the Saint Paul,
Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company, one dated July seventeenth, eighteen hundred and eighty, and one dated March thirtieth, eighteen hundred and
eighty-three (more particularly described in the decision of the Commissioner
of the General Land Office contained in his letter of February third, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, in the appeal of the case of John Ireland against
Joseph Bennon and others from the action of the local land office and at Saint
Cloud, Minnesota), the said John Ireland and those with whom he contracted
to sell certain of said lands, either for himself or for said railway company,
were held authorized to purchase from the United States under the provision
of section five of the act of March third, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven
(Twenty-fourth Statutes, page five hundrd and fifty-six), after the date upon
which the claim of said railway company to receive said lands as indemnity
lands had been deified and canceled by the Interior Department Provided, That
no such person shall be entitled to the benefits of this act who shall fail to make
entry within two years after the passage thereof: And provided further, That
this act shall not be considered as entitling any person to make another homestead entry who shall have received the benefits of the homestead law since
being prevented, as aforesaid, from completing title to the lands so settled
upon and improved by him.
title,

:

to be benefited by this act are those who sethomestead claimants upon lands within the indemnity limits
of the grants by Congress to aid in the construction of the St. Paul,
Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway and who failed to obtain title
because of the superior claims of Reverend John Ireland and others
under the act of March 3, 1887, as purchasers from said railway company, and such claimants to come within the provisions of the law
must have been qualified homesteaders at the time of their settlements
and residence upon their original claims, and their entries must be
made within two years from the date of the approval of this act, to
wit, on or before April IT, 11)08. Those persons who have received the
benefits of the homestead law since being prevented from completing
title to the lands within the limits of the railway grants settled upon
and improved by them are excluded from the benefits of the act.
Therefore, when any homestead claimant in making final proof on
his homestead entry claims credit under the provisions of this act for
the period of his residence and the amount of his improvements upon
his original claim, which may include the time of his continuous resi-

-

The persons intended

tled as

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

632

dence and improvements while defending in good faith his claim as a
homestead settler, you will require him to make affidavit as to the facts
relative to his settlement, residence, and improvements thereon which
must describe such claim by legal subdivisions and be corroborated by
the affidavits of at least two witnesses having knowledge of such facts,
and said affidavits must satisfactorily show compliance with the law to
the extent claimed, as they will form part of the final proof for the
land, title to which is sought.
You will also require the claimant to make affidavit that he has not
received the benefits of the homestead laws since being prevented
from completing title to the land originally settled upon and claimed.

Very

respectfully,

W.

A. Richards, Commissioner.

Approved, May 22, 1906
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
:

opening of ceded portion of crow indian reservation in montana.

By the

President of the United States.

A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, By an agreement between the Indians of the Crow
Indian Reservation in Montana, on the one part, and Benjamin F.
Barge, James H. McNeely, and Charles G. Hoyt, Commissioners on
behalf of the United States, on the other part, amended and ratified
b} act of Congress approved April twenty-seven, nineteen hundred
and four (33 Stat., 352), said Indians ceded, granted, and relinquished to the United States all their right, title, and interest in and
to the unallotted lands within the following boundaries, to-wit
r

Beginning at the northeast corner of the said Crow Indian Reservation
thence running due south to a point lying due east of the northeast corner of
thence running due west to the northwest
the Fort Custer military reservation
corner of said Fort Custer military reservation; thence due south to the southwest corner of said Fort Custer military reservation
thence due west to the
intersection of the line hetween sections ten and eleven, township two south,
thence due
range twenty-eight east of the Principal Meridian of Montana
;

;

;

north to the intersection of the Montana hase line
thence due west to the
intersection of the western boundary of the Crow Indian Reservation thence in
a northeasterly direction following the present boundary of said reservation to
;

;

the point of beginning.

And, Whereas, Under the
ment,

among

other things,

it

act of Congress ratifying said agree-

was provided

That the unallotted lands, except such lands as may have been
withdrawn for reclamation under the act of June seventeen, nine-
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teen hundred and two (32 Stat., 388), and such tracts as may have
been reserved for thirty days after the date of opening as subject to
the preference right of entry of the purchasers of the improvements

and except sections sixteen
and thirty-six, or lands selected in lieu thereof, which are reserved
for common school purposes and are granted to the State of Montana for such purposes, shall be disposed of under the homestead,
townsite, and mineral land laws of the United States, and shall be
opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President,
which proclamation shall prescribe the manner in which the lands
may be settled upon, occupied, and entered by persons entitled to
make entry thereof; and no person shall be permitted to settle upon,
occupy, or enter any of said lands, except as prescribed in such proclamation, until after the expiration of sixty days from the time when
the same are open to settlement and entry: Provide^ That as to the
lands opened under such proclamation, all rights of honorably discharged Union soldiers and sailors of the late Civil and the Spanish
war, or the Philippine insurrection, as defined and described in sections twenty-three hundred and four and twenty-three hundred and
five of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of March first,
nineteen hundred and one (31 Stat., 847), shall not be abridged.
Now, Therefore, I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the said act of Congress, do hereby declare and make known that all of the unallotted
lands in said reservation, except such as may at that time have been
withdrawn for reclamation under said act of June seventeenth,
nineteen hundred and two, and such lands as may have been reserved
of the former Indian claimants thereon,

as subject to the preference right of entry of the purchasers of the

improvements of the former Indian claimants thereon, and except
sixteen and thirty-six, or lands selected in lieu thereof,
which are reserved for common school purposes for the State of
Montana, will, on and after the sixteenth day of July, nineteen
hundred and six, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, and not
otherwise, be opened to settlement, entry, and disposition under the
general provisions of the homestead, townsite, and mineral land
laws of the United States.
And it is further provided that, commencing at 9 o'clock a. m. on
Thursday, June 14, 190(>, and ending at 6 o'clock p. m., Thursday,
June 28, 1906, a registration will be held at Miles City and Billings,
State of Montana, and Sheridan, State of Wyoming, for the purpose
of ascertaining what persons desire to enter, settle upon, and acquire
title to any of said ceded lands under the homestead law, and of
sections

ascertaining their qualifications so to do.

To

obtain registration

each applicant will be required to show himself duly qualified to
make homestead entry of these lands under existing laws, by written
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application to be

made on

a

blank furnished only at the places

herein designated for registration, by the Commissioner of the Gen-

Land Office, and to give the registering officers such appropriate
matters of description and identity as will protect the applicant and
the government against any attempted impersonation. Registration can not be effected through the use of the mails or the employ-

eral

ment of an agent, except

that honorably discharged soldiers and

sailors entitled to the benefits of section twenty-three

hundred and

four of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended by
the act of Congress approved
(31 Stat., 8-17),

may

March

first,

nineteen hundred and one

present their applications for registration and

due proofs of their qualifications through an agent of their own
having a duly executed power of attorney on a blank furnished by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, but no
person will be permitted to act as agent for more than one such soldier or sailor.
No person will be permitted to register more than
once or in any other than his true name.
Each applicant who shows himself duly qualified will be registered
and given a nontransferable certificate to that effect, which will entitle
him to go upon and examine the lands to be opened hereunder; but
the only purpose for which he can go upon and examine said lands is
that of enabling him later on, as herein provided, to understandingly
select the lands for which he may make entry. No one will be permitted to make settlement upon any of said lands in advance of the
opening herein provided for, and during the first sixty days following said opening no one but registered applicants will be permitted
to make homestead settlement upon any of said lands, and then only in
pursuance of a homestead entry duly allowed by the local land officers,
or of a soldiers' declaratory statement duly accepted by such officers.
The order in which, during the first sixty days following the opening, the registered applicants will be permitted to make homestead
entry of the lands opened hereunder, will be determined by a drawing
for the district publicly held at Billings, Montana, commencing at
9 o'clock a. m., Monday, July 2, 1906, and continuing for such
period as may be necessary to complete the same. The drawing will
be had under the supervision and immediate observance of a committee of three persons wdiose integrity is such as to make their control of the drawing a guaranty of fairness.
The members of this
committee will be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, who
will prescribe suitable compensation for their services. Preparatory
to this drawing the registration officers will, at the time of registering each applicant who shows himself duly qualified, make out
a card, which must be signed by the applicant, and giving such a
description of the applicant as will enable the local land officers to
selection,
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This card will be subsequently sealed in a

separate envelope which will bear no other distinguishing label or
mark than such as may be necessary to show that it is to go into the
drawing. These envelopes w ill be carefully preserved and remain
sealed until opened in the course of the

drawing herein provided.

When

of these sealed envelopes

registration is completed
brought together at the place of the drawing and turned over
to the committee in charge of the drawing, who, in such manner as
in their judgment will be attended with entire fairness and equality
of opportunity, shall proceed to draw out and open the separate
envelopes and give to each inclosed card a number in the order in
which the envelope containing the same is drawn. The result of the
drawing will be certified by the committee to the officers of the
district and will determine the order in which the applicants may
make homestead entry of said lands and settlement thereon.
Notice of the drawings, stating the name of each applicant and
number assigned to him by the drawing, will be posted each day at
the place of drawing, and each applicant will be notified of his number and of the day upon which he must make his entry by a postal
card mailed to him at the address given by him at the time of regisThe result of each day's drawing will also be given to the
tration.
press to be published as a matter of news.
Applications for homestead entry of said lands during the first sixty days following the
opening can be made only by registered applicants and in the order
established by the drawing.
Commencing on Monday, July 10, 190G, at 9 o'clock a. m., the
the

all

will be

applications of those drawing numbers

presented at the land

office in

Billings,

1

to 125, inclusive,

Montana,

must be

in the land district

in which said lands are situated, and will be considered in their
numerical order during the first day, and the applications of those
drawing numbers 12G to 250, inclusive, must be presented and will be
considered in their numerical order during the second da}', and so
all of said lands subject to entry under the homeand desired thereunder, have been entered. If any applicant fails to appear and present his application for entry when the
number assigned to him by the drawing is reached, his right to

on at that rate until
stead law,

enter will be passed until after the other applications assigned for

day have been disposed

that

tunity to

make

abandoned his right

To

of,

when he will be given another opporwhich he will be deemed to have

entry, failing in
to

make entry under such drawing.

obtain the allowance of

a

homestead entry, each applicant must

personally present the certificate of registration theretofore issued

him, together with a regular application and the necessary accompanying proofs, together with the regular land office fees, but an

to

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

636

honorably discharged soldier or sailor may file his declaratory statement through his agent, who can represent but one soldier or sailor
as in the matter of registration.
Persons who make homestead entry for any of the ceded lands will
be required to pay four dollars per acre, payment in all cases to be
made as follows: One dollar per acre at the time of entry, and the
remainder to he paid in four equal annual installments, the first
installment to be paid at the end of the second year.
Upon all
entries the usual fee and commissions shall be paid, as provided for
in the homestead laws on lands the price of which is one dollar and
twenty-five cents per acre.

In case any entryman fails to make the payments herein provided
any of them, promptly when due, all rights in and to the
lands covered by his or her entry shall at once cease, and any payments theretofore made shall be forfeited, and the entry shall be
held for cancellation and canceled, and the land embraced therein
shall thereupon be subject to entry at the price and upon the terms
above set forth. Lands entered under the townsite and mineral land
laws shall be paid for in amount and manner as provided by said
laws, but in no case at a less price than that fixed for such lands if
entered under the homestead laws.
The production of the certificate of registration will be dispensed
with only upon satisfactory proof of its loss or destruction. If at
the time of considering his regular application for entry it appears
that an applicant is disqualified from making homestead entry of
these lands, his application will be rejected, notwithstanding his
If any applicant shall register more than once
prior registration.
hereunder, or in any other than his true name, or shall transfer his
registration certificate, he will thereby lose all the benefits of the
registration and drawing herein provided for. and will be precluded
from entering or settling upon any of said lands during the first
sixty days following said opening.
Any person or persons desiring to found, or to suggest establishing, a town site upon any of the said lands, at any point, may. at any
time before the opening herein provided for. file in the land office a
for, or

written application to that

effect,

describing by legal subdivisions the

lands intended to be affected, and stating fully and under oath the
necessity or propriety of founding or establishing a

The

town

at

that

forthwith transmit said petition to
the Commissioner of the General Land Office with their recommendaplace.

local

officers

will

Such Commissioner,

he believes the public
the Secretary of the
Interior approve thereof, issue an order withdrawing the lands

tion in the premises.
interests

will

be subserved thereby, will,

if

if

described in such petition, or any portion thereof, from homestead

entry and settlement and directing that the same be held for the
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time being for disposal under the towrisite laws of the United States
ir such manner as the Secretary of the Interior may from time to
time direct; and, if at any time after such withdrawal has been
made it is determined that the lands so withdrawn are not needed
for townsite purposes they may be released from such withdrawal
and then disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead

laws in the manner prescribed herein.
All persons are especially admonished that under the said act of
Congress approved April 27, 1904, it is provided that no person shall
be permitted to settle upon, occupy, or enter any of said lands, except

manner prescribed

in the

in this proclamation, until after the expira-

from the time when the same are opened to settlement and entry, and the lands are not subject to mineral exploration
tion of sixty days

or location during that period.

After the expiration of said period

of sixty days, but not before, as hereinbefore prescribed,

any of said

lands which are non-mineral, remaining undisposed of,

may

be

set-

and entered under the general provisions of the
homestead and townsite laws of the United States in like manner
as if the manner of effecting such settlement, occupancy, and entry
had not been prescribed herein in obedience to law, and such of said
tled upon, occupied,

lands as are mineral will then be subject to the provisions of the

mining laws.

The Secretary of

the Interior shall prescribe all needful rules and

regulations necessary to carry into full effect the opening herein

provided for.
In witness whereof, I have hereto
of the United States to be affixed.

Done

at the

set

my hand

and caused the

seal

City of Washington this 24th day of May, in the year

of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and six, and of the Independ-

ence of the United States the one hundred and thirtieth.
|

Theodore Roosevelt.

seal.
|

By

the President

Elihu Root,
Secretary of State.

opening of ceoed portion of crow indian reservation in montana.
Regulations.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, May ,J'h 1906.
Register and Receiver,

United States Land Offi'r<\ Billings, Montana.
Gentlemen: The following regulations are hereby prescribed

for

the purpose of carrying into effect the opening of the ceded portion

of the

Crow Indian Reservation

in the State of

Montana, provided

DECISIONS DELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

638
for

iii

the act of Congress of April 27, 1904 (33 Stat., 352), and in

the President's proclamation of
First. Applications either to

May
file

24, 1906,

thereunder:

soldiers' declaratory statement or

make homestead entry

of these lands must, on presentation, in accordance with proclamation opening said lands to entry and settlement,

be accepted or rejected, but local officers may, in their discretion,
permit amendment of a defective application during the day only
on which same is presented.
Second. No appeal to General Land Office will be allowed or considered unless taken within one day, Sundays excepted, after the
rejection of the application.

Third. After rejection of an application, whether an appeal be
taken or not, the land will continue to be subject to entry as before,
excepting that any subsequent applicant for the same land must be

informed of the prior rejected application and that the subsequent
application, if allowed, will be subject to the disposition of the prior

application upon the appeal,

if any is taken from the rejection
which fact must be noted upon the receipt or certificate
issued upon the allowance of the subsequent application.

thereof,

Fourth. Where an appeal is taken the papers will be immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will be at once
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior
with appropriate recommendation, when the matter wilLbe promptly
decided and closed.
Fifth. Applications to contest entries allowed for these lands filed
during the sixty days from date of opening will also be immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will at once be
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior
with proper recommendation, when the matter will be promptly
decided.

Sixth. These regulations will supersede, during the sixty days
from the opening of these lands, any rule of practice or other regulation governing the disposition of applications with Avhich they
conflict,

and

will apply to all appeals taken

may

from the action of

the

during said period of sixty days.
Seventh. The purpose of these regulations is to provide an adequate and speedy method of correcting any material errors in local
offices, and at the same time to discourage groundless appeals and
put it out of the power of a disappointed applicant to indefinitely
tie up the land or force another to pay him to withdraw his appeal.
Give all possible publicity, through the press and otherwise, to
local officers

these regulations.

W. A.
Approved,

May

24,

1906

E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

Richards, Commissioner.
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ceded crow indian lands-homestead entry-oualifications.
Circular.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, R. C, May 2Jh 1906.
The following persons are not qualified to make homestead entry of
the lands of the ceded portion of the Crow Indian Reservation-, in
Montana
1. Any person who has made a prior homestead entry and is not entitled to
make a second homestead entry. Under the act of June 5, 1900 (31 Stat., 267),
any person who made a homestead entry and commuted the same prior to June
5, 1900, is entitled to make a second homestead entry; under the act of May 22,
1902 (32 Stat, 20.3), any person who made final five-year proof, prior to May 17,

on lands to he sold tor the benefit of Indians, and paid the price provided
who would have been entitled under
title without such payment, had not
proof been made prior thereto, is entitled to make a second homestead entry
under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 527), any person who, prior to April 28,
1904, made homestead entry but was unable to perfect the entry on account of
some unavoidable complication of his personal or business affairs, or on account
of an honest mistake as to the character of the land, provided he made a hona
fair effort to comply with the homestead law and did not relinquish his entry
for a consideration, is entitled to make a second homestead entry
under section
2 of said act any person who has made a homestead entry of a quantity of land
containing less than 100 acres, and is still owning and occupying the same, may
enter a sufficient quantity of lands contiguous to the lands embraced in his
original entry to make up the full amount of 160 acres; under section 6 of the
act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), any person who has made a homestead
entry for less than 160 acres, and has received the receiver's final receipt therefor, is entitled to enter enough additional land, not necessarily contiguous to
the original entry, to make 160 acres.
2. A married woman, unless she has been deserted or abandoned by her hus19(>(>,

by law opening the land to settlement, and
the "free homestead" law to have received

;

;

band.

One not a citizen of the United States, who has not declared his intention
become such.
4. Anyone under 21 years of age, not the head of a family, unless he served in
the Army or Navy of the United States for not less than fourteen days during
3.

to

actual war.
5.

Anyone who

is

the proprietor of

more than 100 acres

of land in

any State

or Territory.

One who has acquired

title to, or is claiming under any of the public land
pursuance of settlement or entries made since August 30, 1890, an
amount of land other than mineral land, which, with the tract now sought to be
entered, will exceed in the aggregate 320 acres.
0.

laws,

in

W.
Approved,

May

24, 1906:

E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

A. Richards, Commissioner.
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OPENING OF SHOSHONE OR WIND RIVER INDIAN RESERVATION IN
WYOMING.

By the

President of the United States.

A PKOCLAMATIOX.
By an agreement

between the Shoshone and Arapahoe
belonging to the Shoshone or Wind River reservation in the State of Wyoming, on the one part, and James McLaughlin, a United States Indian Inspector, on the other part, amended

Whereas,

tribes of Indians,

and ratified by act of Congress approved March third, nineteen
hundred and five (33 Stat., 1016), the said Indian tribe ceded,
granted, and relinquished to the United States all the right, title,
and interest which they may have had to all of the unallotted lands
embraced within said reservation, except the lands within and
bounded by the following described lines:
Beginning in the midchannel of the Big Wind River at a point where said
stream crosses the western boundary of the said reservation; thence in a southeasterly direction following the midchannel of the Big Wind River to its conjunction with the Little Wind or Big Popo-Agie River, near the northeast corner of township one south, range four east; thence up the midchannel of the
Big Popo-Agie River in a southwesterly direction to the month of the North
Fork of the said Big Popo-Agie River: thence up the midchannel of said North
Fork of the Big- Popo-Agie River to its intersection witli the southern boundary
of the said reservation, near the southwest corner of section twenty-one, township two south, range one west; thence due west along the said southern boundary of the said reservation to the southwest corner of the same; thence north
along the western boundary of said reservation to the place of beginning.

And. Whereas,
hundred and

teen

It

was provided by said

five,

act of

March

three, nine-

that said unallotted lands ceded to the United

States under said agreement should be disposed of under the provi-

and mineral land laws of the
United States, and should be opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President of the United States on June fifteenth,
nineteen hundred and six. which proclamation shall prescribe the
manner in which the lands shall be settled upon, occupied, and entered
by persons permitted to make entry thereof, and no person shall be
permitted to settle upon, occupy or enter said lands except as presions of the homestead, townsite, coal

scribed in said proclamation, until after the expiration of sixty days

from the time when the same are open

to settlement

the rights of honorably discharged soldiers
civil

and Spanish wars,

as defined

and

and entry; and

sailors of the late

and described in sections twenty-

three hundred and four and twenty-three hundred and five of the

Eevised Statutes of the United States, as amended by the act of
one, nineteen hundred and one, shall not be abridged;
And, Whereas, The time for the opening of said unalloted lands
was extended to the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and

March
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unless the President shall determine that the same may be opened
an earlier date, by Public Resolution of Congress, approved March

six,

at

twenty-eighth, nineteen hundred

Twelve)

and

six

(Public Resolution No.

;

Now, Therefore,

Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
power in me vested by the said
Act and Resolution of Congress, do hereby declare and make known
I,

States of America, by virtue of the

that all the unallotted lands in the ceded portion of said reservation,

except such as

may

at that time have been reserved for carrying out

the provisions of said

amended

treaty relative to the rights of

Asmus

Boysen, allowing him to locate in accordance with the Government
surveys not to exceed six hundred and forty acres in the form of a
square, of mineral Or coal lands in said reservation, and to purchase

and after the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hunsix,
manner hereinafter prescribed, and not otherwise,
and
in
the
dred
settlement,
to
entry, and disposition under the general probe opened
visions of the homestead, townsite, coal, and mineral land laws of the
United States.
And it is further directed and provided that commencing at nine
o'clock a. m., on Monday, July 16, 1906, and ending at six o'clock
p. m., Tuesday, July 31, 190G, a registration will be held at Lander,
Shoshoni, and Thermopolis; also, at Worland, provided that the Big
Horn Railroad, now in course of construction, shall be completed and
doing a passenger traffic to that place on July 1G, 1906, for the purpose of ascertaining the names and qualifications of all persons who
desire to enter, settle upon, or acquire title to any of said ceded lands
under the homestead laws.
To obtain registration for the purpose of making a homestead entry
of any of said ceded lands each applicant will be required to show
himself duly qualified under the law to make such entry, and this
showing must be made by the presentation of a sworn application for
registration executed on a blank furnished by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office which can be obtained only at the time and places
of registration herein mentioned, and each person registering must
the same, will, on

give the registering officer such appropriate matters of description
and identification as will protect the applicant and the Government
against any attempted impersonation.
Registration can not be effected through the use of the mails or the
employment of an agent, excepting that honorably discharged soldiers
and sailors entitled to the benefits of section twenty-three hundred
and four of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended
by the act of Congress approved March one, nineteen hundred
and one (31 Stat., 847), may present their applications for registration for the purpose of making a homestead entry and make due proof
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of their qualifications through an agent of their own selection having
a duly executed power of attorney on a blank furnished by the Com-

missioner of the General
be permitted to

Land

Office,

but no person will be permitted
No person will
sailor.

more than one soldier or
register more than once, nor

to act as agent for

will he be permitted to

any other than his true name.
Each applicant who shows himself duly qualified will be registered
and given a non-transferable certificate to that effect, and each person holding such certificate will be entitled to go upon any ceded
lands subject to entry hereunder and examine such lands, but the only
purpose for which he can go uj^on and examine such lands is to enable
him later on, as herein provided, to understanding^ select the lands
for which he may make entry.
The order in which during the first sixty days following the opening the registered applicants will be permitted to make homestead
entry of lands opened hereunder will be determined by a drawing for
the district, held at Lander, Wyoming, commencing at nine o'clock
a. m., Saturday, August 4, 1906, and continuing for such period necessary to complete the same. The drawing will be had under the
supervision and immediate observance of a committee of three persons
whose integrity is such as to make their control of the drawing a
guaranty of its fairness. The members of this committee will be
appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, who will prescribe suitPreparatory to this drawing
able compensation for their services.

register in

the registration officers will, at the time of registering each applicant

himself duly qualified, make out a card which must be
signed by the applicant, and give such a description of the applicant
This
as will enable the local land officers to thereafter identify him.

who shows

card will be subsequently sealed in a separate envelope which will
bear no other distinguishing label or mark than such as may be necessary to show that it is to go into the drawing. These envelopes will
be carefully preserved and remain sealed until opened in the course
of the drawing herein provided. When the registration is completed
all

of these sealed envelopes will be brought together at the place of

drawing and turned over to the committee in charge of the drawing,
who, in such manner as in their judgment will be attended with entire
fairness and equality of opportunity, shall proceed to draw out and
open the separate envelopes and to give to each inclosed card a number in the order in which the envelope containing the same is drawn.
The result of the drawing will be certified to the officers of the district
and will determine the order in which the applicants may make
homestead entry of said lands and settlement thereon.
Notices of the drawing, stating the name of each applicant and the
number assigned to him by the drawing, will be posted each day at
the place of the drawing, and each applicant will be notified of his
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number and the day upon which he must make his entry, by a postal
card mailed to him at the address given by him at the time of the
registration. The result of each day's drawing will also be given to
the press and published as a matter of news. Applications for homestead

entry during the sixty days following the opening can be

made only by

registered applicants

and

in the order established

by

the drawing.

Commencing August
o'clock

a.

hundred and six, at nine
drawing numbers 1 to
make homestead entries, must be pre-

fifteenth, nineteen

m., the applications of those persons

100, inclusive, entitling

them

to

Lander, Wyoming, in the land district in
which the said lands are situated and will be considered in their
numerical order during the first day, and the applications of those
sented at the land

office at

drawing numbers 101 to 200, inclusive, entitling them to make homestead entries, must be presented and will be considered in their
numerical order during the second day, and so on, Sundays excluded,
at the rate of 100 such applications per day until and including August
on and after August twentytwenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and six
seventh, nineteen hundred and six, such applications will be considered in like manner at the rate of 120 per day, Sundays excluded,
until and including September sixth, nineteen hundred and six; on
and after September seventh, nineteen hundred and six, such applications will be considered at the rate of 140 per day, Sundays excluded,
until and including September eighteenth, nineteen hundred and six;
on and after September nineteenth, nineteen hundred and six, such
applications will be considered at the rate of 100 per day, Sundays
excluded, until and including September twenty-ninth, nineteen hundred and six; and on and after October one, nineteen hundred and
;

six,

such applications will be considered at the rate of 170 per day,

Sundays excluded, until and including October thirteenth, nineteen
hundred and six, the expiration of the sixty day period.
If any applicant fails to appear and present his application to
make a homestead entry, when the number assigned to him by the
drawing is reached, his application to enter will be passed until after
the other applications assigned to that day have been disposed of,
when he will, on that day, be given another opportunity to make
entry, and if he fail to do so he will be deemed to have abandoned
his right to

To

make entry under such drawing.

obtain the allowance of a homestead entry each applicant will

personally present the certificate of registration theretofore issued to
him, together with a regular homestead application and the neces-

sary accompanying proofs, together with the regular land

but an honorably discharged soldier or sailor

file

office fees,

his declaratory

who can represent but one soldier or
matter of registration.

statement through his agent,
sailor as in the

may
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The production of the certificate of registration will be dispensed
with only upon satisfactory proof of its loss or destruction. If, at
the time of considering the regular application to enter, it appear
that the applicant is disqualified from making homestead entry on
these lands his application will be rejected notwithstanding his prior
registration.
If any applicant shall register more than once hereunder or in any other than his true name, or shall transfer his registration certificate, he will thereby lose all the benefits of the registration and drawing herein provided for and will be precluded from
entering or settling upon any of said lands during the first sixty days
following the opening.
Persons who make homestead entries for any of the ceded lands
within two years after the opening of the same to entry shall pay one
dollar and fifty cents per acre for the lands embraced in their entries
and for all of the ceded lands thereafter entered under the homestead
laws the sum of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre shall be
paid,

payment

in all cases to be

made

as follows

Fifty cents per acre at the time of making entry and twenty-five
cents per acre each year thereafter until the price per acre hereinbefore provided shall have been fully paid.

Upon

all

entries the

usual fees and commissions shall be paid as provided for in the homestead laws on lands the price of which

is

one dollar and twenty-five

cents per acre.

In case any entryman fails to make the payments hereinbefore
provided for under homestead entries within the time stated, the right
of said entryman to the lands covered by his or her entry shall be for-

and the entry

will be canceled.
person or persons desiring to found, or to suggest establishing, a townsite upon any of the said lands, at any point, may, at any
time before the opening herein provided for, file in the land office a
feited

Any

written application to that

effect,

describing by legal subdivisions the

lands intended to be affected, and stating fully and under oath the
necessity or propriety of founding or establishing a
place.

The

town

at that

local officers will forthwith transmit said petition to the

Commissioner of the General Land Office with their recommendations
Such Commissioner, if he believe the public inter-

in the premises.

be subserved thereby, will, if the Secretary of the Interior approve thereof, issue an order withdrawing the lands described in
such petition, or any portion thereof, from homestead entry and settlement and directing that the same be held for the time being for
disposal under the townsite laws of the United States in such manner
as the Secretary of the Interior may from time to time direct; and,
if at any time after such withdrawal has been made it is determined

ests will

that the lands so withdrawn are not needed for townsite purposes,
they may be released from such withdrawal and then disposed of
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in the

manner

prescribed herein.

The lands entered under the townsite, coal and mineral land laws
amount and manner provided by the laws under
which they are entered, and unless entry and payment under mineral
locations shall be made within three years from date of location, all
shall be paid for in

rights thereunder shall cease.

All persons are especially admonished that under said act of Congress approved

March

three, nineteen

hundred and

five, it is

provided

that no person shall be permitted to settle upon, occupy, or enter any

manner prescribed in this proclamation
from the time when the same
settlement and entry. After the expiration of said
days, but not before, as herein prescribed, any of said

of said lands except in the

until after the expiration of sixty days

are opened to

period of sixty

lands remaining undisposed of
tered, or

townsite, coal

manner

may

be settled upon, occupied, en-

located under the general provisions of the homestead,

and mineral land laws of the United States

as if the

manner

in like

affecting such settlement, occupancy, entry,

and location had not been prescribed herein in obedience to law.

The Secretary of

the Interior shall prescribe all needful rules

and

regulations necessary to carry into full effect the opening herein

provided for.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 2nd day of June in the year
of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and six, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and thirtieth.

Theodore Roosevelt

[seal.]

By

the President

Elihu Root,
Secretary of State.

opening of ceded portion of shoshone or wind rtver indian
reservation in wyoming.
Regulations.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, June 4, 1906.
Register and Receiver,

United States Land Office, Lander, Wyoming.
Gentlemen: The following regulations are hereby

prescribed for

tha purpose of carrying into effect the opening of the ceded portion
of the Shoshone or

Wyoming, provided

Wind River

Indian Reservation in the State of
March 3, 1905 (33

for in the act of Congress of
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Stat., 1016),

and

in the President's proclamation of

June

2,

1906,

thereunder
First. Applications either to file soldiers' declaratory statement or

make homestead entry

of these lands must, on presentation, in accordance with proclamation opening said lands to entry and settlement, be accepted or rejected, but local officers may, in their discretion, permit amendment of a defective application during the day
only on which same is presented.

Second.

No

appeal to General

Land

sidered unless taken within one day,

Office will be allowed or con-

Sundays excepted,

after the

rejection of the application.

Third. After rejection of an application, whether an appeal be
taken or not, the land will continue to be subject to entry as before,
excepting that any subsequent applicant for the same land must be

informed of the prior rejected application and that the subsequent
application, if allowed, will be subject to the disposition of the prior

application upon the appeal,

if any is taken from the rejection
which fact must be noted upon the receipt or certificate
issued upon the allowance of the subsequent application.
Fourth. Where an appeal is taken the papers will be immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will be at once
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior
with appropriate recommendation, when the matter will be promptly
decided and closed.

thereof,

Fifth. Applications to contest entries allowed for these lands filed
during the sixty days from date of opening will also be immediately
forwarded to the General Land Office, where they will at once be
carefully examined and forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior
with proper recommendation, when the matter will be promptly
decided.

Sixth. These regulations will supersede, during the sixty days
from the opening of these lands, any rule of practice or other regulation governing the disposition of applications with which they
may conflict, and will apply to all appeals taken from the action of
the local officers during said period of sixty days.

Seventh. The purpose of these regulations is to provide an adequate and speedy method of correcting any material errors in local
offices, and at the same time to discourage groundless appeals and

put
tie

it

out of the power of

up the land or

Give

all

a

disappointed applicant to indefinitely

pay him

force another to

to

withdraw his appeal.
and otherwise, to

possible publicity, through the press

these regulations.

W.
Approved June 4, 1906
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

A. Richards, Commissioner.
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SHOSHONE OR WIND RIVER INDIAN LANDS— HOMESTEAD ENTRY—QUALIFICATIONS.

Circular.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, June {, 1900:
The following persons are not qualified to make homestead entry
of the lands of the ceded portion of the Shoshone or

Indian Reservation in

Wind

River

Wyoming:

1. Any person who has made a prior homestead entry and is not entitled to
make a second homestead entry. Under the act of June 5, 1900 (31 Stat., 267),
any person who made a homestead entry and commuted the same prior to June
Under the act of May 22,
5, 1900, is entitled to make a second homestead entry.
1902 (32 Stat, 203), any person who made final five-year proof, prior to May

17, 1900, on lands to be sold for the benefit of the Indians, and paid the price
provided by law opening the land to settlement, and who would have been entitled under the " free homestead " law to have received title without such
payment, had not proof been made prior thereto, is entitled to make a second

homestead entry; under the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat, 527), any person
who, prior to April 28, 1904, made homestead entry but was unable to perfect
the entry on account of some unavoidable complication of his personal or business affairs, or on account of an honest mistake as to the character of the
land, provided he made a bona fide effort to comply with the homestead law
and did not relinquish his entry for a consideration, is entitled to make a second homestead entry under section 2 of said act any person who has made a
homestead entry of a quantity of land containing less than 160 acres, and is
still owning and occupying the same, may enter a sufficient quantity of lands
contiguous to the lands embraced in his original entry to make up the full
amount of 160 acres; under section 6 of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat,
854), any person who has made a homestead entry for less than 160 acres, and
has received the receiver's final receipt therefor, is entitled to enter enough
additional land, not necessarily contiguous to the original entry, to make 160
;

acres.
2.

A

married woman, unless she has been deserted or abandoned by her hus-

band.
citizen of the United States, and who has not declared his intenbecome such.
4. Anyone under 21 years of age, not the head of a family, unless he served
in the Army or Navy of the United States for not less than fourteen days during
3.

One not a

tion to

actual war.
5.

Anyone who

is

the proprietor of more than 100 acres of land in any State

or Territory.
6.

One who has acquired

title to,

or

is

claiming under any of the public land
made since August 30. 1890, an

laws, in pursuance of settlement or entries

amount of land other than mineral land, which, with the tract
be entered, will exceed in the aggregate 320 acres.

W.
Approved June 4, 1906
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
:

now sought

A. Richards, Commissioner.

to
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EVEN-NUMBERED MINERAL SECTIONS IN FORMER UNCOMPAHGRE INDIAN
RESERVATION, UTAH.

By the

President of the United States.

A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, by the act of Congress approved June
it was provided:

7,

1897 (30 Stat.,

87),

The Secretary

of the Interior

in severalty to the

is

hereby directed to allot agricultural lands

Uncompahgre Ute Indians now located upon or belonging

to

Uncompahgre Indian reservation in the State of Utah, said allotments to
be upon the Uncompahgre and Uintah reservations or elsewhere in said State.
And all the lands of said Uncompahgre reservation not theretofore allotted in
severalty to said Uncompahgre Utes shall, on and after the first day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, be open for location and entry under all the
the

land laws of the United States

;

excepting, however, therefrom all lands con-

taining gilsonite, asphalt, elaterite, or other like substances.

And

the

title to all

of the said lands containing gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite,

or other like substances,

And

whereas,

it

is

is

reserved to the United States.

provided by the act of Congress approved

1903 (32 Stat., 998), entitled, "An act making appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of the Indian Depart-

March

ment,"
That

3,

etc.,
in the

as follows
lands within the former Uncompahgre Indian reservation, in the

State of Utah, containing gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite, or other

like

sub-

which were reserved from location and entry by provision in the act
of Congress entitled "An act making appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of the Indian department, and for fulfilling treaty stipulations
with various Indian tribes, for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and for other purposes," approved June seventh,
eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, all discoveries and locations of any such
mineral lands by qualified persons prior to January first, eighteen hundred and
ninety-one, not previously discovered and located, who recorded notices of such
discoveries and locations prior to January first, eighteen hundred and ninetystances,

one, either in the State of Colorado, or in the office of the county recorder of

Uintah county, Utah, shall have all the force and effect accorded by law to
locations of mining claims upon the public domain.
All such locations may
hereafter be perfected, and patents shall be issued therefor upon compliance
with the requirements of the mineral land laws, provided that the owners of
such locations shall relocate their respective claims and record the same in the
office of the county recorder of Uintah county, Utah, within ninety days after
the passage of this act. All locations of any such mineral lands made and
recorded on or subsequent to January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-one,
are hereby' declared to be null and void and the remainder of the lands heretofore reserved as aforesaid because of the mineral substances contained in
them, in so far as the same may be within even numbered sections, shall be
sold and disposed of in tracts not exceeding forty acres, or a quarter of a
quarter of a section, in such manner and upon such terms and with such restrictions as may be prescribed in a proclamation of the President of the United
States issued for that purpose not less than one hundred and twenty days after
the passage of this act, and not less than ninety days before the time of sale
;
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and the balance of said lands and also all the mineral therein are
hereby specifically reserved for future action of Congress.

or disposal,

Now,

Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United
power vested in me by law, do
hereby declare and make known that the even-numbered sections of
surveyed lands in said former Uncompahgre Indian reservation in
Utah, heretofore reserved by said act of June 7, 1897, to the United
therefore,

I,

States of America, by virtue of the

States as containing deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or

other like substances, saving and excepting such of said even-num-

may

be appropriated and claimed under discoveries
and
recorded prior to January first, eighteen
and
made
hundred and ninety-one, and relocated and re-recorded as specified
by said act of March third, nineteen hundred and three (32 Stat.,
998), and saving and excepting lands allotted to Indians, and all

bered sections as
locations

other lands legally reserved or appropriated, shall be offered for sale

upon sealed bids

Utah, land

at the Vernal,

office in tracts

not exceed-

ing forty acres in the aggregate, or the smallest legal subdivision

approximating that area;
said lands,

and that the even-numbered sections of
after the date on which the township

now unsurveyed,

plat of survey thereof

is officially filed

in the local land office in the

usual manner, as well as any of the lands offered at this sale remain-

ing unsold

may

be advertised and sealed bids invited therefor upon

same place and at such time as may be specified
by direction of the Secretary of the
Interior.
Inasmuch as the government is unable to determine definitely those tracts in the surveyed even-numbered sections princithe same terms at the

in a public notice duly given

pally valuable for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other

may be offered for any forty-acre tract or lot
approximating that area subject to the regulations as to proof of

like substances bids

character of the land, to be hereafter issued.

The

bids for the lands offered will be opened at the Vernal, Utah,

on Saturday, September 15, 190G, commencing at one
mountain standard time, and will continue from day
to day until all bids have been examined.
All bids to receive consideration must be filed in the district land
office at Vernal, Utah, before 4 30 o'clock p. m. of the day preceding
that set for the opening of the bids.
The right is reserved to reject any and all bids.
As an individual, or as a member of an association, the purchaser
must be twenty-one years of age and a citizen of the United States
or have declared his intention to become such citizen.
Bids for said lands shall be in accordance with such form, and at
such minimum price as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Interior who shall also prescribe all additional rules and regulations
necessary to carry into full effect the sale herein provided for.
land

office

o'clock p. m.,

:
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In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the
United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 6th day of June in the year
of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and six, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and thirtieth.
seal of the

Theodore Roosevelt.

[seal.]

By

the President

Elihu Root, Secretary

of State.

even-numbered mineral sections in former uncompaiigre
indian reservation, utah.
Circular.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, June 25, 1906.
For the purpose of carrying into effect the sale of the evennumbered sections in the former Uncompahgre Indian reservation
in

Utah, valuable for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or

other like substances under the President's proclamation dated June
G,

1906, the following regulations are prescribed.

Sealed bids must be prepared,

filed, received, opened and acted
on in accordance with the following requirements:
First. Each bid must be made on a form similar to that attached
hereto which shall be furnished upon application to the register and
receiver of the Vernal, Utah, land office or the Commissioner of the
General Land Office and must be signed by the bidder who shall
be a citizen of the United States and who shall therein give his

post-office address.

Second. Each bid must be sealed in a separate envelope which shall
be addressed to the " Register and Receiver, United States Land
Office,

Vernal, Utah," and such envelope must bear an indorsement

across

its

face showing that

it

contains a bid for land in the even-

sections in the former Uncompahgre Indian reservation
containing deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other like
substances and must not bear any indication of the amount of such

numbered

bid or the description of the tract bid for.

Third. Each bid must be accompanied by a check payable to the
official of a national

Secretary of the Interior certified by the proper

bank for twenty per centum of the amount of such bid which check
must be by the bidder placed in the envelope containing the bid.
Fourth. No bid will be considered that is received by such register
and receiver after 4 30 o'clock p. m., mountain standard time, on
Thursday the fourteenth day of September, nineteen hundred and six.
:
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must be made for each forty-acre

fractional lot constituting a quarter of a quarter section.
Avill
is

tract or
.

No

bid

be considered describing the tract bid for otherwise than as

described on the

official

it

plats of survey.

Sixth. Each bidder may present bids for any number of tracts but
with each bid must make and transmit the deposit above required.
Seventh. No bid will be accepted for said lands which shall be at
a less rate than five dollars per acre for the land embraced in such
bid.

Eighth. The bids will be opened by the register and receiver at
their office in the presence of such bidders as

may

care to attend on

Friday the fifteenth day of September, 1906, at 1 p. m., mountain
standard time, and the register and receiver will indorse on each bid
the name of the bidder, the amount of the bid and the amount of the
deposit immediately after the bids are opened.
Ninth. The register and receiver will then transmit the several
bids with the certified checks to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office. The Commissioner will transmit the said bids to the
Secretary of the Interior with his recommendation in the premises.
Tenth. Notice of the award by the Secretary of the Interior upon
the said sealed bids will be given to each of the bidders by the Commissioner of the General Land Office through ordinary mail to the
address given in his bid.

The balance due on

Eleventh.

all

the accepted bids after crediting

thereon the respective certified checks will become due and must be

paid to the register and receiver of the said local land office within
thirty days from the date of the mailing of notice by the Commissioner of the General Land Office as aforesaid and if not so paid the

amount deposited with such bid

as hereinbefore provided will be forUnited States to be disposed of as are other proceeds
arising from said sale under said act and the land will be thereafter
re-offered under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by
feited to the

the Secretary of the Interior.

Twelfth.

On

the

payment of the amount of

their bids

by the pur-

chasers as hereinbefore provided the register and receiver will issue

and receipts modified by endorsements
showing that same are issued for lands of the
former Uncompahgre Indian reservation in Utah valuable for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other like substances, under
the act of March 3, 11)08 (32 Stat., 998), which will be transmitted to

the ordinary cash certificates
across the face thereof

The duplicate receipt will be given
purchaser by the receiver upon the full payment.
Thirteenth. Each bidder will be required to file with his bid an

this office as the basis of patent.
to the

affidavit

showing himself

to be a citizen of the

United States, twenty-
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one years of age, and furnish evidence in the form of affidavits duly
corroborated that the lands sought to be purchased by

him

are prin-

cipally valuable for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other

and that the same are not claimed or held under dismade and recorded prior to January 1, 1891,
and relocated and re-recorded as specified in the act.
Fourteenth. All bids will be subject to mineral claims asserted by
parties claiming a preference right to the lands entered by reason of
the terms of said act of March 3, 1903, and for the purpose of giving
such adverse claimants an opportunity of presenting their objections
no patents will issue on the lands sold for a period of thirty days from
like substances,

covery and location

date of issuance of final receipt.

Parties alleging the lands sold to

be non-mineral or valuable solely for minerals other than those
in this circular or otherwise legally appropriated

may

named

also be heard

All protests against the sale must be
under oath and duly corroborated and when based upon a claim of
preference right under the act shall be accompanied by record evidence of location showing a compliance with the terms of the act.
Cases arising under this paragraph will be adjudicated under the
rules of practice of the Department of the Interior so far as they

within the period specified.

are applicable but the proceedings will be treated as special until the
final

determination thereof.

Very

W.

respectfully,

A. Richards,
Commissioner.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.
BID.

The Secretary of the

Interior,

State of
a citizen of the United
dollars per acre for the following
pay
described tract of land of the former Uncompahgre Indian reservation in Utah
Sir:

I,

,

States, do hereby bid

and

of

,

,

offer to

valuable for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other like substances

I

herewith enclose certified check of

—

,

for

dollars, the

same being twenty per cent of the total amount of this bid for the above
described land, the same to be retained and credited as part payment of the
purchase price should this bid be accepted, or retained by the United States as
a forfeit on my part if this bid is accepted and I should within thirty days
from the mailing of the notice by the Commissioner of the General Land Office
of its acceptance, fail to pay the register and receiver at the Vernal, Utah, land
office the balance due on this bid.
I inclose herewith evidence of citizenship
and evidence that the lands sought to be purchased by me are principally valuable for deposits of gilsonite, asphaltum, elaterite or other like substances and
that the same was not claimed or held under discovery or location made and
recorded prior to January 1, 1891, and relocated and re-recorded as specified in
the act.
This

day of

,

190G.
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1902— SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL

ENTRY—FORT ASSINIBOINE MILITARY RESERVATION.

Mary
An

entry

is

C. Sands.

a contract between the government

and the entryman, and

until all

the requisites of an entry have been met no contract exists and the appli-

cant can acquire no vested right to the land which will prevent a withdrawal thereof by the government.
Lands withdrawn under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902, from all disposition "except under the homestead laws," are not subject to soldiers'
additional entry under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes.
The fact that the act of April 18, 189(3, provides that the hinds in the abandoned
portion of the Fort Assiniboine military reservation, thereby opened to
entry, shall be disposed of only under the laws therein specifically named,
does not prevent a withdrawal, under the provisions of the act of June 17,
1902, of any of said lands as to which no vested right has attached.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

June

(F. L. C.)

Mary

6,

C. Sands, as assignee of

pealed from your

office

Land

Office,

(D. C. H.)

1906.

Abram

C.

decision of August

3,

Peterbaugh, has ap1905, holding for can-

cellation her soldiers' additional entry for lot 7 of Sec. 3, T. 32 N.,

R. 15 E., Greatfalls, Montana, containing 3G.54 acres, and allowed

under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes on April 22, 1905, in accordance with instructions contained in your office letter of March
Your office held said entry for cancellation, for the reason
25, 1905.
it appeared from the records of said office that the township in
which the land in question is situated was withdrawn under the act
of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), by order of the Secretary of the
Interior, dated April 12, 1905, and that therefore the land embraced
in the said entry was not subject to location under a soldiers' additional homestead right at the time the entry was allowed, April 22,
1905.
The appeal is based on the following grounds

that

1.

2.

this

Applicant's rights became vested before the land

was withdrawn.

The Secretary had no authority under the act
land from entry because the land was not

June

of

17, 1902, to

withdraw

subject to withdrawal uuder

said act.

Appellant's contention under the

assignment of error seems to
by its former letter of
March 25, 1905. directed that her application for said land be allowed,
her rights thereby became vested and could not be interfered with or
prejudiced by the subsequent order of April 12, 1905, withdrawing
first

be based upon the fact that since your

office

the land.

This contention
held that an entry

tryman.

Under

is

is

not sound and cannot be admitted.

It has been

a contract between the government and the en-

the law three things are necessary to be done in

order to constitute an entry on public lands:

first,

the applicant

must
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make an

which entitle him to make the
make a formal application; and third, he must
the money required. Until all three of these

affidavit setting forth the facts

entry; second, he must

make payment

of

requisites are complied with,

no such contract

exists,

and the appli-

cant can acquire no vested rights in the land sought to be entered.

The

receiver's receipt filed in this case

shows that the money was not

paid until April 22, 1905, at which time it also appears that the final
There being then no contract existing between
certificate was issued.
the government and the applicant at the date of the withdrawal of
the township in which the land in question is situated, the applicant
acquired no vested rights by his application to enter said land,
although the same Avas filed before the lands in said township Avere
ordered to be withdrawn.
It is further contended by appellant that soldiers' additional entries
under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes are in the nature of homestead entries, and although lands susceptible of irrigation, under the
act of June IT, 1902, supra, may be withdrawn from entry except
under the homestead laws, the lands are still, under said exception,
subject to entry by one holding a right under the aforesaid section of
the Eevised Statutes.
The question presented by this contention was well and carefully
considered by the Department in the cases of Cornelius J. MacNamara and William W. Wooldridge (33 L. D., 520 and 525), and it was
therein held that lands withdrawn under the act of June 17, 1902, as

susceptible of irrigation, are not subject to soldiers' additional entry

under section 2306 of the Eevised Statutes, and now, upon reconsideration of the question and the matters urged in support of appellant's contention, the

Department

sees

no reason for disturbing the
and they will be adhered to.

decisions rendered in the aforesaid cases,
It

is

also contended that the land in question

is

within the limits

of that portion of the Fort Assiniboine military reservation, which

was abandoned in 1888, and for that reason was not a part of the
public lands and not subject to withdrawal under the act of June 17,
1902.

To

sustain this contention the appellant cites the act of April 18,

1896 (29 Stat,, 95), which,

among

other things, provides that the

abandoned portion of said reservation
open to the operation of the laws regulating homestead entry, except
and one of the Revised Statutes, and to entry
under the townsite laws and the laws governing the disposal of coal lands,
desert lands, and mineral lands, and shall not he subject to sale under the
provisions of any act relating to the sale of abandoned military reservations.
shall be

section twenty-three hundred

Appellant

insists that

under the provisions of said act of 1896,

limiting the lands to entry for the purposes therein specially named,
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was precluded from withdrawing

said

lands for irrigation purposes under the act of June 17, 1902.

There

is

no force in this contention.

The

restriction in the said act

of 189G, limiting the lands to entries of the character therein specified,

did not deprive Congress of control over said lands, and of the

them to use for any other purpose which in its
might deem suitable and proper.
The Secretary of the Interior having by virtue of the authority
given by said act of 1902 withdrawn the land in question from entry
for the purposes therein specified, before any vested right attached
thereto, said withdrawal must be given full force and effect.
See
instructions of January 13, 1904 (32 L. D., 387-388).
Upon a full consideration of the whole matter, your decision is
right to subject

judgment

it

hereby affirmed.

mining claim—expenditure— claims held in common.

Lawson Butte Consolidated Copper Mine.
Improvements made upon one or more of several contiguous mining claims held
in

common may

be accepted as applicable to tbe entire group, in satisfac-

tion of the statutory requirement relative to the expenditure of five hun-

dred dollars upon or for the benefit of each of the claims, only where the
purpose of such improvements is to facilitate the extraction of mineral
from the claims, and the improvements are of such character as to redound
and the fact that the
to the benefit of all the claims in this respect
mineral formation covered by the claims is a continuous deposit constituting one ore mass, will not justify applying the cost of improvements on
one of the claims toward meeting the requirements of the statute as to the
others, unless it appear that such improvements will aid in the extraction
of mineral from, or tend to promote the development of, such other claims.
;

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

June

(F. L. C.)

8, 1906.

Land

Office,

(G. N. B.)

December 29, 1902, the Trinity Copper Company made entry
under the name of Lawson Butte Consolidated Copper Mine, for
the Lawson Butte, Poker, 44, Bories, Sunshine, Comet, Montana,
Columbia, Sheep Springs, 99, Colorado, Martin, Mascot, Eobin, Interview, Doe, Big Buck, Blue Jay, Boston Copper, Black Oak, Pine
Bur, Lester, and Sage, contiguous lode mining claims, survey No.
3937, Redding, California.

July

18, 1904,

your

office

held the entry for cancellation to the ex-

Lawson Butte, Poker, 14, Black Oak, Pine Bur, Lester,
Sage, Doe, Big Buck, and Blue Jay claims, on the stated ground that

tent of the

the certificate of the surveyor-general does not

show that

five

hun-

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

656

dred dollars' worth of labor had been expended or improvements
made upon or for the benefit of each of said claims prior to the
expiration of the period of publication. Subsequently the company
submitted a number of affidavits with a view to establish that the

improvements made are
statute.

By

sufficient to satisfy the

requirements of the

decision of April 13, 11)05, your office held the showing

made to be insufficient and adhered to the former
The company has appealed to the Department.

decision.

appears from the evidence that the claims in the group extend
The Doe,
Big Buck, and Blue Jay claims lie at the bottom of the westerly side
It

over and cover both sides of a high ridge or mountain.

The remainder of the
bottom of the easterly side of the ridge.
The improvements certified by the surveyor-general consist of tunnels, cuts, a shaft, buildings, and trails, and aggregate in value
$14,(>40, which (exclusive of the trails valued at $500) might be
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute, provided the
improvements were so situated and of such a character as to redound
The value of the expenditures upon
to the benefit of all the claims.
each of the excluded claims is less than $500. The surveyor-general
certifies that a tunnel upon the Interview claim, valued at $2,000, and
one on the Robin claim, valued at $1,400, are for the benefit of those
claims, and also for the benefit of the Colorado, 99, Doe, Big Buck,
and Blue Jay claims. The tunnels referred to are projected in a
northeasterly direction and away from the Doe, Big Buck, and Blue
Jay claims, and the portals thereof, from the official plat, appear to
be at least 1,000 feet above any portion of the surface of said claims.
The surveyor-general also certifies that a tunnel on the Mascot
claim, valued at $4,000, one on the Boston Copper, valued at $1,700,
and one on the Columbia, valued at $1,200, and the additional improvements, in the way of numerous shallow open cuts, small tunnels,
and a shaft, in the aggregate valued at $2,285, which he found at
different points on ten of the claims, are for the benefit of the claims
upon which they are situated as well as the other claims in the group.
The tunnels referred to do not run toward the 44, Poker, Lawson
Butte, Black Oak, Pine Bur, Lester, and Sage claims, nor toward the
of the ridge and are crossed by Spring creek.

excluded claims

lie

at the

The portals are at a much higher elevation
than any portion of the said claims, and at a considerable distance
other excluded claims.

therefrom.

It is not

shown by the surveyor-general's

certificate, or

otherwise, that the other improvements mentioned were designed, or

could be used, for the benefit of other claims than those upon which

they are situated.

by the appellant that the evidence shows that the
mineral formation covered by the claims is a continuous deposit conIt is asserted
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mass of or in the mountain, and because thereof it
contended that the improvements made and certified by the surveyor-general are a good and sufficient means or system of developstituting the ore
is

ment of
It

is

all

the claims.

made upon one or more of
common may be accepted in satis-

well settled that improvements

several contiguous claims held in

faction of the statutory requirement only where the purpose of such
improvements is to facilitate the extraction of mineral from the
claims, and the improvements are of such character as to redound to
Copper Glance Lode
the benefit of all the claims in this respect.
It must appear that each
(29 L. D., 542,549), and authorities cited.
of the claims constituting the group will profit by the work done or
improvements made upon one or more of such claims. Elmer F.

Cassel (32 L. D., 85, 87.)

Assuming that the mineral exists in a practically continuous mass
body of the mountain and extends under the surface of the

in the

group of claims embraced in the entry, as asserted by the
it does not appear how the tunnels relied upon, which are
projected away from and at a point high aboA e the surface of the
excluded claims, could in any manner aid in the extraction of mineral
from such excluded claims, or could tend to promote their development. The tunnels if continued in their projected courses would
not reach the deposit under the surface of the excluded claims, and
could not by any possibility be utilized for their benefit. Under
these circumstances the improvements relied upon to satisfy the
entire

appellant,

7

statutory requirement are not such as may be applied to the claims
excluded from the entry. The decision of your office is affirmed.

school lands—identification by survey-lands excepted-acts

february

32, 1889,

and february

State of South Dakota

v.

28, 1891.

Riley.

Under the grant of sections sixteen and thirty-six made to the State of South
Dakota for school purposes by the act of February 22, 1889, the State takes
no vested interest or title to any particular land until it is identified by
survey, and prior to such identification the grant, as to any particular
tract, may be wholly defeated by settlement, the State's only remedy in
such case being under the indemnity provisions of said act and of the act of
February 28, 1891, amending sections 2275 and 227(5 of the Revised Statutes.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

June

(F. L. C.)

The State

8,

Land

1006.

Office,

(J. R.

W.)

of South Dakota filed a motion for review of depart-

mental decision of June 2S,
V

5194— Vol. 34—05 m

42

11)05

(unreported), dismissing

its

protest
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against allowance of

Mathew

entry as to the E. J of the SE.

Eiley's final proof on his homestead
J, Sec. 36,

T. 3 S., R. 3 E.,

Rapid

City,

South Dakota.
Riley has resided on the land continuously since May, 1891. The
land is in the Black Hills forest reserve, created by executive proclamation of February 22, 1897 (29 Stat., 902). The township plat
of survey was filed in the local office December 15, 1899. The
entry was not made until July 25, 1902, under the act of April 15,
1902 (32 Stat, 106).

The motion
to the State

involves two points: (1) that the school land grant
jiresenii of specific sections, whether surveyed or

was in

not; (2) but if not so, then upon Riley's failure to make entry within
three months from filing of the plat, the State's right attached, and

Congress was without power to divest that right.
The grant was made b/y sections 10 and 11 of the act of February
22, 1889 (25 Stat., 676, 679), which, so far as here material, provides that

That upon tbe admission of each of said States into the Union secnumbered sixteen and thirty-six in every township of said proposed
States, and where such sections, or any parts thereof, have been sold or otherSec. 10.

tions

wise disposed of by or under tbe authority of any act of Congress, other lands
equivalent thereto, in legal subdivisions of not less than one-quarter section,
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of which the same is taken,
are hereby granted to said States for the support of common schools, such

indemnity lands to be selected within said States in such manner as the
lature may provide, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior:

legis-

Pro-

That the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections embraced in permanent
reservations for national purposes shall not, at any time, be subject to the
grants nor to the indemnity provisions of this act, nor shall any lands embraced
in Indian, military, or other reservations of any character be subject to the

vided,

grants or to the indemnity provisions of this act until the reservation shall
have been extinguished and such lands be restored to, and become a part of
the public domain.
*
*
and such land shall not be subject to pre-emption, homeSec. 11. *
stead entry, or any other entry under the land laws of the United States,
whether surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be reserved for school purposes only.

It is necessary to a
its

proper construction of the act to consider

all

provisions and other legislation on the same subject and the

administrative constructions thereof, as well
with, the last quoted clause, in determining

That Congress did not intend absolutely

and

as,
its

in connection

proper meaning.

to dispose of the sections

granted, beyond any power to control their use and disposal in such

manner

as to exclude the State from any benefit of them, is clear
from the proviso to section 10, which declared those sections in permanent reservations for national purposes not subject to the grant,
and those in Indian, military, or other reservations of any character

not subject to the grant until the reservation

is

extinguished.

The
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unlimited

is

There is no appropriate word like
" existing," or other word of like meaning, to so limit the power of
Congress to withhold some of the granted sections. The United
States being absolute owner of the lands could impose such limitaBut were there no
tion and qualification of its grant as it saw fit.
qualification, the provision for indemnity for sections granted necessarily implies a power to defeat the grant by reservation to public
use, or by other grants, prior to the survey and ascertainment of the
ms to the

time of their creation.

sections granted.

All former grants of this character gave the States the sections
granted, without restriction to surveyed land.

The words

or unsurveyed " add nothing to the effect of the grant.

have always been construed as

effective to

" surveyed

Such, grants

grant lands not at the

time surveyed, as well as those then surveyed, attaching when survey
was made. The United States therefore had the right, notwithstand-

ing the last clause quoted of the grant, to provide

how

the land

might be disposed of and the grant be defeated. It was for the
United States alone to provide the rule or lapse of time whereby the
settlement right should become barred. If Congress saw fit by the
act of April 15, 1902, to extend the time for the settler to assert the

right of entry that he

had

failed in proper time to assert, its action

can not be questioned by the State. Within what
time the settlement right shall be presented is one properly to be
determined by the United States.
Reservations are not infrequently made of unsurveyed lands.
in that respect

Before survey what lands pass to the State by its grant are imposIt has always been the rule of construction
of school land grants to the States that the right to any particular
tract of land is not fixed until the tract is identified by the approval
of the plats of survey.
Congress knew of this established rule of
construction, and had it intended that a different rule should apply
to the grant here in question it would presumably have so declared
That the grant was not one of the specific
in unequivocal terms.
tracts, but of quantity to be filled from certain sections, if undisposed
of before survey, and was subject to amendment and change by
later legislation, was early held by the Department, and that conIn instructions of April 22, 1891
struction has been adhered to.
sible of identification.

(12 L.
Stat.,

I).,

February 28, 1891 (26
and 2276 of the Revised Statutes,

400, 403), referring to the act of

796), amending

sections 2275

after discussion of the principles involved. Secretary Noble held thai
In view of

all

the facts and circumstances herein set forth,

tation in concluding that the provisions of the prior act of
[Sees.

10

and

11

said sections 2275

in

:

have no hesiFebruary 22. 1889
I

question], in so far as they are in conflict with those of

and 2270 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the

later
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February 28, 1891, are superseded by the provisions of said sections as
amended, and that the grants of school lands to those States mentioned in said
act of February 22, 1889, are to be administered and adjusted under tlie proact of

visions of this later general law.

And

(ib.,

401)

it

was held that:

It is now [by act of 1891] provided in substance: that where settlements
are made before survey which are found to have been made upon sections
sixteen or thirty-six, those sections shall be subject to the claim of such settlers,

and that the State or Territory shall have indemnity for such lands. Indemnity is also provided where such sections " are mineral lands or are included
within any Indian, military, or other reservation, or are otherwise disposed of by
the United States."

This construction

is

the basis of the decisions in State of Washing-

Kuhn

(24 L. D., 12, 13), Todd v. State of Washington (24
L. D., 100), Noyes v. State of Montana (29 L. D., 095), instructions

ton

v.

of August

9, 1904 (33 L. D., 181), and the decision in Schumacher v.
State of Washington (33 L. D., 454). The rule will not now be

overturned or disturbed, unless it be judicially held to be erroneous.
In Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold, etc., Company (93 U. S., 634, 638).
considering a similar act, in words of present grant, the court held
are words of present grant in this law
but, in construare not to look at any single phrase in it, but to its whole scope, in
order to arrive at the intention of the makers of it. " It is better always," says
Judge Sharswood, " to adhere to a plain common-sense interpretation of the
It is true that there

ing

it,

;

we

than to apply to them refined and technical rules of gramQygefs Estate, 65 Penn. St. 312. If a literal interpretation of any part of it would operate unjustly, or lead to absurd results, or be
contrary to the evident meaning of the act taken as a whole, it should be
rejected. There is no better way of discovering its true meaning, when expressions in it are rendered ambiguous by their connection with other clauses, than
by considering the necessity for it, and the causes which induced its enactment.

words of a

statute,

matical construction.

Again (page 639), referring to the decision in Schulenberg v. Harriman (21 Wal., 44), the court observed that "in this instance words
of qualification restrict the operation of those of present grant.'

This decision

is

cited

by the court in Hawaii

v.

Mankichi (190 U.

1

S.,

213), as good authority in construction of statutes, and also in Min-

nesota

v.

Hitchcock (185 U.

S.,

399 and 400), to the construction of

the school land grant to that State, showing that

it is still

regarded

by the court as authority. As the words " surveyed or unsurveyed "
nowise enlarged the grant beyond what similar acts without them
have always been held to pass, the decision is applicable to the present case, and it is held that under the grant in question the State of
South Dakota takes no vested interest or title to any particular land
until it is identified by survey, and that prior to such identification
the grant, as to any particular tract, may be wholly defeated by settlement, the State's only remedy in such cases being under the indemnity provision of the acts of 1889 and 1891, supra.
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therefore presents no cause to vacate, recall, or modify

and

is

denied, and the decision

is

adhered

to.

NORTHERN PACIFIC GRANT— LANDS CLASSIFIED AS MINERAL—ACT OF
JULY 1, 1898.
Northern Pacific Ry.
Lands

classified as mineral

Co. v. Frei et al.

under the provisions of the act of February 2C>, 1895,
Pacific Railway Company

are not subject to selection by the Northern

under the provisions of the act of July

Secretary Hitchcock
(

1,

1898.

Commissioner of the General Land Office,
( F. W. C.
June <?, 1906.

to the

F. L. C.

The Department has considered the appeal by the Northern Pacific
Railway Company, as successor in interest to the Northern Pacific
Railroad Company, from your office decision of February 24, 1904,
holding for cancellation its selection of the NE. \ and SE. J, Sec. 1,
T. 43 N., R. 2 E., Cceur d'Alene land district, Idaho, made under the
provisions of the act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat,, 597, 020), and also its
selection of the NW. J and SW. \ of said section 1, made under the
provisions of the act of

March

March

2,

1899 (30 Stat, 993).

Governor of Idaho made application for the
township under the provisions of the act of August 18,

15, 1899, the

survey of this

1894 (28 Stat., 372, 394). It does not appear, however, that publicawas ever made as required by said act or that any selection or

tion

claim has been

filed

on behalf of the State to any portion of the

lands here in question, and no further consideration need be given to
the claim of the State to these lands at this time, if any

June

21, 1901, while the

Railway Company

it

has.

land was yet unsurveyed, the Northern

NE. J and SE. J
and on October 1,
following, selected the remainder of the section under the act of
March 2, 1899, supra. The plat of survey of the township was not
filed in the local land office until August 21, 1903, and on September
11, and October 8, following, the railway company filed new lists
conforming its previous selections above referred to to the lines of
At the time of the filing of the township plat,
the public survey.
Samuel Frei presented a homestead application for the SE. \ NW. J,
SW. NE. J, NE. I SW. i and NW. J SE. J of said section 1, and
Thomas T. Ritter made similar application for the SE. J SW. J, N. ^
SE. I and SW. J SE. ^ of said section. These applications were
Pacific

filed its selection

of said section, under the act of July

1,

for the

1898, supra,

1-

rejected

for conflict with 'the prior selections above referred

November

and Ritter each presented duly
alleging settlements upon the land applied

22, following, Frei

roborated affidavits,

to.

corfor,
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1901, and Ritter June 5, 1901; also that they had
upon the lands since dates of settlement and made valuable
improvements thereon, those of Frei being valued at $500 and those
of Ritter at $300. They each requested hearings in order to offer
proof in support of their allegations of settlement and improvement.
Frei, July 9,

resided

In the disposition of the cases made in your office decision of February 24, 1904, it became unnecessary to act upon their request for
hearings, it being held therein that the selections under the act of
1898 by the railway company should be canceled because the lands

had been, in October, 1899, classified as mineral land by
commissioners appointed under the act of February 26, 1895 (28
Stat., .683), which classification received
departmental approval
March 26, 1901, and was held to bar the selection in question. It
was also held that, as the base given for the selection made under
the act of March 2, 1899, was of lands outside the primary limits of
the Northern Pacific land grant, although within the Pacific Forest
Reserve, it did not furnish a sufficient base for the selection under
said act.
It w as further noted that both Frei and Ritter claimed
the NW. I SE. J of said section, but action looking to a determinaselected

T

and

was postponed
company's claims under
the selections in question. The company has appealed to this Department and filed a brief in support thereof.
With regard to the selections under the act of 1899, the questions
raised are fully disposed of in the decision of this Department in
the case of Northern Pacific Railway Company ?'. Mann (33 L. D.,
621), and for the reasons therein given your office decision rejecting
the selection under the act of 1899 is affirmed.
With regard to the selection under the act of July 1, 1898, it is
admitted that the decision of your office is supported by paragraph
12 of the regulations issued under said act, dated February 14, 1899
(28 L. D., 103), which is as follows:

tion of their respective rights in

to said tract

until the final determination of the railway

Subject to the limitations

made from any

named

in

paragraphs 13 and

14, selections

may

be

public lands within a State into which the Northern Pacific

railroad land-grant extends, surveyed or unsurveyed, not valuable for stone,

and not occupied by a settler
but odd-numbered sections within ihe Bozeman,
Helena, and Missoula land districts in the State of Montana, and the Coeur
d'Alene land district in the State of Idaho, which are also within the i.rimary
limits of said land-grant, can not be selected by or patented to the railroad
claimant unless they have been finally classified as non-mineral under the act
iron or coal, not subject to valid adverse claim,

at the time of such selection

;

of February 26, 1895 (28 Stat., G8.3).

But it is earnestly contended that said regulation is not in harmony
with the instructions and decisions of this Department under the act
of February 26, 1895, supra, as found in 25 I;. D., 446, and 26 L. D.,
423, and the purpose of the present appeal is to secure a modification
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1898, in the para-

graph above quoted.

The portions of
ferred

the instructions under the act of 1895, above re-

to, specifically

quoted in the appeal under consideration, relate

purpose of said act of 1895, which was to facilitate the adjustment of the Northern Pacific land-grant by enabling the Secretary
of the Interior to ascertain without delay, for the purposes of that
to the

adjustment, what lands within the limits of the grant to said com-

pany

in the

particular districts

named

in the

States of

Montana and

Idaho, were mineral in character and for that reason excepted from
the grant, and the effect of the mineral classification under said act

with regard to the subsequent disposition thereof under the general
it being held that such classification forever barred the

land laws,

land from the railroad grant but did not prevent other disposition
of the land where subsequent investigation showed the tracts lo be

A

non-mineral in character.

careful examination

of the instruc-

tions referred to furnishes no sufficient guide for determining the

question at issue in the case under consideration.

under which classification was made of tiie lands
by its first section authorizes and directs the
Secretary of the Interior to cause all lands within certain specified

The

act of 181)5,

in question as mineral,

districts in the States of

Montana and Idaho, within

the Northern'

Pacific land-grant
to he

examined and

classified

by commissioners to be appointed as hereinafter

provided, with special reference to the mineral or non-mineral character of such
lands, and to reject, cancel, and disallow any and all claims or filings heretofore made, or which may hereafter be made, by or on behalf of the said North-

Company on any lands in said land districtis, which upon
examination shall be classified as provided in this act as mineral lands.
ern Pacific Railroad

Again, section

7

of said act provides:

That no patent or other evidence of title shall he issued or delivered to said
Northern Pacific Railroad Company for any land in said land districts until
such land shall have been examined and classified as nonmineral. as provided
for in this act. and such patent or other evidence of title shall only issue then
to such land, if any, in said land districts as said company may be, by law
and compliance therewith and by the said classification, entitled to, and any
patent, certificate, or record of selection, or other evidence of title or right to

possession of any land in said land districts, issued, entered, or delivered to
Company in violation of the provisions of this

said Northern Pacific Railroad

act shall be void: Provided, That nothing contained in this act shall be taken
or construed as recognizing or confirming any grant of land or the right to
any land in the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company, or as waiving or in

any wise affecting any right on the part of the United States againsl the said
Northern Pacific Railroad Company to claim a forfeiture of any land grant
heretofore

made

to said company,,

Other provisions of
opportunity to be heard

act afford the company due and full
opposition to the mineral classification by

this
in
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the commissioners

named under

the act before the final classification

of the lands by the Secretary of the Interior.

Any

lands classified,

from the
however, as mineral under
The
Pacific
land-grant.
provisions
above
operation of the Northern
Interior
quoted authorize and direct the Secretary of the
this act are forever excluded

to reject, cancel

and disallow any and

all

claims or filings heretofore made, or

may hereafter be made,
Company on any lands in said
which

provided

classified as

in

by or on behalf of the Northern Pacific Railroad
land districts which, upon examination, shall be
this act as mineral lands

—

and declares void any patent issued

Company

to said

Northern Pacific Railroad

in violation of the provisions of said act.

It is claimed in the appeal

under consideration that these pro-

visions of the act of 1895 relate only to lands included in the original

grant; that the act of July
that

it

1,

1898,

is

a

separate grant in itself;

provides a different rule of adjustment, in

this, that

under

the original grant lands containing iron and coal were not excluded

from the grant, while under the act of 1898 such lands are specifichave equal
operation along the entire line of the Northern Pacific railroad and,
ally excluded; also that the provisions of the act of 1898

as a consequence, that the provisions of the act of 1895, limited to

certain districts in

The

Montana and Idaho, do not apply.
was passed primarily

act of 1898, like other relief acts,

for

the protection of individual claimants as against the Northern Pacific

land-grant, and provided for a speedy adjustment of conflicting

claims within the Northern Pacific land-grant by

first

affording the

individual claimant an opportunity to transfer his claim to other

public lands of the character described or to retain the railroad lands

formerly claimed, and in the latter event the railroad company was to
all its right, title and interest in and to such
land, whereupon it was to be entitled to select other lands in lieu of
the land relinquished and patents were to " issue for the land so
Under the
selected as though it had been originally granted."

be invited to relinquish

scheme thus provided the lands selected took the place or were in
and claimed under the original grant
This
•and thus became, upon selection, a part of the original grant.
is made plain by the part of the act just quoted as well as by that
further provision of the act which provides that

lieu of the lands relinquished

nothing

in this act shall

he construed as enlarging the quantity of land which
Company is entitled to under laws hereto-

the said Northern Pacific Railroad
fore enacted.

In paragraph 10 of the regulations issued under the act of 1898. in
referring to that portion of the act just quoted,

it is

said:

1864 (13 Stat, 365), the railroad company became
entitled to all the odd-numbered sections within the primary limits of the
grant or to indemnity for such as were " granted, sold, reserved, occupied by

Under the

act of July

2,
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homestead

or preempted, or otherwise disposed of,"

settlers,

the definite location <>f
to which the company

its

line of road.

was

entitled

is

665

at the

date of

Thus the maximum quantity

of lands

established by

ascertaining the area

included in odd-numbered sections within the primary limits of the grant as
adjusted to the line of definite location. The clause in the act of July 1. 1898,

providing against an enlargement of the quantity of lands to which the railroad

company was then entitled has reference to the maximum quantity ascertained
as aforesaid, and does not restrict the privilege of making selections under that
act to those instances where the railroad claimant has an absolute legal right
to the particular lands relinquished, a matter which would not be involved in an
ascertainment of the quantity of the grant.

The general indemnity provisions found

in the

acts of

July

2,

1864 (13 Stat.. 365), and the resolution of May 31. 1870 (16 Stat,
The act of 1898
378). limit selection- to certain prescribed limits.

made thereunder to certain states. Selecunder the latter act are nevertheless indemnity and when made
become a part of and are in partial satisfaction of the original grant.
The selection in question is not only on behalf of the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, being made by its successor in interest,
but i- primarily on account of the Northern Pacific land-grant, and
in the opinion of this Department, any patent or evidence of title
given to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company or its successor in
interest, under a claim predicated upon the Northern Pacific landgrant, to land- classified as mineral under the provisions of the act of
February 26, 1895, supra, would lie void.
limits the selections to be
tion-

To permit the company to make selection of lands classified as
mineral under the act of 1895, thus reopening the adjudication made
under said act. would destroy all that was accomplished thereunder,
and the

fact that the act of 1898 is more restrictive in its provisions,
excluding coal and iron lands, included under the original act, is no
reason therefor. Had it been otherwise, L c. had the original act
excluded coal and iron land-, and the act of 1898 permitted selection

to bo

made

much

stronger.

Finally

it

for such lauds, the

i>

company's position would have been

urged that under existing practice individual claim-

ant- to land- within the limits of the Northern Pacific land-grant
are permitted, under the provisions of the act of 1898, to transfer their

claim- to land- classified a- mineral under the act of 1895, and. as
the language used to define the class of lands that may be selected by
the railroad company under the act of L898, and those to which the
individual claimant- may. under said act. transfer their claims,
the

is

same, that equal opportunity should be afforded the railroad

company

t<>

make

sufficient

to

say:

-election of these lands.
first,

that

the

individual

In answer thereto

claimant

was

not.

it

i-

like

company, interested at the time of the classification and
consequently was not afforded due and full opportunity to be heard

the railroad

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

666

upon the question of the character of the lands prior

to their final

classification, and, second, that the exclusive provisions of the act of

1895 relate only to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and those
claiming under or through its land-grant.
The entire matter considered, the Department affirms your office
decision

LAND

and the

selections in question will be canceled.

IN INDIAN RESERVATION- LIEU SELECTION—ACT OF APRIL
1

21,

904.

Regulations.

Registers and Receivers,

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D. C, June 8, 1906.
United States Land Offices.

Gentlemen: The act of April 21, 1904 (33 Stat,, 189, 211), making appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of the
Indian Office and for fulfilling treaty stipulations with the various
Indian tribes for the
alia

—

fiscal

year ending June 30, 1905, provides, inter

That any private land over which an Indian reservation has been extended
may be exchanged at the discretion of the Secretary of the
Interior and at the expense of the owner thereof and under such rules and

by executive order,

may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, for vacant
nonmineral, nontimbered, surveyed public lands of equal area and value and
situate in the same State or Territory.
regulations as

Preliminary to making relinquishment and selection of other lands
under the provisions of the foregoing act, the owner of any private
land over which an Indian reservation has been extended by executive order, must file with the Commissioner of the General Land
Office an application addressed to the Secretary of the Interior,
requesting that he be permitted to surrender the lands by him owned
and to select other lands in lieu thereof, pursuant to the provisions
of the act of April 21, 1901 (33 Stat., 211), conformable to the rules
and regulations adopted by the Secretary of the Interior and subThe land proposed
ject to the exercise of the Secretary's discretion.
to be surrendered must be accurately described by legal subdivisions
if surveyed, or in the event that it is unsurveyed by such designation
as will readily enable the Commissioner of the General Land Office
There may accompany such application a brief, or
to identify it.
forth such reasons as the petitioner may see proper
setting
argument,
application
to accept such land as a basis of selection
why
the
to offer,
should
act
be entertained by the Secretary of the
under the aforesaid
with
report thereon, will be submitted by
This
petition,
Interior.
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Office to the Secretary of the

by the Secretary to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for report as to whether the described lands
are needed for the use of the Indians, and such recommendations as
If the Secretary is of opinion,
the Commissioner may deem proper.
after considering the application, that it is inadvisable for the Government to acquire the title to the land described therein, under the
provisions of the aforesaid net, he will deny the application.
Interior.

If,

It will then be referred

however, the Secretary decides to entertain the proposition, sub-

ject to the further exercise of his discretion, he

thereafter selections

under the

may

be

made by

will so order,

and

the petitioner, or applicant,

rules, regulations, restrictions, limitations,

and conditions

herein following:

PRIVATE LANDS SUBJECT TO EXCHANCJK.
1.

Private lands subject to exchange under the provisions of this

act include all lands within the limits of an Indian reservation estab
lished by executive order, to
lent has been earned

by

full

which the right

to a patent or

its

equiva-

compliance with the laws of the United

States governing the disposal of said lands.

RELINQUISHMENT OR RECONVEYANCE.
2. Relinquishment or reconveyance made in pursuance of this act
must be executed and acknowledged in the same manner as conveyance of real property is required to be executed and acknowledged by
the laws of the State or Territory in which the land is situated.
Where the relinquishment or reconveyance is made by an individual
it must show whether the person relinquishing is married or single;
and if married, the wife or husband of such person, as the case may
be, must join in the execution of the relinquishment or reconveyance in
such manner as to effectually bar any right or estate of dower, curtesy, or homestead, or any other claim whatsoever to the land relinquished, or it must be fully shown that under the laws of the State
or Territory in which the relinquished land is situated such wife or
husband has no interest whatever, present or prospective, which
makes her or his joinder in the relinquishment or reconveyance necessary. Where the relinquishment or reconveyance is by a corporation

should be recited in the instrument of transfer that it was executed
pursuant to an order, or by the directions of the board of directors or
other governing body, a copy of which order or direction should
accompany such instrument of transfer which must follow in the

it

matter of

its

execution strictly the laws of the State or Territory in

which the land

is

situated

relating to corporate conveyances, and

should bear the impress of the corporate

seal.
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ABSTRACT OF TITLE.
3. Each relinquishment or reconveyance must be accompanied by a
duly authenticated abstract of title showing that at the time the
relinquishment or reconveyance was executed the title was in the
party making the same, and that the land was free from conflicting
record claims, tax liability, judgment or mortgage liens, pending
suits, or other incumbrances.

AUTHENTICATION OF ABSTRACT.

The

4.

title

memoranda

of record or on

other

or

must be signed
and must show that the

certificate of authentication of the abstract

by the recorder of deeds under his
is a

file

full, true,

official seal

and complete abstract of

all

in his office, including all conveyances,

matters

mortgages

incumbrances, judgments against the various grantors,

mechanics, or other liens, lis pendens, and all other instruments
which are required by law to be filed with the recording officer,
affecting in any manner whatsoever the title to the described land.
The custodian of the tax records must certify that all taxes levied or
assessed against the land or that could operate as a lien thereon have

been fully paid and that there are no unredeemed tax sales and no
tax deeds outstanding, as shown by the records of his

office.

The

absence of judgment liens or pending suits against the various grant-

which might affect the title of the land relinquished or reconshown by the official certificates of the clerks of all
courts of record whose judgments under the laws of the United
States, or the State or Territory in which the land is situated, would
be a lien on the land reconveyed or relinquished, without being tranors

veyed, must be

scribed other than on the court records.

LANDS SUBJECT TO SELECTION.
5.

Selections under the provisions of this act are restricted to sur-

veyed, nonmineral, nontimbered, vacant unreserved public lands situated in the same State or Territory as, and equal in area and value to,
the lands relinquished.
SELECTIONS.

must be made by the owner of the land relinquished
name by a duly authorized agent or attorney-in-fact; and
when made by an agent or attorney-in-fact proof of authority must
0.

Selections

or in his

be furnished.

APPLICATIONS TO SELECT.
7.

Applications to select hereunder must be filed in the proper
and must specifically describe the land desired to be

local land office
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surrendered and that sought to be selected, the county and State, or
Territory, as well as the Indian reservation, and the land district
wherein situated must be given of the land relinquished. It must, in

each instance, be represented that the applicant is the owner of the
land relinquished and that he desires to surrender the same to the
Government and select in lieu thereof public lands under the provisions of the act of April 21, 11)04 (33 Stat, 211)

;

that the land sur-

rendered and that selected therein described are of equal area and
value; that the land selected is nonmineral, nontimbered, vacant and
unoccupied public land; that the applicant will, without cost to the
Government, place the deed of relinquishment of record and extend
the abstract of title to the date of the recordation thereof upon being
notified so to do by the land department; and that upon the request
of the Secretary of the Interior he will deposit with him a reasonable

amount of money to enable the Secretary to investigate and determine the legality of the selection.
8. The application must be accompanied by a deed of relinquishment or reconveyance to the land tendered as the basis of exchange,
duly executed, and a properly authenticated abstract of title to the
land, by the required commissions, and proof that the relinquished
land and that selected are equal in area and value; that the selected
land is nonmineral, nontimbered, vacant and unoccupied adversely
to the selector therein; that the land relinquished and offered in
exchange has not been made the basis of another selection, and that
the land applied for

is

not situated within a mineral township nor

within six miles of a mining claim, or in default of the showing last

mentioned, a request for notice of publication must be made, etc.,
and satisfactory evidence that the Secretary has, subject to the further
exercise of his discretion, entertained the selector's preliminary
application to reconvey the basis land and select other lands in lieu
thereof.

The

support a selection under this act
by some credible person possessed of
the requisite personal knowledge in the premises, and may be executed
before any officer qualified to administer oaths, and must be corroborated by at least one person who has no personal interest in the
exchange and who is familiar with the character and condition and
value of the land selected and the value of the land relinquished.
This affidavit or affidavits, fully corroborated, must show that the
land selected is nonmineral and nontimbered in character; that it
contains no salt springs or deposit of salt in any form sufficient to
render it chiefly valuable therefor; that it is not in any manner
1).

affidavit or affidavits to

must be made by the

selector or

occupied adversely to the selector; that it is not situated within a
mineral township or within six miles of a mining claim, and that
the lands selected

and

the lands relinquished are equal in area

and
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value,

may

and are situated

in the

The

same State or Territory.

selector

post and publish notice of his application in lieu of the showing

as to the mineral character of the township

mining
10.

and the proximity of

claims.

Forms

panying

of application for selection under this act and accom-

affidavits as to relinquished

and

selected land, as set out

hereinafter in these instructions, or their equivalents, should be
used.

All proofs and papers necessary to complete a selection must

be filed at one and the same time, except as herein otherwise specially
provided.

PUBLICATION.
11.

Where

the land in the application to select

is

within six miles of

mining claim or within a mineral township, or if the applicant fails
to show that the land is not within a mineral township nor within
six miles of a mining claim, you will require the applicant, within
twenty days from the filing of his application, to begin publication of
notice thereof at his own expense in a newspaper to be designated by
the register as of general circulation in the vicinity of the land and
published nearest thereto. Such publication must cover a period of
thirty days, during which time a similar notice of the application
must be posted in the local land office and upon each and every nona

T

contiguous tract included in the application.
12.

The

and give the

notice should describe the land applied for

date of application, and state that the purpose thereof

is to

allow

all

persons claiming the land under the mining laws, or desiring to show
it

to be mineral in character,

an opportunity to

file

objection to such

application with the local officers of the land district in which the

land is situate and to establish their interest therein or the mineral
character thereof.
13. Proof of publication shall consist of an affidavit of the publisher, or of the foreman or other proper employee, of the newspaper
in which the notice was published, with a copy of the published notice
attached.
Proof of posting upon the land, and that such notice
remained posted during the entire period required, shall be made by
the applicant or some credible person having personal knowledge of
the fact.

and

The

register shall certify to posting in his

last dates of

office.

such publication and posting shall, in

The

first

all cases,

be

given.

MISCELLANEOUS.
14. Owmers of lands over which an Indian reservation has been
extended by executive order will not be permitted to make selection
for noncontiguous tracts in lieu of compact bodies of land situated
within such reservations, and all rights of selection based upon lands
situated within the same section shall be restricted to one section.
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Any attempt on the part of the owner of land within a reservation to
avoid this rule by making surrender to the Government by separate
deeds or by a sale of part of the land to another person after the
approval of these regulations will defeat the proposed transfer.
15. Fees must be paid by the applicant at the time of filing his
application in the local land office at the rate of $1 each to the register and receiver for each 160 acres or fraction thereof included in
his application.

made under this act will not be passed to patent until
months following the filing of the application in the local
This is to enable any person claiming an adverse right to the

Selections

16.

after four
office.

selected land to
17.

The land

have

full

opportunity to regularly assert said right.

relinquished and the land selected must be, as nearly

as practicable, equal in area, but the rules of

approximation obtaining

in other classes of entries will be observed.
18.

Applications to select under the provisions of this act will not

defeat the right of the Secretary of the Interior or of the President of
the United States to withdraw or reserve the land for such proposed

may deem proper prior to the approval
by the Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary,
acting within the exercise of his discretion, may reject any and all
applications at any time prior to final approval of the same for any
reason appearing to him good and sufficient, notwithstanding the
application may have been received and certified by the local office
and recommended for approval by the Commissioner of the General
public purposes or uses as they

of the selection

Land

Office,

but

all

asserted rights, based

upon application or

set-

tlement subsequent to the filing of applications under the provisions
of this act with the register and receiver, will be held subject thereto,

and suspended pending the

final

determination thereof.

PRACTICE.
19.

Notices of additional or further requirements, rejections or

other adverse actions of registers and receivers, the Commissioner,
or the Secretary will be given,

and the rights of appeal, review, or

rehearing recognized in the manner

now

prescribed by the rules of

practice, except as herein otherwise provided.
20.

If application to contest or a protest or other objection shall at

any time be filed against the selection or the application to select, you
will forward the same to this office for its consideration and disposition.

21.

Applications to enter

filed

subsequent to and in conflict with

applications to select under this act will be suspended by you and held

await the final disposition of the application hereunder except
where such subsequent application to enter is supported by allegations

to
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of prior right,

in

which event you will transmit the conflicting

application to enter to this
22.

office.

Applications presented to your

office

under the provisions of

the foregoing act, not in substantial compliance with the requirements

herein made, or not accompanied by the prescribed proofs, or if the
land offered as a basis of exchange is not situated within the boundaries of an Indian reservation created by executive order, will be
All applications sufficient in form, accompanied
rejected by you.
by the required proofs, will be accepted for transmission as here-

inbefore provided, and you will note on your records against the

land: "Application of

The

,

act April 21, 1904, pending."

register will certify the condition of

and you

cations,

your records on the appli-

will transmit the papers to this office unless publica-

is necessary, in which event you will
forward the record
promptly after the filing of the proofs thereof in your office.
23. The Commissioner will, upon the receipt of an application to
select under the provisions of this act in the General Land Office,
cause the same to be examined, and if, in his judgment, the rules and
regulations have been complied with he will transmit the records
If, however,
to the Secretary with his report and recommendation.
the Commissioner finds that the selection is defective or that the rules
and regulations have not been complied with, he will reject the selec-

tion

tion or require further proofs.
24. If

upon examination of an application

to select

under

this act

should be allowed, the applicant will be
required to have his relinquishment recorded in the manner prescribed by the State or Territory where the land is situated, and to
the Secretary decides that

it

have the abstract of title extended down to and including the date
the deed of relinquishment or conveyance was recorded.
25. If the

Secretary be of opinion that further evidence as to value

and character of the land involved is necessary, he may institute such
an inquiry as he may deem advisable, and may require the applicant
to deposit a

sum of money

to defray the expense of the investigation.

In any case where deposit shall be required to defray the expense of
an investigation it will be made with the Secretary of the Interior, to
be held and disbursed by him or under his directions.
26. If the Secretary approve the proposed exchange the Commissioner of the General

Land

Office will, as soon as practicable, after

the receipt of the advice of such approval,

the records of his

land

is

office

subject to disposal thereof.

the local

office

make

and notify the local

suitable notations on

wherein the selected
The Commissioner in his letter to
office

will require that the applicant be notified of the

approval of his application, and informed that he will be allowed
sixty days in which to place the deed of reconveyance or relinquishment of record and to extend the abstract of title down to and includ-
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ing the date of the recordation of such deed, and that he be further
advised that in default of action within the time specified the application will be finally rejected without further notice.
27. Approvals by the Secretary of the Interior will be subject to
and conditioned upon the bona fide compliance on the part of the
applicant with all the regulations and requirements herein or which
may, by direction of the Secretary of the Interior, be hereafter

promulgated.

The Secretary of the Interior may, in the exercise of the dishim vested by law, withhold his approval from any application. made under the provisions of this act, although the applicant
28.

cretion in

may have complied with
Owners of land

the rules and regulations herein prescribed.

situated within the boundaries of Indian reserves,

created by executive order, are hereby specifically informed that
in the opinion of the Secretary, the

made under
lic interests,

Very

the provisions of this act,

such application will be rejected.
respectfully,

W. A. Richards,
Approved

if,

approval of any application,
would be inimical to the pub-

Commissioner.

:

E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

4—088.

SELECTION IN LIEU OF LAND IN

INDIAN RESERVATION.

(Act April 21, 1904.)

To the

Rcc/islcr

Gentlemen

am

and Receiver, United States Land

Office,

:

the owner of the

Meridian, containing

acres; said land is
within the boundaries of the
Indian Reservation, and is located within the
land district;
I desire to relinquish and reconvey said lands to the United States and in lieu
land district, State of
containing
thereof to select the
acres, under the provisions of the act of April 21, 1904 (33 Stat, 211).
In compliance with the regulations under said act I have made and executed a
deed of reconveyance to the United States of the tract first above described
Indian Reservation, and in relation thereto
Situated within the said
I

situated in the County of

,

State of

,

,

have caused a proper abstract of title to he made and authenticated, both of
which are herewith submitted, and I do hereby bind myself and promise to
have said deed placed of record and the abstract of title duly extended to the
date of the recordation of such deed without cost to the United States upon
I
leceipt of notice from the Land' Department that I am required so to do.
further agree that I will deposit with the Secretary of the Interior, upon
1

5194—Vol. 34—05 m
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demand, a reasonable sum of money to be by him expended in investigating
tbe bona fides of this application.
There are also submitted certificates from tbe proper officers showing that the
land relinquished, or surrendered, is free from incumbrance of any kind; also
an affidavit, duly corroborated, showing the land selected to be nontimbered and
in character and unoccupied, and that the lands surrendered and
the lands selected herein described are equal in area and value. I therefore
nsk that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, a United
States patent issue to me for the tract or tracts herein selected.

nonmineral

Dated,

Land Office at
I,

—

-

above selected,
free

from

in

conflict,

190—
do hereby certify that the land
lieu of the land herein relinquished to the United States, is
and that there is no adverse filing, entry, or claim thereto.
,

Register of the land

office,

Register.

Selection approved by the Secretary,

Approved by the Commissioner,
100
Approved for patent,

—

,

.

,

100

100

—

—

—
4—089.

AFFIDAVIT FOR SELECTIONS.
[Under act of April

21,

1904 (33

Stat., 211).]

INDIAN RESERVATIONS.

[To be made by the selector, or other credible person cognizant of the facts,
before an officer authorized to administer oaths. Before being sworn, affiant should be advised of the penalties of a false oath.]

Department of the

Interior,

United States Land Office,
,

190—.

being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is
a citizen of the United States, and that his post-office address is
that he is well acquainted with the character, condition, and value of the
following-described land, and with each and every legal subdivision thereof,
;

having personally examined the same, to wit

that his personal knowledge of said land enables him to testify understandingly
witli respect thereto; that there is not,

within the limits of said land, any

known

vein or lode of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead,
tin,

or copper

;

that there

deposit of coal, or any

is

not, within the limits of said land,

known

placer deposit,

that said land contains no salt springs, or
sufficient to render

it

oil,

known

any known

or other valuable mineral;

deposits of salt in any form,

chiefly valuable therefor; that

no portion of said land

is
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claimed for mining purposes under the local customs or rules of miners, or
otherwise; that said land is essentially nonmineral in character, has upon it no
mining or other improvements, and is not in any manner occupied adversely to
the selector; and that the selection thereof is not made for the purpose of
obtaining title to mineral land. Affiant further says that he is well acquainted
with the value of the hereinafter described land, having frequently passed
over the same, and that from personal observation and knowledge he states
that the lands hereinbefore and hereinafter described are of equal value;

I hereby certify that the foregoing affidavit was read to affiant in my presence before he signed his name thereto that said affiant is to me personally
known (or lias been satisfactorily identified before me by
), and
;

I

him
and that

verily believe

self to be;
office in

,

and the person he represents himwas subscribed and sworn to before me at my

to be a credible person

this affidavit

day of

on this

,

190

—

—

Note. It must also be shown by affidavit or otherwise whether the selected
land is within six miles of a mining claim.

desert land entry—annual expenditure.
Stevenson

v.

Scharry.

The annual expenditures upon a desert land entry, and proof thereof, required
by the act of March 3, 1891, are for the information of the land department
and as evidence of the good faith of the entryman, and a contest for
default of such proof

may

be defeated by the filing of proof subsequent

to the initiation of the contest, but prior to final action thereon,

showing

that the requisite annual expenditure has in fact been made.

The

desert land law requires an annual expenditure of one dollar per acre

embraced in the entry, for the first, second and third years,
but does not require that the first or any other annual expenditure shall
effect reclamation of any part of the land, the sole requirement in that
respect being that the land shall be reclaimed within the period allowed
for each acre

therefor.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)

June

9,

1906.

Land
(J.

Office,

R. W.)

John Scharry filed a motion for review of departmental decision
March 25, 1905 (unreported), cancelling his desert land entry for
the W. i SW. J, Sec. 10, T. 7 N., R. 31 E., Walla Walla, WashingSuch motion,
ton, in the contest of William Stevenson against him.
was
brief
thereon
has been
shown,
for cause
entertained, and with
Departbefore
the
responded
to
is
and
the
record
served and
now
ment for its final action.
of
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no substantial controversy upon any question of fact.
made April 29, 1902. July 25, 1903, Stevenson
filed a contest affidavit charging (1) failure of Scharry to expend
one dollar per acre or any sum in improving the land since the entry,
and (2) failure to make annual proof within the time required.
September 16, 1903, a hearing was held at the local office in which
both parties fully participated. The evidence disclosed that Scharry
had purchased of the Walla Walla and Columbia Irrigation Company, in February, 1903, a water right for this land, agreeing to pay
therefor $1,600 and a yearly rate of $1.50 per acre. One hundred
The company on its part agreed and oblidollars was then paid.

There

is

Scharry's entry was

itself to furnish for the land one-twentieth of a cubic foot of
water per second continuously from April 15 to October 15. The
contract was not formally signed by the company until July 29, 1903.

gated

The evidence showed

that the

Water Company located its ditch in 1892

and relocated it during the summer of 1903 that it had expended between $19,000 and $20,000 in construction of a ditch over
eight miles long from its proposed intake to within three miles of the
land.
When this was done is not shown by the record. No diversion dam had been constructed nor could water be turned into the
ditch until such work should be done and flumes be constructed for
crossing depressions of ground intersecting the course of the ditch.
The proposed expenditure for completion of the project was between
$75,000 and $100,000. The annual proof required of the entryman
was not filed until the day of the hearing. The local office was of
opinion that the default of annual proof was not of itself fatal to
the entry.
Upon the second ground of contest the local office found
or 1893

;

that—
the purchase of a contract for a water right and the payment of one hundred
dollars on the same might he considered as an improvement within the intent

company were an actual bona

fide company, with irrigatfrom which to supply water
In proof of expenditures, such as is submitted in this case, it
to said land.
devolves upon the entryman to show affirmatively whether or not said company
has to sell, or is ahle to deliver, the water to irrigate said lands, as per the
terms of said contract. This he has failed to do. There are many irrigation
schemes, and prospective irrigation projects in this part of the country. These
usually consist of preliminary surveys, with the hope of securing capital to build
ditches through the country, but it does not follow that each of these companies,
with the very remote possibility of ever getting water, or of building a ditch at
all, has anything of value to sell.
We are of the opinion that in this case the Walla Walla and Columbia IrrigaTherefore Mr. Scharry's contract is of
tion Company has no water right to sell.
no value.

of the law,

if

the said

ing ditches, reservoirs, laterals,

Your

office

etc.,

in operation,

held the entry for cancellation for default of annual

proof, citing

Hochwart

burg (20 L.

D., Ill)

v.

Maresh

and Andrew Clayand such action was

(31 L. D., 276)

as authority therefor,
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local office clearly held that default

of annual proof was not of itself sufficient cause for cancellation of
the entry if the requisite annual proof

is

in fact filed before its final

upon the entry, but recommended cancellation of the entry
because there was no present ability of the irrigation company to
perform its contract. This holding was not adhered to by your office
and the cancellation was based upon the default of annual proof.
The desert land act as amended March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095),
action

orovides,

among

other things

any person under this act unless he or his
have expended in the necessary irrigation, reclamation, and
cultivation thereof, by means of main canals and branch ditches, and in permanent improvements upon the land, and in the purchase of water rights for the
irrigation of the same, at least three dollars per acre of whole tract reclaimed
and patented in the manner following: Within one year after making entry for
such tract of desert land as aforesaid, the party so entering shall expend not
less than one dollar per acre for the purposes aforesaid; and he shall in like
manner expend the sum of one dollar per acre during the second and also
during the third year thereafter, until the full sum of three dollars per acre is
Said party shall file during each year with the register, proof, by
so expended.
the affidavits of two or more credible witnesses, that the full sum of one dollar
per acre has been expended in such necessary improvements during such year,
and the manner in which expended, and at the expiration of the third year a
map or plan showing the character and extent of such improvements. If any
party who has made such application shall fail during any year to file the
testimony aforesaid, the lands shall revert to the United States, and the twentyfive cents advanced payment shall be forfeited to the United States, and the
That no land

shall he patented to

assignors shall

entry shall be cancelled.

The original desert land act (19 Stat., 377) gave a period of three
years for reclamation without requirement of annual expenditure or
proof of

Section

it.

five,

above quoted, added by the act of 1891,

required proof of annual expenditures in efforts to effect reclamation

and imposed a forfeiture

The proper

in default of such expenditure

construction of the act therefore

for annual expenditure

and of proof of

it is

is,

and proof.

that the requirement

for information of the

land department of the good faith of the entryman and to prevent
long segregation of lands so entered where no diligence is shown in

matters of reclamation.

This being the evident purpose of the proand good faith rather than

vision, the essential thing is diligence

the actual formal proof of

In

Andrew Clayburg

it.

(20 L. D., Ill), referring to this section,

it

was held that
This makes the failure to file this testimony during any year as the ground
upon which his entry may he canceled, and in every case where there is a total
failure to file such testimony during any year after a desert declaration has
been filed, upon information of such failure, your office clearly has full and
complete jurisdiction to proceed, under rules of practice, against such entry
and to finally cancel the same for such failure. * * * In other words, the
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The

<>f the requisite amount
required to show full compliance with the law.

the .yearly testimony showing the expenditure

filing of

on the land

is all

that

is

intent of the act as requiring evidence of good faith,

and the

interlocutory character of such proofs and of the proceedings thereon
is

the clear general purport of that decision.

In Hochwart

Maresh, supra, your

v.

held that a charge of

office

do fault in filing proof of annual expenditure upon a desert land

entry did not state a cause of action and this ruling was reversed by
upon authority of Andrew Clayburg, supra. That

the Department

however did not go

to the extent of holding that default in
proof necessitated cancellation of the entry if the requiannual expenditure had been in fact made, and formal proof of

decision

filing of final
site

was tendered.

The

is was
came to the Department upon contestant's appeal and no service had been made, though service by
publication was attempted. It did not show that the requisite annual
expenditure had been made and that the default was merely in the
formal proof of it and that formal proof was in fact later tendered.
The right of a contestant under the act of May 14, 1880 (21 Stat.,
it

report in the latter case indicates that

substantially ex parte, as the case

140), does not attach until the final successful result of his contest.

Emma H. Pike (32 L. I)., 395)
(31 L. D., 137)
Heirs of Hayes (33 L. D., 21). The preference right is
in the nature of a reward to an informer and is intended to prevent
fraudulent appropriation of public lands. Pending the adjudication
of a proceeding in the land department there is full jurisdiction to
Williams v.
recognize and adjust the equities of the entryman.
United States (138 U. S., 511, 524); Strader
Goodhue, supra;
McCraney v. Heirs of Hayes, supra. The case last cited is strictly
analogous to the one at bar, final proof being allowed after initiation
of a contest for default of such proof. The local office held correctly
contest for default of annual
on that branch of the present case.
proof
subsequent
to its initiation but prior
defeated
proof may be
by
requisite
therein,
that
the
annual
expenditure was in
to final action
for
review
is
well
grounded
in this respect.
fact made, and the motion
of
contest
the
local
office
erred.
As to the first ground
The law requires merely annual expenditure to the requisite amount, in good
It does not require that the first
faith for purpose of reclamation.
or any other annual expenditure shall effect reclamation of any part
His expenditure must be honestly intended to effect
of the land.
reclamation of the land, but the sole further requirement is that the
tract shall be reclaimed within the time allowed. There was but one
Strader

v.

McCraney

Goodhue

;

;

v.

t>.

A

witness to support the charge.

know what he

He

testified,

among

other things

[the entryman] has been doing part of last year.

Part of the
They were running
time he has been out with the engineers on the ditch.
the lines over the ditch both with a level and by a transit in the vicinity of
I

.

.

.

—
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I

sir.

...

I

suppose he was though.

ground
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know that he was working to get water on it,
He was out with the engineers running over the

don't

— the ditch.

He further

testified that the contestant

knew such

fact of the entry-

and told him of it. The entryman and another witness
testified to the same facts in substance and to the fact of the contract,
the payment of $100, the doing of work on the ditch, and that he had
further, at expense of several hundred dollars, endeavored to interest
persons in Seattle and elsewhere to invest capital in the canal project,
among whom he names Dr. Smith, State Senator Kinnear, Mr. Hallenbeck, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Cameron, " and various other parties/
whom he had taken over the ditch line. In view of the Department
this evinces good faith, and actual expenditure to the requisite amount
being shown, the entry is entitled to stand intact subject to the entryman's future compliance with the law.
The Department decision herein is therefore recalled and vacated,
the action of the local office and decision of your office are reversed,
and the contest is dismissed.
man's

efforts

1

RIGHT OF WAY-TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH LINES-SECTION
OF MARCH 3, 1901.

3,

ACT

Opinion.
The approval by the Secretary

of the Interior of the plats of incorporated cities

and towns in the Indian Territory operates as a dedication of the streets
and alleys thereof to public use, and thereafter, the Indians no longer
having any interest in the ground embraced in such streets and alleys, the
Secretary of the Interior has no authority to subject them to the terms of
section 3 of the act of March 3, 1901, authorizing him, among other things,
to grant rights of way for the construction of telephone and telegraph lines
within and through incorporated cities and towns in the Indian Territory.

Assistant Attorney -General Campbell to the Secretary of
June 9, 1006.

flic

Interior^

(G.B.G.)

By

reference of the Acting Secretary, I am asked for opinion " as
whether rights of way in the nature of an easement should be
granted by the Department for the construction of telephone lines
within incorporated cities and towns in the Indian Territory after
the approval of the town plat, after the streets and alleys of such
towns have already been dedicated to public use, and whether gento

eral

damages should be

assessed against such lines constructed after

the approval of the town plat."

—

The phrase in this question as propounded to wit " rights of
way in the nature of an easement" indicates that reference is had
This
to section 3 of the act of March 3, 1901 (31 Stat,, 1058, 1083).
section authorizes the Secretary of the Interior

:
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right of way in the nature of an easement for the construction,
and maintenance of telephone and telegraph lines
through any Indian reservation, through any lands held by an Indian tribe or
nation in the Indian Territory, through any lands reserved for an Indian
agency or Indian school, or for other purpose in connection with the Indian
service, or through any lands which have been allotted in severalty to any
individual Indian under any law or treaty, but which have not been convoyed
to the allottee with full power of alienation.
to grant a

....

operation,

A

further provision

is,

that " the compensation to be paid the

and the individual

tribes in their tribal capacity

right of

way through

allottees for such

their lands shall be determined in such

as the Secretary of the Interior

may

manner

direct."

I am of opinion that the approval of the plats of these towns
within the Indian Territory by the Secretary of the Interior oper-

ated as a dedication of the streets and alleys therein to public use.

This view has heretofore been expressed by the Department in letter
of August 18, 1900 (I. T. I). 2606-1900), and in an opinion of February 2, 1905, I expressed a substantially similar view upon a kindred
matter (see 19 Opinions, Assistant Attorney-General, 86, 87). This
being true, it results that upon the approval of such plats all interest
of the Indians in the streets and alleys of these towns terminated and
the ground ceased to be such as the Secretary of the Interior

thorized to subject to the terms of the act of
Legislative policy

is

March

3,

au-

is

1901, supra.

in accord with this view of the law, as

is evi-

—

denced by a provision in the act of April 26, 1906 (Public No. 129),
that " all municipal corporations in the Indian Territory are hereby
authorized to vacate streets and alleys or parts thereof, and said
streets and alleys, when vacated, shall revert to and become the
property of the abutting property owners."
I advise

you therefore that the Secretary of the Interior

authorized to grant rights of

way

is

not

for the construction of telephone

and towns in the Indian Territory
plat, and necessarily that general
in
nature
of
damages
the
compensation to the Indians may not be
assessed against such lines constructed after such approval and
lines within incorporated cities

after the approval of the

town

dedication.

Approved
E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

APPLICATION TO AMEND— OATH— OFFICER.

Schuyler
An

C.

Reneau.

amend a homestead entry, as well as all affidavits filed in support thereof, should be executed before some officer designated by section
2294 of the Revised Statutes and the acts of March 11, 1902, and March 4,

application to

1904,

amending that

section.
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Land

Office,

(E. O. P.)

11, 1906.

Schuyler C. Reneau has appealed to the Department from your
decision of October 13, 1905, rejecting his application to amend
his original homestead entry, made August 6, 1901, for the SW. |,
Sec. 19, and NW. J, Sec. 30, T. 19 N., R. 36 W., containing 325.06
acres, to include in lieu of said tracts, the N. J, NW. J SE. J, NE. \
SW. i, W. J SW. J, Sec. 33, and S. \ S. i, Sec. 28, T. 20 N., R. 37 W.,
Broken Bow land district, Nebraska.
At the time said application to amend was filed a portion of the
land therein described was embraced in the soldiers declaratory
statement filed by Charles II. Bunemann, which was subsequently
rejected by the local officers as to part thereof because the tracts deAfter the rendition of the decision
scribed were non-contiguous.
office

1

now under

Bunemann withdrew

his appeal from the
and directed that his declaratory statement be held for naught. The record was thus cleared of any prior
claim which might have been asserted by Bunemann to the tracts in
conflict with the amended application of Reneau and leaves for determination at this time only the questions presented by the amended

consideration,

decision of the local officers

application of Reneau.

Your
From

office, in

rejecting said application, held:

the facts stated

it

appears that

Bunemann was

the prior applicant for

the tracts in conflict, and Reneau's application does not conform to the regulations governing amendments (see page 18, general circular of January 29, 1904),
it

not appearing from the showing

was

made

that the land applied for

is

that which

originally intended to he entered.

The Department is of opinion that at the time your office decision
was rendered the application of Reneau to amend could not have been
accepted as to the land in conflict, then covered by the declaratory
statement of Bunemann, but this objection has been removed by the
withdrawal of the claim of Bunemann for the tracts in conflict.
The matters set forth in the affidavit filed in support of the pending
application fail to clearly show that the land now applied for Avas
the land examined by Reneau prior to the time he made his original
His original entry included but approximately half the
entry.
area now applied for and it is difficult to believe that Reneau did in
fact examine all the land described in his present application, prior to
making the entry he now asks to amend.
The report of the local officers required by departmental circular
of January 11, 1889 8 L. D., 187), was made prior to the withdrawal
of the claim of Bunemann, and is too incomplete to be of service to
the Department in passing upon the accuracy of the statements
(
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contained in Reneau's affidavit.

By

said circular

it

is

directed that

the local officers
transmit the application to this office with your joint report both as to the
existence of the error, the diligence of the entryman, and the credibility of

each person testifying thereto.

The Department

is

before one of the
Statutes,
1.

and the

amend,
must be executed

clearly of opinion an application to

as well as the affidavits filed in support thereof,
officials

acts of

designated by section 2294 of the Revised
11, 1902 (32 Stat., 63), and March

March

1904 (33 Stat., 59), and that Reneau's application and the

affi-

davits, executed before a notary public, can not be accepted.

For the reason herein assigned, the action of your

office is

hereby

affirmed.

MINING CLAIM—NOTICE— SECTION 2327, HE VISED STATUTES, AS
AMENDED BY ACT OF APRII^ 28, 1904.

Frank
The provisions

of the

act

of April

G. Peck.
28,

1004,

amending section

2P>27

of

the

Revised Statutes, relate exclusively to the question of, and are intended
to prescribe the rule or guide whereby to determine, the subject-matter
of mineral patents that is, the particular tract actually conveyed by any
such patent whenever the question may arise and in no wise modify
or affect any requirement of the mining statutes with respect to notice
of an application for patent, nor can they have any effect to cure defects
or irregularities in the notice of patent proceedings had in any case.

—

—

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

June

(F. L. C.)

November

5,

Land

Office,

((I. J.

H.)

H. Irwin
mining claim, Del Norte (then Lake City) land

1889, patent No. 15322 issued to Joseph N.

for the Nelson lode
district,

13, 1006.

Colorado.

July 27, 1904, Frank G. Peck, claiming to be the present owner of
the patented Nelson claim, hied in your office a petition for an
amended survey and the issuance of a corrected patent for said claim,
alleging in support thereof, among other things, in substance and
effect, that the deputy mineral surveyor who made the survey upon
which the patent is based erroneously described the claim as situated
in Sec, 34, T. 41 N., E, 2 W., whereas it is in fact located in Sec. 34,
T. 42 N., E. 1 W., N. M. P. M., and that he also made a slight error,
both as to course and distance, in fixing the tie line connecting the
claim with a corner of the public surveys.
September 9, 1904, your office authorized Peck to make application
for an amended survey of the claim, which he did, and amended survey was made in October, 1904. Upon receipt of the field notes and
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the claim to be actually

W., instead of in T. 41 N., R. 2 W., N. M.
P. M., and also show that the tie line connecting the claim with a
corner of the public surveys, as fixed by the former survey, is slightly
in error both as to course and distance, your office, by decision of
located in T. 42 N., R.

March

13, 1905,

1

held that—

The showing establishes the contention of the claimant and yon will now
advise him that he will be permitted to republish and repost notice of application for patent for the statutory period and furnish proof thereof.
This is
necessary because Of the fact that the land actually claimed is situated eight
or en miles from the land previously published for.
Upon the completion of
said publication and posting, the claimant may submit proof thereof, surrender
I

same by a reconveyance of the land
covered thereby to the United States and an abstract of title brought down to
date, whereupon steps will be taken in the direction of the issuance of a new and
correct patent, if all be found regular.
the erroneous patent, accompanying the

April
far as

it

8,

1905,

required

Peck filed motion for review of that decision, in so
him to republish and repost notice of application for

patent and furnish proof thereof.
1905, the motion for review

By your

was denied.

office

decision of

Peck has appealed

Department.
It is contended to support the appeal, in substance and

May

2.

to the

effect,

that

and published in the original patent proceedings
was sufficient, and that under the provisions of the act of April 28,
1904 (33 Stat., 545), amending section 2327 of the Revised Statutes,
the claim as bounded by the lines actually marked, defined, and established on the ground by the monuments of the official surve}^ upon
which the patent grant is based should be deemed to be patented
under the patent already issued, and that therefore a new patent correctly describing the claim according to the amended survey should
issue without requiring reposting and republication of notice.
The notice as published and as posted in the local office, the field
notes of survey, the final certificate of entry, and all papers in the
record relating to the original patent proceedings in which the township and range are given, erroneously describe the claim as situated
in township 41 north, range 2 west.
No names of adjoining or
near-by claims are given in the notice, it being stated therein: "Adjoining claims, if any, unknown."
the notice as posted

The published notice of an application for patent should designate with substantial accuracy the situation of the applicant's claim
on the ground, and
should contain such matter as will inform a man of ordinary prudence having
an interest in a mining location conflicting witb the one applied for. thai application is made for patent to the ground in conflict, thereby giving him an opportunity to file and prosecute an adverse claim ami thus assert and protect bis
Hallett and Hamburg
rights as provided by section 232G, Revised Statutes.

Lodes (27 L.

D., 101, 108).
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The

notice in the present case, which, as before stated, describes

the land as situated in a township and range other than those in which
it is

actually located, and which contains no mention of near-by claims

or other matters which

might indicate that the claim is located elsewhere on the face of the earth than at the point therein specified,
can not be said to designate the location of the claim on the ground
with substantial accuracy. That the notice as published and posted
did not describe the true location of the claims with substantial accuracy is evidenced by the fact that, with a copy of the notice before
it, the land department issued a patent purporting to convey a tract
of land some eight or ten miles distant from the tract actually claimed
and intended to be described in the notice. There was nothing in the
notice to in any wise indicate that it was intended to apply to another
and different tract than that which by its terms it purported to cover.
So far as shown by the copy of the notice or from any other papers
before the land department in connection with the original patent
proceedings, the claim appeared to be located in township 41 north,
range 2 west, and the land department could not do otherwise than
issue patent on the record as it stood.
No notice having ever been
published describing the claim as it is actually located on the ground,
obviously the land department would not be warranted to issue a
patent therefor in lieu of the one heretofore issued, without first requiring posting and publication of proper notice, as required by law,
with a view to giving possible adverse claimants an opportunity to
assert and protect their rights.

As

to the contention based upon the act of April 28, 1904, supra,
would appear to be sufficient to say that if the tract marked on the
ground by the monuments of the official survey, though situated in a
different township from that in which the tract actually described in
the notice is situated, must be deemed to be embraced within the terms
of and conveyed by the patent already issued, there would be no necessity for the issuance of a new patent.
But has the act any application
to this case?
The section (2327) as amended reads as follows:
it

The

description of vein or lode claims upon surveyed lands shall designate

the location of the claims with reference to the lines of the public survey, but
need not conform therewith but where patents have been or shall be issued
;

upon unsurveyed lands, the surveyors-general, in extending the public
survey, shall adjust the same to the boundaries of said patented claims so as
in no case to interfere with or change the true location of such claims as they
are officially established upon the ground. Where patents have issued for
mineral lands, those lands only shall be segregated and shall be deemed to be
patented which are bounded by the lines actually marked, defined, and established upon the ground by the monuments of the official survey upon which the
patent grant is based, and surveyors-general in executing subsequent patent surveys, whether upon surveyed or unsurveyed lands, shall be governed accordingly.
for claims

The said monuments shall at all times
what land is patented, and in case of any

constitute the highest authority as to
conflict

between the said monuments of
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such patented claims and the descriptions of said claims in the patents issued
monuments on the ground shall govern, and erroneous or inconsistent descriptions or calls in the patent descriptions shall give way thereto.
therefor the

This section

is

a part of the general

mining laws and should be

construed, if possible, to harmonize with the other portions of such

Section 2325, also a part of the general mining laws, provides,

laws.

among

other things, that notice of the application for patent to

mining claim

shall be published for a period of sixty days.

a

The main

is to apprise any one having an
mining location conflicting with the one applied for
that application is made for patent to the ground in conflict, and to
afford him opportunity to assert and protect his rights in the manner
provided by section 232G. To issue patent on a claim as to which
notice has never been published might deprive adverse claimants, if
any there be, of opportunity to assert and protect their claims in the
manner provided by law. This the land department has no authority

purpose of publication of the notice
interest in a

to do.

As

unambiguous terms thereof

the

disclose, the

amendatory proand are

visions of the act of 1904 relate exclusively to the question of,

intended to prescribe the rule or guide whereby to determine, the
subject-matter of mineral patents; that is, the particular tract actu-

conveyed by any such patent whenever the question may arise.
Those provisions in no wise modify or affect any requirement of the
mining statutes with respect to notice of an application for patent;
nor have they, nor were they intended to have, the effect to cure any
defect or irregularity in the notice of patent proceedings had in any
What has or has not actually passed by the outstanding Nelson
case.
ally

patent

is

not the question here.

The only question presented

is,

whether the notice already given would justify the issuance of a new
patent, in lieu of the former, expressly embracing the claim as defined
and described by the amended survey; and that question is above
answered in the negative.
The decision of your office, as appealed from, is affirmed.

HOMESTEAD— SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL— REISSUE OF EOST CERTIFICATE.

Herman

C. Ilfeld.

fact that a certificate of additional right has issued in the name of
the soldier under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes will not prevent him
from selling ami divesting himself of the right itself, of which the certifi-

The more

cate
•

is

merely the evidence; and upon satisfactory showing of the
certificate', it may be reissued and recertified

destruction of the

name

of the assignee entitled to the right.

loss or
in

the
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

June

(F. L. C.)

Land

Office,

(P. E.

13, 1900.

W.)

The Department has before it the appeal of Herman C. Ilfeld
from your office decision of April 10, 1906, rejecting his application,
as assignee, for reissue and recertification to him of the certificate of

Henry Eaton, April 17, 1882, for his additional right
under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes.
There is no question as to the validity of said additional right in
Eaton and there is no dispute as to the facts in the case. It appears
that your office at the time of the issue of the said certificate of right
transmitted the same to Eaton's attorneys at Springfield, Missouri,
who filed his application therefor, and that it was lost or destroyed
in their office, and never reached Eaton.
Seventeen years later, not
knowing that said certificate had been issued, and supposing that his
application therefor had been rejected, Eaton, on December 14, 1899,
sold and assigned all his additional right under said section 2306
of the Revised Statutes, to Theodore F. Barnes, for $120, and on
December 22, 1899, he made a further sale and assignment of all his
right issued to

Barnes, the consideration being $1.00. In the
former assignment Eaton declared under oath that he had made no
previous sale or assignment of his said additional right. In the
latter it is declared that the assignment is made for the express purpose of " divesting Eaton of all right to make an additional entry,
and to convey said right to the exclusive use of said Barnes." With
said second assignment Eaton executed, and delivered to Barnes,
said right to said

his affidavit stating:
I have not made any prior application for an additional homestead entry
under the provisions of section 2306 of the Revised Statutes of the United
and that I have
States nor has a certificate of right of entry been issued to me
not heretofore disposed in any manner of my right of entry granted by said
section 2306
and that I have this day assigned my said right of entry
to Theodore F. Barnes.
;

.

On June
of entry to

.

.

18, 1900, said

Herman

Barnes assigned

1900, applied to locate the

R. 18 E., Santa Fe,

all

of said additional right

C. Ilfeld, the appellant herein, who, on July 23,

same upon the W. ^ NE.

New Mexico

J,

Sec. 26, T. 8 N.,

Territory.

August 4, 1900, said Eaton executed an instrument purporting to
convey to John H. Howell all his interest in the lost certificate of
right.
The said instrument is not with the record, having been filed
in your office by Howell and subsequently withdrawn by him, but a
copy thereof is with the record, as " Exhibit A", attached to Ilfeld's
present application, and identified by affidavits of said Howell and
John M. Rankin, his attorney, who drafted the said instrument.
Therein Eaton states that through certain attorneys of Springfield,
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for a certificate

never having heard from his attorneys respecting
his said application, he supposed that said application had been
rejected," but that he had recently been advised of its issue and deof right, but that

k

*

livery to his said attorneys; that he

had

it

in his possession

;

had never seen the

certificate nor

that he

has never sold said certificate, nor his right thereto, nor his right to an addiany one whomsoever, but that lie is. at the present time (August
4, 1900) the true and lawful owner of said certificate and right to an additional
entry of 80 acres
tional entry, to

;

and that he
hereby

sells

and conveys to John II. Howell
all of the affiand to the certificate herein described, and to
an additional homestead entry of 80 acres.
.

.

ant's right, title
his right to

August

.

.

and

14, 11)00,

3^0111* office,

Howell

filed the said affidavit

together with his

true and lawful

.

.

interest in

own

owner of the

and

bill

affidavit stating that he

soldiers

1

of sale in

was

additional homestead

" the

certifi-

which was issued to Henry Eaton on the 17th day of April, 1882,
and by virtue thereof asked for the reissuance of said
lost certificate and its recertification to himself under the provisions
of the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat,, 397).
This application was withdrawn by Howell on October 2G, 1900,
for the reason that he had learned of the said sale, on December 22,
1899, to Barnes of Eaton's additional right, alleged to be uncertified.
By your office letter of November 13, 1900, all papers filed by Howell
were returned to him and he transmitted Eaton's affidavit and bill
of sale to Eaton's attorneys, receiving back the amount he had paid
therefor.
Howell and the local officers made affidavit to the foregoing facts showing the disposition made of Eaton's said affidavit
and bill of sale to Howell, and the local officers thereupon requested
that the'lost certificate be reissued and recertified to Ilfeld, the apcate

for 80 acres,"

pellant herein.

November

8,

1901, your office rejected Ilfeld's application to locate

Eaton's assignment on the land described, on the ground that the
said certificate of right issued to

counted

Eaton was outstanding and unac-

for.

October 27, 1905, Ilfeld applied to your office for the reissue of
This
lost certificate and for its recertification to himself.
application was supported generally by a showing of the fact- hereinbefore staled, and particularly by a copy of the affidavit and bill of
sale from Eaton to Howell and by the affidavit of J. lv. Milner, one
of Eaton's said counsel at Springfield. Missouri, explaining how
Eaton's said certificate was lost in his office and stating that the same
never reached Eaton, and was never sold nor in any manner disposed of.
Eaton's
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Your office having called for the original affidavit furnished Howell
by Eaton, dated August 4, 1000, and in order to perfect Ilfeld's application, there was hied, on February 26, 1906, the affidavit of
Howell, stating that the copy of Eaton's assignment to Howell attached to Ilfeld's application herein, as " Exhibt A," is a " true and
full copy " and that the facts stated in Ilfeld's application arc true
Also the affidavit of John M. Rankin
to affiant's personal knowledge.
stating that he drafted said affidavit and assignment from Eaton to
Howell, and conducted the negotiations between them and has personal knowledge of the facts; that said "Exhibit A" is a "'rescript
of a carbon copy of the original affidavit and bill of sale executed by
Eaton on August 4, 1900, for the purpose of selling his lost certificate
to John H. Howell, and that the original affidavit was returned to
Eaton in order to secure the refunding to Howell of the money paid
Eaton for his alleged right. The record also shows that with a view
to still further strengthen Ilfeld's application and showing herein, a
detailed statement in the form of an affidavit of all the foregoing
facts was prepared by counsel for appellant and sent to said Eaton
to be executed by him, that Eaton, refusing to execute the same
unless and until he was paid the sum of $120, transmitted the same
Thereon is the endorsement: "If they would send
to your office.
the money, papers would be signed." Therewith he enclosed the
check given him by said Barnes in payment for his said right, and
his affidavit stating that he " did bargain " with Barnes's agent, " the
sale being for add. Hd. 80 acres, untaken soldier's pre-emption,"
and
1

'

that be

now makes

sale to T. F.

payment for my
amount claimed,

Your

this affidavit for the purpose of setting aside the pretended

Barnes for the reason that
$120,

which
of

office letter

from Eaton,

he, said

Barnes, has never made any
lie did send check for the

right to said land as per agreement.
is

enclosed.

December

16, 1005, in

reply to the foregoing

states that the said check has the following condition

typewritten thereon
His additional homestead, 80 acres, to he legal and accepted by U.
Commissioner, reasonable time allotted for examination.

Your

S.

Land

said letter advised Eaton, that

appears from the records of this office that you executed a complete assignment of your alleged additional right on December 14, 1800, in favor of Theodore
it

F.

Barnes

in consideration of $120, the receipt of

...

which you acknowledged

in

that a certificate of right was
appears
issued to you on April 17, 1882, and transmitted to Milner and Lisenby, at Springfield, Mo., and that said certificate was never located but is still outstanding
Mr. Herman C. Ilfeld is now seeking to have said cerand unsatisfied
tificate, which is alleged to have been lost, recertified in his name, and, as a part
of the evidence of his ownership he submits a copy of an affidavit executed by
you on August 4, 1000, wherein you acknowledged to have sold to Mr. John H.
said assignment

.

.

.

It

.

.

.
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and interest in and to said certificate
does not appear that you have any rights

right, title

office

it

has any power to protect.

from the foregoing that Eaton, in ignorance of the issue
made a sale and assignment to Barnes
which divested him of all right under said section 230G. This sale
being prior to the transaction with Howell was not affected thereby
even if the latter sale had not been revoked. There is, therefore, no
right in Howell and no remaining right in Eaton which will impair
or defeat the right sought to be asserted herein by Barnes's assignee.
The mere fact that a certificate of right had been issued to Eaton
could not prevent him from selling, and divesting himself of. the
right itself, of which the said certificate was merely the evidence.
If the certificate should be found and should prove never to have
been otherwise disposed of, it would enure to the benefit of any one
taking under Eaton's sale and assignment and the Department is
It is clear

of said certificate of right,

unable to concur in the conclusions readied by your office that ** the
right which Mr. Eaton sold to Mr. Howell has been restored to him
by his repayment to Mr. Howell of the purchase money " and that

Eaton

" is the

owner of the additional right represented by the cerEaton's repayment to Howell was in recognition of the

tificate."

fact that he
to Howell.

Eaton and

the right and could not convey
Ilfeld,

invested with all the rights

is

The only question remaining

to Barnes.
fore,

was not the owner of
The applicant herein,

whether the

now

it

stands in the place of

Eaton had before
for consideration

his sale

is,

there-

loss or destruction of the said certificate is suffi-

it is not in existence and
was issued more than 24 years ago, was
never in the possession of the beneficiary nor seen by him, and its
disappearance is reasonably accounted for by a member of the law
This case is to be disfirm which filed Eaton's application therefor.
tinguished from that of Charles Tompkins, assignee of Lorenzo D.
Findley (32 L. D., 246), which is relied on in the decision herein
appealed from, wherein a certificate of right was by the beneficiary

ciently

shown

to justify the conclusion that

will not be presented.

It

claimed to have been fraudulently procured and assigned without his
knowledge. The Department said therein:
There
tificate

is

no sufficient evidence

in

the case to warrant a finding that the cer-

was fraudulently procured, and there

show that the

is

not a particle of evidence to

certificate lias been lost or destroyed.

an application, by an assignee of the
of right for an additional entry
could not be allowed upon
right,
of
said
certificate
of
the
face
the
in
the sole ground that the certificate had been outstanding for 25 years
It

was held

beneficiary

in that case that

named

in said certificate

without being located or presented for recertification.
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asked by the assignee of the beneficiary

case the recertification

is

named

who admits

in the certificate

explaining that

it

was

lost or

its issue

and joins his counsel

destroyed in their

office

in

without ever

reaching him.

Upon

Department

is

of the opinion that the non-existence of the said certificate of right

is

careful consideration of the entire record, the

sufficiently

shown

and

to justify its reissue

of Ilfeld as assignee of the beneficiary

Your

said decision

is

recertification in the

named

name

therein.

hereby reversed.

homestead entry—kinkaid act.

Henry Hookstra.
In determining the "extreme length " of a homestead entry under the " Kinkaid Act," the measurement should follow the lines of the public survey,
and no entry should be allowed for any tract exceeding two miles either in
length or breadth, and no application for an entry in as nearly compact
form as possible should be rejected solely because its combined length and
breadth or diagonal measurement exceeds two miles.
Where an entrymau under the " Kinkaid Act" does not include in his entry the
full area allowed by law, for the reason that there is no land subject to
entry adjoining that entered, he may,

if

adjoining land thereafter become

subject to entry, enlarge his original entry so as to include therein the full

area allowed by law.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
'

June

(F. L. C.)

An
office

appeal has been
decision of

amend

his

filed

15, 1906.

Land Office,
(A. W. P.)

on behalf of Henry Hookstra from your

December

18,

1905, rejecting his application to

homestead entry No, 18792, made June

28, 1904, for the

NW.

Sec. 8, S. i S. J, Sec. 9, S. J SW. J, Sec. 10, and the N. J
1, Sec. 15, T. 27 N., K. 16 W., O'Neill, Nebraska, land district, so as
to embrace, in addition thereto, the SW. J
J, N. J SW. J, SW.

SE.

J,

NW.

SW.

township and range.
It will be observed that Hookstra 's original homestead entry,
which contains four hundred and eighty acres, was made under section 1 of the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547— commonly known
as the " Kinkaid Act "), under which section, according to his showing as to qualifications, made in support thereof, he would have been
i

J,

Sec. 15, in said

entitled to

make entry

for the full area of six

hundred and forty

acres.

In support of the present application, filed at the local office August 28, 1905, Hookstra alleges, by affidavit duly corroborated, that
at the time he made the original entry he was desirous of making as
large an entry as possible under the act, but by reason of the con-
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tiguous tracts of land having been taken by other persons, the four
hundred and eighty acres were as large an area as he could then
obtain; that at date of such entry he intended to initiate a contest
against homestead entry No. 17535,

gust Dreyer, for the
Sec. 15, of said

SW.

\

NW.

J,

made on May

W.

J

16, 1902,

by Au-

SW.

J and SE. \ SW. J,
west, but upon examina-

township 27 north, range 1(>
found that one

J. D. McGinley
had already, of date May 28, 1904, initiated a contest against the
same, which was then pending and undetermined; that if he had
taken such action he would have set out in an affidavit and hied with
his homestead application that he did not elect to exhaust his homestead right by making entry of four hundred and eighty acres; that
said McGinley failed to prosecute his contest, and because thereof it
was dismissed on October 24, 1904; that on December 9, 1904, he
(Hookstra) initiated a contest against the same, as result of which
said entry was canceled by your office letter of July 11, 1905, notice
of which he was given by the local officers on July 29, 1905 and
that by reason of the cancelation of said entry so contested the NE.
} SW. J, Sec. 15, which has at all times been vacant, is nearer his
original entry than the SE. \ of the SW. 5, Sec. 15, for which reason

tion of the records at the local office

;

he includes

it

in his present application, instead of the last described

tract.

Your
that—

action in rejecting said application

was based on the ground

The act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat, 547), provides that entries shall he "as
nearly compact in form as possible," and " in no event over two miles in
extreme length."
Mr. Hookstra 's application to amend his entry No. 18702 must he denied, for
the reason that if the desired land were embraced in the entry, the form of same
would violate the two-mile limitation contained in the statute.

now urged

in support of the appeal that it was error to conwords "extreme length" found in the act to mean the
greatest distance between any two points of the tract composed of
the entry and the land embraced in said application and that by such
construction the original entry would also exceed the two-mile limit
It is

strue the

;

as to length.

Considering this phase of the case,
is

two miles

in

it

appears that Hookstra's entry

length and three-fourths of a mile in breadth, while,

with the land now applied for, the tract would remain the same
length, but be one and a half miles in breadth.
Hence the combined
length and breadth of this tract would equal three and one-half miles.
But, as now suggested on appeal, by the same process of reasoning
the combined length and breadth of the original entry, would be two

and three-quarters miles. Measuring diagonally from the extreme
northwest to the southeast corners of the entire tract, it would also
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exceed two miles, but this

is

likewise true as to the original entry.

The Department, however, does not accept

either of the above plans of

measurement in determining the extreme length of an entry, as preIf such a plan were adopted where
scribed by the act in question.
an entry embraced an entire section, the combined length and width
would be two miles, and if it embraced one-half of two adjoining
parallel sections, its combined measurement would be two and one-half
miles, while by diagonal measurement it would also exceed two miles
But certainly an application embracing such a tract could
in length.
not properly be rejected solely on the ground that it exceeded the
two-mile limitation.
In determining the extreme length of an entry in contemplation of
this act, therefore, the Department is of the opinion that the measurement must follow the lines of the public survey, and that no entry
can be allowed for any tract exceeding two miles either in length or
breadth, but also that no application for six hundred and forty acres

compact form as possible should be rejected solely becombined length and breadth or diagonal measurement
might exceed two miles.
Considering this application on the shoAving made in support
thereof, it will be observed that technically it is not an application
for amendment, but rather an application to enlarge the original
in as nearly

cause

its

entry so as to include additional adjoining land now vacant, but
formerly embraced in the homestead entry of another, which »was
canceled as result of applicant's contest. While it has generally been
held that the election of a qualified party, when filing for a homestead, to take less than the law allows him, is a waiver of his claim
for a larger quantity, yet applications of this character have been

allowed where through ignorance or misinformation the entryman has
been misled as to his rights, and no adverse claim has intervened
(Josiah Cox, 27 L. D., 389; Charles Carson, 32 L. D.. 176); also
where he had clearly disclosed his intention to so amend to include an
adjoining tract, when he had cleared the record of an existing entry
(Hadley v. Walter, 25 L. D., 27-6; Joseph Heisel, 26
covering it.
L. D., 69; Daniel L. Hartley, idem., 663; Green Piggott, 34 L. D.,

In the case of Ella Pollard (33 L. I)., 110) it was also held,
according to the s}dlabus, which appears to sum up correctly the doc573.)

irine

announced therein, that:

Where

a desert land entryman does not include in his entry the full area
allowed by law, for the reason that there is no vacant land adjoining that
entered which is susceptible of irrigation and reclamation, he may, if adjoining land of the character subject to desert land entry thereafter becomes
vacant, enlarge his original entry so as to include therein the full area allowed
by law.

The
the

facts in this case are very similar

same as

in the case at bar.

While

and

it is

in all material respects

true that the former was
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an application to amend or enlarge a desert land entry, yet the prinis the same, and there appears to be no good reason why it may
not govern in the disposition of the case now under consideration.
In accordance with the views herein expressed, the decision of your
office is reversed, and, in the absence of any other material objection,
ciple

the application will be allowed.

lilght

of

way for telephone and telegraph
february

lines— act oe

15, 1901.

Regulations.
Paragraph 54 of the regulations of September 28, 1905, requiring that all
applications for rights of way under the act of February 15, 1901, for telegraph and telephone lines, must be accompanied by an official statement
of the Post Office Department showing that the applicant has complied
with the regulations under title 05 of the Revised Statutes, revoked.

Secretary Hitchcock
(S. V. P.)

By

to the

Commissioner of
June 18, 1900.

the General

Land
(F.

Office,

W.

C.j

from Acting Postmaster General, dated the 31st ultimo,
is invited to paragraph 54 of the
regulations concerning right of way for canals, ditches and reservoirs, and for permission to use rights of way for telegraph and telephone lines, electric plants, etc., approved by this Department September 28, last (34 L. D., 212, 232), which provides thatAll applications for the use of a right of way under this act, through any
letter

the attention of this Department

lands designated therein, for telegraph and telephone purposes, must be accompanied by an official statement from the Post-Office Department showing that
the applicant has complied with its regulations under title sixty-five of the
Revised Statutes of the United States and amendments thereto.

This regulation is issued under the act of February 15, 1901 (31
which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to permit
the use of rights of way through the public lands, forest and other
reservations of the United States and certain named parks in California, for electric plants, poles and lines for the generation and disStat,, 790),

power and for telegraph and telephone purand pipe lines, etc.
Attention is also invited to the filing in March, 1905, by the Standard Consolidated Mining Company, with the Post-Office Department,
of its alleged acceptance of the restrictions and obligations of the act
of Congress approved July 24, 18(H), entitled, "An act to aid in the
construction of telegraph lines and to secure to the Government the
use of the same for postal and military purposes, and of acts amendatory thereof, which acceptance was evidently filed in furtherance of
the requirement of paragraph 54 of the regulations above quoted.
tribution of electric
poses,

and for

canals, ditches, pipes,

1

'
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to said Standard Consolidated Mining Company, the
from the Acting Postmaster General states:

With regard
letter

It was stated by the company that it proposed to erect a telephone line in
township 3 north, range 24 east, M. D. M., to he used entirely for private purposes, to connect the electric power house situated on Green Creek, which had
been occupied by the company for twelve years preceding, with its storage
system on the head waters of said creek; and that the line was to be about ton

miles in length.
It was advised by the Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office Department that this corporation was not a telegraph company within the meaning
of the act of 1866, supra, and not entitled to any of the benefits of that act;
that the act of 1901 is not amendatory of the act of 1866, and that the Postmaster General was not required therefore to file the proffered acceptance.
As authority for his conclusion, the Assistant Attorney General referred to the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Richmond v. Southern Pell
Telephone Company (174 U. S., 761), and an opinion of the Attorney General
in volume 24 Opinions of Attorneys-General, at page 603.
Following the opinion thus expressed by the Assistant Attorney General, this
Department declines to file alleged acceptances proffered by telephone companies
of the benefits and obligations of the acts of 1866 and 1001, and, as will have
been seen, such policy conflicts with the quoted regulations of the Department
of the Interior, to fhe serious embarrassment of such companies.
I have the honor to suggest that this matter be taken up between the Department of the Interior and the Post Office Department for the purpose of arriving
at some arrangement which will obviate the difficulty herein set forth.

published

By

act of

February

15, 1901, supra, it is

provided:

That the Secretary of the Interior be, and hereby is, authorized and empowered, under general regulations to be fixed by him, to permit the use of rights
of way through the public lands, forest and other reservations of the United
States, and the Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant national parks, California,
for electrical plants, poles, and lines for the generation and distribution of electrical power, and for telephone and telegraph purposes, and for canals, ditches,
pipes and pipe lines, flumes, tunnels, or other water conduits, and for water
plants, dams, and reservoirs used to promote irrigation or mining or quarrying, or the manufacturing or cutting of timber or lumber, or the supplying of
water for domestic, public, or any other beneficial uses to the extent of the
ground occupied by such canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, reservoirs, or other
water conduits or water plants, or electrical or other works permitted hereunder,
and not to exceed fifty feet on each side of the marginal limits, or not to exceed
fifty feet on each side of the center line of such pipes and pipe lines, electrical,
telegraph, and telephone lines and poles, by any citizen, association, or corporation of the United States, where it is intended by such to exercise the use permitted hereunder or any one or more of the purposes herein named Provided,
That such permits shall be allowed within or through any of said parks or any
forest, military, Indian, or other reservation only upon the approval of the chief
officer of the Department under whose supervision such park or reservation
falls and upon a finding by him that the same is not incompatible with the public interest: Provided further, That all permits given hereunder for telegraph
and telephone purposes shall be subject to the provision of title sixty-five of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, and amendments thereto, regulating
rights of way for telegraph companies over the public domain
And provided
further, That any permission given by the Secretary of the Interior under the
:

:
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may be revoked by him or his successor in
and shall not be held to confer any right, or easement, or interest
any public land, reservation, or park.
provisions of this act
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his discretion,
in, to,

or over

It will be seen that this act makes all permits given thereunder for
telegraph and telephone purposes " subject to the provision of title
sixty-five of the Revised Statutes of the United States and amendments thereto, regulating rights of way for telegraph companies over
the public domain." It is clear therefore that any permit which
might be obtained from this Department under said act would be subject to all the burdens of title G5 of the Revised Statutes, and this
without regard to any action on the part of the applicant for the permit in the matter of filing with the Post-office Department of an acceptance of the restrictions and obligations of the matters included
under title 65 of the Revised Statutes.
There is no question iioav before the Department as to the effect of
the proviso to the act of February 15, 1901, as to the burdens imposed,
nor any claim for benefits by reason thereof, and from a careful consideration of the entire matter the requirement of paragraph 54 of
the regulations approved September 28, 1905, supra, seems to be
unnecessary, and compliance with its conditions will not be longer

exacted.

settlement rights—adverse possession—estoppel.
Peterson
One who

any claim
and remains

fails to assert

v.

Palmer.

to a tract of public land in the

adverse posses-

though knowing that the adverse occupant continues to claim, occupy, and improve the land, is estopped thereby
from subsequently asserting a prior settlement right thereto in himself,
notwithstanding the tract is found upon survey to be a part of the technical
quarter-section upon which his improvements are located.
sion of another,

silent,

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(S. V. P.)
June 18, 1906.
(J. L. McC.)

The
was

plat of T. 26 N., R. 19 W., Kalispell land district, Montana,

filed in the local office

On

the same day Lulu

and 7 and the E. £ of the

on October

17, 1904.

Palmer made homestead entry for

lots 6

SW.

J of Sec. G, in said township.
On November 17, 1904, Neils Peterson filed affidavit of contest
against said entry, alleging prior settlement on the SE. J of the SE.

NW.

I of Sec. 6, the W. i of the
Sec. 7, same township and range.

The land
of the

SW.

in dispute
-I

is

J

and the NE.

J of the

NW.

J of

the forty-acre tract constituting the SE. J

of said section

6.
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A

at which it w as shown that Miss Palmer setAugust 20, 1902, by commencing the building
of a house (on the NW. J of said SW. |), in which she took up her
residence as soon as it was finished, and continued to reside therein
She made no improvements upon the
until the date of her entry.
forty-acre tract in controversy but she testified that while work was
in progress on her house
about August 22, 1902 her uncle, F. F.

hearing was had,

T

tled on the land on

;

—

—

Stevens, posted notices on the land setting forth the extent of her
claim.
Inasmuch as counsel for the contestant express a doubt
whether any notices were ever posted, or if so, that they were posted
where any person would be likeley to see them, it may not be amiss
to quote the testimony on this point
abbreviated by the omission
of some needless verbiage:

—

There was no necessity for placing more than two notices up there any way
all the north and east is a rough country
and nobody

....
....
....

because

in going
but on the south side of this quarter,
hunting they will go down that road, and turn off into the timber;
so I went over near this southeast corner in question
where there
is a creek comes along,
and there is a trail comes in along about
there
and a few acres of open timber and I thought it a most
feasible place for a hunter to pass, so I stuck up a notice there stating how

travels in there

;

.

;

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

;

she had taken the land.
A. Yes,
Q. Did that notice state that she claimed that forty among others?
sir, in a square, and warned them against trespassing; and then the other notice
was put on a tree along the main traveled road.

—

Q. From your observation of the forty when you put up those notices, are
you able to testify whether there was any person living on the land, or any
improvements upon the same? A. There was none whatever there was nothing
but an old trail.

—

In behalf of the contestant

;

it is

claimed that the forty-acre tract

was first occupied, some time in the summer of May,
1902, by one John Tisdale; he remained about a year, and sold his
improvements and possessory right to J. A. Folk; he, in January,
1904, sold to J. II. Parker; he, on May 3, 1904, sold his improvements
to the contestant Peterson, who made a few more improvements upon
the tract in controversy, in section 6, and built a house, in which he
in controversy

established residence, in section

In view of the facts above

7.

set forth the local officers

found and

held

We

fail to find

that the contestee ever established the corners or boundaries

SW. i of Sec. G, or in any manner exerany right of ownership over the SE. i of the SW. i of said Sec. G, but
rather acquiesced in the acts of improvement performed by John Tisdale, the
original locator of the disputed 40, and his successors in interest that the
contestee never establisbed any possession or control either by act of location,
settlement or improvement of SE. i of SW. i, Sec. G, T. 2G N., R. 19 W.
We further find that Neils Peterson, successor in interest to Robert II.
Parker, settled upon this disputed 40, together with other lands claimed by him
of the land claimed by her, to wit, the

cised

;
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Sec 7. to wit, lots 1 and 2 and the NE. I of X\V. |, said Sec. 7, in the month
May, 1004, and has since continued to reside upon and cultivate the same
without any notice on the part of contestee or others of any adverse claim to
the land claimed by him, and that by reason of such settlement, occupation,
and improvement, the said Neils Peterson is the owner of the tract in dispute.
in

of

Miss Palmer appealed; and your office, on September 30,
rendered a decision the gist of which follows:

100.).

It has been repeatedly held by the Department that settlement rests solely
on acts performed in person by the party claiming the benefit thereof (see 8
L. D., 623
13 L. D., 142 20 L. D., 010). Whatever acts of settlement the party
;

;

whom

Peterson purchased performed, could in no manner inure to the
Miss Palmer claimed, and had a right to claim, by reason
benefit of Peterson.
of her settlement and residence, the entire SW. j
and as Peterson did not
appear on the scene until two years afterward, it follows that Miss Palmer
has the superior right to the land. Your decision is therefore reversed; the

from

;

contest

is

From

dismissed; and the contestee's homestead entry will remain intact.

an appeal by his local
argument from his resident attorney.
that your office erred in holding that " the

this action the contestant has filed

attorney, supported by an

The appeal

alleges

simple facts that are necessary to determine the issue in this case are
that Miss Palmer settled on the SW. J of Sec. G in August, 1902,
and has resided there to the date of her entry."
The appeal does injustice to your decision by isolating a single
sentence, and omitting to quote the other " simple facts " set forth in

sentences that immediately follow the one above quoted.

The remaining nine allegations of error are substantially different
forms of repeating the one numbered " 5 "
The Hon. Commissioner erred in not holding that from a time antedating
Lulu Palmer within said section, continuously, until

the settlement of said

the time of hearing, said southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of said
section six was in the possession and occupation of and claimed by parties

other than said contestee, under the homestead laws, and that during the same
time until she made entry of said land said Lulu Palmer made no claim to said

southeast quarter of the southwest quarter.

The argument accompanying

the appeal contends:

If the record of evidence in this case had been carefully examined below, it
ought to have been apparent to the writer of that decision that the case was conducted on the ground that Miss Palmer's claim never extended by reason of her
settlement to the tract in dispute, hut was an afterthought; that she never, by
word, act, or deed, did anything to advise anyone of the extension of her claim
to this tract
that she sat idly by while others were occupying and improving it.
;

and acquiesced in their acts of settlement thereon, thus evidencing a hick of
purpose on her part to include said tract within her claim, while a1 the same
time her inaction in respect of the claim constituted, under the circumstances,
a fraud on her part,

if

she in fact did intend to claim

it.

Neither of contestant's counsel makes any direct reference to the
upon which Miss Palmer appears principally to rely: to wit,

fact

the frequent ruling of the Department that improvements

made upon

DECISIONS KELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

698

public land prior to survey constitute notice of claim to the entire
technical quarter-section

Birdwell, 20 L. IX, 338,
contention

is

upon which they are found (sec Luke v.
and many other cases). Nevertheless, their
by her actions she excluded herself
and is now estopped from claimThis contention merits careful consid-

to the effect that

from the operations of said

ruling,

ing the tract in controversy.
eration.

When

Miss Palmer settled upon the northwest quarter of this
quarter-section, in August, 1902, the " forty " in controversy was
occupied by John Tisdale. She does not allege that she ever informed him that she claimed it. Indeed, it does not appear that she
ever saw him.
She became
J. A. Folk took possession of the tract in May, 1903.
him
his
family;
went
his
cabin,
she tesand
to
well acquainted with
"
nearly
every
tifies (see page 73 of the transcript of the testimony),
adds:
day, to get milk of him." She
I

said
Q.

Q.

was
I

at his house one day,

took

it

and he asked me how

I

took

my

claim? and

I

in a square.

—

Where was he living then? A. He was living on this forty.
What more did he say to you, if anything? A. That was all

—

the conversa-

tion.

Here was certainly a good opportunity for her to tell him that her
which she " took in a square," included the " forty " on which
they two were conversing; but it does not appear that she did so.
Folk sold out to Parker, who took up his residence in the house on
the " forty " in controversy but it does not appear that Miss Palmer
ever informed him that she claimed the land.
Next came the contestant, Peterson. He is a Dane by birth, and
claim,

;

understands the English language so poorly that his examination at
the hearing had to be conducted through an interpreter.

witness was his son-in-law, B. A. Shak.
prior to his purchase of the land,

He

The

first

testified that Peterson,

had been living

in

Minnesota

;

but

finding the winters there too cold for him, and wishing to live near
his

daughter, he asked his son-in-law to find some land in his

(the son-in-law's) vicinity, which he (Peterson) could purchase and
his home upon for the remainder of his life.
While looking
about with this end in view Shak found Mr. Parker living upon
the tract in controversy, claiming it as his own, but willing to sell
if he could get his price.
Upon examining with a tentative purpose
of purchasing, witness found a tw o-room cabin (in which Parker and
his family lived), some open ground about it, and Parker in the act

make

7

,

T

of cutting down more trees to increase the cultivable area; one
hundred and fifty fruit trees set out, a barn, a root-house, a chickenhouse, and " a spring fixed up for use "-— the tract being enclosed with
a pole-and-brush fence, sufficient to prevent the incursions of cattle.
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—

Parker claimed the undisputed right to the land so far as a right
could be obtained before survey; and neither he nor the witness had
On May 3,
the least idea that any other claimant was in existence.
"
have
this
day
sold and
stating,
I
document
executed
a
190-1, Parker
the
description
claim,"
on
my
squatter's
improvements
conveyed my
that followed including the tract in controversy, "to Nels Peterson,
not stating the consideration;
;u id received payment for the same
but witness Fred. Wyman, " scaler and timber-cruiser," states in his
deposition that the improvements were worth from $800 to $350.
Peterson thereupon removed, with his family, from Minnesota to
Montana, took up his residence on a part of the land so purchased—
but not on the part here in controversy, as on account of his age he
found it hard work to climb the hill leading to the house; so he built
another house, on land more nearly level. Then he fenced his entire
claim, setting posts perpendicularly in the ground and adding one
wire on top of the pole-and-brush fence originally surrounding the
Witness William Myers, who put up the fence,
tract in controversy.
being asked why he did not build a better one, replied, " The simple
reason is, the old gentleman said he was out of money." This witness
also cultivated and hoed about the trees in the orchard, until they
were " in as nice condition as any trees in the country " and did
other work in the way of improving the land in controversy. The
contestant kept a cow, grazing her upon this "forty;" and Miss
Palmer testifies
1'

—

;

Q. Mi. Peterson kept a

A. Yes,

Q. Frequently

No,
(,).

sir,

cow

there,

and you got milk from them, didn't yon?

sir.

not

all

—that

is,

they supplied you with milk

all

this

summer?

— A.

the time.

While they had milk they supplied you?

— at

Although buying

least,

—A.

obtaining

Yes,

sir.

—milk of the Peterson family

cow that was pastured on the
land she now claims, which land Peterson was fencing and otherwise improving, Miss Palmer never mentioned to the Petersons
that she claimed it; and the first that Peterson knew of such claim
was when he and his son-in-law, Shak, the day after the filing of
the township plat (being unaware of any necessity for exceeding
haste), came to the local office to file for the tract (with the other
" forties " settled upon by Peterson).
Thus, during all the period from the date of her alleged settlement
(August 20, 1902), until the filing of the township plat (October IT.
1904), while all the time in frequent and much of the time in daily
communication with the parties claiming the land, residing upon it,
and expending their money in improving it, Miss Palmer stood idly
daily during the summer, given by a

by, and gave none of the parties

any intimation of her claim. Tier
conduct conies within the scope and intent of the legal maxim, "* He

who

will not speak

he would speak."

when he should speak, will not be heard when
As was said by the court in the case of Hill v.

Epley (31 Perm. State Reports,
ton
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Grannis, 14 L. D., 381)

v.

p. 334, cited

with approval in Pendle-

:

Where the conduct of a party has heen such as to induce action by another,
he shall he precluded from afterward asserting, to the prejudice of that other,
the contrary of that of which his conduct has induced the belief. The primary
ground of the doctrine is, that it would be a fraud on a party to assert what his
previous conduct had denied, when on the faith of that denial others have acted.
Still

more completely covering the

case here under consideration

the departmental ruling in Roberts et

481)

al. v.

Gordon (14 L.

is

D., 475,

:

One who

fails to assert any claim to a tract of public land which is in the
adverse possession of another, and remains silent, though knowing that the
adverse occupant continues to claim, occupy, and improve the land, is estopi>ed_
thereby from subsequently denying the good faith of said occupant, and assert-

ing a right of priority in himself.

After a careful consideration of
the appeal

ment

is

and the argument

all

the testimony, together with

filed in

support thereof, the Depart-

constrained to reverse the decision of your

office,

and

to

direct that Miss Palmer's entry be canceled as to the land in conflict,

and that of Neils Peterson be allowed, unless some other reason

to the

contrary shall appear.

yellowstone forest reserve— certain lands open to
homestead settlement and entry.
Instructions.

Department of the Interior,
General Land Office,
Washington, D.

G.\

June

19, 1906.

Register and Receiver, Lander, Wyoming.

Gentlemen: March
was approved
AN ACT To extend

15, 1900, the

following act (Public, No. 46)

the provisions of the homestead laws to certain lands in the Yellowstone forest reserve.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Ignited
States of America in Congress assembled, That the general provisions of the
homestead laws of the United States be, and the same are hereby, extended to
and over the surveyed lands in townships forty-eight, forty-nine, and fifty, and
ranges one hundred and five and one hundred and six, within the Yellowstone
forest reserve, and the said lands shall be subject to entry ninety days after
the passage of this act, within which ninety day period the Secretary of Agriculture may set aside such portions of said lands as were not occupied by a
bona fide settler January first, nineteen hundred and six, not to exceed in the
aggregate one hundred and sixty acres, as may be necessary for forest reserve
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administrative purposes, which lands so set aside shall not be subject to settlement, entry or location during the life of the forest reserve: Provided, That
the commutation clause of the homestead laws shall not apply to the said lands,

and any bona

fide settler

who made

settlement on said lands prior to January

nineteen hundred and six, and who had prior to that time lost or exercised his homestead right, may enter and perfect title to the lands settled upon
by him as though his homestead right had not been lost or exercised, upon the
payment of the sum of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre for the land
included in his entry at the time of making final proof.
first,

The

said act docs not take the land out of the reserve, but merely

permits settlement and entry under the homestead law, and applies
to the surveyed lands only. It does not permit settlement or entry of

The surveyed lands

the unsurveyed portion of said townships.

are

subject to appropriation under section 2289 of the Revised Statutes
only, without the right of commutation,

and any application

to enter

or appropriate the land under any other law, except the mineral law,

must be

rejected.

Bona fde

settlers

on the land have a preference right of entry and

made prior to January 1, 1900, may
make entry notwithstanding they may have previously lost or exercised their homestead right, but will be required to make payment
for the land entered at the rate of $1.25 per acre at the time of making final proof. As to parties other than such settlers who attempt
a second use of the right to make entry, you will be governed by the
those whose settlements were

by the Department
Applicants to make
second entry under the provisions hereof must describe the land
formerly entered in such manner as to enable this office to readily
identify the entry.
Bona pic settlers will be allowed credit for the
time heretofore spent on the land entered. While the land has been
subject to settlement since the approval of the act, March 15, L906,
the same does not become subject to entry until ninety days after
act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 527), construed
in the case of

Cox

that date, or on

v.

June

Wells, 33 L.

13,

regular manner and given
series,

1906.
a

I).,

The

657.

entries will be

made

in

the

regular number of your homestead

referring to the act as authority therefor.

a list of the land selected under said act by the
Secretary of Agriculture for forestry administrative purposes, and

Below follows

the same are not subject to settlement or entry; nor will any settle-

ment subsequent to January 1, 1906, prevail against the selection by
Department
Sec. 4, T. 48 N., R. inc.
Lots 6, 8, NW.
SE. \ and SE.
SW.
W., 6th P. M.

the Agricultural

.1

Very

\

respectfully,

W.
Approved

.',,

:

E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary.

A. Richards, Commissioner.
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INDIAN LAND-ALLOTMENT-HOMESTEAD ENTRY.
George H. Dupuis.
An

Indian to whom land in a reservation has been allotted as
tribe, but which land has never become a part of the public
to the general provisions of the homestead law, can not, as
United States, make homestead entry, under section 2289
Statutes, of the land so allotted to him.

a

June

An

appeal has been

of your
officers

office

of

filed

December

21, 1906.

of a

a citizen of the
of the Revised

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
(F. L. C.)

member

domain subject

Land

Office,

(C. J. G.)

by George H. Dupuis from the decision

27, 1905, sustaining the action of the local

denying his application

to

make homestead entry under

tion 2289 of the Revised Statutes for the

NW.

J of Sec. 34,

T

sec-

31 N.,

R. 4 W.j O'Neill, Nebraska.
The applicant is a Santee Sioux Indian and in an accompanying
affidavit alleges:

In the year 1885 and for many years previous thereto I had voluntarily taken
my residence on the land above described within Knox County, Nebraska,
separate and apart from any and all tribes of Indians and did on such occasion
adopt the habits of civilized life and from said time to the present I have voluntarily kept my said residence separate and apart from any and all tribes of
Indians and have kept up and within the habits and customs of civilized life
and have not returned to the customs and manners of my tribe, whereby I
am, and from the year 1887 have been, a citizen of the United States and as
such am entitled to all the rights and privileges of citizens.

up

I am the identical person for whom the above described land is set and held
apart for occupancy and homestead under the 6th article of the Sioux Treaty of
1868 that I have not made proof under said sixth article and have not received patent or any title to said land or certificate therefor and I hereby
elect to hold and occupy the land above described under and by virtue of section
2289 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and in consideration of filing
on said land under the general homestead laws, I hereby waive my right to hold
and claim said land under said sixth article of said Treaty.
I further show that I took up my residence on the above described land in
1885 and from said date to the present have held and occupied the same as my
homestead, continuously.
I further show that I have made lasting and valuable improvements on said
land consisting of 140 acres of breaking, done in 1885 and since, that I have also
a house 16 feet by 28 feet; also barns and fencing, etc., and have made divers
other improvements.
;

:

It is stated in the decision of your office that the schedule of allotments and assignments to Santee Sioux Indians shows the land now
applied for by Dupuis to be embraced in allotment No. 192, made to
him March 31, 1885. His application was rejected by the local officers
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The concluding paragraph of the treaty of April 29,
18G8 (15 Stat,, G35, 637), with the different tribes of Sioux Indians,
under which said land was set apart for Dupuis. is in part as follows:
for this reason.

And
of any

it is

further stipulated that any male Indians over eighteen years of age,
tribe that is or shall hereafter become a party to this treaty,

band or

is or who shall hereafter become a resident or occupant of any reservation or territory not included in the tract of country designated and described
in this treaty for the permanent home of the Indians, which is not mineral land,

who now

nor reserved by the United States for special purposes other than Indian occupation, and who shall have made improvements thereon of the value of two
hundred dollars or more, and continuously occupied the same as a homestead
for the term of three years, shall be entitled to receive from the United States
a patent for one hundred and sixty acres of land including his said improvements, the same to be in the form of the legal subdivisions of the surveys of the
public lands. Upon application in writing, sustained by the proof of two disinterested witnesses, made to the register of the local land office when the land
sought to be entered is within a land district, and when the tract sought to be
entered is not in any land district, then upon said application and proof being
made to the commissioner of the general land office, and the right of such
Indian or Indians to enter such tract or tracts of land shall accrue and be perfect from the date of his first improvements, and no longer.
And any Indian
or Indians receiving a patent for land under the foregoing provisions, shall
thereby and from thenceforth become and be a citizen of the United States,
and be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of such citizens, and shall,
at the same time, retain all his rights to benefits accruing to Indians under this
treaty.

A

proviso in the act of

March

1,

1883 (22 Stat., 433, 444),

is

as

follows

That the patents authorized

to be issued to certain individual

Indians by

the concluding paragraph of article six of the treaty with the Sioux Indians,

proclaimed, the twenty-fourth day of February, eighteen hundred and sixtynine, shall be of the legal effect and declare that the United Stales does and
will

hold the land thus allotted for the period of twenty-five years in trust

and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have
been made, or in case of his decease, of his heirs, according to the laws of
the State or Territory where such land is located, and that at (lie expiration of
said period the United States will convey the same by patent to said Indian
or his heirs as aforesaid in fee discharged of said trust and free of all charge
©r incumbrance whatsoever, and no contract by any such Indian creating any
charge or incumbrance thereon or liability of said land for payment thereof
for the sole use

shall be valid.

It is alleged that certificate never issued to

Dupuis

for the land

apart for him, that he never applied for nor received patent under article 6 of the treaty of 18G8, and the records of your office do

set

not show that trust patent ever issued to him under the act of L883.
His present application is based on the claim thai he has lived on

and apart from his tribe, lias 'adopted the habits
life, and theref6re, under the general allotment act of
1887 (24 Stat., 388), is a citizen of the United State-

his land separate

of civilized

February

8,
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entitled to all the rights

Section 6 of said act provides,

Every Indian born within the

and privileges of other

among

territorial limits of the

other things
United States who has

voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and apart from
any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life, is

hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and
and immunities of such citizens, etc.

is

entitled to all the

rights, privileges,

A citizen of the United States can only make homestead entry,
under section 2289 of the Revised Statutes, of lands subject thereto
and that are part of the public domain. The land in question was
allotted to Dupuis as part of an Indian reservation and such allotment was made and he was entitled thereto by virtue of being a
member of the Santee Sioux tribe of Indians. The fact that the
land was set apart for him under article G of the treaty of 1868 in
itself determines the character of said land and distinguishes it from
public lands subject to entry under the general provisions of the
homestead law. The lands in said reservation not theretofore allotted to Indians were by executive order restored to the public domain
on April 15, 1885, but the land set apart for Dupuis March 31,
1885, was not so restored; and his election to waive his right to hold
the land under article G of the treaty and enter the same under section 2289 of the Revised Statutes, does not make it public land.
On the contrary, it was held for his benefit, he and it remained under
the supervision of the Indian department and upon the required
showing a trust patent declaring " that the United States does and
was to be issued. As stated the
land constituted a part of an Indian reservation which was disposed of by treaty stipulation in a specific manner and whatever
rights Dupuis had or acquired in said land were based on the fact
of his being a member of the Santee Sioux tribe of Indians. These
are far different attributes from those contemplated by the act of
1887 having reference to an Indian who takes np his residence
separate and apart from his tribe and who by reason thereof acquires
will hold the land " for his benefit

the rights and privileges of citizens of the United States, among
them being the right to make homestead entry of public lands under
section 2289 of the Revised Statutes.

The

decision of your office concludes as follows

no appeal is taken from this decision, a patent
him, as provided by the act of March 1, 1883, supra.
If

This

is

undoubtedly the proper course

in trust will be issued to

to pursue,

provided Dupuis

possesses the requisite qualifications under article 6 of the treaty of
1868.
Accordingly, if a trust patent shall be issued, then if Dupuis
can show the proper qualifications patent in fee simple may issue to
him under the act of May 8, 190G (Public— Xo. 149), which provides:

That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is hereby
authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent
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and capable of managing
such allottee a patent

The

his or her affairs at

Statutes,

office,

in so far as

make homestead entry under

to
is

to be issued to

in fee simple, etc.

decision of your

Dupuis

any time to cause

7(J5

it

denies the application of

section 2289 of the Revised

hereby affirmed, and the papers are returned for appro-

priate action, after further consideration,

and investigation

if neces-

sary, in accordance with the views herein expressed.

REPAYMENT—TIMBER AND STONE APPLICATION.
T. J.

Murphy.

Where an

applicant under the timber and stone act states in his declaratory
statement that he has personally examined the land applied for, when as
a matter of fact he has not done so, but in his final proof swears that no
inspection of the land has ever been made by him, entry on such proof can
not be allowed, but as the purchase money paid by him upon submission of
the proof still remains in the control and custody of the land department,
repayment thereof may be made.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General
( F. L. C.
June 21 1906.
,

An
office

Land
(

Office,

C. J. G.

appeal has been filed by T. J. Murphy from the decision of your
of October 17, 1905, rejecting his application for the return of

the purchase

money paid by him upon submitting

the timber and stone act of June

of Sec. 32, T. 28

Murphy

S.,

3,

final proof under
1878 (20 Stat., 89), for the NE. J

R. 16 E., Lakeview, Oregon.

declaratory statement under said act in October, 1902,
in which he alleged, among other things
that

I

filed

have personally examined said land, and from my personal knowledge
is unfit for cultivation, and valuable chiefly for its timber
is uninhabited
that it contains no mining or other improvements.

state that said land

that

it

;

He advertised to make proof January 21, 1903, but failed to do so
and thereupon made application to readvertise, which was rejected
by the local officers on the ground of his failure to submit proof on
'

the date

named or within ten days thereafter. Murphy stated that
was due to the fact that he did not have the money re-

his failure

quired to pay the purchase price for the land and attendant expenses;

was made

good faith and it was his intention
Upon. appeal your office directed the
to perfect title to the land.
local officers, in the absence of any adverse claim to the land, to
allow Murphy to readvertise. This he did and submitted proof
October 20, 1904, which was rejected by the local officers for the
reason that no personal examination of the land had been made by
that his application

5194— Vol. 34—05 m
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Murphy.
which

it

An appeal was taken to your office December 12, 1904, in
was urged that it was error to hold that Murphy could not

make entry under

the act of 1878 without a personal examination of

Hoover v. Sailing (110 Fed. Rep., 43).
As hereinbefore shown, he stated in his declaratory statement that he
had made a personal examination of the land. In his final proof,
the land, citing the case of

—

replying to question 4 "Are you acquainted with the land above
described by personal inspection of each of its smallest legal sub-

— Murphy stated: "I am not." And in answer to ques— "When and in what manner was such inspection made? "

divisions? "
tion 5

he replied, "

Made

In support of his appeal

none."

Murphy

alleged

was advised by a United States commissioner that it was not
necessary for him to personally inspect the land; that he had no
recollection of having made a sworn statement to the effect that he
had made such examination. Your office, however, sustained the
action of the local officers, holding that Murphy was not qualified to
make entry under the timber and stone act, basing such holding on
that he

unreported departmental decision of July 9, 1902, in which, referring to decision in the case of Hoover v. Sailing, supra, it was said:
The Department has already had occasion to consider the effect that should
be given this decision in the administration of the act above cited, but has not
found

and

it

it is

Your

necessary, up to the present time, to pass finally upon the question,

not deemed advisable to
office also

GOO), wherein

make any change

in the existing regulations.

referred to the case of Patrick

held (syllabus)

it is

McNamee

(32 L. D.,

:

Where an applicant to purchase under the act of June 3, 1878, states in his
preliminary affidavit that he has personally examined the land, and it subsequently appears from his final proof that he had not made personal examination
of the land prior to making such affidavit, his application will be rejected.

On September
your

In 1002,

and

Murphy

1905,

20,

filed

the following affidavit in

office:
I

was manager

of the

in that capacity, frequently

Honeyman McBride's wholesale woolen
met Jacob Wrage, a

tailor, at

house,

that time doing

business in Corvallis.
He repeatedly asked me or advised me to take out a
timber claim. 1 refused many times, principally under plea that I had not
time to go on the land. His answer was to me always that there was no occasion for me to go on the land, and he showed me a citation, which he received from J. W. Hamaker, U. S. Land Commissioner of Klamath Falls, in
which the Court decided personal examination was not necessary. Such a
citation

is

attached to the papers, which is in your
Falls to the commissioner at the time I

Klamath

in

office,

made

and which

I

showed

application for final

proof.

About October,
ing as

me

I

1002,

was about

I

decided to

to sign the application.

application of land.

ness has placed

me

make an application, and one Sunday mornWrage called at my residence and asked

to leave Portland,

I

I

looked hurriedly at

did not read

in the

it

it

and saw that

carefully or thoroughly and

unfortunate position

I

am now

in.

I

it

my

was an
careless-

received a copy
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of the County Examiner, the paper in which my application was published in
due time, and then noticed that a sworn statement was supposed to have heen
made by Thomas J. Murphy.
I expressed my uneasiness to Wrage when I sent him money, but in his answer the same excuse was given, that is was not necessary to appear in person.
In January, 1903, Wrage warned me not to send down money for final proof.
On February the 4th, I received another letter from Wrage, in which he enclosed the letter of Ilamaker of January 27th, 1903, to him showing that
intended to cheat the Government or make any false representation,
might
have done so at that time, and now have possession of the receipt or the patent
from your office.
In January or early in February of 100.'), Ilamaker was in Portland, and
Wrage requested me to call and see Mr. Ilamaker, which I refused. On February 25th an answer received from me by Ilamaker, asking him about the
status of the case at that time, he sent me a copy of the affidavit for re-advertisement; also a favor of his on March 14th referring to the same matter: one
of which letters contained a citation of Judge Grosscup relating to the decision
il*

I

I

in a

case similar to mine.

During the spring of 1903 I called at the Surveyors General office in Portland
and had an interview with Mr. Linnen, one of your staff from Washingtou. I
explained the case thoroughly to him and showed him all the papers in my
He asked me to call again and Col. Green, Mr. Linnen and myself
possession.
talked the matter over, and I received an impression in my mind which evidently was wrong, that under the many peculiar circumstances, and in the face

me

of the citation sent to

by Ilamaker, that a personal inspection of the land

would be waived.
I
I

then pressed the matter from the Lake View office and in March, 1904,
to re-advertise.
I complied with all the requirements

was given permission

Klamath Falls and made application for
had an interview with one of your special
agents, a Mr. Shaw, I think, was his name, and told the circumstances to
him, and he also expressed his opinion that it was not necessary under the
circumstances for me to visit the land. The same day I appeared before him
at the time,
final

to

and

proof.

make

in October

I

visited

In Klamath Falls

final proof.

.

.

I

.

Your office, in passing upon Murphy's application for return of
purchase money, concluded as follows:
There is no doubt in my mind that Mr. Murphy's signature to the sworn
statement No. 1431, for the NE. i of Sec. 32, T. 38 S., R. IT E., is genuine, and
that the statement therein that he had personally examined said land is false.
and that he attempted to take advantage of said sworn statement when he asked
to be allowed to re-advertise and when he made his final proof.
As Mr. Murphy has been guilty of false swearing and deceit in his sworn
statement, he is not entitled to the return of the purchase money now in the
hands of the Receiver, and you will so advise the party and of his right of
appeal.

See case of James T. Pall (33 L.

office

of the fact that

it

560).

Murphy

signed the declaratory statement in
In view
finds he was guilty of false swearing.

It is not denied that

which your

I).,

was made

to

appear that he had not personally

examined the land involved prior to such statement,

lie

could not be

permitted to complete entry for said land.

The ad of 1878 has

uniformly been construed by the Department

as requiring such per-
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McNamee, supra; Grace P. FeatherHence, it was properly held that Murphy Avas
not qualified to enter the land applied for by him. While the statement contained in his declaratory statement as to having " personally examined " the land was an erroneous one, yet under the facts
disclosed it is not necessarily proven that such statement was made
with the deliberate and culpable purpose of deceiving and defrauding
the Government.
On the contrary, when making final proof he
openly stated that he had not personally examined the land. The
misstatement contained in his declaratory was therefore not carried
into his final proof upon which he sought to perfect entry'.
The
case under the facts resolves itself rather, as claimed in the appeal,
not into an attempt to make entry based upon the statement that he
had personally examined the land, but into an attempt to make entry
regardless of the fact that he had not personally examined the land
sonal examination.
stone (32 L.

I).,

Patrick

631).

as stated in his final proof.

that of

James T.

The

Ball, supra.

case

is

clearly distinguished

from

There, not only the declaratory state-

final proof contained false statements.
Upon the face
of the final proof in that case entry was allowable, and that con-

ment but the

summation was avoided only by an investigation disclosing the falsity
of both declaratory statement and final proof. Here, Murphy's
final proof disclosed facts upon its face which showed the entry could
not be allowed.

As

the

money

in question

still

remains in the con-

and custody of the land department it may, for proper reasons, be
returned to the purchaser, no specific statutory authority being required to do so. It is believed sufficient showing and Avarrant have
been made to entitle Murphy to a return of the money applied for by
him. The decision of your office is accordingly hereby reversed, and
if no other objection shall appear, the money question will be retrol

turned.

townsite proof-indian land.
Diocese of

Duluth

v.

Bena Townsite.

is no requirement that townsite proof shall be made by persons not resident of the town, and such residence does not affect their competency to
make such proof.
The act of March 3, 1905, authorizes the purchase by the diocese of Duluth of
one hundred and sixty acres of land in the ceded Chippewa Indian reservation, but as that act does not recognize any rights as accruing to the diocese

There

by virtue of applications theretofore made by

it

for the dedication, or pur-

chase, of certain of said lands for mission or church purposes,

any applica-

tion by the diocese under said act can not be given relation to the earlier

applications

made

prior to the passage of the act, to the prejudice of inter-

vening adverse rights.
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The Protestant Episcopal Mission of the Diocese of Duluth apMarch 6, 1906, rejecting its application
under the act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat, 1048, 10G8), to purchase the
SE. J of the SE. | Sec. 27, and the NE. J of the NE. J, Sec. 34, T. 145
pealed from your decision of

,

W., Cass Lake, Minnesota, and awarding the right of entry
of them to the judge of the district court, as trustee, as part of the
X., R. 28

Bena Townsite.

The land

is within the ceded Chippewa Indian reservation opened
under the acts of January 14, 1889 (25 Stat,, 642), June 27,
1902 (32 Stat., 400), and February 9, 1903 (32 Stat,, 820), which latApril 28, 1902, the archter act extended the townsite laws thereto.
deacon of the diocese, superintendent of missions, applied, through
the acting Indian agent, Leech Lake, to have these tracts set apart
for church purposes, which the Department held to be not permissible
under the provisions of law then existing for disposal of these lands.
October 27, 1903, and June 27, 1904, respectively, W. S. McClenahan,
judge of the district court in and for Cass count}^, and J. G. McGarry,
probate judge in and for said county, filed their respective townsite
declaratory statements for three hundred and twenty acres, including
these lands, each alleging an urban settlement and occupation of them
October 19, 1903, and applying to purchase them as trustee for the
occupants. November 22, and June 28, 1904, respectively, the local
office rejected these applications, for the reason that April 23, 1903,
these lands were withdrawn from entry and reserved " for the pur-

to entry

poses of reforestation," notified to the local

Upon

office

December

petition of the townsite settlers, the Department,

3,

1903.

February

13,

urban settlement of the land was
made before December 3, 1903, the case should be governed by the deAfter examination and
cision in Richards Townsite (32 L. D., 319).
report by a special agent, directed by the Department, April 30, 1904,
the withdrawal of April 23, 1903, was modified to exclude these lands
therefrom. May 9, 1904, for the reason that Congress was considering a bill for disposal of these lands to the Diocese of Duluth, promulgation of its decision of April 30, 1904, was suspended by the
Department until March 31, 1905, when, Congress having adjourned
without passing the bill, the order of suspension was vacated and, on
March 6, 1905, the diocese by its archdeacon filed with (he Secretary
of the Interior and in your office applications to purchase the lands
under the act of March 3, 1905, supra, and April 17. 1905, filed a
similar application in the local office, which rejected the same, and
appeal was taken from that action to your office,
1904, held

(unreported) that,

if

;

,
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June 13, 1905, in Bena Townsite (34 L. D., 24), it was held that
within and for the State of Minnesota, the judge of the district court
within and for the county, being designated by the law of that State
to act as the townsite trustee, was the proper officer to make the
entry.

In the meantime, March 8, and April 20, 1905, protests of the
archdeacon of the diocese were filed against the townsite entry, and
notice was ordered given of any further proceedings looking to appropriation of these lands. Notice was duly given by the applicant
for townsite entry that he would offer proof at the local office, September 16, 1905, at which time both parties appeared, and the dioPart of the record is a stipulation by councese renewed its protest.
sel

for the parties respecting procedure.

November 13, 1905, the local office found that urban settlement was
made upon the lands October 19, 1903, by eleven persons, named,

who

did some street clearing and other improvements between that
time and January 12, 1904, when the Indian agent ordered them
that Septemoff and took charge of their properties and belongings
ber 7, or 8, 1904, lines were run, some clearing done, and buildings
;

attempted to be built, when the agent stopped, and September 10,
1904, gave claimants notice to desist from further attempt at town
development; that April, 1905, the notice being recalled, the urban
settlers renewed their development work, and at the date of hearing
there were on the townsite twenty-one framed residences, two store
buildings, three-quarters of a mile of streets opened, cleared, and
partially graded the SE. ^ of the SE. J, Sec. 27, and part of the
N. | of the NE. ^, Sec. 34, were platted; the value of improvements
was $8,000; fifteen residents owned their houses, and with their families resided therein on the townsite, and others not owning their
houses resided there with their families; that, excluding Indians,
there were not one hundred persons having a " fixed place of residence " upon the townsite, and that the SE. J of the SE. J, Sec. 27,
and the N. J of the NE. J, Sec. 34, only were settled upon, and were
all the land that could be entered as a townsite under the proof.
Both parties appealed to your office.
Your office reviewing the evidence pointed out omissions and errors in the local office computation of residents, and found that
something more than one hundred and one persons were fixed residents of the townsite, and held that prior to the act of March 3,
1905, supra, there was no authority for dedication of any of these
lands to church or mission purposes, so that the prior application of
;

the diocese could not segregate them from appropriation as a townsite;

that the urban settlement, October, 1903, and application for

townsite entry under the act of February

gate the land and exclude

it

9,

1903, supra, did segre-

from purchase by the diocese; that the
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townsite application and proof are sufficient in form and substance,
and warrant entry of the three hundred and twenty acres applied

including the two tracts here in controversy, and allowed the
payment for the land and appraised value of the timber thereon amounting, in the aggregate, to
for,

townsite entry, conditioned upon

The Diocese

$2401.

of Duluth appealed from your decision.

assigned as errors of your decision that the townsite proof
was not made by disinterested witnesses; in not finding that the
It

is

entry

speculative, for the benefit of a private corporation organized

is

Bena Townsite Company;

in finding that there were one hundred inhabitants, or that the lands were occupied as a townsite from
October 19, 1903, to April 28, 1905; in finding that the application

as the

of the diocese under the act of

March

3,

1905,

was not

" a continuance

of and consummation of the rights and equities therein dating from

March

and prior thereto," and was subsequent

1902,

1,

town-

to the

site application.

The Department
in townsite cases

is not cited to any rule or decision requiring proof
by witnesses not resident of the town. All resi-

dents of the town are in such cases interested as beneficiaries of the
entry, but the notoriety of the fact of urban settlement

the probability of entry

than

is

fictitious

evidence

appellant,

The

was not

Hammond

case of

W. W. Burke

a decision

ing witnesses.
is

(1 L.

such that

D., 9G), cited

of the Department.

That

by

in Cassius

and holds
must be two corroborat-

(7 L. D., 88) was, however, departmental,

that with settlement claimants' proof, there

entry

is

much more remote

is

that of fictitious proof of compliance with law in case of

private entry.

C.

upon

It is true, in strictly technical sense, that a townsite

generically a settlement entry, and all occupants of lots or

town are
come through the entry by

tracts within the

of Cassius C.

Hammond

interested, as their expectant titles

their trustee.

The

rule

however

does not exclude their competency.

probability of conspiracy and false testimony

is

must

in ease

The

much more remote

number of people
community is a matter capable of observation to people
generally and capable of rebuttal, and the reason for proof by disin ease of

townsite than of private entries, and the

in a village

interested witnesses does not exist.
It is also impossible that a townsite entry under the laws of the
United States can be speculative, or for the benefit of a private corporation.
The law requires the entry to be for use and benefit of the
occupants or residents of the town, and the trust is enforceable by the
courts for benefit of the occupants as to the tracts which they severally occupy, and for the town community as to tracts not appropriated.
Without neglect ,of duty or breach of the trust, there can

not be a speculative towmsite entry.
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As

to the

number of

resident inhabitants, the concurring findings

and your office to the number of ninety-seven are
fully supported by the testimony, and that number is sufficient to
include more than the land claimed by the diocese, but examination
of the evidence and the finding of the local office shows that it inadvertently overlooked and failed to include the family of Fred Tibbets, wife and child, and the local office deemed the telegraph operator
and the railroad agent not proper to be enumerated because they
boarded at the hotel, instead of living in houses owned by themselves
or rented.
The latter two persons should not be regarded as tranThey must be regarded as members of the urban community,
sients.
as they or some other person in their stead to perform their duty
must be in and part of the community, so long as a railroad and a
telegraph with station and office exist in the town to transact the
business of transportation of persons and freight, and transmission
of intelligence. While persons in such employment are liable to be
transferred by their employers to other points, the necessity of traffic
requires the presence of such person, and while such a person is in
the town with no present probability of being transferred elsewhere,
he must be regarded as one of the residents entitled to be enumerated
in computing the number of the community or town population.
of the local

office

The act of March 3, 1905, contained nothing recognizing the
former requests of the diocese for dedication of these lands to mission
or church purposes, or for their purchase.
No application under the
act could therefore be given relation to the earlier applications made
prior to date of its passage. In the meantime, the act of February
9, 1903, opened the land to urban appropriation, and such appropriation was made. Thereby the land became segregated against any
later appropriation by the diocese to its use.
The forcible exclusion of the urban settlers by the Indian agent
did not affect their rights acquired by settlement. The finding of the
local office and your office that their settlement was in good faith is
supported fully by the evidence in the record.

Your

decision

is

affirmed.

contest affidavit-priority of application.
Jones et
An

al. v. Bettis.

application to contest received by mail will not be regarded as having been
presented or filed until it is taken up, numbered, and entered of record, and

where a contest application is presented in person and in the ordinary
course of business is accepted, numbered, and entered of record, and
another application to contest the same entry is at that time, unknown to
the local officers, in the unopened mail in the office, priority will be accorded
the application first accepted and filed.

THE PUBLIC LANDS.

DECISIONS RELATING" TO

Acting Secretary Wilson
(

F. L. C.

7l3

Commissioner of the General Land
June 26, 1900.
( A. W. P.

to the

Office,

George W. Jones has appealed from your office decision of October
wherein you affirm the action of the local -officers in rejecting
his affidavit of contest against homestead entry No. 2G804 ( Wakeeney
scries), made by Minnie Bettis on October 24, 1903, for the SW. },
Sec. 12, T. 13 S., E. 39 W., Colby, Kansas, land district, and awarding
a prior right of contest against said entry to Joseph Henry Wells.
It appears from a note attached to Jones's affidavit of contest,
signed by the register and receiver, that it
28, 1905,

'was filed in this office about :30 A. M., September 4, 1005, and rejected for the
A. M., on September 4. 1905, the contest affidavit of Joseph
reason that at
Henry Wells against said homestead entry was upon the register's desk in the

unopened mail, and

filed

The following
of September

4,

prior to the affidavit of George

W.

Jones.

notice appears to have been given Jones by letter

by the

1905, signed

register

Referring to your application to contest II. E. No. 20804 made Oct. 24th,
1004 1100.°,], by Minnie Bettis, for the SW. h Sec. 12, T. 13 S., R. 30 W., you
are advised that at
A. M. Sept. 4th, 100— [1005]. a contest affidavit for the
above land by Joseph II. Wells, was in the mail and unopened on the register's desk, at the time you made your application, shortly after
A. M., hence
notice can not issue to you for the reason that the application of Wells was
the first filed, the mail was not opened until after you left the office, as otherwise you would have been informed when here.

In affirming the above action of the local
October 28, 1905, yon state that
It

is

alleged by Jones, by

way

by decision of

officers,

of affidavit, that he reached your office at

four minutes after nine o'clock on the morning of September 4, and made inquiry if a contest had been filed against said entry and was informed that
there was not; that the receiver then gave him a blank affidavit of contest

and affiant sat down at his desk and prepared the affidavit; that affiant remained in your office until noon of the same day, and received no notice of any
other contest.
In the matter of alleged simultaneous applications to contest

that the

first

one accepted

is

entitled to proceed.

(33 L.

I).,

it

has been held

582.)

The same

rule would not apply in this case for the reason that Wells's affidavit had been

m

your

office

some minutes before Jones reached there and

for one-half hour

before the contest affidavit of Jones was actually filed.
I see no sufficient reason for disturbing your action
light of contest to Wells,
final

affidavit

will

in awarding the prior
remain suspended pending the

termination of the contest brought by the former.

From
that

whose

it

said decision Jones lias appealed to this Department, urging

was error

also alleges thai

to

award

(he prior right of contest to Wells.

the record

does not

He

warrant the statements con-

office decision'. " that he reached the local office at four
minutes after nine o'clock on the morning of September 4," and that
his " affidavit of contest was filed at 9 :30 A. M."

tained in your
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The

first

statement appears to have been based upon Jones's cor-

roborated affidavit accompanying his appeal to your

office.
Therein
he alleges that when he arrived at the local office " it was just four
minutes of 9 o'clock." In the corroborating affidavits of Fred B.

Lewis and Martha Coleman it is alleged that affiants arrived at the
local office a few minutes before nine o'clock A. M., and that Jones
arrived a minute or two later. As to the second statement, it will be
observed that in the note attached to Jones's affidavit the local officers
was filed in this office about 9 :30 A. M." Referring to

state that it "

the Wells affidavit therein they state that

it

was upon the

register's

desk in the unopened mail, and filed prior to Jones's affidavit. In the
letter to Jones notifying him of the rejection thereof, they refer to
Therein
his application as having been made " shortly after 9 A. M."
they again state that at 9 A. M. the Wells application was in the
unopened mail on the register's desk, which " was not opened until
It will also be observed that the local offiafter you left the office."
letter
transmitting
the appeal of Jones to your office state
cers in their
was
opened
at 9 A. M. Jones " entered the office,
that when the door
procured the status of said entry No. 26804, called for and received a
blank affidavit of contest, sat down at a desk and at his leisure prepared, presented, and was sworn to his affidavit of contest against
said homestead entry, all of which transpired after the office was
opened at 9 o'clock A. M., on said September 4, 1905, while the affidavit of contest of Joseph Henry Wells was on file promptly at and
before 9 o'clock A. M. on said day."
From the above quotations from the record it would appear that
neither of the statements contained in your office decision, to which
objection is made, is technically correct. This is material, however,

only to the extent that such corrections
as to

which of the

affidavits

was

may

first filed

The only question presented herein

affect the determination
with the local officers.

for consideration

is

as to the

and Wells as contestants of Minnie Bettis's
homestead entry. It is clear from certain statements contained in
the local officers' letters, and hereinbefore quoted, that at the time
Jones appeared at the local land office and prior to the subsequent
filing of his affidavit of contest, the contest affidavit of Wells was in
but that this mail was notthe unopened mail on the register's desk
opened until after his (Jones's) affidavit had been accepted and conCan such a contest application in the unopened mail
test fee paid.
on the register's desk be said to have been filed prior to one properly
tendered at the local office by an applicant and accepted without
knowledge of the receipt of the mail application? Both the finding of the local officers and decision of your office hold in the affirmIn your said decision it was determined that the two appliative.
cations in question were not simultaneously filed, as in the case of
priority between Jones

;
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In that case,

it

will

by mail and received
However, they were not regarded
;it the local office at the same time.
as simultaneous, it being held that the one first taken up, numbered,
and entered on the records, in the regular course of business, was
While not governing in the case at bar, yet
entitled to precedence.
inferred
from the principle therein enuncibe
reasonably
it might
holds, that where a contest applicaso
Department
now
ated, and the
mail,
it
will
not be regarded as having been
by
received
is
tion
be observed, both applications were presented

presented or filed until such application has in fact been taken up,

numbered, and entered on the records.
In the somewhat similar case of Kelso
242),

it

v.

Janeway

et

</J.

(22 L. D.,

was held (syllabus) that:

As between two applications to contest an entry, one received by mail in
due course, and lying unopened on the register's desk at nine o'clock in the
morning, and one presented in person at such hour, priority should be accorded
the latter.

The

effect of this

holding would appear to give precedence to the

application presented in person over that received and

unopened mail at

9 A. M., only

when

the former

was

among

the

in fact also

tendered at that hour, but the decision seems to go further than indicated by the above syllabus.

Therein

it

was said

(p. 244) that:

Where applications received by mail are lying on the desk of the local officers
on the opening of the office for business, if in the ordinary course of business
the mail is in fact opened and the application thus in business hours becomes
presented to the officers, it will have priority, but if in like manner an applicant presents his contest at once, at nine (/clock or before the mail is opened,
then such application should have priority.
In

the

case

at

bar,

as

stated,

Wells's

application

was

in

the

unopened mail at 9 A. M., at which hour upon the opening of the
local office Jones entered, procured the status of the homestead entry
of Minnie Bettis, received a blank affidavit which he prepared, was
sworn to, and filed shortly thereafter, but prior to the opening of the
mail and filing of the Wells contest application, and in accordance
with the views herein expressed priority must be accorded the application of Jones, and the judgment of your office to the contrary
reversed.

Accompanying the record is also an appeal prosecuted by the
entrywoman, Minnie Bettis, and a separate protest of George W.
Jones from what purports to be the erroneous action of the local officers in proceeding with hearing and determination of the Wells contest during the pendency of Jones's appeal, but, as the same were no
part thereof, they have not been considered by the Department, but
are herewith returned, with'the accompanying papers, lor appropriate action by your office.
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school land-survey-fractional township.
State of California.
Where

was returned as a
and no further survey of the township has since been
made, the State, after a lapse of more than forty years, is justified in
accepting such survey as a final and complete survey of the township and in
proceeding with the adjustment of its school land grant upon the theory
at the time of survey of a township a portion thereof

" salt lake

now

dry,"

that the township

is

fractional.

Acting Secretary Wilson
(F. L. C.)

The

list

15,

Land
W. C.)

the General

State of California has appealed from your

December
land

Commissioner of
June 26, 1900.

to the

Office,

(F.
office

decision of

1905, holding for cancellation its indemnity school

of selections, K. and E. No. 198, state No. 301G, being of lot

NW.

J of SW. J, Sec. 3, S. i of SE. J of Sec. 28, NAV. J
J,
Sec. 32, N. i of
J and SE. J NE. J, Sec. 34, all in T. 40 N., E.
3 W., M. D. M., Eedding land district, California, embracing 314.70

2 and

NE.

NW.

acres, the selection

being made in lieu of undescribed lands amounting
M. D. M., alleged to be

to 314.70 acres, Sec. 16, T. 30 S., E. 38 E.,

mineral in character.
The decision appealed from holds that the selection is invalid for
the reason that the base land is unsurveyed. Other objections aremade to the list but are immaterial in view of the conclusion herein
reached.

was made of township 30 south, range 38 east,
by which public lands within the township were
surveyed into sections and parts of sections, amounting to 14136.36
acres, the remaining portion of the township, about 9000 acres, being
It seems that survey

M. D. M.,

in 1856,

returned as within a " salt lake

now

If the portion of the townshould have been regularly surveyed and platted and not meandered. No further or additional survey has ever been made of the portion of the township returned as
within the limits of this lake.

ship within said lake was dry land

On

this return the question arises

more than forty years

dry."

it

:

Was

the State on

May

10, 1897,

after the survey of 1856, warranted in treating

that survey as a complete survey of the township and proceeding with

the adjustment of

its

Without determining

grant in aid of

common

schools, accordingly?

whether survey should have
been made of the portion of the township shown by the survey of
1856 to be within a lake, or whether survey thereof could now be
made, under all the circumstances it is the opinion of this Department
that the State was fully warranted in accepting the survey of 1856 as
a final and complete survey of the township, and in proceeding in the
at this time as to
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upon the theory that the townbecame entitled to

this theory the State

its school grant on account of said township.
By the
survey of 1856, section 3G is in place. There was no section 1G, the
part of the township corresponding thereto being within the reported

9G0 acres under

" dry lake."

If the State took the entire section 36 she would still be* entitled to
indemnity, because of the fractional township, to the amount of 320
acres, and if no other selections have been made on account of the loss

of section 16

it

would seem that the

passed, if otherwise satisfactory.

The

selection in question

might be

fact that the State in its selec-

tion specifically defines the loss as being a part of section 16, mineral
in character, should not defeat its substantial rights in the premises,

provided it amends its list so as to show that the lieu lands are
claimed because of the fractional character of the township. If the
State insists, however, and persists in its claim to the section 16 in
place, lost because of mineral character, she must await such time as,

by appropriate survey, the said section 16 may be identified.
In view of this holding it is deemed inadvisable to pass finally upon
the sufficiency of the selection in its present form, and the matter is
therefore remanded to your office for further consideration and decision in the light of the holding herein made.

Richmond and Other Lode Claims.
Motion for review of departmental decision of April

12,

1906,

34 L. D., 554, denied by Secretary Hitchcock, June 30, 1906.

school land grant—exemption of mineral lands.
State of South Dakota
The grant

of sections sixteen

and

v.

Delicate.

thirty-six, to the State of

South Dakota for

school purposes, by the act of February 22, 1880, took effect on the admission of the State into the Union as to lands of the class and character

subject to the grant in such of said sections as were at that date identified
by the government surveys. As to unsurveyed lands, the grant does not

attach until identification by approved survey, and if at that time any of
the lands embraced in such sections are known to be mineral in character

Any

they are excepted from the grant.
portion of the superficial area within the boundary

lines fixed by the
with a school section,
rightfully be claimed and held under the mining laws.

location of a valid lode mining claim,

may

in

conflict
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Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the

(J

aw nil Land

Office,

'

June

(F. L. C.)

December

30, 1906.

(F.

Thomas W. Delicate, as
Road Agent and six other

30, 1901,

(No. 1243) for the

trustee,

H. B.)

made entry

lode mining claims,

survey No. 1408, Rapid City, South Dakota, land district.
It appearing from the field notes of survey and the official plat
that one of the claims of the entered group, the Atlantic, embraces
a small conflict with, and in the northeast corner of, school section
16, T. 2 S.,

the local

R. 6 E., B. H. M., your

officers,

among

office,

December

12, 1903, directed

other things, to notify the proper authorities

of the State of South Dakota accordingly and to allow them sixty
days within which to show cause why the mining claim should not

pass to patent.

In response the State asserted, through its Attorney-General, and
submitted a written argument to sustain, its claim to the land in controversy, and prayed that to the extent thereof the mineral entry be
canceled and

title

thereto declared to be vested in the State.

Thereafter, by decision of January 16, 1905, finding and stating
the facts to be that the Atlantic claim was located January 2, 1897,

and that the township survey embracing the school section in queswas executed August 12 to September 8, 1898, approved May 23,
1899, your office sustained the entry upon the ground, in substance and
effect, that until the section was identified by the approved survey no
right in the State could attach, and that prior to identification and at
the time the mining claim was located the land in controversy was
subject to location and entry under the mining laws.
From that decision the State has appealed to the Department. In
brief and in so far as is pertinent to the present controversv, its contention is that by virtue of the provisions of the enabling act of
February 22, 1889 (25 Stat., 676), whereunder it (together with
North Dakota, Montana, and Washington) was admitted to the
Union, and whereby sections 16 and 36 in every township were granted
to the State for the benefit of public schools, the right and title of
the State attached absolutely, at and as of the date of the act, to all
lands, whether surveyed or unsurveyed then and thereafter included in such sections except only as to such lands as were known
tion

—

—

at that date to be mineral in character.

The granting

provisions of the enabling act, applicable to the

it and upon which the appellant State
contained in sections 10 and 11 thereof, as follows:

four States admitted under
here

relies, are

That upon the admission of each of said States into the Union secnumbered sixteen and thirty-six in everey township of said proposed
States, and where such sections, or any parts thereof, have been sold or otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any act of Congress, other lands
Sec. 10.

tions
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equivalent thereto, in legal subdivisions of not less than one-quarter section.
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of which (he same is taken,

are hereby granted to said States for the support of common schools, such
indemnity lands to be selected within said States in such manner as the legislature may provide, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior: Provided, That the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections embraced in permanent
reservations for national purposes shall not, at any time, be subject to the
grants nor to the indemnity provisions of this act, nor shall any lands embraced
in Indian, military, or other reservations of any character be subject to the
grants or to the indemnity provisions of this act until the reservation shall
have been extinguished and such lands be restored to, and become a part of, the
public domain.
Sec. 11. That all lands herein granted for educational purposes shall be disposed of only at public sale, and at a price not less than ten dollars per acre,
the proceeds to constitute a permanent school-fund, the interest of which only
shall be expended in support of said schools.
But said lands may, under
such regulations as the legislatures shall prescribe, be leased for periods of not
more than five years, in quantities not exceeding one section to any one per*
son or company; and such land shall not be subject to pre-emption, homestead
entry, or any other entry under the land laws of the United States, whether
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be reserved for school purposes only.

It is urged that the reservation, in section 11, from pre-emption,
homestead entry or any other entry under the land laws of the
United States, of the lands therein referred to, " whether surveyed or

unsurveyed," distinguishes the grant, in respect of the time when the
State's title to the unsurveyed lands takes effect, from the usual grants
to other States for like purposes; and, as lending strength to this
view, that the exceptions from the operation of the grant, recited in
section 10, are in terms of the past tense

and 36 sold or otherwise disposed
vations,

etc., at

To support

of,

and include only sections 16

or embraced in permanent reser-

the date of the act.

its

contention the State cites certain decisions of the

United States Supreme Court, with respect

to grants to particular

States, containing expressions to the general effect that

words of

present grant, in the absence of restraining clauses, import an immediate transfer of title

it

may

—a

—although

grant in praesenti

subsequent

and attach
and that whenever the identity of the granted
ascertained the title relates back to the date of the grant.

proceedings

be required to give precision to that

title

to specific tracts,

lands

is

may

be remarked, in passing to a consideration of the question
presented by the appeal, that the grants to the four States admitted
under the enabling act of sections L6 and 36, if available, were to take
It

"
upon the admission of each of said States into the Union
and not as of the date of the act; and South Dakota's admission was
proclaimed by the President November 2, 1889 (26 Stat.. L549).

effect "

The
ment,

infirmity in the State's contention, in the view of the Departrespect of the force and effect of the grant so far as per-

is in

tains to the unsurveyed lands

which should be or were thereafter.

720
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upon extension of the public surveys, embraced

in sections 1G

and

36.

Neither the terms of the act nor the decisions cited sustain the theory
that, unless excepted by reason of conditions existing at the date of
the State's admission, such lands forthwith became subject to and are
within the operation of the grant.

In Schulenberg v. Harriman (21 Wall., 44, 02), cited by the State,
the court said that " unless there are other clauses in a statute
restraining the operation of words of present grant, these must be
taken in their natural sense to import an immediate transfer of title,
although subsequent proceedings may be required to give precision
to that title and attach it to specific tracts." And in the case of Grinnell v. Railroad Co. (103 U. S., 739), cited in the same connection, it
was held that the grant of alternate odd-numbered sections, within
certain limits, on each side of lines of railroad to be thereafter constructed was a grant in praesenti, and that upon definite location of
the roads the identity of the granted lands was ascertained and the
title related back to the date of the grant.

The Department

fully recognizes the force of the general prin-

ciple expressed in the first of the above cases, followed

and

in effect

restated in the second, but the question here, as in any case,
its

application.

is

in

Clearly, as the language imports, the principle

is

applicable only with respect to such lands as are within the in-

tendment and purview of the grant; or as it may be stated, observing the language of the court in the second case, the title which relates back to the date of the grant must attach, upon ascertainment
of their identity, to the "granted" lands. What is within the
grant in each case is the first inquiry; and here the grants by the
sections above quoted are subject to the further provisions of section
18 of the act, as follows

That all mineral lands shall be exempted from the grants made by this act.
But if sections sixteen and thirty-six, or any subdivision or portion of any
smallest subdivision thereof in any township shall be found by the Department
of the Interior to be mineral lands, said States are hereby authorized and
empowered to select, in legal subdivisions, an equal quantity of other unappropriated lands in said States, in lieu thereof, for the use and benefit of the com-

mon

schools of said States.

In view of the express provisions of this section

it

is

manifest

that the last clause of section 11 was not intended to include mineral

lands or entries thereof under the mining laws and equally that the
excepting provisions of section 10, the language of which is pointed
;

out by the State as indicating the time at which adverse rights
must have intervened, have no application to mineral appropriations.
By the terms of section 18 mineral lands are expressly exempted
from the grants made by the act, and adequate provision is made for
indemnity to each of the States concerned for such sections 16 and

DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.

721

subdivisions thereof, as " shall be

found. ... to be minimporting that future disclosures were in contemplation. The express exemption is but a substantial reiteration
of the provisions of section 2318, Kevised Statutes, long antedating
36,

or

eral lands," the tense

the State's grant, that
In

all

cases lands valuable for minerals shall be reserved from sale, except

as otherwise expressly directed by law.

Pursuant thereto

has usually been specifically provided in the
that mineral lands should be exempted and the exemption is uniformly held to embrace all lands
known to be mineral in character at the date title thereto would
otherwise definitely vest.
various grants

it

made by Congress

;

The cases above mentioned are types of others cited by the State,
and involved grants to aid in the future construction of lines of
railroad.
Giving the fullest effect to what is said by the court in
each case, in connection with the facts thereof, as to the terms of
present grant in which the various acts under consideration were
framed, as importing grants in praesenti, and as to the retrospective
relation of title upon identification of the subject-matter by the

maps of

and the court
and embrace lands which are
ascertained prior to the filing of such maps to be of any excepted class
In holding, therefore, that upon definite attachment
or character.
filing of

has not held, that

title relates

definite location, it does not follow,
title will so relate

back to the date of the granting act the court plainly
title actually attaches under and by

speaks only of the lands to which
virtue of the act.

The doctrine

of the relation of

title

necessarily implies the im-

So in
title until the time when the relation occurs.
upon the public lands which were unsurveyed at the date
of the State's admission there were no sections 16 and 36 to pass by
the grant. Until the public surveys were extended thereover the
State's title, if any, was in prospect merely: that title could attach
only to the specific sections. Not until those sections were ascertained and established could the grant become operative as to them
and the legal title thereto pass, and then only if they were of the
class and character of lands subject to the grant.
That lands thereafter embraced in sections 16 and 36 and at that
time known to be mineral in character were not intended to pass
perfection of
this case,

under the grant is, as before suggested, plainly apparent from the
exempting provisions of section 18 of the act, which embrace all
lands which "shall be found. ... to be mineral lands." It is not
a defeat of the grant in any part by conditions subsequently arising:
mineral lands, if known to be such, are not within the grant and the
grant can not attach to specific sections, or parts of sections, compris;
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ing lands of

known mineral
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character.

Any

such lands, therefore, so

found to be mineral in character prior to the ascertainment, by
approved survey, of sections 1G and 36, at which time the grant would
otherwise become operative as to them and the legal title thereto pass,
are within the exemption.
See Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad
Co. (154 U.S., 288).
The question hereinabove discussed was considered by the Department in the recent case of State of South Dakota v. Trinity Gold
Mining Company (34 L. D., 485), and, by reason of the similarity
in material particulars in the corresponding sections of the acts providing for grants of lands to Utah and to South Dakota for the
support of common schools, was disposed of under the principles
remarked in the case of Mahoganey No. 2 Lode Claim (33 L. D., 37)
and announced in the decisions cited in the latter case, which came
up from Utah. The principles as thus announced are of equal application and force here; but in view of the contentions which are
elaborately and earnestly pressed upon the attention of the Department in the case at bar, and especially whereby it is sought to distinguish the grant here involved, the question has in this case been
reviewed at length.
It is also objected by the State, in effect, that as the conflict embraces but a portion of the superficial area of the Atlantic claim,

which is not asserted to contain in itself any mineral deposits, it
was not exempted from the grant, irrespective of the date when
the latter would take effect. In reply to this it may be said, whilst the
portion of the mining claim so in conflict with the school section is
altogether at one side and south of the indicated lode line of the
claim, yet as it is within the boundary lines fixed by the location,
which appears to be in all respects regular, it may rightfully be
claimed and held under the mining laws. This is well explained
in Lindley on Mines (2nd Ed., Vol. I, Sec. 71, p. 101), wherein,
contrasting the original lode law of July 2G, 1866 (14 Stat., 251),
with the general law of May 10, 1872 (17 Stat., 91), the author of
that treatise says:

Under the act of 1872 tbe miner

which must be so defined
Failing in this, he obtains nothing.

locates a surface

as to include the top, or apex, of his lode.

it is his loss.
He can only hold the
course to the extent that the top, or apex, thereof is found within
his boundaries.
He may thus acquire a superficies fifteen hundred feet in
length by six hundred feet in width, if local regulations do not restrict these

If

he mistakes the course of his vein,

vein on

its

measurements.
In other words, under the old law he located the lode.

must

Under the new, he

locate a piece of land containing the top, or apex, of the lode.

the vein

While

the principal thing, in that it is for the sake of the vein
that the location is made, the location must be of a piece of land including the
top, or apex, of the vein.
If he makes such a location, containing the top, or
is

still
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other lodes having their

tops, or apices, within their surface boundaries.

It is not alleged
sufficient lode

on the part of the State that there has been no

discovery within the limits of the Atlantic claim, and

no further question remains
The decision of your office

to be considered.
is

affirmed.

school land grant— mining claim— plioof of mineral
character.
State of South Dakota

v.

Walsh.

the mineral character of a mining claim in conflict with a section
claimed by the State under its school-land grant is challenged ,by the
State, the usual formal proofs under mineral patent proceedings will not
suffice, but in such case the mineral character of the claim involved must
be established by substantive proof; and the State is not bound to take
the initiative at a hearing ordered to determine that question.
Case of Mahoganey No. 2 Lode Claim, 33 L. D., 37, cited and distinguished.

Where

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General

June

(F. L. C.)

The

30, 1900.

Land
(F.

'

State of South Dakota has appealed from your

office

Office,

H. B.)

decision

of October 12, 11)05, holding for dismissal its protest against the
entry (No. 1507, July 18, 1904) by John Walsh, Jr., for the Mitchell
lode mining claim, survey No. 1811, Rapid City, South Dakota, land
district,

B. H.

embracing

with school section

a conflict

30, T. 5 N.,

R. 2 E.,

M.

February

24,

1905, after mineral entry

record received, your

office

had been made and the

directed the local officers to notify the

State authorities of the allowance of the entry and that sixty days'
time would be afforded them within which to show cause why it
should not be permitted to stand.

In response the State submitted protest against the entry in which
is denied that the land in controversy was known to be mineral in
character at the date of approval of the township survey embracing
the section in question, it being also therein contended that the grant
to the State of sections 10 and 30 took effect as a present grant as to
all sections not otherwise appropriated or known to be mineral in
character at the date of the State's admission to the Union.
Upon receipt of the protest, and on May 0, 1905, your office ordered
a hearing, to determine whether the conflict area was known to be
mineral in character " at the date the right of the Stale would otherwise have attached thereto." What date was considered in that connection, or whether the question in that behalf raised by the protest
it

,
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was discussed in this particular case, does not appear
from the record.
However, by the decision first above mentioned, from which the
pending appeal is taken, your office dismissed the protest, Siting
that the local officers had
of the State

transmitted evidence of service of said order for a hearing upon the mineral
claimant and also upon the State authorities and reported that default was
made by both parties at the hearing, and that no action of any kind had been
taken therein.

The mining claim involved was

located August 1, 1899, the abstract
and the records of your office disclose that the public
survey embracing tin section concerned was executed October 27-28,
It is averred on behalf of the
1899, and approved March 6, 1901.
State that in the field notes of survey of the township which includes
the land in controversy, the lands therein were returned as agri-

of

title recites;

1

cultural.

For the reasons given in the case of South Dakota r. Delicate, this
day decided by the Department (31 L. D., 717). the tract in controversy i^ excepted from the grant to the State if known to be mineral
in character prior to the approval of the public survey identifying

the section with which the conflict appears.

In the case of Mahoganey No. 2 Lode Claim (33 L. D., 37) the

Department held (syllabus) that

A mineral location, made prior to the admission of the State of Utah into the
Union, was not of itself sufficient to establish the mineral character of the land
located so as to defeat the grant to the State for school purposes made by section
of the act of July 1G, 1894; but where the State was specially notified of
the pendency of an application for patent under such location, and made no
objection by way of protest or otherwise to the allowance of the mineral entry,
it is bound by the record made upon such application, and a hearing for the
purpose of determining the character of the land is unnecessary.
In the present
versy was

known

however, the State of South Dakota responded

case,

to the notice specially

served on

to be

vey or approval of survey."

and approval thereof,
to

it

by denying that the tract

mineral in character

Upon

in contro-

" at the date of field sur-

extension of the public surveys

in the absence of

anything in the

official

records

the contrary, each section 16 and 30 thereby ascertained pre-

sumptively passes to the State under its grant. Where, therefore, the
mineral character of a conflicting mining claim is challenged as in this
case, the usual formal proofs under mineral patent proceedings will
not suffice. In such case the mineral character of the claim involved

must be established by substantive proof, and the State

is

not bound

to take the initiative at a hearing ordered for that purpose.

The

mineral entry allowed here without previous notice to the State can
not have the

effect to cast the

burden upon the State

;

and the date of
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approval of the survey whereby the schoo] section has been identified
and defined is the date as of which the mineral character of the claim
must be established.
The decision of your office is modified accordingly, and the record
i-

returned for further proceedings agreeably hereto.

IE DEX.
Page.

Abandonment.

No rights are acquired by an application to purchase under the timber and stone act presented at a time

See Contest.

Adverse Claim.

when the land is
such appropriation

See Mining Claim.

Pending

the Secretary of the Interior authority to sell to the owner or owners of
a wagon road or tramway, not to exceed twenty acres of public land, for
terminal facilities, at each end of the
road, contemplates the sale of an absolute fee in the lands, and where
the lands, at the date applied for,
are included within a forest reserve,
they are not subject to sale under
notwithstanding the
said section,
wagon road or tramway in connection with which they are desired
may have been constructed prior to
the creation of the reserve
In view of the provisions of the
act of February 1, 1905, transferring
to the Secretary of Agriculture the
execution of certain laws affecting
public lands within the limits of forest reserves, and the construction
placed upon that act by the Secretary of the Interior and concurred in
by the Secretary of Agriculture, applications for permits for use of
rights of way within forest reserves
on account of wagon roads or tramof the act of
ways, under section
May 14, 1808, come within the jurisdiction and control of the Secretary
of Agriculture

Allotment.
See Indian Lands.

Amendment.
See Application,

Appeal.
See Practice.

the

not

subject

to

380

disposition

of
a
school land indemnity selection, even

Alaskan Lands.
Paragraph 13 of regulations of
August 1, 1004, relating to townsites
in Alaska, amended
The provisions of section G of the
act of May 14, 180S, conferring upon

Page.

Applieation.

71

though erroneously received, no other application including any portion
of the land embraced in such selection should be accepted, nor will any
rights be considered as initiated by
the tender of any such application
12
Applicants for public lands lose
no rights by. mistakes and laches of
officers of the land department
but
persons claiming the benefit of this
rule must show that they have an inchoate right and that they have not
been so dilatory in assertion of it as
to give rival bona fide applicants
superior right
380
An application to amend a homestead entry, as well as all affidavits
filed in support thereof, should be
executed before some officer designated by section 2204 of the Revised Statutes and the acts of March
11, 1002, and March 4, 1004, amending that section
680
An appeal from the rejection of a
defective application to enter does
not operate to reserve the land and
entitles the applicant only to a judgment as to the correctness of such
action at the time it was taken, and
where the application was properly
rejected, it is immaterial, in the face
of an adverse appropriation of the
land, whether the applicant received
541
proper notice of such action
Where a foreign-horn homestead
applicant fails to file with his application proof of naturalization, or
that he has declared his intention to
become a citizen of the United
States, it is within the discretion of
the local officers to receive and bold
the application and afford the applicant an opportunity to furnish the
;

:i

10

10

required proof. <>r to reject the application outright, in which Latter
event it can have no effect to segre
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Page,

gate the land from other appropria-

541

tion

Where proceedings are instituted
on behalf of the Government solely
for the purpose of clearing the record
of an existing entry, no question of
a preference right is involved, and

where a relinquishment is subsequently filed and there are no valid
adverse rights outstanding, the rule
that no application to enter shall be
received until proper notation of the
cancellation of the entry is made
upon the records of the local office,
437
has no application

Approximation.
See Horn est cad, sub-title, Soldiers'
Additional; Alining claim.

Circular of April 4, 1906, relative
applications for water rights

544

under act of .Tune 17, 1902

The act

of .Tune 17, 1902, affords
for the purchase by the

authority
United States of an incomplete irrigation system to be used in connection with, and to become a part of, a
larger system contemplated by the

government

351

drawal

311

An

application to enter under the
provisions of section 2306 of the Revised Statutes, even though approved
by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, will not, prior to the allowance of entry thereon, prevent a
withdrawal of the land covered thereby under provisions of the act of
17,

1902

Directions

the President, under section 23S0 of
the Revised Statutes, as a town site_
There is nothing in the act of Tune
17, 1902, to prohibit a graduated
scale of the annual payments required of users of water from reclamation projects constructed under
said act, and in all cases where it
is deemed advisable this plan of payment may be adopted
The drilling of wells in the vicinity of an irrigation project, for the

16

78

of
determining
whether
underground water exists that may
be made available in connection with
the project, comes within the power
conferred by the second section of
the act of Tune 17, 1902, " to make
examinations and surveys
for
the development of waters "
533
Under the authority conferred upon
the Secretary of the Interior by the
act of Tune 17, 1902, he may, in his
.

Public lands lying within the irrigable area of a reclamation project
constructed under the provisions of
the act of Tune 17, 1902, can be disposed of only under the homestead
law and in conformity with the legal
subdivisions defined by the public
65
land surveys
Lands withdrawn under the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902,
from all disposition " except under
the homestead laws," are not subject
to soldiers' additional entry under
section 2306 of the Revised Statutes. 653
An application to make soldiers'
additional entry under section 2300
of the Revised Statutes, although
filed prior to the passage of the act
of June 17, 1902, and pending at the
date of an order withdrawing the
lands covered thereby under the provisions of said act, is not effective to
except the lands from such with-

June

reclamation project, withdrawn from
entry, except under the homestead
law, for disposal in accordance with
the provisions of the act of June 17,
1902, and subsequently reserved by

purpose

Arid Land.
to

survey, subdivision, appraisal and
sale of certain lands in Idaho within the irrigable area of the Minidoka

560
given

relative

to

the

.

.

enter into contracts for
the construction of irrigation works
or construct such works by labor employed and operated under the superintendence and direction of govern-

discretion,

ment

officials

567

No such

rights are acquired by settlement upon lands embraced in the
entry of another as will attach upon
cancellation of such entry, where at

that time the lands are withdrawn
for use in connection with an irrigation project under the act of Tune
17. 10(»2; nor is there any authority
in said act for purchase by the government of the settler's claim or of
the improvements placed upon the
land by him
478
The act of Tune 17, 1902, contemplates that the United States shall
be the full owner of irrigation works
constructed thereunder, and clearly
inhibits the acquisition of property,
for use in connection with an irrigation project, subject to servitudes or
perpetual obligation to pay rents to
a landlord holding the legal title
thereto
180
Uncompleted claims to lands withdrawn under the provisions of the
act of Tune 17, 1902, and determined
to be needed for construction of irrigation works in connection with a
project that has been found practicable, should not be allowed to be

INDEX.
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Page.

perfected, but should remain in the
same status as existed at the time
the determination was made and the
of

rights

the

claimants

land entry are held in private ownership within the meaning of the act
of June 17, 1902, and the entryman
or his assignee is entitled to the

same

29

445

of section 5 of the
act of June 17, 1902, restricting the
sale of a right to use water for land
in private ownership to not more
4

351

The Secretary of the Interior has
authority to make temporary leases

within the irrigable area of an irrigation project under the act of June
17, 1902, but not subject to the restrictions, limitations and conditions
of said act, can not, under the law,
prior

the acquisition of title to
enter into an agreemenl
to convey to a water-users associathe

to

land,

retary of the Interior by the act of
Juno 17, 1902, to make the necessary withdrawals to carry into effect
the provisions of the act, and to acquire rights and property for the
purpose contemplated, implies the
right to appropriate for irrigation
purposes public lands to which the
United States has the full legal and
equitable
title,
but the inchoate
rights acquired by a bona fide settlein pursuance of and in
compliance with the public
land laws should not be arbitrarily
In detaken without compensation.
compensation
it
termining
the
should be considered with reference
to the loss sustained by the settler
in depriving him of his inchoate
by the arbitrary taking of
right
lands which he had cultivated, im-.
proved and resided upon under authority of law with a view to the

strict

480
is

347
Sec-

ment made

of lands reserved or acquired by purchase for use in connection with an
irrigation project contemplated under the provisions of the act of June
17, 1902, whore use under the proposed lease will not interfere with
the use and control of the lands
when needed for the purposes contemplated by the reservation or pur-

entry

em-

in his entry, to be held in
by such association and sold
for the benefit of the homesteader to
persons competent to make entry of
such lands
532
The fact that the act of April 18,
1896, provides that the lands in the
abandoned portion of the Fori As
siniboine military reservation, thereby opened to entry, .shall be disposed of only under the laws therein
specifically named, does not prevent
a withdrawal, under the provisions
of the act of June 17, 1902, of any
of said lands as to which no vested
right has attached
653
Lands formerly within the Fort
Buford military reservation were by
the act of May 19, 1900, restored to
the public domain and made subject
to existing laws relating to disposal
of the public lands, except such laws
as are not specifically named therein,
and are subject to withdrawal under
the reclamation act as other portions of the public domain subject
to entry under the general
land
laws and a withdrawal of such
lands for reclamation purposes is
effective as to all of the lands for
which entry was not made within
three months from the filing of the
township plat, and prior to the with-

The power conferred upon the

one hundred and sixty acres,
will not prevent the recognition of a
vested water right for a larger area
and protection of the same by allowing the continued flowage of the
water covered by the right through
the works constructed by the gov-

A homesteader whose

land

drawal

than

chase

the

;

The provision

ernment

of

trust

adjusted

withdrawal

portion

braced

421
upon the basis of that status
Lands hold by virtue of a desert

rights and privileges and is
subject to the same conditions and
limitations, so far as the right to
the use of water is concerned, as any
other owner of lands within the irrigable area of an irrigation project
constructed under the provisions of
said act
All entries of lands withdrawn
under the provisions of the act of
June 17, 1902, are subject to the conditions imposed by section 3 thereof,
and a revocation of the withdrawal
operates to remove those conditions
and leaves the entries in the same
situation as entries made prior to the
withdrawal, and such conditions can
not, by force of a second withdrawal,
be reimposed upon such of the entrios made during the period of the
first withdrawal as had
not been
perfected at the date of the second

x'age.

any

tion

155
acquisition of the title
The Secretary of the Interior has
no authority under the provisions of
(lie
seventh section of the act of

June 17, 1902, to compensate settlers
upon lands within the limits of a
withdrawal made in connection with
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Page
an irrigation project unless they
have in good faith acquired an inchoate right to the land hy complying with the requirements of law
up to the date of the withdrawal and
have such a claim as ought to be re155
spected by the United States
Withdrawals under the provisions
of the act of June 17, 1902, in connection with irrigation projects, will

made

as follows
1. When a site has been selected,
with a view to making an examination and survey for the purpose of
determining whether the construction of an irrigation project upon
such site is practicable and advis-

be

able, a

:

withdrawal will immediately

be made of all lands believed to be
susceptible of irrigation from such
contemplated works, in accordance
with the second form of withdrawal
provided for by the third section of
the act of June 17, 1902, and at the

same time a preliminary withdrawal
will be made of lands that may be
needed for use in the construction
and operation of the works, which
will reserve such lands from entry
of every character but will not affect
entries previously made.
2. As soon as it shall be deter-

mined that the project is practicable
and advisable and the construction
of the same is approved and authorized by the Secretary of the Interior,
a withdrawal will be made of all

public lands shown by the examination and survey to be required for
use in the construction and operation of the works, and all persons
who may have made entry of such
lands within such withdrawal prior

preliminary withdrawal and
acquired a vested right
thereto, will be notified of the appropriation of their lands for irrigation
purposes and that their entries will
be canceled and their improvements
paid for by the government as provided for by the eighth and ninth
to the

who have not

sections of the circular of June 6,
1905, unless sufficient cause be shown
within sixty days from the date of
such notice
15S

Canals and Ditches.
See Right of Way.

Circulars and Instructions.
See Tabic

of,

page XXIII.

Coal Land.
The
graph

prescribed by parathe coal-land regula-

affidavit

32

of

Page.

must be made by the claimant

tions

himself

A

" preference

49
"

right of entry
under section 2348 of the Revised
Statutes arises where any person or
persons, severally qualified to enter,
have opened and improved any coal
mine or mines upon the public lands,
and are in actual possession of the
same and such right accrues only to
the person or persons who have so
opened and improved such mine or
mines,
and have the possession
thereof
178
"
A
preference right of entry
under section 2348 of the Revised
Statutes is not created, or initiated,
by the filing of a declaratory statement under section 2349. The office
of the declaratory statement is to
preserve the right, not to create it.
If
the right does not exist, the
;

declaratory statement has no

office

perform and is without force or
effect for any purpose
178
to

It is not in all cases essential to
the validity of an application to purchase coal lands, or to the completion of proceedings thereunder, that
the applicant show that he had actually opened and improved a mine of
coal on the lands applied for.
This
is necessary only where the applicant
asserts a preference right of entry
under the statute and must maintain his assertion or suffer defeat in
favor of another applicant or claim-

178

ant

not essential to the validity
of an application by an association
of four persons to purchase six hundred (or six hundred and forty)
acres of coal lands that the applicants shall have opened and improved a mine or mines of coal on
each of the tracts embraced in the
application.
It is sufficient in such
case, where there are no conflicting
claimants, that the applicants show
that they are severally qualified to
purchase, that the lands applied for
are of the character subject to sale
under the coal land laws, and that
as an association of persons the
applicants have expended not less
than five thousand dollars in working
and improving a mine or mines of
coal on the lands
267
In determining whether a tract of
public land contains coal deposits the
well known rules of evidence are as
applicable as in any other case, and
whatever is relevant to and bears in
any degree upon the question is admissible in evidence
194
In such cases the characteristics
peculiar to coal deposits are to be
It

is

INDEX.
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Generally

194

pert

Where an association

Page.

C'ont e si.

kept in view, and the presence of
such deposits may be determined
upon authenticated evidence of conditions which constitute the sufficient
guide of the geologist or coal exof four per-

sons has expended not less than five
thousand dollars in working and improving a mine or mines of coal on
the public lands such association, in
the absence of any prior or superior
claim, may enter under the coal land
laws not exceeding six hundred and
forty acres, including such mining

The allegation in an affidavit of
contest that land " is more valuable
for the timber and stone," does not
by necessary implication charge that
the land is mineral in character and
does not constitute a sufficient basis
for a contest
115
Initiation of.

improvements, even though no declaratory statement may have been filed
for the lands
447
The object and purpose of a declaratory statement under section 2: >49
of the Revised Statutes are to give
notice of, and to .preserve for the
period specified in section 2350, a
preference right of entry already acquired under section 2348
and such
preference right of entry is not created or initiated by the filing of a
declaratory statement
448
If
the privilege of postponing
entry in the manner provided by sections 2349 and 2350, after a preference right of entry shall have been
acquired under section 2348, be not
desired by the claimant, the filing
of a declaratory statement before
application or entry is not necessary
or required
and in such case, even
if the claimant should fail to make
application to enter and to pay for
the lands within the sixty days allowed by section 2349 for tiling a
declaratory statement, neither the
failure in this respect nor failure to
file a declaratory statement would
operate to forfeit the right to purchase and enter the lands except in
favor of some other qualified ap,

An application to contest received
by mail will not be regarded as having been presented or filed until it is
taken up, numbered, and entered of
record, and where a contest application is presented in person and in the

ordinary course of business is accepted, numbered, and entered of
record, and another application to
contest the same entry is at that
time, unknown to the local officers,
in the unopened mail in the office,
priority will be accorded the appli-

;

;

plicant

:

448

Under the proviso to section 7 of
act of March ::. 1891, the filing

(lie

of a protest, bringing to the notice
of the government the invalidity or
illegality of an entry, within two
years from the date of the issuance
of the receiver's final receipt, operates to suspend tlie running of the
statute and will defeat confirmation
of the entry under said provision
whether the land department actually orders an investigation of the
matters charged in the protest with-

the two-year period or not

first

accepted and

712

filed

Desert Land.

A contest based solely upon the
ground that the entry is invalid because the land embraced therein is
not of the character subject to such
entry, may be allowed, notwithstanding the entry, at the date of the initiation of the contest, was embraced
in an order of suspension issued by

301
the land department
In case of the suspension of an
entry by order of the land department the entryman is not compelled
to comply with the law during the
period of suspension, and contest on
the ground of failure to comply with
the requirements of the law during
302
such period should not be allowed
Where contest against a suspended
entry, on the ground of failure to
comply with law, is erroneously allowed by the local officers, and hearing had thereon, the testimony ado
duced at the hearing, having
taken without jurisdiction, can not
be considered upon removal of the
302
suspension
A contest against a desert-land
entry, based solely upon the ground
that the land is non-desert in character, may properly be entertained
during suspension of the entry: bul
a contest charging that the entry
man has failed to comply with the
requirements of the law should not
be entertained during such period
where the suspension becomes effective prior to the expiration of the
450
statutory life of the entry
I

Confirmation.

in

cation

11

82

INDEX.

Tage.
direction by the Secretary of the
Interior to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office to withhold the
issuance of patent on all desert-land
entries within a given land district
does not amount to a suspension of
such entries, and the jurisdiction of
the' local officers to consider contests
against the same is in no wise af426
fected thereby
The authority of the local officers
to order a hearing on a contest
against a desert-land entry is in no
wise affected by an order of the land
department suspending all desertland entries in the township in which
the entry in question is situated,
where the order of suspension was
not issued until after the expiration
of the statutory lifetime of the

A

426

entry

Homestead.
An affidavit

of contest against a
in effect,

homestead entry, charging,

that the entrywoman had, since making entry, married and gone to reside with her husband upon his uncompleted homestead entry, but containing no charge that she had
abandoned her claim for more than
six months prior to the initiation of
the contest, does not state facts sufficient to warrant cancellation of the
entry, and should not be entertained- 463
In case of a contest against a
homestead entry based upon the
charge that the entryman is disqualified to make entry by reason of being
the owner of 160 acres of land, proof
of the technical vesting in the entryman, by devise or operation of law,
of a naked legal title that is, or may
be,
subject to outstanding claims
against the estate of the person from
whom the title moves, will not, in
itself, be held to disqualify the entryman who thus acquires the title, but
it must be further shown that the
title so acquired is a beneficial one
330
In case of a contest against a
homestead entry on the ground of
abandonment, it is not essential that
the charge in the affidavit of contest,
required by the act of June 16, 1898,
that the entryman's absence was not
due to service in the army, navy or
marine corps, shall follow the wording of the statute, it being sufficient
if the language employed in effect or
by necessary implication excludes
military, naval and marine corps
service as the cause of the entryman's absence
534

Page.

Contestant.
A successful contestant is entitled
to the full period of thirty days after
the case is finally closed and no
longer open to proceedings on review
or appeal, within which to assert his
preference right of entry
615
The preference right of entry accorded a successful contestant by
the act of May 14, 1880, does not
accrue to one who contests and procures the rejection of an application
to purchase under the act of June 3,

1878

377

The mere

tender, by an applicant
to purchase under the timber and
stone act, of the required proof,
purchase price and fees, which are

properly

refused by the local offinot the equivalent of an
within the meaning of the
act of May 14, 1880, according a
preference right to one who contests
and procures the cancellation of an
entry
371
General allegations in a protest
filed with a view to defeating a successful contestant's preference right,
tending to show a speculative intent
and immoral practice in other contests instituted by the same contestant, are not sufficient to bring into
question his preference right in a
case wherein his conduct is unimcers, is
" entry,"

peached

376

Cultivation.
See Homestead.

Deposition.
See Evidence.

Desert Land.
See Entry.
Directions given that a hearing be
had for the purpose of determining
the character of certain lands in the
Burns land district, Oregon, alleged
to be desert lands and selected by the
State under the act of August 18.

1894

The Department

declines to approve the application of the State of
Washington for the segregation of
certain lands in that State under the
provisions of the act of August 18,
1894, known as the Carey act, and
further declines to adopt the suggestion of the State to the effect that the
government proceed with the reclamation of the lands, which fall
within the irrigable area of a con-

589

INDEX.
Page.
irrigation project under
the provisions of the act of June 17,
1902, and, after reclamation shall

templated

have hee.n accomplished under the
proposed project, to allow the State
the benefits thereof as though performed by it under the provisions of
453
the Carey act

Ditches and (aiiaU.
Sec Right of Way.

Entry.
Generally.
An entry is

a contract between the
government and the entryman, and
until all the requisites of an entry
have been met no contract exists and
the applicant can acquire no vested
right to the land which will prevent
a withdrawal thereof by the govern653
ment
The Secretary of the Interior has
no authority to enter into any agreement providing that an entry of public lands may be consummated in any
manner or at any time other than as
provided by the law under which

such entry

is

made

351

Desert Land.
The desert -land act of March 3,
1877, as amended by the act of March
1891, requires that sufficient water
he conducted upon the land embraced
in the entry to reclaim it from its
desert character and render it suitable for agricultural purposes, and
that one-eighth of the land be placed
under cultivation
488
As proof of cultivation within contemplation of the desert-land act
actual tillage must as a rule be
:>>,

shown
The act of March

488
3,

1891, contem-

that
expenditures made
upon a desert land entry in compliance with the requirements of seclion 5 thereof shall be for permanent
improvements necessary to the irrigation, reclamation and cultivation
of the land, and as residence upon a
desert land entry is not required, the
erection of a dwelling-house thereon
is not a permanent
improvement in
contemplation of the act
465
The mere purchase by a desertland entryman of well casing alleged
to he with a view to constructing an
artesian well on the land embraced
in his entry, but which was never
used for such purpose, nor even 'removed to the land, hut was paid for
b w note and left in the warehouse of
plates

the

733
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the merchant from whom it was purchased, does not constitute a " permanent improvement" within the
meaning of the desert land act, and
the value thereof can not he applied
toward meeting the requirements of
the law relating to annual expenditure
U79
The annual expenditures upon a
desert land entry, and proof thereof,
required by the act of March 3, 1891,
are for the information of the land
department and as evidence of the
good faith of the entryman, and a
contest for default of such proof may
be defeated by the filing of proof sub
sequent to the initiation of the contest, but prior to final action thereon,
showing that, the requisite annual
expenditure has in fact been made_ <'.7r»
The desert land law requires an
annual expenditure of one dollar per
acre for each acre embraced in the
entry, for the first, second and third
years, hut does not require that the
first or any other annual expenditure shall effect reclamation of any
part of the land, the sole requirement in that respect being that the
land shall be reclaimed within the
675
period allowed therefor
A direction by (he Secretary of
he Interior to the Commissioner of
the General Land Office to withhold
the issuance of patent on all desertland entries within a given land (lis
trict does not amount to a suspension of such entries, and the jurisdic
tion of the local officers to consider
contests against the same is in no
426
wise affected thereby
The authority of the local officers
to order a hearing on a contest
against a desert-land entry is in no
wise affected by an order of the land
I

department

suspending

all

desert-

entries in the township in
which the entry in question is situ
ated, where the order of suspension
was not issued until after the expiration of the statutory lifetime of

land

the

120

entry

Where a

desert-land entry is suspended by the land department prior
to the expiration of the statutory
life of the entry, for the purpose of
investigating the character of the
land, a contest againsl the same.
charging that the land is dob desert
in character, and also that the entry

man has
law

may

in

to comply with the
matter of reclamation,

failed

the

be entertained in so far as it
Charges the nun desert character of
the land, but should be dismissed as

INDEX.
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the charge relating to non-compliance with law; and if as a result
of (he contest it be determined that
the land is of a character subject to
entry under the desert-land law, the
521
suspension should be removed
In case of an application by a corporation to make desert-land entry,
it is within the power and it is the
duty of the land department to inquire into the qualifications of the
individuals composing the corporation to make entry in their own right
under the provisions of the desertto

430
land law
It is within the power and is the
duty of the land department to require a corporation, seeking to acquire title to a desert land entry as
assignee of the original entryman,
to show that the individual members
composing the corporation are not
disqualified under the desert land
law to hold and acquire title to such
443
entry
Recognition in the act of March
3, 1891, of the right of assignment
of desert-land entries furnishes no
authority for recognizing a right on
the part of a desert-land entryman
to enter "into an executory contract
to convey the land after the issuance
of patent and to thereafter proceed
with the submission of final proof
in furtherance of such contract
383
A citizen of one State or Territory
who goes to another State or Territory with the avowed intention to

make
and

in

permanent home therein,
his sworn application to make

his

desert land entry declares himself to
be a resident of such State or Territory, is held to be a " resident citizen " thereof within the meaning of
the desert land law and in that respect qualified to make such entry
therein, where in. pursuance of his
expressed intention he makes his
home in such State or Territory,
even though he may not, at the date
of making the entry, have acquired
a political residence in the State or
Territory such as would entitle him
to the voting privilege
586

Homestead.
The fact that land is more valuable for the timber and stone thereon
than for agricultural purposes does
exclude it from appropriation
under the homestead laws, if not
mineral in character
115

not

Equitable Adjudication.
Where the only objection to confirmation of a military bounty land

Page,

warrant location, made
is

the

purely

good
technical one
in

faith,

that

through inadvertence of the land department the land covered thereby
was never formally offered at public
sale under the provisions of the act
of July 4, 1876, as it should have
been, of which fact the locator was
ignorant, the location may be referred to the P>oard of Equitable Adjudication for confirmation under
Rule 11

21

Estoppel.
one who

fails to assert any claim
of public- land in the adverse possession of another, and re-

to a

tract

mains silent, though knowing that
the adverse occupant continues to
claim, occupy, and improve the land,
is
estopped
thereby from
subsequently asserting a prior settlement
right thereto in himself, notwithstanding the tract is found upon
survey to be a part of the technical
quarter-section upon which his improvements are located
695

Evidence.
The entire cost of depositions
taken under and by virtue of the
provisions of the act of January .",1.
1903, must be paid by the party in
whose behalf they are taken
398

Fees.
An

applicant to make homestead
is not
entitled to have the
fees and commissions paid by him
upon a prior homestead entry, canceled for conflict, applied in payment of the fees and commissions
required in connection with his second application
but, upon proper
application therefor, the fees and
commissions paid upon the canceled
entry will be repaid under the provisions of section 2 of the act of

entry

;

June

16,

251

1880

Final Proof.
Circular of August
tive to final proof

1,

1905, rela-

on claims within

reserves
63
Circular of May 9, 1906, prescribing rules to be observed in passing
601
on final proofs
The right conferred by law upon
the heirs of a deceased homestead
entryman to submit final proof on the
entry can not be delegated to another
46
An applicant to purchase under
the timber and stone act is entitled
forest

INDEX.
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copy of the final proof sub133
mitted on his application
Where in final proof proceedings
a witness is asked to give a categorical answer to an interrogatory, he
should be permitted, in connection
therewith, to state such facts and
circumstances in explanation thereof
as in his opinion make the categorical answer the correct one to the
question he is required to answer in
133
such form
Where the final proof submitted
on an entry made under section 2307
of the Revised Statutes shows that
the entrywoman never established
to

a

actual

residence upon the land,

al-

accordance with
the directions contained in departmental decision in the Anna Bowes
case that if she desired to retain her
entry she would be required to begin
actual residence upon the land within six months from notice, such proof

though notified

is

and

insufficient

but where

it

in

will

be rejected

;

appears that the proof

was offered prior to the expiration
of six months from the date of such
notice, the entry should not be canceled unless it be first ascertained
that she did not begin actual residence upon the land within the prescribed period
118

Forest Land.
Sec Reservation.

Homestead.
See Entry.

Generally.
Where a homestead claimant, by
contract to convey the land embraced in his entry after the submission of final proof, puts it beyond his
power to acquire title under the entry exce| >t by perjury, he thereby forfeits his rights, and upon proof of
such fact the entry will be canceled-

Widow; Heirs;

40

Tage.
the treaty of March ^, 1899, between the United States and Great
Britain, and his alien heirs, subjects
of the latter country, have therefore
no such claim or right to the lands
embraced in the entry as is entitled
to protection under the provisions of
said treaty
51
The heirs of a deceased homestead
entryman may delegate to another
the power to perform for their benefit the cultivation on
the entry required by law. and such cultivation,
if actually carried on in good faith
for the required period, constitutes
compliance with the homestead law
the same as though performed by the
heirs themselves
40
By virtue of the provisions of section 2305 of the Revised Statutes as
amended by the act of March 1. 1901,
proof of the death of a homestead
entryman while actually engaged in
the military service of the United
States
renders
unnecessary
any
showing that would have been otherwise required touching his compliance with law in the matters of residence, cultivation and improvement. 302
The properly-constituted administrator of the estate of a deceased
homestead entryman is authorized to
submit final proof under the provisions of section 2305 of the Revised
Statutes as amended by the act of
March 1, 1001. as his " legal representative "
392
Upon satisfactory proof of the
death
of
a homestead
entryman
while actually engaged in the military service of the United States,
leaving no widow or minor orphan
children surviving him, it is the duty
of the land department, under the
provisions of section L':'»i)7> of the Revised Statutes as amended by the act
of March 1, 1901, to issue patent to
his "legal representatives." leaving
to the courts to determine in
it
whom the title shall vest
392
1 of

Indian.

Devisee.

There is no provision of the homestead law by which any rights or
claims to public lands, prior to the
issuance of patent, can be devised or
succeeded to and perfected by, or on
behalf of, other than citizens of the
United States

A homestead entryman who

735

at the

time of his death had not acquired
the legal title to the land embraced
in his entry, was not at such time,
by reason of his claim under the entry, a person " holding real property," within the meaning of article

51

An Indian to whom land in a reservation has been allotted as a member of a tribe, but which land has
never become a part of the public
domain subject to the general provisions of the homestead law. can not,
as a citizen of the United States.
make homestead

entry, under section
2289 of the Revised Statutes, of the

land so allotted to him

Additional.

A homestead entryman
titled to

make

a

is not ensecond entry under

702

736
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the provisions of the act of April 28,
1904, ."»:: St;it., 527, upon a showing
that he relinquished his original
entry for the reason that the land
embraced therein was unsuitable for
farming purposes and was not of

acreage to enable him to
support himself and family by using
the land for grazing purposes
Circular of April 10, 1006, under
act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat., 547),
commonly known as the " Kinkaid
sufficient

Act"

GO

owner of more than one hundred
and sixty acres of land, is therefore
502

502

527

'

The

right

435

468
to

make

additional

theretofore had

entered under
lands within
territory described in the act,

homestead

and

who

laws

own

and occupy such
can only be exercised
Upon lands contiguous to the original
entry
The right of additional entry accorded by the proviso to section 3 of
the act of April 28, 1904, extends to
all persons who prior to application
lands,

and

to exercise said privilege had
homestead entry, and there

warrant

GO

made
is

no

in the act for further limit-

ing the right, as is done in the instructions of May 31, 1904, issued
under said act, to a homesteader
who had resided upon and cultivated the land embraced in his original entry for the period required
by law
60
Where an application to make
homestead entry was pending at the
date of the act of April 28, 1904, and
prior to allowance of entry thereon
the applicant presented a supple
menial application to enter additional lands under the provisions of
said act, requesting that the two applications be considered together,
the fact that entry on the original
application was inadvertently allowed without considering the supplemental application, does not warrant rejection of the application for
additional entry on the ground that
the original entry was allowed subsequently to the passage of the act
274
An additional entry under the act
of April 28, 1904, even though for a
less amount of land than authorized
by the act, exhausts the right but
where at the time the entryman
sought to exercise his additional
right, part of the lands contiguous to
his original entry and subject to his
preference right and desired to be entered by him, were found to be embraced within an existing though invalid additional entry made by another under said act, and he thereupon made entry for a less amount
of land than he was entitled to enter, and thereafter by means of a
contest procured the cancellation of
the invalid entry covering the remainder of the lands desired by him,
;

;

exhausted

said act
134
The right of additional entry provided for hy section 2 of the act of
April 28, 1904, is limited to persons

the
the

54G

section'

2 of the act of April 28, 1904, generally known as the " Kinkaid Act,"
is limited to persons who made their
original entries prior to the date of

who

Circular of May 31, 1904, under
87
act of April 28, 1904, amended
Circular of September 1, 1905,
relative to second entries under section 3, act of June 5, 1900, and section 1, act of April 28, 1904
114
The act of April 28, 1904, known
as the " Kinkaid Act," does not repeal any of the provisions of the
homestead laws, but merely amends
said laws by allowing entry of a
greater number of acres, within the
limits designated, than is permitted
thereunder, and one disqualified to
make entry under the general homestead laws, by reason of being the

likewise disqualified to make entry
under said act
The qualifications of au applicant
to make additional entry under tbe
act of April 28, 1904, must be determined as of the date of the presentation of the application and not
as of the date when his original entry was made
Residence upon the land embraced
in the original homestead entry is an
indispensable
prerequisite
to
the
preference right to enter additional
contiguous land accorded by the act
of April 28, 1904
The act of April 28, 1904, known
as the " Kinkaid Act,
authorizes a
second or additional homestead entry of so much land, within the limits defined in the act, as added to
that embraced in the first entry shall
not exceed six hundred and forty
acres, regardless of the fact that the
entryman may have relinquished his
first entry for a valuable consideration
The act of April 28, 1904, commonly known as the " Kinkaid Act,"
contemplates only one additional enand where
try under its provisions
such entry is made, even though for
an amount of land less than authorized by the act, the right is thereby

Page,

homestead entry accorded by

INDEX.
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may, upon the cancellation of
such invalid entry, be permitted to
enter such lands in accordance with
he

his original

Where one

entitled to

make

to enter, and at the time
making such entry announces his

of
in-

tention to amend his additional entry to include other lands desired by
him, sufficient to aggregate the quantity to which he is entitled under the
act, as soon as he succeeds in clearing the records of other claims to
such adidtional lands, and takes
prompt action to that end, he may
be permitted to amend his entry in

notwithstanding the soldier may
have died prior to the enactment of
said

accordance with such purpose when
the additional lands desired by him
become subject to entry, provided the
rule as to compactness be observed- _ 573
" extreme
determining
In
the
length " of a homestead entry under
the " Kinkaid Act," the measurement should follow the lines of the
public survey, and no entry should
be allowed for any tract exceeding

two miles either in length or breadth,
and no application for ah entry in as
nearly compact form as possible
should be rejected solely because its
combined length and breadth or
diagonal measurement exceeds two

690

miles

Soldiers' Additional.
In every case where the soldier
rendered the requisite military service and made homestead entry for
less than one hundred and sixty
acres prior to the adoption of the
Revised Statutes, the proper foundation exists for an additional entry
under the provisions of sections 2300
and 2307 of the Revised Statutes,

addi-

tional entry under the act of April
28, 1904, exercises his right for a
less amount of land than he is entitled

Page.
ing from his muster into the service,
and not from his enrollment
u:
»

527

intention

737

Where

an entryman under the
" Kinkaid Act " does not include in
his entry the full area allowed by
law, for the reason that there is no
land subject to entry adjoining that
entered, he may, if adjoining land
thereafter becomes subject to entry,
enlarge his original entry so as to include therein the full area allowed
by law
690

Adjoining Farm.
stead privilege, even though for less
than 160 acres, and thereby ex-

hausted bis homestead right, is disqualified to make an adjoining farm
entry under section 2289 of the Revised Statutes
537

:',:;:!

;

Location having been allowed of a
portion of an additional right based
upon a homestead entry made by the
widow of a soldier, and recertification made for the remainder of the
right, it is held, upon application
being made for the allowance of a
further additional right based upon
an entry made by the soldier himself, that no foundation therefor exists, the additional right allowed on
the homestead entry of the widow
being considered as having been
based upon the homestead entry of
the

One who has exercised the home-

legislation

Sections 2300 and 2307 of the
Revised Statutes do not contemplate
more than one additional right of
entry, founded upon one and the
same military service
339
Sections 2300 and 2307 of the Revised Statutes do not contemplate
more than one additional right of
entry, founded upon one and the
same military service and the existence of a valid additional right
based upon a homestead entry made
by the soldier, precludes an independent additional right to his
widow, or after her death to the
heirs of her estate, based upon a
333
homestead entry made by her

339

soldier

The additional right accruing to
the widow of a soldier, under sec
tions 2306 and 2307 of the Revised
Statutes, by reason of an entry for
and sixty
less than one hundred

made by

In computing the period of service
of a soldier " who has served in the

herself, is a property
vested in her, and is not forfeited by her remarriage or death
but in case of her remarriage is held
in abeyance during coverture, and in
event of her death remains an asset

army

of her estate

acres
right

;

Soldiers'.

of the United States," within
the meaning of that phrase as used
in section 230 1 of the Revised Statutes, the entrance of the soldier into
the army will be considered as dat-

5194— Vol. 34—05

m-

The additional right
cruing to the widow of

341
of entry
a

ac

soldier un-

der the provisions of sections 2306
and 2307 of the Revised Statutes,

788
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based

upon an entry made by her-

self, is not lost, forfeited or extinguished by her remarriage, but is
merely held in abeyance during coverture, and upon removal of such
disability may be exercised or disposed of by her as though she had
342
remained the soldier's widow
Where a soldier qualified to make
additional entry under the provisions of section 2306 of the Revised
Statutes dies without having exercised or disposed of such right, his
widow is, in the first instance, entitled thereto, by virtue of the provisions of section 2307, but if she

remarry or die without having exeror disposed of the right, his
children become entitled thereto, and if not exercised
or disposed of by them, through a
guardian, during their minority, the
right remains an asset of the solcised

minor orphan

333

dier's estate

In case a soldier's widow entitled
to make additional entry under sections 230G and 2307 of the Revised
Statutes, by virtue of an entry for
less than one hundred and sixty
acres made by herself, remarries,

without having exercised or disposed
of such right, it can not be asserted
during coverture nor can the fact
;

that the only child of the soldier
joined the widow in an assignment of
such right in any wise affect the situation, in view of the fact that the
right is based upon an entry made by
the widow and not by the soldier
345
The mere fact that a certificate of
additional right has issued in the
name of the soldier under section
2300 of the Revised Statutes will
not prevent him from selling and
divesting himself of the right itself,
the certificate is
of which
merely the evidence and upon satisfactory showing of the loss or destruction of the certificate, it may be
reissued and recertified in the name
of the assignee entitled to the right- 685
Only one application of the rule
;

of approximation is allowed to each
original right of soldiers' additional
entry, and where the right is divided,

the rule may be applied only in the
location of one portion thereof; but
where a portion of a right is located
for a tract of land embracing merely
a fraction of an acre excess, such
small excess will not, under the rule
mini in is non curat lex, be re<lc
garded as preventing the holder of
the remainder of the right, in making location thereof, from applying
441
.
the rule of approximation „_

—

Page.

Act of March

2,

1889.

The right to make an additional
entry accorded by section 5 of the
act of March 2, 1880, arises only
where the original entry was made
prior to the passage of said act, and
can be exercised only upon land contiguous to that embraced in the original entry
but the additional entry
provided for by section 6 of said act
may be allowed whether the original
entry was made prior or subsequent
to the passage of said act and for
land contiguous or noncontiguous to
the original entry
537
By the exercise of the right to
make additional homestead entry
conferred by section 6 of the act of
March 2, 1889, even though for a
less amount of land than might have
been taken thereunder, the entryman
thereby
exhausts
the
privilege
granted by said section
294
;

Indemnity.
See Railroad Grant

School Land.

Indian Land§.
See Reservation.

Proclamation of July 14, 1905,
opening Uintah lands
Proclamation of August 2, 1005,
modifying proclamation of July 14,
1905, opening Uintah lands
Regulations of July 15, 1905, governing opening of Uintah lands
Circular of July 15, 1905, defining
persons not qualified to enter Uintah
lands
Instructions of October 16, 1905,
relative to disposition of Uintah
lands after expiration of " sixty-day
period "
Circular of February 20, 1906, under act of January 27, 1906, relative
to extension of time within which to
establish residence on Uintah landsInstructions of November 7, 1905,
relative to lands in Round Valley
reservation opened to settlement and
entry
Proclamation of May 24, 1906,
opening Crow lands
Regulations of May 24, 1906, governing opening of Crow lands
Circular of May 24, 1906, defining
persons not qualified to enter Crow
lands

Proclamation of June 2,
opening Shoshone or Wind

1

6
7

8

176

452

248

632
637

639

1906,

River
640
lands
Regulations of June 4, 1906, governing opening of Shoshone or Wind
River lands--,-,-,=„.„.— 645

NDEX.
Page.
Circular defining persons not qualified
to enter Shoshone or Wind
647
River lands
Proclamation of June 6, 1906,
opening even-numhered mineral sec048
tions in Uncorapahgre reservation
Circular of June 25, 1906, relative
to sale of even-numhered mineral
sections in Uncompahgre reserva-

650

tion

The general laws prohibiting the
introduction of intoxicating liquors
into the Indian country are applicable to towns in the Osage Indian
419
reservation
There is no provision in the act
of March 3, 1905, relating to townsites in the Osage Indian reservation,
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to insert in deeds for lots in
such townsites a clause prohibiting
the sale or storage of liquor on the
premises conveyed and providing for
a forfeiture of title in case of violation of the prohibition
418
Opinion expressed that the " liquor
clause" now inserted in deeds by
heirs of deceased Indian allottees,
prohibiting the sale or storage of
liquor on the land conveyed, and providing for a reversion of title in case
of violation of the prohibition., should
be modified by a further provision
"that the rights of mortgagees in

good

faith,

their heirs

and assigns,

shall not be voided or jeopardized by

such reversion
412
Opinion expressed that it is inadvisable to insert in deeds by heirs of
deceased allottees in the Yankton Indian reservation the " liquor clause,"
prohibiting the sale or storage of
liquor on the land conveyed and providing for a reversion of title in case
of violation of the prohibition, the
agreement with the Yankton Indians
and the provisions of the act of
August 15, 1S!)4, ratifying the same,
being the proper authority which
should be invoked for the protection
of the Indians in that respect
415
An Indian to whom land in a reservation has been allotted as a member of a tribe, but which land has
never become a part of the public
domain subject to the general provisions of the homestead law, can
not, as a citizen of the United States,
make homestead .entry, under section
2289 of the Revised Statutes, of the
land so allotted to him
702
Where an Indian woman, a member of one tribe, marries an Indian
man, a member of another tribe, bul
is never enrolled as a
member of
her husband's tribe, she is entitled to

7 3D
Page,

an allotment in her own tribe, as
the head of a family, notwithstanding her husband, prior to his marriage, received an allotment in his
tribe as a single person

252

A

married woman, not the head of
a family, is not qualified, under the
provisions of section 2 of the act of
5, 1872, to make entry of lands
in the Bitter Root Valley opened to
settlement by said act
313
The authority conferred upon the
Secretary of the Interior by the act
of December 21, 1904, to sell and
dispose of certain lands claimed by
the Yakima Indians and adjoining
their then-recognized reservation on
the west, held to embrace such of
said lands as fall within the limits
of the Mount Ranier forest reserve13
There is no authority for leasing lands formerly within the Uintah
Indian reservation and withdrawn
generally for reservoir purposes under the act of March :>, 1905, where
such lands have not been appropriated for any particular purpose so
as to take them out of the category
of public lands
549
No rights could be acquired by settlement upon lands within the ceded
limits of the Red Lake Indian reservation, with a view to making homestead entry thereof, prior to the
opening of said lands to settlement
and entry
94
No rights were acquired by settlement upon lands within the ceded
portion of the Red Lake Indian reservation prior to their opening to
settlement and entry, and where such
settlement was entirely upon lands
selected with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior prior to the
opening, by the Minnesota and Manitoba Railroad Company, under its
grant made by the act of April 17,
1900, of right of way and necessary
lands for terminal facilities at the
crossing of Rainy River, no entry can
619
now be allowed of such lands
In view of the provisions of the

June

act of February 9, 1903, which extended the townsite laws to the
lands within the ceded limits of the
Red Lake Indian reservation and
authorized their occupation for townsite purposes prior to formal opening thereof to disposition under the
homestead laws, the occupation of a

portion of said lands as a townsite
prior to and on the date they were
opened to settlement and entry, prevented the attachment of any rights
on that date under a settlemenl with
a view to acquiring title under the

740

INDEX.
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homestead laws, covering the same
land, initiated prior to occupation of
the land for townsite purposes

The act

of July 1, 1902, supplementary to the act of March 3, 1885,
relating to the disposition of lands in
the Umatilla Indian reservation, accords to bona fide settlers a preference right to purchase the lands settled upon for the period of ninety
days, and where during that period
is made by one claiming the
preference right, but who in fact is
not entitled thereto, the entry allowed thereon will not be canceled
for invalidity on the that ground
alone, where there was no existing
preference right in another to the
lands at the time such entry was

purchase

made
626
No time is specified in the act of
March 3, 1885, within which a purchaser thereunder must make the required proof of residence and cultivation, but it rests with the claimant
when it shall be submitted, so long as
it be within a reasonable time, and
when submitted, the claimant, in the
face of a contest charging failure to
comply with the law in the matter of
residence, must stand or fall upon
the showing made, and will not be
permitted, if the proof be insufficient
or fraudulent, to cure the default
The act of March 3, 1905, authorizes the purchase by the diocese of
Duluth of one hundred and sixty
acres of land in the ceded Chippewa
Indian reservation, but as that act
does not recognize any rights as accruing to the diocese by virtue of
applications theretofore made by it
for the dedication, or purchase, of
certain of said lands for mission or
church purposes, any application by
the diocese under said act can not lie
given relation to the earlier applications made prior to the passage of
the act, to the prejudice of interven70s
ing adverse rights

Insanity.

Irrigation.
See Arid Land,

Circular of July 3, 1905, directing
that notices of sales of isolated
tracts shall specify the date, place,
and hour of commencement of sale__ 14
Circular of November 4, 1905,
relative to suspension of applications
for isolated tracts containing less
than forty acres
245

Jurisdiction.
See

Land

Department;

Public

Land.

Land Department.
Circular of May 12, 1906, under
section 452, R. S., relative to entries
by employes of General Land Offiee__ 605
The Secretary of the Interior has
no authority to enter into any agreement providing that an entry of public lands may be consummated in any
manner or at any time other than
as provided by the law under which
such entry is made
351
In the administration of the public
land laws the land department has
no authority to determine on their
behalf alleged rights of claimants
thereunder except where such claimants seek to obtain the legal or paramount title to the lands claimed
and where a claimant seeks to obtain
the legal title to a tract of public
land the inquiry by the land department is directed to questions affecting his right to have such legal title
conveyed to him and not to questions
relating to possessory or other rights
unrelated to and disconnected with
his application for the legal title
276
;

Lieu Selection.
See Reservation, sub-titles Forest

Lands and Indian; School Lands.

Harried Woman.
See Indian Land.

Mineral Lands.

not necessary in invoking lie
confirmatory provisions of the act
of June 8, 1880, in instances where a
homesteader has become insane, to
show that such homesteader is a citizen of the United States, it beingonly necessary to show that he had
complied with the provisions of the
homestead law up to the time of
becoming insane
167
It is

Page.

Isolated Tract.

I

Under the provisions of section 16
March 3, 1891, town-

of the act of

may be made by incorporated towns and cities on the mineral lands of the United States, subject to existing rights under any
valid mining claim or possession,
lode or placer, held under existing
site entries

law

The

fact that a tract of land was,
prior to survey, classified as mineral
under the act of February 26, 1895,
can not be considered as a classifica-

102

INDEX.
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lands as mineral " at
the time of actual government survey," within (he meaning of the act

Hon

of

of

the

August

5,

1892

211

,

Mining Claim.
Generally.
Paragraphs

22, 23

lations amended
All affidavits

and 24 of regu260

under

the

mining

laws are required to he verified in
accordance with the provisions of
section 2335 of the Revised Statutes,
except where authority for their execution is otherwise specifically given
314
by statute
Proceedings to secure a mineral
patent by one without interest in, or
control over, the lands applied for,
arc without authority of law and no
500
rights can be acquired thereunder
To sustain an application for mineral patent, as against persons alleging the land to be non-mineral, it
must appear that mineral exists in
the land in quantity and of value
sufficient

to

subject

it

to

disposal

under the mining laws
59G
Where the mineral character of a
mining claim in conflict with a section claimed by the State under its
school-land grant is challenged by
the State, the usual formal proofs
under mineral patent proceedings
will not suffice, but in such case
the mineral character of the claim
involved must be established by substantive proof and the State is not
bound to take the initiative at a
hearing ordered to determine that
question
723
Case of Mahoganey No. 2 Lode
Claim, 33 L. D., 37, cited and distinguished
723
Proceedings for patent to a mining
claim embracing land lying partly
within one land district and partly
within another, conducted wholly
within one land district, and the
allowance of entry thereon covering
the entire claim, are in no wise
;

effective as to the lands lying with-

out such land district, and do not
constitute
substantial
compliance
with law as to such lands, within
the meaning of sections 2450 to 24."
of the Revised Statutes, such as
would warrant confirmation of the
entry in its entirety under said sections

An

applicant for patent to a mining claim who, invoking the provisions of section 2332 of the Revised
Statutes, proves that he, or his
grautors, has held and worked the
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the period of time prescribed by the local statutes of limitation for mining claims, is not required to produce record evidence of
his location, or to give any reason
for not producing such evidence
462
Section 2332 simply declares what
proof shall be sufficient to show possessory title in an applicant for
patent, in the absence of any adverse
claim, and does not dispense with the
requirement of section 2325 of an
expenditure of five hundred dollars
in labor or improvements upon the
claim, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a patent
462
The main purpose of section 2332
of the Revised Statutes is to declare
that evidence of the holding and
working of a mining claim for a
period equal to the time prescribed
by the local statute of limitations
for mining claims shall be considered as sufficiently establishing the
location of the claim and the applicant's right thereunder " in the
absence of any adverse claim," and
there is no authority for restricting
the application of the provisions of
said section to such cases only in
which the applicant for patent is unable by reason of the lapse of time
or the loss of mining records by fire
or otherwise to furnish the proof
of possessory title required by the

claim

for

mining laws

The
Raven

limit

182
of

Mining

the

grant

to

the

Company made by

the act of May 27, 1002, was the
privilege to locate, under the mining
laws, one hundred mining claims
upon the unallotted lands of the
Uintah and White River tribes of
Ute Indians, and neither that act
nor any of the subsequent acts extending the time of opening said unallotted lands relieved said company
from compliance with the provision
of section 2325 of the Revised Statutes requiring payment to be made
for lands embraced in a mining claim
as a condition to the issuance of
patent therefor under the mining

306

laws

Location.

40

A location under the mining laws
does not of itself amount to an appropriation of land in such a sense
as to preclude the inclusion of the
same, or parts thereof, within the
limits of a subsequent location, sub
ject to such existing rights as may
be thereafter maintained under the
prior location

Any

portion

i

of

the

superficial

t
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area within the boundary lines fixed
by the location of a valid lode mining claim, in conflict with a school
section, may rightfully he claimed
and held under the mining laws
717

The owners

of unpatented mining

claims located upon the mineral
lands of the United States are entitled to the exclusive and peaceable
possession of their claims so long as
they continue to comply with the requirements of the law respecting possessory rights, and are not required
1<> apply for patent at any time, or
ever, in order to preserve such pos270
sessory rights
Locations upon the mineral lands
of the United States, lawfully pos
sessed and held under the mining
laws at the date of a townsite entry
embracing such locations, are within
the meaning of the language of section 1G of the act of March 3, 1891,
" any valid mining claim or possession held under existing law," and
can not be injuriously affected by
the allowance of such entry and the
mineral claimant may, upon proper
proceedings and proofs as in other
cases, obtain patent for his claim
notwithstanding the townsite entry
276
or the issuance of patent thereon
In determining whether an alleged
mineral location is a " valid mining
claim or possession " within the
meaning of the general townsite
laws and section 1G of the act of
March 3, 1891, relating to townsite
entries by incorporated towns and
cities on the mineral lands of the
United States, the question of the
character of the land is a primary
one; and if the mineral claimant has
had ample time and opportunity to
show by exploration and development
whether valuable mineral deposits
exist on the land, and has not done
so, and has not in any manner established that the location embraces
mineral land under the well-settled
rules of determination in cases where
the character of the land is directly
in issue, his location can not be held
to be a valid mining claim or posession within the meaning of the law_ 590
;

Application.

Whenever proceedings under an
application for mineral patent have
failed, by reason of a default incurable as to tbem, the application
stands rejected, but may, if not in
itself or for any extrinsic reason
fatally defective, be made the instrument of renewed proceedings. It is
not, however, in the interval a pend-

Page.
ing application, and can be considered as renewed, and as again taking effect, only as of the date proceedings under it are actively resumed
72
An application for patent embracing a lode within the limits of a
placer claim for which patent application is pending can not be permitted to proceed beyond the point
of filing in the absence of a determination by the land department that
the lode was known to exist at the
date of the filing of the placer application
and the law does not contemplate a proceeding to that end
before the land department, or the
acceptance by the latter of such lode
application, when an adverse suit
against the placer applicant has been
begun by the lode claimant, during
the pendency of which all proceedings in that department must be
stayed
72
;

Survey.

A portion of an irregular legal subdivision is not sufficiently identified
to enable the Department to accurately describe the same in a patent by an attempted description
thereof in terms of the public-land
surveys, and where patent is sought
to a placer mining claim embracing
a portion of an irregular legal subdivision or lot an official survey of
the particular portion claimed will
be required

9

Notice.

The mining laws do not require
that the notice of an application for
patent to a mining claim by a corporation shall designate the State or
Territory under the laws of which
the corporation was organized
568
A recital of exclusion of conflict
in the notice of an application for
patent to a mining claim as effectually eliminates the conflict area as if
the exception and exclusion were in
terms declared in the application for
554
patent itself
By the newspaper published nearest a mining claim, within the contemplation of section 2325, Revised
Statutes, is meant the newspaper of
established character and general
the vicinity of the
nearest in point of
is,
that
practicable accessibility
nearest by the distance from the
claim involved over the most nearly
direct traversable route, and over
which the editions of the paper are
or may be transported by the usual
circulation

claim which

in

is

;

INDEX.
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and available means of conveyance.

The distance in contemplation is that
which must actually be traveled to
bring the paper into the neighborhood of the claim, in order that the
intended office of the notice may in
281
that vicinity be performed
Section 2325 of the Revised Statutes requires that an applicant for
patent under the mining laws shall
file with his application an official
plat of the claim or claims applied
for, and shall post a copy of such
plat, together with a notice of the
application for patent, in a conspicuous place on the land embraced in
the plat, previous to the filing of the
application,

"and

shall

file

an

affi-

davit of at least two persons that such
notice has been duly posted."
The
words " such notice " have been uniformly construed by the land department to embrace both the plat and
notice referred to.
Held: That the
requirement as to the affidavit is

mandatory, and where such affidavit
is not filed all proceedings upon the
application for patent are without
authority of law
583

The provisions of the act of April
1004, amending section 2327 of

28,

the

Revised

Statutes,

exclu-

relate

sively to the question of,

and are

in-

tended to prescribe the rule or guide
whereby to determine, the subjectmatter of mineral patents that is,

—

the

particular

actually conveyed by any such patent whenever
the question may arise and in no
wise modify Or affect any requirement of the mining statutes with respect to notice of an application for
patent, nor can they have any effect
to cure defects or irregularities in
the notice of patent proceedings had
in any case
682
tract

—

Adverse Claim.

An adverse claim under section
2326 of the Revised Statutes is required to be filed "during the period
of publication" of notice of the application for patent, and where the
last day of such period falls on Sunday, an adverse claim filed on the following Monday can not be recognized
by (he land department as an adverse claim within the meaning of
said sec) ion and can not have the
effect to stay the patent proceedings
upon (lie application
568
The only judicial proceedings in
which a claim may become involved,
resulting
in
delay
which would
otherwise he fatal to entry, and
which will protect the li-; !:; of
1
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the applicant for patent during their
pendency, are those arising under
the mining laws themselves, whereby the applicant is prevented from

completing

his

prior to final
litigation

The general

patent proceedings
determination of the

56
principle

of

the exof con-

clusive judicial cognizance
troversies involving the right of possession as between rival mineral

claimants and the binding force of a
court's award in such a case has in
view a possessory right which is the
essential

basis

of,

which may

and

ultimately ripen into, the legal title
obtainable
from
the
government
under the mining laws but it necessarily remains for the land department, in the exercise of its jurisdiction and in the discharge of its
duty, to determine in any such case
the force and effect as against the
United States of the possessory right
so awarded by the court
401
Where a placer adverse claimant,
on the strength of his placer location, prevails in a suit under section
2326, Revised Statutes, against an
applicant for patent to lode claims
within the placer limits, and the
placer location should thereafter be
found by the land department, in the
;

exercise

of

its

jurisdiction,

to

em-

brace non-placer land, the possessory right so awarded would fail as
a basis of title to the portion of the
placer location in controversy and
equally to the lodes therein embraced,
and would fall short of that effective
basic right essential to the fore
closure of any purely lode rights in
the patent applicant; and the latter
would have suffered no prejudice by
401
reason of the judgment of the court
Having prevailed in the adverse
suit solely by virtue of his placer
location, any additional rights which
claimant
adverse
the
successful
might set up under subsequent lode
locations by him of the ground in
controversy would be wholly inde101
pendent of the court's award
The oath to an adverse claim,
made by the agent or attorney-infact of the adverse claimant, under
the act of April 26, 1882, must be
verified before an authorized officer
within the land district where Hie
adverse claim is situated, in accordance with the provisions of section
2:::;n,

R.

Where

314

s
the

oath

to

an

adverse

claim is made by the agenl of the
adverse claimant outside of the land
district, although before a notary

INDEX.
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such adverse claim is not
properly verified .within the meaning
314
of said section 2335

Page,
not be extended in zigzag form
make the distance between
the side lines of the claim exceed
the width of six hundred feet allowed by law in the location of vein
or lode claims
470

Discovery and Expenditure.

Placer.

may

whose

extends
jurisdiction
throughout a county lying partly
within and partly without the land

public

so as to

district,

The

The

cost of construction or such

portions of wagon roads, used in
the transportation of supplies to and
ore from a mining claim or claims,
as extend beyond the boundaries of
the latter can not he accepted in satisfaction of the statutory requirement with respect to the expenditure in labor or improvements for
jiatent purposes, the connection between the outlying portions of the
roads and active mining operations
or development being too remote to
justify

their

Improvements made upon one or
more of several contiguous mining
claims held in common may be accepted as applicable to the entire
group, in satisfaction of the statutory requirement relative to the expenditure of five hundred dollars
upon or for the benefit of each of
the claims, only where the purpose
of such improvements is to facilitate
the extraction of mineral from the
claims, and the improvements are
of such character as to redound to
the benefit of all the claims in this
respect
and the fact that the mineral formation covered by the claims
is a continuous deposit constituting
one ore mass, will not justify applying the cost of improvements on
one of the claims toward meeting the
requirements of the statute as to the
others, unless it appear that such
;

improvements

tion of mineral from, or tend to proof,

such system and legal subdiviwhere, if so conformed, the
land embraced in the location would
be as a whole more valuable for
placer mining than for agricultural
purposes
It is no objection to the validity
of a placer location that it embraces veins or lodes as well as
to

sions,

will aid in the extrac-

mote the development
claims

other public-land laws prothe disposal of nonmineral
no application to locations
and entries under the mining laws__
9
The smallest legal subdivision of
the public surveys provided for by
the mining laws is a subdivision of
ten acres, in square form and such
laws do not contemplate that in the
location and entry of placer mining
claims rectangular tracts of five
acres may be recognized and treated
as legal subdivisions
260
The mining laws contemplate that
in
all
cases, except in instances
where impracticable so to do, placer
mining locations must be made in
conformity with the system of publicland surveys, that is, rectangular in
form and of dimensions corresponding to appropriate legal subdivisions,
and with east-and-west and northand-south boundary lines
56
The fact that a placer mining location, if made to conform as nearly
as practicable to the system of public-land surveys and the rectangular
subdivisions of such surveys, as required by section 2331 of the Revised Statutes, would embrace small
portions of land not valuable for
placer mining, constitutes no reason
for failure to conform the location
;

556

acceptance

of approximation perentries under the home-

rule

mitted in
stead and
viding for
lands has

such other

655

Entry.
Lands not embraced in the application for patent for a mining claim,
and in the published and posted notice and other proceedings, can not
be embraced in the entry
260
Lode.

The mining laws contemplate that
the end lines of a lode claim shall
have substantial existence in fact,
and in length shall reasonably comport with the width of the claim as
located
470
In case of a mining location upon
a blanket lode or vein, the lode line

placer deposits
A location under the mining laws
does not of itself amount to an appropriation of land in such a sense as
to preclude the inclusion of the same,
or parts thereof, within the limits of
a subsequent location, subject to sue'.
existing rights as may be thereafter
maintained under the prior locaand the fact that a place' location
tion, if made to conform to legal subdivisions of the public surveys, would
embrace all or a portion of the land
covered by a prior location, is not a
:

42

42

INDEX.

sufficient
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reason for failure to eon-

form the placer location to legal subdivisions, as required by section 2331
44

of the Revised Statutes

that portions of other
claims already entered may be embraced in a placer location by conforming the same to legal subdivi-

The

fact

sions, does not

Mill

all

320

Notice.
See Isolated Tract; Mining Claim;
Practice ; Settlement.

44

Site.

Section 2337 of the Revised Statutes contemplates that at the time
application is made for patent to a
mill-site claim the land embraced
therein is being used or occupied for
325
mining or milling purposes
Section 2337 does not contemplate
that patent may be obtained for a
separate mill site for each of a group
of contiguous lode claims held and

worked under a common ownership,
and where more than one mill site

Officers.
Applicants for public lands lose
no rights by mistakes and laches of
officers of the land department
but
;

persons claiming the benefit of this
rule must show that they have an inchoate right and that they have not
been so dilatory in assertion of it as
to give rival bona fide applicants a
superior right
380

Oklahoma Lands.
Sections sixteen, thirty-six, thirteen and thirty-three of the lands
ceded by the Comanche, Kiowa and

applied for in connection with a
group of lode claims a sufficient and
satisfactory reason therefor must be
is

shown
The provision

Page.
other respects
1904, shall be
1,
adjudicated, in respect to the matter
of contiguity of the mill-site claims
to vein or lode claims, under the
practice which prevailed in the General Land Office prior to the departmental ruling in the case of Alaska

under the law in
prior to January

Copper Company

make such conformity

impracticable, within the meaning
of section 2331 of the Revised Statutes, inasmuch as under the law
such entered claims may be excluded
from patent proceedings involving

the placer

745

;'--•">

of section 2337 of
" Where
the Revised Statutes that
non-mineral land not contiguous to
the vein or lode is used or occupied
by the proprietor of such vein or
lode for mining or milling purposes,
such non-adjacent surface ground
may be embraced and included in an
application for a patent for such vein
or lode, and the same may be patented therewith, subject to the same

Apache Indians under agreement ratified by the act of June 6, 1900, reserved for school and other purposes, are not subject to the opera-

:

preliminary requirements as to survey and notice as are applicable to
IFvltJ:
veins or lodes." construed.

The words

" vein or lode," in said
used in the reare not
stricted sense of indicating a body
of mineral, or mineral -bearing rock,
in place, only, but are used in the
larger sense of designating a located vein or lode claim, and that
only non-mineral land not contiguous
to a vein or lode claim may be ap-

seel ion.

320
propriated for mill-site purposes
Direction given that all applications for mill site patents which may
be made and carried to entry before
July 1, 1906, or which may, by pro
lest or otherwise^, without the fault
of the applicant, he prevented from
being carried to entry before that
date,
where the locations of the
claims were made and perfected

tion of the mining laws
Under the provision of the act of
June 0, 1900, relating to the opening

54

to settlement and entry of the ceded
Kiowa, Comanche and Apache lands,
authorizing qualified entrymen hav-

ing lands adjoining the lands ceded,
less than 160
acres, to enter so much of the ceded
lands lying contiguous as shall, with
the lands already entered, make in
the aggregate 160 acres, such entry
men may make extension of their
existing entries so as to include portions of sections thirteen and thirtythree within the ceded country, notwithstanding the provision of said
act reserving said sections for uni-

whose entries embrace

versity, agricultural colleges,

normal

schools and public buildings of the
Territory and future State of Okla
homa, and for all lands so lost the
Territory must look to the indemnity
163
provisions of its grant
:

Patent.
for the cancellation of a
Suit
patenl will not be advised by the
land department merely because such
patent was inadvertently issued; but
it

must appear that some

interest of

746
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the government, or of some party to
whom it is under obligation, has suf298
fered by such inadvertent action
Where patent has inadvertently
issued for a tract of land, the land
department, notwithstanding the title has passed out of the government,
has authority to order a hearing be-

tween claimants under tlje patent
and persons asserting adverse rights
to the land, with a view to determining the advisablity or necessity for
bringing suit for cancellation of the
patent
29S
The provisions of the act of April
28, 1904, amending section 2327 of
the Revised Statutes, relate exclusively to the question of, and are intended to prescribe the rule or guide
whereby to determine, the subjectmatter of mineral patents that is,
the particular tract actually conveyed by any such patent whenever
682
the question may arise

—

Practice.
See Rules
page XXIX.

The Rules

Cited

and Construed,

*

Rage,
should not be granted for the purpose of permitting the contestant to
supply the proof he neglected to produce at the hearing, but the contest
should be dismissed
203
Objection to the jurisdiction of
the local office, on the ground that
the record does not afford due proof
of service of notice of contest, is not
well founded where the fact of legal
service is not denied
534
Where the affidavit filed as a basis
for an order of publication of notice
of contest against an entry does not
specifically allege that the entryman
is a
nonresident of the State or
Territory in which the land is located, it should show the date or
dates upon which inquiries as to the
entryman's whereabouts were made,
that they were made with a view to
obtaining personal service of the
notice, and that at that time the
contestant was prepared to make
personal service of the notice if the
entryman were found within the
State or Territory wherein the land
situated
473
After a case involving conflicting
claims to a tract of public land has
been closed in the land department,
the Secretary of the Interior, in the
exercise of his supervisory power,
will, upon reopening the case for
further consideration, be governed by
the same rule, in determining the
rights of the parties, as is observed
by the courts in a proceeding to
charge the holder of a patent from
the United States as trustee that is,
it must not only be shown that the
party to whom the land has been
awarded is not entitled to it, but
that the party attacking his claim
has the better right thereto, and
that if the law had been properly
administered, the land would have
been awarded to him
82
is

of Practice require that

notice of an appeal to the Department shall be served upon the appellee or his counsel
but where decision in a case is inadvertently ren;

dered by the Department in the absence of proof of service of the appeal, such decision will not be disturbed on motion for review, in the
absence of a showing of reversible
error, merely because of want of
proper service of the appeal
371
In case a contest is erroneously
dismissed upon motion of the entryman, the General Land Office is without authority to reverse such action
and then dispose of the case on the
evidence theretofore submitted by
contestant, without first affording
the entryman an opportunity to present his defense
396
Where the testimony in a case is
authorized to be taken elsewhere
than at the local office, neither party
should be permitted to submit further testimony on the day set for
the. hearing at the local office, except upon due notice to the other
and proper order therefor
396
Where a contestant fails at the
hearing to sustain the allegations in
the affidavit of contest relative to
the nonmilitary service of the homestead entryman charged with abandonment, and the defendant thereupon moves that the contest be for
that reason dismissed, a new trial

;

Preference Right.
See Contestant.

Private Claim.
Under the provisions

of section 7

of the act of July 23, 1866, persons
who in good faith and for a valuable

consideration purchased lands from
those who claimed and were thought
to be Mexican grantees or assigns,
are entitled, provided they fulfil the
other conditions of the act, to purchase such of said lands found not
to be included in the grant as finally surveyed, regardless of what
other lands, not within the lines of

INDEX.
Page.
purchase, were fin07
ally found to be the lands granted
Where the tie line purporting to
connect the survey of a private land
claim with the public-land surveys is
shown to be erroneous, the actual
locus of the claim as defined and sur67
veyed on the ground must prevail
The " necessary expenses " of making survey and plat of private land
grants under the provisions of section K> of the act of March 3, 1891,
one half of which are to be paid by
the grant-claimant, embrace all the
expenses necessary to the completion of such a survey as will be entitled to approval by the Court of
Private Land Claims, including the
cost of publication of notice of the
survey required by the statute and
the cost of additional surveys, where
necessary and ordered by the court,
but not including the cost of examinations in the field made by special
130
agents of the land department
There is no provision in the act of
March 3, 1891, requiring one claiming a complete and perfect title
through the Spanish or Mexican
government to lands situated within
the territory embraced in the Gadsden Purchase, who does not come
into court voluntarily for the purpose of having his title confirmed
under section 8 of said act, but is
brought into court by the United
States without his consent, to except
from his claim, and, as a condition
to the confirmation of his title, to
recognize the title of the United
Slates to, such portions of the lands
claimed by him as may have been
sold or disposed of by the United
States
500
The United States may, under the
provisions of said act, bring the
grant claimant into court without
his consent, for the purpose of determining whether he has any title to
the lands claimed, and, if so, the
extent of such title, but not for the
purpose of confirming the title to
portions of said lands sold or disposed of by the United States
500
The Commissioner of the General
Land Ofiice is without authority or
discretion to adjudge anil determine
whether the survey of a private land
grant conforms to the decree of the
court confirming the grant, but has
simply to perform the ministerial
duty of issuing patent for the land
according to the lines of flic survey
as approved by the court and in accordance with the terms of (lie der>o<;
cree
their

original

—

—
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Pul) if Land.
I

The provisions in the act of August 30, 1890, limiting the amount
of land to which title may be acquired by any one person, under the
public land laws, to 320 acres, has
no application to private cash entries made under the provisions of
section 2354 of the Revised Statutes. 242
The Secretary of the Interior has
no power to withdraw from disposal
under the general land laws public
lands occupied and improved by a
town for the purpose of storing and
conducting a water supply to the
town, pending Congressional action
authorizing the town authorities to
make entry of the same but action
upon any application to enter such
lands may be suspended by the land
department until the town authorities have been afforded opportunity
to secure the contemplated legisla144
tion
In the administration of the public land laws the land department
has no authority to determine on
their behalf alleged rights of claimants thereunder except where such
claimants seek to obtain the legal
or paramount title to the lands
claimed and where a claimant seeks
to obtain the legal title to a tract
of public land the inquiry by the
land department is directed to ques;

;

tions affecting his right to have
such legal title conveyed to him and
not to questions relating to posses-

sory or other rights unrelated to and
disconnected with his application for
270
the legal title

Railroad Cirant.
See

Railroad

Lands;

Bight

<</

Way.

Generally.
No rights were

acquired by settle-

ment upon lands within the ceded
portion of the Red Lake Indian res
ervation prior to their opening to
settlement and entry, and where
such settlement was entirely upon
lands selected with the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior prior to
the opening, by the Minnesota and
Manitoba Railroad Company, under
its gran) made by the act of April
17, 1900, of ri-hf of way and neces
sary lands for terminal facilities a
the crossing of Rainy Liver, no entry
can now lie allowed of such lands
I

I

NDEM
The

NITY.

Railway
Pacific
entitled to indemnity for

Northern

Company

is
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lands lost to the grant made by the
act of July 2, 1864, to the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, on account of the prior grant of May 5,
1864, to the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, between
Thomson's Junction and Duluth
105
A railroad indemnity selection,
valid when made, under
departmental order relieving the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company from the
designation of a particular loss as a
basis for the selection, will not he
avoided upon an allegation that a
loss subsequently designated, in obedience to departmental order of August 4, 1885, was not the nearest
available loss.
Any requirement for
the specification of a loss as a basis
for an indemnity selection is only for
departmental information and as an
aid in the adjustment of the grant— 105
All action looking to the disposition
of lands involved in second indem
nity selections made by the Northern
Pacific

Railway Company

in lieu of

lands alleged to have been lost to its
grant within the limits of the withdrawal on general route of the Lake
Superior and Mississippi Railroad
Company, has been suspended by
the land department to await final
determination of the question (now
pending before the Supreme Court
of the United States) whether lands
so situated furnish a sufficient basis
for second indemnity selection
but
where it appears that any such
lands are embraced in entries allowed prior to selection by the company, the suspension as to such
Aclands will no longer continue.
tion on such entries will proceed in
due course and the selection to that
207
extent will be canceled
;

Adjustment.
The Northern Pacific Railway
Company is the lawful successor in
interest to the land-grant rights of
the Northern Pacific Railroad Com-

pany

105

Directions given that in case a
selection by the Northern Pacific
Railway Company is canceled for
conflict, and thereafter, in the adjustment of the conflicting claims
under the provisions of the act of
July 1, 1808, the individual claim is
canceled upon relinquishment, the
selection of the company be imme364
diately reinstated
An application to purchase under
the provisions of the act of June 3,
1878, presented prior to, but upon
which proof and payment were not

Page,
1898,
does not present a claim for adjustment under the provisions of the act
of July 1, 1898
105
Where an applicant to purchase
under the provisions of the act of
June 3, 1878, is allowed to make
proof and payment in violation of an
order withdrawing the land from entry, no claim is thereby initiated
falling within the remedial provisions of the act of July 1, 1898
105
Lands classified as mineral under
the provisions of the act of February
26, 1895, are not subject to selection
by the Northern Pacific Railway
Company under the provisions of
the act of July 1, 1898
661
Where at the time of the passage
of the act of July 1, 1898, the conflicting claims of a homestead settler and the Northern Pacific Railway Company to a tract of land
were of a character subject to adjustment under that act, the fact
that the settler subsequently purchased the land from the company in
order to protect his improvements
will not prevent him from transferring his claim to other lands in accordance with the provisions of said
act
209
Where a tract of land falling within the Northern Pacific land grant
and not excepted therefrom was sold
by the company prior to January 1,
1898, and the purchaser thereafter,
because of the erroneous decision of
the land department holding said
land to have been excepted from the
railroad grant, sought to supplement
his title by purchase of the lands
from the United States under the
provisions of section 5 of the act of
March 3, 1887, these facts alone do
not present such conflicting claims
to the land on January 1, 1898, between the purchaser and the company, as are subject to adjustment
under the act of July 1, 1S98
575
Where a tract of land was inadvertently patented to the Northern
Pacific
Railway Company, either
prior or subsequently to the act of
July 1, 1S98, during the pendency
of an application to make homestead entry thereof based upon settlement made in good faith prior to
January 1, 1898, the conflicting
claims of the company and the settler are subject to adjustment under
the provisions of said act, notwithstanding the issuance of such patent- 146
The provisions of the act of July
1, 1898, are applicable to patented
lands, whether patented before or

made

until

after,

January

1,

INDEX.

749

Page.
after the passage of the act, if such
lands are in dispute between the
company and the individual claimant and belong to either of the
classes described therein, and where
patents issued to individual claimants prior to the passage of the act,

Railroad Lands.

under rulings then, in force, which
under rulings now governing would
have to be held to have been imconflicting
issued,
the
properly
claims to such lands are subject to
adjustment under the provisions of
said act, provided the company has
not, by the selection of other lands
in lieu of those in controversy, or
otherwise, abandoned its claim there-

484

to

Under the provisions of the act
July

1,

the Northern

1898,

Railway Company

of
Pacific

bound to accept
subject to relinquishment under said act prepared
and submitted to it by the Secretary
of the Interior, and can not, as a
matter of right, require of the individuaf claimant the establishment of
his claim at a hearing
but where a
settlement claim has, upon an ex
parte showing by the settler, been
included in such a list, the Department, notwithstanding the approval
of the list, has the right to inquire,
by hearing or otherwise, whether the
showing- on which the tract was
listed represented the true condition or status of the tract involved
the

list

of

is

lands

;

on January

1898

1,

Northern racific Railway Company
in lieu of lands alleged to have been
lost to its grant within the limits of
the withdrawal on general route of
the Lake Superior and Mississippi
Railroad

Company,

has

been

sus-

pended by the land department to
await final determination of the question (now pending before the Supreme Court of the United States)
whether lands so situated furnish
a sufficient basis for second indemnity selection
but where it appears
that any such lands are embraced in
entries allowed prior to selection by
the company, the suspension as to
such lands will no longer continue.
Action on such entries will proceed in flue course and the selec;

tion to that extent will be canceled.
In case of a decision favorable to
the company on the question pend-

ing before the court, it may then relinquish whatever claim it may have
to the lands

under

its selection,

with

See Railroad Grant.
Circular of May 22, 1900, under
act of April 17, 1900, relative in
settlers upon St. Paul, Minneapolis
and Manitoba railway lands
630
The fact that a tract of land was.
prior to survey, classified as mineral under the act of February 20,
1895, can not be considered as a
classification of the lands as mineral
"at the time of actual government
survey," within the meaning of the
act of August 5, 1892
211
Even if it be admitted, as contended by the Northern Pacific Railway
Company, that the Northern Pacific
land grant can never be fully satisfied from selections made within the
limits provided for in the act of
July 2, 1804, and the joint resolution
of May 31, 1870, such fact furnishes
no authority for permitting the company to relinquish the lands within
the Mount Ranier National Park
and the Pacific forest reserve falling within the secondary or indemnity
limits of its grant, and to select
other lands in lieu thereof, under the
provisions of the act of March 2,

1899

148

The act

153

action looking to the disposition of lands involved in second indemnity selections made by the
All

Page.

view to selection of other lands in
lieu thereof under the provisions of
the act of July 1, 1898
207
a

of April 19, 1904, providing that settlers or entrymen upon

lands within the indemnity limits
of the grant in aid of the Chicago,
St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha
railway, and also within the primary
limits of the grant in aid of the Wisconsin Central railroad, restored to
the public domain November 2, 1891,
by order of the land department, who
were prevented from obtaining title
under the public land laws because
under the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Wisconsin Cen-

tral

Railroad

Company

v.

Forsythe

the lands were held not to be excepted from the grant to the Wis
consin Central company, lias no ap
plication to lands opposite the unconstructed portion of the Wisconsin
Central road, which fall within the
forfeiture provisions of the aci of

388
29, 1890
act of February 24, 1905, relating to lands within the Mobile
and Girard railroad grant, according
coining
to a homestead entrynian

September

The

provisions the privilege
claim to other lands,
does not contemplate that an entry-

within

its

to transfer his

INDEX.

750

Page,
entry
under the commutation provisions of
the homestead law and received final
certificate thereon shall, in the exercise of the privilege accorded hy said
act, make a second homestead entry
and submit proof thereon, after due
notice, as required in making an
original homestead entry, nor that
the lands applied for shall be a compact body of contiguous land, but
where not contiguous all the land
must be within the same land district, and where the aggregate of the
legal subdivisions applied for exceeds the acreage embraced in the
original entry, the entryman will be
517
required to pay for such excess
An application to exercise the privilege of transfer accorded by the act
of February 24, 1905, is not required
to be made by the entryman in person nor is he required to furnish an
affidavit under the act of August 30,
1890, to the effect that he has not
since that date made entry of or acquired title to a quantity of land
under the agricultural land laws,
which, with the land now applied
for, will exceed three hundred and
517
twenty acres

man who

has completed

his

;

repayment
618
While paragraph 13 of the instructions
governing
repayments,
approved January 22, 1901, provides
that " where there has been a conveyance of the land and the original

to

purchaser applies for repayment, he
must show that he has indemnified

duce a full reconveyance to himself
from the last grantee or assignee,"
any successor of such original purchaser in a line of conveyances is
equally within the reason of the rule
and should be given the same stand-

See Arid Lands.

Repayment.
applicant

;

his assignee or perfected the title in
him through another source, or pro-

Reclamation.

An

Page.
been made by him, entry on
such proof can not be allowed, but
as the purchase money paid by him
upon submission of the proof still
remains in the control and custody
of the land department, repayment
705
thereof may be made
Repayment is not authorized under
the provisions of the act of June 16,
1880, where entry is properly allowed
on the proof presented, but is subsequently canceled upon a showing
that such proof is false and in this
respect an assignee has no better
right than the entryman
618
An applicant for repayment of the
purchase money paid on a commuted homestead entry, who claims
the right to repayment as mortgagee
under a mortgage executed prior to
completion of the entry, is not an
assignee within the meaning of the
statute and is therefore not entitled
ever

for

repayment of
of an over-

money paid by reason

328

ing as his grantor.:

A

for area in excess of that
actually embraced in the entry, will
be required to furnish non-alienation
affidavit or to show fully the nature,
terms and conditions of any sale
and conveyance of the land
471
Where entry under the act of June
3, 1878, was erroneously allowed for
land chiefly valuable for its mineral
deposits and upon which
mining
claims had been located and improvements made prior to the timber land
entry, but of which the entryman

pre-emption entryman who
double minimum price for lands
posed to be within the limits
railroad grant, but which were
sequently held not to be within

had no knowledge, and it appears
that he acted in good faith and did

greater than the cash payment made
by the entryman and in such case,
where the amount of the cash payment is not sufficient to make the repayment due the entryman in full,
he may be permitted to make an additional cash payment of such an
amount as added to the sum originally paid by him in cash will aggregate the cost of the land at one
dollar and twenty-five cents per acre,
and thereupon have the land warrant
551
returned to him unsatisfied

charge

representation, repayment of the purchase money paid by him may be al-

Where an applicant under

263
the tim-

ber and stone act states in his declaratory statement that he has personally examined the land applied for,
when as a matter of fact he has not
done so, but in his final proof swears
that no inspection of the land has

is

entitled

to

supof a
sub-

such

repayment of

the excess of one dollar and twentybut
five cents per acre paid by him
where payment was made partly in
cash and partly by land warrant, the
Secretary of the Interior has no
authority, in making repayment, to
;

draw

his

warrant for
;

not procure the entry through mis-

lowed

limits,

paid

an

amount

INDEX.
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Reservation.
See Right of

Way ;

School Land.

751
Page,
sideration and such action as may be
proper relative to the lands within
the reserve but in the event it appear that the right to use lands
without the reserve is subordinate to
permission to use lands within the
reserve, the application should first
be passed upon by the Secretary of
;

Indian.
Regulations of June 8, 1906, under act of April 21, 1904, relative to
selections in lieu of lands in Indian
666
reservations

Military.

named, does not prevent
a withdrawal, under the provisions
of the act of June 17, 1902, of any
of said lands as to which no vested
653
right has attached

Forest Lands.
Circular of August

1,

1905, rela-

on claims within
63

forest reserves

1905, under act
1905, relating to
7,
over lands segregated

Circular of July

7,

from Yosemite National Park and
included in Sierra forest reserve
15
Instructions of June 19, 1906, under act of March 15, 1906, relative
to opening of certain lands in Yellowstone forest reserve to settlement
and entry
700
Directions given that all applications for rights of way or other
privileges over or upon public lands
forest reserves,
fore the General

now pending
Land

Office

be-

and

June

8,

departmental
1905 (concurred

in

Two distinct classes of exchanges
are authorized by the act of June 4,
first, perfected titles, where
1897
title is given and title is received, in
which case nothing is required to
be done by the selector but to vest
the United States with good title to
the land relinquished in a forest reserve and to select the land taken in
lieu thereof in accordance with the
law and regulations governing such
exchanges and second, unperfected
claims, wherein the lands taken in
exchange are taken by the selector
with credit for his previous partial
compliance with the law governing
his entry, settlement, or claim upon
the relinquished land, but with obligation under such law to do such
acts as he had, prior to his relin126
quishment, not yet performed
Where a selection tendered under
the exchange provisions of the act of
June 4, 1897, is in conflict with a
prior pending application, the selector should be apprised of the conflict and given opportunity to protect his rights by proper proceed122
ings
Where a selection tendered under
the exchange provisions of the act
of June

letter
in

1897,

is

in

conflict,

in

part,

of

by the

Secretary of Agriculture in letter of
June 13, 1905), be transmitted to
the Department of Agriculture for
consideration and disposition
Where applications for rights of
way or other privileges affect lands
lying partly within and partly without forest reserves, and involve (pieslions within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and also
questions within (he jurisdiction of
the land department, separate applications will not be required, but In
such cases the application will be
examined, and, if found regular,
approved by the land department an
so far as it affects lands without the
reserve, and then transmitted to the
Department of Agriculture for .on

4,

with prior pending applications, it should not, for that reason,

falling wholly within the jurisdiction
of the Department of Agriculture, as

defined

1897.

;

Generally.
tive to final proof

>,,

:

specifically

in

64

Act of June

The fact that the act of April 18,
1896, provides that the lands in the
ahandoned portion of the Fort Assiniboine military reservation, thereby opened to entry, shall be disposed of only under the laws therein

of February
rights of way

Agriculture

G4

be rejected in its entirety, but the
selector should be afforded opportunity to protect his rights by proper
301
proceedings
The fact that land is more valuable
for the timber and stone thereon than
for agricultural purposes does not
bar selection thereof under the provisions of the act of June 4, 1897, if
115
not mineral in character
Pending disposition of a schoolland indemnity selection, even though
erroneously received, selection of the
same land in lieu of a tract in a
forest reserve relinquished under the
exchange' provisions of the act of
June 4. 1897, should not be allowed- 119
The fact that a successful contestant who in the exercise of his preference right applies to select the land
under the act of Juno 1, 1897, did

752

INDEX.
L»age.

to the land assigned
as base for 'the selection at the date
of the initiation of the contest, furnishes no ground for rejection of the
not

have

title

application, it being only necessary
that the selector have title to the
base land at the time he initiates the
proceeding for an exchange under the

act by relinquishing
States

it

to the

United
370

1

Lands formerly embraced within

;

the Fort Assinniboine military reservation, and opened to entry by the
act of April 18, 189G, are subject to
selection in lieu of lands within a
forest reserve relinquished to the
United States under the exchange
provisions of the act of June 4, 1897- 290
The provision in the act of July 4,
1884, that the lands in the former
Columbia Indian reservation by said
act restored to the public domain
should be disposed of " to actual settlers
under the homestead laws
only," is no bar to the selection of
portions of said lands in lieu of an
unperfected claim to lands in a forest

reserve,

based upon

homestead

settlement, and relinquished under
the exchange provisions of the act of

June

4,

1897

127

The provision
1900,

of the act of
declares that

which

June

....

subse-

Reservoir Lands.
See Arid Land; Right of Way.

Residence.
The

homestead entry-^
an official position the
duties of which are required to be
performed at some place other than
on the land embraced in his entry,
constitutes no sufficient excuse for
his absence from the claim, unless it

be confined to
vacant surveyed non-mineral public
lands which are subject to homestead
entry," applies only to selections
made under the provisions of the act
of June 4, 1897, and has no application to selections made by the

man

shall

Northern Pacific Railway Company
under the provisions of the act of
March 2, 1899

Where at the date of the act
March 3, 1905, repealing the

be

made

in

lieu

thereof,

under the

March

3,

1905,

30

A homestead entryman

is

entitled

the exclusive possession and enof the land embraced in
his entry, and where he in good faith
builds a house upon the land with a
view to establishing residence and
complying with the law, but is prevented by the threats of a rival
claimant from establishing residence
upon the particular portion of the
land selected by him for that pur-

458

proviso to the act of

is actually
position or employ-

to

in lieu of lands within a forest reserve relinquished to the United
States in accordance with the provisions of the act of 1897, the land
department is without authority to
now permit such selection to be

selection for a like quantity of land

his absence

official

joyment

ex-

In case a selection under the exchange provisions of the act of June
4, 1897, is canceled for conflict with
a prior settlement claim, and another

shown that

ment
88

of

made

fact that a

holds

due to his

change provisions of the act of June
4, 1897, no selection had been made

is

603

ficiency

6,

quently to October 1, 1900, "all selections of land made in lieu of a
tract
covered by an unperfected
bona fide claim, or by a patent, included within a public forest reservation,

Page,
the abstract of title of the relinquished land assigned as a basis
for (be selection must be extended to
the date of the later application
504
A selection under the provisions of
the act of June 4, 1897, for a less
area than embraced in the relinquished land offered as a base, not
the result of mischance or misprision
on the part of the local officers, is a
waiver of the excess and there is
nothing in the act of March 3, 1905,
repealing the act of June 4, 1897,
authorizing the selector to make a
further selection based upon such
excess area
578
Where prior to the repeal of the
exchange provisions of the act of
June 4, 1897, by the act of March 3,
1905, selection was made and approved for unsurveyed lands described in terms of legal subdi visions
of the public surveys, and upon survey some of the subdivisions were
shown to be fractional and to contain a less area than contemplated
by the selection, the selector may,
under the saving provisions of the
act of March 3, 1905, make additional selection to cover such de-

not incumbent upon him
his residence upon another portion of the land, and he will
not be held in default for failure to
do so
348
Failure of a homestead entryman
to reside upon his claim, necessitated
by employment in the public service,
pose,
to

it

is

establish

INDEX.
Page,

an abandonment thereof, where he in good faith
established and maintained residence
prior to engaging in such service and
has continued to comply with the
requirements of the law in the matters of cultivation and improvement
not be construed

will

;

but such employment will not relieve
from the necessity of establishing
residence nor excuse the entryman's
396
failure in that respect

Right of Way.
applicato
of name of United
States in judicial proceedings to for358
feit rights of way
Circular of July 7, 1905, under
act of February 7, 1905, relating to

Regulations
for

tions

rights of

relative

use

way over lands segregated

from Yosemite National Park

and

15
included in Sierra forest reserve
Regulations of September 28, 1905,
relative to rights of way for canals,
telegraph and
reservoirs,
ditches,
212
telephone lines, etc
Paragraph 2 of circular of February 11, 1904, and paragraphs 3 and
66 of the circular of September 28,
1905, relating to rights of way for
railroads,

canals,

amended
Paragraph 54

reservoirs,

etc.,

583

the regulations
of September 28, 1905, requiring that
all applications for rights of way
under the act of February 15, 1901,
for telegraph and telephone lines,
must be accompanied by an official
statement of the Post Office Department showing that the applicant has
complied with the regulations under
title 65 of the Revised Statutes, reof

voked

693

Directions given that all applications for rights of way or other
privileges over or upon public lands
forest reserves, now pending bethe General Land Office and
falling wholly within the jurisdiction
of the Department of Agriculture.
in

fore

as defined in departmental letter of
June 8. 1905 (concurred in by the
Secretary of Agriculture in letter
of June 13, 1905), be transmitted
to the Department of Agriculture
for consideration and disposition
Where applications for rights of
way or other privileges affect lands
lying partly within and partly without forest reserves,
and involve
questions within the jurisdiction of
the Department of Agriculture ,and
also questions within the jurisdiction

5194

-Vol.

34—05

m-

48

753

Page,
of the land department, separate
applications will not be required, but
in such cases the application will be
examined, and, if found regular, approved by the land department in so
far as it affects lands without the reserve, and then transmitted to the
Department of Agriculture for consideration and such action as may
be proper relative to the lands within the reserve; but in the event it
appear that the right to use lands
without the reserve is subordinate to
permission to use lands within the
reserve, the application should first
be passed upon by the Secretary of
Agriculture
64
No rights can be initiated for the
use or benefit of any railroad company under the provisions of section
1 of the act of March 3, 1875, prior
to the organization of such company under the laws of a State or
593
Territory
The grant of sections sixteen and
thirty-six made to the Territory of
New Mexico for school purposes by
the act of June 21, 1898, is a grant
in pracsenti, and any question as to
the authority of the Territory to
grant rights of way for railroads
across any such lands is one for determination by the officers of the
Territory and not by the Secretary
518
of the Interior
The right of way granted by section 13 of the act of February 28,
1902, is a mere easement, for " depot
grounds, terminals, and other railway purposes," and the grantee has
no authority to extract oil from the
grounds embraced in a right of way
504
acquired under said act
The act of March 3, 1901, specificthat telephone and
ally provides
telegraph lines constructed under its
provisions shall be operated and
maintained under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, which carries
with it the power to require sworn
statements from the person, company, or corporation operating the
lines, to the end that the annual tax
be properly assessed and collected
but in the event of noncompliance
with such requirement, it is not within the power of the Secretary, under
the
close
to
executive authority,
places of business of the offending
parties, any question as to the forfeiture of the right of way being a
matter for determination by the
;

04

courts

288

INDEX.

754

rage.

telegraph lines referred to in section
3 of the act of March 3, 1901, is conThe
1
ditioned upon two things
line upon which the tax is sought to
be imposed must he upon lands such
as the Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to subject to the terms of
the act, and (2) the line must not be
subject to State or Territorial taxaWhere the line upon which the
tion.
tax is sought to be imposed runs
through any of the lands which the
Secretary is authorized to subject
to the terms of the act, and is not
subject to State or Territorial taxation, such line is under the act subject to an annual tax not exceedingfive dollars for each ten miles thereof constructed and maintained, regardless of any tax which may be
levied and collected by a municipality through which the line runs__ 28S
Rights of way under the provisions
of section 3 of the act of March 3,
1901, are " in the nature of an easement," and are property rights subject to sale or transfer without the
consent of the Secretary of the In:

(

)

288

terior
" line,'"

as employed in
section 3 of the act of March 3, 1901,
means the right of way granted, and
each separate line of poles is held to

The term

Page.

Riparian Rights.

The annual tax upon telephone and

constitute an independent line, upon
which the grantee may place as many
wires as he chooses, the tax to be
assessed against the property only
at the rate of five dollars for each ten
In towns, where no
miles of line.
well-defined system of parallel wires
is maintained, each wire will be regarded as covering a separate right
of way, and, if otherwise within the
terms of the act, is subject to tax288
ation as such
The approval by the Secretary of
the Interior of the plats of incorporated cities and towns in the Indian Territory operates as a dedication of the streets and alleys thereof
to public use, and thereafter, the Indians no longer having any interest
in
the ground embraced in such
streets and alleys, the Secretary of
the Interior has no authority to subject them to the terms of section 3
of the act of March 3, 1901, authorizing him, among other things, to
grant rights of way for the construction of telephone and telegraph lines
within and through incorporated
cities and towns in the Indian Territory
G79

Upon the admission of a State into
the Union it acquires in its sovereign
capacity the right to all the soil
under navigable rivers, subject to the
power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States and with foreign nations, and all lands that may
afterward form upon the beds of
such streams become the property of
the sovereign State, or of the proprietor of the shore lands, in virtue
of his riparian right, according to the
law of the State in which the land is
situated
423

School Land.
Generally.
Sections sixteen, thirty-six, thirteen and thirty-three of the lands
ceded by the Comanche. Kiowa and

Apache

Indians

under

agreement

the act of June 6. 1900,
reserved for school and other purposes, are not subject to the operaratified by

tion of the

mining laws

54

The grant of sections sixteen and
thirty-six made to the Territory of

New Mexico

for school purposes by
the act of June 21, 1898, is a grant
in praesenti, and any question as to
the authority of the Territory to
grant rights of way for railroads
across any such lands is one for determination by the officers of the
Territory and not by the Secretary
of the Interjor
548
The grant of sections sixteen and
thirty-six made to the State of South
Dakota for school purposes by the
act of February 22, 1889, took effect
on the admission of the State into
the Union, as to lands at that date
identified by the government survey,
but as to such of the indicated sections as had not been surveyed at
the date of the admission of the
State, the right of the State does not
attach unless and until identified by
survey, and if at the time of survey
they are known to be mineral in
character, they are excepted from
the grant
485
The grant of sections sixteen and
thirty-six, to the State of South Dakota for school purposes, by the act
of February 22, 1889, took effect on
the admission of the State into the
Union as to lands of the class and
character subject to the grant in
such of said sections as were at that
date identified by the government

INDEX.
Page,
surveys.
As to unsurveyed lands,
until
the grant does not attach
survey,
identification by approved
and if at that time any of the lands
embraced in such sections are known
to be mineral in character they are
717
excepted from the grant

Indemnity.

tions

The requirement in
March

instructions of

of

list

Where

6,

245

its
right thereto and
lands in lieu thereof

1903, that

indemnity school

have not been

sold,

the

disposition

encum-

of

a

land indemnity selection, even
though erroneously received, no other
application including any portion of
the land embraced in such selection
should be accepted, nor will any
rights be considered as initiated by
the tender of any such application__
12
In the adjustment of school land
grants, it is within the power, and is
the duty, of the land department to
see that sufficient losses, or quantities
of land to which the State
might have been entitled under its
grant had they been in place and not
otherwise
disposed
of,
equal
in
amount to previous certifications on
account of the grant, approximately,
are furnished as a base for such previous approvals or certifications, before other approvals and certifications are made on account of the
grant
270
There is nothing in the act of
March 1, 1877, relating to indemnity
school land selections in the State
schoo.i

California,

in

conflict

with this

599

more

than forty
accepting such
survey as a final and complete survey of the township and in proceeding with the adjustment of its school
land grant upon the theory that the
after

years,

a

lapse

is

of

justified

in

710
is fractional
public lands of the United
States are in good faitli purchased
from a State in the belief that the
State has acquired title thereto under its school grant, and in faith of
such purchase are held and occupied
for many years, entry thereof by a
third party should not lie allowed
without first affording the State an
opportunity to make good the title

township

Where

a

other

vised Statutes, protects all rights acquired by settlements made prior to
survey in the field upon sections sixthirty-six,
teen
or
reserved
for
school purposes, but where a township is ordered surveyed on application in behalf of the State, under
the act of August 18, 1894, and the
lands are withdrawn for the purposes
specified therein, such settlements
only as were made prior to the withdrawal are protected as against the
State
434
Where at the time of survey of a
township a portion thereof was returned as a '• salt lake now dry,"
and no further survey of the township has since been made, the State,

270

Where

select

The act of February 28, 1891,
amending section 2275 of the Re-

school section is embraced within the limits of an Indian reservation, the State may, under the provisions of section 227.~> of
the Revised Statutes, as amended by
the act of February 28, 1891, waive
its
right thereto and select other
land in lieu thereof, noth withstanding such section was identified by
survey prior to the establishment
of the reservation
013
Under the grant of sections sixteen and thirty-six made to the
State of South Dakota for scliool'purposes by the act of February 22,
1889, the State takes no vested in-

requirement

the title to school sections

has vested in the Territory of New
Mexico under the grant made by the
act of June 21, 1898, and such sections
are
subsequently
embraced
within a reservation created by executive order, the Territory may, under
the provisions of section 2275 of
the Revised Statutes, as amended by
the act of February 28, 1891, waive

rule 2 of the

hered to

of

wholly defeated by settlement, the
State's only remedy in such case being under the indemnity provisions of
said act and of the act of February

305

bered, or otherwise disposed of,"
shall be furnished by the State, ad-

Tending

prior to such identification the grant,
as to any particular tract, may be

1891, amending sections 2L!7r>
and 2270 of the Revised Statutes___ 657

" a
the
selections
certificate
of
proper authorities that the base

lands

Page.
terest or title to any particular land
until it is identified by survey, and

28,

Regulations of January 10, 1906,
relative to school indemnity selec-

with each

755

purported
assigning
basis

conveyed by it. by
and sufficient

to

be

a

proper

and making selection

of

the

land under its school grant; and in
case of failure on the part of the
State to make the title good, the

INDEX.
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Page,
present claimant through purchase
from the State should be afforded
opportunity to protect his rights by
himself making entry of the land
304
under the public land laws

Selection.
See Railroad Grant; Reservation ;
School Land ; States and Territories;
Swamp Land.

Settlement.
As between rival applicants for
same land, the prior settler
must maintain his prior right by
the

continued compliance with the law__ 298
No rights can be acquired by acts
of settlement as against an entryman claiming under a prior record
entry, but as between subsequent
claimants the prior actual settler is
entitled to precedence upon the cancellation of the entry or extinguish257
ment of the record title
The rule that settlement rights
can not be acquired by the tenant or
employe of another which can be
set up to defeat intervening rights,
is not applicable in all cases where
the relation of landlord and tenant
is established, and should never be
extended to cases where the relation of tenant was assumed merely
for the purpose of protecting settlement rights and in furtherance of a
bona fide intention on the part of a
settler

to

assert

his

rights

at

the

257
opportunity
Settlement upon lands in advance
of the hour of opening, in violation
of an order of the land department
prohibiting such settlement, confers
no rights upon the settler as against
the first legal applicant to enter the
land after the hour of opening, and
such settler can not, by virtue of
his mere presence upon and occupancy of the land after the hour of
opening,
with
the
improvements
made prior to that time, secure a
settlement right
524
Notice of a settlement claim,
posted conspicuously on the land,
sufficient to protect the claim
is
against one who subsequently makes
application for a portion thereof
under the timber and stone act,
whether the timber-land applicant has
actual notice of the settlement claim
or not, provided the posted notice
was of such character that it might
have been seen by a reasonable exercise of diligence
00
Notice
of
settlement
claim,
a
posted on a subdivision thereof outfirst

Page,
side of the technical quarter-section

on which the improvements are

lo-

protect
the
settler's
claim to such subdivision as against
the claim of one who subsequently
makes application therefor under the
timber and stone act
90
One who fails to assert any claim
to a tract of public land in the adverse possession of another, and remains silent, though knowing that
the adverse occupant continues to
claim, occupy, and improve the land,
is
estopped
thereby
from subsequently asserting a prior settlement
right thereto in himself, notwithstanding the tract is found upon
survey to be a part of the technical
quarter-section upon which his improvements are located
695
cated,

will

Special Agent.
Circular of February 14, 1906,
relative to manner of proceeding on
special agents' reports
439

States

and

Territories.

See School Land; Swamp Land.
Failure on the part of a State to
publish notice of an application for
the survey of lands within thirty
days from the date of such application, as provided by the act of August 18, 1894, does not affect its
preference right to select such lands,
for the period of sixty days from
the filing of the township plat of
survey, conferred by the act of

March 3, 1893
The provision

139
in the act of

March

1893, according to certain States
preference right, over all persons
or corporations, except prior settlers,
for a period of sixty days from the
filing of the township plat of survey,
within which to select lands under
grants made by the act of February
22, 1889, was not repealed by the
provisions of the act of August 18.
1894, according a similar right of
selection for a period to extend
from the date of application by the
State for the survey of the lands until the expiration of sixty days from
the date of the filing of the township plat, provided notice of the application for survey be published
within thirty days from the date of
the filing of such application
139
The preference right, for a period
of sixty days from the filing of the
township plat of survey, accorded
the State (Idaho) by the act of
March 3. 1893, within which to
make selection of lands under grants
3,

a
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Page,
to the State, does not segregate the
applications,
other
lands against
"

but they should be received, subject
to the State's right, and. if that be
not exercised, take effect, if otherwise entitled to approval, as of the
301
date of their presentation
All leases or " permits for right
of pasturage" issued by the hoard
of public lands of the Territory of
New Mexico under the provisions of
acts of the legislative assembly of
that Territory, and covering any of
the lands granted to the Territory
by the act of June 21, 1S98, should
be limited, in accordance with the
provisions of section 10 of that act,
to not exceeding one section or 640
acres of land to any person, corporation,

or association

of persons,

and

such leases or permits must be
submitted to the Secretary of the
143
Interior for his approval

all

Statutes.
See Acts of Congress and Revised
Statutes cited and construed, pages

XXV

and XXVIII.

Page,

notwithstanding the return of the
field notes of survey of the township_
In the adjustment of all claims
resting on a selection or exchange <>t
lands, presented in accordance with
law for public lands in the State of
Minnesota, prior to survey thereof,
the land department will, by hearing
or otherwise, determine the true
character of the lands selected, if
claim is presented thereto on behalf
of the State under its swamp land
grant, based upon the field notes of

22

survey, notwithstanding the return
of the field notes of survey of the
township may afford a sufficient base
for the State's claim
151
The issuance of patent upon entries embracing lands alleged by the
State to have passed to it under its
swamp land grant terminates the
jurisdiction of the land department
thereover
and any question as to
the character of the lands and
whether the issuance of patent therefor was inadvertent will be inquired
into only for the purpose of deter.

;

mining

whether

recommendations

should be made for the institution of

The
to set aside the patent.
question as to whether the issuance
of patent amounted to an adjudication that said lands were not swamp,
and therefore did not pass to the
State under its grant, is one for determination by the courts, and not
246
by the land department
suit

Survey.
It is within the power of the land
department at any time to re-trace
any surveys it has made whenever
it becomes necessary
to the determination of a question pending be-

fore it for its decision involving
rights in public lands
188
The provision of the act of August
18, 1804, authorizing the survey, on
application in behalf of the State,
of any unsurveyed townships of public lands therein, and the withdrawal
thereof from the date of the application until the expiration of sixty
days from the filing of the township
plat, with a view to satisfy the
puhiic land grants to the State, authorizes and requires the withdrawal
of all of the lands in the townships
for the survey of which application
is made oh behalf of the State
433

Swubii|»

Land.

In the adjustment of all claims for
public lands in the State of Minnesota initiated in accordance with

law prior

to survey of the lands, in
instances where selection thereof is
made by the State under its swamp
land grant, and the held notes of

survey afford a sufficient basis for
such selection, the land department
will, by hearing or otherwise, determine the true character ot the lands.

Timber and
"

Lands

Sloiie Aet.

chiefly valuable for stone

"

are subject to entry under the act
of June 3, 1878, regardless of whether
or not the stone can. under existing conditions, considering the cost
of quarrying and transportation, be

marketed at

123

a profit

An

executive order reserving lands
for a specific public purpose has the
same effect, as against an application
to purchase under the act of June
1878, as an adverse claim of a pri191
vate individual
Where an applicanl to purchase
under the act of June :;. 1N7V fails
to submit proof on the day fixed
therefor in the published notice, or
within ten days thereafter where pre
vented by accident or unavoidable
delay from submitting it on the day
set therefor, a withdrawal thereto
fore made for forestry purposes, cm
bracing the land, thereupon immediately attaches and becomes effective
as to such land, regardless of the
tact that the applicant, within the
:'..
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Page,
ten-day period after the date fixed
in the notice, may have filed application to readvertise notice of inten101
tion to submit proof

made

or intended to be for his beneor that of any person other than
133
the applicant herself

The affidavit or sworn statement
required of an applicant to purchase under the timber and stone
act must be sworn to in the county,
parish or land district where the
land 'is situated; and where in such
statement the land intended to be
taken is incorrectly described, and
an application to amend the original
statement so as to properly describe
the lands desired is filed, the amendatory affidavit must be sworn to in
the same manner as required in case

fit

An applicant to purchase under
the timber and stone act is entitled
to a copy of the final proof sub133
mitted on his application

Tiinl>er Cutting.
The provisions

into by a timber and stone entryman,
prior to final proof and the issuance
of certificate, for the sale of the
timber on the land, is in violation of
the provisions of the act of June 3,
1878, against the speculative entry
of timber lands for the benefit of
7

581

An

applicant to purchase under
the timber and stone act does not become the owner of the land applied
for, with legal right to sell, mortor otherwise encumber the
gage,
same, until the required proof has
been furnished, the purchase price
tendered and received, receipt given

and final certificate issued,
and at any time prior thereto the
land department may require the applicant to furnish an affidavit of
therefor,

non-alienation
In case of

476

an application by a
married woman to purchase under
the timber and stone act, it is immaterial whether the proof that she
proposes to make, the purchase with
her separate money and for her own
use and benefit be shown by the par-

The fact that a married woman
to
purchase
making application
under the timber and stone act proposes to pay from her separate
money only the fees and expenses of
making the entry, and to borrow
upon her own credit, to be secured
by mortgage on the land, the sum
necessary to pay therefor, does not
of itself impugn the good faith of the
applicant, in the absence of anything tending to show that the person from whom she proposes to bor-

3,

" domestic
purposes
for
used
within the meaning of section 8 of

the

act

of

March

3,

1891,

as

amended

112

Townsite.
Paragraph 13 of regulations of
August 1, 1904, relative to townsites
in Alaska, amended
There is no requirement that

ticular specified affidavits in the
regulations, or in some other manner, so long as the facts required to
be shown are proved by competent
evidence in some portion of the

record

of section 8 of the
1891, as amended by
same date, conferring
upon the residents of certain States
and Territories authority to cut timber on the public lands for agriculmanufacturing or
mining,
tural,
domestic purposes, contemplate the
cutting and use of timber for smelt78
ing purposes
and counties are " resiCities
"
dents
of the State in which they
are located, within the meaning of
that term as used in section 8 of the
act of March 3, 1891, as amended,
conferring upon the residents of
certain States and Territories authority to cut timber on the public
lands for agricultural, mining, manu112
facturing, or domestic purposes
Timber used by cities for constructing electric-light plants and
building bridges, and by counties for
building bridges and constructing
flumes across the county roads, is

act of March
act of the

539
of an original affidavit
An agreement or contract entered

another

Page.

row the purchase money is a lumberman or engaged in acquiring timbered lands, or that under pretense
of a mortgage security the entry is

129

71

townsite proof shall be made by persons not resident of the town, and
such residence does not affect their
708
competency to make such proof
Under the provisions of section 16
of the act of March 3, 1891, townsite entries may be made by incorporated towns and cities on the
mineral lands of the United States,
subject to existing rights under any
valid mining claim or possession,
lode

or

placer,

held

under existing

law

Under section 11 of the act of
March 3, 1891, attorney's fees may
be properly included in the account
of a townsite trustee, as legitimate

102

INDEX.
Page,
expenses incident to the execution of
his trust, and allowed by the land department, where necessary and not
in excess of a just and reasonable
amount
287
The term " judge of the county
court for the county," employed in
section 2387 of the Revised Statutes
to designate the officer authorized to
make townsite entry under said secas trustee for the several use
and benefit of the occupants of the
townsite, embraces any presiding judicial officer of a court having jurisand where
diction within the county
any one of several officers coming
within the purview of the statute is
designated by the State legislature
as the proper officer to assume the
trust and make the entry, such designation is entitled to be recognized by
the officers of the land department- _
Where a patent has not issued for
a public reservation in a townsite at
the date the townsite is vacated, and
the original entryman for such reservation fails to make application
therefor within six months from the
vacation of the townsite, it thereupon, under the provisions of the act
of May 11, 1896, becomes subject to
disposal as an isolated tract under
section 2455 of the Revised Statutes,
and can not be disposed of in any

Page,
a view to acquiring title under the
homestead laws, covering the same
land, initiated prior to occupation of
the land for townsite purposes
94

Warrant.
Where the only objection to confirmation of a military bounty land
warrant location, made

:

24

other manner
356
The reservation of a lot in a townsite in the Territory of Oklahoma for
the purpose of erecting thereon an
armory for use of a company of the
Oklahoma National Guard, constitutes a reservation for " the public interest " within the meaning of
section 4 of the act of May 14, 1890,
authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to reserve any undisposedof lots in townsites in said Territory
for " public use as sites for public
buildings " if in his judgment " such
reservation would be for the public
interest "
530
In view of the provisions of the
act of February 9, 1903, which ex-

in

good

faith,

purely technical one that
through inadvertence of the land department the land covered thereby
was never formally offered at public
sale under the provisions of the act
of July 4, 1876, as it should have
been, of which fact the locator was
ignorant, the location may be referred to the Board of Equitable
Adjudication for confirmation under
Rule 11
21
The location of a military bounty
land warrant issued prior to the
death of the warrantee, by one
claiming through an assignment of
the warrant from 'the widow of the
warrantee, will not be confirmed in
the absence of proof showing that the
widow was the sole heir, or was
authorized to assign the interests of
the other heirs, if there were any__
37
The substitution of cash for a military bounty land warrant will not be
permitted where the only obstacle
to confirmation of the location under
the warrant is the refusal of the
locator or transferee to endeavor to
procure the necessary proof to establish the validity of the location__
37
Where two military bounty land
warrants are erroneously issued upon
the same military service, both can
not be recognized, and where in such
case the warrantee, having both
warrants in his possession, assigns
one of them, he is estopped thereafter to assert the validity of the
other, and an assignee of such invalid warrant has no higher legal
606
right than the warrantee
The issue of a duplicate military
bounty land warrant under the provisions of the act of June 23, 1860
(now section 2441, Revised Statutes),
in the belief that the original has
been lost or destroyed, creates no
new liability or obligation on the
is

tion,

tended the townsite laws to the lands
within the ceded limits of the Red
Lake Indian reservation and authorized their occupation for townsite purposes prior to formal opening
thereof to disposition under the
homestead laws, the occupation of a
portion of said lands as a townsite m
prior to and on the date they were
opened to settlement and entry, prevented the attachment of any rights
on that date under a settlement with

759

the

part of the United States, where the
original warrant had been located
and satisfied prior to the issu.' of

the duplicate

Water

Right.

See Arid Lund.
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